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**A REFUTATION  
OF THE VERSAILLES  
WAR GUILT THESIS**

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A REFUTATION OF THE  
VERSAILLES WAR GUILT THESIS

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BY  
*ALFRED VON WEGERER*

*Translated from the German by*  
EDWIN H. ZEYDEL

*Introduction by*  
HARRY ELMER BARNES

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NEW YORK · ALFRED · A · KNOPF · LONDON

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*Originally published as*  
DIE WIDERLEGUNG DER  
VERSAILLER  
KRIEGSSCHULDTHESE

*Verlag von Reimar Hobbing*

*Berlin*

*1928*

*Manufactured in the United States of America*



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PREFACE FOR THE AMERICAN  
EDITION

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B. B.

*The German edition of my book was concluded in the summer of 1928. In the meantime there have appeared eight volumes of Austrian documents concerning "Austria-Hungary's Foreign policy 1908-1914," the admirable book of the American historian Sidney B. Fay, "The Origins of the World War," the memoirs of Sir Arthur Nicholson, "Lord Carnock," M. Poincaré's book "Les Responsabilités de la Guerre," as well as several other publications of minor importance. Furthermore my attention has been called by the criticisms of the German edition of my book to certain small and unimportant errors. All this has prompted me to go over various chapters of my book once more and make certain additions and revisions before publishing the English edition.*

*The fundamental thesis of my book, that the Versailles verdict concerning the responsibility for the war is false, that it partly relies on forged material and that a revision of this verdict is necessary in order to restore Germany's good name and to take the edge off the discordances between the nations which have arisen out of the false verdict on the outbreak of the World War, stands upright and unshaken in its full and undiminished extent.*

ALFRED VON WEGERER

Berlin, July 1930

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## P R E F A C E

Up to the present time war has been universally regarded as a legitimate and, indeed, often as a holy instrument used by sovereign States to further their political or religious interests. However, during the years 1914–1918, the idea that war is a crime against humanity had become generally accepted. It was logical, therefore, that the question of responsibility for the World War should have been introduced; and consideration of this question constitutes a chapter in the history of mankind whose attention is now fixed on the problem of how to avoid war in the future.

At the same time that the question of war guilt was being considered, the attempt was made, during the post-war period, to restrict the right of independent States to use armed force against each other. The League of Nations, various conferences on disarmament, treaties of guarantee, the Pact of Locarno, and lately, the treaty for the renunciation of war all attest humanity's renewed interest in this problem. As a consequence, the right to wage war has been partly transferred to a society of several States, like the League of Nations, and has been abolished among the Powers signatory to the Kellogg Pact, except in cases of self-defense.

The driving force behind these efforts to secure a lasting peace is to be found in the fact that the methods of fighting, which had already undergone startling

changes in the World War, will in the future assume such forms that the next war, compared with the last one, must appear as child's play. Through the development of gas warfare, together with aeroplanes and other inventions in the process of being perfected, the war of the future will not be confined to belligerents. On the contrary, the civilian population—in short, women and children and particularly those people living in cities will be marked out for annihilation as much as the armies, if not more. In fact, if war breaks out suddenly, the nationals of the attacking Power resident in the country attacked, and the population of neutral States as well will be threatened with death by gas bombing.

The notion that began with Rousseau that war was to be waged only between States and was not to be waged as a *bellum omnium contra omnes* (war of all against all), has turned out to be a delusion, at least as far as the part, *contra omnes* (against all), is concerned. Consequently it is very easy to understand why so much attention is now being paid to the difficult question of how to prevent war in the future.

Whatever merit there may be in the methods of war prevention cited above, the fact remains that something very essential is still lacking. War, in the well-known words of Clausewitz, is “the continuation of politics by different methods”; or, to put it otherwise, war as a political instrument must be resorted to when politics with its peaceful methods has reached an impasse. In order to restrict war, therefore, it is highly necessary to substitute for it new methods which offer the possibility of bringing about, in existing conditions, needed

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changes which hitherto appeared attainable only through war. If, over a long period of time, a nation is denied recourse to these methods, then it might, treaties notwithstanding, be brought to a point where it *will* resort to the old method of war, if it does not wish to lose its sovereignty.

The Treaty of Versailles has created conditions that are politically bad. Only by correcting these conditions, which are unjust and unbearable, by peaceful methods, can war or revolution be averted in the future. If such methods are not employed soon enough, things will some day explode of themselves. At present it would appear that people expect to prevent the explosion by winding wires around the over-heated kettle of Europe rather than by lifting the cover. The wires represent the post-war treaties; the cover personifies a revision of the Peace Treaty.

So we see that the danger of war, despite the many efforts that have been made and are being made to remove it, has in reality scarcely diminished; at least not to the extent that it should have, considering the manner in which war will be waged in the future. It behooves us, therefore, to go still farther in our search for practicable means of reducing the danger of war, and to do so sincerely and honestly.

The question of outlawing war not only raises new problems as far as the politics of war are concerned, but is also inseparable from the problem of how to further develop the moral standards of treaty-bound nations. Of first importance in this sphere of problems is the understanding of the significance of the war guilt question in its relation to world politics.

The introduction of the question of war guilt after the World War would have furthered the development of peace and have constituted a forward step in the history of mankind if statesmen had acted with absolute justice and impartiality, and had really and honestly intended to establish the causes of the great catastrophe and to ascertain what circumstances or what governments had brought it about. If statesmen had acted in this manner, they could have put an end to the sinister practice of making secret treaties, which create distrust among peoples and involve them in secret obligations to go to war when they have had nothing to do with the making of such treaties and do not know of their existence. These statesmen might also have exposed to public disgrace the irresponsible and frivolous acts committed by certain leaders prior to the outbreak of the War. Of course we do not fail to appreciate that all this would have been exceedingly difficult, and could not have been accomplished in a short time.

However, instead of proceeding along these lines, statesmen, using the well-known methods which we need not consider here, pronounced and broadcast a judgment which flew in the face of the most fundamental principles of morality, and the only purpose of which was to make it possible to enslave and rob the vanquished with all the appearance of legality, and beyond that, to deliver him up to universal ignominy. Wilson, who, it may be said, had left his country in the rôle of a Paul, was transformed at Versailles into a Saul; and the representatives of the European Powers, in the responsible position in which they found themselves, were too deeply steeped in their own hate for the

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Central Powers to exercise freely their moral wills.

In laying down officially, in treaty form, at Versailles, the false dictum that the Central Powers, especially Germany, were responsible for the World War, the Allied statesmen and their associates deliberately glossed over the real causes of the War, and sidetracked the effort to determine the connection of events leading up to the outbreak of hostilities. With Germany eliminated as a World Power, her military and naval armaments destroyed, and her monarchical form of government overthrown, the delusion was propagated that the possibilities of future war had been removed or at least reduced to a minimum. That this dictum was false is as plain today as sunlight.

Furthermore, the manner in which responsibility for the World War was fixed at Versailles involves the establishment of a precedent which may some day prove to be harmful, since the danger exists that at the conclusion of future wars the recipe that worked once will be tried again, and in each case full blame will be placed summarily on the defeated Power. For this reason it is to the interest of peoples of all countries that they become acquainted with and try to abolish the procedure employed and followed at Versailles, namely, placing on the vanquished, on false grounds and in a dishonourable and illegal manner, entire responsibility for the war, and basing the oppressive terms of the peace treaty on this responsibility. Not until nations become aware of what took place at Versailles will there be any assurance in the future that such immoral procedure on the part of victorious Powers will not be repeated. Hence the war guilt question, if attempts to place it on a moral

and legal basis are successful, may serve in the future as a valuable aid in sharpening the consciousness of guilt.

Besides its significance from the standpoint of world politics, there is another aspect of the war guilt question, which concerns the German people and their former allies. It is hard for us Germans to forget that there was a time when the whole Peace Treaty hinged on the question of war guilt. During the peace negotiations at Versailles, the harsh terms of the Treaty were based exclusively on Germany's guilt and were enforced partly by virtue of it. If guilt had not been so fixed, it would never have been possible to erect such an atrocious Treaty.

These facts in the course of time have been completely forgotten, and the opinion has often been expressed that the question of war guilt is only a scientific or, at the most, an historical question having no longer any political significance. This view is based on the assumption that everything has been settled by the signing of the peace treaties, by the Dawes agreement, the Pact of Locarno, and Germany's entrance into the League of Nations. A change in conditions, felt by most people to be unbearable, can be promoted or effected, it is argued, only through conciliation, not through a revision or an abrogation of the false war guilt verdict. As far as the offended honour of the German people is concerned, that matter can be lightly passed over; in short, we Germans may set our own value on our honour and be rather indifferent to the opinion of the rest of the world. Enough in this direction has already been accomplished, we are told. The German Government has repeatedly



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rejected the war guilt lie, the President of the Reich having recently done so in his Tannenberg address.

Such views we must combat as vigorously as possible. They are inherently untrue and imply a surrender of moral values. Aside from that, Germany's real interests require that the Versailles verdict be set aside.

Naturally, a revised judgment in the war guilt question will not in itself suffice to free us with one stroke from the burdens of the Versailles peace settlement. But it would be wrong, nevertheless, to underrate the moral significance that a revised judgment would have for the state of international relations.

The revision of the Treaty of Versailles can be prepared for in no better way than by convincing public opinion in the former enemy States that the verdict in the war guilt question was immoral and unjust; that it had political force as its basis; and that it was constructed against the better knowledge of mankind. If we contemplate our present-day relations with the other Powers from this point of view, we can observe that there is a connection between the direction which our relations with other States are taking and the state of opinion in them with regard to the war guilt question. In those countries with which our relations are friendly, the false belief about German responsibility for the war is absent or gradually disappearing; on the other hand, those Governments which desire to keep us eternally under the yoke of Versailles and to retain the diplomatic methods of the pre-war period cling with great tenacity to the Versailles war guilt thesis. We are assuredly not mistaken if we express the view that our steadily improving relations with the United States and

other countries can be traced in large part to the fact that the people in those countries are beginning to realize more and more how little consonant with the facts is the charge that Germany was solely responsible for the war, and are convinced that she was the victim of a gigantic fraud. In contrast to this, we must bear in mind that even today in France, whenever occasion offers, responsible statesmen, newspapers, and persons in public life harp on the point that the decisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty are wholly justified, because Germany was to blame for the World War. A short while ago *Figaro* gave space to this thought in the following words: "In fact, if Germany is not guilty, then the Peace Treaty is unjust. It would be unjust even though the guilt were distributed." These Frenchmen and their organs of opinion avail themselves of every opportunity to link up the terms of the Versailles Treaty with war guilt—terms which, in the long run, are impossible of fulfillment, such as the payment of reparations up to the amount of 132 billion marks, the uni-lateral disarmament of Germany, the wholly unnecessary occupation of the Rhineland, the maintenance of the Eastern boundary, and the denial of the natural union of Austria and the German Republic.

As far as our honour is concerned, the insults which were heaped upon us and which were repeated even during the post-war period, particularly by the French, were so severe that no nation, interested in living with its neighbours on terms of honesty and mutual respect and peace, could very easily forget them.

If the question is now asked, why, in view of the plain facts in the war guilt problem, we have not to date ac-

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completed more in the way of practical results, we must reply that up to the present time it has not been possible to create among the German people a uniform opinion as to how the problem should be treated.

For the most part, the reason for this lies in the fact that during the years following the Peace Conference it was not possible to set before the German people a fixed and attainable goal in the fight over war guilt. Unfortunately a large amount of energy and time was spent on problems which could lead only to transitory results. Our opponents themselves, at Versailles, prescribed the goal which we must aim at. That goal is the refutation and the annulment of the verdict rendered against us at Versailles, and to attain it, we believe, is quite possible.

We are most decidedly of the opinion that the facts in the war guilt question that have been established so far by the documents and memoirs that have appeared since the war are quite sufficient to determine the great question whether the verdict laid down at Versailles, namely, that the Central Powers, especially Germany, were responsible for the War, is correct or not.

It is the purpose of the present book to examine this question. The conclusion reached is that on the basis of material available today, the judgment officially rendered against Germany at Versailles is wholly untenable.

In order to prove this, we have refuted point by point all the official accusations and judgments of the Allied Powers, which we have grouped under the heading, "The Versailles Thesis of War Guilt." In the main part of the book we have made clear what we mean by the particu-

lar phrase, "The Versailles Thesis of War Guilt." The text of all the material containing the charges has been reassembled in connected form in the Appendix. In refuting the thesis, we have dealt with each accusation separately, not because all the accusations possess particular significance, but because we desired, by this completeness, to avoid the criticism that we had omitted one or the other accusation because we could not refute it. It has also seemed to us worth while to lay before the German people, at one time and in connected form, the complete collection of official documents containing the charges. However, we should like to express the wish that our critics particularly do not fall into the error of trimming down the war guilt question to single charges cited in the book, but rather, that they consider the verdict in its entirety. If that is done, there can certainly be no one who, after acquainting himself with the material collected in this book for the refutation of the "Versailles Thesis of War Guilt," will dare any longer to regard the judgment rendered at Versailles as just, and consider Germany's case as a *causa judicata*.

By refuting the "Versailles Thesis of War Guilt" we also believe that we can secure acceptance of a formula upon which the entire German people, regardless of party differences, may agree, namely, that the verdict of guilt, as expressed in the "Versailles Thesis of War Guilt" is false, and that for the sake of our self-respect and in order to establish the necessary moral foundation for a revision of the Treaty, this verdict must be set aside.

ALFRED VON WEGERER

*Berlin, September, 1928*

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INTRODUCTION

BY

*HARRY ELMER BARNES*

The revision of our knowledge as to who was responsible for starting the World War in 1914 has been the greatest revolution in human intellectual perspective which has ever been achieved in a decade of our racial experience. Nothing comparable has ever taken place in the past.

Among those who have given their time, money and energy to promoting the search for truth in this field, Dr. Alfred von Wegerer of Berlin—Editor of “Die Kriegsschuldfrage”—stands at the top of the list. No other person has devoted himself with such singleness of purpose to this theme. He has become a notable world figure, whose services will be better recognized and rewarded as time passes. In due time, the work which he has promoted will be seen to be incomparably more significant than that undertaken in Europe by Herbert Hoover, Charles G. Dawes, Owen D. Young and the like. Therefore, it will be interesting to learn something of the life of this important man.

His father belonged to an old Prussian military family and enlisted as volunteer during the Franco-Prussian War

of 1870–71. He took part in the World War as a general. His mother was descended from a Saxon family; her father was state minister in the Duchy of Coburg-Gotha for many years.

Dr. von Wegerer was born in Rastatt, in the former Grand Duchy of Baden, on the 22nd of February, 1880. At first he was educated at home and later on in the cadet corps. In the highest form of the cadet corps he became page-in-ordinary to the Empress Frederic, the mother of Emperor William. On the 22nd of March, 1900, he became lieutenant in the fusileer regiment belonging to the Empress Frederic. The regiment was stationed at Wiesbaden and Homburg vor der Hoehe.

The world looked very peaceful in those days and the younger officers often discussed the question as to whether their profession still had any use in the world. When the Boer War broke out the army's interest in war in general increased. Added to this was the tension which later arose between France and Germany owing to the first Morocco crisis.

In Wiesbaden and Hamburg society von Wegerer very often had occasion to meet foreigners, especially English and Americans. The great day of the Homburg season, where he was aide-de-camp after 1906, was the 4th of July. The luncheon and dinner parties given on this day, in the course of which the American hosts generally expressed their strong sympathy for Germany, are among his pleasantest memories of that time.

Between 1910 and 1913 Von Wegerer was at the staff college (Kriegsakademie) in Berlin and applied himself almost exclusively to the study of war. During the summer of 1912 he went over to England to improve

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his knowledge of the language. Having completed his studies at the staff college he was nominated captain in the fusileer regiment in Hanover.

On the 2nd of August 1914 he took the field with a company of this regiment. They were transported to the West without knowing their place of destination. On the 3rd of August they were unloaded in Malmedy and on the morning of the 4th of August crossed the Belgian frontier. The relations between the German soldiers and the Belgian population were very good in the beginning. The German troops paid for everything in gold. After a short time the Belgian attitude toward them changed and war seriously commenced.

At the end of August, 1914, Von Wegerer was wounded near Guise and transported back to Hanover soon afterward. After his recovery he was claimed in November as aide-de-camp by his former commander, who had charge of a division in the East. He remained in this position until the spring of 1917 and took part in the battles at the Narew, before Riga and in Wollhynia. In 1917 he was transferred to a scaling battalion and took part in the battles in Flanders. In the late summer of the same year he took over a battalion of his former regiment and fought in the East and then before Rheims.

In November 1917 he was ordered off to Turkey to drill Turkish scaling troops for the planned conquest of Bagdad. Nothing came of the proposed storming of Bagdad, however, as the war was carried on chiefly in Palestine from that time forth. He met the army in Nazareth and was at first attached to the staff of General von Falkenhayn. In the spring of 1918 he was entrusted with the affairs of first officer of the general staff of a newly

formed army, operating under command of a Turkish Pascha in the district of the Eastern Jordan. While attached to the staff of this army, composed of Germans and Turks, he took part in the battles going on in this country and later on in the retreat by way of Damascus behind the Taurus.

After the breakdown his men were transported back by way of the Black Sea through the Ukraine. Von Wegerer arrived in Vienna at Christmas 1918.

In the summer of 1919 he participated in the organization of the so-called "Grenzschutz" (boundary protection) against the Poles in the east. When Thorn was surrendered to the Poles he returned to Berlin and sent in his resignation. In September of this year he married a lady from Bremen. His wife had lived in America for several years before the war (in Florida) and was charmed by her American residence.

In the spring of 1920 Von Wegerer started work in a political organization which attacked political radicalism and opposed the development of Bolshevism. In the autumn of 1921 he turned his attention to the War Guilt Question and in 1922 took over the management of the "Zentralstelle für Erforschung der Kriegsursachen." ("Central Bureau for Research into the Causes of the World War.") A year later, during the conflict in the Ruhr, he founded the monthly review "Die Kriegsschuldfrage." Since then he has devoted himself entirely to the abolition of the Versailles War Guilt thesis.

In the autumn of 1925 he spent six weeks in the United States and came away under the impression that an attempt to enlighten the American people respecting the War Guilt Question would not be in vain.



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Dr. Von Wegerer's journal, "Die Kriegsschuldfrage," quickly took its place as the leading scientific periodical of its kind in the world and soon became the chief source of information on this subject. It has published a vast amount of invaluable information on every conceivable aspect of responsibility for the cataclysm of 1914. It opens its columns freely to scholars of all nations, publishing foreign articles frequently in both English and German. The articles in "Die Kriegsschuldfrage" have at times "smoked out" Entente diplomats and apologists and have forced them to explain or defend their policies. It has provided extensive rejoinders to all attempts of Entente statesmen and scholars to defend the war-time version of responsibility for the diplomacy of the summer of 1914.

In recognition of his preëminent services in promoting research and writing on the question of war guilt, the University of Munich conferred the doctorate upon Herr von Wegerer in 1929.

It is frequently asserted that the question of who caused the World War in 1914 is of purely academic interest today. It has no direct relation to present-day European problems. Europe today is not built upon the premises of the Versailles settlement. This is a popular fiction in the United States today, sponsored especially by Dr. Raymond Leslie Buel and Professor R. C. Binkley. They argue that, even though Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles does specifically state that Germany and her Allies were solely responsible for the World War, the makers of the Treaty did not really mean what they wrote. They seem to forget that in December, 1920, Poincaré wrote: "In fact, if it was not the Central Powers

that brought on the War, why should they be condemned to pay for it? If there was divided responsibility, then, in justice, there should be a division of the cost." In similar vein Lloyd George said in 1921: "For the Allies German responsibility for the War is fundamental. It is the basis upon which the structure of the Treaty was erected, and if that acknowledgement is repudiated or abandoned the Treaty is destroyed."

There is another group which contends that, though the Treaty of Versailles may have been founded on the thesis of unique German responsibility for the World War, we should hush up on this subject. Nothing can be done about it. To bring it up will do no good. On the contrary, it will only revive war hatreds and promote ill-will between the ancient enemies. World peace is what we are looking for, and all other considerations are subordinate to this one.

Most sensible people will agree that world peace is a larger and more important issue than settling the question of who started the World War. If it could be shown that silence upon the question of war guilt would hasten and assure world peace we should remain silent, however great the moral injustice to the Central Powers. It would appear to the writer, however, that the position of those now opposed to a discussion of the causes of the War is illogical and untenable.

There can be no hope of establishing peace in Europe until the normal and material injustices of the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon and Neuilly are undone and Europe is reconstructed in harmony with justice and decency. The plant of Locarno cannot flourish in the

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pot of Versailles. The facts and the principles underlying these two settlements are irreconcilably opposed.

One can scarcely expect peace in a Europe with no adequate international organization when thirty national states threaten peace instead of the eighteen which existed in 1914. A settled state of affairs can hardly be expected to develop when Germany and her allies are disarmed and compelled to pay crushing indemnities on the ground of their sole responsibility for the great conflict, while the Entente Powers, armed to the teeth, endeavor to reduce or evade altogether their pecuniary obligations to the United States on the ground that they saved us from perpetual slavery under the heavy hand of the Hun.

The crying injustices of Transylvania, the Tyrol, Bessarabia, Macedonia, the Polish Corridor, the Saar, and Silesia, to mention but a few of the more atrocious fruits of Versailles, must be rectified before Europe can aspire to peace. Otherwise, the oppressed nations will but await a more favorable alignment of European powers to begin anew the attempt to secure justice by deceit and force. The German Government has done well to remind the world of this fact within the last week in its reply to Briand's proposal of a Pan-European union.

Inasmuch as the post-war settlement, with its abuses all too briefly catalogued above, was based upon the wartime assumption and the Versailles charge of the unique guilt of Germany in causing the World War, it is no more permanent or defensible than the cornerstone upon which it was erected. As we now know for all time that there is not an iota of truth in Article 231 of the

Treaty of Versailles, there is no mode of attacking this nefarious document which is so potent as a consideration of the real facts as to who launched Europe in 1914 upon the four years of unparalleled carnage, which have been followed by a decade of chaos, misery and oppression.

Another constructive and pragmatic reason for re-examining the facts concerning war responsibility arises from the hope that a dawning consciousness of how badly we Americans were deceived about the actual issues in the European situation from 1914 to 1918 may serve to make us rather more cautious and hesitant about capitulating to propaganda in the event of another European cataclysm. We may be led to more of a tendency to scrutinize evidence and to avoid being the victims of skilful foreign press-agents and silver-tongued orators.

It cannot be successfully maintained that the Entente Powers of 1914–1918 are the only ones in Europe likely to try to deceive us. All sides to any great conflict are bound to do their best to enlist our aid and sympathy. Sometime in the future, England and Germany may be united against France and Italy. If so, England's command of the seas would give Germany that access to our attention which she was denied in 1914–1918. Under such circumstances we might need to be as critical of German propaganda as we ought to have been of French and British partisanship in the Great War.

It so happens, however, that in the present instance we have to consider the manner in which Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia deceived us as to the facts relating to the outbreak of the World War and as to the issues at stake in the struggle. An understanding of these facts certainly should do much to make us less ready to

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pull the chestnuts out of the fire for any European nation or coalition whatever in the event of another European conflagration.

Finally, the facts about the World War and its results should help along the cause of peace by making it clear how futile it is to hope that we can end war by more war. The war spirit and methods create a psychological attitude on the part of the participants in the struggle which makes it well-nigh impossible to expect constructive, far-sighted and generous conduct as its conclusion.

Statesmanship does not emerge headlong on the heels of savagery. If we desire peace, it must be achieved in a period of peace and not hoped for as the aftermath of war. The greatest words of President Wilson during the War were that there could be no permanent peace which was not a "peace without victory." If, by setting forth the facts about war guilt and the post-war treaties, we can arouse a sufficient wave of moral revulsion and indignation to force a revision of the post-war Treaties in harmony with facts and justice, more will have been achieved than can be hoped for from any armed conflict of whatever proportions.

Therefore, it would appear that the question of who brought on the World War is a problem of the greatest moment and the utmost timeliness. It is such (1) because upon the lies of the war period were erected the detestable treaties which followed its close; (2) because the chief sound moral basis for revising these treaties is the truth about the causes of the World War; (3) because European peace and union can be secured only as a result of the revision of the treaties; (4) because study of the facts about war propoganda from 1914 to 1918 af-

fords the best possible protection against our being so rudely and completely deceived another time; and (5) because the results of the conflict demonstrate for all time the futility of expecting war to be ended by war and show us that if we are to secure peace it must be worked for in a time of pacific relations.

It is because Dr. Von Wegerer's book is by far the best treatment of the revised views of war responsibility in relation to the making of the Treaty of Versailles that we recommend it to the fair and serious consideration of American readers. Properly perused and assimilated by the thinking people of the western world, this book would do more to further world peace than the combined armies and navies of any ten existing nations.

*New York City,  
July 18, 1930.*

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WAR GUILT THESIS*

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*A REFUTATION OF THE  
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


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CHAPTER I

*THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE VERSAILLES  
THESIS OF WAR GUILT*



THE question of war guilt played no special part in the armistice negotiations in the fall of 1918. In the Lansing note of November 5 we find the only place in which Germany is characterized as the aggressor nation and is held responsible for the damages caused. The note reads:

The President [Wilson] is now in receipt of a Memorandum of observations by the Allied Governments on this correspondence which is as follows:

. . . 'Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of January the eighth 1918 the President declared that the invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.'

These words meant undeniably that the question involved was merely one of indemnification for damages caused by military invasion. They were not intended to imply that Germany was to be regarded as the political

aggressor in bringing on the World War and as liable, consequently, for the damages arising out of it.

A short time after the conclusion of the armistice negotiations, the German Government, through the mediation of the Swiss Government, transmitted on November 29 to the English, French, Belgian, Italian, and American Governments a note in which the proposal was made that the war guilt question be settled by a commission of neutral Powers. The note read as follows:

In order to bring about world peace, to provide lasting security against future wars, and to re-establish mutual confidence between the nations of the earth, it appears very urgent that full light be thrown on all the events which led up to the war with respect to all the States that were involved in it. A complete, honest picture of the world situation and of the negotiations between the Powers in July, 1914, and of the steps which were taken by individual Governments at this time, could and would assist a great deal to demolish the barrier of hate and misunderstanding that was erected between the nations during the long war period. A just appreciation of what transpired on the side of friend and foe is necessary for the future reconciliation of the peoples of the earth, and affords the only possible basis for the League of Nations and a lasting peace.

The German Government, therefore, proposes that a neutral commission be set up to examine the question of responsibility for the War, which commission is to consist of men whose character and political experience will guarantee a just verdict. The Governments of all the warring Powers would have to declare themselves ready to submit their official documents to inspection. The commission would be authorized to examine all individuals who, at the out-



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break of the war, held the levers of control in the Governments of their respective countries, as well as all witnesses whose testimony would be of value in establishing proof.

To this very sensible proposal England, through the Political Department of the Swiss Foreign Office, very unreasonably and autocratically replied on March 7, 1919, that it was unnecessary to make any answer whatsoever to the German proposal, since the Allied Powers were of the opinion that "Germany's responsibility for the war was incontestably established a long time ago."


Despite this communication, which seemed to make any investigation of war guilt unnecessary, the Allied Powers deemed it important to undertake by themselves a scientific examination of the question. In a plenary session of the Preliminary Peace Conference, called by the Allied and Associated Powers, it was decided on January 25, 1919, to set up a Commission to consist of fifteen members and to be called *The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties*. In choosing the very title of this Commission, the conferees at Versailles rendered their verdict beforehand. Nevertheless, this travesty on scientific procedure was carried out to the very end. The United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania, and Serbia were represented on the Commission, which consisted entirely of representatives of the enemy Powers. Germany in particular was not assigned a place on it; and so the most fundamental principle upon which all verdicts are based, *audiat et altera pars* (let the other party also be heard), was grossly violated.

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On March 29, 1919, this Commission, of which Robert Lansing, James Brown Scott, Sir Ernest Pollock, André Tardieu, Scialoja, Politis, Nagaoka, Koumanoudi and others were members,<sup>1</sup> presented a report entitled: *Rapport présenté à la Conférence des Préliminaires de Paix par la Commission des Responsabilités des auteurs de la Guerre et sanctions* (Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties). The first chapter of this report, which we shall briefly refer to hereafter as the *Report*, concerned the responsibility of the authors of the War, and reached the conclusion that the Central Powers, together with Turkey and Bulgaria, had deliberately planned the War and had intentionally made it unavoidable.

The *Report* was not presented to the German Government, but its contents were made known to it later through unofficial channels. When the Allied Governments declared that the *Report* was a matter of internal concern to the Preliminary Peace Conference, it became, as a consequence, a highly official document, and constituted the only pertinent basis for the verdict laid down in the Peace Treaty and in the note subsequently delivered to Germany. The judgment set forth in the *Report* that the Central Powers were responsible for the War is the scientific foundation upon which the Peace Treaty was openly erected at Versailles. Whether this foundation will some day be replaced, only the future can tell.

On May 7, 1919, in the Trianon Palace at Versailles, the draft of the peace terms was handed to the Germans.



THE DELIVERY OF THE VERSAILLES TREATY



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In connection with it there followed an exchange of notes between the chiefs of the two peace delegations, Brockdorff-Rantzau and Clemenceau. Germany sought in vain to have the reparations obligations based on the passage in the Lansing note quoted above, and not on the assumption of war responsibility as set forth in Article 231. Clemenceau broke off this exchange of notes with the declaration that Germany, having accepted the Lansing note, had "implicitly and clearly" admitted her "responsibility" as well as her "aggression," and that it was now too late for her to disavow it.

Clemenceau thereby gave a new interpretation to the Lansing note, since into the concept of "aggression" he inserted that of "responsibility." Accordingly, the opinion of the Peace Conference was that Germany, at the conclusion of the armistice, had already recognized her responsibility for the war.

The German Government requested that proof of its alleged guilt be submitted to the German people, but this request was denied. However, since the *Report* had been unofficially communicated to the German Government, the German peace delegation took its stand on a counter-proposal. By the so-called Committee of Four, including professors Hans Delbrück, Max Weber, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and Count Max Montgelas, a memorandum was drafted which, in view of what was known about war responsibility at that time, constitutes a brilliant defense of the German position.<sup>2</sup> This document, which we shall refer to hereafter under its usual title, *The Professors' Memorandum*, stressed the necessity of an impartial investigation and arrived at conclusions essentially different from those of the Allied Commis-

sion. To the German counter-proposals there was added a covering note in which the request for a neutral inquiry was repeated. The passage in which this request was made reads as follows:

The German delegation renews its request for a neutral investigation of responsibility for the War and for acts committed during its progress. A non-partisan commission would have the right to examine the archives of all the warring powers and to question the principal leaders involved.

Only the confidence that the question of guilt will be examined impartially can produce among the nations lately at war that spirit which is necessary for the establishment of the League of Nations.

The Allied Powers answered these German counter-proposals, which were founded in a spirit of justice and reconciliation, with the ultimatum of June 16 which demanded that Germany sign the Peace Treaty without reservations, within a period of time which at first was fixed to three days, and later, at five.

A section of the ultimatum dealt almost exclusively with the question of war guilt. Although this section, which formed Part VII of the ultimatum, bore an intellectual relationship to the German *Professors' Memorandum*, it represents on the whole, in the matter of war responsibility, an independent judgment resting on a comparatively factual basis, and contains many conclusions which make it possible to refute scientifically the verdict of the Allied and Associated Powers. Hence, while we are refuting "The Versailles Thesis of War Guilt," we shall devote special attention to this section which, sur-

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prising to say, has so far received little consideration.

The ultimatum itself was enclosed in a covering note which dealt largely with the question of war guilt. The note lacked, however, the objective tone of Part VII. On the contrary, it indulged in sharp comments on the alleged reprehensible characteristics of the German people. However, while we are refuting objectively "The Versailles Thesis of War Guilt," we cannot let the note pass unobserved, since it, too, contains a number of definite conclusions as to the question of guilt.

In the course of time all of these conclusions as regards Germany's responsibility have come to be grouped under the collective heading, "The Versailles Thesis of War Guilt." Under this heading we shall also include all the imputations of guilt, all the accusations and judgments with respect to the events leading up to the War and its final outbreak, which were brought forward against Germany by the Allied and Associated Governments and by their official organs during the peace negotiations at Versailles.

"The Versailles Thesis of War Guilt" is contained, therefore, in the following documents all of which, except Number 1, were officially communicated to the German Government by the Preliminary Peace Conference:

1. The Report of the Commission of the Allied and Associated Powers on the responsibility of the authors of the War.
2. The Peace Treaty of Versailles, especially the Introduction and Article 231.
3. Part VII (Section 1) <sup>3</sup> of the ultimatum of June 16, 1919, containing an answer by the Preliminary Peace Conference to the observations made on the peace terms by the German Delegation.

4. Part I of the covering note accompanying this ultimatum.

We consider it necessary to use the heading, "The Versailles Thesis of War Guilt," in order to express in a single phrase the indictment against Germany, and to indicate what we must rectify. All that has been charged against Germany since the Versailles Conference, and all that will be charged against her in the future in the matter of war guilt, by statesmen, diplomats, historians, publicists, and politicians, is not of the same character as the accusations made against her at Versailles. If Germany should ever be moved to refute officially the charges that stand against her with respect to responsibility for the outbreak of the War, her Government can confine itself to the accusations and judgments contained in the above documents, for here the maxim applies: *Quod non est in actis, non est in mundo* (What does not exist in fact, does not exist at all).

#### NOTES FOR CHAPTER I

<sup>1</sup> *Das deutsche Weissbuch über die Schuld am Kriege*, new edition, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, Berlin, 1927, pp. 32-33. [There is an English translation of an earlier edition, entitled: *German White Book Concerning the Responsibility of the Authors of the War*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, N. Y., 1924.—Tr.]

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 63 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Section II contains a statement of the penalties to be imposed.



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## CHAPTER II

### *THE BASIS OF THE COMMISSION'S REPORT ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CENTRAL POWERS FOR THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR*



BEFORE we begin our critical review of the charges against Germany and Austria that are listed in the *Report*, we shall inquire to what extent the documents upon which the *Report* is based stand critical analysis. It will be discovered that these documents were in the highest degree too incomplete and too unfit to warrant the severe verdict that was rendered.

The following official coloured Books were used by the Commission: the *German White Book* of 1914 and that of 1915; the *Austrian Red Book* of 1915; the *English Blue Book* of 1914; the *French Yellow Book* of 1914; the *Russian Orange Book* of 1914; the *Serbian Blue Book* of 1914; and the *Greek White Book* of 1913. There were, in addition, a memorandum of the Serbian delegation, and the treaty of August 24–September 6, 1915, between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, taken from documents supplied by the Serbian delegation. Among other official documents the *Report* mentions Emperor Francis Joseph's message to his people; a report by the Bavarian Minister, von Lerchenfeld, dated July 18, 1914; and a further report by von Lerchenfeld, dated July 31, 1914,

and containing the text as published by Kurt Eisner.

The non-official documents used were Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum; Dr. Mühlon's memorandum; Henry Morgenthau's *Secrets of the Bosphorus*, London, 1918;<sup>1</sup> and Basri Bey's *The De-Balkanized Orient and Albania*.

#### A. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

##### 1. *The German White Book of 1914*

The Commission had at its disposal the following official German documents relating to the July crisis and the outbreak of the War: the *German White Book* of 1914 and the enlarged edition of the same, published in May, 1915. The *German White Book* of 1914 contained for the most part a memorandum that had been drawn up in great haste and in which the German Government had been forced to spare Austria as far as it was possible. To this *White Book* there were added as an Appendix several documents some of which had been abridged and had had their texts slightly changed about. The *German White Book* of 1915 contained some 40 documents.

How incomplete the German material was will at once become clear if we compare it with the *German Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the War*, the so-called *Kautsky Documents*, which were published by the German Government in November, 1919, and which contained altogether 879 documents.<sup>2</sup> The members of the Commission could scarcely have been unaware of the incompleteness of the *German White Book* of 1915. Furthermore, the members of the Commission might have suspected that parts of the documents published in the

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*German White Book* had been considerably abridged, exactly as the coloured Books of their own Governments had been, and that the documents had been reprinted in paraphrased form in order to preserve the key to the texts. The fact that such was not the case, but that, on the contrary, only slight and, for the most part, unimportant changes and omissions were to be found in the published documents, does not alter matters.<sup>3</sup> However, the Commission did not consider it necessary to call upon the German Government for additional documentary material for use in arriving at its verdict concerning the responsibility of the Central Powers for the War.

We shall now show by quotations of separate documentary passages to what extent certain documents, which were not published in 1915, out of consideration for Austria, might have contributed to Germany's exoneration. These passages were withheld from the Commission as a consequence of its not knowing about the existence of the German documentary material. For instance, on July 29, the Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, for the personal orientation of the German Ambassador at Vienna, von Tschirschky, wrote among other things the following:

At Petersburg it [the Austrian Government] announces its territorial disinterestedness; us it leaves entirely at sea regarding its program; Rome is put off with meaningless phrases on the compensation question, at London Count Mensdorff is giving away portions of Serbia to Bulgaria and Albania, and placing himself in direct opposition to Vienna's solemn declarations at Petersburg. I must draw from these contradictions the conclusion that the disavowal of Count Hoyos communicated in telegram 83 was only

a play to the gallery, and that the Government at Vienna is entertaining plans which it finds it advisable to keep secret from us, in order to assure itself of German support in any event and not to expose itself to a possible refusal of that support by making them public.<sup>4</sup>

On July 30 the Chancellor forwarded to the Ambassador at Vienna Grey's proposal that mediation by four Powers, after the occupation of Belgrade or other places, be reconsidered. The Chancellor added the following comment:

As a result we stand, in case Austria refuses all mediation, before a conflagration in which England will be against us; Italy and Roumania to all appearances will not go with us, and we two shall be opposed to four Great Powers. On Germany, thanks to England's opposition, the principal burden of the fight would fall. Austria's political prestige, the honor of her arms, as well as her just claims against Serbia, could all be amply satisfied by the occupation of Belgrade or of other places. She would be strengthening her status in the Balkans as well as in relation to Russia by the humiliation of Serbia. Under these circumstances we must urgently and impressively suggest to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the acceptance of mediation on the above-mentioned honorable conditions. The responsibility for the consequences that would otherwise follow would be an uncommonly heavy one both for Austria and for us.<sup>5</sup>

On the same day the Chancellor dispatched another note containing a report by Count Pourtalès. The note concluded as follows:

We can not expect Austria to deal with Serbia, with whom she is at war. The refusal to hold any exchange

of opinions with Petersburg, however, would be a serious error, as it would be direct provocation of Russia's armed interference, which Austria-Hungary is beyond all else interested to prevent.

We are, of course, ready to fulfil the obligations of our alliance, but must decline to be drawn wantonly into a world conflagration by Vienna, without having any regard paid to our counsel. Also, Vienna appears to disregard our advice in regard to the Italian question.

Please talk to Count Berchtold at once with all impressiveness and great seriousness.<sup>6</sup>

These examples could be extended, of course, by quotations from an endless number of other documents. The few given, however, should suffice to show that in view of their ignorance of these documents the judges at Versailles could not have rendered a conclusive verdict with respect to war guilt.

We shall now turn to the *Austrian Red Book* of 1915.

## 2. *The Austrian Red Book of 1915*

The case for the Austro-Hungarian *Red Book* of 1915 is much the same as for the German White Books. The Austro-Hungarian *Red Book*, which the Commission had at its disposal, had been concluded on February 3, 1915, and contained 69 documents. How incomplete this material was is manifest from the fact that even the new edition, which appeared in three parts in September, 1919, contained various additions and supplements which amounted altogether to 352 documents.<sup>7</sup> This becomes even more evident in Vol. VIII of the Diplomatic Documents of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published at the end of 1929, and entitled

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“Austria-Hungary’s Foreign Policy from the Bosnian Crisis of 1908 up to the Outbreak of War in 1914.” In this volume there are 1265 documents concerning the July crisis of 1914 alone, although the documents published close with the 31st July, 1914. One may therefore in this case, too, assume without hesitation that the Commission was well aware of the incompleteness of the documentary material which it had at its disposal. Nevertheless, the Commission did not think it necessary to take steps to procure further documentary material.

### 3. *The English Blue Book of 1914*

This collection contains 159 documents, to which two reports from the British Embassies in Berlin and Vienna, as well as an historical introduction, were added. As was evident from the *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914*, published at the end of 1926 and containing 677 documents, the above collection of 159 documents, although it contained considerably more documents than the *German White Book* and the *Austrian Red Book*, was extraordinarily incomplete. Moreover, as will become clear by comparing the *English Blue Book* of 1914 with the *British Documents on the Origins of the War* published in 1926, 100 documents out of the 159 documents in the *English Blue Book* were either abridged or paraphrased. Nor were these abridgments made only in cases where it was a question of material of secondary importance which could be left out to save space; the omissions are almost without exception passages which could not but have served to exculpate Germany in a great measure from responsibility for the War. The British

Government, therefore, must be criticized for having placed at the disposal of the Commission material concerning the incompleteness of which it must have been just as cognizant as it was of the fact that the omissions would inevitably lead to wholly false assumptions on the part of the members of the Commission. The latter, who must surely have been aware of the great responsibility attaching to their verdict, made no attempt, so far as we know, to inform themselves as to the adequacy of the documents contained in the *English Blue Book*.

Again we wish to show by means of a few examples how unsuited the *Blue Book* of 1914 was to support a definitive judgment as to the responsibility of the Central Powers for the War. For this purpose we shall refer first of all to the *British Documents*, Nos. 101, 125, and 265. The full texts of the passages omitted are here printed in italics: <sup>8</sup>

(33673)

No. 101.

Sir. G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

D. 5:40 P.M.

R. 8 P.M.

Tel. (No. 166.) *Urgent*

*My immediately preceding telegram.* (1) <sup>9</sup>

Minister for Foreign Affairs telephoned to me this morning saying that he had just received text of ultimatum presented by Austria at Belgrade yesterday that demands a reply in forty-eight hours. Step thus taken by Austria meant war, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy.

\* *Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador told me confidentially that result of the visit of*

*the President of the French Republic had been to establish the following points:—*

*1. Perfect community of views on the various problems with which the Powers are confronted as regards the maintenance of general peace and balance of power in Europe, more especially in the East.*

*2. Decision to take action at Vienna with a view to the prevention of a demand for explanations or any summons equivalent to an intervention in the internal affairs of Servia which the latter would be justified in regarding as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.*

*3. Solemn affirmation of obligations imposed by the alliance of the two countries.\* 10*

Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government would proclaim their solidarity with France and Russia. He characterised Austria's conduct as immoral and provocative. Some of the demands which she had presented were absolutely unacceptable, and she would never have acted as she had done without having first consulted Germany. The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would not only give Russia strong diplomatic support, but would, if necessary, fulfil all the obligations imposed on her by the alliance.<sup>11</sup>

I said that I could not speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but that I would telegraph all that they had said. I could personally hold out no hope that His Majesty's Government would make any declaration of solidarity that would entail engagement to support France and Russia by force of arms. We had no direct interests in Servia, and public opinion in England would never sanction a war on her behalf. Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that the Servian question was but part of general European question and that we could not efface ourselves.

I said that I gathered that His Excellency wished us to join in telling Austria that we could not tolerate her



active intervention in Servian internal affairs. If she paid no attention to our representations and took military action against Servia, did Russia propose to declare war upon her? <sup>12</sup> Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the whole question would be considered by a Council of Ministers to be held this afternoon, but that no decision would be taken till a further Council of Ministers had been held under the presidency of the Emperor, probably to-morrow. He personally thought that Russia would at any rate have to mobilise.

I suggested that the first thing to be done was to try to gain time by bringing our influence to bear to induce Austria to extend term of delay accorded to Servia. The French Ambassador replied that time did not permit of this; either Austria was bluffing or had made up her mind to act at once. In either case a firm and united attitude was our only chance of averting war. I then asked whether it would not be advisable to urge Servian Government to state precisely how far they were prepared to go to meet Austria's wishes. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that some of the demands contained in ultimatum might no doubt be accepted, but that he must first consult his colleagues.

As they both continued to press me to declare our complete solidarity with them, I said that I thought you might be prepared to represent strongly at Vienna and Berlin danger to European peace of an Austrian attack on Serbia.<sup>13</sup> You might perhaps point out that it would in all probability force Russia to intervene, that this would bring Germany and (?France) into the field, and that if war became general, it would be difficult for England to remain neutral. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he hoped that we would in any case express strong reprobation of Austria's action. If war did break out, we would sooner or later be dragged into it, but if we did not make common cause with France and Russia from the outset we should

have rendered war more likely, *and should not have played a "beau rôle."*

From French Ambassador's language it almost looked as if France and Russia were determined to make a strong stand even if we declined to join them. *Language of Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, was not so (?decided) on this subject.*

Austrian Government seemed purposely to have presented their ultimatum at moment when President of the French Republic and President of the Council were leaving Russia on their return to France, where they cannot arrive for four or five days.<sup>14</sup>

*Towards the close of our interview we were joined by Roumanian Minister, with whom Minister for Foreign Affairs had a private conversation in which His Excellency invited also Roumanian Government to make representations at Vienna.*

*(Repeated to Paris, 1:20 p.m., No. 217.)*

Published in BB No. 6 (paraphrased and parts omitted).<sup>15</sup>

We shall now reproduce Document No. 125.

(33883)

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.

D. 8 P.M.

R. 10:30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 169.) *Very confidential.*

I communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, *in private letter*, substance of your telegram No. 216 of 25th July to Paris, (1) <sup>16</sup> and I this afternoon discussed with him French Ambassador's suggested communication to Servian Government recorded in your telegram No. 17 of 24th July to Belgrade. (2) <sup>17</sup>

As regards former, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austrian Ambassador's explanations did not

quite tally with information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards latter, both his Excellency and French Ambassador agreed that as delay accorded expires this evening, it is too late to make such a communication. Minister for Foreign Affairs said Serbia was quite ready to do as you suggested, and to punish those proved to be guilty, but no independent State could be expected to accept political demands put forward. From a conversation he had with Servian Minister yesterday, Minister for Foreign Affairs thought that, in event of Austrian attack, Servian Government would abandon Belgrade and withdraw their forces to interior, while they would at the same time appeal to Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favor of such an appeal. Obligations taken by Serbia in 1908 (sic) to which reference is made in Austrian ultimatum were given to Powers and not to Austria, and he would like to see question placed on international footing. Were Serbia to appeal to Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave question in hands of England, France, Italy and Germany. It was possible, he added, that Serbia might propose to submit question to arbitration.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs then told us that at Council of Ministers held under his presidency this morning Emperor had sanctioned drafting of Imperial Ukase, which is only to be published when Minister for Foreign Affairs considers moment come for giving effect to it, ordering mobilisation of 1,100,000 men. Necessary preliminary preparations for mobilisation would, however, be begun at once.* On my expressing earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced on her.

*French Ambassador then said he had received a number of telegrams from Minister in charge of Minis-*

*try for Foreign Affairs, that no one of them displayed slightest sign of hesitation, and that he was in position to give his Excellency formal assurance that France placed herself unreservedly on Russia's side.*

*After thanking him, Minister for Foreign Affairs turned to me with question "And your Government?" I replied that you did not yet despair of situation, and that great thing was to gain time. I repeated what I had said to Emperor in audience—reported in my despatch No. 100, Secret, of 3rd April [Extracts annexed]—that England could play rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality. *With the exception of the "Times," nearly the whole English press was on the side of Austria, to whom Mr. Gladstone had addressed warning of "hands off."* The public had their spirit [group undecipherable]. They did not understand that Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing present status quo in Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now rivers of blood would flow and we would in the end be dragged into war.*

*French Ambassador remarked that French Government would want to know at once whether our fleet was prepared to play part assigned to it by Anglo-French Naval Convention. (3) <sup>18</sup> He could not believe that England would not stand by her two friends, who were acting as one in this matter.*

I said all I could to impress prudence on Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him, if Russia mobi-

lised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but unless Germany can restrain Austria I can regard situation as desperate. Russia cannot allow Austria to crush Serbia and become predominant Power in Balkans, and, secure of support of France, she will face all the risks of war.<sup>19</sup> *For ourselves position is a most perilous one, and we shall have to choose between giving Russia our active support or renouncing her friendship. If we fail her now we cannot hope to maintain that friendly co-operation with her in Asia that is of such vital importance to us. Attitude of Italy, according to Minister for Foreign Affairs, seems to be lukewarm, and she does not seem to have been consulted by Austria beforehand.*

(Sent to Paris.)

Published in BB No. 17 (paraphrased and parts omitted).

We shall now give in full the text of Document No. 265.

(34666)

No. 265.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

D. 4:30 P.M.

R. 7:27 P.M.

Tel. (No. 122.)

French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me that at present there is no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Serbia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by declaration of war and Emperor's appeal to his people published this morning.<sup>20</sup> Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet if Austro-Hungarian

Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe declaration made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to acquire Servian territory nor to destroy independence of Servia. But Italian Ambassador feels sure that Austro-Hungarian Government would refuse to do this.

*Confidential.*

*French Ambassador is reporting to French Government that he is convinced by admissions of Servian Minister, with whom he was in close contact till Minister departed 26th July, that growing condition of unrest in Southern Slav provinces of Dual Monarchy was such that Austro-Hungarian Government were compelled either to acquiesce in separation of those provinces or make a desperate effort to retain them by reducing Servia to impotency. Servian Minister always said that time was working for Servia, and he told French Ambassador that within three years Southern Slav provinces would be ready to rise against Austria-Hungary without Servia having to raise her little finger. Austria-Hungary realises she could wait no longer, and determined on war, from which it looks as if nothing would now deter her. French Ambassador thinks this shows that conflict is not due to German instigation and that it does not necessarily show that Germany desires European war, as is thought by many in France.*

*(Repeated to Embassies.)*

*Published in BB No. 79 (paraphrased—last paragraph omitted).*

*Cf. F No. 93.*

It will have to be admitted that an adequate judgment as regards war responsibility could not have been rendered without a knowledge of the passages that were left out in the three documents reproduced above. Further-

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more, it will have to be conceded that the fact that these passages were omitted constitutes a serious charge against the Allies.

#### 4. *The French Yellow Book of 1914*

This is the worst case of all. The *Yellow Book*, published by the French Government on December 1, 1914, contained 159 documents, six of which belong to the year 1913 and served the purpose of propaganda, being intended to show in an exaggerated light the nature of German militarism. One of these so-called documents was the falsified memorandum purporting to have been written by General Ludendorff. As for the rest, the remarks made above concerning the *English Blue Book* apply in an even higher degree to the *French Yellow Book*. Although we are not in a position as yet to give the exact figures to show how incomplete the *French Yellow Book* of 1914 really was, since the French archives concerning the outbreak of the War have not yet been thrown open to European investigators, we can hardly go wrong in assuming that the documents that were not published by France are also several hundred in number. Quite apart from the many obvious gaps in the *French Yellow Book*, it is clearly demonstrable that the *Yellow Book* contains several documents the texts of which were falsified in order to distort the meaning in a manner unfavourable to Germany. It is even clear that certain of the documents are pure inventions. In this connection we shall refer to the *Französisches Gelbbuch von 1914* (French Yellow Book of 1914), published in 1926 by the

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*Zentralstelle für Erforschung der Kriegsursachen* (Central Bureau for Research into the Causes of the War), in which the demonstrable falsifications are made separately obvious.<sup>21</sup> We may call particular attention to the fact that nothing as yet has been done by the French Government to either deny or correct the demonstrable falsifications. Among these is included, as we have already indicated, the memorandum of General Ludendorff, containing several pages, and referred to by the general as early as 1919, in a special publication.<sup>22</sup> Further falsifications in the *French Yellow Book* have also been revealed in the fourth volume of Poincaré's memoirs; for instance, Document 115.

In order to show how misleading to the members of the Commission the *French Yellow Book* really was, we shall merely quote below the authentic text of Document 118 and the forged text of this document as it appeared in the *French Yellow Book*. The announcement of the Russian mobilization on July 31, which the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, M. Paléologue, dispatched to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. René Viviani, was short and to the point. It ran as follows:

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

D. 10:45 P.M.

R. 8:30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 318.)

The general mobilization of the Russian army has been ordered.

Paléologue.<sup>23</sup>

Instead of this telegram, the official *Yellow Book of 1914* contained the following announcement:





ГОСУДАРЬ ИМПЕРАТОРЪ

ВЫСОЧАЙШЕ повелѣть соизволяетъ:

ПРИВЕСТИ АРМІЮ И ФЛОТЪ НА ВОЕННОЕ ПОЛОЖЕНІЕ.

Первое число мобилизации назначено *18 Мая 1914. в 11-15 часовъ*


ОБЪЯВЛЕНІЕ

*Сельского* уездного по воинской повинности присутствія  
О ПРИЗЫВѢ НИЖНИХЪ ЧИНОВЪ ЗАПАСА

*Города Сельска*

Во исполненіе ВЫСОЧАЙШАГО повелѣнія о приведеніи арміи и флота на военное положеніе:

- 1) Нижнимъ чинамъ запаса съ увольнительными билетами, а не являющимся таковыхъ съ видами на жительство или удостовѣреніями о личности, явиться на сборный пунктъ уезднаго воинскаго начальника въ *пос. Андреевск* на 3 день мобилизации въ *воскресенье 20 Мая утромъ* *Утро*
- 2) Нижніе чины запаса *Гор. Сельска* должны собраться въ *пос. Сельск* на 2 день мобилизации въ *субботу 19 Мая* въ *1 часамъ ночи* откуда будутъ перевезены на сборный пунктъ.
- 3) Всѣ учрежденія и лица, у которыхъ запасные служатъ, обязаны немедленно окончить съ ними расчетъ и выдать увольнительные билеты, если таковые находятся у нанимателей.



Казанская губернія, г. Сельск



No. 118.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg,  
to M. René Viviani, President of Council, Minister  
for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

By reason of the general mobilization of Austria and the mobilization measures which, for the past six days, have been secretly but uninterruptedly carried out by Germany, the order for the general mobilization of the Russian army has been issued, as Russia cannot without the gravest danger allow herself to be anticipated in this matter; as a matter of fact, the military measures taken by Russia merely correspond to those taken by Germany.

For imperative reasons of strategy the Russian Government, knowing that Germany was arming, could no longer delay the conversion of her partial mobilization into a general mobilization.

Paléologue.

This forged document is made up of nothing but untruths. The general Austrian mobilization was ordered *after* the Russian mobilization. At the time when this telegram was dispatched, Germany had ordered neither secret nor uninterrupted mobilization measures, to say nothing of the fact that these measures had not been in progress for six days. There could, therefore, have been no reason for thinking that Germany was attempting to forestall Russia. On the contrary, exactly the reverse was the case; Russia had anticipated Germany by several days, as she had officially begun her mobilization measures on July 25.

A forgery such as that presented here in *Yellow Book*

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No. 118 is, as may not be overlooked, of fundamental and far-reaching importance. During the war and after Germany in the eyes of the world was commonly regarded as the aggressor. This conception rested mainly on false allegations, such as those reproduced in *Yellow Book* No. 118. The Russian mobilization was in reality an act of aggression. In *Yellow Book* No. 118, however, it appears as an act of defence. Germany having allegedly been secretly arming herself and Austria having ordered a general mobilization.

The question arises, how such a forgery was possible. Complete darkness enshrouded this point for years. At last M. Poincaré himself has endeavoured to explain what happened. In his book, "Les Responsabilités de la Guerre,"<sup>24</sup> he informs us that the "editors" of the *Yellow Book* were responsible for the telegram. But M. Poincaré here makes a further utterance which is of the greatest importance. He did not know, he says, that Document 118 was an "addition." The addition, however, was "in agreement with the profound conviction of the minister."

This means that M. Viviani, the French Foreign Minister, was in 1914 convinced that the Russian mobilization was ordered on account of secret German military preparations and the general mobilization ordered by Austria. In other words: M. Viviani made the same mistake as M. Poincaré in 1914. This proves that France in 1914 went to war under altogether false suppositions.

Whether this was really the conception of Mm. Viviani and Poincaré or not there can nevertheless be no doubt that since the publication of the *Yellow Book* the public opinion of the world has been misled as a consequence of the forgery by the editors of the *Yellow Book*.

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The Russian order for general mobilization was not an act of defence, but, deprived of its false motives, stands revealed as an act of aggression.

Messrs. Robert Lansing and James Brown Scott, the delegates of the American Commission, could have ascertained that the *French Yellow Book* No. 118 was a forgery, if they had examined it in the light of the American documents on the outbreak of the World War. For Mr. Wilson, the American chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburg, and Mr. Penfield, the American Ambassador in Vienna, had, as is shown by the "Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914," quite correctly reported the times at which the Russian and Austrian mobilizations were ordered. The United States Government was therefore accurately informed concerning the sequence of the mobilizations.

The forgery of *Yellow Book* No. 118 may therefore by no means be regarded as a petty side issue. It has on the contrary caused the verdict concerning the responsibility for the outbreak of the World War to be turned in favour of Russia and against Germany and Austria.

We shall now take up the *Russian Orange Book*.

### 5. *The Russian Orange Book of 1914*

Simultaneously with the British Government, the Russian Government had, on August 6, published a collection of documents relating to the July crisis. A large number of these documents were abridged in a manner disadvantageous to Germany. In 1922, on behalf of Germany, the falsifications of the *Russian Orange Book* were exposed in a very illuminating book by Baron von Romberg.<sup>25</sup>

How incomplete the *Russian Orange Book* of 1914 was becomes evident from a study of the new edition of *Das Russische Orangebuch von 1914*,<sup>26</sup> published by the *Zentralstelle für Erforschung der Kriegsursachen*. This volume contains 227 documents, whereas the *Orange Book* of 1914 gave only 79 documents.

In order to illustrate the kind of omissions in individual documents that characterized the *Russian Orange Book*, we quote below the report of the Russian Chargé d' Affaires in France, M. Sevastopulo, as it is given in the Romberg publication. The omitted passages, which the Commission knew nothing about, are here printed in italics:

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.  
Telegram No. 184.

(R. O. B. No. 8.)

Paris, July 11/24, 1914.

A copy of the note officially presented at Belgrade has *to-day* been communicated to the French Government by the Austrian Ambassador, *with the addition of a detailed statement of reasons which was already published in the newspapers*. The German Ambassador later visited the Minister<sup>27</sup> and read to him a communication containing the Austrian arguments, and indicating that in case of a refusal *or aggressive attitude* on the part of Serbia, Austria would be obliged to resort to pressure and, in case of need, to military measures. The communication ended with the observation that, in the opinion of Germany, this question ought to be settled between Austria and Serbia direct, that it was to the advantage of the Powers to localize the affair<sup>28</sup> by leaving it to the interested parties, *and that Germany ardently desired the locali-*

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*zation of the conflict, for the interference of another Power would, on account of existing treaties, bring on incalculable consequences. The Acting Head of the Political Department,<sup>29</sup> who was present at the interview, asked the Ambassador whether the Austrian action should be considered as an ultimatum or only as a mise en demeure—in other words whether, in the event of Serbia not submitting entirely to the Austrian demands, hostilities were inevitable. The Ambassador avoided a direct reply, alleging that he had no instructions. But from his tone one could imply that the hope of a settlement of the incident through Austro-Serbian negotiations is not as yet lost. As Berthelot further told me, former Minister Pichon to-day had a conference with the Austrian Ambassador from which he also gained the impression that Austria does not consider her measure an unconditional ultimatum.*

*Sevastopulo.*

## 6. *The Serbian Blue Book of 1914*

On November 18, 1914, the Serbian Government published a *Blue Book* containing 52 documents concerning the events that had taken place between July 29 and August 6. Since no full edition of the Serbian documents, nor even individual documents bearing on the outbreak of the War, have so far been published, it is impossible to adduce any direct proof as to the incompleteness of the *Serbian Blue Book*. There can, nevertheless, be no doubt that this has at least as many gaps in it as the other colored books. The *Blue Book*, for instance, publishes only three insignificant documents out of the doubtless very extensive and informative telegrams exchanged between Belgrade and St. Petersburg, and only two documents out of the telegrams exchanged between Belgrade and Paris—

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telegrams which must have contained a great deal of information concerning the co-operation of France in the drafting of the Serbian Reply Note. Of these two documents, one, dated July 2, consists of only three lines, while the other, dated July 4, is of no importance whatever. In consequence of the violent attacks that were made against the Serbian Government in 1924–25, on account of its cognizance of the Sarajevo crime as revealed by the ex-Minister of Education, M. Ljuba Jovanovitch, the Jugoslav Government announced the impending publication of a new *Blue Book*. Up to the present time, however, it has not published a single new Serbian document concerning the outbreak of the War. For this reason we are unable to essay an investigation as to whether the documents reprinted in the *Serbian Blue Book* correspond with the actual originals or not.

We may, however, point out one error that is already demonstrable, but concerning the origin of which we cannot pass judgment. The Serbian Minister at Vienna, Jovan M. Jovanovitch, on August 16 sent to Pashitch, then Prime Minister, a letter in which he mentions that at the beginning of July a change had taken place in Austria's demeanour; and he adds, in this connection, that the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorff, had constantly travelled to the southern, eastern, and northern parts of the Monarchy, and "at that time had had an interview with the Chief of the German General Staff, Count Moltke, in Bohemia—at Carlsbad, I believe."<sup>30</sup>

This story, which was dragged into the London *Times* as late as the year 1922 by no less a person than a British Vice-Consul, Mr. Gann,<sup>31</sup> is demonstrably incorrect, as is clear from the documents published by Field-Marshal





ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND AND HIS FAMILY



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Conrad,<sup>32</sup> as well as on the basis of other established facts. Moltke saw Conrad for the last time on May 12.

### 7. *Other Official Documents*

In addition to these collections of official documents the Commission, as we have already mentioned above, made use of the *Greek White Book* in arriving at its decision concerning war responsibility. Any detailed criticism of this coloured Book is hardly necessary. The Commission also had at its disposal a *Memorandum of the Serbian Delegation* (comprising several chapters) regarding which we know only this, that it was accompanied by certain original documents, among others the Treaty of August 24–September 6, 1915, between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria.<sup>33</sup> It would be exceedingly valuable if this hitherto undivulged *Memorandum of the Serbian Delegation* could be published and made accessible to scientific criticism.

The *Report* cites a passage in the message of Emperor Francis Joseph to his people. Although this document is the only one in which we can discover nothing to criticize, we must, nevertheless, regretfully admit that those responsible for the *Report* have quoted the text of this document incorrectly. According to the *Report*, the quoted passage reads: "It is the act of a little group of madmen"; whereas the correct text of the document reads: "The madness of a little band of misguided men cannot, however, loosen the holy bond which knits me and my peoples together. . . ." <sup>34</sup>

The *Report* also quotes a report, dated July 18, written by Count Lerchenfeld. As a matter of fact, this report

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was not written by Count Lerchenfeld himself, but by the then Chargé d' Affaires of the Bavarian Legation, Herr von Schoen. In 1922 the fact was established that this report as it appears in the Eisner publication is a "falsification."

The second report of Count Lerchenfeld, "as published by Kurt Eisner," and dated July 31, was not a report at all, but a telephone message from the Bavarian Legation in Berlin to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Munich. The Kurt Eisner text also reveals a variation from the original text, so we may conclude that the former was a falsified version of the latter.

We must not forget to point out, however, that it is Kurt Eisner, and not the men who drew up the *Report*, who should be held responsible for the falsification of the sources that have just been quoted. Whether the Commission was aware of the falsifications introduced by Eisner, who was assassinated on February 21, 1919, the writer does not know.

We shall now turn our attention to the non-official documents.

#### B. THE NON-OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

As we indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the documents involved under this heading are the following: Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum; Dr. Mühlton's memorandum; the book of the American Minister in Constantinople, Henry Morgenthau, entitled: *Secrets of the Bosphorus*, London, 1918; and the book by Basri Bey entitled: *The De-Balkanized Orient and Albania*.

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### 1. *Prince Lichnowsky's Memorandum*

Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador at London, had written down in the summer of 1916 a number of private notes which he intended for his family archives. He had penned these notes without having had at his disposal the official documents and notes belonging to the period of his official activities. These notes, to which he attached the title, *Meine Mission in London*, he sent to the director of the Hamburg-American Line, Albert Ballin; the director of the Deutsche Bank, Arthur von Gwinner; and the editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, Theodor Wolff. "Each of the three persons named kept this dangerous gift in the deepest drawer of his writing desk." wrote Theodor Wolff in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of March 25, 1918. A fourth copy, however, fell into the hands of an army Captain who, without Prince Lichnowsky's knowledge, had a number of copies of the memorandum reprinted, and sent them to various people in high positions.

Thus it came about that the memorandum found its way by some channel or other into Sweden, where, in March, 1918, it was printed in the Socialist newspaper, *Politiken*. Prince Lichnowsky's own opinion of his memorandum is clear from a letter dated March 5, 1918, dispatched by him to the German Chancellor, Count Hertling. The letter follows: <sup>35</sup>

As your Excellency well knows, a few purely personal notes of mine which I wrote down in the summer of 1918 have, through an unheard-of breach of faith, found their way into outside circulation. In ex-

planation of this affair, I beg leave to report the following:

My notes consisted for the most part of private observations on our whole foreign policy since the Congress of Berlin. In the alienation of Russia after that event and in the extension of the policy of alliances to Eastern questions, I discovered what I thought to be the real roots of the World War. Following this, I subjected our Moroccan and naval policies to a brief examination. Naturally I could not allow my mission in London to come to a close without noting down some reflections, the more so as I felt the need to record, for the sake of the future as well as for my own justification, the details of my experiences and impressions in London before they escaped my memory. These observations, which were intended, of course, for the family archives, I prepared without having at my disposal the official documents or notes pertaining to the period of my official activities. Feeling sure that their contents would be kept absolutely secret, I showed my notes to a few of my political friends in whose judgment and reliability I had equal faith. Unfortunately, one of these gentlemen, without my knowledge, gave my pamphlet to an officer assigned to the political Division of the General Staff. This officer, whom I did not know, was keenly interested in the questions involved. Completely unaware of the significance of his act, he had a number of copies of my memorandum made and sent them to various persons who, for the most part, were strangers to me. When I learned of the mischief that had been done, it was, unfortunately, too late to gather in all the copies that had been distributed. I placed myself at the disposal of Dr. Michaelis, who was then Chancellor, and expressed to him my profound regret over the entire painful affair. In constant touch with the Foreign Office, I have since been active in working as hard as possible to prevent the further dissemination of my views, but, unfortunately,

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without success. Will your Excellency kindly allow me to express once more in this form, as I have already expressed it to you orally, my keen regret over this highly provoking incident. I am sincerely and respectfully

Your Excellency's obedient servant,  
Lichnowsky.

The memorandum, therefore, cannot be regarded as a final expression of Prince Lichnowsky's views on the outbreak of the War. Certainly it is not a document which the members of the Commission should have been allowed to use as a basis for their report.<sup>36</sup>

## 2. *Dr. Mühlön's Memorandum*

This memorandum is a circular originally drawn up in the form of a letter written by a certain Dr. Mühlön who, at the time of the outbreak of the War, was a member of the board of directors of Krupp's. Copies of this letter were sent by Dr. Mühlön to various people. The time at which the original document was first drawn up is not known to the writer. According to the letter itself, Dr. Mühlön, in the second half of July, 1914, had several conferences with Dr. Helfferich and Herr Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach; and in the letter he relates various utterances which he alleges he heard from these two gentlemen and from which he drew the inference that the German Government in 1914 lacked a desire for peace. According to Schulthess' *Geschichtskalender* for the year 1918, Part I, from which the above and following data have been taken, the two gentlemen, as was stated at the meeting of the Main Committee of the Reichstag, held on March 16, 1918, expressed the opinion that in the case

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of Dr. Mühlon they had to deal with a man who was ill and nervous and who, even at the time of his official activities at Essen, had not been able to enter a room occupied by men with whom he was not acquainted, and who, after his retirement from the board of directors, had repeatedly suffered nervous breakdowns and had had to sacrifice a long period exclusively to the recovery of his health. Dr. Helfferich and Herr Krupp did not assume that Dr. Mühlon had actually wished to injure the Fatherland, but they did definitely deny the statements he had put into their mouths and from which he had tried to deduce certain conclusions. They could only describe the document he had written as pathological.

In order to give an accurate account of Dr. Mühlon's letter, which was printed in several newspapers, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of March 22, 1918, gave the following semi-official version:

According to the written statements of the two gentlemen upon whose alleged information Dr. Mühlon bases his account, the facts in the case are as follows:

Dr. Mühlon, at that time a member of the board of directors of Krupp's, had a conference in July, 1914, with Dr. Helfferich, then director of the Deutsche Bank. At this conference the latter informed Dr. Mühlon that the Deutsche Bank, on account of the threatening political situation which had followed the murder at Sarajevo, had found it necessary to delay putting through certain important business transactions concerning which there had been negotiations extending over a long period of time. In like manner Herr Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, at the beginning of July, expressed the view before those members of the board of directors who were responsible for supplying the



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Krupp firm with raw materials and food, that he considered the whole political situation that existed after the assassination of the Crown Prince and his wife sufficiently grave to make it imperative that preparations be made for any contingency that might arise. The stories with which Dr. Mühlton embellishes these facts in his letter, and the tendency of which is to place the blame for the outbreak of the War on Germany, are denied by Dr. Helfferich and Herr Krupp von Bohlen und Holbach as untrue and fantastic. The representative of the Chancellor has further added, in the Main Committee of the Reichstag, that an examination of the statements of the two gentlemen, so far as they could be tested objectively, has revealed that the alleged utterances could not have been made, since they were in irreconcilable contradiction with the facts.

In the case itself we can establish the following points:

1. Even before the outbreak of war, rumours seem to have been afloat about an alleged war council or crown council or conference taking place on Sunday, July 5, under the presidency of His Majesty, the Kaiser, and participated in by representatives of Austria-Hungary. These rumours were without foundation. Neither on July 5 nor any other day during that time did such a council meet.

2. The negotiations with Austria-Hungary concerning the difficult situation created by the murder at Sarajevo were carried on exclusively by the Foreign Office. The constitutionally qualified officials of the Government alone are responsible, formally and actually, for the course of these negotiations.

3. The policy of the Imperial Government, in full agreement with the aims of His Majesty, the Kaiser, was directed from the beginning toward the maintenance of peace. Of course, peace could not and ought not to have been purchased at the cost of abandoning the dual Austro-Hungarian empire. Convinced that in

an embarrassing situation clarity and frankness was the best policy to pursue, the Imperial Government did not let a single doubt arise as to its position concerning Austria-Hungary.

4. No less clearly did the Imperial Government let it be known, to the Russian Government particularly, that a Russian mobilization meant not only an immediate German mobilization, but, for pressing reasons, war. Within these limits, dictated by considerations of alliance, duty, and self-preservation, the Kaiser and his Government, as was frequently demonstrated, did everything humanly possible up to the last minute to avert the catastrophe. The Sukhomlinov trial has incontestably shown, even to the doubters for whom German statements and documents do not suffice, where the responsibility for the world conflagration rests.

The above information must be sufficient to show to what erroneous conclusions the authors of the *Report* must have come when they used the aforementioned account of Dr. Mühlön. Besides this so-called Mühlön memorandum there is another publication by this same man which appeared in French in book form and was entitled: *L'Europe Dévastée* (Devastated Europe). This book was also widely circulated by the propaganda agencies of the Allies.<sup>37</sup> We do not know whether Dr. Mühlön's book, in addition to his memorandum, was used by the members of the Commission as source material.

### 3. *The Remaining Non-Official Documents*

As stated once before, we are referring here to the book written by the American Ambassador at Constantinople, Henry Morgenthau, and entitled: *The Secrets of the Bosphorus*. With this particular publication we are not ac-

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quainted. We have in our possession, however, a book entitled: *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, prepared by the Ambassador with the assistance of Mr. Burton J. Hendrick, and published by Doubleday, Page and Company, of New York, in 1918. We have also a French translation of this book under the title: *Mémoires de l' Ambassadeur Morgenthau*, which was published in Paris by Payot et Cie. We have discovered that the subject-matter of both publications involved here is the same, the publication used by the Commission having been issued merely under a different title.

As for Morgenthau's book itself, we should like to refer the reader to the trenchant criticism written by the American historian, Sidney B. Fay, entitled: "Mr. Morgenthau's Legend of the Potsdam Crown Council," which appeared in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, February, 1925, and to page 203 in the second volume of the well-known book by Fay *The Origins of the World War*. The proceeding at the alleged Potsdam Council have been treated in most detailed fashion by Dr. Kurt Jagow in the August 1928 number of *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*.

Unfortunately we have not been able to obtain the remaining document mentioned in the *Report*: Basri Bey's *The De-Balkanized Orient and Albania*. We cannot, therefore, pass any judgment; even though it should prove to be a reliable source, it could not have contained anything of a definitive nature to support the verdict pronounced in the *Report*.

\*                         \*  
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We have now concluded our observations. The most important basis for the judgment laid down in the *Report*

was furnished by the coloured Books issued during the War. These publications from start to finish contained, as we have shown, only a small fragment of the documentary material available; and the individual documents were abridged and disfigured by various omissions and transpositions in the text. The coloured Books of the three great Powers: England, Russia, and France, clearly show a tendency to leave out anything that might throw an unfavourable light on their own policies, or that might tend to exculpate the Central Powers. The *French Yellow Book*, in addition to the foregoing characteristics, contains forged documents which serve the same purpose. The remaining official documents are characterized, in part, by incorrect texts based upon falsifications, for which the Commission, we admit, cannot be held responsible. In the selection of the non-official documents the Commission betrayed an evident effort to utilize material of whose extremely doubtful value they must have been aware.

We thus arrive at the conclusion that the Commission utilized for its report on the responsibility of the Central Powers for the World War, material that was extremely incomplete, full of gaps, tendencious, erroneous, and partly falsified. This is, indeed, a very harsh judgment; but, as we believe we have shown, it is one quite in accord with the facts.

It is evident that on the basis of such material no verdict of even moderate soundness could have been pronounced concerning responsibility for the War. Moreover, it must be pointed out that the condemned nations were not allowed to defend themselves, and that the material placed at the disposal of the Commis-

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sion constituted, therefore, the sole basis of the verdict.

The establishment of this point has led to a controversy in the August number of the New York review *Current History*.<sup>38</sup> The authors of the report were asked by the editor of this periodical, Mr. Ochs-Oakes, to define their attitude to my thesis that the report was founded on forged material. Answers were received from Lord Hanworth, André Tardieu, the Frenchman Larnaude, the Belgian Baron Rolin Jacquemyns, the Polish Ambassador in London, Skirmund, and the Pole Leon Lubienski. All with the exception of Baron Rolin Jacquemyns begged the question. Baron Rolin argued that even if the documents had been forged the verdict depended less on the documents than a consideration of the events as they took place "behind the scenes." From M. Poincaré's statement, however, we now know that even men like Poincaré and Viviani, and later the cabinets and the public opinion of the world, were confirmed in their false conception of the happenings.

My accusation therefor remains unrefuted and I add to it with the full force of my whole-hearted conviction: Paragraph 231 of the Versailles Peace Treaty was based to a large extent on a fundamental deception supported by the editors of the *Yellow Book* by means of a forged document.

In the next chapter we shall show how erroneous the *Report* was.

#### NOTES FOR CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup> Hutchinson and Co.—Tr.

<sup>2</sup> There is an English edition of these documents entitled: *Outbreak of*

*the World War—German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky*, Published in one volume, under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, by the Oxford University Press, New York, 1924.—Tr.

<sup>3</sup> Consult the article by August Bach entitled: "Das erste deutsche Weissbuch" (The First German White Book) in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, November, 1925.

<sup>4</sup> *German Documents*, No. 361. [The translation of passages from the *German Documents* has been taken from the volume published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.—Tr.]

<sup>5</sup> *German Documents*, No. 395.

<sup>6</sup> *German Documents*, No. 396.

<sup>7</sup> In this number are included a few documents which had already been published in 1915.

<sup>8</sup> *Die Britischen Amtlichen Dokumente über den Ursprung des Weltkrieges 1898–1914*, Hermann Lutz, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, Berlin, 1926. [*British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914*, edited by Gooch and Temperley, London, 1926.—Tr.]

<sup>9</sup> No. 84. (As noted in the *British Documents*).

<sup>10</sup> The following note occurs in the English publication of the *British Documents*: \* "In the *Blue Book* this passage was omitted (see Introduction, p. VII). By an oversight, however, a reference to it was left in the table of contents. The attention of the Office having been drawn to this fact by a German scholar in the spring of 1924, the text of the missing passage was communicated to him with the permission of the Secretary of State. The passage has therefore since then been published in Germany." (Cf. Friedrich Stieve, *Iswolski und der Weltkrieg*—p. 213, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, Berlin, 1925). [Eng. ed: *Iswolsky and the World War*, G. Allen and Unwin, London, 1926.—Tr.]

<sup>11</sup> This sentence was reprinted in highly paraphrased form in the *Blue Book* of 1914.

<sup>12</sup> In the *Blue Book* of 1914 the word, "forthwith," was added.

<sup>13</sup> Instead of the words, "European peace," the *Blue Book* of 1914 contained the words, "the whole peace of Europe."

<sup>14</sup> In the *Blue Book* of 1914 the paragraph beginning with the words, "Austrian Government," and ending with the words, "five days," came before the preceding paragraph.

<sup>15</sup> The "Minutes" subjoined to this Document have been omitted here.

<sup>16</sup> No. 105. (As noted in the *British Documents*.)

<sup>17</sup> No. 102. (As noted in the *British Documents*.)

<sup>18</sup> [Note.—In raising this question the French Ambassador was acting without instructions from his Government. It was merely a private observation arising out of his own personal interpretation of the situation (see Introduction, p. xii).] (As noted in the *British Documents*.)

<sup>19</sup> The text of the original Document as it now appears in the recent

edition of the *British Documents* reads: "secure of support of France."

In the *Blue Book* of 1914 it reads: "if she feels secure of the support of France."

<sup>20</sup> The corresponding English words are: ". . . are now fully committed . . ."

<sup>21</sup> Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte.

<sup>22</sup> Ludendorff: *Französische Fälschung meiner Denkschrift von 1912 über den drohenden Krieg* (The French Falsification of My Memorandum of 1912 on the Imminence of War). Ein Beitrag zur "Schuld" am Kriege (A Contribution to the Question of War Guilt). Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1919.

<sup>23</sup> Raymond Poincaré: *Au Service de la France*, Vol. II, entitled: *L'Union Sacrée* Librairie Plon, Paris, 1927, p. 445. [There is an English translation and adaptation of this work with the title: *The Memoirs of Raymond Poincaré*, W. Heinemann Ltd., London, 1926-1929.—Tr.]

<sup>24</sup> "Les Responsabilités de la Guerre." Quatorze Questions par Reué Gervis, quatorze réponses par Raymond Poincaré. Payof, Paris 1930.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Baron von Romberg: *Die Fälschungen des russischen Orangebuches*, Walter de Gruyter and Co., Berlin, 1922. [English edition: *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*, Baron von Romberg, B. W. Huebsch, Inc., N. Y., 1923.—Tr.]

<sup>26</sup> Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte.

<sup>27</sup> Bienvenu-Martin, French Minister of Justice, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during Viviani's visit in St. Petersburg.

<sup>28</sup> The last three words are missing in the Romberg publication. [That is to say, the words in the Romberg publication corresponding to the above clause: "that it was to the advantage of the Powers to localize the affair by leaving it to the interested parties," rendered into English would read: "that it was to the advantage of the Powers to leave the affair to the interested parties."—Tr.]

<sup>29</sup> Berthelot.

<sup>30</sup> *Serbian Blue Book*, No. 52. [In translating documents from the various colored Books of 1914-15, as quoted by the author, the translator has followed closely the English edition: *Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War*, containing the British, French, Russian, Belgian, Serbian, German, and Austrian Books, printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office by Harrison and Sons, London, 1915. The reader may also consult an American edition of these colored Books, entitled: *Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War*, edited by James B. Scott, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, N. Y., 1916.—Tr.]

<sup>31</sup> *London Times*, May 1, 1922. See also p. 216.

<sup>32</sup> Field-Marshal Conrad: *Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906-1918* (My Period of Service 1906-1918), Rikola-Verlag, Vienna, 1922, III, p. 673.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Pribram: *Austrian Foreign Policy 1908-18*, London, 1923, pp.

90–91; Burian: *Drei Jahre aus der Zeit meiner Amstführung im Kriege*, Berlin, 1923, p. 104. [There is an English edition of Burian's work entitled: *Austria in Dissolution*, E. Benn, London, 1925.—Tr.]

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Schulthess' *Europäischer Geschichtskalender* (Calendar of European History), 1914, Part I, p. 463. C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Munich.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 1919, Part I, pp. 120 ff.

<sup>36</sup> For a criticism of Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum we refer the reader to the observations made by Foreign Minister von Jagow on March 20, 1918, published in the *Vossische Zeitung*, March 24, 1918. The Commission should have paid some attention to this criticism. [The Lichnowsky memorandum and that of Dr. Mühlton, together with von Jagow's observations on the former, may be found in *The Disclosures from Germany*, American Association for International Conciliation, N. Y., 1918.—Tr.]

<sup>37</sup> Presumably the book referred to here is the one which appeared in English under the title: *The Vandal of Europe*, An Expose of the Inner Workings of Germany's Policy of World Domination, and its Brutalizing Consequences, G. P. Putnam's Sons, N. Y., 1918.—Tr.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. my essay "The War Guilt Question" (*Die Kriegsschuldfrage*), volume 1928, p. 825 seq.



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### CHAPTER III

#### *A REFUTATION OF THE INDICTMENT AND THE VERDICT*



IN the following chapter we propose to subject the *Report* to a critical examination, on the basis of the publications and the results of research into the war guilt question that are available today. For our purpose we have divided up the *Report* into twenty-one articles of indictment which we shall treat separately in critical fashion. For the most part the sentence sequence of the *Report* has been retained, single items in the indictment having been changed about only in such cases where greater unity was thereby secured for purposes of review. We reproduce the charges separately according to the exact text of the *Report*,<sup>1</sup> in each case placing the accusation under a special heading to the section containing the refutation.<sup>2</sup> For this reason the foot-notes, enclosed in parentheses, are included in the text of the *Report*.

In the *Report* the charges brought against Germany and Austria are contained in a special Section, "A," and those against Turkey and Bulgaria, in Section "B." We shall leave out of consideration the charges brought against Turkey and Bulgaria, and confine ourselves to the Section dealing with Germany and Austria.

## A. GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

*1. Emperor William Ceases to Pose as the Champion of Peace*

*Many months before the crisis of 1914, the German Emperor had ceased to pose as the champion of peace. Naturally believing in the overwhelming superiority of his Army, he openly showed his enmity towards France. General von Moltke said to the King of the Belgians: "This time the matter must be settled." In vain the King protested. The Emperor and his Chief of Staff remained no less fixed in their attitude. (Yellow Book; Mr. Cambon to Mr. Pichon, Berlin, November 22, 1913.)*

First of all, let us point out a slight infelicity in the very first words of the *Report*. We catch the experts at Versailles asserting something about the rôle that Emperor William played in German politics which does not accord at all with the conception which they otherwise entertain of this rôle. If, as the *Report* states, the German Emperor ceased some months before the July crisis to pose as the "champion of peace," it follows indirectly but none the less unmistakably that in the minds of the authors of the *Report* he had also worked up to that time in the interests of peace. Hence the contention that Germany had long been preparing for war falls to the ground; otherwise, it must be admitted that the Kaiser had wielded no influence on the policies of the Imperial Government. This, however, the judges at Versailles would be the last to concede, since in another place they have particularly accused the Kaiser of having conducted an autocratic régime.

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As proof that Emperor William “many months before the crisis of 1914 . . . openly showed his enmity towards France,” part of a conversation between General von Moltke and the King of the Belgians is cited. The conversation, however, is quoted erroneously in the *Report*. The facts are these:

On November 22, 1913, the French Ambassador at Berlin, Jules Cambon, had informed the Quai d’Orsay that the King of the Belgians had been conversing with the Kaiser and von Moltke on the subject of Franco-German relations. During the conversation the following words were alleged to have been uttered by von Moltke: “For this time matters must be settled, and Your Majesty [the King of the Belgians.—Author] has no idea of the tremendous enthusiasm that will fill the whole German nation on that day.”

When the German Government learned of Jules Cambon’s communication, in December, 1914, after the publication of the *French Yellow Book*,<sup>3</sup> Foreign Minister von Jagow asked General von Moltke for an explanation. Moltke reported on December 18, 1914, as follows:<sup>4</sup> “I deny with all emphasis having said that I considered that war was necessary and inevitable, or that *cette fois il faut en finir* (this time we must settle the matter).”

The King of Belgium has never publicly acknowledged the opinions which he is said to have uttered in the conversation with von Moltke. On the contrary, in May, 1914, the King expressed the following opinion concerning the conversation in question to the German Military Attaché, Major von Klüber: “I also understood very well the significance of what General von Moltke told me in Potsdam and what you are repeating to me now. I too consider the

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French menace extremely grave, and so do the nobility and a large majority of the clerical party.”<sup>5</sup>

Emperor William strove until the summer of 1914 to better the relations with France. As proof of this, we need only refer to one of the last attempts made by the Kaiser in that direction. In the spring of 1914 he invited Briand to Kiel, but Briand, pleading the excuse that he was too “busy with parliamentary duties,” declined the invitation.<sup>6</sup> Thimme conjectures not without good reason that Paléologue thwarted Briand’s visit by his “allusion to the danger of falling a victim to the fascinating charms of Emperor William.”<sup>7</sup> Poincaré also dissuaded Briand from going to Kiel.<sup>8</sup>

The statement in the *Report* that the Kaiser’s departure from a policy of peace was founded upon his belief in the overwhelming superiority of his army, does not accord with the facts, though this contention received wide publicity both before and during the War. Let us just glance at the following figures taken from Count Montgelas’s well-known computation<sup>9</sup> of the war strength of the European Powers at the outbreak of hostilities:

For France and Russia the combined military strength of the first and second line troops in 1914 amounted to 5,070,000 men; for Germany and Austria, 3,358,000. This gave France and Russia an advantage of 1,712,000 soldiers.

Furthermore, according to French investigations the overwhelming superiority of the German Army was non-existent, as the book by General Buat: *L’Armée Allemande pendant la Guerre de 1914–1918*<sup>10</sup> (The German Army during the War of 1914–1918) convincingly makes clear. The opinion of this French general deserves

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special consideration, since he held during the War the position of Chief of the Division of Operations, on the French General Staff. M. Briand, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, too, in his speech in the Chamber, delivered on Nov. 30, 1927, gave the peace strength of the French Army in 1914 (Home and Colonial Forces) as alone amounting to 990,000 men.<sup>11</sup>

By way of summary, therefore, it may be asserted that the conclusion expressed by the authors of the *Report*, that Emperor William had shown a hostile attitude towards France many months before the War, cannot be deduced from the conversations quoted, or from any other sources. In fact, it was just the other way around.

## 2. *The Assassination at Sarajevo*

*On the 28th of June, 1914, occurred the assassination at Sarajevo of the heir-apparent of Austria. "It is the act of a little group of madmen," said Francis Joseph. (Message to his people.) The act, committed as it was by a subject of Austria-Hungary on Austro-Hungarian territory, could in no wise compromise Serbia, which very correctly expressed its condolences (Serbian Blue Book, p. 30) and stopped public rejoicings in Belgrade. If the Government of Vienna thought that there was any Serbian complicity, Serbia was ready (Yellow Book, No. 15; Mr. Cambon to Mr. Bienvenu-Martin, July 21, 1914) to seek out the guilty parties. But this attitude failed to satisfy Austria and still less Germany, who, after their first astonishment had passed, saw in this royal and national misfortune a pretext to initiate war.*

This very brief account of the assassination at Sarajevo, which led to the World War, does not accord entirely with the facts.

The sentence quoted from Francis Joseph's message to his people, "It is the act of a little group of madmen," does not correspond to the text of the Emperor's message, as we have already shown in Chapter II. For sixty-five years Francis Joseph had shared joy and sorrow in common with his people; and the fact that in his message he tended to limit the responsibility of the Bosnian people for the assassination to a little group of madmen, signifies merely that the grey-haired old monarch, even in those difficult days, still retained his nobility of mind. The Commission that sat in judgment on the Sarajevo crime certainly descended to a reprehensible practice when it used these words, misquoted too as they were, for the purpose of sidetracking the search for the real culprits.

That Francis Joseph later understood who the real instigators of the crime were is revealed in his correspondence with the German Emperor, in which he says:<sup>12</sup> "Investigations carried on to date have shown that the bloody deed of Sarajevo is not the work of a single individual but the result of a well-organised plot, the threads of which reach to Belgrade, and though it may be impossible to prove the complicity of the Servian Government, there can be no doubt whatever that this Government's policy, intent as it is to unite all South-Slavs under the Servian flag, must encourage such crimes. . . ."

Even if it is true, as the *Report* further states, that the Serbian Government very correctly expressed its condolences,<sup>13</sup> the statement that Belgrade forbade public rejoicings must be contrasted with the report of June 29,

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of the Austrian Chargé d’Affaires in Belgrade, von Storck, who related: “The news arrived at about 5 o’clock; the Servian Government at about 10 o’clock caused the Obilic festivities to be officially stopped. They continued, however, unofficially for a considerable time after it was dark. The accounts of eye-witnesses say that people fell into one another’s arms in delight, and remarks were heard, such as ‘It serves them right, we have been expecting this for a long time,’ or ‘This is revenge for the annexation.’ ”<sup>14</sup>

The declaration of the Serbian Government, as mentioned in the *Report*, that it was ready to seek out the guilty parties if the Government of Vienna thought that there was any complicity, was not made until July 20, and hence only a few days before the delivery of the Austrian note. Viewed in the light of our present-day detailed information about the period prior to the assassination at Sarajevo,<sup>15</sup> this step appears as a last-minute attempt on the part of the Serbian Government to avoid an unpleasant inquiry on Serbian territory, as a result of its complicity in the murder. In von Storck’s report of June 30, 1914, to Count Berchtold, we have strikingly revealed to us how little on the day after the assassination the Serbian Government troubled itself about finding out who the assassins were. Von Storck reported:

To-day I sent an enquiry to Herr Grouitch, General Secretary of the Foreign Office, asking the obvious question what measures the Royal police had taken, or proposed to take, in order to run down the threads of the assassination which notoriously lead to Servia.

The answer was that the matter has not yet engaged the attention of the Servian police.<sup>16</sup>

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Grouitch's information of June 30 may be defended on the grounds that probably the Serbian police had not done anything up to that time simply because they had been negligent. However, later utterances made by the General Secretary of the Serbian Foreign Office in the presence of the English Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, Mr. Crackanthorpe, who thereupon reported to his Government that "of Princip the Servian Government knew nothing,"<sup>17</sup> prove that the Serbian Government purposely did not stir a finger in order to expose the perpetrators of the murder. In fact, as we now know, the Serbian Government knowingly and deliberately allowed the false impression to spread that it had no opportunity to attend to the case.<sup>18</sup> It is significant, too, as showing the attitude of the Serbian Government that even as early as June 29, that is to say, one day after the assassination, the Serbian Minister at Petersburg, M. Spalaikovitch, had a report published in the Russian Press to the effect that the organization that had prepared the Crime, viz., the "Black Hand," was an "invention" of political circles in Vienna.<sup>18a</sup> One must, moreover, regard this attempt to deceive as a very clumsy piece of work, seeing that even in Austria no one had as yet hit on the idea that the conspiracy had originated with the "Black Hand."

It is obvious that the attitude shown by the Serbian Government toward the assassination could not satisfy Austria. When, however, the authors of the *Report* conclude from this that Serbia's attitude was Germany's excuse for starting a war, they draw a conclusion which is not only arbitrary and mischievous, but is one which stands contradicted by the whole conduct of the German Government during the July crisis.





THE LATIN BRIDGE (LATEINERBRUECKE) IN SARAJEVO



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The facts concerning the assassination at Sarajevo, Seton-Watson and the then Serbian Prime Minister, M. Pashitch, to the contrary notwithstanding, are clearly and unmistakably revealed by M. Ljuba Jovanovitch, who was Serbian Minister of Education at the time of the assassination, in his article in the book, *The Blood of Slavdom*.<sup>19</sup> He says:

I do not remember whether it was at the end of May or the beginning of June, when one day M. Pashitch said to us (he conferred on these matters more particularly with Stojan Protitch, who was then Minister of the Interior; but this much he said to the rest of us) that certain persons were making ready to go to Sarajevo to murder Francis Ferdinand who was to go there to be solemnly received on *Vidov-Dan*. [St. Vitus's Day, June 28: the anniversary of the battle of Kosovo, and a national Serb festival.—Tr.] As I was told afterwards, this plot was hatched by a group of secretly organized persons and by patriotic Bosno-Herzegovinian students in Belgrade. M. Pashitch and the rest of us said, and Stojan agreed, that he should issue instructions to the frontier authorities on the Drina to prevent the crossing over of the youths, who had already set out from Belgrade for that purpose. But the frontier "authorities" themselves belonged to the organization, and did not carry out Stojan's instructions, but reported to him (as he afterwards told us) that the instructions had reached them too late, because the youths had already crossed over.

Thus the Government's endeavour to prevent the execution of the plot failed. So too did the endeavour made on his own initiative by our Minister in Vienna, M. Jova Jovanovitch, who, in an interview with Minister Bilinski, sought to have the Archduke dissuaded from taking the fatal journey which he was contemplating. And so the attempt at Sarajevo was to be car-

ried out, in more terrible measure than had been anticipated, and with results which no one could then have pictured even in his wildest dreams. . . .

On the afternoon of *Vidov-Dan* I was in my house on the Senjak. About five o'clock an official telephoned to me from the Press Bureau and told me what had happened at noon at Sarajevo. *Even though I knew what had been planned there,*<sup>20</sup> I felt, as I held the receiver, as if some one had dealt me an unexpected blow; and when a little later the first report was confirmed from other quarters, I began to be overwhelmed with grave anxiety.

From the statements of Ljuba Jovanovitch here quoted, we may conclude that the Serbian Government knew about the assassination weeks before it took place; and as is shown by the entire conduct of the Serbian Government in 1914, it made only a half-hearted attempt *pro forma* to halt the assassins at the border. Then, later, when the report came that the assassins had already crossed the border, the Serbian Government sat back and let matters run their own course. A warning to Vienna did not follow.<sup>20a</sup>

All attempts that have been made so far to give a new meaning to these convincing words of Ljuba Jovanovitch have been notoriously unsuccessful. These same words, which so seriously incriminate the Serbian Government, were confirmed again by Ljuba Jovanovitch on April 26, 1926, before the Radical Club in Belgrade.<sup>21</sup> His testimony, singularly important in its bearing on the war guilt question, has been pointedly referred to in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*.<sup>22</sup>

The joint knowledge and co-responsibility of the Serbian Government in 1914 is the pivotal center around



SEAL OF THE "BLACK HAND"  
(SCHWARZEN HAND)



which the "Versailles Thesis of War Guilt" may be raised off its hinges, and we will never cease to hammer away at this point.

The assassination at Sarajevo, therefore, was by no means "the act of a little group of madmen," of youthful, revolutionary Bosnians, but was the result of Pan-Serbian propaganda which had been carried on systematically since the annexation of the Provinces and had its seat in Belgrade. Having been planned for a long time by the "Black Hand," the assassination was carried out with the joint knowledge and tacit toleration of the Serbian Government. The task of organizing the details lay in the blood-stained hands of the same Serbian officers—Dimitrijeviitch Apis, and Tankositch—who were actively involved in the brutal murder of King Alexander and Queen Draga in 1903, which provoked the entire world, England especially, to extreme anger. In 1914, and at the Peace Conference in 1919, this abhorrence for a crime which was scarcely less atrocious than that of 1903, was missing. Bernard Shaw is really right when he says that the World War would not have broken out if people had become more indignant in 1914 over the murder of two persons.

### *3. The Vienna Ultimatum and the Berlin Government*

*At Potsdam a "decisive consultation" took place on the 5th of July, 1914. (Lichnowsky memoir.) Vienna and Berlin decided upon this plan: "Vienna will send to Belgrade a very emphatic ultimatum with a very short limit of time." (Dr. Muehlon's memoir.)*

*The Bavarian Minister, von Lerchenfeld, said in a confidential dispatch dated the 18th of July, 1914, the*

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*facts stated in which have never been officially denied: "It is clear that Serbia can not accept the demands, which are inconsistent with the dignity of an independent state." (Report of July 18, 1914.) Count Lerchenfeld reveals in this report that, at the time it was made, the ultimatum to Serbia had been jointly decided upon by the Governments of Berlin and Vienna; that they were waiting to send it until President Poincaré and Mr. Viviani should have left for St. Petersburg; and that no illusions were cherished, either at Berlin or Vienna, as to the consequences which this threatening measure would involve. It was perfectly well known that war would be the result.*

*The Bavarian Minister explains, moreover, that the only fear of the Berlin Government was that Austria-Hungary might hesitate and draw back at the last minute, and that on the other hand Serbia, on the advice of France and Great Britain, might yield to the pressure put upon her. Now, "the Berlin Government considers that war is necessary." Therefore, it gave full powers to Count Berchtold, who instructed the Ballplatz on the 18th of July, 1914, to negotiate with Bulgaria to induce her to enter into an alliance and to participate in the War.*

The notion that at the consultation at Potsdam on July 5, 1914, the plan was decided upon to have Vienna send to Belgrade a very emphatic and concisely phrased ultimatum, anticipates decisions that were not made until later. At any rate, the official documents dealing with the Potsdam Conference that are available today contain nothing to corroborate Dr. Mühlson's opinion, cited here as proof.<sup>23</sup>

Let us now turn to the Report of July 18,<sup>24</sup> which in the



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*Report* is ascribed to Count Lerchenfeld, but which was, in fact, not his, but was written by the then Bavarian Chargé d'Affaires, von Schoen. The authors of the *Report* should have known this fact, since the Bavarian Legation in Berlin had printed a communication corroborating it in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of November 25, 1918. Unfortunately the Bavarian Legation neglected at this time to disclose the additional fact that the contents of the Bavarian Legation's Report as published by Kurt Eisner in the *Bayerischer Staatsanzeiger* do not agree with the contents of the real *Report*.<sup>25</sup> The correct text was not published until August 10, 1919—hence after the signing of the Peace Treaty—in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.<sup>26</sup>

At the Fechenbach trial it was established that the von Schoen Report used by the authors of the *Report* represented a falsified version by Kurt Eisner. On comparing it with the original, we discover that many important passages were omitted or abridged.

Let us now quote the opinion of Professor Edouard Dujardin, of the Sorbonne. While the Fechenbach trial was on, he, along with other foreign authorities, was interested in the question whether the omissions were to be regarded as falsifications. Professor Dujardin concludes:

According to the complete reproduction of all those passages in the von Schoen Report which involve Germany's collaboration in drafting the note to Serbia, it is evident that the individual who published the von Schoen Report in the *Bayerische Staatszeitung* did not omit certain passages that were couched in verbose diplomatic language—whose omission under any circumstances would have been easily understood—but did leave out exactly those passages wherein the German

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Government was represented as resolved on the one hand to localize the conflict, and on the other, to refrain from any mobilization of her troops and to persuade Austria to refrain from a general mobilization.

This individual, therefore, did not commit the falsification which consists in changing a word; he has committed that infinitely more serious one which consists in falsifying the meaning of a document by leaving out an essential part. We cannot call that the thoughtless lying of a corner loafer; it is the low trickery of an Escobar.

In brief, my opinion is that the text as published in the *Bayerische Staatszeitung* is one of the most notorious and infamous falsifications in all history.<sup>27</sup>

The decision of the Vienna Government to send an ultimatum to Serbia did not come up before the Cabinet Council until July 7, and then only as a suggestion advanced by Count Tisza. Berchtold wanted the basis for any action against Serbia to be based jointly on the policy of the Serbian Government and the assassination.<sup>28</sup> Not until July 11 did Tschirschky, in a private dispatch, impart to von Jagow the information that Vienna had made the decision to send Belgrade a note containing specific demands.<sup>29</sup>

The *Report* is not in accord with historical facts when it draws the conclusion from the "Lerchenfeld Report" that the ultimatum to Serbia had been jointly decided upon by the Governments of Berlin and Vienna. In the Schoen Report three demands that were to be contained in the ultimatum to Serbia were cited. Comparing these demands in the form in which they are worded by Schoen, with the actual text of the ultimatum, one is immediately struck by the fact that the precise wording of the two documents dif-

fers very sharply. As to the general tenor of the terms of the ultimatum, the German Government, as we have seen, was well informed; the decision to send the ultimatum, however, as well as the very important wording of it, was solely the work of the Vienna Cabinet. As for the rest, the English and French Governments were at least as accurately informed beforehand about the contents of the ultimatum as the German Government was.<sup>30</sup>

The passage in the *Report*, stating that the ultimatum was not to be sent until Poincaré had started on his journey, has not been garbled through Eisner's abbreviated version, but rather through the fact that the authors of the *Report* have left out the reason for the postponement. The reason why the ultimatum was not to be delivered until Poincaré had left St. Petersburg was "in order not to facilitate an agreement between the Dual Alliance Powers on any possible counter-action";<sup>31</sup> in other words, to insure the localization of the conflict, which Germany desired.

How seriously the German Government expected that the war could be limited to an Austro-Serbian affair, which is contrary to the impression given by the *Report*, is brought out again in an omitted passage in the Lerchenfeld Report, so dearly cherished by the authors of the *Report*. The passage reads:

Russia's attitude, above everything else, will be of decisive weight in determining the question whether the war can be localized.

If Russia under no circumstances wants war with Germany and Austria, then—and this is the most favourable factor in the present situation—she can remain inactive, and remind the Serbians that she does

not approve, any more than do the other Powers, of bomb throwing and revolver shooting as methods of agitation. Especially might Russia do this so long as Austria does not threaten Serbia's national independence. . . .

In the interest of localizing the conflict, the Imperial Government will initiate diplomatic action on the part of the Great Powers as soon as the Austrian Note is presented at Belgrade.<sup>32</sup>

In order to refute the contention in the *Report* that Berlin and Vienna were fully convinced that war would result if the ultimatum were dispatched—here again no distinction is made between a war with Serbia and a world war, though there is no doubt that a world war is meant—it will suffice to quote from the Schoen Report one passage which, owing to Eisner's omissions, was known to the Allied Commission only in a garbled form:

England will not prevent Austria from calling Serbia to account. She will scarcely, however, permit the country to be destroyed; on the contrary—true to her traditions—she will presumably interfere as a champion of the principle of nationalism. A war between the Dual Alliance and the Triple Alliance would be little relished by England at the present time, in view of the situation in Ireland.<sup>33</sup>

There would be nothing objectionable to the passage in the *Report* which reads: "Serbia, on the advice of France and Great Britain, might yield to the pressure put upon her," if the Commission had not gone so far as to insert before this remark the clause, "the only fear of the Berlin Government was." The Schoen Report merely states: "They would have liked it even better here, if

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action against Serbia had not been so long delayed, and if the Serbian Government had not been given time to make an offer of satisfaction on its own account, perhaps acting under Russo-French pressure.”

The statement, “the Berlin Government considers that war is necessary,” constitutes one of the most serious defects in the *Report*, since the drafters of the *Report* did not make clear what they really meant by war: whether a world war or an Austro-Serbian war. One cannot emphasize strongly enough the intentional ambiguity about this extraordinarily important point. The German Government, of course, regarded a war by Austria against Serbia as unavoidable, but only under the condition, as the Schoen Report also sets forth, that such a war were localized. To quote from this Report:

Herr Zimmermann takes for granted that both England and France, neither of whom desires war at this time, will exert a pacifying influence on Russia; moreover, he counts on the fact that “bluffing” is one of the most cherished requisites of Russian policy, and that Russia likes very much to threaten with the sword, but at the decisive moment hesitates to draw it on behalf of others.<sup>34</sup>

In similar fashion Foreign Minister von Jagow expressed himself in a private letter to Prince Lichnowsky on July 18.<sup>35</sup> He said:

We must attempt to localize the conflict between Austria and Serbia. Whether we shall succeed in this will depend first on Russia, and secondly on the moderating influence of Russia’s Allies. The more determined Austria shows herself, the more energetically we support her, so much the more quiet will Russia

remain. To be sure, there will be some agitation in Petersburg, but, on the whole, Russia is not ready to strike at present. Nor will France or England be anxious for war at the present time.

As for the statement in the *Report* that the Ballhausplatz was instructed by Berlin as early as July 18 to enter into negotiations with Bulgaria, it must first of all be said that the *Report* is quite arbitrary about the date. The facts in the case were briefly as follows:

The idea that Austria should enter into an alliance with Bulgaria came from Vienna, and appeared in documentary form for the first time in the memorandum and autograph-letter which Count Hoyos delivered in Berlin on July 5. The wishes of the Berlin Government in the matter were complied with, although very unwillingly. After the cabinet meeting of July 7, Vienna in return gave up the plan of entering into treaty negotiations with Bulgaria, and informed Berlin of this decision also. How little Berlin concerned itself in the subsequent period with treaty negotiations between Vienna and Sofia, is apparent from the fact that on July 26 Foreign Minister von Jagow inquired of Tschirschky "how far transactions between Vienna and Sofia concerning drawing Bulgaria into the Triple Alliance have been carried, and whether there are in existence any agreements as to Bulgaria's eventual intervention, in the event of the extension of the conflict."

#### 4. *The Kaiser's North Sea Cruise*

*In order to mask this understanding, it was arranged that the Emperor should go for a cruise in the North Sea, and that the Prussian Minister of War should go for a*

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*holiday, so that the Imperial Government might pretend that events had taken it completely by surprise.*

On this point we can confine ourselves to some information given in the *Bemerkungen* (Observations) of the Committee of Four.<sup>36</sup>

The Kaiser began the North Sea cruise on July 6, the date having already been set a long time back. Consequently it is not correct to say that it had been "arranged" that the Kaiser should go for a cruise in the North Sea in order to mask the understanding between the German and Austrian Governments concerning the conflict between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia. The same might be said of the Prussian War Minister's vacation, since General von Falkenhayn had asked for his leave of absence on July 2, three days before the conversations in Berlin began.

Though its source is not indicated, the above-mentioned statement in the *Report* is to be traced presumably to a passage in the Schoen Report which Eisner shortened but whose contents he gave correctly in the following words: "It [the Imperial German Government—Tr.] will claim that Austria's action has been just as much of a surprise to it as to the other Powers, pointing out the fact that the Emperor is on his northern journey and that the Prussian Minister of War, as well as the Chief of the Grand General Staff, are away on leave of absence."

On what authority Schoen bases this statement cannot be determined. It is sufficient to know, however, that Schoen's information was not corroborated in the text of the instructions which the Chancellor sent on July 21 to the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, Paris, and London.<sup>37</sup>

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In the circular dispatch containing these instructions the claim expected by Schoen is not made.

### 5. *Austria's Ultimatum to Serbia*

*Austria suddenly sent Serbia an ultimatum that she had carefully prepared in such a way as to make it impossible to accept. Nobody could be deceived; "the whole world understands that this ultimatum means war."* (*Lichnowsky memoir.*) According to Mr. Sazonoff, "Austria-Hungary wanted to devour Serbia." (*Austro-Hungarian Red Book*, No. 16.)

It is not true that Austria "suddenly" sent Serbia an ultimatum. On the contrary, it was clear to all Serbians after the assassination that Austria would present very drastic demands to their Government; and people in the Entente countries were likewise aware that Austria would take vigorous action.

As early as July 15, the British Ambassador at Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, was in a position to give the British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, from a private source of information, a "forecast of what was about to happen."<sup>38</sup>

On July 16, the action that Austria would take against Serbia was exhaustively discussed at a soirée in the home of Countess Kleinmichel in St. Petersburg.<sup>39</sup>

On July 20, 1914, the French Government was informed of the imminent action about to be taken by Austria against Belgrade, through a consular report which contained astonishingly exact and detailed information about the contents and form of the ultimatum.<sup>40</sup>

The ultimatum, therefore, did not come as a complete



surprise either to the Great Powers or to Serbia, but, on the contrary, actually came later than was expected.

The statement that the ultimatum had been prepared in such a way as to make it acceptable is true only as far as the first stages of its preparation are concerned. At the meeting of the Cabinet on July 7, all the Ministers present, with the exception of the Hungarian Minister-President, Count Tisza, were of the opinion "that a purely diplomatic victory, even though it should end in a striking humiliation of Serbia, would be worthless, and that therefore such far-reaching demands must be made of Serbia that she will refuse them and thereby break the way for a radical solution of the question by means of military action."<sup>41</sup>

As time went on, however, the idea as to what form the ultimatum should take changed considerably. This is apparent from a private letter of the Counselor of the German Embassy at Vienna, Prince Stolberg, to von Jagow, on July 18. Prince Stolberg writes: "As I reported yesterday, Berchtold hopes that the Austrian demands, about which he did not go into particulars, will not be accepted by Serbia. He is not, however, quite sure, and I gathered the impression from his statements as well as from those of Hoyos, that Serbia *can* accept the demands."<sup>42</sup>

The author of the ultimatum, Baron von Musulin, who was a secretary in the Foreign Office in Vienna, goes into this matter in great detail in his memoirs, *Das Haus am Ballplatz*<sup>43</sup> (The House on the Ballplatz). We shall quote from his book:

A third point which I feel called upon to make clear here is the fact that although the wording of the Note, as compared with that of the first draft, became gradu-

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ally sharper, the idea that the conditions of the Note should be formulated in such a way as to make them unacceptable to Serbia was positively not expressed during the confidential discussions held by the cabinet. On the contrary—I can speak only of what I know and of what I myself heard—as we drew up each separate item in the list of demands that were to be included in the time-limit Note being prepared for presentation to Serbia, we asked, with reference to each demand that we felt called upon to exact from Serbia so that we could achieve something more than a mere diplomatic victory that would be inherently worthless, whether this demand would and could be accepted by Serbia; and in each case the paragraph containing the particular demand was not declared to be in its final form until the question had been answered affirmatively.

I must here add a few more comments on the Austro-Hungarian demands and their acceptableness from Serbia's viewpoint.

When the text of the drafted Note was completed and the day approached for its delivery in Belgrade, the general opinion of those in the Foreign Office was that Serbia would accept under any conditions, there being only a few pessimists who believed that Russia would not allow Serbia to accede to our demands. No one thought that Serbia would refuse of her own accord.

Baron von Musulin's opinion that the Note was not prepared in such a way as to make it "impossible to accept" in advance was also shared by Baron Friedrich von Wiesner, who had conducted the inquiry into the murder at Sarajevo. This we have on the authority of the American historian, Harry Elmer Barnes, who writes: <sup>44</sup>

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In the Summer of 1926 the present writer listened to Dr. Friedrich von Wiesner as he stated at length to a group of experts on war responsibility that, between the 19th and the 23rd of July, 1914, the Austrians had decided that they would remain satisfied with complete Serbian acceptance of the ultimatum. He further stated that the ultimatum, as finally drawn up, was so formulated, not in the hope of bringing about a Serbian refusal of certain sections, but because the conditions laid down appeared to be the minimum which would guarantee Austria safety from the Serbian menace.

That it was the general belief throughout the world that the ultimatum meant war is not true either. Without a question the ultimatum produced a deep impression everywhere, and threw Europe into a state of great suspense. Despite this fact, important newspapers, especially in England, justified the ultimatum and saw in it no grounds at all for immediate war by Serbia or Russia against Austria. To prove this, we shall quote the opinions of two English newspapers, taken from the little book by Professor Friedrich Meinecke of the University of Berlin, entitled: *Probleme des Weltkrieges* (Problems of the World War). The *Pall Mall Gazette* wrote on July 24: <sup>45</sup>

That Belgrade is a hotbed of conspiracy against the tranquillity of a neighbouring State is undeniable. It is the duty of the Serbian Government not only to keep itself aloof from such machinations, but to refuse them the shelter of its jurisdiction. Austria is entitled to demand the strict fulfilment of those obligations, and we trust the answer to her summons will show a genuine readiness on the part of Serbia's rulers to purge the country of its reproach.

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On July 25, the *Daily News* declared that "there does not appear to be anything really intolerable in the Austrian demands in view of the undoubtedly grave evidence of cumulative provocation produced. Most of the ten demands made, stripped of the rather needlessly high language in which they are couched, are such as any State has a right to ask of its neighbours. . . . The best way to get it withdrawn so far as Serbia is concerned is undoubtedly by prompt submission. Negotiation can follow later."<sup>46</sup>

In contrast to these newspaper opinions, Sazonov's utterance quoted farther on in the *Report* that "Austria-Hungary wanted to devour Serbia," only goes to prove how much Sazonov lent himself to exaggeration. At the very beginning of the crisis Austria-Hungary had made it clearly known to St. Petersburg that her object was not territorial aggrandizement, but merely the maintenance of the status quo.

As evidence of this, we would call attention to Count Berchtold's conversation with Prince Kudascheff, the Russian chargé d'affaires at Vienna, on July 14, 1914. We quote the following:<sup>46a</sup>

"Nothing is further from our intentions than the humiliation of Serbia which is not of the slightest interest to us. I have striven, too, to eliminate from the Note anything that might produce that impression. Our aim is mainly to clear up the impossible situation between Serbia and the Monarchy and to induce the Serbian Government on the one hand publicly to disavow the tendencies directed against the Monarchy and to suppress them by administrative measures and on the other hand to make it possible for us to assure

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ourselves that these measures are conscientiously carried into effect.”

Later he says:

“Finally I pointed out that we were not aiming at any acquisition of territory, but only at maintaining existing conditions, a standpoint that must surely be understood by the Russian Government, just as we should regard it as only natural that Russia should permit no attack on its own territorial integrity.”

Berchtold's idea that no acquisition of territory was aimed at is also evident from his report to Count Szápáry, the Ambassador at St. Petersburg, dated July 25, in which he says:<sup>46b</sup>

“The Monarchy is saturated as regards territory and has no desire for Serbian possessions. If a war with Serbia is forced on us, it will not be, as far as we are concerned, a war for territorial aggrandizement but purely and simply one of self-defence and self-preservation.”

If it is argued that the Austrian Ambassador in London, Count Mensdorff, spoke in a very different way concerning Austria's territorial intentions, so that even Bethmann Hollweg himself was indignant about it, we can only regard the ambassador's action as arbitrary and unauthorized and not in keeping with the views of Count Berchtold, the Foreign Minister at Vienna.<sup>46c</sup> Furthermore, on July 31 Berchtold, through a circular dispatch to the Austrian Ambassadors, dispelled the fears that had spread among the friendly Governments. He telegraphed to the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, for transmission to

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the French Prime Minister and for the information of the Ambassador himself, the following telegram:

With regard to the fear expressed by those with whom you have conversed, that we want to annihilate Serbia, will your Excellency please call M. Viviani's attention at once to the fact that we have already informed St. Petersburg officially that our action against Serbia is not aimed at territorial aggrandizement, and that we do not intend to infringe upon the political sovereignty of the Kingdom.<sup>47</sup>

Sazonov's doubtful assertion that Austria wanted to devour Serbia was obviously not quite correctly reported to Vienna by the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Szápáry. According to Count Pourtalès' dispatch, which tells about the same conversation as that quoted from Document 16 of the *Austrian Red Book*, cited in the *Report*, Sazonov said to Count Pourtalès merely this: "If Austria-Hungary devours Serbia, we will go to war with her."<sup>48</sup> To this Count Pourtalès replied "that he did not presume any such intention on the part of Austria-Hungary, as this would be contrary to the most special interest of the Monarchy. The only object of Austria-Hungary was '*d'infliger à la Serbie le châtiment justement mérité.*'"

In order to form an opinion regarding the justifiability of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia, one must appreciate the grounds upon which the Austrian demands were based and as they were set forth in the *Dossier*, which unfortunately reached the Great Powers too late. In the *Dossier* all the charges brought by Austria against the Greater-Serbia movement were grouped in a very detailed and convincing manner.<sup>49</sup>

The Allies, however, paid not the slightest attention to

the *Dossier*. Perhaps we are right in assuming that the authors of the *Report* knew nothing at all about the *Dossier*, which was written in German. In fact, even the gravamina which were added to the ultimatum as an appendix and were therefore known to the Powers early enough are not mentioned in the *Report* by as much as a word. This could not but lead the more inevitably to a false conception concerning Austria's action against Serbia, since as we know today, the *Dossier* in many points fell short of what Austria could actually have laid to the charge of Serbia. In this *Dossier* there is moreover no reference to the criminal activities of the "Black Hand," although the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was fairly well informed concerning the aims and activities of that organization. This failure to mention the "Black Hand" is explained by the fact that the offices concerned neglected at the time to place the material in question before Herr Von Wiesner for his inspection.

#### 6. *The Extension of the Time-Limit*

*Mr. Sazonoff asked Vienna for an extension of the short time-limit of forty-eight hours given by Austria to Serbia for the most serious decision in its history. (Blue Book, No. 26.) Vienna refused the demand.*

In another place it is stated:

*On the 24th of July Russia and England asked that the Powers should be granted a reasonable delay in which to work in concert for the maintenance of peace. Germany did not join in this request. (Russian Orange Book, No. 4; Yellow Book, No. 43.)*

It is true that Vienna refused Sazonov's request for an extension of the time-limit; on the other hand, the assertion that Germany did not join in the request for such an extension is not entirely correct.

The Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, received on the morning of July 24 the text of the ultimatum which Austria had presented to Belgrade on the 23rd.<sup>50</sup> On the same day a luncheon was served at the French Embassy in St. Petersburg by the French Ambassador, Maurice Paléologue.<sup>51</sup> Present at this luncheon, besides Sazonov, were the British Ambassador, Buchanan, and the Rumanian Minister, Diamandi. On this occasion Buchanan suggested that an attempt be made to induce Austria to extend the term of delay accorded to Serbia. Paléologue was of the opinion that time did not permit of this, and that the only chance of averting war lay in a firm and united attitude. At three o'clock in the afternoon a Council of Ministers was held in St. Petersburg under the presidency of the Prime Minister, Goremykin. At this meeting approval was given to Sazonov's proposal that an agreement be entered into with the Cabinets of the Great Powers to induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to accord a postponement of the answer to the demands set forth in the ultimatum.<sup>52</sup> Accordingly, Sazonov dispatched a telegram to the Powers,<sup>53</sup> in which he stated:

In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her willingness to inform the Powers of the results of



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the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow the Powers sufficient time to study them. In case the Powers should be convinced that certain of the Austrian demands are well founded, they should be in a position to offer suitable advice to the Servian Government.

Following the dispatch of this telegram, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, Prince Kudashev, called in the morning at the Foreign Office in Vienna where he was received by Baron von Macchio, Berchtold being away at Ischl with the Emperor. Macchio informed Prince Kudashev that he would communicate to Berchtold the request for an extension of the time-limit, adding that he could already tell the Russian representative that there was "no chance of our consenting to prolong the term which had been fixed."<sup>54</sup> As a basis for his opinion Macchio pointed out that the Russian desire for an extension of the time-limit seemed to rest on the mistaken supposition that copies of the Note had been sent to the Powers for the purpose of affording the latter an opportunity to express their opinions concerning it, whereas the copies had been presented to the Powers for the sole purpose of informing them, in compliance with the rules of international etiquette, of the step which the Austrian Government had taken. Beyond that, Austria regarded her action as a matter concerning herself and Serbia alone.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires had also applied directly to Berchtold.<sup>55</sup> Upon receipt of Prince Kudashev's telegram, Berchtold had directed the Foreign Office to answer it in his name and to state that "we cannot consent to an extension of the time-limit." He added that, even

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after the severance of diplomatic relations, Serbia, by accepting unconditionally Austria's demands, "could bring about a peaceful solution; in which case Austria would still consider herself obliged to exact from Servia reimbursement for all expenses incurred by Austria's military measures."<sup>56</sup> In a further telegram to Macchio, Berchtold confirmed the reply that had already been given in his name.<sup>57</sup>

Before Buchanan's telegram concerning Sazonov's overture to the Great Powers had reached London, Grey had already discussed the ultimatum with the German Ambassador, Lichnowsky, and had signified his willingness to join with Germany in pleading for a prolongation of the time-limit at Vienna, "as in that way *perhaps a way out* might be found."<sup>58</sup>

Lichnowsky's telegram reporting this conversation with Grey arrived in Berlin on the morning of the 25th. Its full text, with the exception of the last paragraph, was passed on to the German Ambassador at Vienna. With it went an additional note by Foreign Minister von Jagow: "Have replied to London that I would communicate Sir E. Grey's proposals to Vienna. But as the ultimatum expired today and Count Berchtold was at Ischl, I did not believe that an extension of the time-limit would be possible."<sup>59</sup> It appears, therefore, according to the information given the German Ambassador at Vienna, that Germany refrained from taking a positive attitude on the proposal to extend the time-limit, merely expressing the belief that the proposal would not be feasible on account of lack of time and Count Berchtold's absence at Ischl.

As we have noted, the proposal to extend the time-limit was correctly passed on to Vienna. How far Germany

herself concurred in this overture of the Russian Government cannot be determined precisely by a study of the documents. That she attached no great significance to it may be concluded from the fact that the proposal was not passed on with that urgency which would have been the case had Germany thought that Austria would accept. To the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, Bronevski, von Jagow, according to the former's own report,<sup>60</sup> said: "I cannot do any more than direct attention to our wish." The English Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold, had given Bronevski the same answer.

Today, when we are better able than the statesmen at that time were to appraise the situation in 1914, we may say with some degree of certainty that an extension of the time-limit would have served only to strengthen Serbia's uncompromising attitude, and would not have prevented Russia's armed intervention at all. On the other hand, if Austria had made the time-limit still shorter and had sent the ultimatum to Belgrade a few days earlier, the Serbian Government very likely would have yielded unconditionally. Vienna would have gained that diplomatic victory which she desired and which, indeed, she needed in order to maintain her position *vis-à-vis* Serbia; while the latter, with the support of Russia and her satellites, most likely would have obtained from Austria, through subsequent negotiations, an amelioration of the more unacceptable demands.

### *7. The Influence Exerted on Serbia by the Great Powers*

*On the 24th and 25th of July, England and France multiplied their efforts to persuade Serbia to satisfy the*

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*Austro-Hungarian demands. Russia threw in her weight on the side of conciliation. (Yellow Book, No. 36; Blue Book, Nos. 12, 46, 55, 65, 94, 118.)*

First of all we propose to examine the documents in order to discover how much influence England and France exerted on Serbia. With reference to the Serbian question, we find Grey, according to *Blue Book*, No. 12 (*British Documents*, No. 102), instructing the English Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, Mr. Crackanthorpe, as follows:

It seems to me that Servia ought certainly to express concern and regret that any officials, however subordinate, should have been accomplices in murder of the Archduke, and promise, if this is proved, to give fullest satisfaction. For the rest, I can only say that Servian Government must reply as they consider the interests of Servia require.

I cannot tell whether anything short of unconditional acceptance will avert military action by Austria on expiration of time limit, but the only chance would be to give a favourable reply on as many points as possible within the limit of time, and not to meet Austrian demand with a blank negative.

You should consult with your Russian and French colleagues as to saying this to Servian Government. Servian Minister here implores us to give some indication of our views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of giving more advice than above, and I do not like to give that without knowing what Russian and French Governments are saying at Belgrade.

It cannot be maintained that on the basis of these instructions Crackanthorpe was put in a position to influence decisively the Belgrade Government. The clause, "as they consider the interests of Servia require," actu-

ally prevented the Chargé d'Affaires from exerting any decisive influence whatever. Grey assumed a heavy responsibility in sending this telegram, and placed himself diametrically in opposition to public opinion in his country. As a matter of fact, Crackanthorpe abstained from offering advice to the Serbian Government, since the French and Russian Chargés d'Affaires had not yet received corresponding instructions.<sup>61</sup>

The next document cited in the *Report* as evidence, *Blue Book* No. 46 (*British Documents*, No. 176), as well as the other documents cited: *Blue Book* No. 55 (*British Documents*, No. 198); *Blue Book*, No. 65 (*British Documents*, No. 197); *Blue Book* No. 94 (*British Documents*, No. 295); and *Blue Book* No. 118 (*British Documents*, No. 360) do not enter into the question of the influence exerted in the drafting of the Serbian reply note, since these telegrams were sent during the period from July 27 to July 31, and consequently after the dispatch of the Serbian reply.

In Document No. 36 of the *French Yellow Book*, containing a telegram of July 25 from the Acting Minister of the Foreign Office, Bienvenu-Martin, to the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Vienna, we find merely a confirmation of the above-mentioned instructions of Sir Edward Grey on July 24 to the English Chargé d'Affaires, Crackanthorpe. We have already noted why these instructions were not carried out by the English representative. Whether any instructions from the French Government did reach Belgrade, and if so, what they were and in what manner they were executed, is not disclosed in the French documents that have so far been published by the Quai d'Orsay. This is

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one of the many instances which serve to show how necessary it is that the French documents be made public.<sup>62</sup> Telegrams revealing whether Russia exerted influence to secure from Belgrade a peaceful reply to the Austrian ultimatum are similarly unavailable. Final judgment in the matter must be reserved until we have access to the correspondence exchanged between Belgrade on the one hand, and St. Petersburg and Paris on the other, during the period that falls between the dispatch of the ultimatum and the sending of the Reply Note. As we learn from the book of the French historian, Pierre Renouvin, it is possible that France herself co-operated with Belgrade in drafting the reply.<sup>63</sup> From this it may be inferred that things were done which it is highly important that we should know about, and concerning which the published documents have nothing to say.

As far as the documents cited in the *Report* go, the efforts made by England and France, and seconded by Russia, to persuade Serbia to satisfy the Austrian demands were restricted to the instructions issued by Grey to the English Chargé d’Affaires at Belgrade, Mr. Crackanthorpe, who did not carry them out. To assert, therefore, that England and France “multiplied” their efforts verges on the comical. That Russia not only did nothing to restrain Serbia, but, on the contrary, encouraged her to refuse precisely the most important Austrian demands is apparent from Sazonov’s complete understanding of the ultimatum, and is confirmed by Baron Giesl.<sup>64</sup> Giesl, for instance, mentions the fact that at lunch on July 25 he learned from various journalists who had talked with Pashitch that the latter confidently expected that a peaceful solution of the crisis would be reached through accept-

ance of the Austrian demands. Not until the afternoon wore on did a complete reversal of attitude occur. As Giesl learned, a longer dispatch from the Tsar to King Peter had arrived, and "it was understood that Serbia's opposition had been strengthened by Russia's declaration that she was ready to back up Serbia with all the power at her command." It was further reported to Giesl that "Crown Prince Alexander brought the telegram to the Officers' Club. When it was read, a loud demonstration in favour of war took place." The Belgrade representative of the Vienna Telegraph Bureau, Dusan A. Loncarevic, in his book "The Rise of Jugoslavia,"<sup>65</sup> makes the same observation. He describes how he on July 25, the day when the Ultimatum was declined, called at the office of the Politika in order to say goodbye to his Serbian colleagues. He says that the proprietor of the paper Vlada Ribnikar told him that in the early hours of the afternoon a sensational change had taken place. Firstly, a short telegram had arrived from St. Petersburg, calling upon Serbia to mobilize. This telegram, which was immediately acted upon, was followed by a second in which the standpoint of the Russian Government was explained in greater detail. It will be interesting when the Russian documents are published to check the statements made by Loncarevic. The Tsar's peaceful influence on Serbia must have been very weak, indeed.

#### *8. Serbia's Reception of the Austrian Ultimatum*

*Contrary to the expectation of Austria-Hungary and Germany, Serbia yielded. She agreed to all the requirements of the ultimatum, subject to the single reservation*

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*that, in the judicial inquiry which she would commence for the purpose of seeking out the guilty parties, the participation of Austrian officials would be kept within the limits assigned by international law. "If the Austro-Hungarian Government is not satisfied with this," Serbia declared she was ready "to submit to the decision of the Hague Tribunal." (Yellow Book, No. 46.)*

*"A quarter of an hour before the expiration of the time limit," at 5.45 on the 25th, Mr. Pashitch, the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs, delivered this reply to Baron Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian Minister.*

*On Mr. Pashitch's return to his own office he found awaiting him a letter from Baron Giesl saying that he was not satisfied with the reply. At 6.30 the latter had left Belgrade, and even before he had arrived at Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Government had handed his passports to Mr. Yovanovitch, the Serbian Minister, and had prepared thirty-three mobilization proclamations, which were published on the following morning in the Budapesti Kozlöni, the official gazette of the Hungarian Government. On the 27th Sir Maurice de Bunsen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey: "This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia." (Blue Book, No. 41.) At midday on the 28th Austria declared war on Serbia. On the 29th the Austrian army commenced the bombardment of Belgrade, and made its dispositions to cross the frontier.*

*The reiterated suggestions of the Entente Powers with a view to finding a peaceful solution of the dispute only produced evasive replies on the part of Berlin or promises of intervention with the Government of Vienna without any effectual steps being taken.*



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The statement that Austria-Hungary and Germany expected that Serbia would not yield is untrue. The most one can say is that in view of Serbia's conduct up to that time, Austria-Hungary and Germany hardly expected that Serbia would accept all the demands. In the section, "Austria's Ultimatum to Serbia," we have already shown how in the final drafting of the ultimatum consideration was paid to the question whether the demands involved would and could be accepted by Serbia. At no time before the ultimatum was presented, did the German Government make any declaration as to how far it counted on Serbia's acceptance of Austria's demands. As for the refusal of the ultimatum itself, we must particularly stress the point that the two demands rejected by Serbia were all-important; namely, the collaboration of the Austro-Hungarian Government in suppressing the anti-Austrian movement in Serbia, and the participation of representatives of the Austrian Government in the investigation of the murder at Sarajevo. The rejection of the last demand, especially, robbed Austria of the practical opportunity to uncover the conspiracy at Belgrade. On this very point the future peace of the Dual Monarchy rested. Furthermore, the Hague Tribunal would not have been in a position to render a decision that would have done justice to Austria-Hungary's needs. Since the complicity of the Serbian Government had been rightly suspected by Austria from the very beginning, an inquiry would have had no effective result unless commissions had been set up with power to influence the course of the investigation.<sup>66</sup>

There is no fault to be found with the account of the presentation of the Serbian reply and of the breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria.<sup>67</sup>

The mobilization proclamations referred to as published on July 26 in the *Budapesti Kozlőni* were public notices of mobilization as legally fixed by the Minister of Militia, Samuel Hazai. We have not been able to determine whether there were actually "thirty-three" proclamations. By way of illustration we shall reproduce one of these proclamations *in extenso*:

Royal Hungarian Minister of Militia

No. 12. 303/Präs. 4. 1914.

His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, by virtue of Article 20, Section 4, of the Law of 1886, has been pleased to order by an Imperial Decree issued on July 25 of this year, at Ischl, the general mobilization of the Hungarian militia within the limits required by the national defense. The calling in of troops will take place by proclamation or by the issuance of mobilization cards. The government bureaus will receive special instructions as to where proclamations are to be displayed or where cards are to be issued.

Samuel Hazai, m.p., Minister of  
Militia.

On the 27th the English Chargé d'Affaires, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, dispatched to Sir Edward Grey a telegram in which Austria-Hungary is described as having "gone wild with joy at prospect of war."<sup>68</sup> Today, of course, we are not in a position to determine how correct Maurice de Bunsen's description of the war feeling in Austria was. As the former Russian Ambassador at Vienna, M. Shebeko, recently informed me, there was in his opinion a mood in Vienna in favour of war against Serbia. His impression was, however, that this war mood underwent a noticeable change, as soon as it became

known that the dispute with Serbia threatened to lead to a European War. We do know, however, that in other countries the desire for war was just as strong. From Paléologue, for instance, we learn that the crowds in St. Petersburg "saluted with shouts of joy." Furthermore, the American Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg, Wilson, who by the 27th had already gained the impression that the army demanded war, reported to Washington on July 31: "Whole country, all classes, unanimous for war."<sup>69</sup> In the course of time the war feeling which dominated St. Petersburg assumed a more violent form. Witness merely the destruction of the German embassy in St. Petersburg.<sup>70</sup>

In Paris the enthusiasm that attended Poincaré's reception at the Gare du Nord station was most pronounced.<sup>71</sup> Even in England, where the people are not in the habit of surrounding the palace in joyous demonstrations, Grierson, in his memoirs, reports on August 2 "crowds cheering the King and Queen who appeared on the balcony at Buckingham Palace."<sup>72</sup>

It is an exaggeration to say that on July 29 the Austrian Army commenced the bombardment of Belgrade. Concerning this point we have the following communication of Lieutenant-Colonel Kissling, who has worked on the Austrian documents relating to the War:

On the night of July 28-29, four steamboats and twenty-five tugs belonging to the Danubian Steam Navigation Company and headed for Broko were fired upon by Serbian infantry at Semlin, whereupon the infantry and signal-batteries of the Imperial and Royal 14th Infantry-Brigade and the Danubian squadron opened up fire. After the second broadside, the

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Semlin bridge was blown up by the Serbians on July 29 at 1:20 A. M.

At an early hour in the morning the monitors: *Temes*, *Bodrog*, and *Szamos*, on orders from the Commander of the 14th Infantry-Brigade stationed at Semlin, bombarded the radio-station and fortifications at Topčider (a castle and park in the vicinity of Belgrade.—Author). The Serbians answered with infantry fire only. Toward evening the lines of defense, the radio-station, and the magazine were shelled again by the monitors. The Serbian artillery continued to be silent.

That plans for a regular bombardment of Belgrade were not made until July 31 and then were soon given up, is revealed in the following communication of the above-mentioned writer:

The Danubian monitor squadron engaged the Serbian artillery on July 31 when the latter, from the fortress at Belgrade and the forts situated east of the city, opened fire on Austro-Hungarian ships.

In the meantime the Imperial and Royal 7th Infantry-Division placed eighteen heavy guns in position before Belgrade, intending to open fire on the Serbian capital on the morning of August 1. On July 31, at 7:25 A.M., when the Imperial and Royal Chief of the General Staff, who was then in Vienna, received word of the impending bombardment from the Commander of the 7th Infantry-Division, he telegraphed the following order under Op. No. 94:

“Bombardment of Belgrade unnecessary and in violation of international law, hence not to be attempted under any condition. Shell old fortress only if necessary. Enemy’s fire to be subdued with absolute regard paid to safety of city. Use *aéroplanes en masse* only in case of absolute necessity. Commencement of general

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air operations reserved for operating Commander-in-Chief.”

The statement that the Austrian Army made dispositions on July 29 to cross the border is in no sense true. As the Chancellor reported to Emperor William on July 27: “Austria does not appear to be able to enter upon military activities before the 12th of August.”<sup>73</sup> Even the English Military Attaché at Vienna, Major Sir T. Cuninghame, on July 26 reported to Sir Edward Grey through Sir Maurice de Bunsen: “5th August considered earliest day on which general advance possible.”<sup>74</sup>

### 9. *Mediation by Four Powers*

*On the 25th of July Sir Edward Grey proposed mediation by four Powers (England, France, Italy and Germany). France (Yellow Book, No. 70) and Italy (Ibid., No. 72; Blue Book, No. 49) immediately gave their concurrence. Germany (Blue Book, No. 43) refused, alleging that it was not a question of mediation but of arbitration, as the conference of the four Powers was called to make proposals, not to decide.*

The facts about the proposal of mediation by four Powers were as follows: On July 24 the German Ambassador was called to the office of Sir Edward Grey who, deeply stirred by the ultimatum, news of which had just reached London, requested Prince Lichnowsky to suggest to the Chancellor “that in the event of a dangerous tension between Russian and Austria, the four nations not immediately concerned—England, Germany, France and Italy—should undertake to mediate between Russia

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and Austria.”<sup>75</sup> On the same day Grey dispatched to Sir Horace Rumbold, the representative of the British Ambassador at Berlin, a telegram in which he likewise expressed the view that the only chance he saw of mediating influence being effective was that the four Powers: Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation in case relations between Russia and Austria-Hungary should become threatening.<sup>76</sup>

The Kaiser, as his comments in the margin of Lichnowsky's telegram indicate, was against this proposal which he considered unnecessary because Austria had already set Russia straight as to what she was going to do, and because Grey could propose nothing else. Moreover, the Kaiser regarded the matter as an affair of honour and of life and death with Austria, in which others should not interfere. This view of the question signified that the Kaiser intended to observe the policy which the German Government had followed from the beginning; namely, the policy of non-intervention in the Austro-Serbian dispute.

Nevertheless, on July 25 Rumbold was informed by Foreign Minister von Jagow that Germany would hazard everything in order to avert the calamity of a general war, and was quite willing, in case relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia became threatening, to fall in with Grey's "suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg."<sup>77</sup>

Quite apprehensive lest Grey's proposal of mediation should not receive adequate attention in Berlin, Lichnowsky once again, in a private telegram of July 25, urgently advised Jagow to accept the English suggestion as to

mediation and to announce this fact to Vienna and St. Petersburg.<sup>78</sup>

In a further telegram of the same date the Ambassador informed the Foreign Office in Berlin that it was Grey's opinion that mediation by the four Powers should be initiated at the moment that Russia mobilized after Austria, a step which Grey was sure would follow. In stating this view, Grey was differentiating between the Austro-Serbian conflict, in which he did not wish to meddle, and the Austro-Russian dispute which, under the circumstances, would probably lead to a world war.

In answer to this telegram, von Jagow informed the German Ambassador at London that if war between Austria and Russia should break out, Germany, reserving her well-known obligations as an ally, would be willing "with the other Great Powers to inaugurate mediation between Austria and Russia."<sup>79</sup>

Again on Sunday, the 26th, at the request of Prince Henry, who was then in London, Lichnowsky reported to the Foreign Office that the English King had conveyed to the Prince his desire that joint British-German action, with the assistance of France and Italy, might be successful "in mastering in the interest of peace the present extremely serious situation."<sup>80</sup>

On the same day the German Ambassador informed the Foreign Office that after the publication of the Austrian demands it was no longer believed possible in England that the conflict could be localized, and he considered the moment had arrived "to start mediation along lines suggested by Sir E. Grey." This telegram arrived in Berlin on Sunday, July 26, at 7 o'clock in the evening.<sup>81</sup>

Thus we see that the English proposal of mediation by four Powers was supported most enthusiastically by the German Ambassador at London, and was not turned down by the German Government at all.

In corroboration of these facts we submit the following passage from the draft of a telegram from the Chancellor to the Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.<sup>82</sup> Unfortunately this telegram was not released.

Should an acute antagonism between Austria-Hungary and Russia develop, we should support by act and deed the efforts of other Great Powers to arbitrate this antagonism, true to the principles of that policy which, for over forty-four years, we have followed with success in the interest of the maintenance of the peace of Europe.

The reason why the proposal of mediation by four Powers could not be carried out was the fact that on the 26th, England made an altered proposal of mediation calling for a Conference of the four Ambassadors at London. Since this Conference was to have the additional task of intervening in the Austro-Serbian dispute, Germany, who had originally accepted the proposal of mediation by four Powers, now rejected it.

#### *10. Russia's Intervention*

*On the 26th of July Russia proposed to negotiate directly with Austria. Austria refused. (Yellow Book, No. 54.)*

On this point the *Report* is correct. Document No. 54 of the *Yellow Book*, cited as proof, contains Paléologue's communication to Bienvenu-Martin on July 26. In this



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communication Paléologue quotes a conversation that Sazonov had on that date with the Austrian Ambassador, Count Szápáry. Szápáry himself, on July 27, sent a detailed report of this conversation to Berchtold.<sup>83</sup> In his report Szápáry stated that he had the impression that mistaken ideas in regard to the character of our action were prevalent in Russia. We seemed to be suspected of wishing to push forward into Balkan territory and begin a march to Salonica or even to Constantinople. Others indeed were going so far as to describe our action as the starting point of a preventive war against Russia, which Germany had planned. All these suppositions, I said, were partly mistaken and partly altogether unreasonable. The aim of our action was self-preservation and self-defence against hostile propaganda of word, writing, and deed, which threatened our existence. It would occur to no one in Austria-Hungary to threaten Russian interests, or indeed to pick a quarrel with Russia.

Further on in the conversation Sazonov and Szápáry discussed the Austrian Note in great detail. On this occasion Sazonov expressed the view that the two points "dealing with the collaboration of Austro-Hungarian officials in Serbia," and the point "dealing with the removal of officers and civil servants to be designated *ad libitum* by us," were unacceptable in their present form. Szápáry represented them both as necessary demands of his Government.

Toward the end of the conversation Sazonov, by way of summarizing his views, declared "that the affair about the Note was really an affair of words only, and that it might surely be possible to get over the difficulties as they stand at present."

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The proposals which Sazonov had made to Count Szápáry on the 26th were repeated on the 28th by the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, Shebeko, during the course of a conversation with Berchtold. The Austrian Government, however, decided not to take up mediation on that basis. Concerning the rejection of the Russian proposals Berchtold, in his telegram to Szápáry on July 28, says: <sup>84</sup> "In my answer I explained that I could not accede to such a proposal. There could be no negotiations regarding the text of the reply note, which we had found unacceptable. No one in our country would understand or approve. There could be no question of negotiations when, as the Ambassador was aware, public opinion in Hungary as well as in Austria was already a prey to terrible excitement. Besides, we had to-day declared war on Servia."

For further discussion of this point the reader may consult Section 15.

### *11. The Rejection of the Conference Proposal*

*On the 27th of July England proposed a European conference. Germany refused. (Yellow Book, Nos. 68 and 73.)*

The proposal to hold a conference had grown out of the idea of mediation by four Powers. As Grey informs us in his memoirs, <sup>85</sup> he was agreed with Nicolson that a conference should be proposed at the opportune moment, or after all other means of preserving peace had failed. Since it would be difficult to determine when the oppor-

tune moment had arrived, Grey thought that the proposal would stand a better chance of being accepted if the incitation came from another quarter.

On Sunday, July 26, Grey enjoying his customary week-end absence from London, Sir Arthur Nicolson was in charge at the Foreign Office. Late Saturday evening he received from Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, a telegram containing Sazonov's desire to have the Austro-Serbian question placed on an international footing.<sup>86</sup> The passage reads as follows:

Obligations taken by Serbia in 1908 (*sic*) to which reference is made in Austrian ultimatum were given to Powers and not to Austria, and he would like to see questions placed on international footing. Were Serbia to appeal to Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave question in hands of England, France, Italy and Germany. It was possible, he added, that Serbia might propose to submit question to arbitration.

In Buchanan's telegram it was further reported that the draft of an Imperial Ukase had been sanctioned, authorizing the Foreign Minister to begin at once preliminary preparations for mobilization and to arrange for the mobilization of 1,100,000 men. Nicolson, therefore, falling in with Grey's plans, considered the moment had arrived to take up Sazonov's suggestion to place the question on an international footing and to dispatch the telegram necessary to bring about a conference of the four Ambassadors.

The drafts of these telegrams reached Grey at Ichen Abbas on Sunday afternoon. He pronounced them satis-

factory and ordered the telegrams dispatched. The telegrams, which were identical, read as follows:<sup>87</sup>

Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

Tel. (No. 232.)

D. 3 P. M.

Ask Minister for Foreign Affairs if he would be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of Italy, Germany, France, and myself in a conference to be held here at once in order to endeavour to find an issue to prevent complications. With this view representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburg and Belgrade should be authorised in informing Governments to which they are accredited of above suggestion to request that pending results of conference all active military operations should be suspended.

Before pursuing the subject of the conference proposal any further, let us note how Grey himself regarded this proposal. For this purpose we may consult his memoirs. Convinced that Germany's preparations for war were in a stage far more advanced than those of France and Russia, Grey anticipated German opposition to the conference proposal, since a conference would furnish France and Russia with more time for their own military preparations and thereby change the situation to Germany's disadvantage. Grey, in his memoirs, goes on to say that in case Germany had raised such objections, England would have had to be ready "to give or get guarantees that there would be no mobilizations during the Conference."<sup>88</sup>

What practical plans he had for surmounting this difficulty, which unquestionably was very great, the British Foreign Minister does not divulge; nor does he give his reasons for supposing that he could halt Serbia's mobi-

lization, which was already in progress; Austria's partial mobilization; and the preliminary mobilization measures of Russia. Indeed, it strikes us that Grey did not become aware of the difficulties that attended his conference proposal in its relation to the military situation until he began to write his memoirs, for, as his telegram to Buchanan on July 25 reveals, he was calculating on the possibility of joint action by Germany, Italy, France, and England in securing peace "*after Austria and Russia had mobilized.*"<sup>89</sup>

In his telegram to Buchanan, Grey goes on to say:

I was afraid, too, that Germany would reply that mobilisation with her was a question of hours, whereas with Russia it was a question of days; and that, as a matter of fact, I had asked that if Russia mobilised against Austria, Germany, instead of mobilising against Russia, should suspend mobilisation and join with us in intervention with Austria, thereby throwing away the advantage of time, for, if the diplomatic intervention failed, Russia would meanwhile have gained time for her mobilisation.

Next, let us consider in what light the conference proposal was viewed in Russia. As the above-quoted telegram, Grey to Buchanan, discloses, Benckendorff was afraid that Grey's proposal of mediation would create the impression in Germany that France and England had divorced themselves from Russia, and he urged that England give Germany to understand that in case of war England would not stay neutral. Sazonov, on the other hand, as his telegram of July 27 to Buchanan makes clear, took a different view of the matter.<sup>90</sup>

The British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hope, may be favourable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favourable solution of the conflict.

Sazonov, then, was in favour of Grey's proposal, but only in the event that direct negotiations with Vienna should not materialize. France and Italy gave their adherence to Grey's proposal.

Let us now take up Germany's attitude. On Sunday, the 26th, Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, had a conversation with Sir Arthur Nicolson. On this occasion Nicolson in a general way acquainted Lichnowsky with the "proposal to hold a conference *à quatre*." This information Lichnowsky passed on to the Foreign Office that same day.

The telegram follows:<sup>91</sup>

Telegram 161.

London, July 26, 1914.

Have just talked with Sir A. Nicolson and Sir W. Tyrrell. According to reports at hand here, a general calling to the colours of the Russian reservists is not projected, but only a partial mobilization far from

our frontiers.<sup>92</sup> Both gentlemen see in Sir E. Grey's proposal to hold a conference *à quatre* here, the only possibility of avoiding a general war, and hope that in this way it would be possible to get full satisfaction for Austria, as Serbia would be more apt to give in to the pressure of the Powers and to submit to their united will than to the threats of Austria. But the absolute prerequisite to the bringing about of the conference and the maintenance of peace would be the cessation of all military activities. Once the Serbian border was crossed, everything would be at an end, as no Russian Government would be able to tolerate this, and would be forced to move to the attack on Austria unless she wanted to see her status among the Balkan nations lost forever. Sir W. Tyrrell, who saw Sir E. Grey last evening and is fully cognizant of his views, pointed out to me repeatedly and with emphasis the immense importance of Serbia's territory remaining unviolated until the question of the conference had been settled, as otherwise every effort would have been in vain and the world war would be inevitable. The localization of the conflict as hoped for in Berlin was wholly impossible, and must be dropped from the calculations of practical politics. If we two should succeed—that is, His Majesty the Emperor or his Government and representatives in conjunction with Sir E. Grey—in preserving the peace of Europe, German-English relations would be placed on a firm foundation for time everlasting. If we did not succeed, everything would be doubtful.

I would like to offer an urgent warning against believing any further in the possibility of localization, and to express the humble wish that our policy be guided solely and alone by the need of sparing the German nation a struggle in which it has nothing to gain and everything to lose.

Sir E. Grey returns this evening.

Lichnowsky.

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Just a few minutes after the arrival of Lichnowsky's telegram, there came to the Foreign Office from St. Petersburg the report of Count Pourtalès that Sazonov had readily acquiesced in a proposal to inaugurate direct conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna. This proposal had been made by Pourtalès independently of his Government.

Following is the text of the passage dealing with the proposal:<sup>93</sup>

While insisting that I was not empowered to make any proposition and could therefore only suggest my own personal ideas, I replied that the following method might perhaps be feasible. In case the Vienna Cabinet might be found willing to modify to a certain extent the form of certain of the demands, which, from the statements of Count Szapary, did not seem to be entirely excluded as a possibility, it might be possible to get into immediate touch with Austria-Hungary on this matter. Should an agreement be the result, then Serbia \* . . . be advised by Russia to accept the demands on the basis agreed upon between Austria and Russia, and to permit Austria to be notified of this through the medium of some third Power. Sazonoff, to whom I again emphatically insisted that I was not speaking in the name of my Government, said that he would immediately telegraph to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna along the lines of my proposal.

\* Cipher group lacking here.

Over against the British conference proposal, therefore, stood the proposal advanced by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg and immediately taken up by the Russian Foreign Minister. As may be seen from the following telegram to the German Ambassador at London,



the Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, fell in with the St. Petersburg proposal which he considered the better one because it contemplated a direct understanding between St. Petersburg and Vienna, and rejected Grey's proposal to convoke in London a conference of the four Ambassadors.<sup>94</sup>

Telegram 179.

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

Had no knowledge here up to the present of Sir E. Grey's proposal to hold a conference *à quatre* there.<sup>95</sup> We could not take part in such a conference, as we would not be able to summon Austria before a European court of justice in her case with Serbia. Sir Edward Grey makes a sharp distinction, as Your Excellency has expressly reported, between Austro-Serbian and Austro-Russian conflict, and is concerned about the former just as little as we ourselves. Our mediation activities must be confined to a possible Austro-Russian clash. In regard to the Austro-Serbian conflict, the method of a direct understanding between Petersburg and Vienna as suggested by telegram (163) from Petersburg appears to me feasible. I therefore request you most urgently to advocate in London the necessity and the possibility of localization.

In rejecting the conference proposal, therefore, the Chancellor did not raise the objections that Grey had anticipated, but, on the contrary, advanced new reasons why a conference could not be held.

As Jagow stated in the course of a conversation with Goschen on the afternoon of July 27, he, Jagow, was also of the opinion that the conference suggested by Grey "would practically amount to a court of arbitration," and that it could not be called together except at the re-

quest of Austria and Russia. The Foreign Minister further declared that he was also in accord with Bethmann Hollweg's belief, already communicated to London, that Sazonov's intention to exchange views with Berchtold "might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments."<sup>96</sup>

Germany had other reasons for turning down the conference proposal besides those that she gave London. Naturally these reasons could not be communicated to the British Government.<sup>97</sup> Germany was not quite so satisfied with the results of the Ambassador's Conference of 1912-13 as Grey later, in his memoirs, pictured England to have been. The relation in which the Great Powers, France and England, stood to Russia, and Italy's friendly attitude toward Serbia would just about have left Germany the sole defender of Austria's interests, and the outlook for the Dual Monarchy from the very start would have been unfavourable. As a result of Russia's attitude, the Austro-Serbian dispute had resolved itself into a test of strength between the Entente and the Triple Alliance; and in a conference in which Italy was sure to play a doubtful rôle, Austria and Germany would have met defeat. That Grey himself did not at that time regard Germany's unfriendly attitude toward the conference proposal as intransigent is unmistakably clear from Grey's communication to the British Ambassador at Berlin.<sup>98</sup>

Your construction of proposed conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement, but none would be put for-

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ward unless it was ascertained that it would be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with each of whom it would be easy for those conferring to keep in touch through their respective allies.

But I entirely agree that direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia is the most preferable method of all, and as long as there is a prospect of that taking place I would suspend every other suggestion.

I understand that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed friendly exchange of views to Austrian Government, and if Austria accepts it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.

That there were still further reasons why an Ambassadors' conference did not appear to be the proper agency for settling the conflict is disclosed in a later telegram from Lichnowsky on July 30.<sup>99</sup> In this telegram Lichnowsky indicated Berlin as a more appropriate place in which to mediate an agreement between Vienna and St. Petersburg, since Grey was less familiar with the whole question, possessed less influence at Vienna, and since it looked as though the negotiations would be long drawn out. Furthermore, Lichnowsky described the Austrian Ambassador at London, Count Mensdorff, as being too timid, and as lacking both in influence at Vienna and in personal initiative. To this must be added the fact that at the conference Germany would have had a stout opponent in the person of the French Ambassador at London, Paul Cambon, a zealous advocate of the encirclement policy.

By way of outlining once again the subject of the conference proposal, we shall set down briefly the facts involved as follows: Grey amplified the proposal to have

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four Powers mediate the Austro-Russian dispute—a proposal which Berlin had already accepted—to include mediation of the Austro-Serbian dispute, this mediation to take place through a conference of the German, French, and Italian Ambassadors at London, and a representative of the British Government. At the same time there happened to come from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg a proposal calling for the initiation of direct conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna. The Russian Foreign Minister fell in at once with the latter proposal and passed it on to Vienna.

Germany regarded the mediation proposal emanating from St. Petersburg and already being acted upon, as the better one, and turned down the conference proposal. The reason given London was that Germany could not summon Austria before a court of arbitration to settle the latter's dispute with Serbia; such a request would have to come from Russia and Austria. There were other reasons, too, but they were not mentioned. For instance, past experience with groups of Powers, especially the Franco-Anglo-Russian combination, and Italy's friendly attitude toward Serbia made the prospects for a conference look rather dubious. Beyond that, military difficulties stood in the way. Grey was aware of these, though Germany did not touch upon them. Eventually Grey designated the proposal which had originated with Germany and had been adopted by Russia, and which called for a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, as "the most preferable method of all," and discarded his own proposal of a conference.

The importance of the conference proposal must not be over-emphasized, however. Sharp opposition had devel-

oped between the two groups of Powers. The opposition was so pronounced that though trouble might have been deferred it would not have been settled by a conference of Ambassadors. Furthermore, the Austro-Serbian dispute—it was not yet clear during these critical days just what the dispute was all about, since Austria had made the mistake of not submitting to the Powers the *Dossier* containing the charges against Serbia—was of such a serious nature that an Ambassadors' conference would not have succeeded in effecting any real adjustment of the relations between the two countries. Moreover, one should not overlook the point that has already been stressed; namely, that the conference would have had to cope with the problem of a Serbia completely mobilized, an Austria partially mobilized, and a Russia in a state of preliminary mobilization. Today it may be rightly assumed that the conference would have failed to halt Russia's preparations for mobilization and consequently, Austria's; and that, with eastern and southeastern Europe bristling with bayonets, war would have broken out spontaneously as a result of some border incident, or as a result of further mobilization.

It is quite misleading, therefore, to envisage the conference proposal as a panacea that might have averted war if Germany had not turned it down.

### *12. The Renewal of the Proposal of Mediation by Four Powers*

*On the 29th of July Sir Edward Grey asked the Wilhelmstrasse to be good enough to "suggest any method by which the influence of the Four Powers could be used*

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together to prevent a war between Austria and Russia." (*Yellow Book*, No. 97; *Blue Book*, No. 84.) She was asked herself to say what she desired. (*Blue Book*, No. 111.) Her reply was evasive. (*Yellow Book*, Nos. 97, 98 and 109.)

In making this proposal to the Wilhelmstrasse, Grey was renewing the proposal of mediation by four Powers which had been originally accepted by Germany, and had been set aside when Germany rejected the conference proposal. From the above-quoted *Blue Book*, No. 84 (*British Documents*, No. 263), containing a telegram of July 29 from Grey to Goschen, we learn in what form this proposal was made. The specific passage in the telegram reads as follows:

The German Government had said that they were favourable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations *à quatre* in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace.<sup>100</sup>

Document 97 of the *Yellow Book*, cited in the *Report*, consists of a telegram of the same date, July 29,

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from Viviani to the French Ambassador at London, Paul Cambon. In this telegram the French Government expresses the same wish that Grey does in the telegram just quoted, and mentions the fact that the Russian Government will also convey the same wish to the British Government.

On July 29 Lichnowsky reported to the Foreign Office the conversation regarding the renewed proposal as follows:

Even today Minister regards a direct exchange of opinions between Vienna and Petersburg as the most feasible way, but asked me, however, what was to happen if, as the Vienna telegram seemed to indicate, the conferences were to collapse? Would we then be in a position to make any sort of a proposition? He had suggested a conference of the ambassadors here, which had not appeared to us to be feasible; we had accepted the idea of a mediation *à quatre*, however, and he would be glad if we were in a position to make any kind of a proposal.<sup>101</sup>

The telegram then went on to give further particulars about the conversation between Grey and Lichnowsky. For instance, Lichnowsky defended the decision of the German Government not to mix in the Austrian quarrel, and expressed his belief that Austria was doing only what was necessary to secure peace and order on her frontier. Austria's action was in the interest of European peace; moreover, Austria was not aiming at territorial aggrandizement. Grey replied that he hoped that there might be found some way out which would permit Austria to receive full satisfaction, while not requiring Russia to stand inactively by until Austria had attained the final accom-

plishment of her warlike undertaking. Russia could not possibly accept such humiliation. Lichnowsky further reported that Grey had informed him "that the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Rome had stated to the Marquis di San Giuliano that, with provision for certain interpretations as to the mode of participation by Austrian agents, Serbia would be inclined to swallow even Articles 5 and 6 of the Austrian note, thus accepting all demands."<sup>102</sup>

That part of Lichnowsky's report which concerned Vienna was passed on to the German Ambassador at Vienna with the request that Count Berchtold be informed about it at once. The Ambassador was requested to add that "we consider such compliance on the part of Serbia an appropriate basis for negotiations, if founded on an occupation of a portion of Serbian territory as a hostage."<sup>103</sup>

The reference to an occupation of Serbian territory as a pledge was a repetition of the "occupation of Belgrade" proposal which had been communicated to Vienna on the evening of the preceding day.<sup>104</sup> Tschirschky's reply to this was that Berchtold had told the British Ambassador at Vienna, de Bunsen, that he, Berchtold, had only refused to discuss the Austro-Serbian quarrel with Russia, but that he was willing to discuss with the latter all questions directly concerning Austria and Russia. Tschirschky continued:

He said that to claim that with the acceptance of Articles 5 and 6 of the Austrian note, the note would be accepted in its entirety, was an error, as Serbia had made reservations with regard to various other points. The integral acceptance of the demands of the note would have sufficed here, as long as a peaceful ter-



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mination of the conflict between Serbia and the Monarchy was still possible. Now, since a state of war had supervened, Austria's conditions would naturally be different.<sup>105</sup>

Shortly after Grey had talked with Lichnowsky, he sent for the latter again and repeated his proposal, adding that "It would seem to him to be a suitable basis for mediation, if Austria, after occupying Belgrade, for example, or other places, should announce her conditions."<sup>106</sup>

In answering these two telegrams of Lichnowsky's, the Chancellor requested the Ambassador to "Kindly thank Sir E. Grey for his frank explanation and tell him that we are continuing to mediate in Vienna and are urgently advising the acceptance of his proposal."<sup>107</sup>

In like manner Jagow informed the French Ambassador, Jules Cambon, on July 30, that "'to gain time,' he had decided to act directly, and that he had asked Austria to tell him the ground on which conversations might be opened with her."<sup>108</sup> It was this reply which the *Report* calls "evasive."

With reference to Jagow's reply of July 30, just mentioned, the *Report* cites *Blue Book*, No. 111 (*British Documents*, No. 340) in which Grey informed Goschen that he had asked Lichnowsky once again to put forward "any reasonable proposal." In this connection the authors of the *Report* overlooked the fact that this conversation between Grey and Lichnowsky did not take place until July 31; consequently, on the day after Jagow gave the reply in question. How the German Government really reacted to this last English proposal of mediation is revealed in Goschen's report to Grey on July 31. Goschen says:

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I spent an hour with Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

He (Jagow.—Author) expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once.<sup>109</sup>

The foregoing account makes it clear that the Russian general mobilization, which had been ordered on the 30th, now precluded Germany from expressing any wish as to how diplomatic negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg should be conducted. From this time on, Germany, her security threatened by Russia's mobilization and the expected mobilization of France, had but one desire; and that was, not to expose herself to greater danger by remaining militarily inactive. It was extremely necessary that Germany should know just what the political situation was, and at this stage of the crisis the only way she had of finding out was to issue an ultimatum.

And yet, before the Chancellor passed on to the German Ambassador at Vienna Lichnowsky's telegram concerning the British proposal of mediation, he added a postscript which proves conclusively that even on the 30th

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the German Government in a very emphatic manner sought to influence Vienna in favour of mediation.

As a result we stand, in case Austria refuses all mediation, before a conflagration in which England will be against us; Italy and Roumania to all appearances will not go with us, and we two shall be opposed to four Great Powers. On Germany, thanks to England's opposition, the principal burden of the fight would fall. Austria's political prestige, the honour of her arms, as well as her just claims against Serbia, could all be amply satisfied by the occupation of Belgrade or of other places. She would be strengthening her status in the Balkans as well as in relation to Russia by the humiliation of Serbia. Under these circumstances we must urgently and impressively suggest to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the acceptance of mediation on the above-mentioned honourable conditions. The responsibility for the consequences that would otherwise follow would be an uncommonly heavy one both for Austria and for us.<sup>110</sup>

When the *Report* concludes that Germany gave an evasive answer to Grey's aforementioned proposal that Germany suggest some means of averting war between Austria and Russia, it does not take into account Germany's efforts to influence Vienna in consequence of Grey's suggestion on July 29.

### *13. The Proposal to Submit the Dispute to the Hague Tribunal*

*On the same day, the 29th of July, the Czar dispatched to the Emperor William II a telegram suggesting that the Austro-Serbian problem should be submitted to the Hague Tribunal. This suggestion received no reply. This im-*

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*portant telegram does not appear in the German White Book. It was made public by the Petrograd Official Gazette (January, 1915).*

The rejection of the proposal to submit the Austro-Serbian dispute to the Hague Tribunal constitutes one of the principal items in the charges brought by the Allies. It is true that this particular telegram from the Tsar was not included in the *German White Book* of 1914, whereas the other telegrams from the Tsar were. For that reason, propagandists believed that special significance was to be attributed to this arbitration proposal. Today, however, it can be easily proved that at that late hour the Tsar's telegram possessed no practical value.

The history of this proposal runs briefly as follows: At the conclusion of Serbia's reply note to Austria-Hungary, a suggestion was made—this is a fact that is largely overlooked—to lay the dispute before the international tribunal at the Hague. Austria did not acquiesce in the proposal, and it was not mentioned anywhere in the exchange of views between the Great Powers. The fact that the European Cabinets attached no practical importance to the proposal may become clear from the consideration that the proposal itself was nowhere mentioned in the exchange of ideas that afterwards took place between the powers.

The suggestion regarding the Hague Court popped up again in a note sent by Nicholas II to Sazonov on July 27.<sup>111</sup> The note read:

I shall receive you tomorrow at six o'clock. I have an idea; and in order to save time, which is very pre-

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scious, I shall tell you what it is. Why should we not try, after coming to an understanding about the matter with France and England, and afterwards with Germany and Italy, to suggest to Austria that she submit her quarrel with Serbia to the examination of the Hague Tribunal? Perhaps we shall have time to do this before things have gone too far. Try to take this step today, before your report [to me tomorrow.—Tr.], so that we may gain time. I have not yet given up hope that peace can be secured.

These very definite instructions from the Tsar left Sazonov cold. He omitted to ask either the French or the British Governments whether they desired to support the Tsar's proposal. The Tsar's note was suppressed in the *Orange Book* of 1914, and was published for the first time in the *Livre Noir*.<sup>112</sup> In his memoirs,<sup>113</sup> too, Sazonov fails to mention the fact that the Imperial order was not executed.

Two days later, on the evening of the 29th, after William II's conciliatory telegram had arrived at Peterhof, the Tsar seized the opportunity to suggest once again, on his own initiative, that the question be submitted to the Hague Tribunal. In the telegram which he sent direct to the Kaiser, he wrote:<sup>114</sup>

Thanks for your conciliatory and friendly telegram. It is decidedly different in tone from the official message presented by your Ambassador to my Minister today. I beg you to explain this divergency. Submission of the Austro-Serbian dispute to the Hague conference commends itself to me. I trust in your wisdom and friendship.

Your loving  
Nicky.

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From Sazonov's memoirs we now learn that the Tsar sent this telegram out of a feeling of deep dejection brought on by worry lest peace could not be maintained in Europe. From the same source we learn that this telegram was dispatched allegedly without Sazonov's knowledge, and that among the vast army of subordinates at the Foreign Office, not one remembered to tell him about it afterwards. Sazonov says that he did not hear of it until January, 1915.

It is evident from the above account that only a very limited significance can be attached to the Tsar's proposal, since it was made without the knowledge of the responsible Minister and, as we learn from Sazonov's conduct on the 27th, without that Minister's consent. Walther Schücking, furthermore, has demonstrated convincingly that the proposal in itself possessed hardly any significance.<sup>115</sup> When, too, it is realized that shortly before this the Tsar had ordered the Russian general mobilization, and had modified it a few hours later to a partial mobilization against Austria, which was all the change he made, it is clear beyond question that at this eleventh hour the proposal had no practical value whatever. In the face of such measures which seriously threatened the security of Austria and indirectly that of Germany, it was much too late to revert to a proposal which had not been given consideration by any European Cabinet since July 25.

Notwithstanding the fact that the plan to have the Hague Court arbitrate the Austro-Serbian dispute could not be considered on the evening of the 29th, it is not correct to say that the German Government paid no attention to the plan. During the night of July 29-30, the Chancellor requested Pourtalès<sup>116</sup> to have a talk with

Sazonov and to explain to the latter the discrepancy between Pourtalès' message and the Kaiser's telegram, as referred to in the Tsar's telegram above. The Chancellor then very correctly added: "Consideration of the Hague conference would in this case naturally be excluded."<sup>117</sup>

#### *14. The Conviction of the Bavarian Legation*

*The Bavarian Legation, in a report dated the 31st of July, declared its conviction that the efforts of Sir Edward Grey to preserve peace would not hinder the march of events. (Second report of Count Lerchenfeld, Bavarian plenipotentiary at Berlin, published on the instructions of Kurt Eisner.)*

First of all, we must point to an inaccuracy. When this passage from the Eisner report was translated for inclusion in the *Report*, the word *redlich* (honest), which came before the word *Bemühungen* (efforts), was left out. This omission distorted the meaning just enough to produce the impression that the German Government regarded Grey's efforts rather lightly, and did not want them to succeed. Furthermore, it is incorrect to say that this was a report from the Bavarian Legation. It was a telephone message. And finally it must be remembered that Kurt Eisner had already abridged the text that was altered by the Entente Commission, as has been noted.

According to the records of the Foreign Office in Munich, the message given by telephone by the Bavarian Legation at Berlin, ran as follows:<sup>118</sup>

Received at Munich, July 31, 1914, 7:45 A. M.

Up to twelve o'clock tonight, no reply to the joint *démarche* of England and Germany has come from

Vienna. In official circles in Berlin it is not expected that the *démarche* will be successful; on the contrary, the conviction is that the doubtlessly honest efforts of Grey to preserve peace will not hinder the march of events.

Last evening, as has been our custom of late, we dined at the Bristol, which at the present time serves as a sort of general meeting place for diplomats. We found the Austrians even more serious than they have been during the past few days. They were absolutely incommunicative.

There is little advantage promised in the visit of the Federal Ministers here; and besides, the danger exists that the gentlemen will be unable to return home.

Eisner, therefore, had omitted the first sentence and a half, and the last two paragraphs.

In this correct version of the telephone message one notes particularly the anxiety expressed over the non-arrival of any reply from Vienna to the joint *démarche* of England and Germany. Of course the authors of the *Report* cannot be held responsible for the false judgment they formed concerning this telephone message. The fault lies in Kurt Eisner's falsification, which has already been exposed.<sup>119</sup>

15. *Austria's Willingness to Discuss the Ultimatum, and the German Ultimatum to Russia*

*The Entente did not relax its conciliatory efforts, but the German Government systematically brought all its attempts to nought. When Austria consented for the first time on the 31st of July to discuss the contents of the Serbian note with the Russian Government and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador received orders to "con-*



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*verse*” with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, (Blue Book, No. 133; Red Book, No. 55), Germany made any negotiation impossible by sending her ultimatum to Russia. Prince Lichnowsky wrote that “a hint from Berlin would have been enough to decide Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success and to declare that he was satisfied with the Serbian reply, but this hint was not given. On the contrary they went forwards towards war.<sup>120</sup> (Lichnowsky memoir, p. 41.)

We have here a reference to the instructions forwarded by Berchtold to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Szápáry, on July 30.<sup>121</sup> According to these instructions, Szápáry was to clear up apparent misunderstandings concerning Berchtold’s categorical rejection of Sazonov’s proposal to initiate conversations, and was to make it known that he, Berchtold, was quite ready to give the desired explanations regarding the Note, which appeared, however, to have been superseded by the outbreak of war. The discussion, in any case, “could only take the form of supplementary explanations, as it has never been our intention to yield on any of the points contained in the note.”

As we learn from his report to Berchtold on August 1,<sup>122</sup> Szápáry did not follow Berchtold’s instructions very closely. On the contrary, he made, among others, the following observations. He was well aware that it was Russia’s position that the tenor of the Note should be softened, whereas it was Berchtold’s opinion that only the meaning of the Note could be explained. The Ambassador did not mention Berchtold’s view that Austria could not depart in any way from the terms of the Note, but, on the

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contrary, toned down the discrepancy in the views of Sazonov and Berchtold, affirming, indeed, that it was not to be overlooked that essentially these views came to the same thing. Sazonov inferred from what Szápáry said that it would be possible to lay the matter before the London conference. In order to lessen the exaggerated significance that was being read into his words, Szápáry, in the course of further conversation, was obliged to call repeated attention to the situation created by the general mobilization, and to lay greater emphasis on the differences in the views of both sides. As Szápáry himself reports, however, two very important points were not discussed at all in the course of the interview: on Szápáry's side, the purely retrospective and theoretical character of any conversations regarding the text of the Note; on Sazonov's, the question as to what was to be done about military operations while possible negotiations were in progress.

Sazonov's memoirs reveal very distinctly how he himself regarded Szápáry's attempt to renew the proposal for direct conversations which had been turned down on the 28th. We shall, therefore, quote the pertinent passage in full:<sup>123</sup>

Cannon thunder prevented the resumption of negotiations to which I had attached a practical importance only during the first stage of the Austro-Serbian conflict. The declaration of war on Serbia and the bombardment of Belgrade deprived them of any real significance, and I lost all interest in them, though, for reasons already indicated, I did not refuse to continue them. Negotiations could help nothing now, and there was no more reason for delay.

In this paragraph we find the very same opinion expressed that General Dobrorolski, Chief of the Mobili-

zation Section of the Russian General Staff, voiced in 1921. He said: "War was already a settled matter [on July 25!—Author], and the flood of telegrams that passed between the Governments of Russia and Germany furnished merely the *mise en scène* of an historical drama." <sup>124</sup>

It is apparent from the above account that the cause of the interruption of direct conversations that were resumed between St. Petersburg and Vienna lay in the distinctly opposite views of Sazonov and Berchtold. On the other hand, the authors of the *Report* contend that it was Germany who rendered negotiations impossible by her ultimatum to Russia. In doing this they overlook completely and, no doubt, quite intentionally the reason for the German ultimatum: the Russian general mobilization!

To support their contention, the authors of the *Report* quote from Lichnowsky's memoir the passage which the latter used in referring to the rejection of the conference proposal. Apart from the improper use of this quotation, Lichnowsky's opinion is wholly untenable today after we have learned from the German documents relating to the outbreak of the War how positively and persistently the German Government strove to influence Vienna's conduct toward Russia. <sup>125</sup>

#### 16. *Secret Mobilization and Concentration of the German Army*

*On the 1st of August the German Emperor addressed a telegram to the King of England (White Book, Annex 32; Yellow Book, Annex II, bis, No. 2) containing the following sentence:*

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*“The troops on my frontier are, at this moment, being kept back by telegraphic and telephonic orders from crossing the French frontier.” Now, war was not declared till two days after that date, and as the German mobilization orders were issued on that same day, the 1st of August, it follows that, as a matter of fact, the German Army had been mobilized and concentrated in pursuance of previous orders.*

Concerning this far-fetched and wholly erroneous conclusion which many Frenchmen, unfortunately, still believe is correct,<sup>126</sup> there is this to be said: The German order calling for mobilization was signed by the Kaiser at his palace on August 1, at five o'clock in the afternoon. Shortly thereafter a telegram from Lichnowsky arrived from London. In it the Ambassador stated that “in case we did not attack France, England would remain neutral and would guarantee France’s neutrality.” He would learn further particulars that afternoon.<sup>127</sup> This startling communication from the Ambassador was followed up by another telegram in which Lichnowsky reported that “Sir E. Grey wanted to make proposals to me this afternoon regarding England’s neutrality, *even in the event that we should have war with France as well as Russia.*”<sup>128</sup> He was to see Grey that afternoon at three-thirty, and would report at once.

Lichnowsky’s communication, which seemed to give a favourable turn to the entire situation, was regarded by the Kaiser and his councillors at the palace as highly promising. The Kaiser proposed to change the deployment of his main forces so that they would advance toward the east and hence against Russia, and not toward the west as had been fixed by the mobilization order. In a

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personal telegram the German Emperor assured the King of England that he would refrain from attacking France and would employ his troops elsewhere, if France would offer him her neutrality and the British navy and army would guarantee it. The text of this telegram was as follows:<sup>129</sup>

I just received the communication from your Government offering French neutrality under guaranty of Great Britain. Added to this offer was the inquiry, whether under these conditions Germany would refrain from attacking France. On technical grounds my mobilization which had already been proclaimed this afternoon must proceed against two fronts east and west as prepared. This cannot be countermanded because I am sorry your telegram came so late.<sup>130</sup> But if France offers me neutrality which must be guaranteed by the British fleet and army I shall of course refrain from attacking France and employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on my frontier are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephon[e] from crossing into France.

The last sentence of this telegram is the one cited in the *Report*. About ten o'clock in the evening yet another telegram from Lichnowsky arrived, describing Grey's proposal in greater detail.

As a result of this telegram of Lichnowsky's, the contents of which were later on alleged by Grey to be a misunderstanding<sup>131</sup> on the part of the Ambassador, the Kaiser proposed to order a change in the deployment of troops. Fortunately, owing to the opposition of Count Moltke, this order was not executed. All that was done was

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to halt the 16th Infantry-Division, which was prepared for an immediate advance upon Luxemburg.<sup>132</sup>

From the sentence quoted out of the Kaiser's telegram to the English King, the authors of the *Report* drew the conclusion that the German army had been mobilized and concentrated in pursuance of previous orders, since the troops were already in a position to receive the order to halt their advance across the French frontier at the time the telegram was dispatched. This conclusion, absolutely unfounded, only goes to show how imperfectly the authors of the *Report* understood the German methods of mobilization. Apparently these gentlemen assumed that it was not possible to begin the advance on the same day that the order for mobilization was released. They did not know that sections of the Germany army were mobilized expeditiously, so to speak, a procedure which put the troops in a position to begin deployment on the very first day of mobilization. The supposition that an earlier mobilization order had been issued is, therefore, quite gratuitous. This lack of understanding may be partly explained by the fact that apparently military experts were not appointed to the Commission which drew up the *Report*. This mistake shows up in the next accusation also.

### *17. The Beginning of German Mobilization*

*As early as the 21st of July German mobilization had commenced by the recall of a certain number of classes of the reserve (Yellow Book, No. 15), then of German officers in Switzerland (July 23, ibid., No. 60), and finally of the Metz garrison on the 25th of July. (Ibid., No. 106.)*

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*On the 26th of July the German Fleet was called back from Norway. (Ibid., No. 58.)*

The dates cited in the above passage call for comment. The statement that German mobilization had begun on July 21 through the recall of a certain number of classes of the reserve does not square with the facts. The facts in the case, as I have already set them forth in my article, "Ein Irrtum der Ententekommission" (A Mistake by the Entente Commission), *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, September, 1923, are as follows:<sup>133</sup>

According to the *Yellow Book*, No. 15, Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, sent on July 21 to Bienvenu-Martin, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, a communication the last paragraph of which reads:

I have also been assured that, from now on, the preliminary notices for mobilisation, the object of which is to place Germany in a kind of "attention" attitude in times of tension, have been sent out here to those classes which would receive them in similar circumstances. That is a measure to which the Germans, constituted as they are, can have recourse without indiscretion and without exciting the people. It is not a sensational measure, and is not necessarily followed by full mobilisation, as we have already seen, but it is none the less significant.

Jules Cambon.

What the source of this report was and how it was appraised by the French Naval Attaché is disclosed in Bronevski's telegram to Sazonov, published in *Krasnyi-Arkhiv* (Red Archives), Volume I, Moscow, 1922.<sup>134</sup>

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Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Minister of  
Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg.

No. 117. Berlin, 9/22 July, 1914.

Confidential. The French Naval Attaché, with Cambon's knowledge, told me today about a rumour which his British colleague had just passed on to him, (a rumour) the truth of which has not yet been tested by either of them and according to which a number of German soldiers belonging to the Reserve have been sent preliminary notices about a possible mobilization. Such preliminary notices were sent out in Germany in the year 1911 and at the end of 1912 at a moment of great tension caused by Serbian agitation over the Adriatic. These preliminary notices have nothing to do with the calling out of troops for military training, and with the general manœuvres planned for this coming August.

As our new Naval Attaché has but just arrived and the Military Attaché cannot return here, it is impossible for the Legation to inquire into the truth of this disturbing rumour. I have therefore requested the French Ambassador to keep me informed about any news he gets.

Bronevski.

This report sounds essentially different from the one passed on by Jules Cambon. The British Ambassador apparently did not forward a report concerning the "rumour." At any rate, no mention is made of it in the British documents.

Jules Cambon's report of July 21 respecting the issuance of orders to appear for military service is based on an error.

In the year 1900 a radical change in mobilization methods was effected in Germany. In this year the Govern-



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ment did away entirely with the practice of issuing "orders to appear for military service" to the reservists, etc., after public notice of the mobilization order had been given.

According to a decree promulgated by the Ministry of War in the autumn of 1900, the reservists were to be called in on the basis of "war orders" and "pass notices" issued to the reservists by the proper district commanders immediately after the former's release from active service. The difference between "war orders" and "pass notices" was this. "War orders" were handed out to the soldiers whose liability under mobilization was definitely fixed, whereas the men with "pass notices" had to report, in case of mobilization, to their district commanders to await further instructions as to their disposal. It was indicated in the "war orders" and "pass notices" on what day and with what group the reservist in question had to report.

Public notices of the mobilization day having been given, the reservists automatically reported for military duty. Special orders to report for military service, therefore, were not required. An issuance of orders to report for military service, without a change being made in the plan of mobilization, would simply have thrown the whole machinery out of order.

It is true that in July, 1914, as was the case each year, reservists were called out to take part in peacetime manœuvres after public notice had been given fixing the time and place of these manœuvres. According to a fixed plan, however, these men were allowed to go home after they had served their period of training. This fact can be readily proved by consulting the official documents and

passenger lists. By means of a passenger list (55/1914), the author could easily show that even on July 22 reservists, who had been called out to the drill-grounds of Arys in East Prussia, were permitted to go home.

To summarize briefly, we may say that the statement contained in the *Report* originated as follows: The British Naval Attaché hears a "rumour according to which a number of German soldiers belonging to the Reserve have been sent preliminary notices about a possible mobilization." Out of this "rumour" the French Ambassador manufactures the report that "the preliminary notices for mobilization . . . have been sent out here to those classes which would receive them in similar circumstances." The Commission of the Preliminary Peace Conference stretches the report further and decides: "As early as the 21st of July German mobilization had commenced by the recall of a certain number of classes of the reserve."

This particular case reveals very plainly how the Commission went about its work. The method cannot be described as scientific, exactly.<sup>135</sup>

We now come to the statement regarding the recall of German officers from Switzerland. The authors of the *Report* cite the report of the French Consul-General at Basle to the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, on July 27, 1914.<sup>136</sup> The quoted passage reads: "Four days ago the German officers on leave in this district received orders to break off their leave and return to Germany."

According to facts established by the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry, Part VII, Appendix 20, [See footnote 4.—Tr.] orders for the recall of men on furlough

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were not telegraphed by the Ministry of War until July 29, at 10:40 and 11:20 in the evening.

In connection with the further statement that the German officers of the Metz garrison were recalled on July 25, the *Report* refers to *Yellow Book*, No. 106. The citation of this document is not apposite here. *Yellow Book*, No. 106 has nothing to say about the recall of German officers from the Metz garrison. On the contrary, *Yellow Book*, No. 106 contains a report from Viviani to the French Ambassador at London, Paul Cambon. In this report there is listed a number of alleged military measures being taken in Germany, indicating that Germany is getting the start on France with her military preparations. In the meantime, from the *British Documents on the Origins of the War* we have learned that the document published in the *French Yellow Book* of 1914 as No. 106 was condensed in a telegram dated July 30, whereas a part of the real document is not dated until July 31. Aside from this, many alterations were made in the text; and as a result we find a change was made in a date. According to *Yellow Book*, No. 106, the railway stations in France were not occupied by the military authorities until July 28, while according to the original report published as an enclosure in *British Documents*, No. 319, the railway stations in France had been occupied as early as Sunday, July 26.<sup>137</sup>

On the other hand, it is quite true that the German fleet was called back from Norway on July 26, as proof of which the report of the French Minister at Christiania to Bienvenu-Martin is cited. It will require but brief space, however, to show that this measure can by no means be construed as indicating a desire for war; that it was, on

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the contrary, at the very most, a belated measure taken to safeguard the fleet. The German fleet lay scattered and inactive in the harbours of Norway, while the English fleet had been concentrated at Portland for trial manœuvres since July 16. Moreover, the danger existed that Russian torpedo boats would attempt a surprise attack on the German ships. It was high time, therefore, that the German fleet was extricated from its precarious position, in the interest of its own safety, and brought back to the protection of the German naval ports.<sup>138</sup>

### *18. The Entente's Desire for Peace*

*The attitude of the Entente nevertheless remained still to the very end so conciliatory that, at the very time at which the German fleet was bombarding Libau, Nicholas II gave his word of honour to William II that Russia would not undertake any aggressive action during the pourparlers, (Telegram from Nicholas II to William II; Yellow Book, No. 6, Annex V.) and that when the German troops commenced their march across the French frontier Mr. Viviani telegraphed to all the French Ambassadors "we must not stop working for accommodation."*

As far as Russia is concerned, the facts in the case are as follows: In the course of the exchange of telegrams between the Kaiser and the Tsar, Nicholas II on July 31, at noon, had dispatched a telegram, which is correctly quoted in the *Report*, stating that so long as *pourparlers* with Austria respecting Serbia lasted, his troops would commit no acts of provocation. The conclusion which the authors of the *Report* draw from this telegram; namely,

that the attitude of the Entente, especially that of Russia, was conciliatory, is not correct at all. Russia's un-conciliatory attitude had stood out so sharply when she ordered her general mobilization, justifiable only on the grounds that she wanted war, that this attitude could not have been outweighed even by a solemn word from the Tsar that his troops would not commit any acts of provocation. The provocation lay in the general mobilization itself; no further acts were necessary. In this connection we need only refer to the following set of instructions drawn up by the Russian Government in 1912.

Confidential.  
Copy.

Protocol

of special instructions concerning preliminary war measures having to do with the organization of the backward service on the southwestern front,  
according to Plan A.

November 8/21, 1912.

. . . In view of these considerations, the Commission deems it imperative to lay particular stress on the necessity of:

1. not losing a minute in announcing our mobilization, so that we may execute this measure more or less simultaneously with the enemy;
2. timing our declaration of war so that our operations can be completed if Austria has not concluded her war with Serbia. . . .

It is absolutely imperative that instructions to the effect that the proclamation of mobilization is tantamount to a declaration of war, be changed. Such instructions may lead to serious misunderstandings between ourselves and those Powers with whom, on account of political circumstances of one kind or an-

other, we do not contemplate war or the opening of hostilities, at least in the very beginning.

On the other hand, it will prove advantageous to deploy troops without commencing hostilities, so that the enemy will not irretrievably lose hope that war can be averted. The measures we take in this connection can, through clever diplomatic negotiations, be so masked that the fears of the enemy will be allayed as much as possible.

When such measures make possible the gaining of a few days' time, they must be resorted to unconditionally.

In view of these considerations, it appears advantageous

1. to change the instructions which state that the proclamation of mobilisation is tantamount to a declaration of war;
2. to issue, shortly before the proclamation of mobilisation, suitable instructions regarding the opening of hostilities against one or the other of the Great Powers who might take part in the war;
3. to synchronize the opening of hostilities with our preparedness. To that end we must strive to gain the necessary time, wherefore hostilities are not to open unless absolutely necessary. Departure from these regulations may be allowed only in case of open, aggressive acts by the enemy. . . .<sup>139</sup>

Protocol signed by

Lieutenant-General Alexejev,  
Lieutenant-General Svjetlov,  
Major-General Dragomirov,  
Major-General Miller.

Approved by Colonel Stogov.

From the protocol it becomes quite clear that Russia intended to mask its military measures by means of diplo-

matic negotiations with the object of lulling the suspicions of its opponents. As this procedure became known to the German General Staff, even before the outbreak of war, it will not seem incomprehensible that after the news of the Russian general mobilization became known, all diplomatic steps on the part of Russia, among which at this stage of the dispute the Tsar's telegram must also be included, justified Russia's opponents in feeling the most profound distrust.

That people in Russia as soon as the order for general mobilization had been issued were themselves convinced that war had thus become inevitable and that there was no longer any going back is expressed by the Chief of the Russian Mobilization Section, General Dobrorolski, in his well-known book, *The Mobilization of the Russian Army in 1914*, where he says: "If the time for this (mobilization) has once been fixed, everything is settled, there is no longer any turning back. It automatically fixes the beginning of the War in advance." <sup>139a</sup>

The Tsar himself, too, was fully aware of the importance of the Russian general mobilization. This becomes clear from the words that he made use of to Sazonov when the latter had wrested from him for the second time the decisive order for general mobilization: "Think of the responsibility," said the Tsar, "that I am taking on myself on your advice. Remember that it is a question of sending thousands and tens of thousands of men to their death!" <sup>139b</sup>

The statement in the *Report* that the bombardment of Libau took place at the very time of the dispatch of the Tsar's telegram, July 31, is not correct. The bombardment of the Russian naval port of Libau by the two small cruis-

ers, the "Augsburg" and "Magdeburg," did not occur until after seven o'clock on the evening of August 2; consequently, fully twenty-four hours after a state of war had supervened between Germany and Russia.

How inaccurate the authors of the *Report* are in their chronological account of events is revealed not only in the matter of the bombardment of Libau, but also in the further statement that Viviani's telegram was dispatched at a time when the German troops were commencing their march across the French frontier. Viviani's telegram to the French Ambassador, containing the passage, "We must not stop working for accommodation," was dispatched on August 1, whereas the German troops were not free to cross the frontier until August 3, at six o'clock in the evening.<sup>140</sup> There was no advance by German troops across the French frontier on August 1.

### *19. The Alleged Bombing of Nuremberg by Aeroplanes*

*On the 3d of August Mr. von Schoen went to the Quai d'Orsay with the declaration of war against France. Lacking a real cause of complaint, Germany alleged, in her declaration of war, that bombs had been dropped by French aeroplanes in various districts in Germany. This statement was entirely false. Moreover, it was either later admitted to be so (Statement of the municipality of Nuremberg, dated April 3, 1916.) or no particulars were ever furnished by the German Government.*

Certainly the German Government did not lack a real cause of complaint for declaring war, even though it is true that the statement concerning the alleged bombing of



Nuremberg by aeroplanes, cited in the declaration of war, rested upon a false military report. The authors of the *Report* seem to take delight in the fact that the German Government gave credence to this false report; but their attitude merely goes to show how different our methods for getting at the truth about the war guilt question are from theirs.

The statement of the municipality of Nuremberg, dated April 3, 1916, cited above, was published in the *Medizinischen Wochenschrift* (Medical Weekly) of May 18, 1916, by Professor Schwalbe.<sup>141</sup> It read as follows: "The Acting Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Bavarian Army Corps here knows nothing about any bombing by enemy airmen of the Nuremberg-Kissingen and Nuremberg-Ansbach railroad before and after the outbreak of war. All statements and newspaper reports relating to this matter have turned out to be untrue."<sup>142</sup>

With reference to the alleged bombing of Nuremberg by aeroplanes, we shall quote the following passages from an article by Count Max Montgelas, published for the first time in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of March 7, 1922, and reprinted in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage* for July, 1927. Count Montgelas writes:

Although more than two years have elapsed since the complete publication of the official German documents, the opinion still seems to prevail in France that the German declaration of war on August 3, 1914, was based exclusively on the report of the bombing of Nuremberg by aeroplanes, and that this report was simply a trickish and malicious invention on the part of high Government officials. . . .

When and how the report concerning the bombing of Nuremberg reached the Foreign Office cannot be de-

terminated through the official documents. . . . This report was on file at General Headquarters. The journal of the Quartermaster-General, Volume I, contains the following note, dated August 2, No. 38: "The 3rd Bavarian Army Corps reports: Airmen are bombing Nuremberg." From further unpublished documents in the Imperial archives, submitted in copy form to the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry, we gather the following facts:

The then Commander-in-Chief of the above-mentioned Corps reported during the inquiry in October, 1919, that on August 1—presumably a mistake for August 2—he had received by telephone from the Nuremberg railroad offices news about aeroplanes bombing the outskirts of the city. This news he had passed on conditionally to General Headquarters; and after the railroad management had learned that the news was false, he had reported this fact also by telephone to General Headquarters.

The news had come in to the railroad management at Nuremberg on August 2, both from the Würzburg-Nuremberg and the Ansbach-Nuremberg roads; the line superintendent at Nuremberg had telegraphed the Railroad Division of General Headquarters to that effect, adding the statement: "Trustworthy information unobtainable." So far as the official documents tell us, a disavowal of this report did not follow. Since news of the alleged incident was transmitted by the railroad management, by means of circular telegrams, to all the stations along the Würzburg-Nuremberg and Ansbach-Nuremberg lines, the news must have reached the press in the same manner.

The military day-books of the 3rd Bavarian Army Corps, the 5th Infantry-Division of Nuremberg, the 21st Infantry-Regiment of Fürth bei Nuremberg, and the 7th Infantry-Regiment of Bayreuth contain mention of numerous rumours of telephone reports concerning enemy airmen. Most of these reports were con-

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sidered unworthy of belief; nevertheless, at various places, precautionary measures to take care of all contingencies were ordered; and news of this also got to the press. . . .

The false report regarding Nuremberg may be traced, therefore, to the fact that the first telephone report of the Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Bavarian Corps was entered in the journal of operations at General Headquarters without reservation, while the disavowal of this report in particular was not entered. This was a very serious oversight on the part of the telephone officer concerned in handling the call.

Moreover, the Foreign Office should have inquired further into the facts in the case when, on the afternoon of August 3, after the declaration of war had been dispatched, a report came in from the Munich Legation expressing doubt that the incident had taken place. (Document, No. 734). At the same time it must be remembered, of course, that the Nuremberg incident plays a very secondary rôle in the actual text of the declaration of war. (Document, No. 734).

As a result of the mutilation of all cipher telegrams, normal diplomatic intercourse between Germany and France was stopped from the morning of August 3 on. For this the German Government was not to blame.

And so, even if it is true that the report about the bombing of Nuremberg by aeroplanes, as contained in the declaration of war, was "entirely false," it would be quite wrong to conclude from that fact that the German Government lacked a real cause of complaint for declaring war on France. The cause of complaint for the German declaration of war on France was drawn up in a draft which was completed on August 1, but which, unfortunately, was not dispatched. It was replaced by a new draft in which the report of the alleged bombing of Nuremberg by aero-

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planes was included. The cause of complaint for the declaration of war on France, presented very convincingly in the first draft, was worded as follows:<sup>143</sup>

The German Government had been striving to reach a peaceful outcome from the commencement of the crisis. But while, at the desire of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, and in cooperation with England, she was still endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and Petersburg, Russia mobilized her entire army and her fleet. By these measures, which had been preceded by no extraordinary preparations for war in Germany, the security of the German Empire was threatened. Not to take measures to meet such a menace would have meant to stake the existence of the Empire. The German Government therefore required the Russian Government to suspend at once the mobilization against Germany and her ally, Austria-Hungary. Simultaneously, the German Government acquainted the French Government with the matter, and, in consideration of the well-known relations of the Republic to Russia, requested a statement as to whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war. To this inquiry the French Government returned the equivocal and evasive answer that France would act in accordance with her interests. By this reply, France reserves the right to place herself at the side of our opponents, and is in a position to attack us in the rear at any moment, with an army which has been mobilized in the meantime. Germany is forced, under these conditions, to perceive a threat in this, all the more since no reply has been returned to the demand she had made upon Russia to suspend the mobilization of her armed forces, notwithstanding the period of her respite has long expired, and since a Russo-German war has now broken out as a result. Germany is unable to leave to France the choice of the time when the menace to her western frontiers shall be brought into action,

but, threatened from two sides, is forced to proceed in her own defense at once.

Thus I am instructed to make known to Your Excellency the following announcement:

“His Majesty the German Emperor declares in the name of the Empire that he considers himself as being in a state of war with France.”

The cause of complaint as set forth in the above draft is convincing, and very much so, because it concerns facts the significance of which is at once apparent. Even though this draft, as we have noted, was unfortunately not dispatched, the cause of complaint contained in it was so commonly known that the French Government must have been aware of it without having to be informed by a special communication.

#### *20. The Ten-Kilometre Zone and the Frontier Violations*

*Moreover, in order to be manifestly above reproach, France was careful to withdraw her troops ten kilometers from the German frontier. Notwithstanding this precaution, numerous officially established violations of French territory preceded the declaration of war. (Yellow Book, Nos. 106, 136, 139, etc.)*

a) *Patrols of various strengths crossed the French frontier at fifteen points, one on the 30th of July at Xures, eight on the 2d of August, and the others on the 3d of August, before war was declared.*

*The French troops lost one killed and several wounded. The enemy left on French territory four killed, one of whom was an officer, and seven prisoners.*

b) *At Suarce, on the 2d of August, the enemy carried*

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*off nine inhabitants, twenty-five horses, and three carriages.*

c) *Four incursions by German dirigibles took place between the 25th of July and the 1st of August.*

d) *Finally, German aeroplanes flew over Lunéville on the 3d of August, before the declaration of war, and dropped six bombs. [Report of local authorities.]*

Inasmuch as the legend about the ten-kilometre zone has been refuted so often, we shall refrain from a new treatment of the subject and refer to an earlier publication.<sup>144</sup>

On July 30, 1914, at the instance of the French Prime Minister, Viviani, who was not a little proud over the matter, the order was given to withdraw the French covering troops to a distance of from eight to ten kilometres from the border. The order, issued by the Minister of War, Messimy, read as follows:<sup>145</sup> "Covering troops on foot will take up at once positions provided for in case of sudden attack. However, for diplomatic reasons, it is indispensable that no incident be caused by us. Consequently, no troops or patrols under any pretext are to approach the frontier or go beyond the line." Then follows an enumeration of the positions to be occupied, forming a line ten kilometres distant from the Franco-German frontier.

In a further order, dated August 1, the diplomatic reasons are stated more definitely. "With a view to assuring ourselves of the support of our English neighbours, it is still essential not to have patrols or detachments cross the general line fixed by the telegram . . ." A third order from the Minister of War, also dated August 1,

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states: "In the name of the President of the Republic, and for grave diplomatic reasons, the Minister of War insists again on the absolute necessity of not crossing the line of demarcation indicated in the telegram. . . ."

The French historian, Renauld, in his book, *Histoire populaire de la guerre* (A Popular History of the War), hits the nail on the head when he says that the withdrawal of the French troops ten kilometres from the frontier was ordered for the sole purpose "of producing an argument which the English Government could present to its people in order to enlist their support in favour of war. Its purpose, therefore, was warlike, not peaceful."

This opinion advanced by Renauld as early as 1923 is confirmed by the British documents relating to the origins of the War. Thus, from Document No. 447 of the *British Documents* we learn that Cambon, in a conversation with Grey after the cabinet meeting on August 1, said that for the sake of public opinion in England, France had drawn her forces back from the German frontier. This is exactly what Renauld asserts. Of particular interest, however, is the reason given Grey by Cambon for this measure. He declared, namely, that France was now in a position "to take only the defensive, and not the offensive, against Germany." From a military viewpoint, the inference drawn from the withdrawal of the covering troops a few kilometres is obviously ridiculous, and needs no further consideration.

Another argument to prove that the purpose of this military measure, ostensibly an act of renunciation, was not to preserve peace but to make sure of English support, is the fact that the order to withdraw the troops behind the frontier was not completely revoked until 12:30 P. M. on

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August 5. By this time it was certain that England had joined France in war against Germany.

However, let us not confine ourselves solely to these matters which were unknown to the men who drew up the *Report*. Let us consider the French measure from another angle also. First of all, it must be emphasized that the posting of French covering troops on July 30 was anything but a peaceful gesture. These troops, consisting of eleven divisions of infantry and ten of cavalry, were a menace to Germany who at this time had not yet posted her covering troops. This Germany did not do until July 31, at 1: P. M., when the German Government issued the proclamation, "Threatening Danger of War," after news of the Russian general mobilization had reached Berlin.

Furthermore, the assumption that any military advantage was sacrificed by drawing the French covering troops back, ostensibly out of a love for peace, is not true. Aside from the fact that the withdrawal of the troops was not fixed precisely at the ten-kilometre line, but that at numerous points the distance of withdrawal amounted to only five or six kilometres, it should be mentioned that strategically it was to the best interests of France to avoid any premature incidents on the German frontier. The Allies' plan, which had been repeatedly discussed in conferences between the French and Russian General Staffs, was to attack Germany simultaneously. It was up to the French army, therefore, to wait until the Russian steam-roller was ready to move and the intervention of the English landing-forces was assured.

This understanding of the situation was strengthened in an interesting fashion by a debate which took place in the French Chamber of Deputies on January 31, 1919.



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The subject of the debate was the abandonment of the ore basin of Briey.

The events leading up to this debate were as follows: In January, 1917, two French generals, Malleterre and Verraux, had locked horns in a newspaper debate. General Malleterre, in the *Temps* of January 31, 1917, had expressed astonishment that through its order to withdraw the French troops ten kilometres from the frontier, at the outbreak of hostilities, the French Government should have abandoned the ore basin of Briey which was so singularly important in time of war. On February 3, 1917, in *Œuvre*, General Verraux has come to the defense of the Government which had issued this order, asserting that the 42nd Division, which occupied the post opposite Briey, had received instructions in January, 1914, to take up, at the first alarm, a position on the slopes of the Meuse twenty-five kilometres from the frontier.

In his speech before the Chamber, Viviani touched upon this debate between the two generals; and in defending from party criticism the abandonment of the ore basin of Briey, spoke as follows:<sup>146</sup>

The instructions published by General Verraux, dated January, 1914, contain, for reasons into which I cannot go here, the order to withdraw for a distance of twenty-five kilometres in the region of Briey. The order issued by the Government had the effect, at least, of compelling the troops to take up positions ten kilometres away, whereas, if they had followed the earlier order, they would have withdrawn to the twenty-five-kilometre line.

Two different conclusions may be drawn from this. In the first place, it will be noted that the order to withdraw

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the troops to the ten-kilometre line did not involve at the outset the abandonment of French territory generally; on the contrary, the positions taken up in consequence of the order included land that had already been abandoned.

Furthermore, it is to be noted that the withdrawal of troops, to particular positions at least, had been planned and ordered long before the War broke out.

We are not in a position today to test the truth of the statements contained in Note (a) of the *Report*, dealing with violations of French territory at fifteen points previous to the outbreak of war. In this connection the reader is referred to an article by Count Max Montgelas in the October issue of *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, 1928, entitled "Grenzverletzungen vor Kriegsausbruch 1914" (Frontier Violations Previous to the Outbreak of War in 1914), in which the author proves, on the basis of military documents, cases of frontier violations by the French on August 1, 2, and 3. By way of introduction, Count Montgelas writes:

As I look at it, the question of frontier violations, so far as they involve responsibility for the outbreak of the War, has long since been closed. It has been established to the satisfaction of non-partisan investigators that numerous frontier violations occurred on both sides, in fact not only against the wishes of the civil authorities, but against the express orders of the higher military commands as well. Among the younger soldiers on both sides there were impulsive firebrands who wanted the reputation of being the first to engage the enemy. Conscious of the fact that doubts are still repeatedly cast on the veracity of German statements, I must, nevertheless, trouble the reader with these unimportant details and quote a number of well-

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authenticated reports of frontier violations by the French.

Note (b) states that at Suarce, on August 2, the Germans carried off nine inhabitants, twenty-five horses, and three carriages. This incident had already been cleared up on August 4 in a communication from the chief of the General Staff to Foreign Minister von Jagow.

The telegram read:<sup>147</sup>

Against express orders, a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, apparently led by one officer, crossed the border on the second of August. Probably it was shot to pieces. Only one man returned. That this patrol brought back horses, is, therefore, impossible.

Without a more explicit declaration as to time and place, it is impossible to verify the statement that four incursions of French territory by German dirigibles took place between July 25 and August 1. It should be borne in mind, however, that the alleged crossing of the frontier by dirigibles during these days was not made the subject of an official complaint by France against Germany, as was the case with other frontier violations. It is highly probable that the reports of these particular incidents are traceable to the war psychosis which prevailed generally at this time. The suddenness with which the War broke out produced such a violent disturbance in the minds of most people in France and Germany that many things were said to have happened that later turned out to have been hallucinations.<sup>148</sup>

We come finally to the bombing of Lunéville on August 3 by German aeroplanes, before war had been declared.

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In commenting on this incident we shall again refer to an earlier account.<sup>149</sup>

A German aeroplane started at 5:45 in the afternoon (Central European time) from the airport of Bühl near Saarburg, and flew over Maixe to Lunéville and thence back to its airport, where it landed at 8:15 in the evening. According to the observer's account, six bombs were dropped over Lunéville, five falling within the city and the sixth striking the drillgrounds. The objectives of the air attack were the airport and barracks at Lunéville. What effect the bombs had could not be determined. An estimate as to when the bombing of Lunéville took place was not included in the report. The time, however, was figured out later. The flying distance from Saarburg to Lunéville by way of Maixe amounts approximately to seventy kilometres, which, considering conditions at that time, must have taken from forty to fifty minutes to negotiate. To this must be added the time required for an aeroplane to reach a height where it can be effective for military purposes; that is, about thirty minutes. The aeroplane, therefore, could not have reached Lunéville before seven o'clock in the evening (six o'clock, Paris time). At that hour a state of war between Germany and France was to be regarded as an actuality.

### 21. *Italy's Attitude*

*The provocation was so flagrant that Italy, herself a member of the Triple Alliance, did not hesitate to declare that in view of the aggressive character of the war the casus fœderis ceased to apply. (Yellow Book, No. 124.)*

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According to *Yellow Book*, No. 124, the text of the telegram cited runs as follows:

Rome, August 1, 1914.

I went to see the Marquis di San Giuliano this morning at half-past eight, in order to get precise information from him as to the attitude of Italy in view of the provocative acts of Germany and the results which they may have.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that he had seen the German Ambassador yesterday evening. Herr von Flotow had said to him that Germany had requested the Russian Government to suspend mobilisation, and the French Government to inform them as to their intentions; Germany had given France a time limit of eighteen hours and Russia a time limit of twelve hours.

Herr von Flotow as a result of this communication asked what were the intentions of the Italian Government.

The Marquis di San Giuliano answered that as the war undertaken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view of the consequences which might result from it according to the declaration of the German Ambassador, Italy could not take part in the war.

Barrère.

The text of the last paragraph does not appear to have been reproduced with full exactness. At any rate, in an anonymous article which appeared in the *Revue des deux Mondes*, October 1, 1926, entitled: "L'Italie et l'agonie de la paix en 1914" (Italy and the Agony of Peace in 1914), and of which Barrère apparently is the author, the last paragraph reads as follows:<sup>150</sup>

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In reply, M. de San Giuliano had said to the German Ambassador "that as the war undertaken by Austria and the consequences which might result from it were aggressive and inconsistent with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, Italy could not take part in the war."<sup>151</sup>

If the text given in the *Revue des deux Mondes* is the correct one, it follows that Telegram No. 124 in the *Yellow Book* was falsified "in order to cast suspicion on the German Ambassador and the German Government."<sup>152</sup>

Even if we must admit that Italy's attitude was actually what it is stated to have been in the document above, we cannot agree with the conclusion that was drawn from this document; namely, that the provocation was flagrant. Above all, in the *Report* the words, "of Austria against Serbia," should have been added after the word, "provocation"; for although Germany is drawn into the picture by the words, "the consequences which might result from it," Document No. 124 deals expressly with the war undertaken by Austria.

There were unquestionably other factors, however, which determined Italy's attitude. We shall refer the reader to Professor Paul Herre's article, "Italiens Rolle in der Kriegsschuldfrage" (Italy's Rôle in the War Guilt Question), from which the following passage is taken:<sup>153</sup>

The old distrust of Austria-Hungary, joined with an unscrupulous desire and a fixed determination to get something definite at any cost, gained the upper hand in Rome. Indeed, on this very day, July 31, Italy emerged at last from her silence. San Giuliano, when asked by the French Ambassador, Barrère, the simple

question, what would Italy's final position be, very obligingly gave the latter the confidential information, which the French Government was to keep secret, that Italy regarded Austria-Hungary's action as an aggression and would unquestionably refuse to fulfil her obligations as an ally. Salandra, according to Barrère's account, went even farther. Without reserve he confided to the Ambassador: "You have nothing to fear from us." Barrère asked: "May I so inform Paris?" And the Prime Minister replied: "You may." With these words France's concern about the Italian frontier was removed, and she was free to concentrate her united military forces against Germany.

Could the true character of this decision be more clearly shown by the documents? However typical a representative of Hapsburg statecraft he was, Mérey was not wrong when he judged the situation as follows: the question whether Italy would take part in the war or remain neutral did not depend on the matter of compensation, really, but on how she viewed the entire European situation; and with respect to that situation she came to the conclusion which Giolitti later expressed very concisely and convincingly: "For the Government there was no other way out. Italy cannot go to war against England." It was merely the effect of Italy's dependence on British sea-power, a condition which had existed unchanged from the time the Triple Alliance was formed to the time of its dissolution, during which period a war against England was regarded in Rome as "a horrible prospect." A few days later the Colonial Minister, Martini, in the course of a conversation with the British Ambassador, Rudd, referred expressly to the disclosure made by the Marquis Rudini in 1896; namely, that under no circumstances could Italy agree to go to war against England; and Martini emphasized the fact that Italy's allies were fully aware of this tacit policy. That policy, more than the conduct of the Danubian Monarchy,

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constituted, in the eyes of all Italians, the political justification for the decision they made.

## 22. *The "Conclusions"*

On the basis of this *Report* which has now been critically reviewed part by part, and on the basis of the second Section concerning Turkey and Bulgaria, which has not been considered, the Commission came to the conclusion, as Mr. James Brown Scott informs us in his article, *Le Procès du Kaiser*, that "the German Government . . . aided and abetted Austria-Hungary to declare war against Serbia." <sup>154</sup>

In the *Report* the Conclusions were then drawn up as follows:

1. *The war was premeditated by the Central Powers together with their Allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable.*

2. *Germany, in agreement with Austria-Hungary, deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war.*

It is to be noted that the conclusions drawn up in the *Report* go beyond the actual conclusions of the Commission. The very thing needed, in order to erect a basis for "Reparation," was a verdict that would hold Germany responsible for the War. It is a well-known axiom that in settling up accounts, the total result cannot be right if the particular items are wrong. Applying this axiom to the *Report* which has just been reviewed in twenty-one sections, we can readily see that no further proof is required



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to make it clear that the conclusions of a report which reveals so many mistakes and misunderstandings cannot be correct. However, we shall go out of our way to touch briefly upon a few of the statements embodied in the "Conclusions."

In setting forth the manner in which the War was brought about, those who drew up the "Conclusions" speak of Germany and Austria as a unity, the "Central Powers." Thus the two Governments are condemned as having been jointly and equally responsible for the War. Germany and Austria were both sovereign States bound together by an alliance, it is true, but not by a military convention. They were, therefore, as regards the character of their union, a step behind the Dual Alliance and the Entente. Just as it would occur to no one today, in adjudging responsibility for the War, to treat either Russia and France, or England and France, or, indeed, Russia and Serbia as one, so naturally, in assessing Germany's and Austria's responsibility, no one can speak simply of the "Central Powers." This term, as used here, can be rightfully employed only when one is dealing with the period after hostilities had commenced. It is true that there existed on July 5 a common understanding between both Powers concerning the necessity of action by Austria against Serbia; an understanding as to how the two Powers should act "under any and all circumstances," that is, in the event of a threatening European conflagration, was neither sought nor attained at this time. After July 5, the German Government gave Austria *carte blanche* in dealing with Serbia, and advanced no proposals of its own until the Serbian reply came to hand. From this time on the telegrams dispatched to Vienna re-

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veal an ever widening breach in the positions of Germany and Austria. Whereas Germany tried hard to bring about direct negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg on the basis, finally, of the "Halt in Belgrade" plan, Austria stubbornly maintained an attitude of intransigence toward Russia. To be sure, Berchtold declared that he was willing to explain the ultimatum to Russia; but he would not, even on July 31, consent to relax the pressure on Serbia. An accord between the German and Austrian Governments was not struck again until the Russian partial mobilization rendered negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg more difficult, if not impossible, and the Russian general mobilization compelled Germany to think of her own security and to deal with Russia at once in her own way. In an exaggerated sense, one may speak of a step, jointly taken and agreed upon in advance by both Powers, as "premeditated," and consider this step the result of acts "deliberately committed" in order to make the War "unavoidable," if one has in mind the refusal to submit the Austro-Serbian dispute to arbitration. But that is as far as one may justifiably go. One is entirely wrong if one means by this step the instigation of the World War.

The second paragraph of the "Conclusions" recapitulates the detailed assertions in the *Report* that Germany rejected the many conciliatory proposals of the Entente Powers and defeated their repeated efforts to avoid war. Since these assertions have been answered in such clear and adequate fashion in Sections 9, 10, 11, and 12, we shall dispense with further consideration of them here.

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### 23. *Some Concluding Observations on the Report*

We cannot finish the task that we set out to accomplish, however, without considering the *Report* once more in its entirety. The extraordinarily difficult question as to who was responsible for the War, a question which has engaged the attention of an increasing number of experts from 1919 to the present day, which has given birth to a literature that extends into hundreds, yes, thousands of volumes and has not been conclusively settled yet—this difficult question, we repeat, was solved by a commission of fifteen men in the short space of two months. Six printed pages suffice to prove so incontrovertibly that Germany and Austria were the guilty Powers that the matter is to be considered to this very day a *causa judicata*. A magnificent piece of work, indeed! All honour and glory to a commission that could perform such a task! Anyone who takes the trouble, however, to read this entire *Report* through once, even without reading the foregoing criticism, cannot help but feel, after dismissing the comical side of it, that this document, which may be considered in its effect as perhaps one of the most important documents of all time, is so shallow and worthless that nothing in history can compare with it. The contents of these six pages constitute the scientific verdict which men felt morally justified in using as a basis for dictating two peace treaties, criticism of which we shall not attempt here. That the authors of this document and the Governments involved in its preparation have little faith today in the product of their handiwork seems to be indicated by the fact that in the entire literature on the war guilt question no reference to this document has ever been made by

its supporters. If the *Report* were regarded as incontrovertible, it goes without saying that it would be cited, and cited frequently, during discussions of the war guilt question. It is precisely because our opponents do not mention the *Report* that general attention has been called to it again, since it forms the official, scientific basis for the verdict of guilt brought against Germany and Austria, and given practical expression in the two treaties of peace.

#### 24. *The American Reservations to the Report*

The American representatives on the Commission drew up on April 4, 1919, certain reservations bearing on the question of war responsibility. Although they expressly declared that they concurred not only in the conclusions reached by the Commission, but in the process of reasoning by which the conclusions had been arrived at and justified, the American representatives nevertheless called attention to four documents, three of which had been made public by the Serbian Minister at Paris, M. Vesnitch, and the fourth of which has never been made known. We should like very much to know what this fourth document was,<sup>155</sup> for we should then discover on what documentary evidence the American representatives based their opinion that the War "resulted because of the deliberate determination of Austria-Hungary and Germany to crush that gallant little country [Serbia] which blocked the way to the Dardanelles and to the realization of their larger ambitions."

The first of these documents to engage the attention of the American representatives was the report mentioned so often after the War, the report by von Wiesner on Sara-

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jevo, dated July 13, 1914, and containing the preliminary conclusions of the investigation that von Wiesner had carried on at that place.

In the reservations, however, the report was not given in full. Only the following passage was quoted: "Cognizance on the part of the Serbian Government, participation in the murderous assault, or in its preparation, and supplying the weapons, proved by nothing, nor even to be suspected. On the contrary there are indications which cause this to be rejected."<sup>155a</sup>

In October, 1925, in a lengthy article<sup>156</sup> entitled: "Der verfälschte und der echte Text des Dokument Wiesner" (The Falsified and the True Text of the Wiesner Document), an article that was later printed in the *New York Times*,<sup>157</sup> von Wiesner pointed out that the sentences quoted by the American representatives had been arbitrarily torn out of the context and should by no means be regarded as the "material portion" of the report. Von Wiesner then posed three questions, which have not yet been answered: first, from what source did knowledge about the document, which up to that time had not been made public, come; secondly, was the document known in its original form, or merely in extract; thirdly, in the event that they had it only in extract, what steps did the American representatives take to acquaint themselves with the document in its complete form.<sup>158</sup>

How the Wiesner telegram was prepared and how it must be appraised within the framework of the entire investigation conducted by Austria into the Sarajevo crime has only recently been revealed to us by Wiesner himself.<sup>159</sup> From Wiesner's latest account it is evident that the text of his telegram, taken in its entirety, does not sub-

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stantiate in the least what the American representatives aimed to prove when they quoted a small part of it. Wiesner's explanations show, further, that Potiorek, Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Inspector-General of Ordnance, disagreed most emphatically with Wiesner's conclusions. He declared that it had been "established beyond a doubt" that the Serbian Government knew about the plot; and as we know, he resolved to express in a lengthy letter his own opinions on the subject.

The full text of the Wiesner telegram and an extract of Potiorek's letter are quoted below.

1. Telegram of State Counsellor von Wiesner:<sup>160</sup>

State Counsellor von Wiesner to Imperial and Royal  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Unnumbered telegram.

Cipher.

Sarajevo, July 13, 1914.

That Pan-Serbian propaganda is being carried on here from Serbia as a centre, not only through the press but also through clubs and other organizations and further that this is taking place with the encouragement as well as with the knowledge and approval of the Serbian Government is the conviction of authoritative circles here. The material that has been laid before me by the civil and military authorities as the basis on which they have formed their conviction may be characterized as follows:

The material belonging to the period preceding the assassination offers no evidence that would lead me to suppose that propaganda was encouraged by the Serbian Government. There is, however, material which though sparse is sufficient to show that this movement with Serbia as a centre was fostered by clubs with the toleration of the Serbian Government.

## INVESTIGATION OF THE CRIME

There is nothing to show the complicity of the Serbian Government in the directing of the assassination or in its preparation or in the supplying of weapons. Nor is there anything to lead one even to conjecture such a thing. On the contrary, there is evidence that would appear to show that such complicity is out of the question.

From the statements of the persons charged with the crime, it has been ascertained, in a manner hardly controvertible, that the crime was resolved in Belgrade and that it was prepared with the assistance of a Serbian State official named Ciganovic and of Major Tancosic, these two men providing the bombs, ammunition and cyanide of potassium. The participation of Pribicevic has not been proved and the first reports on this point are due to a regrettable misunderstanding on the part of the police authorities investigating the case. It has been proved objectively and beyond all doubt that the bombs originally came from the Serbian Army magazine at Kragujevac; but there is no evidence to show that they had only recently been taken from this magazine for the special purpose for which they were employed, as the bombs may have belonged to the war stores of the Comitatschis.

Judging by the statements made by the accused, we can scarcely doubt that Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabez were secretly smuggled across the frontier into Bosnia with bombs and arms by Serbian organs at the instigation of Ciganovic. These organized transports were conducted by the Frontier Captains Schabatz and Loznica and carried out by organs of the excise guards.

Even though it has not been ascertained whether these men were aware of the purpose of the journey, they must surely have assumed the mysterious nature

of the mission. Other investigations made subsequent to the assassination throw light upon the organization of the propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana. The material obtained is valuable and can be turned to account. It has yet to be carefully examined. Investigations are being made with all speed.

In the event of intentions which prompted my departure still remaining unchanged, the demands could be still further extended:

(a) The suppression of cooperation of the Serbian Government organs in the smuggling of persons and articles across the frontier.

(b) Dismissal of Serbian Frontier Captains Schabatz and Loznica, as well as of the excise guard organs concerned.

(c) Prosecution of Ciganovic and Tankosic.

I leave this evening, arriving Vienna Tuesday evening. Will come straight to the Ministry: It is necessary that I should supplement my remarks with verbal report.<sup>161</sup>

2. Letter of Potiorek, Inspector-General of Ordnance <sup>162</sup> [part dealing with the Wiesner mission given in extract]; July 14, 1914:

Last evening, before his departure, Counsellor von Wiesner acquainted me with a copy of the telegram which he dispatched at noon yesterday to the Foreign Office. At the time he sent his telegram Mr. von Wiesner, it must be admitted, had not examined carefully the large assortment of material which had been handed over to him and which he took with him to Vienna. It must be strongly emphasized, too, that he had no knowledge at that time of the important evidence which is discussed at the end of this letter and which is the second main reason for my writing this communication. Regardless of these circumstances,



however, I believe that a comment or two concerning the telegram is very much in order. I told Mr. von Wiesner himself what I thought of it when he acquainted me with its contents.

Mr. von Wiesner considers the complicity of the Serbian Government in the assassination as out of the question, whereas I hold it to be downright impossible that at least some person or other in a democratic Government in such a small country as Serbia should not have had knowledge of the preparation of the crime and the traitorous working methods of the whole propaganda. According to the investigations carried on so far, several persons in B. H. (Bosnia-Herzegovina) certainly knew what was going to happen on June 28. According to one of the assassins, the preparations were talked over in a tavern in Belgrade. A person who was in Belgrade at that time and is now here, heard the same thing, and after his written report had been forwarded to the Provincial Government here, he was held by the police in Belgrade until after the crime had been committed so that he would not be in a position to divulge what he had heard. Of course, like all the others involved in the propaganda and murder, this fellow is not to be trusted. Nevertheless he is in our hands and his written statement, therefore, is a confirmatory document which cannot be overlooked.

Furthermore, in Serbia, side by side with the official Government, there exists a rival military government, which has its roots in the army. It has been proved that Serbian officers in active service participated in the preparation of the assassination, took also a prominent part in the whole propaganda, and are therefore among the instigators of the traitorous agitation stirred up in our country. The army, to be sure, is not part of the Government. But to try to maintain that the official Serbian Government does not know what the army is doing is futile.

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I had something more I wished to say about the contents of Counsellor von Wiesner's telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially with reference to Major Pribichevitch; but for want of time and also because Counsellor von Wiesner, on his arrival in Vienna, may revise this part of his report after he has gone through the material in the interim, I shall refrain from further comment.

Late yesterday afternoon I received a copy of the report of the Chief of Police of Tuzla. With it came a printed statement of this year's accounts of the Sokol Society, *Dusan Silni*, in Kragujevac. The latter was translated at once, and I have enclosed a copy of the translation in my letter.

Here we have a document, therefore, which proves beyond all doubt that in addition to the *Narodna Odbrana*, or more correctly speaking, functioning as an organ of that organization, a union of Serbian Sokol societies not only in B. H. but also in the provinces of the Hungarian Crown and in Austria has been engaged in treasonable and criminal activities; and it merely remains to be ascertained, as a matter of secondary importance, how long these activities have been going on.

At the same time we also have documentary proof now that several Serbian officers in active service and high Serbian military officials are leaders of these treasonable machinations.

In explanation of his telegram Wiesner, in the recent account cited above, says <sup>163</sup>

that this report was intended for departmental use, and especially for the information of the Minister and also of that small circle of law reporters who knew the situation exactly, had put in many hours every day on the subject, were intimately acquainted with all the

details of the as yet unsolved question, were conversant with my point of view as I was with theirs, were familiar with my diction, and who were aware of what the object of my work in Sarajevo had been. They readily understood the contents of my brief telegram which I had written strictly from the standpoint of the penal law. On the other hand, I do not hesitate to admit that my dispatch can give rise to misunderstandings and false interpretations in an outsider who was not connected with the actual development of the case. In doing so, however, I hold no brief for the good faith of those Entente writers who have misused this telegram to serve their own purposes. The crux of the matter is the third paragraph of my telegram, the one which the American representatives tore out of the context and made to stand alone.

What did I mean when I stated in that paragraph that there was nothing to show the complicity of the Serbian Government in the assassination nor anything that could lead one even to conjecture such a thing; that, on the contrary, evidence existed which tended to exclude such complicity? As I have said before, these assertions did not mean that the proof of Serbia's innocence had been established, but meant that no proof existed of her guilt, and that investigations had brought to light certain things which might be pointed to as indications ("evidence") that the Belgrade Government was innocent and which might be used against us. Certainly that was not a "decisive position favourable to the Serbian Government." That this could be the only meaning of the passage in question was clear to all those who had anything to do with the case, for there was no one among them, including myself, who had not been forced to the conviction that the Serbian Government was behind the whole pan-Serbian movement, possessed some knowledge of the murder-plot, and allowed the murderess free rein to carry it out."

Furthermore, it must be added that up to July 25, consequently after the presentation of the ultimatum, no new facts of any material importance were brought to light. After this date, however, the meeting of the assassin, Chabrinovitch, and the Prince Regent Alexander at the Government Printing Office in Belgrade became known, and this naturally revived the suspicion that the official Serbian Government had been implicated in the assassination at Sarajevo.<sup>164</sup>

This impression was further accentuated by two communications which, as has only recently become known through the new Austrian documents, were received at the Ballhausplatz.

The first communication is a report of the Ambassador at Constantinople, Markgraf Pallavicini, to Count Berchtold, dated July 15, in which a passage occurs stating that "the Bulgarian Minister at Rome, M. Rizoff, had visited him and had told him that he, Rizoff, in consequence, among other things, of his personal knowledge of the Serbian wire-pullers, was firmly convinced that in the tragic assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand Serbian officer circles, as well as the Crown Prince Alexander, had had a hand in the game."

Rizoff's special knowledge was derived from his activity as Bulgarian Minister in the capital of Montenegro, Cetinje, where he had had intimate personal relations with all the acting personages.<sup>164a</sup>

The second document adduced by the American representatives is a passage out of the report of the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin, Count Szögyény, dated July 25. The passage, according to the slightly altered text, reads as follows:<sup>165</sup>

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*Count Szögyény to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,  
Vienna*

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Here it is generally taken for granted that in case of a possible refusal on the part of Serbia, our immediate declaration of war will be coincident with military operations. Delay in beginning military operations is here considered as a great danger because of the intervention of other Powers. We are urgently advised to proceed at once and to confront the world with a *fait accompli*.

If one is to grasp the true meaning of this telegram, one must bear strictly in mind the German construction of the word, "refusal," as interpreted by Szögyény. The fact must not be overlooked that the Serbian reply which actually followed was not regarded by the German Government as a general "refusal" but, on the contrary, provoked the proposal that Austria refrain from a general war against Serbia and rest content with a pledge (Belgrade) until the necessary demands had been satisfied.

In the statement that there should be no delay in commencing military operations, we merely find expressed the view that was constantly advanced by the German Government, namely, that quick action would avert a general conflagration.

The third document is another Szögyény telegram from which the following passage, as given in the American reservations, is taken:<sup>168</sup>

*Count Szögyény to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  
Vienna*

307, strictly confidential      Berlin, July 27, 1914.  
The Secretary of State informed me very definitely

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and in the strictest confidence that in the near future possible proposals for mediation on the part of England would be brought to Your Excellency's knowledge by the German Government.

The German Government gives its most binding assurance that it *does not in any way associate itself with the proposals*; on the contrary, it is absolutely opposed to their consideration and only transmits them in compliance with the English request.

Both Bethmann Hollweg and Jagow have declared very positively that they did not give the Austrian Ambassador such information.<sup>167</sup> Count Montgelas thinks it possible that a subordinate in the Foreign Office was "confused" with the Secretary of State, and establishes the fact that in respect to four points Szögyény's telegram is incorrect.

In his book, *Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges*, Jagow avers that Szögyény has "here openly mixed a little truth with much falsehood,"<sup>168</sup> and adds that he can explain the telegram only on the grounds that Szögyény had misunderstood what was told him. Jagow continues:<sup>169</sup>

It was rather difficult at that time to carry on negotiations with him, for old age and physical illness had begun to weaken his intellectual powers and he was no longer the impressive diplomat that he once had been. Hence it is probable that he did not always report precisely and clearly the contents and meaning of conversations, but allowed ideas of his own to creep in when transmitting information that was unfamiliar to him. These things were known in Vienna as well as Berlin. The change of ambassadors at Berlin which followed shortly thereafter was a foregone conclusion at this time.

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Without meaning to disparage the estimable and universally respected Ambassador, we should like to publish, in support of Jagow's opinion of the condition of Szögyény's mental faculties in July, 1914, the following communication from a well-known German business man. The letter is dated March 17, 1925.

I have read with considerable interest in your magazine the first article entitled: "Georges Louis." The article certainly shows what marked personal influence an ambassador can wield over the policies of the particular country to which he is accredited, and what frightfully serious consequences may result when explanations which he receives at the capital where he is stationed are, for reasons intentional or unintentional, "inaccurately" reported to the home Government.

If I stress the unintentional reasons, it is because I am constantly forced to think of what an important task the Austrian Ambassador, Count Szögyény, had to fulfil here in Berlin in the critical July days of 1914, and whether this ambassador was actually in a position to report home "accurately" everything that was told him by the German Government, or conversely, report to the German Government everything exactly as his own Government directed him to do.

In fact, Count Szögyény at that time was positively not in full possession of his mental faculties. Those who knew him only slightly must have been aware of his condition. He had peculiarities which unmistakably marked him as suffering from calcification of the brain. As proof of this, I shall relate the following incident:

Count and Countess Szögyény used to visit nearly every afternoon certain shops on the avenue Unter den Linden, particularly Demuth's shop and my own. The object of their visits was not so much to make purchases as it was to kill time. This circumstance, of

course, is not to be pointed to as proof of any mental deterioration in the Count, for many normal people do this very same thing. What was abnormal, however, was the Count's behaviour during these visits, and the conversation that he used to carry on.

Having entered my shop, he would sit down at once and stare vacantly into space, in the meantime drumming his fingers on the glass show-case while his wife examined the wares. When satisfied that he had done enough drumming, he would invariably ask, much to the relief of my whole salesforce who would wait impatiently for him to pop it, the one and self-same question: "Is this English silver?" Upon being repeatedly assured by me or my saleswomen: "No, Your Excellency, it was made in Vienna," he would turn to his wife and say: "Come, Irma, let us look around some more." Then he would rise; quickly touch the glass show-case again with his fingers; repeat the act when he reached the show-window, touching the pane both on the inside and outside; and then would step into his carriage.

In short, Count Szögyény had a mania for touching glass. He was compelled to touch with his fingers every pane of glass that he came to. If on passing out of my shop he forgot to touch the outer window-pane, he would go back and rectify the omission. All my saleswomen can testify that I am not exaggerating and that the identical incident took place at least fifty times.

Here is a man who within the short space of one month asked at least ten times the question: "Is that English silver?" after he had been repeatedly assured that the article in question was of Austrian make. Now I ask you, Sir, do you consider such a man capable of furnishing his Government with accurate political information, which is often so perplexing that it takes the keenest mind to understand it correctly? I think not, and for that reason I cannot get rid of the feeling that misunderstandings fraught with serious con-



sequences arose between the Austrian and German Governments as a result of the enfeebled physical and mental condition of Count Szögyény. I would even go so far as to assert that, in my opinion, the inaccurate reports of the views of the German Government which the Austrian Ambassador sent to Vienna probably led to Austria's fateful decision in the Serbian question.

Abnormal eccentricities in a person often reveal themselves in flashes. Strangers will often recognize these eccentricities sooner than friends.

You are free, Sir, to use this letter in any way you wish, if there is anything in it that interests you. My entire salesforce and I myself will vouch for the truth of what I have written.

Respectfully yours,  
(Signed) von Santen.

The following comments upon the Szögyény telegrams by the American representatives reveal strikingly in what frame of mind the Americans were when they drew up their memorandum of reservations, and show what judgment they arrived at respecting Germany's responsibility.<sup>170</sup>

While comment upon these telegrams would only tend to weaken their force and effect, it may nevertheless be observed that the last of them was dated two days before the declaration of war by Germany against Russia, which might have been prevented, had not Germany, flushed with the hope of certain victory and of the fruits of conquest, determined to force the war.

The American representatives, however, neglect to indicate what the "fruits of conquest" were that Germany is alleged to have been so enthusiastic about.

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The American reservations show how ignorance joined with credulity may produce a verdict that flies in the face of truth. At the same time, however, it is gratifying to note that in no country has "Revisionism" made greater progress than in the United States. It is very likely that the American people, whose representatives at Versailles were the harshest in their judgment of Germany and Austria, and the sharpest in their expression of indignation, will be the first to find a way to abolish the injustice of the Versailles Treaty.

In what a large measure the expectations here expressed have been fulfilled becomes clear from the well-known work of Sidney B. Fay who in the deductions he makes concerning the war-guilt thesis of Versailles comes to the following conclusion: "One must abandon the dictum of the Versailles Treaty that Germany and her Allies were solely responsible. It was a dictum exacted by victors from vanquished, under the influence of the blindness, ignorance, hatred and the propagandist misconceptions to which war had given use. It was based on evidence which was incomplete and not always sound."<sup>171</sup>

### NOTES FOR CHAPTER III

<sup>1</sup> In italics.

<sup>2</sup> The text of the *Report* is taken from *Das deutsche Weissbuch über die Schuld am Kriege*, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, Berlin, 1927, p. 36 ff. Cf. also Appendix I to this book. [The English text is taken from the English edition of the above book entitled: *German White Book Concerning the Responsibility of the Authors of the War*. See Ch. I, foot-note 1.—Tr.]

<sup>3</sup> *French Yellow Book*, No. 6.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Weissbuch des Parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses—zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges*, Heft 2, *Militärische Rüstungen und Mobilmachungen* (White Book of the Parliamentary Investigating Committee—Period Prior to the World War, Part II, Military Arma-

ments and Mobilization Measures), p. 95 [Eng. edition: *Official German Documents Relating to the World War*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, N. Y., 1923,—Tr.]; and *Das deutsche Weissbuch über die Schuld am Kriege*, pp. 85 ff. [Eng. edition, p. 51.—Tr.]

<sup>5</sup> Cf. also *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914* (The Major Policies of the European Cabinets 1871–1914) Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, Berlin, Vol. 39, No. 15, 658, p. 230, foot-note.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 39, No. 15, 673.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 259, foot-note. Cf. also Maurice Paléologue: “La Russie des Tsars pendant la grande Guerre” (The Russia of the Tsars during the Great War) *Revue des deux Mondes*, 1921, I, p. 231. It is to be noted that Paléologue omitted this part when his memoirs came out in book form.

<sup>8</sup> Raymond Poincaré: *Au Service de la France*, Vol. IV: *L’Union Sacrée*, Librairie Plon, Paris, 1927, pp. 168 ff.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Count Montgelas: *Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1923, pp. 82 ff. [Eng. translation: *The Case for the Central Powers*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1925.—Tr.] Cf. also Count Montgelas: “Das französische Generalstabswerk” (The French General Staff and its Work), *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, November, 1927, pp. 1056 ff.

<sup>10</sup> Librairie Chapelot, Paris, 1920.

<sup>11</sup> *Le Temps*, December 2, 1927.

<sup>12</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, I, No. 1. [In translating quotation from documents in this edition of the *Red Book*, the translator has followed closely the text of the English edition: *Austrian Red Book*, Official Files Pertaining to Pre-War History, Parts 1–3, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1920.—Tr.]

<sup>13</sup> *Serbian Blue Book*, No. 5.

<sup>14</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1915, No. 1.

<sup>15</sup> Among the numerous works published on the subject we may mention the following: Fay: *The Origins of the World War*, Vol. II, Chap. I; Wiesner: *The Still Unrefuted Grounds for Austria’s Ultimatum to Serbia Delivered in July 1914* (the *Kriegsschuldfrage*, June 1927, p. 492 et seq.) and the article “The Guilt of the Serbian Government for the Serajevo Murder” in the *Kriegsschuldfrage* for April 1928, p. 307 et seq.; Hans Bauer: *Sarajevo*, Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart, 1930, as well as the author’s essay “The Cause of the World War” in the *Kriegsschuldfrage* of June 1925.

<sup>16</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1915, No. 2.

<sup>17</sup> *British Documents*, No. 80.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. my article: “Wie Serbien England täuschte” (How Serbia Deceived England), *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, March, 1927, which contains the following conclusions: “In the preceding paragraphs we believe we have demonstrated that the official communications issued by the Serbian

Government concerning Princip and Chabrinovitch and its inability to initiate an investigation of the crime, were knowingly untrue.”

<sup>18a</sup> *Austria-Hungary's Foreign Policy*, Vol. VIII, No. 10016.

<sup>19</sup> Belgrade, 1924. A German translation is to be found in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, February, 1925, pp. 68 ff.

[There are English translations of Mr. Jovanovitch's article to be found in the *Journal of the Institute of International Affairs*; March, 1925; the *National Review*, April, 1925; *The Living Age*, May 9, 1925.—Tr.]

<sup>20</sup> Italics author's.

<sup>20a</sup> As the idea that a warning had been sent to Vienna by Serbia previous to the assassination has repeatedly cropped up in spite of many statements to the contrary, we should like to point out that M. Pashitch himself in an interview given to the Budapest newspaper *Az Est* on July 7, 1914, told his interviewer that no warning had been sent. Cf. *Austria-Hungary's Foreign Policy*, Vol. VIII, No. 10152.

<sup>21</sup> *Obzor* (Agram), April 27, 1926.

<sup>22</sup> "Neue Ausschnitte zum Attentat von Sarajewo" (Some New Facts About the Assassination at Sarajevo), *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, 1926, pp. 400 ff.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. also *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, 1927, pp. 1102 ff.

<sup>24</sup> Dr. P. Dirr: *Bayerische Dokumente* (Bavarian Documents), third enlarged edition, Verlag R. Oldenbourg. Munich and Berlin, 1925, pp. 4 ff.

<sup>25</sup> For further discussion, see *Ibid.*, pp. 51 ff.

<sup>26</sup> Shortly before this, the members of the former Committee of Four had made public a similar explanation in which they had paid special attention to the grave mistakes in the Schoen Report as published by Eisner.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, May, 1922.

<sup>28</sup> *German Documents*, No. 19.

<sup>29</sup> *German Documents*, new edition, 1927, No. 340.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *French Yellow Book*, 1914, No. 14, and *British Documents*, No. 50.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Dirr: *Bayerische Dokumente*, p. 5.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9; also *German Documents*, No. 100.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9 ff.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>35</sup> *German Documents*, No. 72.

<sup>36</sup> *Das Deutsche Weissbuch über die Schuld am Kriege*, pp. 63 ff.

<sup>37</sup> *German Documents*, No. 100.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *British Documents*. Nos. 50 and 676.

<sup>39</sup> *Der Beginn des Krieges 1914*, Tagesaufzeichnungen des ehemaligen russischen Aussenministeriums vom 16. Juli bis 31. Juli 1914. Krasny-Archiv, IV, Moscow, 1924. German edition, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, Berlin, 1924, p. 3. [Eng. edition:

*How the War Began in 1914*, diary of the Russian Foreign Office from 3rd to 20th July (old style), published by Red Archives [Krasnyi-Arkhiv], Department of the Soviet Government, in their *Historical Journal*, IV, 1923. Translated from the Russian by W. Cyprian Bridge. George Allen and Unwin, London, 1925.—Tr.]

<sup>40</sup> Ch. *French Yellow Book*, 1914, No. 14.

<sup>41</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, I, No. 8.

<sup>42</sup> *German Documents*, No. 87. (Italics in document).

<sup>43</sup> Verlag für Kulturpolitik, Munich, 1924, pp. 225 ff. Cf. also Giesl: *Zwei Jahrzehnte im nahen Orient* (Two Decades in the Near East), Verlag für Kulturpolitik, Berlin, 1927, p. 264.

<sup>44</sup> *Current History*, New York, August, 1927, p. 648.

<sup>45</sup> Verlag R. Oldenbourg, Munich and Berlin, 1927. [The original text obtained from Jonathan F. Scott: *Five Weeks*, John Day Co., N. Y., 1927, pp. 215–16.—Tr.]

<sup>46</sup> [Original text supplied by the Foreign Editor of the *Daily News*.—Tr.]

<sup>46a</sup> The *Austrian Red Book* 1914, II, No. 23.

<sup>46b</sup> As above, No. 42.

<sup>46c</sup> *German Documents*, No. 301, foot-note 3.

<sup>47</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, III, No. 62.

<sup>48</sup> *German Documents*, No. 160.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Friedrich von Wiesner: "Das Memoire Österreich-Ungarns über die grosserbische Propaganda und deren Zusammenhänge mit dem Sarajewoer Attentat" (The Austro-Hungarian Memorandum on Pan-Serbian Propaganda and its Connection with the Assassination at Sarajevo), *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, June, 1927.

<sup>50</sup> *British Documents*, No. 101.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 101. (The corresponding report in the *Yellow Book* is missing). Cf. also Maurice Paléologue: *Am Zarenhof während des Weltkrieges*, Verlag Bruckmann A. G., Munich, 1925, p. 21. [Englished: *An Ambassador's Memoirs*, George H. Doran Co., New York, 1924–25.—Tr.]

<sup>52</sup> Robert C. Binkley: "New Light on Russia's War Guilt," *Current History*, January, 1926.

<sup>53</sup> *Russian Orange Book*, 1914, No. 9. [In *Collected Diplomatic Documents* (see ch. II, foot-note 28) Sazonov's telegram here quoted is listed as No. 4 of the *Russian Orange Book*.—Tr.]

<sup>54</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, II, No. 29.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 28.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 27.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 30.

<sup>58</sup> *German Documents*, No. 157. [Words in italics occur in the *Kautsky Documents*.—Tr.]

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 171.

<sup>60</sup> Bronevski's final report in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, September, 1927, p. 851.

<sup>61</sup> *British Documents*, Nos. 111, 114.

<sup>62</sup> Poincaré, it is true, in the fourth volume of his memoirs, *Au Service de la France*, has brought to light many new documents, but for the most part they are documents whose publication, in his opinion, "serves France." The evil done to historical research by the refusal to publish the French documents relating to the outbreak of the War is aggravated thereby rather than diminished.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Pierre Renouvin: *Les Origines immédiates de la Guerre*, Alfred Costes, Paris, 1927, p. 87. "Il est possible que ces conseils aient revêtu une forme plus précise encore: on a prétendu que M. Berthelot avait inspiré les termes mêmes de la note serbe." (It is possible that this advice took on a more definite form. It has been suggested that M. Berthelot inspired the very terms of the Serbian reply). [See Eng. ed. of Renouvin's book: "*The Immediate Origins of the War*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1928.—Tr.]

<sup>64</sup> Baron Wladimir Giesl: *Zwei Jahrzehnte im nahen Orient*, pp. 267 ff.

<sup>65</sup> Amalthea Verlag, Vienna, p. 608.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. also Walther Schücking: *Die völkerrechtliche Lehre des Weltkrieges* (Lessons in International Law as Taught by the World War), Verlag Veit & Cie., Leipzig, 1918, pp. 51 ff.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. also Baron Giesl: *Zwei Jahrzehnte im nahen Orient*, Ch. 12.

<sup>68</sup> *British Documents*, No. 175.

<sup>69</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1914, Supplement No. 763. 72/44, p. 26.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *Bericht über die Behandlung der deutschen Konsuln in Russland usw.* (Report on the Treatment of German Consuls in Russia, etc.) Karl Heymanns Verlag, Berlin, 1915.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. *British Documents*, Nos. 270 and 320; *Russian Orange Book* of 1914, No. 94; Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, Berlin, 1925; *Berliner Tageblatt*, July 30, 1914, morning edition, Report of the Paris correspondent. Cf. also Victor Auburtin; *Was ich in Frankreich erlebte* (My Experiences in France), Verlag von Rudolf Mosse, Berlin, 1918.

<sup>72</sup> Duncan S. Macdiarmid: *The Life of Lieut.-General Sir James Moncrieff Grierson*, Constable and Co., Ltd., London, 1923.

<sup>73</sup> *German Documents*, No. 245.

<sup>74</sup> *British Documents*, Nos. 165 and 166.

<sup>75</sup> *German Documents*, No. 157.

<sup>76</sup> *British Documents*, No. 99.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 122.

<sup>78</sup> *German Documents*, No. 179.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 192.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 201.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 218.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 234.

<sup>83</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, II, No. 73.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 95.

<sup>85</sup> *Fünfundzwanzig Jahre Politik 1892-1916, Memoiren von Lord Edward Grey*, German edition, F. Bruckmann, Munich, 1926, I, p. 298. [*Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916*, by Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Fred A. Stokes, N. Y., 1925.—Tr.]

<sup>86</sup> *British Documents*, No. 125.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 140; *German Documents*, No. 304.

<sup>88</sup> Grey, loc. cit., I, p. 300.

<sup>89</sup> *British Documents*, No. 132. (Italics author's).

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 206.

<sup>91</sup> *German Documents*, No. 236.

<sup>92</sup> This information is not clear, since, according to *British Documents*, No. 125, all that the British Foreign Office had been told was that preparations for mobilization had begun, no mention having been made of the frontiers. How Nicolson and Tyrrell had come to learn about a partial mobilization is not apparent. Very likely there was a report of the English Military Attaché supplementing Buchanan's telegram of July 25.

<sup>93</sup> *German Documents*, No. 238.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 248.

<sup>95</sup> The conversation between Goschen and Jagow, in the course of which Goschen informed the latter about the conference proposal (*German Documents*, No. 304), had not taken place up to the time this telegram was sent (July 27, 1 P. M.).

<sup>96</sup> *British Documents*, No. 185.

<sup>97</sup> G. von Jagow: *Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges* (Causes and Outbreak of the World War), new enlarged edition, Verlag von Reimar Hobbing, Berlin, 1919, p. 130.

<sup>98</sup> *British Documents*, No. 218.

<sup>99</sup> *German Documents*, No. 418.

<sup>100</sup> *British Documents*, No. 263.

<sup>101</sup> *German Documents*, No. 357.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 357.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 384.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 323.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 432.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 368.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 393.

<sup>108</sup> *French Yellow Book*, 1914, No. 109.

<sup>109</sup> *British Documents*, No. 385 (*Blue Book*, No. 121).

<sup>110</sup> *German Documents*, No. 395. Cf. also *Deutsch-englische Schuld-Diskussion* (German and English Discussion of War Guilt), Hans Delbrück and J. Headlam-Morley, Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, Berlin, 1921, p. 39.

<sup>111</sup> *Russian Orange Book*, 1914, No. 40.

<sup>112</sup> Librairie du Travail, Paris, 1923, II, p. 283.

<sup>113</sup> Sazonov: *Sechs schwere Jahre*, Verlag für Kulturpolitik, Berlin,

1927. [English trans.: *Fateful Years*, Frederick A. Stokes and Co., N. Y., 1928.—Tr.]

<sup>114</sup> *German Documents*, No. 366, according to the text of the new edition, 1927.

<sup>115</sup> Walther Schücking: *Die völkerrechtliche Lehre des Weltkrieges*, Verlag von Veit & Cie., Leipzig, 1918.

<sup>116</sup> *German Documents*, No. 391.

<sup>117</sup> Cf. Roloff: "Die Memoiren Sazonow" (Sazonov's Memoirs), *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, November, 1927; and Georges Demartial: "Wie Sazonow den Frieden sabotierte" (How Sazonov Destroyed Peace), *Berliner Börsenzeitung*, September 25, 1927.

<sup>118</sup> *Bavarian Documents*, pp. 13 ff.

<sup>119</sup> Before the War, Kurt Eisner was the editor of *Vorwärts*; and at the outbreak of the revolution, Prime Minister of Bavaria.

<sup>120</sup> The last sentence italicized in *Report*.—Tr.

<sup>121</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, III, Nos. 44 and 45.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 97.

<sup>123</sup> Sazonov: *Sechs schwere Jahre*, p. 261. [Eng. ed., p. 212.—Tr.]

<sup>124</sup> S. Dobrorolski: *Die Mobilmachung der russischen Armée 1914* (The Mobilization of the Russian Army in 1914), Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, Berlin, 1922, p. 21.

<sup>125</sup> Cf. *German Documents*, Nos. 361, 383, 384, 385, 395, 396.

<sup>126</sup> Cf. "Das Journal des Débats als Historiker" (The *Journal des Débats* as an Historical Guide), *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, December, 1927.

<sup>127</sup> *German Documents*, No. 562.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 570.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 575.

<sup>130</sup> As given in the *German Documents*. Better rendered, the sentence would read: "This cannot be countermanded because, I am sorry to say, your telegram came so late."—Tr.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, Nos. 596, 603; *British Documents*, No. 419. Cf. August Bach: *Prince Lichnowsky's Alleged Misunderstanding of August 1, 1914*. Published in the *Berliner Monatshefte*, April, 1930.

<sup>132</sup> H. von Zwehl: *Erich von Falkenhayn, Eine Biographische Studie* (Erich von Falkenhayn, A Biographical Study), E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1926, pp. 58 ff.; A. von Tirpitz: *Deutsche Ohnmachtspolitik im Weltkriege* (The Weakness of Germany's Policy During the World War) Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, Hamburg and Berlin, 1926, II, pp. 16 ff.

<sup>133</sup> Cf. also *Das Französische Gelbbuch 1914* (The *French Yellow Book*, 1914), Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, Berlin, 1926, Appendix II.

<sup>134</sup> This telegram may also be found in the *Journal des Débats*, No. 275, October 4, 1922.

<sup>135</sup> In this connection, C. J. Snijders and R. Dufour in their book: *De Mobilisatiën by de groote Europeesche Mogendheden in 1914* (The Mobilization of the Great European Powers in 1914), Leyden, 1927, make



the following comment, on p. 114: "The French books on the War, as well as the work gotten out by the Ministry of War, entitled: *Les Armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre* (The French Armies in the Great War), make a great deal out of this telegram with the very evident purpose of deducing therefrom Germany's warlike intentions. It should be emphasized, however, that during those critical days the French Foreign Office apparently attached no special importance to this report, for it did not come to the attention of the Minister of War until July 28."

<sup>136</sup> *French Yellow Book* of 1914, No. 60.

<sup>137</sup> Cf. "Das Französische Gelbbuch von 1914 Nr. 106," *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, March, 1927.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. Norbert von Baumbach: "Die deutsche und die britische Flotte bei Kriegsausbruch" (The German and the British Fleets at the Outbreak of the War), *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, January, 1927.

<sup>139</sup> Gunther Frantz: *Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg* (Russia's Entrance into the World War), Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, Berlin, 1924, p. 236, Appendix, No. 82.

<sup>139a</sup> Dobrorolski: *The Beginning of the War of 1914*, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, Berlin, 1922, p. 10.

<sup>139b</sup> Paleologue: *At the Court of the Czar during the World War*, German Edition, Munich, 1925, Vol. I, p. 37.

<sup>140</sup> The advance of reconnoitring troops across the frontier on the morning of August 3, reported by Moltke to Jagow on August 4, was simply a precautionary measure to forestall surprise attacks. Cf. "Zur Rede Poincaré's" (Poincaré's Speech), *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, July, 1927, pp. 668 ff., in which there was brought out in more detail the fact that the German Embassy at Paris and the Foreign Office in Berlin differed by as much as one hour as to the time at which the state of war began.

<sup>141</sup> Cf. René Puaux: *Die Lüge vom 3. August 1914* (The Lie of August 3, 1914), Payot, Lausanne, 1918, pp. 199 ff.

<sup>142</sup> Karl Kautsky: *Wie der Weltkrieg entstand*, Paul Cassirer, Berlin, 1919, p. 154. [Eng. edition: *The Guilt of William Hohenzollern*, Skeffington and Sons, Ltd., London, 1920.—Tr.]

<sup>143</sup> *German Documents*, No. 608. The foot-notes have not been included. Cf. also *German Documents*, Nos. 629 and 662, Section on France.

<sup>144</sup> "Der Präsident der französischen Republik zur Kriegsschuldfrage" (The President of the French Republic on the War Guilt Question), *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, May, 1927.

<sup>145</sup> The texts of the orders are taken from the work prepared by the French General Staff: *Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre* (The French Armies in the Great War), Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1922.

<sup>146</sup> Cf. *Journal Officiel*, Chambre des Députés, séance du 31 janvier 1919 p. 197 (Official Journal, Chamber of Deputies, Session of January 31, 1919).

<sup>147</sup> *German Documents*, No. 869.

<sup>148</sup> It would be highly desirable if these occurrences were made the subject of a connected and scientific study in the various countries. Perhaps such a study would succeed in helping people in the countries involved to exercise a little more self-control in the future when war breaks out.

<sup>149</sup> "Poincaré's Rede in Lunéville am 19. Juni 1927" (Poincaré's Address at Lunéville on June 19, 1927), *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, July, 1927.

<sup>150</sup> Cf. August Bach: "Der Telegrammwechsel Rom-Paris bei Kriegs- ausbruch 1914" (The Exchange of Telegrams between Rome and Paris on the Occasion of the Outbreak of War in 1914), *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, November, 1926, p. 884.

<sup>151</sup> The texts of both paragraphs in their original forms are given below.

From the *Yellow Book*:

"Le marquis de San Giuliano, a répondu que la guerre entreprise par l'Autriche, étant données surtout les conséquences qui pouvaient en sortir d'après les paroles de l'ambassadeur d'Allemagne, ayant un caractère agressif ne cadrant pas avec le caractère purement défensif de la Triple Alliance, l'Italie ne pourrait participer à la guerre."

From the *Revue des deux Mondes*:

"M. de San Giuliano avait répondu à l'ambassadeur d'Allemagne que la guerre entreprise par l'Autriche et les conséquences qui pouvaient en résulter ayant une portée aggressive et étant en contradiction avec le caractère purement défensif de la Triple-Alliance, l'Italie ne pouvait participer à la guerre."—Tr.

<sup>152</sup> Bach, loc. cit., p. 884.

<sup>153</sup> *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, April, 1927, p. 332.

<sup>154</sup> *Ce qui passa réellement à Paris en 1918-1919*, Payot, Paris, 1923, p. 185. [English ed.: *What Really Happened at Paris*, edited by E. M. House and Charles Seymour. Scribner's, N. Y., 1921, p. 235.—Tr.]

<sup>155</sup> In the meantime a Memorandum has become known which may perhaps be the fourth document. It is the introduction to the "Memorandum of the Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes Presented to the Peace Conference." Published in German in the *Berliner Monatshefte*, May, 1930.

<sup>155a</sup> The translation is that given in the *German White Book Concerning the Responsibility of the Authors of the War*, p. 28. See Ch. I, footnote 1.—Tr.

<sup>156</sup> *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, September, 1925, pp. 641 ff.

<sup>157</sup> *New York Times*, November 22, 1925, p. 3.

<sup>158</sup> Upon inquiry as to why these questions were not answered, I was told by Americans that the form of Wiesner's article had made it difficult to reply to his questions. Making due allowance for this sensitiveness which was felt at the time Wiesner's article appeared, we still insist that it would be fitting, in the interest of historical enlightenment, to draw aside once more the last curtain of mystery on the Wiesner document.

<sup>159</sup> Eduard Ritter von Steinitz: *Rings um Sasonow* (Closing in on Sazonov), Verlag für Kulturpolitik, Berlin, 1928, pp. 167 ff.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25. Cf. *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, I, No. 17.

<sup>161</sup> Translation as given in the *New York Times*, November 22, 1925, II, p. 3. See above.—Tr.

<sup>162</sup> Steinitz: *Rings um Sasonow*, pp. 27 ff. Conrad, IV, p. 82.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 183–84.

<sup>164</sup> “König Alexander von Jugoslawien und die Attentäter von Sarajevo” (King Alexander of Yugoslavia and the Assassins of Sarajevo), *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, September, 1926, pp. 639 ff.

<sup>164a</sup> *Austria-Hungary's Foreign Policy*, Vol. VIII, No. 10282.

<sup>165</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, II, No. 32.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, 1919, II, No. 68.

<sup>167</sup> *Das deutsche Weissbuch über die Schuld am Kriege*, p. 60. Cf. also “Die Depesche des Grafen Szögyény und die deutschen Vermittlungsaktionen” (Count Szögyény's Telegram and German Action on the Mediation Proposals), *Deutsche Politik*, Weekly, v. 37, September 12, 1919, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart, pp. 327 ff.

<sup>168</sup> *Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges* (Causes and Outbreak of the World War), p. 128, foot-note 1.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 129.

<sup>170</sup> *Deutsches Weissbuch*, 1914, p. 60. [See *German White Book Concerning the Responsibility of the Authors of the War*, p. 29.—Tr.]


<sup>171</sup> Sidney B. Fay, Vol. II, p. 549.

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CHAPTER IV

*THE THESIS OF WAR GUILT IN THE TREATY  
OF VERSAILLES*



THE Versailles Thesis of War Guilt is set forth both in the Preamble to the Peace Treaty and in Article 231. In the Preamble the passage pertaining to guilt reads as follows: <sup>1</sup>

The United States of America, The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, These Powers being described in the present treaty as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, The Hejaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, The Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, Checho-Slovakia and Uruguay, These Powers constituting with the Principal Powers mentioned above the Allied and Associated Powers, of the one part, and Germany, of the other part; Bearing in mind that on the request of the Imperial German Government an Armistice was granted on November 11, 1918, to Germany by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in order that a Treaty of Peace might be concluded with her, and The Allied and Associated Powers being equally desirous that the war *in which they were successively involved directly or indirectly and which originated in the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on July 28, 1914, against Serbia, the declaration of war by Germany against Russia on August 1,*

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*1914, and against France on August 3, 1914, and in the invasion of Belgium, should be replaced by a firm, just and durable Peace.*

The Preamble to the Peace Treaty may be described as an attempt to establish authorship of the War by a chronological sequence of the so-called declarations of war. This method, of course, is absurd. Given the situation as it actually was in 1914, it is irrational to try to discover in the declarations of war the origins of the World War. The declarations of war cited in the Preamble were merely notices of a condition brought about by acts of the enemy. In the Austro-Serbian, as well as in the Franco-German and Russo-German clashes, hostilities began automatically after the issuance of mobilization order.<sup>2</sup> In each of these cases a declaration of war would have been unnecessary had the Government issuing the declaration not felt itself bound by the agreement of October 18, 1907, concerning the opening of hostilities, to serve formal notice that a state of war existed. From Churchill's well-known order of July 30, 1914, we learn that even the English Government intended to open hostilities before the expiration of the time-limit of its ultimatum, which was drawn up in such a form that a subsequent declaration of war would have been unnecessary. Churchill's instructions were as follows:

Your first task should be to aid the French in the transportation of their African army by covering and if possible bringing to action individual fast German ships, particularly *Goeben*, which may interfere with *that transportation*. *You will be notified by telegraph* when you may consult with the French Admiral. Except in combination with the French as part of a gen-

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eral battle, do not at this stage be brought to action against superior forces.<sup>3</sup>

On protest by the British Cabinet, the above instructions were suspended on August 4, at 2:05 P. M. They were not put into force again until the expiration of the ultimatum at midnight of August 4. The order was in effect, therefore, four full days. That the British naval forces did not engage in hostilities during this period was not the fault of the British Government. Had they met the Germans at any time during these four days, they would undoubtedly have attacked the latter, although a formal state of war with Germany as yet did not exist.

Aside from this, it is of course impossible to determine authorship of war simply by arranging mechanically in chronological order the so-called declarations of war. Could responsibility be fixed in this way, the League of Nations might well give up its search for a formula that will positively identify the aggressor in time of war. As the writer of foreign political news in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* once put it,<sup>4</sup> if responsibility for starting a war can be established by any such method as the above, then the rule for determining the aggressor and therewith the guilty party in a war can be found in the Preamble to the Versailles Treaty. But the matter is not as simple as that. It will take a long time before a nation will be held responsible for causing a war when it is forced by the acts of its enemies to serve notice that a state of war exists. A notice of a state of war cannot be branded as a declaration of war, and serving of such a notice is not synonymous with aggression.

We must, however, devote a little further space to the

text of the Preamble to the Peace Treaty, since the text defines very clearly the state of mind of the Allied and Associated Powers. In connection with the co-called declaration of war by Austria and Germany, only the dates are given; on the other hand, the British declaration of war on Germany is not mentioned at all. The march into Belgium, falsely described as an "invasion," is mentioned, but only as the cause of England's entrance into the war. Had this passage been honestly worded, it would have contained the phrase, "and in the declaration of war by England against Germany on August 4, 1914"; or else have included the causes or grounds for the so-called declarations of war by Austria and Germany. For instance, in connection with the German declaration of war on Russia, the Russian general mobilization would have been mentioned. For further consideration of this point, the reader is referred to the Section, "Germany's Declarations of War on Russia and France."

We shall now turn to Article 231, which fixes Germany as the aggressor in the World War. This article forms the first paragraph of Part VIII of the Peace Treaty dealing with "Reparation." It reads as follows:

Part VIII.

REPARATION.

Section I.

General Provisions.

Article 231.

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which

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the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

It was the view of the Allied and Associated Powers that Germany's moral responsibility for the outbreak of the War constituted the basis for reparations. This was the sense in which Article 231 was regarded by the Germans and their enemies in 1919. It was not until later years that a controversy developed on both sides concerning the interpretation and meaning of Article 231.

In order to provide a basis for criticism of Article 231, it will be necessary to give a brief sketch of its origins. In March, 1919, a crisis arose in the conferences held by the Powers to determine the sum to be paid as reparations. The exorbitant demands of the French met with stiff opposition from the Americans. Lloyd George then came forward with a compromise offer, which was accepted "in its essential points" on April 1. It was agreed

That Germany shall be compelled to admit her financial liability for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and their property by the aggression of the Enemy States by land, by sea and from the air, and also, for damages resulting from their acts in violation of formal engagements and of the Law of Nations.<sup>5</sup>

Had this text been incorporated in the Peace Treaty, it would have established nothing more than Germany's legal responsibility for all war damages. But the forces at Paris intent on erecting a moral and not a legal basis for reparation demands were openly stronger. During the



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interval between April 1 and 4, Lloyd George's draft assumed the following form:

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm the responsibility of the enemy States for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of the enemy States.<sup>6</sup>

The text as finally drafted by the Powers was now embodied absolutely unchanged in the Peace Treaty, as Article 231.

Temperley, also, in his work on the Peace Conference, makes it quite clear that Article 231 contains the express declaration that Germany is the sole author of the War.<sup>7</sup> He describes the signing of Article 231 as follows:

On the 21st the Allied Governments dispatched a "final last word" to Germany, assuring her that the concessions indicated in the "first last word" of the 16th June were binding on the Allied and Associated Powers. On the 22nd Haimhausen, now in charge of the German negotiations, informed the Allies that Germany must decline all responsibilities for difficulties on her Eastern frontier, thus again indicating her sensitiveness in this area. He also sent a communication, in which he intimated that Germany would sign, if the Allies would not insist upon Articles 227-30, which provided for the surrender of the Kaiser and of war-criminals, and on Article 231, which declared Germany the sole and only author of the war. The Four met at Mr. Lloyd George's house in the Rue Nitot, and on the same evening despatched a reply rejecting both demands, and insisting on immediate compliance. The time-limit expired at 7 P. M. on the 23rd, but by 5.20

P. M. displays of flags on the Hotels Crillon and Majestic and Astoria, and the press of people in the streets announced to all Paris that the Germans had consented to sign.

In another place Temperley interprets Article 231 in the following words, which express exactly the official view held at Versailles: <sup>8</sup>

The first of the Reparation Clauses (Article 231) asserts the responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage suffered by her enemies as a result of the War. This responsibility is a moral and not a financial responsibility. The Clause means simply that Germany caused the War.

In the conclusions which Temperley appends to the end of his chapter on finance and reparation, he says: <sup>9</sup>

#### SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The logical structure of the Treaty, as regards finance and reparation, may now be summarized in outline as follows:

I. Germany accepts the moral responsibility for having caused all damage suffered as a consequence of the war.

II. The Treaty specifies what portion of this damage is to become a financial liability of Germany.

The following evidence is submitted as proof that even after the signing of the Treaty our former enemies adhered to the conviction that Germany's moral responsibility for the outbreak of the War constituted the basis for reparation demands. On December 27, 1920, Poincaré wrote in the *Temps*:

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Indeed, if the Central Powers did not start the War, why should they be condemned to pay the damages? If responsibility is divided then, as a matter of necessity and justice, the costs must also be divided!

On March 3, 1921, Lloyd George, then Prime Minister of England, declared before the London Conference:

For the Allies German responsibility for the war is fundamental. It is the basis upon which the structure of the Treaty has been erected, and if that acknowledgement is repudiated or abandoned the Treaty is destroyed. . . . We wish therefore once and for all to make it quite clear that German responsibility for the war must be treated by the Allies as a *chose jugée*.<sup>10</sup>

On March 21, 1921, the German Government presented the American Commissioner at Berlin with a memorandum on the reparation question. To this the American Government replied on March 29, 1921, as follows:

This Government stands with the Government of the Allies in holding Germany responsible for the war and therefore morally bound to make reparation, so far as may be possible. The recognition of this obligation, implied in the memorandum of Dr. Simons, seems to the Government of the United States the only sound basis on which can be built a firm and just peace, under which the various nations of Europe can achieve once more economic independence and stability.<sup>11</sup>

And finally the French Government, in its reply to the official German protest at Locarno against the war guilt lie, on August 31, 1924, declared:

It [the French Government.—Tr.] opposes vigorously a thesis which is not only contradicted by the facts of history, but runs counter to the formal clauses of the Treaty of Versailles; a thesis, that is to say, which conflicts with a ruling made by Lloyd George, in the name of the Allies, on March 3, 1921.<sup>12</sup>

Only official utterances concerning the meaning of Article 231 have been quoted. These utterances obviously can be supplemented by any number of newspaper opinions in the former enemy countries during the period following the War.

#### NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

<sup>1</sup> Words appearing in large-faced type in the original are printed in ordinary type here. On the other hand, the passages which relate to the charges brought against Germany and her ally are printed in italics.

<sup>2</sup> On March 12, 1912, the Tsar issued instructions setting forth the Imperial resolution that "a telegraphic order to institute mobilization measures in the European military districts as a consequence of political complications on the western frontier shall be construed to mean at the same time an order to commence hostilities against Austria and Germany." (Montgelas: *Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage*, p. 37). To be sure, these instructions were changed on November 26, 1912, and in their revised form provided that the opening of hostilities should be decreed by a special telegram. (Gunther Frantz: *Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg*, p. 47.) This example serves to show, however, the dangers to which Germany was exposed by a Russian mobilization.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Hermann Lutz: "Churchills Befehl vom 30. Juli 1914," (Churchill's Order of July 30, 1914) *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, August, 1925, pp. 609 ff. [Text of order as given in Winston S. Churchill: *The World Crisis*, Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1923, I, p. 238.—Tr.]

<sup>4</sup> September 21, 1927, No. 441.

<sup>5</sup> Woodrow Wilson: *Memoiren und Dokumente* (Memoirs and Documents of Woodrow Wilson), Paul List Verlag, Leipzig, 1923, III, p. 342. [English text taken from Ray Stannard Baker: *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, Doubleday, Page & Co., N. Y., 1922, III, p. 397.—Tr.]

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, III, p. 348. [Baker, loc. cit., p. 404.—Tr.]

<sup>7</sup> Temperley: *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*. Published under the auspices of the British Institute of International Affairs, Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1924, II, pp. 17, 18.

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 73.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 90.

<sup>10</sup> *New York Times*, March 4, 1921, p. 1.—Tr.

<sup>11</sup> Schulthess' *Europäischer Geschichtskalender*, 1921, Part II, pp. 296 ff. [English text of American note taken from *New York Times Current History*, May, 1921, p. 191.—Tr.]

<sup>12</sup> *Vossische Zeitung*, August 31, 1924.

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## CHAPTER V

### *REFUTATIONS OF THE ULTIMATUM AND THE COVERING NOTE*



IN the early chapters of this book we have seen with what fatuous and most inadequate arguments the Commission of the Allies tried to blame the Central Powers for the outbreak of the War. After the German experts in the Memorandum to the *Report* of the Commission of the Allies had shown on how flimsy a foundation the charges of the Allies rested, a new Commission extended the basis for the judgment in the war guilt question and endeavoured, in the ultimatum as well as in the covering note, to represent certain qualities of the German people and institutions of the German Government as the motive causes for the World War. In addition other charges were made which may be considered as supplementing the *Report*.

The members of the Commission responsible for the drafting of the ultimatum and the covering note of June 16 were: For France, Tardieu; for Great Britain, Philip Kerr; for the United States, Manley Hudson; for Italy, Count Vanutelli Rey; for Japan, Saburi. The covering note was revised and signed by Clemenceau.<sup>1</sup>

We have classified these charges under several headings according to the text of the ultimatum and the cover-

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ing note. In the following chapters we shall deal with them in greater detail.

## I. THE PRUSSIAN SPIRIT

The ultimatum states:

The outbreak of the war was no sudden decision taken in a difficult crisis. It was the logical outcome of the policy which had been pursued for decades by Germany under the inspiration of the Prussian system.

The whole history of Prussia has been one of domination, aggression and war. Hypnotised by the success with which Bismarck, following the tradition of Frederick the Great, robbed the neighbours of Prussia and forged the unity of Germany through blood and iron, the German people after 1871 submitted practically without reserve to the inspiration and the leadership of their Prussian rulers.

The German spirit was not content that Germany should occupy a great and influential place in a Council of equal nations to which she was entitled, and which she had secured. It could be satisfied with nothing less than supreme and autocratic power.

The covering note speaks as follows on the same subject:

For many years the rulers of Germany, true to the Prussian tradition, strove for a position of dominance in Europe. They were not satisfied with that growing prosperity and influence to which Germany was entitled, and which all other nations were willing to accord her, in the society of free and equal peoples. They required that they should be able to dictate and tyrannise to a subservient Europe, as they dictated and tyrannised over a subservient Germany.

Furthermore it is stated in the ultimatum that under the influence of Prussia Germany was the champion of might and of force.

The charges expressed here are directed primarily against the Prussian spirit, in which the authors of the ultimatum and of the covering note see a cause for the war. The history of Prussia, they say, was characterized by the spirit of domination, aggression and war. It is not our purpose entirely to deny these qualities of the Prussian people. But we must emphasize that this spirit has its origin in the tasks which were set Prussia by history. Without the development of a warlike spirit which was made orderly through discipline and nurtured by tradition, Prussia could not have fulfilled her historical mission. Without the struggles of the first margraves of Brandenburg against the revolting knights in the fifteenth century, without the victorious battles of the Great Elector, without the wars of Frederick the Great, without the Wars of Liberation against Napoleon I and not least of all without the victorious German-French War of 1870-1871, neither a strong Prussia nor a German Empire could have emerged.

A better understanding of the historical requisites of this Prussian state than was revealed by the judges at Versailles is manifested by the English historian Seely, who in his work *Life and Times of Stein*, vol. 1, argues as follows: The peculiar course of the history of a given state is often determined by a fundamental characteristic of its geographical situation. England's history, for instance, is determined by her decided separation from, yet close proximity to the European continent; America's history by her unlimited possibilities of expansion and by



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the fact that she has no rivals. The determining peculiarity of Prussia's position, on the other hand, lies in the fact that she had neighbours and rivals who were immensely superior and from whom she was separated only by boundaries which she had herself created. The direct consequence of this peculiarity was that the activity of the government in Prussia covered a much wider sphere than in England and America. The instinct of self-preservation determines the character of states to a much larger extent than any other factor. For England, where great difficulties always confronted invasion, self-preservation was a simple matter; for America it was still simpler. Hence England required no great governmental exertion, America still less, while Prussia needed as much as possible on account of the extraordinary difficulty of protecting herself. For the same reason the Prussian Government has always had a military character.

Thus writes Seely, the British scholar. He recognizes that in view of her geographical situation in the midst of Europe Prussia was bound to create her own boundaries which were to separate her from her more powerful neighbours, and that in order to solve the difficulties arising from the necessity of self-defence she required a maximum of government. Thus the system of government peculiar to Prussia had developed out of the requirements of the Prussian state and, supported by the tradition borne by the dynasty, it became the very foundation of the state. The fact that in the course of time this system acquired influence in the rest of Germany, too, is ascribable to its correctness and to its success. But the claim that the system was logically bound to lead to the World War is purely arbitrary and does not take into account

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the political conditions existing since the founding of the German Empire.

Germany was saturated in Europe. She merely strove, like other nations, to expand her trade and deemed herself justified to speak a word in the "council of equal nations" when it was a question of changes in world politics, and to defend her own interests. Germany never strove for the highest autocratic power. Germany did indeed endeavour to dispose of the products of her skilled and industrious population in the markets of the world, and to make her commerce secure. But to deduce from this a striving for world hegemony is not in consonance with the historical facts as they have been manifested in the world politics of the European cabinets.

During the forty-four years preceding the World War, so rich in crisis affecting foreign policy, Germany under the Prussian system was a stronghold of peace. We could here cite many opinions of eminent scholars, among them non-Germans, confirming the above conception. We shall confine ourselves to the following judgment of the American historian Sidney B. Fay:<sup>2</sup>

On the contrary, Germany worked more effectively than any other Great Power, except England, to avert the war, not only in the last days of July, 1914, but also in the years immediately preceding.

In judging the influence which the Prussian spirit exercised upon the governmental system in the later German Empire, one factor should not be overlooked. Beside the spirit of Potsdam the spirit of Weimar also played an important rôle in the conformation of Germany. The fact that these two tendencies were compatible was the pre-

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requisite and the happy explanation for Prussia's success in becoming a component part of the German Empire created by Bismarck.

When the ultimatum states that the outbreak of the World War is to be traced not to a sudden decision but represents rather the result of a policy which was pursued by the Great Powers for decades, it is undoubtedly correct. But Germany cannot be made solely or principally responsible for this policy. Germany did not change her system of alliances after 1890 and pursued no aims which might have been attained through war. The policy which divided Europe into two hostile camps originated in France and found its chief expression in the alliance with Russia and in the *Entente cordiale*. Colonial agreements as well as military and naval commitments, including the involvement of Belgium in the anticipated battle-front of the Allies, led to an ever firmer and, as the summer of 1914 showed, to an indissoluble union of three Great Powers of Europe, for the purpose of shattering at the given moment the waxing power of Germany.<sup>2a</sup>

If the German people after 1871 submitted to the influence of Prussia, they did not do so, as the authors of the ultimatum believe, under the hypnotic influence of Bismarck's success but in the clear conviction that among the German states Prussia was the logical leader by virtue of her history which was crowned with successes, by virtue of her model army, by virtue of her orderliness in matters of government and by virtue of her natural sources of power. When in 1870 the German people were for the second time in that century attacked by the French from motives of envy and lust of conquest, not only

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Prussia but particularly the South German states felt the necessity for a permanent union of the German race, since only a unified German Empire would be able to offer a guarantee for the future against the aggression and hunger for revenge manifested by France. To speak of a subjection or a tyrannizing of the South German States by Prussia is tantamount to misunderstanding completely the position of Prussia with regard to Germany south of the Main River.

The concept of a Prussian spirit which was dissatisfied and strove for autocratic power, expressed in the ultimatum of the Allies, has been frequently motivated by the enemy propaganda on the basis that the majority of the German people lived under the influence of men whose frame of mind was particularly martial or overweening. Nietzsche, Treitschke and Bernhardt are usually mentioned in this connection. The selection of alleged leaders of German thought certainly does not reveal any profound knowledge of German intellectual life.

At the beginning of the century, to be sure, the philosopher Nietzsche exercised an important influence upon the German intellectual youth, and many a weak, unstable character became a victim of this spirit who violently transcended the old bounds of morality. But no real student of Nietzsche would ever dare say that Nietzsche influenced the spirit of the nation to strive politically for autocratic power with the help of state authority. We should like to recall here one utterance of Nietzsche in his *Zarathustra*: "We good Europeans know nothing of national differences; and what are kings to us?"

Treitschke too is misjudged in this connection. Indeed Treitschke was an ardent patriot and through his work

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on the history of Germany in the nineteenth century and other outstanding contributions, including his lectures *Politik* published after his death in 1896, he exercised a powerful influence over the generation living before the war. But, as Friedrich Meinecke once said, "the new German school of historians did not walk in Treitschke's tracks but rather in Ranke's, and though it shared with Treitschke the strong interest in the historical and political problems of the immediate past, it consciously strove to emulate Ranke in impartiality and objectivity toward other nations, correcting wherever possible the distortions and exaggerations of Treitschke's picture of history."<sup>3</sup> Then too the political significance of Treitschke lies not so much in the decade before the war but farther back. The English historian Gooch is right when he mentions Treitschke together with Droysen and Sybel as among the "most important co-founders of imperial Germany."

Least accurate but most widespread especially in the United States is the idea that the general of the cavalry Friedrich von Bernhardi nurtured in the army a spirit of aggression which had serious political consequences. For the support of this notion the effect of a book by Bernhardi entitled *Germany and the Next War* is cited. In this work the general points to the necessity of preparing for the coming war. The chapter in this book called "The Duty of War" is of course no pacifist document, but it should not be overlooked that elsewhere in Europe similar literature was written and read. We call attention merely to the books of the French chauvinist writer Le-Bon. The difference between Bernhardi and Le-Bon lies in the fact that while the writings of the former were not

widely read, the works of Le-Bon were among the most popular in France. From his *Psychologie politique* (1910), which leaves no doubt concerning the bellicoseness of this philosopher, we shall take but a few sentences quoted from an article by Lwoff, *Der Weltkrieg und der französische Nationalismus*.<sup>4</sup> Le-Bon writes as follows: "A universal peace would signify the end of all civilization and progress and would bring about the reversion to the crassest barbarism." In another place he says: "Wars or even threats of war are a powerful factor in the moral and material development of the nations." Despite these doctrines which tend to incite war, Le-Bon paints the terrible picture of war fittingly in the following words: "Terrible encounters, devoid of all compassion, where entire regions are methodically despoiled, until finally no house, no tree, no human being remains. These pictures must remain alive in our souls, when we rear our children and our soldiers. Let us calmly leave to the rhetoricians the futile speeches on pacificism, brotherliness and other nonsense."

The writings of General von Bernhardi on the other hand found but little attention in military circles so far as they did not concern questions pertaining directly to the cavalry. In the Berlin war academy it was even said of them that they "should be used with caution."

To show how the political ideas of Bernhardi were judged by the Emperor himself, we quote a marginal comment of Emperor William in the copy of a correspondence presented to him. This correspondence—it was the Wedekind or princes' correspondence—had sharply criticized an article by General Bernhardi published in the *Post*. In the margin the Emperor wrote: "That man

must be treated roughly, he sows evil." As a matter of fact the general later was severely rebuked for his activities as a writer. This was done through the military cabinet.

The striving for the highest autocratic power is attributed above all to the Pan-Germans, concerning whom many opponents of Germany had a grotesque notion. Fortunately we are now able to point to the sensible work of an American woman, Miss Mildred S. Wertheimer,<sup>5</sup> and thereby to reduce these notions to their correct proportions. On the basis of the number of members enrolled in the Pan-German League, which at the time of its greatest development around 1900 did not exceed 22,000, she reaches the following conclusion:

The number of members of the League was relatively small, and when measured by the talk about "Pan-Germanism," "Pan-German plots," "Pan-German schemes," etc., seems almost laughably insignificant. Because of the fact that the members belonged to the more or less educated classes, their organization had an importance somewhat out of proportion to the actual size of its membership. Even in the rising tide of German nationalism, however, these pioneers were sneered at by most of their own compatriots as a small and unimportant group of fanatics.

If the references to Nietzsche, Treitschke, Bernhardt and the Pan-Germans seemed insufficient to prove the German striving for world dominion, the attempt was made to show that the song "Deutschland, Deutschland über alles . . ." was an indisputable evidence of the German will to conquer the whole world. With this more than stupid assertion a Frenchman, Vernier, dealt in 1913 in a work entitled *La France en Danger—L'Œuvre des Pan-*

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*Germanistes*. Here Vernier attributes to the song written by Hoffmann von Fallersleben in 1841 an entirely wrong meaning so as to deduce from it the far-fetched argument that it expresses an imperialistic lust of conquest. He produces this effect by means of a frivolous translation.<sup>6</sup>

We believe that this clarifies sufficiently the groundless charges that the "Prussian spirit" was a cause for the World War, and we turn to the next point.

## 2. GERMAN MILITARISM

We have classified the charges of militarism under five headings. These we shall subject to a critical examination one after the other. Thus in one place in which the attitude of Germany at the time of the Conferences at the Hague is alluded to though not expressly mentioned in the ultimatum, we read:

At a time therefore when the western nations were seriously endeavouring to limit armaments, to substitute friendship for rivalry in international affairs, and to lay the foundation of a new era in which all nations should cooperate in amity in the conduct of the world's affairs, the rulers of Germany were restlessly sowing suspicion and hostility among all her neighbours, were conspiring with every element of unrest in every land, and were steadily increasing Germany's armaments and consolidating her military and naval power.

The question of the attitude of the German Government at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 was investigated expertly in the parliamentary committee of investigation of the Reichstag.<sup>7</sup> Here it was shown that in



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the First Hague Conference the German Government was in agreement with practically all the other Powers participating in the Conference in refusing to consent to any reduction of armaments by treaty. The reasons for Germany's attitude lay in the fact that the proposals made by Russia in 1899 were of such a nature "that the probable opponents of Germany would have been placed in a position of advantage as regards their own armaments over against those of Germany and her allies." A defect of the proposals is also found in the fact that there was no practical proposition made to guarantee a controllable mode of reducing armaments which would have taken into account the vital interests of all the Powers. The committee very rightly states that this goal could only have been reached if the question of reduction had been considered not as an isolated question but in connection with a collective guarantee of ownership and an effective international executive agency.

We shall now quote the text of the report of the parliamentary committee. No comment upon it will be necessary.

When after its rejection in 1899 the question was again placed upon the agenda (in 1907), the German government faced the dilemma of either opposing every one of the proposals to be expected from the opposing group of Powers, or to object from the very beginning to the whole discussion of the question. In deciding in favour of the latter alternative, it thought it was choosing the lesser of two evils. Considering the geographical position of the country, situated as it was in the midst of other peoples, with the unfavourable circumstances of wide open boundaries; considering the experiences of earlier German history; con-

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sidering finally the Russo-French dual alliance which even in 1899 was superior in numbers, but which since 1907 had been strengthened by England, in whose wake Italy also followed,—considering all these facts the German government was unwilling to have anything to do with proposals for disarmament that must lead to the one-sided weakening of German policy. Germany was especially apprehensive about discussing the proposals submitted for limiting armaments, because colonial troops were not to be included in the disarmament, which meant that it would have been an easy thing as well for Russia as also for France to attain military supremacy under the pretext of training colonial troops. The German government also considered the fact that the Russian government, which primarily brought the idea of limitation of armaments into the European debate, at the same time was making preparations for a war against Japan; and that England always interpreted disarmament merely to signify that the two-power standard of her fleet and with it her supremacy at sea must in every case be maintained.

But the real significance of the reproaches of the Allies in the matter of the reduction of armaments can today best be seen in the fact that ten years after the total disarmament of Germany the world, despite a general aversion to war, is armed to the tooth for war on land, on sea and in the air. Furthermore it is significant that in spite of the zealous endeavours of Germany and others, all efforts to reduce armaments have failed on account of the quite superfluous militarism of France and the tenacity with which England adheres to her supremacy on the seas.

In another part of the ultimatum we read:

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It is said that Germany developed her armaments in order to save herself from Russian aggression. Yet it is significant that no sooner was Russia defeated by Japan in the Far East and almost paralysed by the subsequent internal revolution than the German Government immediately redoubled its attempts to increase its armaments and to domineer over its neighbours under the threat of war. To them the collapse of Russia was not an occasion to try to reduce armaments and bring peace to the world in concert with the Western Powers. It was the opportunity to extend their own power.

Here too it is unnecessary to counter with anything new. It will be sufficient to quote the text of the report of the parliamentary committee of investigation:

When however the note of the Entente further reproaches Germany with having increased her armaments after Russia's defeat in the Japanese War and with having attempted to impose a tyrannical hegemony upon her neighbours on threat of making war upon them, it should be pointed out that no more favourable opportunity for conducting a war and for realizing the alleged plans of Germany for world dominion could have been found than the period during the Boer War or during the Russo-Japanese War and the inner-political upheaval that followed in Russia upon the heels of the war. The contention of the note that Germany had redoubled her efforts to increase her armaments after Russia had been paralysed militarily through her defeats in the Far East is entirely unfounded. During the years 1905–1907 Germany increased her army by only 7,000 men, i. e., raised it from 622,000 to 629,000 men, while Austria-Hungary did not increase hers at all. All that time moreover the German government did not use its fa-

vourable position to make humiliating demands of other Powers; on the contrary it preferred at the end of the first Morocco crisis to swallow a political defeat at the Algeciras Conference, rather than make the attempt to turn the scales in its favour by the threat of war.

The collapse of Russia would undoubtedly have offered Germany an opportunity to extend her power. But such an opportunity was neither sought by Germany nor was it exploited. The negotiations between the Emperor and the Tsar in Björkoe conducted immediately after the Russo-Japanese War with the knowledge of the chancellor, for the purpose of effecting a rapprochement between Germany and Russia (in which France was later also to participate), show that the opposite was true. If the formation of the continental bloc was not realized, this does not alter the fact that Germany had the intention of using the precarious situation of her eastern neighbour for the purpose of consolidating the European situation and not for the purpose of pursuing any selfish policy of aggrandizement.

The ultimatum then continues:

Further the whole point of German organization was aggressive. Their scheme of railways, both east and west, their order of mobilization, their long concocted plan to turn the flank of France by invading Belgium, the elaborate preparation and equipment, both within and beyond her borders, as revealed on the outbreak of the war,—all had aggression and not defence in view. The military doctrine that Germany could only be defended by springing first upon her neighbours was the excuse for demanding a military organization and a strategic plan which, when the time came, would enable them to smash all resistance to the

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ground and leave Germany the undisputed master both in the East and West.

It is true that the whole point of the German military organization was aggressive—for the simple reason that a blow is the best defence. But it would be incorrect to deduce from the aggressive intention of Germany in case of war with her eastern and western neighbours, that she had the will to political aggression. Nor was her policy influenced by this aggressive intention underlying her military operations, to the extent that she wished to bring about a war.

The plan to conduct operations of war offensively was not peculiar to the German general staff. The French and Russian staffs too had prepared their military operations in such a manner as to provide for a simultaneous attack upon Germany from the East and the West. We have detailed information concerning this fact in the official protocols on the conferences of the French and Russian chiefs of staff between 1911 and 1913.<sup>8</sup>

In accordance with Sect. 1, Art. 4 of the Franco-Russian Military Convention of August 17, 1892, these conferences were held regularly in the summer of each year at St. Petersburg. In the protocols of 1911 there are allusions to conferences held in 1900, 1906, 1908 and 1910.

The protocol of 1911 contains numerous sentences which clearly express the aggressive purpose of France and Russia. In the introduction we read: "The two chiefs of staff agree in declaring that the expression "defensive war" is not to be interpreted in the sense of a war which will be conducted in a defensive manner. Rather do they

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declare emphatically that for the Russian and French armies it will be absolutely necessary to resort to a powerful offensive . . .” And at another point: “The objective, namely to force Germany to leave as large a force as possible on her eastern frontier,” which was the chief purpose of the military convention of 1892—, “can only be attained by means of an offensive.”

That the development of the railway system, with which Germany is reproached in the ultimatum, was by no means neglected in Russia either, is shown particularly by the protocols of 1912 and 1913. Here we learn that various strategic lines are to be doubled and some, essential for mobilization, are to be quadrupled.

The protocol of 1913 recognizes expressly that the further development of the railway net is one of the essential factors for bringing about “the complete annihilation of Germany’s fighting forces which is to be striven for from the very beginning of the operations” at any cost.

After 1900 the Russian Army required 32 days after mobilization had been proclaimed in which to put its armies into the field, while in 1914 this was completed in 18 days. Once the various railway projects had been carried out, it would have been possible for the Russians to put their forces into the field in 16 days.<sup>8a</sup>

Indeed the offensive idea appears much more markedly in the protocol of 1913 than it does in the former Franco-Russian conferences. Thus we read in Art. 3 of the protocol: “Hence it must be the plan of the Allies to try to make a simultaneous attack on both sides, which shall be the supreme effort of the joint endeavour.” And at the end of the article it is demanded that the French

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armies shall have a decided numerical superiority over the German forces in the west.

The fact that Great Britain too played a part in these conferences of the French and Russian chiefs of staff in 1913 appears from Art. 4 of the protocol. There it is stated: "The telegraphic connections between the Russian and the French general staffs can be taken up through English cables by English mediation. The agreement with London has just been reached. The necessary measures have been taken and the transmission of messages can begin."

From this protocol we see quite clearly that the opponents of Germany had prepared their attack at least as well as Germany had. Nor should it be overlooked that the Russians actually succeeded in invading East Prussia and in remaining east of the Angerapp line until February, 1915, despite their defeat at Tannenberg. The French immediately invaded Upper Alsace and as early as August 8 were in Mülhausen. To judge by the charge made in the ultimatum we might almost gain the impression that its authors imagined that it was the duty of an army in case of war to march behind its own frontier and to stay there until peace was concluded. If only such strategy were permitted, it would be useless to equip armies with rifles and cannon.

The claim of the Allies that the strategic plan of Germany, whereby the Schlieffen plan is meant, was a military dogma which was to offer the pretext for shattering all opposition at the given moment, is incorrect in two respects. The Schlieffen plan of operation was not a dogma but a plan originating in the genial mind of Count Schlieffen as the result of Germany's strategic position.

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Its object was to break the French superiority with the numerically weaker German army before the pressure of the Russian masses could make itself fully felt over the almost entirely unprotected eastern frontier of Germany. As the present minister of the Reichswehr, General Groener has shown in his book *Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen*,<sup>9</sup> this plan originated from the same military principle which Frederick the Great used in the battle of Leuthen. Its chief point was to strike a more powerful opponent in his weakest spots, viz. in the flank and in the rear. To construe from this fact a pretext, because as a result of the magnitude of the area involved the plan could not be carried out on any limited battle-field, and because it was necessary to extend the plan beyond the national frontiers of a small country—this only shows that the authors of the ultimatum had no understanding whatsoever of the military conditions created by the World War. Whoever has seen the German film of the World War will immediately understand that the struggle of the gigantic armies which confronted each other at the outbreak of the War could not be confined to any limited space but was bound to claim with elemental force the vast territory required for such a contest.

Had the intention existed to use the Schlieffen plan as a pretext for invading enemy or neutral territory, Germany should not have neglected the opportunity of 1905 “to engage in the inevitable conflict under favourable political and military conditions.”<sup>10</sup>

The covering note states: “They (the rulers of Germany) never ceased to expand German armaments by land and sea.”

This charge is devoid of all justification. To be sure,



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Germany continually increased its armaments by land and sea, but a comparison with the armaments of the Great Powers in question during the decades preceding the outbreak of the war shows that Germany did not march at the head of the procession either absolutely or relatively.

If during the years before the war Germany built a fleet which often caused alarm among Germany's neighbours, especially in England, this was justified by the natural development of Germany's position in the world.

To a certain extent the building of the German fleet may be considered one of the causes for the war because as a result England was more readily persuaded to take sides with her opponents. But we can not go so far as to see in Germany's fleet-building a good reason for England to make war against Germany. Aside from the fact that Germany like every sovereign State had the right to construct the warships necessary for safeguarding her maritime interests, it should not be overlooked that the naval armaments of Germany's opponents considerably exceeded the German power on sea by virtue of the Anglo-French naval convention and the impending conclusion of the Anglo-Russian naval convention. The German naval forces were completely overshadowed both in strength and in offensive power. If the naval armaments before the World War are to be classified as a reason for the war, then we are of the opinion that the impending conclusion of a secret Anglo-Russian naval convention which was denied but yet became known, could be regarded by Germany as a threat of war much more than Germany's open building of battle-ships could thus be regarded by England.

So far as armaments on land are concerned, a comparison of the peace strength of the Triple Alliance and of the Dual Alliance for the period from 1886 to 1914 shows the following.

The peace footing, which forms the basis for calculating the size of the army in case of mobilization, indicates that the Dual Alliance always had a considerable numerical superiority over the Triple Alliance.

TABLE OF PEACE STRENGTH BETWEEN 1886 AND 1914<sup>11</sup>

Peace Strength of	1886	1889	1892	1898	1904	1911	1914
Germany	427,000	468,000	487,000	557,000	588,000	610,000	725,000
Austr.-Hung.	262,000	262,000	288,000	331,000	342,000	362,000	442,000
Italy	216,000	235,000	223,000	209,000	207,000	240,000	250,000
Total	905,000	965,000	998,000	1,097,000	1,137,000	1,212,000	1,417,000
France	472,000	489,000	519,000	561,000	575,000	589,000	851,000
Russia	791,000	926,000	1,020,000	1,000,000	984,000	1,225,000	1,539,000
Total	1,263,000	1,415,000	1,539,000	1,561,000	1,559,000	1,814,000	2,390,000

It appears from the tables that during 1904–1911 the peace strength of France was somewhat smaller than that of Germany but that in 1914 this difference was equalized in favour of France. We must also bear in mind that in 1905 the peace strength of France was slightly inferior to that of Germany and that Russia was considerably weakened on account of her war with Japan. In other words although Germany, due to no fault of her own, had a more favourable position at that time with regard to her neighbours, she avoided a war. Hence there is no reason for holding the opinion that Germany wanted to wage war in 1914 by virtue of a military superiority which did not exist.

The covering note also states:

They developed a system of espionage and intrigue which enabled them to stir up internal rebellion and

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unrest and even to make secret offensive preparations within the territory of their neighbours whereby they might, when the moment came, strike them down with greater certainty and ease.

Although these charges are quite obscure and indefinite, we will discuss them. The accusations against the German espionage fall to the ground when one compares the accomplishments of Germany's opponents in this field.<sup>12</sup> German espionage was restricted to France and Russia. The news service intended against England had not yet been started when the war broke out. How far the German military espionage remained behind that of Germany's opponents appears for instance, so far as Russia is concerned, from the fact that "in 1912 Russia spent about 12 millions of rubles and during the first half of 1914 about 26 millions of rubles for her espionage service." This is taken from Official Russian documents which have been discovered. On the other hand the German general staff up to 1912 had at its disposal for its entire espionage system the sum of 300,000 marks, and pursuant to the army bill of 1912 the sum of 450,000 marks.

To what extent the enemy espionage was active in Germany appears from the table on page 206, taken from Nicolai's book, of the number of convictions before German civil courts on account of espionage.

Of those convicted 107 were Germans, among them 32 natives of Alsace-Lorraine, 11 Russians, 5 Frenchmen, 4 Englishmen, 3 Austrians, 2 Dutchmen, 1 American, 1 Swiss and 1 Luxemburger. The espionage was performed in 74 cases for France, in 35 for Russia, in 15

for England, in 1 for Italy, in 1 for Belgium and in 9 for several of these countries jointly.

In 1907	—	persons were apprehended and 3 convicted.				
“ 1908	66	“ “ “ “	“	“	9	“
“ 1909	47	“ “ “ “	“	“	6	“
“ 1910	103	“ “ “ “	“	“	10	“
“ 1911	119	“ “ “ “	“	“	14	“
“ 1912	221	“ “ “ “	“	“	21	“
“ 1913	346	“ “ “ “	“	“	21	“
“ 1914	154	“ “ “ “	“	“	51	“
In all	1056	“ “ “ “	“	“	135	“

A case of espionage from which it is possible to learn the method employed by the enemies of Germany is here given in the words of Nicolai:

In April 1914 the news service from St. Petersburg reported that the general staff there was negotiating for the purchase of plans of fortresses in Eastern Germany. To judge by the details the treason seemed to issue from the central office in Berlin. Within 24 hours the guilty party in the person of a superior clerk was identified. He confessed that he had been instigated by the Russian military attaché Colonel de Basarow and that he had sent the plans to St. Petersburg through his mediation. The general staff immediately informed the foreign office and demanded the departure of the Russian military attaché. This caused the foreign office apparent uneasiness since the Russian military attaché denied any connection with the undertaking and declared that it was an insult to his position and person to use the evidence of an inferior non-commissioned officer against his statement. But a second communication was made to the Russian embassy, viz. that the messenger who had taken the plans to St. Petersburg under instructions from the military

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attaché was already on his way back to Berlin via a German steamer, that this steamer made no landings between St. Petersburg and Stettin, that it had no wireless apparatus, that it was impossible to get in touch with the messenger, and that the German captain had already been informed of the identity of his passenger. To this was added the suggestion that if Colonel de Basarow wished to await the return and arrest of his messenger he was at liberty to do so. Thereupon the Russian military attaché quit Berlin and his post on the same day. Thus he took the same course which his predecessor Colonel de Michelsen took, who had been caught engaging in treasonable practises. The non-commissioned officer seduced by Colonel de Basarow was given the maximum punishment. His bribe consisted of 800 marks.

As regards the charges that Germany instigated unrest and inner revolt in the territory of her neighbours, we shall limit ourselves to an investigation of these accusations in connection with the attitude of Germany during the Russian revolution of 1905 and the labour disturbances at St. Petersburg in July, 1914. To what extent Germany refrained from interfering during the revolution of 1905 appears from a telegram of the Russian ambassador, Count Osten-Sacken, wherein the assurance is given that the German government would take stern measures against all German demonstrations of sympathy in Berlin.<sup>13</sup> From other documents in the same collection in which the telegram of Osten-Sacken is found it is seen that in 1905 Austria-Hungary gave strict orders to her frontier officials to prevent the smuggling of arms to the Russian revolutionaries. On the other hand Denmark admitted that she was powerless in the face of the transportation of arms to Russia.

Concerning the labour troubles in St. Petersburg in July, 1914, during the presence of Poincaré at the court of the Tsar, Paléologue in his memoirs <sup>14</sup> claims that he had been told that among the leaders apprehended there were several notorious German spy agents. Poincaré too says that the Grand Duke Nicolai Nicolajewitch told him that he believed he could detect the hand of Germany, for Germany would have liked to see the festivities in honour of the Franco-Russian alliance prove unsuccessful.<sup>15</sup> To be sure Poincaré weakens this statement by adding that it is purely a hypothesis.

How untrue the reports given to Paléologue and Nicolai Nicolajewitch were, that the labour troubles could be traced to German instigation, is seen in material published in the periodical of Soviet Russia *The Proletarian Revolution*. In an article on "The Russian Labour Troubles in 1914" Victor Augustin Wroblewski, relying on the material already referred to, gives the circumstances relating to the St. Petersburg revolution as follows: <sup>16</sup>

The cause for the July disturbances is really to be found in an originally economic strike of the workers in the naphtha industry of Baku. In the spring of 1914 an epidemic had broken out on the Russo-Persian frontier, and the naphtha workers demanded an improvement of their unhygienic living conditions which threatened to make a spread of the epidemic likely. When the demands which they made were not granted they struck in May, 1914, and this strike lasted for more than a month. In numerous meetings the labourers of the Empire passed resolutions of sympathy, made collections for their benefit and here and there engaged in sympathy strikes.

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The greatest influence among the labourers of the Russian capital was enjoyed at that time by the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, the so-called Bolsheviks. It was an easy matter for this party to incite the labourers, already aroused by the events in Baku, to undertake mass demonstrations. The situation was so tense that only an impulse was necessary to set the revolution in St. Petersburg and Moskow going. Such an impulse was given by a clash between labourers and police on July 3 in the Putilow works, which were important for the conduct of the war. There were casualties as a result of this clash. That was the signal for a general uprising. The strike spread rapidly over all St. Petersburg. On July 1 there were fewer than 5000 strikers. On July 3 there were over 15,000, on July 4, 90,000, and on July 7 there were 190,000. One of the most active leaders was the Bolshevik Duma deputy Badajew.

On July 14 the strike dwindled in St. Petersburg and Moskow. According to the Bolsheviks it would have been repeated in a short time and on a larger scale if the outbreak of the war had not delayed it for three years.

How foolish the charge is that the labour disturbances of 1914 were traceable to German intrigues becomes even clearer if we consider that the Russian Revolution, the precursor of which was the labour disturbance of July, 1914, was much too powerful and profound a movement to have been instigated by German spies.

The ultimatum sees the final objective of the German military organization in the striving to make Germany the absolute ruler in the east and west. This is of course only an empty phrase which is not worth considering further.<sup>17</sup>

### 3. THE GOSPEL OF HATRED AND FORCE

The ultimatum states:

They mobilized all the resources at their command, the universities, the press, the pulpit, the whole machinery of governmental authority to indoctrinate their gospel of hatred and force, so that when the time came the German people might respond to their call. As a result in the later years of the 19th century, and during the 20th century, the whole policy of Germany was bent towards securing for herself a position from which she could dominate and dictate.

The covering note supplements this assertion with the words:

In order to attain their ends they used every channel in their power through which to educate their own subjects in the doctrine that might was right in international affairs.

In a collection of essays published during the war the Berlin university professor Dr. Ernst Troeltsch called attention to the fact that the Homeric heroes, when engaged in battle, always engage in powerful invectives, and that in the World War too the vast mobilized masses revealed the same impulses as these Homeric heroes, so that the war was accompanied by an instinctive and loud-voiced hatred of the nations. The last echo of such invectives against the German people and their government we find in these and in other passages of the ultimatum and the covering note. To refute such claims in the sense of scientific criticism, is of course impossible. On the other



hand it would lead too far, and it would be superfluous, to refute these invectives by giving an accurate picture of the intellectual currents manifested in Germany during the years before the war. Accordingly we shall limit ourselves to countering the accusations with a few remarks.

Undoubtedly the philosophical faculties of the German universities before the war revealed a tendency which may be described as based upon a philosophy of force. But the influence of a small, limited number of scholars upon the thought of the German mind as a whole should not be overestimated. It should be remembered too that the intellectual life, particularly of Germany, was determined by a great many factors. But the statement that the German universities taught hatred toward other nations is nothing more than a malicious invention on the part of the authors of the ultimatum, which is all the more regrettable since some of them were among those numerous foreigners who during the years before the war crowded the philosophical and historical lecture rooms of Heidelberg and Göttingen.

The press in Germany did not stress the national will to power any more vehemently than did the press of Germany's neighbours. A comparison of the political tenor of the German press with that of the foreign press during the years before the war would show that the German newspapers and periodicals were much more restrained and moderate than those of Germany's opponents. We remind the reader merely of the famous article in the *Saturday Review* of July 28, 1897, with its candid and absolutely clear conclusion: "Germaniam esse delendam"; and of the article in the *Birchewija Wjedomosti* of June 13, 1914,<sup>18</sup> inspired by Suchomlinoff, which ended with the

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significant words: "Russia and France want no war, but Russia is ready and France must be ready also."

The utterances of the German papers at one of the crucial moments, during the July crisis on the 24th, are especially characteristic for their attitude. The British chargé in Berlin, Sir H. Rumboldt, reported thereon in detail to Sir Edward Grey.<sup>19</sup> It follows from this report that the conservative journals in particular judged the political situation with great restraint. For instance the Pan-German *Post*, after criticizing the Austrian ultimatum unfavourably, closes its article with the following words:

A whole string of questions is involved in the delivery of the Austrian note. Never was the danger of a European war more imminent than now. Austria ought to realize her responsibility for the energy which she has now so unexpectedly displayed. . . . Is Austria acting independently? Well and good. Let her continue to act independently. We can wait.<sup>20</sup>

Professor Sidney B. Fay in his book "The Origins of the World War," in Vol. I in the chapter on "The Underlying Causes of the War," also deals at some length with the importance of the Press as one of the causes of the War. Professor Fay also read a paper on this subject in Berlin in March, 1930, before the "Society for the Investigation of the Causes of the War." Professor Fay levelled no special reproach at the German Press. In his book it is the Austro-Serbian Press campaign after the Serajevo assassination that Professor Fay mentions and in his lecture he remarked that without the assistance of the English Press, Grey would never have succeeded in

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making the Belgian question the reason for going to war with Germany. Cf. *Berliner Monatshefte*, April number, 1930, p. 376.

But the accusation that even from the German pulpit the gospel of hatred and force was preached shows most strikingly the sinister intention of the authors of the ultimatum. They accuse but they offer no objective evidence or impartial judgment. We are convinced that not a single one of the authors of the ultimatum ever heard a sermon preached in a German Protestant or Catholic church in which there was proclaimed from the pulpit a gospel of hatred and power. We are convinced too that upon the table of the judges at Versailles there was not a single German sermon which might justify this abominable charge.

We should like to quote a single instance to show how inaccurate is the claim that the whole mechanism of the state machinery was used to preach hatred and force. In the autumn of 1913 when the billows of patriotic enthusiasm rose to the heights in Germany on the occasion of the one-hundredth anniversary of the Wars of Liberation, there were addresses made in Leipzig on October 18, dedicating the memorial to the great battle. These addresses show more clearly than anything else could that there were no thoughts of conquest or traces of a lust for world domination rife in Germany. The impressive memorial was described as "the will of the people hardened into stone" and as "the visible token of gratitude to God and to our heroic fathers for our freedom and our national existence."

Frederick Augustus, who as King of Saxony took the monument under his protection, said in his responsive

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address that it was his wish that the monument might signalize to future generations "how in this hour Germans and Russians, Austrians, Hungarians and Swedes kneel in reverence before God, the almighty guide of world history, and pray to him that He may preserve peace to us for the welfare of our German people, etc."

If therefore neither the universities, nor the press, nor the pulpit, nor the government instilled in the German people a gospel of hatred and force, it should not be overlooked on the other hand that especially since the summer of 1911 a movement made itself felt among Germans to concentrate the popular forces in a nationalistic sense. The fact that in the face of Anglo-French pressure the German government was forced to renounce its justified claims in Morocco had opened the eyes of many Germans to the circumstance that Germany was not to be permitted a peaceful development of her position as a world power and that the German people had failed to assert their interests effectively. The possibility of a clash of arms between the two groups of powers in Europe seemed more threatening, and an open outbreak was avoided only by the yielding attitude of Germany. It was generally and correctively felt that the renunciation of Morocco in favour of France meant a diminution of German prestige. The fact that the indignation over the Morocco agreement, widespread among the German people, soon disappeared, was due primarily to the meritorious service of the Chancellor. His calm but stern judiciousness brought it about that the *fait accompli* was finally received and accepted with moderation.

If during the years before the war the conviction gained ground in Germany that might makes right in inter-

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national affairs, this was due above all to the policy of conquest and might pursued by the opponents of Germany. It required no special doctrine impressed by the German government upon its "subjects," as the covering note puts it. To what extent the thesis that might makes right, which the authors of the covering note pretend to attack, actually exists in the settlement of international affairs has subsequently been brought home to the German people in a vivid manner by the dictated peace of Versailles.

#### 4. DEMOCRACY AND UNIVERSAL DOMINATION

On this subject the ultimatum states:

It was the fear of the rulers of Germany lest their plans for universal domination should be brought to nought by the rising tide of democracy, that drove them to endeavour to overcome all resistance at one stroke by plunging Europe in universal war.

In substantiation of this view the following passage is cited from the German memorandum:

The real mistakes of German policy lay much farther back. The German Chancellor who was in office in 1914 had taken over a political inheritance which either condemned as hopeless from the start his unreservedly honest attempt to relieve the tension of the internal situation, or else demanded therefor a degree of statesmanship, and above all a strength of decision, which on the one hand he did not sufficiently possess, and on the other hand, he could not make effective in the then existing conditions of German policy.

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The above claim of the ultimatum is based upon the well-known but incorrect assumption that Germany had plans of universal domination and therefore unleashed the world war. We have already suggested in previous chapters the fatuousness of such a claim. To meet the charge once more in this connection we can not do better than refer to the volumes published by the Foreign Office and entitled *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871 bis 1914*. There is no trace of any plans for world domination to be found in these volumes.<sup>21</sup>

No less fatuous than the accusation that Germany planned world domination is the claim of the authors of the ultimatum that Germany's leaders, fearing the growing tide of democracy, plunged Europe in universal war. This would be tantamount to saying that Germany had the intention of waging a preventive war in order to anticipate the growth of democracy. In making this charge the authors of the ultimatum failed to specify whether the German leaders were allegedly afraid of the growth of democracy among the neighbours of Germany or in the German nation itself. Perhaps they were thinking of both.

To cap the climax of absurdity, so far as the growth of democracy among Germany's neighbours is concerned, the authors of the ultimatum failed only to say that in order to defeat "the rising tide of democracy" Germany declared war against the Tsar!

That it was not a part of the German policy to oppose democratically governed states is clearly revealed by Germany's consistent attitude toward the United States. It is easy to show how during the last two decades preceding the war the German government did all in its power to make its relations with democratic North America as

cordial as possible. We remind the reader of the visit of Prince Henry of Prussia in February, 1902, of the exchange professors and of the cultivation of many other relations which acted as links between the two countries. How highly Germany respected the United States of America at the outbreak of the war is shown by the serious attention paid in Berlin to the attempt of President Wilson to mediate between the two sides shortly after the war had begun. When the American ambassador Gerard on August 10 presented to Emperor William the well-known message of the President, the Emperor immediately sat down and in the presence of the ambassador wrote a long telegram explaining the whole outbreak of the war and at the end thanking the President for his message.<sup>22</sup> In contrast to this a similar step on Wilson's part undertaken in London as early as August 3, that is before the official entrance of England into the war, was rejected with the consent of the American Germanophobe Ambassador Page.<sup>23</sup> Hence the democratic President's attempt at mediation found more attention in the Berlin castle than it did in the London Foreign Office.

We should like to make the general remark at this point that it is not at all correct to imagine a democratically governed country as being peaceable and a country with a monarch or a dictator as being warlike. The governmental forms have nothing to do with the will to war. The World War has shown clearly that democratic countries are just as prone to go to war and to see it through to a victorious outcome as monarchical states are. In 1928 the British minister of foreign affairs, Chamberlain, admitted in Geneva that democracy is no guarantee for world peace.<sup>24</sup>

Nor was the growth of social democracy, which in 1914 had 111 seats in the Reichstag, any reason for waging war for the purpose of avoiding an internal crisis. To be sure, the German Social Democratic Party of 1914 would not have sanctioned any plans of world domination or a war for conquest. On the other hand the party did all it could to avoid a war on two fronts and to advocate national self-assertion. To show how sensibly the political situation was judged by the social democrats in 1914 we quote from the report of Hermann Müller, the former German chancellor, relative to his activity among the French socialists at Paris late in July, 1914. The report was made upon his return, in a party caucus, and was one of the important bases for the attitude of the Social Democrats on the morning of August 3 when the discussion of the war credits came up. Hermann Müller later recorded his report. According to this he spoke as follows to the French socialists concerning the situation in Germany:

The German socialists are accustomed to tell their government the truth in the sharpest manner. We are notorious for this in the Internationale. Recently we publicly rebuked the government most sternly because prior to the sending of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia it did not sufficiently concern itself with this question, which affected Germany too. But that is a matter which can now no longer be changed; at the present moment the greatest danger threatens from St. Petersburg. If the Pan Slav war party succeeds in effecting the general Russian mobilization, war will be inevitable. We are firmly convinced that William II and Bethmann Hollweg are earnestly working for peace. During the past week I have been in Central



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and South Germany, after the Austrian ultimatum has become generally known and war is a possibility. But nowhere did I hear a harsh word against France. The opinion prevails in Germany, and is common throughout our party, that Russia would be to blame if a world war broke out at the present time. France can prevent this by bringing sufficient pressure to bear in St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace.<sup>25</sup>

This appraisal of the facts was absolutely correct and proves that in 1914 there was certainly no reason for the German leaders to plunge Europe in universal war because of a fear of the rising tide of democracy.

Since the authors of the memorandum are all still living, with the exception of Professor Max Weber, Heidelberg (died 1920), and, as is generally known, follow the question of war guilt with the greatest interest, it would have been logical for the authors of the ultimatum to ask them for an expression concerning the use of their memorandum for motivating a thesis of the ultimatum. Privy Councilor Professor Hans Delbrück, who died in the summer of 1929, the oldest of the authors of the German memorandum, was kind enough to make the following remarks to the writer in an interview:

The reference of the ultimatum to the German memorandum is so devoid of sense that it really requires no refutation. What the four reporters in their striving to determine the pure objective truth admitted was that the Germans made mistakes not only during the last moments but also farther back. This general admission can not be brought into harmony with the claim of the ultimatum, viz. that Germany brought on the war in order to acquire world domina-

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tion. Besides, the sentences quoted from our memorandum are directly preceded by the assertion that the mistakes made were "not at all in the nature of premeditating war." Of course the reporters did not agree as to what the most serious mistakes of German policy had been. One stressed one factor, another a different factor. I for my part saw the principal mistake in the construction of battleships and in the plan of war with the invasion of neutral Belgium, an act which necessarily drove England to take the side of the Entente. But that is something quite different from a striving for world dominion, and in a certain sense it is quite the opposite thereof. For the expenditure of such great sums for a fleet which was after all not strong enough to be a match for the British fleet, and the consequent insufficient development of the army are proofs that Germany had no aggressive intentions. The march through Belgium was nothing but an act of desperation, because the general staff believed that it could not carry on a victorious war in any other way. Other members of the Commission, if I remember correctly, saw the principal mistakes of German policy in the Eastern policy and in the relation to Austria. But that is beside the point.

These mistakes, wherever you seek them, have not the slightest connection with any antithesis of aristocracy and democracy, such as the ultimatum would construe from our memorandum. Germany was the first large country in Europe which introduced the general, equal, secret and direct ballot in connection with the freedom of the press and the right of free assembly. It had a sound equilibrium between this democratic popular representation and the monarchy. The mistakes which were made were the fault of the Reichstag quite as much as they were the fault of the government. For that very reason it was so difficult for Herr von Bethmann to relieve the tensions which were present. To use our memorandum in

order to wish to show that Germany unleashed a war for the purpose of stemming the growing tide of democracy is to do violence to the text as well as to the meaning thereof. All four reporters agreed absolutely that the claim of the hostile entente, viz. that Germany was seeking world hegemony through the war, is untrue.

We have here an illuminating example of how one untruth begets another. The lie that Germany brought on the war could not be made plausible to the peoples of the world if it was not bolstered with the claim that it was the ambition of the military monarchy which committed this crime. It was necessary to continue spinning lies and to make it appear that Germany was an autocracy. The Reichstag had to be erased from the picture, and nothing was said about the fact that the Reichstag had unanimously voted the war credits. In France on the other hand Jaurès had to be got out of the way by murder so as to suppress the opposition against the war policy of Poincaré.<sup>26</sup>

In another part of the ultimatum it is alleged that Germany opposed the entire current of democratic progress and international friendship in the world. This claim too is sufficiently answered by the above remarks of Privy Councilor Delbrück. The fact that Germany did not close the door to international friendship appears from the circumstance that Germany was represented in the Interparliamentary Union like any other European country, and that she also adhered to the international agreements made at Geneva and The Hague. But in the next chapter we shall have to discuss this point in greater detail because the ultimatum contains similar allegations in other passages.

## 5. TREATMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Both in the ultimatum and in the covering note there are various passages from which it appears that the Entente charges Germany with having caused the war through her conduct of international affairs.

In the ultimatum the rulers of Germany, it is said, "were restlessly sowing suspicion and hostility among all her neighbours, were conspiring with every element of unrest in every land."

In the formulation of this charge we must first of all emphasize its extreme generality. "Restlessly" Germany sowed suspicion among "all" her neighbours with "every" element of unrest in "every" land. It is surprising that "all" Germans are not charged with this crime; this would make it one hundred percent nonsensical. But since we have made it our duty to consider even the most inane charges of the war guilt thesis of Versailles, we must oppose this charge too with a few objective remarks.

As so often in the case of the allied charges, the situation is just the opposite of what it is described to be. During the twenty-five years preceding the World War Germany concluded a large number of treaties with her neighbours which prove conclusively that the "rulers of Germany" were eager to bring about a peaceful settlement of interests in the event of international disputes.

We remind the reader of the Heligoland-Zanzibar treaty of 1890, whereby the island of Zanzibar facing German East Africa was traded to England for Heligoland.

In 1898 there was a treaty concluded between Germany and England on the Portuguese colonies in Africa. The

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treaty assured Germany Angola in case Portugal was forced to sell her colonies on account of financial difficulties. But the value of this treaty was lost to Germany when England, through additional agreements in the so-called Windsor Treaty, guaranteed the maintenance of the Portuguese colonies and thereby made it impossible for these colonies to be sold to Germany. If one of the two contracting parties to these political negotiations had any reason to be suspicious, it was certainly Germany and not Great Britain.

In the following year another treaty was concluded between Germany and Great Britain concerning the partition of the Samoa Islands. In this the United States was also interested. In 1900 Germany and Great Britain made the Yangtse agreement to assure to each other the integrity of China. In 1901 there was an agreement between Germany and Great Britain on the delimitation of the territory between Lake Njassa and Lake Tanganyika in East Africa. And as late as June 15, 1914, the Bagdad agreement between Germany and Great Britain was made; and another treaty on the partition of the Portuguese colonies, which was essentially a revision of the aforementioned treaty of 1898, was about to be concluded.

But in her dealings with France, too, Germany showed that she was far from sowing distrust and was constantly ready to live at peace with her revengeful neighbour. The Algeiras conference of 1906 which determined the European spheres of influence in Morocco, the agreement with France of February, 1909, whereby Germany recognized the existing political interests of France in Morocco, and finally the Morocco-Camerun treaty of November, 1911, which contained Germany's definitive renunciation

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of Morocco in return for an unimportant territorial extension in Camerun, show to what extent the "rulers of Germany" were eager to dissipate the suspicion which confronted Germany and to avoid a war even at the cost of renouncing rightful interests.

Even though in 1890 Germany did not renew the re-insurance treaty because the successors of Bismarck considered the system of alliances of the great chancellor too complicated, yet the Russian policy of Germany consistently reveals the striving to cultivate the traditional friendship existing toward the eastern neighbour and to strengthen it. During and after the Russo-Japanese war the German government did everything in its power to revive an alliance with Russia. And when the Treaty of Björkoe which was based more upon deceptive hopes than upon realities dissolved despite the signature of the Tsar of all the Russians, this was due to distrust sowed in Paris. The fruits were harvested at St. Petersburg in 1917. The agreement of 1911 between Germany and Russia concerning Persia, the meeting of the Emperor and the Tsar in Baltischport in June, 1912, and the conversations in Potsdam and St. Petersburg are further proofs for the endeavour of the German government to make its relations with the Russian neighbour friendly.

That Germany was not only eager to come to agreements with her neighbours in multifarious matters but also strove for a spirit of trustful co-operation among the nations in conflicts which did not concern Germany directly, is shown by the London conference of ambassadors in 1912-1913 which aimed at a settlement of the Balkan conflicts. Grey, who presided at this conference, was so impressed by the course taken by the conference that he

regrets in his memoirs that the London Conference or similar machinery does not exist as a permanent institution for settling future disputes in the Balkans. In spite of his friendly co-operation with the German ambassador during the conference in London Grey did not hesitate barely half a year later to withhold consciously and intentionally from the German Government the existence of an Anglo-Russian naval convention which was about to come into force. This he did despite direct inquiries on the part of Germany at the Foreign Office. In this case Grey did not tell a direct lie, but practically his evasive reply was equivalent to a lie. Certainly Grey's answer helped to instil in the German Government a justified distrust toward England, for the German Government had been confidently informed that negotiations were going on between England and Russia for the purpose of effecting a naval agreement.

Despite this deception of Germany, proved as a fact today and admitted by Grey himself in his memoirs, in a matter which threatened the security of Germany, the authors of the ultimatum had the effrontery to say at another point that Germany under the influence of Prussia was the champion of deception, intrigue and cruelty in the treatment of international affairs.

We shall cite a few other examples to show how international affairs were treated by the other Great Powers and what Germany's attitude was. In 1895 the English prime minister Lord Salisbury proposed the consideration of the partition of Turkey. This proposal, which was directed against the very existence of the Turkish Empire, was rejected by Germany. In 1900 Russia and France proposed to Germany a joint intervention in Lon-

don in favour of the Boers. Germany did not participate. When in 1901 England invited Germany to take joint action against the establishment of a French protectorate in Morocco, the proposal was not accepted by Germany.

We select one more case from the July crisis which shows how the other side tried to deceive Germany. We refer to the dishonest attitude of the Russian chief of staff Januchkewitch in his dealings with the German military attaché Major von Eggeling. After the war Eggeling wrote about it as follows: <sup>27</sup>

On July 29 at 3 P. M. I had the well-known interview with Januchkewitch in which on behalf of the minister of war he repeated the latter's assurance of the 26th that only a partial mobilization against Austria was intended and that the Tsar desired no mobilization against Germany; that peaceful intentions continued to exist toward Germany, that no reservist had been called in, that not a single horse had been conscripted. This statement was given to me upon his word of honour. Later in the Suchomlinoff trial Januchkewitch is reported to have remarked that he could well give me that assurance because at that hour he still had the signed ukas in his portfolio. And so it was in truth. Now let the world judge the value of this word of honour.

To-day we know, thanks to the valuable disclosures of Dobrorolski, what orders they were which he had in his portfolio. Up to now—due to the confused testimony at the Suchomlinoff trial—there have been doubts on that point. It was the order for the general mobilization!

On the basis of the reports which had come to me at that time I described the words of the chief of staff, in my telegraphic report, as an attempt to mislead us.



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The covering note continues:

They never ceased to expand German armaments by land and sea, and to propagate the falsehood that this was necessary because Germany's neighbours were jealous of her prosperity and power. They sought to sow hostility and suspicion instead of friendship between nations.

The necessity of German armaments on land and sea has been revealed under the heading of "Militarism," so that we may now limit ourselves to the conviction held by Germany, here described as false, that "Germany's neighbours were jealous of her prosperity and power."

The deeper causes for the unfriendly attitude of England lay precisely in the economic rivalry and in the fear of Germany's growing importance in the world as manifested in the naval and commercial fleet and in the growth of German industry.

Since the conclusion of the entente cordiale in 1904 England expressed ever more clearly her endeavour to hold Germany in check through her friendly relations with France. More than once her responsible leaders declared that England sees in Germany her most dangerous political and economic competitor. In 1905 the admiral of the British fleet, Lord Fisher, approached the King of England with the proposal, repeated in 1908, to utilize the superiority of the British fleet and to prepare for the German fleet the same fate which had befallen the Danish fleet before Copenhagen. This he proposed to do by attacking the German vessels in the midst of peace and at the same time landing an army in Pomerania. Though the King of England did not consent to this, yet the spirit

which pervaded the British navy made it necessary for Germany to arm herself as well as she could so as to curtail as soon as possible the risk of a British attack.

Very candidly Lloyd George declared on July 29, 1908, that the German distrust of England is much easier to understand than England's distrust of Germany; that England herself brought this about; that England had an overwhelming superiority on the sea which protected her from any conceivable enemy; that this did not suffice; that the English began to build dreadnoughts, although they did not need them; that for the Germans the army had the same significance as the fleet had for the British, namely their only protection against a hostile invasion.<sup>28</sup>

Here Lloyd George himself admitted that the Germans were perfectly justified in distrusting their neighbours.

That this impression was also shared by the diplomats who were neutral in the Anglo-German issue is shown by various Belgian diplomatic reports which fell into German hands during the war. On October 27, 1905, the intelligent and well informed Belgian minister in Berlin, Baron Greindel, reported to his government:

The English hatred of Germany arises solely from the envy which the development of the German fleet, of German commerce, and of German industry call forth.<sup>29</sup>

Similarly though using softer words, the Belgian minister in London, Count de Lalaing, reported on May 24, 1907:

It is clear that official England is secretly pursuing a policy hostile to Germany, which aims at Germany's isolation; and that King Edward has not refrained

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from enlisting his personal influence in the service of this idea.<sup>30</sup>

What dangers Germany was threatened with after the annexionist crisis of 1908 is seen with surprising clearness in the new Austrian documents. Count Khevenhüller, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris, in a private letter dated November 11, 1908, wrote the following words to the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Aehrenthal, words that were to prove prophetic for 1914:

The conflict was actually there. I had meanwhile discovered from a most confidential source that England had given them here very pernicious advice. They wanted to drive France into war. Clemenceau and Pichon were told that the moment for the "revanche" had arrived and would never again be so favourable. Austria-Hungary, occupied on the Balkan front, could be of small help to Germany as an ally. Germany now stood alone against Russia, France and England. Means would be found to persuade Italy into withdrawing from her obligations as an ally. (*Austria-Hungary's Foreign Policy*, Vol. I, No. 550.)

Germany was aware of the frame of mind prevailing in the Entente camp, as is seen from a letter written by Count Aehrenthal to Berlin on Dec. 15, 1908. In this letter he says:

I learn from a reliable source of an utterance made by a person visiting Vienna who is an intimate friend of M. Clemenceau to the effect that King Edward during the past two months has been doing all he can to induce Clemenceau to give the Anglo-French *Entente* an aggressive point against Germany. (*Austria-Hungary's Foreign Policy*, Vol. I, No. 747.)

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To the credit of M. Clemenceau we must not neglect to add the following sentences:

Clemenceau is very bitter about this and has declared that he cannot follow English policy along this path but will have to think out ways and means of depriving the Anglo-French *Entente* of the aggressive tendency that King Edward would fain give it. Clemenceau is said to have even gone so far as to consider the eventuality of having to break with England should King Edward continue to wish to exploit French assistance for the satisfaction of his bellicose inclinations towards Germany. (*Austria-Hungary's Foreign Policy*, as above.)

The Belgian chief of staff Ducarne in his memorial on the defence of Belgium (1909) wrote as follows:

Without having to review once more the history of European politics during recent times, we see that for some years it has been expressing a definite tendency. And that appears to be the work of England in particular. By degrees and in secret England has striven to suffuse the political atmosphere with a sort of general but more or less outspoken hostility against Germany.<sup>31</sup>

A report of Greindel of December 6, 1911 is characteristic for the spirit which animated the Anglo-French entente:

Every one in England or France looks upon the entente cordiale as an offensive and defensive alliance against Germany. This is exactly in accord with the character which the late King of England wished to give it. The entente cordiale was not based upon the positive foundation of the protection of mutual inter-

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ests but rather upon the negative foundation of hatred toward the German Empire.<sup>32</sup>

A report of the Russian ambassador in London, Count Benckendorff, dated February 25, 1913, relative to the results of the London conference of ambassadors for the settlement of the Balkan question, shows very clearly how the attitude of the French government shortly before the last crisis was judged. In this report Benckendorff expresses his conviction:

that among all the Powers, France is the only one which, I do not go so far as to say, desires war, but would, nevertheless, regard it without great regret. In any case, there has been nothing to show me that France is taking any active part in working for a compromise. Now, a compromise means peace; beyond that compromise lies war.<sup>33</sup>

To what extent Poincaré, who since 1912 conducted the political affairs of France in an almost autocratic manner, was animated by the idea of revenge, was revealed by him in October, 1920, in the *Revue de l'Université*:

In my school years my thoughts, made gloomy by the defeat, continually traversed the frontier which the Frankfurt peace had imposed upon us, and when I came down from my metaphysical clouds I conceived the sole purpose of life for my generation to be the hope of recovering our lost provinces.<sup>34</sup>

In the conduct of the Russian government during the decade before the outbreak of the war, the hostility toward Germany was less apparent than it was in England and France. Only during the last two years before the

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beginning of the war this political tendency was strengthened in Russia. The success of the Balkan states against Turkey and especially the growth of Serbian power favoured the desire among the Russians to destroy Austria's position in the Balkan peninsula and revived the old dream of the conquest of Constantinople. The Russian rulers knew very well that this objective could be attained only by the defeat of Germany and Austria. In the special Russian conference for solving the question of the straits, on February 8, 1914, Sazonov himself felt

that it could not be assumed that our operations against the straits would pass without a general European war.<sup>35</sup>

We have now seen that primarily England but also France and Russia looked upon the success and power of Germany before the war with envy and malice, and that Germany had every reason to prepare for coming events. It was Germany's most serious mistake that she did not do so sufficiently.<sup>36</sup>

We turn again to the ultimatum, where we read in another place:

It is not the purpose of this Memorandum to traverse the diplomatic history of the years preceding the war, or to show how it was that peace-loving nations of Western Europe were gradually driven, under a series of crises provoked from Berlin, to come together in self-defence. Autocratic Germany, under the inspiration of her rulers, was bent on domination. The nations of Europe were determined to preserve their liberty.

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And in the covering note the policy of Germany responsible for bringing about the war is described as aggressive and as sowing discord.

In these charges too we find merely assertions; the authors of the ultimatum did not make the slightest effort to cite facts in support thereof. If the authors had taken the trouble to enumerate the wars which were "provoked" by Germany and which forced the Allies to join in defence, they would have been driven to the conclusion that such wars cannot be found in the annals of the world's history. It is interesting in the accusation that the authors of the ultimatum speak only of the peaceful nations of western Europe. The ally of 1914, Russia, is simply passed over in silence, probably because the authors of the ultimatum were of the opinion that after all the Russo-Japanese war had not been quite forgotten. For if this war was provoked by any European Power, the tracks lead not to Berlin but rather to London, where in 1902 the Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded.

Considering the other wars immediately prior to 1914, we soon recognize that it is impossible to represent them as having been provoked by Berlin. The Tripolis War of 1911 between Italy and Turkey was the immediate consequence of the seizure of Morocco by France, since the Italians felt impelled as a result thereof to pocket their own booty which they had been assured by the Franco-Italian treaty of 1902. Germany had nothing whatsoever to do with the affair, except that it was very embarrassing for the German Government to see its ally Italy acting so brutally toward Turkey, which to Germany was a friendly nation.

The Tripolis war impelled the Balkan wars, which again were not provoked by Germany. Rather were they a consequence of the Balkan alliance formed under Russian protection and approved by France. During his visit to St. Petersburg in August, 1912, Poincaré himself styled this convention as a "convention de guerre."<sup>37</sup>

Hence we see that in the years preceding the World War it was not Germany which acted as the instigator of an aggressive policy of sowing discord, but that it was the other Great Powers that in the interest of their own expansion provoked wars or themselves waged wars.

#### 6. GERMANY'S ATTITUDE IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND SERBIA

In the ultimatum of the Allies of June 16, 1919, as well as in the covering note accompanying the ultimatum, there are several charges dealing with the attitude of Germany during the conflict between Austria and Serbia. We have, for the purpose of refutation, divided these accusations into five points.

According to the ultimatum the immediate cause for the war was the decision

deliberately taken by those responsible for German policy in Berlin and their confederates in Vienna and Budapest, to impose a solution of a European question upon the nations of Europe by threat of war and, if the other members of the concert refused this dictation, by war itself instantly declared.

The German memorandum indeed admits without reserve the accuracy of this view. The Serbian question was not, and never could have been, purely an Austro-Hungarian question. It affected Germany. It



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affected all the Great Powers. It was essentially a European question, for it involved the control of the Balkans, and therefore concerned the peace, not only of the Balkans, but of the whole of Europe. It was impossible to isolate it, and the authors of the ultimatum of July 23 knew that it could not be isolated.

The interpretation here expressed by the Allies is of fundamental importance, for only if the other Powers, especially Russia, are unreservedly assigned the right, as is here done, to intervene in the Austro-Serbian conflict, can justification be found for the Russian mobilization measures which made the conflict a European affair.

Hence the commission at Versailles tried especially hard to represent the Austro-Serbian conflict as a "European question." We shall first consider the motivation of this claim, which is fabricated around the assertion that the Austro-Serbian conflict "endangered the control of the Balkans and hence concerned not only the peace of the Balkans but also that of all Europe." To this we may say the following.

In 1908 Austria-Hungary, by pursuing the tracks of a waning Turkish imperialism, incorporated additional parts of an alien national body politic, South Slavia, which felt drawn to its own race as soon as the Serbs gained strength and prestige. The dismemberment of these parts of the Turkish state, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina, and their assimilation to the Dual Monarchy, were doubtless a European question which concerned not only Turkey but also the neighbouring Great Power, Russia. But in 1909 this matter was closed so far as international law was concerned, though to the disadvantage of Serbians and not to the advantage of Russia, which

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was cheated out of the possession of the Dardanelles as a result of the attitude of the British.

Hereupon the territorial relations of the Balkan states were newly though not happily regulated by the Balkan wars of 1912–1913. But the status of the Balkan states with regard to the neighbouring European states had not yet been consolidated. Thus Bulgaria had not chosen between the two groups of powers incorporated in the Dual Alliance and Triple Alliance, and the swerving of Roumania to the Russian side had not yet been completed.

The unsettled situation in the Balkans was clearly recognized by Russia and France and led to a retention of the Balkan policy which these two Great Powers had uniformly observed since the autumn of 1912. After the Balkan wars this policy aimed to abolish, to the advantage of Russia and France, the existing split of the Balkan states into two groups, Turkey and Bulgaria on the one hand, and the two Serbian states, Greece and Roumania on the other hand.

Austria also realized the danger threatening the Dual Monarchy as a result of a continued successful Balkan policy on the part of the Dual Alliance, and was on the point of suggesting to Germany her intentions of altering her Balkan policy. This suggestion culminated in the plan to win Bulgaria, even at the risk of seeing Roumania, considered as an uncertain joint ally, go over entirely to the other camp. The reasons for this new Balkan policy were stated in a detailed memorandum.<sup>38</sup>

But it also appears from this memorandum that the Dual Monarchy before the assassination had neither aggressive intentions against Serbia nor planned any territorial modifications in the Balkans. On the other hand the

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Dual Monarchy was with good reason convinced that Serbia "would agree under Russian pressure to pay an adequate price in Macedonia for the entrance of Bulgaria into an alliance aimed against the Monarchy and striving for the acquisition of Bosnia and of the neighbouring regions."<sup>39</sup>

Despite all these offensive endeavours of Russia the Dual Monarchy had only the desire to preserve its own possessions and its prestige in the Balkans.

This phase of a quiet, one might say diplomatic development of the situation in the Balkans was suddenly interrupted, not quite unexpectedly, by the assassination at Serajevo. The seriousness of the crime, which cost the heir to the throne and the Duchess of Hohenburg their lives, and robbed Austria of her future and most capable leader, as well as the obvious connection with the Pan Serbian propaganda conducted from Belgrade, made it impossible for the Dual Monarchy to limit its activities against Serbia necessary for the maintenance of Austria-Hungary to the ordinary diplomatic steps. The situation required a stern attitude against the untrustworthy, unscrupulous and instigative neighbour.

Though it was impossible prior to the decisive step on July 5, 1914, to prove "the complicity of the Serbian government," the authorities had no doubt that the policy of Belgrade which aimed at "the union of all South Slavs under the Serbian flag" had furthered the crime and that the continuance of this condition signified a constant menace to the dynasty and to the lands of the Austrian crown.<sup>40</sup>

The passage in Wiesner's report on the investigation in Serajevo, discovered after the war, could not alter this

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basic political view. It is usually overlooked that Wiesner's investigation was concerned more with the juridical motivation of given demands upon the Serbian government and not with a basis for the procedure *per se*.

The demands of the ultimatum, which concerned in the main a clearing up of the crime upon Serbian territory, and a creation of guarantees which would make a continuation of the criminal propaganda impossible, were therefore a purely internal Austrian affair. If we do not recognize this, we deprive a sovereign state of the right to act independently in matters of foreign policy. And it should not be overlooked that in order to judge the Austrian procedure of 1914 it is necessary to consider the then prevailing mode of procedure and not to measure the practises of 1914 by the standards prevailing now.

This conception of the sovereign rights of a state was held by public opinion in England in 1914 and at first it was shared also in a certain sense by the Foreign Office.<sup>41</sup> Thus the new British minister for Belgrade, des Graz, received from Sir Edward Grey on July 2 the following sensible instructions which unfortunately could no longer be carried out.<sup>42</sup>

I also said that I had told Mr. des Graz, who was proceeding to Belgrade at the end of this week as our Minister there, that it was not our business to take violent sides in this matter, and that what he could say in Belgrade must depend upon what case the Austrians presented. If they proved that the plot to assassinate the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had been prepared and organized on Servian territory, and that Austria had real grounds of complaint against Servia, it would be possible for him to urge in Belgrade that the Servian Government really ought to give to Austria the ut-

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most assurances they could for the prevention of such plots against Austria being carried on in Servia in future.

The same thought is revealed by Sir Edward Grey on the 24th in his telegram to the British chargé in Belgrade. Here he wrote: <sup>43</sup>

It seems to me that Servia ought certainly to express concern and regret that any officials, however subordinate, should have been accomplices in murder of the Archduke, and promise, if this is proved, to give fullest satisfaction.

As late as the 27th Grey expressed himself to Count Mensdorf as follows: If the Austrian government can "make war upon Serbia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good." With these words Grey certainly meant that he looked upon the Serbian question as a Russian question, at the most, and not as a European affair. In this connection we should remember that Count Berchtold expressly obligated himself to settle by negotiations any differences with Russia arising out of the Austro-Serbian conflict.<sup>44</sup>

But it must be admitted that the Austro-Serbian conflict in 1914 might have developed into a "European question" if for instance the views expressed in the ministerial council on July 19 concerning the diminution of Serbia in favour of other Balkan states had been carried out.<sup>45</sup> But as appears from the interview of Berchtold with the Russian chargé on July 24,<sup>46</sup> these plans were abandoned when Russia with her partial mobilization began her armed intervention and carried it so far in agreement with her French ally and with the approval of Eng-

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land, that the Austro-Serbian conflict became one of European proportions. Consequently the responsibility for the fact that the Austro-Serbian conflict grew into a European question and later into a world war lies primarily with Russia, France and England because when they intervened they erroneously believed that Austria's action against Serbia opened a European question. In reality it was only a punitive campaign of a Great Power against a state which had violated in a criminal manner the vital interests of a neighbouring state.

The statement of the judges at Versailles that the authors of the Austrian ultimatum knew that the Austro-Serbian question could not be isolated is unqualifiedly erroneous. It goes without saying that Austria and Germany too could not overlook the possibility of the intervention of Russia. But in the beginning it could certainly not be foreseen at what stage of the conflict this would occur and with what means Russia would effect this intervention. For example Count Pourtalès in his telegram of July 25<sup>47</sup> still says that Russia would probably not resort to arms until Austria attempts "to acquire territory at the expense of Serbia. The expressed desire to Europeanize the question also seems to point to the fact that immediate intervention on the part of Russia is not to be anticipated." The message of Count Pourtalès on the conversation of the German military attaché with Suchomlinoff on July 27<sup>48</sup> seemed to indicate that in case Austria invaded Serbian territory, Russia would mobilize only against Austria and not against Germany. And even when Major von Eggeling asked why Russia would mobilize against Austria, the only answer was a shrug of the shoulders and a reference to the diplomats.

On the basis of such reports the Berlin Government was certainly justified in regarding the situation as less dangerous than it was in reality and than it turned out to be. We shall not decide here to what extent the excessive optimism of the embassy at St. Petersburg was at fault and how far the duplicity of the Russian government is to be blamed.

Of course the attitude of Russia also depended largely upon the view of France and England, and this could not be foreseen early in July. Nor could Berlin know on July 5, when the definite decisions were reached, to what extent Austria would succeed, prior to sending the ultimatum to Serbia, in finding evidence to justify her procedure from the point of view of the outside world.

That the Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg was of the opinion that Austria had no intention of "swallowing Serbia" is clearly expressed in his telegram of July 28 to Lichnowsky, where he wrote: <sup>49</sup>

Sir Edward's assumption that Austria's object is the overthrow of Serbia seems to me to be all the less reasonable, inasmuch as she has expressly declared to Russia that she is looking for no territorial acquisition and that she would not infringe upon the right to existence of the Serbian Kingdom, a declaration that did not fail to make an impression on Russia. Austria intends—and it is not only her right but her duty—to secure herself against the continuation of the undermining of her own existence through the Greater-Serbia propaganda, which finally resulted in the crime of Serajevo.

That in Austria too the good but false impression prevailed that for the present Russia would not interfere is

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seen in the fact that on July 25 the Austrian mobilization was effected according to plans foreseeing only a war in the Balkans.<sup>50</sup> If Austria had planned war against Russia from the beginning, she would of course have taken the measures which looked toward mobilization against Russia. But the fact is that in 1914 Austria had to delay her advance in Galicia against the mobilizing Russian corps because she had not from the beginning counted upon the armed intervention of Russia. That the hope that Russia might remain neutral had by no means been abandoned by people at the Ballhausplatz but was still counted upon even after the measures planned is plainly seen from a private letter of Count Hoyos to the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Stockholm, dated 22. 7. 1914:

If Russia remains neutral now, in the event of our having to take action against Serbia, the entire campaign directed towards the formation of a Balkan combine against us will collapse, and it will then become possible for us to secure a lasting peace in the Balkans, so that for decades to come the peace of Europe will have nothing to fear from the South East. Russia, too, should a decision in favour of neutrality be taken in St. Petersburg, will be obliged to break away from the Pan-Slav movement, with the result that Russian policy will be directed into quieter channels, more likely to guarantee the preservation of world peace. If on the other hand, Russia takes the sword in her hand, it will be proved beyond a doubt that she identifies herself with the Pan-Serbian movement and that this movement is actually only part of a plan of aggression, mapped out on a big scale, to the realisation of which Russia, as soon as her important armaments were completed, would have proceeded even without provocation. For this reason we are con-



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vinced that a frank settlement of accounts with Serbia will not only make for the security of our dynasty and the integrity of the monarchy but will also be in the interests of European stability and peace, which appears to be continually threatened by the aggressive plans of Russia and its Balkan clients.<sup>50a</sup>

The Allies see another evidence of guilt in the fact that the German government empowered its ally "to endeavour to solve the Austro-Serbian question on its own initiative and by war."

The very fact that Germany left to the Dual Monarchy the initiative for settling the conflict and the mode of execution, and the fact that Germany consented to the change in her Balkan policy requested by a special mission in Potsdam on July 5, and gave renewed assurance of her good faith as an ally—these are signs that Germany wished the Austro-Serbian conflict to be considered less a European matter and rather an affair concerning Austria alone.<sup>51</sup>

On the other hand it must be admitted that in the authorization given to Austria by the German government in the conduct of the former toward Serbia, there was a misconception of the possibility that, with the overtense situation, the Austro-Serbian conflict would soon be made a European affair by Russia. But it is an attenuating circumstance that at the beginning Russia's preparedness for war was not realized and that it was felt that she would consider an appeal to arms before actually striking. The only fear was that Russia would instigate the other Powers of the Triple Entente against the Dual Monarchy and would feed the fire in the Balkans.<sup>52</sup>

Then too the solidarity of the Romanoff dynasty and

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the house of Hohenzollern, counted upon with confidence, naturally played a part in the judgment of Russia's probable attitude.<sup>53</sup> How well founded this view was has not only become a lesson of the war for crowned heads but is also a thought once expressed very drastically by King Edward VII. After the assassination of the Serbian king and his consort in 1903 he said to the Russian and Italian ambassadors that a certain bond of collegiality had existed between him and King Alexander; that they both had the vocation of a king, and that they both belonged to this "artisan's guild." And a member of a guild, he went on to say, cannot be apathetic when somewhere another member of the same guild is murdered.<sup>54</sup>

The ultimatum states that the German Government "supported the rejection, without consideration, of the extraordinary concessions made by Serbia to the insolent and intolerable demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government. It supported the mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army and the initiation of hostilities."

The claim that the German Government supported the rejection of the Serbian reply without consideration is not true. The note was rejected by the Austrian minister in Belgrade, Baron von Giesl, when it was presented, and this without further consideration. The German Government did not even have an opportunity to express its opinion to Austria on the Serbian reply. Hence it is impossible to speak of supporting the rejection, so far as the German Government is concerned.

The Serbian reply did not become known in the Foreign Office at Berlin until July 27. On the same day it was brought to the attention of Emperor William. On the morning of the 28th the Emperor in a letter to the Secre-

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were wired to Vienna, arriving in the German embassy there at 4.30 A. M. of the 29th.

It follows very clearly from the following words of this telegram of the Chancellor that at this time the German Government neither expected hostilities to begin nor approved such hostilities: <sup>57</sup>

According to the statements of the Austrian General Staff, an active military movement against Serbia will not be possible before the 12th of August. As a result, the Imperial Government is placed in the extraordinarily difficult position etc.

The allegation that Germany supported the mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army can therefore, according to the facts set forth, refer only to the Austrian partial mobilization which was ordered at 9:30 P. M. on July 25. The mobilization affected the eight army corps against Serbia and Montenegro and some additional troops.<sup>58</sup> It was not only a means of enforcing Serbia's basic change of attitude toward Austria-Hungary, considered necessary by the latter,<sup>59</sup> but also represented a protection against the Serbian army, the mobilization of which had unofficially begun on the 24th,<sup>60</sup> while the official order was given on the afternoon of the 25th, a few hours before the expiration of the ultimatum. There is no evidence that Germany influenced Austria to take this natural step; indeed, this would have been superfluous.

But we must still answer the harsh reproach of the judges at Versailles that the demands of Austria were insolent and intolerable. We shall here not examine in detail all the demands of the Austrian ultimatum but shall restrict ourselves to those which were refused by Serbia.

We are probably correct in assuming that it was these in particular which seemed insolent and intolerable to the members of the Commission.

Point 5 demanded of the Serbian Government:

to agree that in Serbia organs of the Imperial and Royal Government should take a part in the suppression of the subversive movement against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy.<sup>61</sup>

To this the Serbian Government had answered evasively:

The Royal Government must state that it cannot fully comprehend the meaning and import of that demand of the Imperial and Royal Government which asks the Royal Government to bind itself to admit upon its territory the cooperation of organs of the Imperial and Royal Government. But it declares that it is ready to agree to every cooperation which would be in keeping with the principles of international law and of civil law, as well as with those of friendly neighbourly relations.<sup>62</sup>

The Austrian Government commented upon this point of the Serbian note as follows:

This question has no connection with general international law or with civil law. It is a matter of state police pure and simple which must be settled by means of special agreement. Hence the reservation of Serbia is unintelligible and in its vague general form would be apt to lead to unsolvable difficulties in the conclusion of the agreement to be reached.<sup>63</sup>

The most important point in the Austrian note was the sixth, wherein Serbia was expected:

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to institute a juridical investigation against those participants of the plot of June 28 who were upon Serbian territory. Organs delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government will take part in the investigations.<sup>64</sup>

This demand was flatly refused by the Serbian Government on the following grounds:

It goes without saying that the Royal Government considers it its duty to institute an investigation against all those persons who participated or are said to have participated in the plot of June 15/28 and who are in its territory. So far as the participation of specially designated organs of the Imperial and Royal Government in this investigation is concerned, it can not accept this since it would be a violation of the constitution and of the procedure of civil law. But in individual cases the Austro-Hungarian organs could be informed of the results of the investigation.<sup>65</sup>

To this the Austrian Government replied:

Our demand was quite clear and not to be misunderstood. We required 1. institution of a juridical investigation against the participants in the plot; 2. participation of Imperial and Royal organs in the investigations (*recherche* in contrast to *enquête judiciaire*); 3. it was not our intention to have Imperial and Royal organs take part in the Serbian court proceedings. These organs were merely to participate in the preliminary police investigations which were to procure the material for the investigation and make it secure.

If the Serbian Government misunderstands us here, it does so intentionally, for the difference between *enquête judiciaire* and simple *recherches* must be known to it.

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But since it wished to be rid of every control of the proceedings, which if conducted properly would have brought for it very embarrassing results,<sup>66</sup> and since it has no means of plausibly refusing the cooperation of our organs in the police proceedings (there are numerous analogies to such procedure), it has taken a stand which would give its refusal a semblance of justification and make our demand seem as if it could not be complied with.<sup>67</sup>

If we consider the matter dispassionately we must admit that precisely these demands were for Austria a *conditio sine qua non*, since only with the help of these demands was it possible for Austria to uncover the origin of the plot and to get a full satisfaction. Since we now know that the Serbian Government shares responsibility for the crime,<sup>68</sup> we must indeed admit that these demands were “intolerable” for the Serbian Government and perhaps also for the Russian Government. But this is so only for the reason that the investigations resulting therefrom would have proved the complicity of the Serbian Government with the assassins. This was, however, no fault of Austria, nor of Germany.

But to call it impudent, as the ultimatum does, that a state should demand from a neighbouring state the right to participate in the uncovering of a plot which took the life of its heir apparent, especially when for weeks the neighbouring state did not do a thing, and when it was generally recognized even in the foreign press that the threads of the crime went back to the Serbian capital—to assume such an attitude is tantamount to saying that the barriers between two states are also the barriers to right and morality.

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In the covering note to the ultimatum we find also the following charges concerning the attitude of Germany in the Austro-Serbian conflicts:

After completing its preparations for the war the German Government encouraged a subservient ally to declare war against Serbia at 48 hours' notice, knowing full well that a conflict involving a control of the Balkans could not be localized and almost certainly meant a general war.

There is absolutely no proof that the German Government "encouraged" Austria to declare war on Serbia. The plan of declaring war after the rupture of diplomatic negotiations was evolved by Austria and was done so as to eliminate the intervention of other powers before the conflict was settled. Germany's interest lay in seeing to it that Austria's action, deemed absolutely necessary by the latter, would be carried out as soon as possible. From the psychological point of view this was certainly correct.

The wish to send a declaration of war was prompted in Austria by the additional desire not to mobilize her army for a third time against Serbia, without the absolute necessity for mobilization, namely the resolution to make war.

Musulín, too, in his work *Das Haus am Ballplatz*,<sup>69</sup> which unfortunately is not well known abroad, says that the leaders of the Austrian army were not in favour of an "eventual" mobilization. Musulín recalls the statement of General Conrad: "A horse led up to the hurdle three times and then withdrawn will not take the hurdle." As Musulín remarks, Conrad meant by this that the spirit of an army is bound to be shaken if it is mobilized three times and no battle follows.

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The idea that Germany kept her ally subservient is not true. This would also contradict the above discussed charge of the super-wise judges at Versailles that the German Government authorized Austria to try to solve the problem on her own initiative.

Aside from the internal contradiction of these charges it appears from numerous documents that the German Government left it to Austria to settle the conflict independently. In contrast to the notion of the Allies we are inclined to consider it a mistake of the German Government that it did not force its ally to be more dependent upon it.

The insinuation of the Allies that Germany knew that it would be impossible to localize the war certainly does not apply to the initial stages of the crisis. In the first place we call attention to the carefree manner of the German Government, including the military and naval leaders, despite the fact that it had become known that Germany had given Austria a free hand in the settlement of her dispute. The Emperor started on his trip to the Northland. The Imperial Chancellor and the chief of staff were on vacation. The minister of war sent to the chief of staff a written communication in which he did not foresee any warlike encounter to which Germany would be a party.<sup>70</sup> Various orders of a military nature prove that in the responsible departments no war was contemplated.

If it is replied to this that it was done for the purpose of reassuring the opponent and of feigning peacefulness, this too would merely prove that such means were employed to prevent the intervention of the Great Powers in the Austro-Hungarian conflict, i. e. to localize the fire.



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Moreover the ultimatum goes on to say:

Only at the eleventh hour, when all chance of avoiding war had practically vanished, did the German Government counsel moderation on her ally. Even on this single point in Germany's favour, the Memorandum of the German delegates is forced to admit a doubt. "The reason," it says, "for the delay in the reply of the Cabinet at Vienna to this proposal is not known to us," and then they go on to say in words which are underlined: "This is one of the most vital points which still require elucidation." May it not be that, as was not uncommon with the German Foreign Office, unofficial communications or a previous understanding between those who had the real power, differed somewhat from the messages which traveled over the official wires.

Here the judges at Versailles are forced to admit that the German Government advised Austria to be moderate, though in the opinion of the judges too late. Of course, as we have seen, it was too late to keep Austria from declaring war upon Serbia. But it was not too late to persuade Austria to limit her action against Serbia, and it was certainly not too late to prevent the World War desired by the Allies in case of Austria's invasion of Serbia. Had the Russians still waited one or two days with their quite superfluous mobilization, the German pressure upon Vienna would have made itself felt, and the World War would at that time surely have been avoided.

Since it was obviously very embarrassing for the Versailles commission to have to admit the moderating influence of Germany upon Austria, and since it had no substantial arguments with which to force the German

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Government from this favorable position, it did not hesitate to resort to the aspersion that "as was not uncommon with the German Foreign Office, unofficial communications or a previous understanding between those who had the real power, differed somewhat from the messages which traveled over the official wires."

Since there is no proof for these suspicions, it is unnecessary to discuss them. An explanation therefor can be found in the possibility that the Quai d'Orsay assumed that the German Foreign Office employed the same methods as France has been shown to have used in the forgeries of the *French Yellow Book*.

How "favourable" Germany's cause is in this point can not be denied by argument, not even by the suspicions which we have just branded. From July 28 to July 30, the day before the general Russian mobilization became known, Berlin sent no fewer than nine telegrams to Vienna which had the ever more determined purpose of forcing Austria to moderation in view of the concessions of the Serbian reply and in the face of the growing danger of a European war.<sup>71</sup>

In these telegrams the German Government recommended that the conversations in St. Petersburg be resumed and that Lord Grey's proposal, to announce to Serbia the conditions after the occupation of Belgrade or of other places, be met. The temporary occupation of Belgrade was conceived by Germany as a pledge pending the fulfilment of the Austrian conditions and the establishment of guaranties.

How emphatic Germany's warnings were is seen from the words of the Chancellor in the telegram to Herr von Tschirschky, the German ambassador in Vienna:

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We are of course ready to fulfil the obligations of our alliance, but must decline to be drawn wantonly into a world conflagration by Vienna, without having any regard paid to our counsel.<sup>72</sup>

Since Austria made no reply to the various suggestions, Emperor William resorted to the diplomatically unusual means of sending a letter of warning to Emperor Francis Joseph.<sup>73</sup>

We feel that perhaps the reason for the intransigent attitude of Austria can be seen in the fact that as the result of insufficient military preparations Austria was not in a position to capture Belgrade without further ado and to hold it as a pledge. She was only in a position to draw up her troops subsequent to mobilization against Serbia, as provided by contingency B. In contrast to this actual inability on the part of Austria to occupy Belgrade immediately, the many false reports in the German and French press show that public opinion would have considered it a matter of course if the Austrian troops had taken possession of Belgrade without a struggle. Moreover the Anglo-German proposal was apparently not considered sufficient for reaching the desired objective which was deemed necessary.<sup>74</sup> But here the German Government could have taken the necessary steps and would surely have done so if Russia had allowed time.

In the attitude of Germany toward the Austro-Serbian conflict it may be possible today to detect many errors and instances of awkwardness. But it will never be possible to disprove Germany's intention to avoid the world war and to localize the conflict between Austria and Serbia. Germany's intention, expressed after the publication

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of the Serbian reply, to limit Austria's action against Serbia to the absolutely necessary measure of occupying Belgrade, is also irrefragable. These errors and instances of awkwardness are surely very insignificant when compared with the attitude of the opponents who were hardy enough to regard a limited military action of Austria against Serbia, with assurances that the sovereignty and integrity of the Kingdom would be preserved, as sufficient reason for bringing about a world war.

#### 7. REJECTION OF THE PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE

The Allies formulated their charge that Germany assumed an attitude of rejection toward proposals of mediation by saying in the ultimatum that the German Government "steadily rejected every proposal for conference, conciliation or mediation."

The fact that the English proposals of mediation met with no success is always cited by the Allies as one of the reasons why Germany is to blame for the war. Since in refuting the *Report* we have already dealt in detail with this point, it is unnecessary to discuss the reproach of the ultimatum again. We refer the reader to section IX on the four-power mediation, section XI on the rejection of the proposal of a conference, and section XII on the resumption of the four-power mediation.

Only in one point we shall supplement our view on the hopelessness of the proposal for a conference, and show that the Austro-Russian disagreement led to war not so much as a result of the impossibility of bringing about an understanding or of mediating, but rather because both

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sides had a firm and substantiated will to adhere to certain points.

The aggravation of the Austro-Russian disagreement finds its conclusion in the final negotiations between the Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg, Szápáry, and Sazonov, and in the conversations of Count Berchtold and the Russian ambassador in Vienna. Here we see, apart from the important incommensurable factors, what the real issues were.

Austria-Hungary was resolved to force compliance with her demands as formulated in the ultimatum and was not in a mood to "barter away" anything contained in the note.<sup>75</sup> In this attitude Austria was strengthened by the events after the presentation of the Serbian note. Among these were the mobilization of the Serbian army ordered a few hours prior to the rejection of the ultimatum, the information that the Serbian official Ciganovitch could allegedly not be found, and the assumption that Major Tankositch had been permitted to flee.<sup>76</sup> In the sequel the state of war with Serbia and the ensuing mobilization of the Russian army proved obstructions to a diplomatic understanding by means of a conference of ambassadors.

Austria on the other hand was ready to furnish Russia with comments on her ultimatum to Serbia and to negotiate with Russia on those points which required clarification between Austria and Russia after completion of the action against Serbia. Among these were the political demands which Austria had considered in the meeting of the ministerial council of July 19 over and above the ultimatum to Serbia. They amounted to a slight diminution of Serbia in favour of her Bulgarian neighbour.

Russia on the other hand unlike England was not pre-

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pared to permit an invasion of Serbia even for restricted military purposes. In this respect the Russian Government, pursuant to the agreements made between the Tsar and Poincaré, could declare itself in harmony with France. This follows from the understanding, veiled in sonorous clauses, which was made between the Tsar and Poincaré on the occasion of the visit of the latter in St. Petersburg.<sup>77</sup>

Thus there was an actual difference which at this state of incipient and automatically continuing mobilizations could hardly, so far as human vision is able to foresee, have been settled by means of a conference.

This must be considered in addition to the reasons advanced above, if we are to evaluate the charge that Germany's rejection of the conference was a factor in rendering war inevitable.

#### 8. THE FATAL ACT

In the ultimatum the Russian mobilization is described as "the immediate and necessary consequence of the mobilization of the Austrian army, and the declaration of war on Serbia." They are described as "both authorized by Germany. These were the fatal acts by which the decision was taken out of the hands of the statesmen and control transferred to the military."

In the first place the judgment of the Allies is impaired by the basic error of failure to specify which phase of the Russian mobilization it was that is described as the immediate and necessary consequence of the mobilization of the Austrian army, and the declaration of war against Serbia. From the reference to the declaration of war on

Serbia we may deduce that the partial Russian mobilization against Austria is meant. But the authors of the ultimatum overlook the fact that the original decision to order a partial mobilization of the Russian army was already made on July 24 by the ministerial council in St. Petersburg, after the publication of the ultimatum against Serbia. Here the ministers of war and navy were authorized, "in accordance with the duties of their offices, to beg your Imperial Majesty to consent, according to the progress of events, to order the mobilization of the four military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan, and the Baltic and Black Sea fleets." <sup>78</sup>

On the following day the Crown Council, with the Tsar presiding, held a meeting, wherein the decisions made on the previous day were "approved and further developed." It was decided "not to announce the mobilization for the present but to take all preparatory measures for its speedy completion in case of necessity." <sup>79</sup>

As appears from an order to the commandant of the district of Warsaw, the instruction was given on July 26 that the Tsar had directed that July 26 be considered "the beginning of the period of preparation for war in the entire region of European Russia." <sup>80</sup> The Russian "period of preparation for war" was a preliminary stage of the mobilization and embraced far-reaching military measures and measures of military policy. Even dislocations of cavalry formations connected with the operative measures were undertaken during the Russian period of preparation for war. <sup>81</sup>

Wilson, the American chargé in Russia, conceived the initiation of the period of preparation for war as so far-reaching a measure that in his cablegram of the 26th to

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Washington he reported hereon "that the Russian Government had ordered complete army mobilization to begin immediately." <sup>82</sup>

The significance of the initiation of the Russian period of preparation for war naturally gave good reason for the notion in the army, in all government offices, and among the people that the decision to make war had been made. Nor need it be pointed out that the war sentiment called forth by these measures had an effect even upon the highest authorities and that it was bound to weaken appreciably the already feeble will to peace. With good reason the chief of the Russian mobilization division, General Dobrorolski, in his well-known work on the Russian mobilization expresses this thought with the words that ever since July 25 the war "was already a foregone conclusion and that the whole flood of telegrams between the governments of Russia and Germany was only the *mise en scène* of an historical drama." <sup>83</sup>

Accordingly we see that the decision for ordering a partial mobilization, affecting the troops of the four military districts, in all about thirteen army corps, was reached late July 28 in a cabinet meeting with the Tsar presiding. <sup>84</sup> The troops were intended against Austria-Hungary. <sup>85</sup> To be sure the ultimate motive for this decision was Austria's declaration of war against Serbia, published in St. Petersburg at 7 P. M. of the 28th. Diplomatically this fact is expressed in Sazonov's telegram of July 28 to Berlin, London and Paris. <sup>87</sup>

But when the ultimatum states that the Austrian mobilization was one of the causes for the Russian decision to declare a partial mobilization, this statement cannot be recognized so far as the ministerial council of the 28th is



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concerned. There is no proof to show that on the 28th St. Petersburg had received reliable information concerning the Austrian mobilization. On the contrary we know that Sazonov merely received a telegram from the Russian consul general in Fiume declaring that "a state of siege had been declared in Slovenia, Croatia and Fiume, and that all reservists had been called up." <sup>88</sup>

Hence the Russian decision of July 28 to effect a partial mobilization is traceable solely to the declaration of war against Serbia. But now we must decide the question whether there was any immediate necessity for this grave measure on the part of the Russian Government.

From the military point of view mobilization measures on Russia's part would have been justified in consequence of Austria's declaration of war on Serbia if Russia's security had thereby been threatened. Attempts to justify the assertion that this was the case have been made on the ground that with the partial mobilization, ordered on the 25th to begin on the 28th, Austria made preparations for mobilization also in Galicia, that is on the Russian frontier. According to a detailed study of the Austrian Major-General Ferdinand Demus-Morau, chief of the first Imperial and Royal army corps in Galicia, no military measures were taken in Galicia "which could in any way have been interpreted as aggressive measures against Russia." <sup>89</sup> The British military attaché in Vienna also reported at 10 P. M. of the 28th: "Ist, Xth, XIth Galician corps not yet mobilized." <sup>90</sup>

Against Serbia the Austrians had mobilized eight army corps. The Russian general Daniloff himself admits that at least six army corps were necessary against Serbia.

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Since one of the mobilized Austrian corps was called as a protection against Italy, it is impossible to deduce from the mobilization of eight corps that the Austrian mobilization was directed against Russia. Moreover during a war-like engagement with Serbia Austria could not be looked upon as a particularly formidable opponent of Russia. Hence it was a constant concern of the German general staff "that Austria, bound with considerable parts of her army in the Balkans, would not be strong enough against Russia."<sup>91</sup>

The importance of this question during the July crisis appears from the report of Szápáry to Berchtold, wherein Szápáry tells Sazonov that he had heard<sup>92</sup> "that Russia felt reassured because we had mobilized eight corps for our partial mobilization against Serbia."<sup>93</sup> M. Sazonov said that not he, who knew nothing of it, but Tsar Nicholas had expressed this concern upon being informed by the general staff. I attempted to explain to the minister that even a military tiro could easily be convinced that our southern corps could signify no threat against Russia."

If we now ask ourselves whether in consequence of the Austrian partial mobilization it was likely that the Serbian army would in a short time be destroyed and that armed intervention by Russia would be necessary, it becomes clear that this question too may be answered negatively. It was surely known to Russia that the Austro-Hungarian army required about two weeks for its advance into Serbia.<sup>94</sup> The immediate danger of an attack against Belgrade, which was not prepared from a military point of view, had been removed or at least quite diminished through the destruction of the Save bridge during the

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night of July 28–29 by the Serbians.<sup>95</sup> Moreover not even the garrison of Belgrade was exposed to the danger of speedy annihilation since upon Russia's advice it had begun to retreat into the interior as early as the 25th. It should also be considered that on account of the impassable mountainous character of the country and the poor communications the Austrian operations were bound to be very slow. Of course all these facts were known to the Russian general staff.

Hence we reach the conclusion that Austria's declaration of war on the Belgrade Government and the partial mobilization of the Austrian army, directed solely against Serbia, cannot be considered measures calculated to justify the Russian decision for a partial mobilization on the 28th. In view of the immense danger which this measure had for the peace of Europe, and on account of the fact that Russia herself was not menaced in the slightest degree and had sufficient time and opportunity to intervene later in the Austro-Serbian conflict, the Russian order of partial mobilization was a fatal error and signified the first irreparable step toward a general war.

How hasty the decision for a partial mobilization was is seen from the circumstance that the military authorities at St. Petersburg did not even insist upon ordering the partial mobilization on the 28th but spent the 29th in persuading the Tsar to decree general mobilization and in making the necessary preparations for speedily carrying out the decree.<sup>96</sup> Finally the news of the bombardment of Belgrade, which reached St. Petersburg at 5 P. M.,<sup>97</sup> put an end to the hesitation as to what type of mobilization to decree and in connection with other reasons led to the decision to declare a general mobilization.<sup>98</sup>

The authors of the ultimatum make Germany share the responsibility for the declaration of war on Serbia and for the Austrian partial mobilization on the ground that these measures were permitted by Germany. Consequently we must determine the true facts of the case.

The news that Austria would make a declaration of war on Serbia arrived in Berlin at 4.37 P. M. of the 27th in a telegram of Tschirschky.<sup>99</sup> The telegram read as follows:

Telegram 113.

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

They have decided here to send out the declaration of war tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow at the latest, chiefly to frustrate any attempt at mediation.

Tschirschky.

When this telegram arrived the Serbian reply was not yet known in the Foreign Office. Not until the late afternoon of the 27th did the Serbian chargé Jovanovitsch hand the Serbian reply to Herr von Jagow.<sup>100</sup>

Naturally the news of the intended declaration of war was relegated to the background, and the chief attention of the Foreign Office was directed toward the Serbian reply. The note was read by the Emperor early on the 28th and led to the well-known holograph letter of the Emperor to the Secretary of State von Jagow, wherein the proposal was made that the Austrians should content themselves with the occupation of Belgrade, and that with this city as a pledge they should see their demands upon Serbia through.<sup>101</sup> The same proposal was made by Grey. The idea is expressed in Grey's cablegram to Sir Edward Goschen concerning his interview with Lichnowsky, dated July 29, and is worded as follows:

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It was of course too late for all military operations against Serbia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Serbia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.<sup>102</sup>

The necessary instructions were thereupon sent to Vienna.<sup>103</sup> The fact that this telegram does not discuss the declaration of war is probably explained by the circumstance that the chief weight was not laid upon the formal declaration of hostilities against Serbia but rather upon the conviction that the military action deemed necessary by Austria and approved by Germany in principle should be restricted to the occupation of Belgrade or several other places.

Austria's order for a partial mobilization was given without previous consultation in Berlin. It is obvious that Germany had no objection to this measure, which was limited to carrying out the action necessary against Serbia.

But what about the "fatal act"? Was this really the declaration of war against Serbia, or was it not rather the general Russian mobilization? The next section will serve to answer this question.

## 9. GERMANY'S DECLARATIONS OF WAR AGAINST RUSSIA AND FRANCE

The ultimatum contains the following charges on this score:

It is on the German statesmen that equally rests the responsibility for the hasty declaration of war on Russia, when Austria herself was apparently hesitating. . . .

Concerning the declaration of war on France the ultimatum says the following. The responsibility rests on the German statesmen

for the declaration of war on France. So great was the haste of the German Government that when no plausible reason could be found, allegations were invented, the complete falsity of which has long ago been demonstrated. The German Delegation now admits that the German Government "did not take the trouble to verify" the reported facts which they published as justifying the declaration of war.

For the sake of clearness in the examination of the events, we shall consider the declarations of war on Russia and France separately. But the reasons for these declarations must be grouped under a single heading since the two declarations have a causal connection.

The accusation found in the ultimatum, that in making the declaration of war against France Germany lacked plausible reasons and therefore invented some, will be considered in our examination of the events leading to the declaration of war on France.

In that connection we shall see whether it is true that "Austria herself was apparently hesitating" and that hence Germany's declaration of war on Russia increased the warlike spirit of Austria.

*The "Hasty" Declaration of War on Russia*

The Hague Convention on the Outbreak of Hostilities of October 18, 1907<sup>104</sup> has the following to say in §1 concerning the necessity of transmitting a declaration of war:

The Contracting Parties recognize that hostilities among them should not begin without a previous unequivocal notification which must have either the form of a declaration of war provided with reasons or that of an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.

The German Government in 1914 complied with the condition of this Convention which Germany had ratified. On July 31 at 3:30 P. M. an ultimatum was sent to Russia announcing that German mobilization would take place unless Russia desisted from every warlike measure against Germany and Austria-Hungary within twelve hours and made definite declarations on this subject. This ultimatum was presented at midnight of July 31. The twelve-hour period therefore expired at noon of August 1. A note was then despatched to St. Petersburg to Count Pourtalès on August 1 towards one o'clock in the afternoon authorizing the Ambassador to present a declaration of war should no satisfactory reply have been received in the meantime. The Note was presented on the same day at 5 o'clock in the afternoon (Central European time). As, however, the telegram arrived later, the communication concerning the declaration of war was only made at 6 o'clock (Central European time, 7 o'clock Russian time).

But we shall not restrict ourselves to these brief, purely formal statements in order to clear the reproach of "haste." We shall describe in detail the genesis of the declaration of war on Russia and cite and evaluate the reasons which were decisive for the decision.

At 11.40 P. M. of July 31 the official notification reached Berlin from the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, Count Pourtalès, that the general Russian mobilization was taking place.<sup>105</sup> July 31 was mentioned as the first day of mobilization. With this news the danger of war for Germany had become imminent, for it was known that prior to actual mobilization Russia had a so-called "period of preparation for war" which provided far-reaching preparations for mobilization. The publicly announced mobilization could therefore not be considered the beginning of the mobilization measures but represented a point at which the preparations for mobilization could no longer be secretly continued. Moreover it appeared from the telegram of the Tsar to Emperor William of July 30 that already five days ago, that is on July 25, Russia had given orders for mobilization measures. Accordingly Russia had won an important advantage the extent of which can hardly be calculated.

At noon the news of the general Russian mobilization was communicated by the Imperial Chancellor via telephone to the adjutant of the Emperor, Colonel von Mutius. At 1 P. M. the Emperor gave orders for a "state of threatening danger of war."<sup>106</sup> This state of threatening danger of war was not equivalent to mobilization but corresponded to the Russian period of preparation for war, though in many respects it was not as far-reaching as the latter.



The order of the general Russian mobilization, the importance of which we shall discuss below, was clear proof that Russia wanted war and that in view of the well-known contractual obligations between Russia and France, Germany suddenly was confronted by the necessity of a war on two fronts. The Russian measure, which menaced the security of the German Empire most seriously, and which was taken without any reason whatsoever so far as Germany was concerned, demanded a speedy clarification of the situation. Germany surely knew what Russia and her ally, France, had in mind. For *pourparlers* it was now too late. Definite demands had to be made so as to guard against further surprises. For this reason an ultimatum was sent to Russia at 3.30 P. M. of the 31st, and to her ally, France, there was transmitted a *démarche* with a time-limit.

The ultimatum to Russia was worded as follows:<sup>107</sup>

Telegram 153.

Urgent.

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

In spite of the still pending negotiations for mediation and although we ourselves have up to the present hour taken no mobilization measures of any kind, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy, thus against us also. For the security of the Empire, we have been compelled by these Russian measures to declare a state of threatening danger of war, which does not yet mean mobilization. Mobilization must follow, however, if Russia does not suspend every war measure against Austria-Hungary and ourselves within twelve hours and make us a distinct declaration to that effect. Please inform Mr. Sazonoff of this at once, and wire the hour of your communication. I know that Swerbejeff telegraphed to Petersburg yesterday that we had mobilized, which is untrue up to the present hour.

Bethmann Hollweg.

The ultimatum, in other words, threatened German mobilization in case Russia did not within twelve hours suspend every war measure against Germany and Austria-Hungary and give a declaration to this effect. This ultimatum was not a definite declaration of war. Therefore according to the international agreement a special declaration of war was necessary before a state of war with Russia existed.

Count Pourtalès, the German ambassador, had not learned of the order for the mobilization of the entire Russian army and fleet until the early morning of the 31st,<sup>108</sup> while the French and English ambassadors had learned of it during the afternoon of the 30th.<sup>109</sup> It goes without saying that in concealing this important order Russia was not only committing an unfriendly act toward Germany but had the intention of taking advantage of this handicap as much as possible. When Count Pourtalès immediately sought an audience with the Tsar, his request was not granted until evening. The request of Count Pourtalès to delay the order of general mobilization or to cancel it was rejected by the Tsar as impossible for technical reasons. In view of the grave nature of the measure, which decided the question of war or peace, the technical reasons cannot be considered particularly sound. Precisely the manner of Russian mobilization, which during the first day foresaw no railway transports, would have made a delay possible. All that was required would have been a telegram to the effect that August 1 should also be considered as the first day of mobilization.

At 11.10 P. M. the telegram with the ultimatum to Russia arrived at the German embassy in St. Petersburg and

was handed to the Russian minister of foreign affairs Sazonov at midnight of July 31. Concerning his interview with Sazonov, Count Pourtalès sent the following telegram, which arrived at the Foreign Office in Berlin at a time no longer ascertainable.<sup>110</sup>

Telegram 209. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.

Have just carried out instructions, at midnight. Mr. Sasonoff referred again to the technical impossibility of suspending the war measures, and attempted once more to convince me that we overestimated the significance of a Russian mobilization, which was not comparable with that of our own. He urgently requested me to call Your Excellency's attention to the fact that the assurance of the Tsar, on his word of honor, given in today's telegram from His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas to His Majesty the Emperor and King, should satisfy us as to Russia's intentions. I pointed out to him in return that the Tsar by no means obligated himself under all circumstances to refrain from warlike action, but only so long as there still remained a prospect of composing the Austro-Russian quarrel on account of Serbia. I put to the Minister the direct question: Could he give me a guaranty that Russia intended to keep the peace, even in the event that an agreement with Austria was not reached? The Minister was unable to give me an affirmative answer to this question. In that case, then, I replied, nobody can blame us for our unwillingness to allow Russia a longer start in mobilization.

Pourtalès.

During the night of July 31 to August 1, at the same time at which the ultimatum was handed to Sazonov by Count Pourtalès, a thorough, decisive deliberation was

held in Berlin under the chairmanship of the Chancellor concerning the further steps to be taken as a result of the general Russian mobilization. In agreement with the chief of general staff, von Moltke, the Chancellor decided to let the declaration of war on Russia follow in case the ultimatum was not complied with.

At this meeting the text of the declaration of war on Russia as well as on France was drawn up. The wording was very carefully weighed. The words "déclare la guerre" were purposely avoided and the form "relève le défi et Se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie" chosen.

On the morning of August 1, General von Moltke in the course of a ride in the Tiergarten, delivered his report to the Kaiser at the Castle. According to a note made by the Chancellor dated August 1 the tenor of the declarations of war met with the Kaiser's approval.<sup>111</sup>

In its final version the declaration of war on Russia has the following text:<sup>112</sup>

Telegram 159.

Urgent.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

In case the Russian Government should make no satisfactory reply to our demand, Your Excellency will present it with the following declaration at 5 o'clock this afternoon, according to Central European time:

Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé des débuts de la crise, de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un desir qui Lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté L'Empéreur de Russie, Sa Majeste l'Empéreur d'Allemagne, d'accord avec l'Angleterre, S'était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès

des Cabinets de Vienne et de S. Pétersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer.

A la suite de cette mesure menaçante, motivée par aucun préparatif militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eut manqué de parer à ce peril, il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent, le Gouvernement Allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de S. M. l'Empereur de toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires.

La Russie { *ayant refusé de faire droit*  
n'ayant pas cru devoir répondre } à cette  
demande et ayant manifesté par { *ce refus*  
cette attitude } que son  
action était dirigée contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de faire savoir à votre Excellence ce qui suit:

S. M. l'Empereur, mon Auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire, relève le défi et Se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie.

Please wire receipt and time of carrying out these instructions, according to Russian time. Urgent.

Please demand your passports and turn over protection and affairs to the American Embassy.

Jagow.

### Translation of the French portions:

The Imperial Government has been striving, since the commencement of the crime, to bring about a peaceful solution. Complying with a desire expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the German Emperor has been applying him-

self, in accord with England, to playing the rôle of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when Russia, without awaiting the result, proceeded to the mobilization of her entire land and sea forces.

As a consequence of this threatening measure, occasioned by no military preparation on the part of Germany, the German Empire found itself face to face with a grave and imminent danger. Had the Imperial Government failed to prepare itself to meet this peril, it would have endangered the security and the very existence of Germany. The German Government, therefore, felt itself compelled to address the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias insisting upon the suspension of the said military activities.

Russia { having refused to accede to this demand,  
(having belived it unnecessary to respond to this demand,) and having made it manifest by this { refusal that her action was directed against  
(attitude)

Germany, I have the honour, on behalf of my Government, to inform Your Excellency as follows:

His Majesty the Emperor, my August Sovereign, accepts the challenge in the name of the Empire, and considers himself as being in a state of war with Russia.

The telegram was sent at 12.52 P. M. and was to be delivered at 5 P. M. Central European time.

At 2.05 P. M. the following telegram from the Tsar to the Emperor arrived. We quote it in English translation: <sup>113</sup>

I received your telegram. Understood you are obliged to mobilize but wish to have the same guaranty from you as I gave you, that these measures DO NOT mean war and that we shall continue negotiating for

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the benefit of our countries and universal peace dear to all our hearts. Our long proved friendship *must* succeed, with God's help, in avoiding bloodshed. Anxiously, full of confidence await your answer.

As we shall see in the following remarks concerning the significance of Russian mobilization, this proposal had no practical value whatsoever. Importance could be attached to the peaceful assurances of the Tsar only if he had stated why Russia had ordered complete mobilization in the first place. His telegram also fails utterly to deal with the political differences which were up for discussion. Hence this message could be considered merely the sentimental expression of a spontaneous will to peace.

At one o'clock in the afternoon of August 1 a session of Bundesrat had taken place in Berlin. According to the German Constitution and under the circumstances it was necessary for this body to approve the declarations of war.<sup>114</sup>

Here the Chancellor declared among other things:

Yesterday (i. e., July 31) it was to be decided whether or not Vienna should approach Russia along the lines of our or of the English proposal. In any event, Austria-Hungary had taken up again, at our instigation, the direct transactions with Russia, which had been broken off. Thus an understanding was being considered at Vienna yesterday, and, in connection with the matter, we had gone to the utmost limit of the proposals which may be made to a Great Power, and an allied Great Power at that. We did this in the pursuit of the peace policy which we have followed for forty-three years. And at this moment Russia mobilized her entire military forces on land and sea. Only two days before, the solemn assurance had been

given us that absolutely no measures were being taken against us. Actually, however, reports concerning such measures had been continually arriving. A general mobilization we can only accept as a hostile act directed against us. It places us in a position from which we can escape only by action, unless we are willing to sacrifice our honour and our security. It is nothing less than a challenge, when mobilization is directed against us while we are engaged in mediation. Russia is attempting to so represent matters that no hostile action against us will be perceived in this mobilization. Should we commit ourselves to this view, we should be transgressing against the safety of our fatherland. Germany has been watching with an astonishing, not to say an almost inexcusable, calmness the preparations for war in Russia and France, which, if they did not actually constitute mobilization themselves, were nevertheless calculated to expedite it tremendously. By so doing we have become subject to the danger of losing the advantage of the start which lies in the possibility of the more rapid mobilization of our troops; we risked the danger of finding both on our eastern and western borders, within a short period of time, an army equipped for war and ready to strike; we no longer dared to remain inactive, unless Prussian territory in the east was to be occupied, and at the same time, the crown lands in the west, imperiled.

Thus we have been obliged to direct an ultimatum against the mobilization in Russia, requiring the mobilization to be suspended within twelve hours; otherwise we should have to take corresponding steps ourselves: and we added that there existed no doubt with us as to what mobilization meant. In this situation it was not to be avoided that His Majesty should, yesterday, declare a state of threatening danger of war. Simultaneously we inquired of France, while laying before her our point of view, what the attitude of France would be in the case of a Russo-German war.



We attached to the ultimatum to Russia a very brief respite because our own safety did not permit of allowing a further postponement of military preparations. The reply was due today at twelve o'clock noon. I do not yet know what it is. In view of the congestion of the telegraph system, I shall probably have to wait several hours to find out. But I am afraid that Russia will not comply with our demands.

The French reply is due at one o'clock in the afternoon. We do not know the exact terms of the alliance agreement between France and Russia. But from all that is known to us of this treaty, we are compelled to fear that France will not be able to avoid active participation on the side of Russia.

If the Russian reply should prove unsatisfactory and France does not make a plain and unconditional declaration of neutrality—under the circumstances we must absolutely insist on a thoroughly reliable declaration of neutrality by France—the Emperor will declare to the Russian Government that he is forced to consider himself to be in a state of war with Russia, provoked by Russia herself; and to France he will state that we are at war with Russia, and, as France will not guarantee her neutrality, he must assume that we are at war with France also.

I am still forced to make these statements as conditional, as I do not know what the replies will be. I wanted to make these explanations to the Federal Council now, however, in order to lose no more time.

I hope that the Federal Council has gained from my exposition the conviction that Germany has been working up to the last moment for the maintenance of peace, along the lines of her ever-pursued peace policy. But the provocation we have received from Russia is impossible for us to bear, if we are not to abdicate as one of the Great Powers of Europe. In doing as we do, we shall have, on our part also, to take the consequences of the alliance existing between Rus-

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sia and France. It is with a good and a clear conscience that I can ask the consent of the high and federated Governments to the measures which I have just laid before you. We did not wish the war; it was forced upon us. The war will demand from the German people the most extreme sacrifice that has ever been demanded from them. We rely, however, on the help of God, as we did not bring about the war, but wished to prevent it, and will go bravely and determinedly into the struggle, which we must wage for the honour, the freedom and the power of the German Empire.

After the Imperial Chancellor had hereupon requested and unanimously received the consent of the federated governments that in case satisfactory declarations were not given by Russia and France, His Majesty the Emperor should declare to these two Powers that they had brought about a state of war with the German Empire, he added:

Thus my explanations have met with the general approval of the high and federated Governments. If the iron dice are now to be rolled, may God help us.

With the approval of the Bundesrat here given the basis for the presentation of the declaration of war.<sup>115</sup>

At 5 P. M., the hour at which the declaration of war was to be handed to Russia, there assembled in the castle, at the request of the Emperor, the Imperial Chancellor, the chief of the general staff, the minister of war, the chiefs of the military and naval cabinets, as well as the secretary of the Imperial Naval Office, and the order for mobilization was signed by the Emperor in the adjutant's room. The first mobilization day for the German army was the second of August. Accordingly Russia, even with

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the formal decree of her mobilization, had an advantage of two days over the German mobilization.

As we have already shown, the declaration of war itself was not transmitted until 7 P. M. since the telegram with the declaration of war not before 5.45 P. M. (Russian time.) Count Pourtalès reported as follows: <sup>116</sup>

After decodification at seven o'clock, Russian time, I asked Mr. Sasonoff three successive times whether he could make me the declaration demanded in telegram 153, concerning the suspension of hostile measures against Austria and us. After my question had been answered in the negative three times, I handed over the note as instructed.

This telegram did not arrive in the Foreign Office. Thus Berlin lacked confirmation of the fact that the declaration of war had been handed over, and the German Government remained uncertain whether Germany was in a state of war with Russia pursuant to international law. This uncertainty was expressed in a session at the Imperial Chancellor's during the night of August 1-2, concerning which Grand Admiral von Tirpitz writes in his political documents. <sup>117</sup> While the Chancellor took the view that in accordance with international law he required a confirmation, General von Moltke felt that war had begun because the Russians had opened fire at the border. The Chancellor temporarily acquiesced in this.

When early on the 2nd the news came that Russian cavalry had crossed the frontier, the Chancellor realized that the state of war really existed. On the forenoon of the same day he reported to the Emperor: <sup>118</sup>

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According to a report from the General Staff (at four o'clock this morning), there was an attempt at railroad wrecking and an advance by two squadrons of Cossacks on Johannisberg. Have reported the foregoing at once to Vienna and Rome with request for statement concerning fulfilment of alliance obligations, and added, for the benefit of Rome, that we expected a French attack. Passports are being handed to the Russian ambassador.

In accordance with understanding with Ministry of War and General Staff, presentation of declaration of war to France not necessary today for any MILITARY reasons. Consequently it will not be done, in the hope that the French will attack us.

Communication concerning state of war with Russia to be published early today, at half past four, through Wolff dispatch.

The Senate Commission for Imperial and Foreign Affairs of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg was instructed by the State Secretary to hand the Russian minister there his passes, but for the present not to do so to the French consul general.

Upon his request for a written communication whether the operations of the navy against Russia were to begin and whether the navy could be informed of the declaration of war on Russia, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz was instructed:

As a result of the crossing of our frontiers by Russian troops we find ourselves at war with Russia.

I have the honour of most respectfully suggesting to Your Excellency to undertake whatever military measures may be necessary in this case.<sup>119</sup>

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With regard to the events leading to the declaration of war on Russia, confusion has been caused by the memoirs of the minister of war, General von Falkenhayn, published by General von Zwehl, who has meanwhile died.<sup>120</sup> According to these records the following events occurred during the early morning hours of August 1:

General von Falkenhayn had learned by telephone from General Moltke of the German intention "to make declarations of war." Thereupon General von Falkenhayn went to Moltke and persuaded him to accompany him to von Jagow "in order to prevent the foolish, premature declaration of war on Russia." The answer was: "too late."

As appears from a later communication of General von Falkenhayn to Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg, this happened not on the 1st but on the 2nd.<sup>121</sup> That is also the reason why the two generals were informed by the Foreign Office that it was "too late" to prevent the declaration of war on Russia. The fact that the two generals could take this step at all as late as the 2nd must be explained by the circumstance that the generals assumed that it was still possible to prevent the presentation of the official declaration of war to Russia as no confirmation had yet arrived that the Note had actually been presented. As we have seen, the state of war itself was considered to have come into existence from the military point of view, since the hostilities had already begun.<sup>122</sup>

Herewith we close the section on the events leading up to the declaration of war on Russia. We turn now to Germany's declaration of war on France.

*The Declaration of War on France*

At the same time when the ultimatum was sent to Russia, i. e. at 3.30 P. M. on July 31, an ultimatum was sent to France reading as follows:<sup>123</sup>

In spite of the still pending negotiations for mediation and although we ourselves have taken no mobilization measures of any kind, Russia has mobilized her entire army and fleet, thus against us also. As a result we have declared a state of threatening danger of war, which must be followed by mobilization in case Russia does not suspend every war measure against Austria and ourselves within twelve hours. Mobilization will inevitably mean war. Please ask the French Government if it intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Answer must be given within eighteen hours. Telegraph immediately hour at which the inquiry is made. Utmost haste necessary.

The telegram also contained the following secret supplement which was not communicated to France since she did not entertain the neutrality proposal of Germany.

Secret: If, as is not to be presumed, the French Government declares its intention to remain neutral, Your Excellency will inform the French Government that we shall have to demand the turning over of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun as a pledge of neutrality; these we would occupy and return after the completion of the war with Russia. Reply to last proposition must be here by four o'clock tomorrow afternoon.

This demand could probably not have been fulfilled and has often been quoted as proof of the fact that Germany did not seriously hope that France would remain

neutral. But those who hold this view overlook the fact that even if the French had assured their neutrality, this would have been impossible to maintain in the long run. On the other hand the attitude of France up to then made special guarantees necessary in order to render subsequent intervention of France in the war, perhaps at a particularly unfavourable moment, impossible.

The ultimatum to France is distinguished from that to Russia by the fact that it contained the communication of the circumstances under which Germany would consider herself at war with Russia, namely in case Germany were forced to undertake her mobilization. But since no "conditional" declaration of war was here made on France, another note was required.

At 7 P. M. of July 31 the German ambassador in Paris, von Schoen, carried out his instructions.<sup>124</sup> Viviani replied to the ambassador that he had not yet received any news of a general Russian mobilization; that he knew only of precautionary measures and hence did not want to abandon entirely the hope that the worst could be prevented. Concerning the question of the neutrality of France, he promised to answer to that by 1 P. M. of the day at the latest.<sup>125</sup> The statement of Viviani that at this time he still had no knowledge of the general Russian mobilization was correct, to judge by the documents now available.<sup>126</sup> Viviani received the telegram officially announcing the Russian general mobilization<sup>127</sup> after his interview with von Schoen. But Viviani must have known that the general Russian mobilization was imminent and that far-reaching preparations had been made.<sup>128</sup>

The reply to the ultimatum to France reached Berlin

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at 6.10 P. M. on August 1. The telegram read as follows: <sup>129</sup>

To the definite and repeated question, whether France would remain neutral in case of a Russo-German war, the Premier stated to me, *hesitatingly* that France would act in accordance with her interests. He based the uncertainty of this statement on the fact that he regarded the situation as changed since yesterday. It is officially reported here that *Sir E. Grey's proposal of a general suspension of military preparations* has been accepted in principle by Russia, and that Austria-Hungary has declared that she will not infringe on Serbia's territory or sovereignty.

Schoen.

While these suggestions were being put forward, an attempt to mediate in the threatened Franco-German conflict was made by England but was apparently prematurely abandoned by Grey. The serious attention paid in Berlin to this step is one of the best proofs of the German will for peace. Berlin is the best evidence for the German will to peace.

On the afternoon of the 31st a message arrived from the German ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky.<sup>130</sup> Here the ambassador stated that in case of war England could be expected to assume a waiting policy. About 5 P. M. of August 1 there was a conference in the castle at which the Emperor signed the mobilization order. On this occasion there was a dispute as to the necessity of sending a declaration of war. Shortly after the chief of the general staff and the minister of war had left the castle, it was announced that an important message had arrived from England which would be de-



livered immediately after it had been deciphered. The message, which arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.23 P. M. was first turned over to the Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann, who discussed it with the Under-Secretary Wahnschaffe and decided to present it immediately at the castle. The very important communication, he felt, had to be tested for its accuracy and the advance of the troops checked, if this were possible for a brief time without risk. The minister of war von Falkenhayn construed the message in the same way. He doubted its accuracy but regarded it as so important that immediately, in the presence of Under-Secretary of State Wahnschaffe, who had brought him the message, he communicated by telephone with the operations division of the general staff.

The telegram read as follows: <sup>131</sup>

Sir E. Grey has just had me informed through Sir W. Tyrell that he hopes, as the result of a Ministerial Council now in session, to be able to give me this afternoon some facts which may prove useful for the avoidance of the great catastrophe. Judging from Sir William's hints, this would appear to mean that in case we did not attack France, England would remain neutral and would guarantee France's neutrality. I shall learn more this afternoon.

Sir E. Grey has just called me on the telephone and asked me if I thought I could assure him that in case France should remain neutral in a Russo-German war, we would not attack the French. I assured him that I could take the responsibility for such a guaranty, and he is to use this assurance at today's Cabinet session.

P.S. Sir W. Tyrell urgently begged me to use my influence to insure that our troops did not cross the French border. Everything would depend upon that.

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The French troops had retired after one border crossing had occurred.

Lichnowsky.

As we see from the political documents of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz,<sup>132</sup> the message was received with great joy by the Emperor, the Imperial Chancellor and Herr von Jagow.

Especially the Emperor attached far-reaching hopes to this message and at first wished to cancel the entire advance and use the principal forces in the East instead of in the West. Since the preparations necessary for the so-called great Eastern advance had not been continued after April 1, 1913, the general staff naturally objected to this proposal very strenuously. When Moltke protested vehemently, the Emperor abandoned the idea but ordered that the march of the 16th Infantry Division into Luxemburg territory should be postponed for the present. This division had orders, as soon as mobilization was proclaimed, to invade Luxemburg in order to make secure the railway line from Trèves to Metz which cut through the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg but was operated by the German Railways by virtue of a state treaty.<sup>133</sup>

Lichnowsky's telegram immediately prompted the Emperor to send the following telegram to the King of England:<sup>134</sup>

I just received the communication from your Government offering French neutrality under guaranty of Great Britain. Added to this offer was the inquiry whether under these conditions Germany would refrain from attacking France. On technical grounds my mobilization which had already been proclaimed this afternoon must proceed against two fronts east

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and west as prepared. This cannot be countermanded because I am sorry your telegram came so late. But if France offers me neutrality which must be guaranteed by the British fleet and army I shall of course refrain from attacking France and employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on my frontier are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into France.

A quarter of an hour later, at 7.15 P. M., the Imperial Chancellor sent Lichnowsky<sup>134a</sup> the following reply:

Telegram 204. Berlin, August 1, 1914.

Germany is willing to agree to the English proposal, provided England will pledge security with all her armed forces for the unconditional neutrality of France in a German-Russian conflict, and, moreover, for a neutrality to last until the final completion of this conflict. Germany alone would have to decide when that completion had been reached.

Germany's mobilization took place today in reply to a Russian challenge, before the arrival of telegram 205. As a consequence our advance movements, even toward the French border, can no longer be altered. We will guarantee, however, not to cross the French frontier before Monday, August 3, at seven o'clock in the evening, in case England's agreement should be obtained within that time.

Bethmann Hollweg.

It is worth noting the assurance that the French frontier will not be crossed before 7 P. M. of August 3.

Lichnowsky's telegram was supplemented by another reading as follows.<sup>135</sup> It reached the Foreign Office shortly after 6 P. M.

Telegram 209.

London, August 1, 1914.

In addition to telegram 205, Sir William Tyrrell has just called on me to tell me that Sir E. Grey wanted to make proposals to me this afternoon regarding England's neutrality, even in the event that we should have war with France as well as Russia. I am to see Sir E. Grey at three-thirty and will report at once.

Lichnowsky.

As we recall, at about the same time the reply arrived from Paris that France would do what her interests required.

Shortly after 10 P. M. the news came that the mobilization of the French army had been ordered at 5 P. M., Central European time, with the first mobilization day on Sunday, August 2.<sup>136</sup>

The supposed mediation of England turned out to be a fleeting vision when between 9 and 10 P. M. the message of King George to the Emperor arrived, wherein the King stated that in his opinion there had been a misunderstanding in the conversation that afternoon between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey.<sup>137</sup>

A few minutes later a message from Lichnowsky arrived in the Foreign Office which also showed that the original conception of the Ambassador had been based upon a misunderstanding.<sup>138</sup>

Immediately the logical consequences were drawn from this and the arrested advance of the 16th infantry division was ordered to continue.

The complete hopelessness of England's remaining neutral was then confirmed by another message from the ambassador which arrived in the Foreign Office at 9 A. M. of August 2 and read as follows:<sup>139</sup>

Telegram 217. London, August 2, 1914.

Suggestions of Sir E. Grey, which were founded on wish to secure France's permanent neutrality, if possible, were made without previous communication with France and without knowledge of the mobilization, and have since been abandoned entirely as hopeless. Urgently request reply as to whether Telegrams 212, 214 and urgent uncoded telegram unnumbered have arrived.

Lichnowsky.

Herewith the situation was cleared again, and the hope that France would stay out of the war and that England would remain neutral disappeared. This order—counter-order, the stopping of the 16th infantry division and then again the prompt cancellation of these instructions, led to no disorder and showed that the charge that the German leaders lost their heads—a charge frequently heard—is greatly exaggerated, to say the least. Of course it is not surprising that the uncertainty caused some excitement.

Although Lichnowsky's report turned out to be a misunderstanding, the German Government did not withdraw its assurance that the French border would not be crossed before Monday, August 3 at 7 P. M. in case England's agreement could be obtained within that time. Although the German Government was relieved of this obligation by the second communication of Lichnowsky, this time-limit seems to have continued to be a factor, for actually the state of war with France was not notified until August 3 at 7 P. M., Paris time.

According to the records of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz there was a conference in the castle at 10 A. M. of

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August 2 concerning the question of the declaration of war on France.<sup>139a</sup> In a daily record of points of military policy (such as was prepared by the General Staff every day during the crisis), transmitted to the Foreign Office during the forenoon of that day, the following remarks were made with regard to France:

Our eventual declaration of war has nothing to do with the step undertaken in Belgium. The one does not depend upon the other. I do not deem it necessary to hand the declaration of war to France now. I believe that if we refrain from this step for the present, France for her part will be forced by popular sentiment to take hostile steps against Germany even without a formal declaration of war. It is to be assumed that France will enter Belgium in the rôle of protector of Belgian neutrality as soon as Germany's step against Belgium becomes known in Paris.

We have given orders not to cross the French line until acts on the part of France challenge such crossing.

In the conference General von Moltke took the view that the war had actually begun because the French had committed a number of hostile acts. For this reason he regarded the sending of a declaration of war as superfluous. But the Imperial Chancellor felt that without a declaration of war on France he could not hand over the summons to Belgium concerning the invasion of this country by the German troops. Nevertheless the declaration of war on France was not transmitted. The following text had been prepared on August 1: <sup>140</sup>

The German Government has been striving to reach a peaceful outcome from the commencement of the crisis. But while, at the desire of His Majesty the Em-

peror of Russia, and in cooperation with England, it was still endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and Petersburg, Russia mobilized her entire army and her fleet. By these measures, which had been preceded by no extraordinary preparations for war in Germany, the security of the German Empire was threatened. Not to take measures to meet such a menace would have meant to stake the existence of the Empire. The German Government therefore required the Russian Government to suspend at once the mobilization against Germany and her ally, Austria-Hungary. Simultaneously, the German Government acquainted the French Government with the matter, and, in consideration of the well-known relations of the Republic to Russia, requested a statement as to whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war. To this inquiry the French Government returned the equivocal and evasive answer that France would act in accordance with her interests. By this reply France reserves the right to place herself at the side of our opponents, and is in a position to attack us in the rear at any moment, with an army which has been mobilized in the meantime. Germany is forced, under these conditions, to perceive a threat in this, all the more since no reply has been returned to the demand she had made upon Russia to suspend the mobilization of her armed forces, notwithstanding the period of respite has long expired, and since a Russo-German war has now broken out as a result. Germany is unable to leave to France the choice of the time when the menace to her western frontiers shall be brought into action, but, threatened from two sides, is forced to proceed in her own defense at once.

Thus I am instructed to make known to Your Excellency the following announcement:

His Majesty the German Emperor declares in the name of the Empire that he considers himself as being in a state of war with France.

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Please wire initiation and time of execution of these instructions at once, according to Western European time.

Please demand your passports, and turn over protection and affairs to the American Embassy.

Jagow.

In this prepared and later not transmitted text of the German declaration of war on France the deeper causes are expressed very clearly. Today we can only regret that this declaration was not sent.

The perfectly good reason for Germany to determine the beginning of hostilities against France herself lay in the fact that Germany was threatened from two sides and had to "proceed in her own defence at once." Later it will be shown that this defence had, for imperative military reasons, to be conducted in an offensive manner.

At 2.05 P. M. of August 2 the commission was given to the German minister in Brussels to transmit at 8 P. M. of the same day the summons to Belgium which had been previously sent under seal. In this document <sup>141</sup> permission is sought for the German troops to enter Belgium on the ground that the French troops were planning to marshal along the Meuse line from Givet to Namur. In case Belgium showed a friendly attitude, compensation was promised. An answer was required by 8 A. M. of August 3.

At this time there were already several reports of violations of the frontier by the French. These in connection with the French rejection of Germany's ultimative question had to be regarded as an open evidence of the hostile attitude of France. Of course all the reports regarding frontier violations could not be examined and verified at



the time. The history of the war published by the *Reichsarchiv* (vol. 2, *Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918*) quotes the following facts: <sup>142</sup>

After a French airplane had already crossed the border on July 29 at Gottesthal (east of Belfort), as a gendarme from Altmünsterol observed, several strong French patrols of chasseurs crossed the line during the evening of August 1 north and south of the St. Dié-Markirch road; also a patrol which got as far as Wesserling west of St. Amarin in the Thur valley. During the night of August 1-2 German guards on the Hohneck (south of the gorge pass) at the western end of Mühlbach and west of Metzeral, were attacked. On August 2 frontier violations by hostile patrols were noted at various places: at German-Avricourt (north of Blamont), at Urbeis and north of the Felleringen head (northwest of St. Amarin), also at Obertrabach and Altmünsterol (east of Belfort). In the night from August 2-3 and on August 3 a squadron of the 14th chasseur battalion was attacked several times in the pass west of Markirch, at times by a much superior force (French 10th chasseurs). Reports of the advance of entire companies at Gottesthal, which led to the premature destruction of the railway bridge at Ilfurt by German pioneers, later proved to be incorrect, similarly a number of other reports of frontier violations. Thus it was proved upon investigation that the report of the bombing of Nuremberg was not true. The French army command, it must be said, did not wish these frontier violations to take place. On August 2 it reiterated its earlier order prohibiting them.

The various reports on the frontier violations created the impression among the German authorities that Germany was already at war with France. This follows very

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clearly from a letter of 8.30 A. M., August 3, from the Emperor to Grand Admiral von Tirpitz. From this we quote the following passage:

. . . in my opinion this condition is quite untenable in international law; England, though she is neutral or at least pretends to be neutral, lies on guard for France, in order to protect her northern coast, and ties up my fleet, although I am at war with France and the latter has already committed overt acts against us. . . .

During the forenoon of August 3, on the basis of the various reports concerning frontier violations by France, a new text for a declaration of war against France was drafted. The chief of the general staff von Moltke was present part of the time while this was being drafted. At his suggestion the report was also incorporated that enemy fliers had bombed the railway near Nuremberg. This report was later proved untrue. The text of the note was as follows: <sup>143</sup>

Telegram 193.

Urgent.

Berlin, August 3, 1914.

Up to the present time German troops have been ordered to absolutely respect the French frontier, and have implicitly obeyed this order everywhere. On the other hand, yesterday, in spite of the assurance of the ten-kilometer zone, French troops have already crossed the German frontier at Altmünsterol and by the mountain road in the Vosges, and are still on German territory. A French aviator, who must have flown across Belgian territory, was shot down yesterday in an attempt to wreck the railroad at Wesel. Several other French airplanes were unquestionably placed over the Eifel district yesterday. These, also,

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must have flown over Belgian territory. Yesterday, French airmen dropped bombs on the railroads near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg.

Thus France has forced us into a state of war. I request Your Excellency to communicate the foregoing to the French Government at six o'clock this afternoon, to demand your passports, and to leave, after turning over affairs to the American Embassy.

Bethmann Hollweg.

This telegram was sent to the German ambassador in Paris at 1.05 P. M. He was to present the declaration of war at 6 P. M. The telegram, which reached the German embassy in Paris at 4.30 P. M., arrived in an entirely mutilated form, which we quote: <sup>144</sup>

Telegram 193.

Berlin, August 3, 1914.

German restraints had kiln kel Italian Ambassador. We would have respected frontier most strictly and advised July to follow strictly. On the other hand in spite of bodily ten their zone French one another already Elena at old mü regard erol and mortgage mountain road, settlement iu gen sen ante Howard ultramontan and in view of relative territory. French aviators of the Belgian territory traité shortly to await would by the attempt Bassora near Wesel to destroy. Yesterday already down mp. Several other French kts Nowoje Wremja were yesterday over the Eifel district free approach determined. There also must have founded Renouard Belgian territory. Yesterday a French airman dropped bombs on railroad near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg. Thus French have transferred state of war Saragossa. Please crumbling field communicate to Government there this afternoon at six o'clock, demand your passports, and leave, after turning over affairs to American Embassy.

Bethmann Hollweg.

In the garbling of the text it is striking that the statements on frontier violations, unfavourable to the French, could not be deciphered, except for the erroneous announcement of the attacks on Karlsruhe and Nuremberg, while the rest of the telegram concerning the declaration of war and the departure of the ambassador can be clearly made out. It seems likely, therefore, that the mutilation was intentional, for the purpose of keeping the French people in the dark concerning the real reasons for the declaration of war.

The only clear point in the telegram was that the state of war began at 6 P. M.<sup>145</sup> Furthermore the fact that aviators had violated the frontier could be deduced to some extent. It redounds to the credit of the embassy that it accomplished an admirable piece of work in concocting the following text out of this maze of ciphers: <sup>146</sup>

Paris, August 3, 1914.

Mr. Premier:

The German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg.

I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform Your Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power.

At the same time I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that the German au-

thorities will retain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only remains for me to request Your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with my passports and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris.

Be good enough, Mr. Premier, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect.

v. Schoen.

To His Excellency Mr. Viviani, Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The declaration which this communication contained, viz. that Germany considered herself forced into a state of war with France, was, according to the declaration of Ambassador von Schoen, verbally transmitted to the French premier Viviani at 5.40 P. M. A written copy of the declaration of war was also transmitted by the ambassador at 6.10 P. M. through the councillor of the embassy, Prince Hatzfeld.

Herewith we conclude the narrative of the genesis of the declarations of war and turn to the reasons which prompted these measures.

#### THE REASONS FOR THE DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA AND FRANCE

The reasons of the German Government for declaring war on Russia lay in the failure to reply to the ultimatum which demanded the cessation of Russian mobilization.

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As a result of the refusal to discontinue the mobilization it became necessary to take defensive measures for a war on two fronts, to enter Belgium and to declare war on France.

*The Political Significance of the Russian Mobilization*

The Russian general mobilization was, from a purely political point of view, the expression of an unconditional will to war, with which Germany had to reckon. The reasons for this desire on the part of Russia for war could only be sought for in 1914 in Germany in a consideration of the general situation. That technical reasons and perhaps misleading reports also played a part could not be conjectured by Germany. During the period between the evening of July 28, the day on which the two ukases for the mobilization were signed, and the morning of the 31st, when the general mobilization of Russia became officially known in Germany, no aggravation of the political situation as a whole took place. On the contrary, there was clear evidence for the fact that Germany was zealously working toward mediation between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

The situation as it was seen at the time in Germany, is expressed most clearly in the communication of the Imperial Chancellor to the German ambassador in London on the evening of July 31. We quote the text of this document: <sup>147</sup>

Telegram 199.

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

On the twenty-ninth the Tsar requested His Majesty by telegraph to mediate between Russia and Austria.

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His Majesty immediately declared himself willing to do so, informed the Tsar by telegraph, and at once made a move at Vienna. Without awaiting the result, Russia mobilized against Austria. His majesty thereupon called the attention of the Tsar by telegraph to the fact that he was making the mediation action almost futile, and requested the Tsar to suspend his military preparations against Austria. This has not been done. In spite of that fact, we have been continuing our attempts at mediation in Vienna, and we have even gone, in the extreme urgency of our proposals, to the utmost limit of what we could venture toward a sovereign state which is our ally. Our proposals at Vienna were quite along the lines of the English proposals, which we recommended to the earnest consideration of Vienna. They were under discussion at Vienna this morning. During the discussion, even before it had been brought to an end, Count Pourtalès reported officially the mobilization of the entire Russian army and navy. This action on the part of Russia cut short Austria's pending reply to our mediation proposal. It is directed also against us, thus against the Power from which the Tsar had personally requested mediation. This action, which we can not regard otherwise than hostile, we shall have to reply to with serious counter-measures, unless we want absolutely to sacrifice the safety of our fatherland. We can not stand idly by as spectators and watch Russian mobilization on our borders. We have told Russia that we shall have to mobilize, which would mean war, unless, within twelve hours, the military preparations against Austria-Hungary and ourselves were suspended. We have asked France whether she would remain neutral in a German-Russian war. Please use every means to insure that this course of events is duly recognized in the English press.

Bethmann Hollweg.

In explanation of this telegram we must say that the Emperor had informed the Tsar that to his mind Austria was striving with her action against Serbia to get a full guarantee that the Serbian promises would really be carried out, but that Austria did not plan to make any territorial acquisitions at the expense of Serbia. Hence he suggested that Russia should remain a spectator in the conflict, without involving Europe in the most terrible war. Then he continues: "I think a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna possible and desirable and as I already telegraphed to you, my Government is continuing its exertions to promote it."<sup>148</sup>

The most important passages in the telegrams sent by the Chancellor to Vienna during the night of July 29–30 and intended to promote an understanding between Austria and Russia, read as follows:

As a result we stand, in case Austria refuses all mediation, before a conflagration in which England will be against us; Italy and Roumania to all appearances will not go with us, and we two shall be opposed to four Great Powers. On Germany, thanks to England's opposition, the principal burden of the fight will fall. Austria's political prestige, the honour of her arms, as well as her just claims against Serbia, could all be amply satisfied by the occupation of Belgrade or of other places. She would be strengthening her status in the Balkans as well as in relation to Russia by the humiliation of Serbia. Under these circumstances we must urgently and impressively suggest to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the acceptance of mediation on the above-mentioned honourable conditions. The responsibility for the consequences that would otherwise follow would be an uncommonly heavy one both for Austria and for us.<sup>149</sup>



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We can not expect Austria to deal with Serbia, with whom she is at war. The refusal to hold any exchange of opinions with Petersburg, however, would be a serious error, as it would be direct provocation of Russia's armed interference, which Austria-Hungary is beyond all else interested to prevent.

We are, of course, ready to fulfil the obligations of our alliance, but must decline to be drawn wantonly into a world conflagration by Vienna, without having any regard paid to our counsel. Also, Vienna appears to disregard our advice in regard to the Italian question.

Please talk to Count Berchtold at once with all impressiveness and great seriousness.<sup>150</sup>

It clearly follows from the telegram of the King of England to the Tsar that the former shared the view of the German Government as expressed in the aforementioned communication of the Imperial Chancellor to Prince Lichnowsky.<sup>151</sup> In this telegram we read with reference to the said telegram of the Chancellor to Prince Lichnowsky:

I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has produced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal appeal to you to remove the misapprehension which I feel must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace. If you think I can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do everything in my power to assist in reopening the interrupted conversations between the Powers concerned. I feel confident that you are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be done to secure the peace of the world.

The communication, which was also sent to Poincaré, sees in the Russian general mobilization a misunderstanding. In this the King of England certainly shows that he could not explain the necessity of the Russian general mobilization as a logical consequence of the political situation.

In passing we mention the fact that the attempt of the King of England to influence the Tsar could no longer defer the catastrophe because the audience of the British ambassador in St. Petersburg did not take place until late in the evening of August 1. The question of time is of particular interest in this case. Grey's telegram with the message of the King left at 3.30 A. M. of August 1 but did not reach Buchanan until 5 that afternoon. Buchanan's audience with the Tsar did not take place until 10.45 P. M. Meanwhile the German ambassador had handed over Germany's declaration of war on Russia. If Sazonov had been inclined to let the telegram of the King of England influence the Tsar, he could have found opportunity to allow Buchanan to work for a peaceful settlement of the conflict at an earlier hour and perhaps before the presentation of the declaration of war by Count Pourtalès. One cannot help suspecting that Sazonov wished to put off the message of the King of England as an obstacle placed at an inconvenient moment in the path of the war.

Briefly we must now examine the question whether the Russian general mobilization could be justified by the military situation in the Austro-Serbian theatre of war. If this were true, its political significance would, of course, have been greatly diminished.

After Austria had declared war on Serbia (July 28)

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Sazonov declared that on the following day Russia would undertake a partial mobilization against Austria.<sup>152</sup> Against her better judgment Germany failed to lodge a protest against this measure.<sup>153</sup> The Russian minister for foreign affairs knew that a partial mobilization against Austria was considered by Germany as a very dangerous measure. Although the Secretary of State von Jagow said to the French ambassador Cambon that the Russian mobilization against Austria would not call forth German mobilization, yet on the 29th he earnestly called the attention of the Russian ambassador to the consequences of a Russian partial mobilization and added that "the measures taken upon the German frontier forced Germany to think of her own protection, too."<sup>154</sup> But it was quite evident that general mobilization meant war with Germany. This fact becomes absolutely clear when we consider that the decree of Russian general mobilization was not even officially communicated to Germany, just as the decree of the "period for the preparation of war," was not notified to the Germans. Suddenly and without preparation Germany saw herself confronted by these far-reaching measures of Russia. In this too Germany was bound to detect a will to war on Russia's part.

The necessity of supplanting the partial mobilization against Austria by general mobilization could never be justified by the military events in the theatre of war. It was perfectly obvious to every one who knew anything about military matters that Austria could not completely "shatter" Serbia in a few days. Even if we attach an exaggerated importance to the bombardment of Belgrade, which, as we now know, was a measure decreed by sub-

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ordinate officials, yet the necessity of a general Russian mobilization cannot be justified by this fact. Assuming that Austria had taken Belgrade by storm, which, as we now know, she could not do because of insufficient preparations, she would not have been able to penetrate to the interior of the country immediately. Hence Serbia was not threatened by any direct danger which could be averted solely by a Russian general mobilization.

But the Russian general mobilization acquired also special political significance by virtue of the fact that the attitude of Russia's ally did not indicate that a peaceful settlement of the conflict was likely.

In reply to Germany's note France stated that she "would do what her interests demanded." This answer was given without the slightest indication that France wished a peaceful solution of the conflict. Precisely this indefinite manner of answering Germany's unequivocal question was bound to increase to the utmost the suspicions of Germany.

The attitude of England too, apart from the "diplomatic dreams" of Lichnowsky, did not justify the hope that England would keep out of the conflict or would take energetic steps to keep her Russian friend from bringing about a war. The remark of the King of England to Prince Henry on the 26th, that England would remain neutral, which made a deep impression upon the Emperor as monarch, was not taken very seriously by the political leaders of the German Empire.<sup>155</sup> That England had in reality already given up her neutrality on July 28 is clear from a private letter written by Sir Arthur Nicolson to Sir George Buchanan. In this letter he says:

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But I think we have made it perfectly clear that in any case neither Germany nor Austria could possibly rely with any certainty upon our remaining neutral.<sup>155a</sup>

The impression that the Russian mobilization expressed a firm will to war was therefore confirmed and not refuted by the attitude of Russia's allies.

Consequently the political appraisal of the Russian general mobilization is an important factor in justifying the German declaration of war on Russia. We now turn to the military significance of the Russian general mobilization.

### *The Military Significance of the Russian Mobilization*

The European balance of power, which at all times served as the surest guarantee of the peace of Europe, was constructed on the basis of peacetime preparations for war and alliances for war. This balance was appreciably disturbed when a power like Russia mobilized her entire forces on land and on sea. It should not be forgotten that mobilization undeniably meant the marshaling of the gigantic Russian armies along the German eastern frontier and that this marshaling of forces offered the chances for the first warlike encounters on a large scale. Hence the consequences of such action had an important bearing upon the war itself. Of course the mobilization and marshaling of the fighting forces scattered over the huge Russian Empire required more time than a German or Austrian mobilization on the Russian frontier. But this advantage of speedier mobilization was a factor already computed in


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the calculation of the security of the German Empire and was balanced by the numerical superiority of Russia. Thus it could not be sacrificed without prejudice. For the present at least the mobilized forces of Austria were occupied with Serbia and could not be used for operations on the Russian frontier. Nor could Austria leave her Italian border entirely unguarded before Italy's stand was determined. The German forces would probably have been sufficient to oppose Russia, had not Germany been compelled to count upon French mobilization immediately following her own. And French mobilization would of course be followed by a marshaling of the French forces along the German frontier and along the frontiers of the neutral states of Belgium and Luxemburg.

It was also known that in case of war England would very quickly intervene with a British expeditionary corps on the continent. Consequently Germany had to expect that her frontier would be menaced on that side, too.

Hence the danger of the Russian general mobilization lay in the fact that the Russian and French forces could be marshaled along the German frontiers without operative counter-measures on Germany's part. Practically this would have meant the destruction of Germany through operative encirclement. Against this Germany had to defend herself, and that as quickly as possible.

In addition to this, Germany's eastern frontier was practically not protected at all. A completely efficient Russian army, which, as planned by the Dual Alliance, was to proceed into Germany simultaneously with a mobile French army, would doubtless have got to Berlin, assuming that it had not experienced a Tannenberg.







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No one will doubt today that the German people would not have withstood this blow and that an occupation of Berlin by the Russians would have meant an immediate collapse. Germany could never with success have warded off her numerically far superior opponents by means of a defensive war against a mobilized Europe.

Thus the Russian general mobilization was actually to be viewed as a "hostile act," which could be parried only by an attack on Germany's part.

The idea of the Tsar that Germany could calmly have accepted the Russian general mobilization would have been correct if the neutrality of France and England had been guaranteed, or if the military forces of Germany and Austria had been sufficient to oppose effectively, on the defensive, the mobile and marshaled forces of Russia and France. But this was not the case. Apart from the purely numerical superiority of the Russian and French forces with 192 divisions against 135 German and Austrian divisions, the unfavourable frontier conditions of Germany had to be considered.

Although the Tsar in his telegram to the German Emperor guaranteed that the Russian army would not overstep the frontier, this had no practical value. Germany's danger lay not in the fact that this or that patrol or a few squadrons of cossacks might violate the frontier and perhaps disturb in a trivial manner the German mobilization. The important factor, as we have seen, was that the operative defense against the Russian and French mobilization could not be postponed. And furthermore the Tsar would not even have been in a position to make good his word. The events which transpired later have proved this beyond a doubt. To substantiate this we shall cite a skir-

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mish in the vicinity of Soldau concerning which the German General Staff reports as follows: <sup>156</sup>

“Already two hours later (i. e., after presentation of the declaration of war) a small Russian detachment of Cossacks occupied the German post office in Klein-Zwalinnen on the border south of Lötzen); another was repulsed early on August 2 upon German territory at Sochem (20 kilometers south of Soldau) by German curassier posts. Both Russian detachments had crossed the frontier before the state of war could have been known to them. At that time the German troops had not yet received permission to cross the Russian frontier.

Russia’s action of mobilizing the entire fighting forces of the gigantic empire on land and sea was incontestable evidence of the fact that Russia had decided to make war on Germany, and that no hope remained that peace with Russia could be preserved.

### *The Defence against a War on Two Fronts*

Consequently the Russian general mobilization showed without a doubt that war was unavoidable for Germany and that this war would be one on two fronts at least. If we add the probable intervention of England whose first and second fleets had been lying off Portland since July 25 in closed battle array, there was the possibility of a war on three fronts. And if we conceive Germany and Austria after the outbreak of hostilities as a military unit, we must add Serbia as a factor and reckon with a war on four fronts. Then, if we take into consideration the uncertainty of the Italian ally and reflect on the pos-

sibility of intervention by Denmark, against which Germany had to maintain a strong frontier guard at the outbreak of the war, we must realize that Germany was actually confronted by a situation which can only be characterized by the words: Enemies on all sides.

Surveying the military situation which faced Germany early in August, 1914, and which has been described above, we understand why Germany could not afford to await inactively the outbreak of hostilities. She had to utilize her slight remaining advantage of operation on the inner line and defend herself as best she could.

Accordingly the struggle of the Central Powers against the expected coalition of Russia, Serbia, France, Belgium and England required not only the speediest mobilization and marshaling of the German and Austrian forces but also an immediate attack for the purpose of making the operative co-operation of the enemies impossible. The enemies, still spatially separated, had to be warded off before they could join for purposes of operation. While it was essential for the Central Powers to begin hostilities as soon as possible, the situation for the Allies was precisely the opposite. They had to try to complete their mobilization and to finish marshaling their forces before resorting to an attack.

For the purpose of defence against this situation, which by no means invited to war, the German General Staff had since the beginning of the century adopted the plan outlined by General von Schlieffen, namely of defeating, by means of an offensive, that opponent who was strongest and who could be most readily attacked—France. If neutral territory were not to be invaded, Germany's of-

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fensive against France could be executed only along the short line between Switzerland and Luxemburg. But the territory facing this line could not be rapidly invaded on account of the concrete construction of the forts and barriers at the frontier. The accuracy of this assumption was later proved by the struggles at Verdun, which alone cost Germany several hundred thousand men.

At the beginning of the campaign, therefore, the hopeless struggles for the French Thermopylean passes had to be avoided and the attempt made to invade northern France by strategically circling around the left flank of the enemy. But the protection of the German industrial region made it necessary also to create a *glacis*, which could only be obtained by carrying the war into the enemy's country. Thus we see that the Russian general mobilization forced Germany to resort to an offensive against France, and that this offensive had to be conducted in Belgium.

### *The Invasion of Belgium*

We have seen that the inevitability of a war on two or more fronts made it imperative to invade Belgium as soon as possible.<sup>157</sup> On August 3, that is on the second day of mobilization, at 4.30 P. M., the invasion of Belgium was ordered. As we know from the experience of the struggles for Liège, a postponement of this step would have rendered even more doubtful the success of this action against the fortress which was so essential for the prosperous outcome of the early operations.

The invasion of Belgium, considered absolutely necessary from a military point of view, had to be preceded

by an ultimatum in order to avoid the charge that Belgium had simply been assaulted. For this would have reacted very unfavourably upon the neutral world. As a necessary prerequisite for an ultimatum to Belgium demanding undisturbed invasion by the German troops, the Imperial Chancellor felt that Germany had to be in a state of war. According to the Chancellor, who had a highly developed sense of law, this was necessary because Germany had to plead that dire necessity compelled her to demand the right to invade Belgium. But the idea of dire necessity presupposed an actual danger. From the jurist's point of view the dire necessity could not be motivated conditionally, i. e. provided Germany might get into a war with France and Russia.

Hence it was essential that the state of war, as a prerequisite for the invasion of Belgium which was to begin on the third day of mobilization at the latest, should actually have begun at that time. But the military authorities and the commanding officers had to know by 2 P. M. that the invasion was sanctioned politically.

It has been charged, by Germans themselves, that the declaration of war on Russia should not have been made. The war would have developed without it, and the odium of a military attack would not have been borne by the Germans. As the developments showed, it was certain that the war on the eastern front would begin with frontier skirmishes.

But there are important objections against this theory, too. It would have been very uncertain to allow the outbreak of the war, which was required by the second day of mobilization as an argument of necessity with respect to Belgium, to depend upon incalculable events such as

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frontier skirmishes. Then, too, there was the danger that Russia might have denied or even excused violations of the frontier which would have occurred. The result would have been a vain waiting on Germany's part for the beginning of hostilities, and the loss of the opportunity to play her trump card, namely the speedy offensive against France through Belgium. If on the other hand Germany had invaded Belgium before being at war with one of her two chief opponents, she would at the outset have been at a still greater disadvantage from the point of view of international law.

With the general mobilization of Russia, which under the circumstances was bound to be followed by the mobilization of France, the war had become a fact.<sup>158</sup>

Concerning Germany's necessity of opening hostilities after the general mobilization in Russia the American historian William L. Langer of Clark University in Worcester, Mass. has recently expressed himself as follows:

As for the principle that mobilization means war, it seems downright incredible that even a Frenchman could think that Germany would allow the concentration of the enormous Russian army on her frontiers, with every chance that the French army also would be put on a war footing, and then throw away the only chance of German success, which depended upon a speedier mobilization of an inferior number of troops. A German statesman who neglected to answer a Russian mobilization in 1914 by the opening of hostilities would have been guilty of criminal neglect.<sup>159</sup>

*The Declaration of War on France*

At the beginning the declaration of war on France was based upon the same considerations which we have discussed in the case of Russia. After the expiration of the respite of 18 hours war was to be declared on France, too. The Emperor had consented to the tenor of the declaration, and the Bundesrat, too, had agreed that in case the reply from France were unsatisfactory the declaration of war should be presented in Paris.

The intention was not carried out on August 2 because Lichnowsky's telegram concerning the supposed neutrality of England and France had brought it about that during the evening of the 1st the situation was for a while judged differently. Moreover assurance had been given that the German troops would not cross the French frontier before 7 P. M. of the 3rd. From the military point of view it was not deemed necessary even on August 2 to send the declaration of war to France because it could be assumed that war would develop of its own accord on the French border. Finally the invasion of Belgium, which was ordered for the afternoon of the third, decided the question of the presentation of the declaration of war to France. The invasion made it necessary to establish clear relations with France, too.

In addition it would seem to us that two telegrams from London acted as a stimulation for the presentation of the declaration of war to France.

Thus in a telegram of Lichnowsky to the Foreign Office, which arrived on August 2 at 11.40 P. M., Crowe is reported to have said that the news of the German

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troops crossing the French frontier near Nancy, without a previous declaration of war in Paris, had made a bad impression and would probably be not without influence upon the final decision.

On August 3, at 12.25 P. M., another telegram from Lichnowsky arrived stating that "Advance into France without war has had an ominous effect here and has seriously offended the English sense of justice."<sup>160</sup> Half an hour after the transmission of this telegram the German declaration of war on France was on the wire.

It is impossible to determine at this time the effect of the reports in question. At any rate they show very clearly how intent England—and, we may say, Sir Eyre Crowe—was upon influencing Germany to send a declaration of war to France. It is not easy to suppress the suspicion, especially if we bear in mind the character of Sir Eyre Crowe, which is now better known, that he was engaging in a diplomatic manœuver.

In reply to the reasons cited for the presentation of the declaration of war to France it may be said that there was a possibility that Poincaré, who had already declared in the session of the ministerial council on August 1 that France "will not let war be declared upon her,"<sup>161</sup> might have lost his head—temperamental as he was—and finally declared war on Germany. Though we will not dismiss this possibility, yet we consider it natural that this point of view was not entertained during the early days of August, 1914. If the Germans had invaded Belgium without a declaration of war on Russia and France, the result would have been that England would have had her desired pretext for war and that Russia and France would have followed her into the war. It cannot be said



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that such a course would have had any advantages for Germany either during or after the war.

Nor can it be said that after the declaration of the state of war every possibility of re-establishing peace had vanished. As a matter of fact the personal negotiations between the Tsar and the Emperor continued after the declaration of the state of war. If France had really cherished the desire of avoiding a war with Germany, she would have found occasion to do this even after receipt of the notice that Germany considered herself as having been forced into a state of war by France. In this connection we call attention to the attempted mediation of Wilson during early August, 1914. Additional American documents, now available, throw new light upon this move.<sup>162</sup> France could have declared through Washington that the frontier violations committed (or suspected by Germany) did not actually occur, or, if they did, were committed contrary to the wishes of the French Government. The French Government might have added that under these circumstances it believes that the assumption that Germany was forced into war by France is based upon an error and that in the interest of maintaining peace it still desires to bring about an understanding. But as a matter of fact France did not have the desire to maintain peace, as the French reply to the German ultimatum clearly showed.

These thoughts, which to many may seem rather utopian, are merely intended to show that the outbreak of the war between Germany and France cannot be traced for its cause to the declaration of war. This is done in the introduction to the Treaty of Peace. And Poincaré has always succeeded in representing it thus to his coun-

trymen. The truth of the matter is that on August 3 the war had become a fact; it had grown out of the political and military situation. The declarations of war were merely the means of carrying out the stipulation of a paragraph which had been agreed upon in the "Peace Conference" of 1907.

### *Austria's Declaration of War on Russia*

We must now meet the objection in the ultimatum that while Germany declared war on Russia, Austria still seemed to hesitate. Austria's decision to declare war on Russia was reached at the time of the personal report of Count Berchtold to his Emperor on August 3.<sup>163</sup> The declaration of war itself was presented in St. Petersburg on August 5 by Count Szápáry. The note read as follows:

Telegram. Vienna, August 5, 1914.

I request Your Excellency to present to the Minister for Foreign Affairs there the following note:

The undersigned Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has the honour, in the name of his Government, to bring to the notice of His Excellency, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the following:

In view of the threatening attitude assumed by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Serbia, and in consequence of the fact that, according to a communication from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has deemed it necessary as a result of this conflict to open hostilities against Germany, and whereas the latter is now in a state of war with the aforesaid Great Power, Austria-Hungary considers herself likewise at war with Russia.

After having presented this note, Your Excellency will request the issuance of your passes and leave im-

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mediately with the entire personnel of the embassy, except for organs which may possibly be left behind. At the same time we are handing M. von Schebeko his passes.

The report that Germany was at war with Russia did not reach Vienna until the afternoon of August 2.<sup>164</sup> In this telegram the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, Count Szögyény, had reported that Russian troops had crossed the German frontier and that Russia had attacked Germany. Germany therefore regarded herself as in a state of war with Russia. There would be no declaration of war on the part of Germany. Hence it is easy to see why Austria deemed it unimportant to hurry with her own declaration of war on Russia, especially since there was no reason for hastening, through such a declaration, the opening of hostilities, which was strategically undesirable.

Perhaps Austria's delay in sending the declaration of war to Russia was prompted also by the fear that such a declaration to Russia would soon have to be followed by a similar step with regard to France. Austria was anxious to postpone the declarations of war on France and England, since she did not wish to expose the coast along the Adriatic to premature bombardment—before the complete mobilization of her fleet.

#### SUMMARY

1. The presentation of the declarations of war was merely a formal act defining the state created by the facts.
2. Prior to the presentation of the declarations of war,

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a war on two fronts had become unavoidable for Germany, and a war on three fronts seemed probable.

The reasons were as follows:

- a. the fact that the British fleet had been kept in a state of mobilization;
- b. the secret order decreeing a "period of preparation for war" in Russia;
- c. the decree of the general Russian mobilization instead of the announced partial mobilization without the requisite previous notification;
- d. The evasive reply of France to the German question, which, in view of the "alliance franco-russe," made the participation of France in the war certain;
- e. the refusal of England to preserve a neutral attitude in a war between Germany and France, even on condition that Germany renounced an invasion of Belgium;
- f. the agreement of England to protect the coast of northern France, which was practically equivalent to England's participation in the war on sea.

3. The inevitability of the war on two fronts required that Germany, in order to maintain her threatened existence, should open as soon as possible her war of defence to be waged in an offensive manner.

4. The immediate invasion of Belgium was a necessity required by the military situation.

5. To justify the invasion of Belgium, the existence of a state of emergency was requisite, and this could only be considered well-established from the point of view of the outside world if Germany were actually in a state of war with Russia or France or with both.

6. The necessity of beginning operations by the eve-

ning of the second day of mobilization at the latest, and of initiating formally the state of war prerequisite for the invasion of Belgium, rendered the presentation of the declarations of war at this time necessary.

7. A communication to France that the state of war between Germany and France had begun was considered necessary even by England.

8. The military reports incorporated in the declaration of war on France and proved subsequently to be incorrect in part, had no bearing upon the course of events.

#### 10. DELIBERATE PLOTTING AND EXECUTION OF THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR.

On this subject the ultimatum states:

After reading what the German Delegation has to say in self-defence, the Allied and Associated Powers are satisfied that the series of events which caused the outbreak of the war was deliberately plotted and executed by those who wielded the supreme power in Vienna, Budapest and Berlin.

Here perhaps the most serious reproach is made against the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments, namely that they "deliberately" plotted and executed the events leading to the outbreak of the World War.

The "series of events" which caused the outbreak of the war and to which the reproach of deliberate plotting is attached, is not outlined in detail. Of course this circumstance makes it impossible to refute the charge in a precise manner. Moreover the judges of Versailles neglect to distinguish between the Austro-Serbian War and the

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World War—a distinction which is essential at this point of the indictment.

In judging Austria's action against Serbia in July, 1914, the mistake is often made of opening the "series of events" with Austria's ultimatum against Serbia and of representing the assassination of Serajevo as an act committed out of a clear sky, as it were, by a few Serbian nationalists. And emphasis is always laid on the fact that they were Austro-Hungarian nationals.

Meanwhile the numerous publications on the assassination at Serajevo <sup>165</sup> have radically modified the ideas concerning Austria's action in 1914. And yet all these arguments are occasionally brushed aside with the statement that in 1914 Austria was not aware of them, and that therefore they cannot be used *ex post facto* as an excuse for the Austrian attitude. Though we can admit this objection only with the restriction that Austria's information concerning Serbia's part in the assassination was intuitively correct, yet in refuting the Versailles war guilt thesis so far as deliberate design in the Austro-Serbian conflict is concerned, we shall disregard all factors which were proved later, and limit ourselves to what was actually known in Vienna and Budapest during the summer of 1914.

As the preamble of the Austrian ultimatum <sup>166</sup> to Serbia states, the Royal Serbian ambassador, on March 31, 1909, made the following declaration in Vienna on behalf of his government:

Serbia recognizes that she was not affected in her rights by the fact accomplished in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that she will therefore accommodate herself to the decisions which the Powers will make in

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regard to Art. XXV of the Treaty of Berlin. By following the advice of the Great Powers she obligates herself to abandon the attitude of protest and opposition which she has taken since last October with regard to the annexation. And she obligates herself further to change the course of her present policy toward Austria-Hungary and in future to live in friendly neighbourly relations with the latter.

During the years after the annexation crisis Serbia did not by any means live up to the obligations herein expressed. During the period from 1909 to 1914 the entire policy of the Serbian government was bent upon fulfilling the national aspirations of the Kingdom—a policy which was possible of accomplishment only at the expense of Austria. These activities aimed to wrest the South Slavic provinces of Austria-Hungary from the Dual Monarchy and to prepare them for a fusion with the Kingdom. The movement was not restricted to the two provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It extended also to Croatia, Slavonia, Southern Hungary, Krain, Dalmatia, Southern Styria and Southeastern Carinthia. The annexation of Montenegro by Serbia was also a part of this policy. Thus the South Slavic propaganda emanating from Serbia signified an extraordinarily serious menace, and to combat it was a real vital interest of the Dual Monarchy.

The political aim of the “unification of all South Slavs under the Serbian flag” was pursued from Belgrade with means which are possible only in a country to which Western European civilization is still quite alien. This peculiar mentality of Serbia, which cannot be appraised by the standards of European ethics but must be under-

stood in its peculiarity, constituted an extraordinarily difficult problem for the Dual Monarchy. Perhaps it would have been possible to get control of the situation by drastic measures such as were advocated by the master of the ordnance, Potiorek. On the other hand there was the striving to promote the development of the country from within—an effort which proved a failure.

Through countless assassinations which probably originated on the private initiative of Serbian propaganda organizations but which were not only tolerated but even supported by the government, the prestige of the Dual Monarchy in the South Slavic provinces was diminished.<sup>167</sup> The extent and objectives of this propaganda are best seen from the memorial of the “Narodna Odbrana,” which could not have been unknown to the Austrian Government. The Serbian Government was bold enough to permit the published regulations of the “Narodna Odbrana,” the principal organization of the Serbian propaganda, to be sold openly in book-stores.<sup>168</sup>

By two passages from the by-laws of the “Narodna Odbrana” we shall show the spirit prevailing in this organization.

The “Narodna Odbrana” takes the position that through the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina the invasion from the north against our provinces has manifested itself. Hence it regards Austria as our foremost and greatest enemy and represents Austria to our people in this light.

And again:

For the lesson which we learned from the annexation was: We must prepare ourselves most thoroughly



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with all our power and with the utmost tenacity. Let the state officially muster its forces and let private initiative muster its volunteer forces. Let us prepare, let us prepare without cessation for the struggle which the annexation shows us is coming.

Thus the assassination of June 28, 1914, was not the beginning of a national Serbian movement, but was the result of a propaganda prepared for years from Belgrade. Field Marshal Conrad is correct when in his memoirs he characterizes the assassination as Serbia's "declaration of war" on Austria.

But the attitude of Serbia after the assassination, too, proved to every one who was familiar with the conditions that Serbia sympathized entirely with the execution of the crime. Though, as the *Report* states, Serbia expressed her sympathy in proper manner and declared herself ready to ascertain the guilty persons "if the Viennese Government is of the opinion that there were Serbian accomplices in this matter," she did nothing during the four weeks intervening between the crime and the presentation of the Serbian ultimatum which might have helped to clear up the act. There is every indication that the Serbian Government made a secret investigation of the crime.<sup>169</sup> But nothing was ever published concerning the results. On the contrary, Serbia made the outside world believe "that the matter did not concern the Serbian Government."<sup>170</sup> And the Secretary General in the Serbian Foreign Office even told the British chargé Mr. Crackanthorpe the falsehood: "of Princip the Serbian Government knew nothing."<sup>171</sup>

That even after presenting its answer to the Austrian ultimatum the Serbian Government did not seriously intend to yield is shown by the fact that Serbian mobiliza-

tion was already decreed at 3 P. M., while the reply was not handed to Austria before 6 P. M.<sup>172</sup>

If we summarize the entire attitude of the Serbian Government from March 31, 1909, the day of the aforementioned declaration, up to the time of Serbia's reply to the Austrian ultimatum, we must see in it a continuous provocation of Austria, and certainly a deliberate provocation. Consequently the charge of deliberate plotting in the Austro-Serbian conflict applies not to the Dual Monarchy but rather to the Belgrade Government and to the organizations upon which this government depended and from which it derived its support.

This Serbian intent of provoking Austria in order to attain the realization of the Pan-Serbian ideal by continual diminution of the prestige of the Dual Monarchy would not have been possible if Serbia had not found in Russia a steadfast protector and helper in her aspirations. In the spring of 1913 Sazonov said to the Serbian minister in St. Petersburg that "we (sc. the Serbians) must work for a future time when we should acquire much territory from Austria-Hungary."<sup>173</sup> A few days before, on May 6, 1913, Sazonov in a letter to the Russian minister in Belgrade, Hartwig, wrote the words: "Serbia's promised land lies upon the territory of the Austria-Hungary of today."<sup>174</sup> His purpose at the time was to dissuade the Serbians from pursuing plans to annex Bulgarian territory. The actual extent of Russia's, and especially Hartwig's, influence in Serbia can only be fully ascertained once the diplomatic correspondence between St. Petersburg and Belgrade becomes accessible. Not until then will we be able to judge what a menace Serbia, backed up by Russia, was for the aging Monarchy.<sup>175</sup> The Rus-

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sian Professor Pokrowski, who is probably the best informed authority on the Russian antecedents of the World War, told the present writer in a conversation on the origins of the war that in his opinion Serbia was nothing more than a tool in the hands of Russia.

The Russian policy after the Balkan wars was not restricted to an attempt to incite Serbia and Montenegro against Austria-Hungary. Russia was also at work alienating Roumania from the Triple Alliance. This policy was revealed clearly in the meeting of the Tsar with the King of Roumania at Constanza on June 14, 1914. And in passing we mention the fact that these successes were accomplished with French money. Just as he did in the case of Serbia, so Sazonov worked with Roumania, too, viz. by holding forth the promise of foreign territory. We know this from his own memoirs, wherein he relates with a rare candor how on an automobile trip with Bratianu he crossed the Hungarian border into that part of Transylvania which is inhabited partly by Roumanians, in order to show Bratianu what Roumania could gain by allying herself with Russia.<sup>176</sup>

But Russia's influence was not limited to diplomatic communications which showed that at the given moment Russia would be ready to distribute Austrian territory among the Balkan states. Russia's influence over Serbia was even more far-reaching. There were very close relations between the general staffs of Russia and Serbia, principally concerning the exchange of information. There can hardly be any doubt today that the legendary report on the meeting of the Emperor and the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Konopischt, where the war of the Central Powers against Serbia is said to have been plotted,

was concocted by the Russian military attaché in Belgrade, Artamanoff, and communicated to the Serbian general staff. According to the Serbian professor Stanovitch, this communication gave the final impulse to the assassination of Sarajevo.<sup>177</sup>

Russia's influence and Serbia's attitude after the presentation of the Austrian note are expressed most clearly in the Tsar's telegram to King Alexander, wherein the latter is assured of Russia's help in the coming conflict.<sup>178</sup>

Serbia however was supported not only by Russia but also by the ally of the Tsar's empire, viz. France. For a long time France had supported the Pan-Slavic aspirations of Serbia. After the reception of King Peter in Paris (November, 1911) the Russian minister in Belgrade, Hartwig, had a talk with the Serbian minister for foreign affairs, Milanovitch. The latter spoke to him as follows concerning his impressions gained in Paris and his conversations with French statesmen:<sup>179</sup>

In full agreement with Russia, France is ready to further in every respect the realization of the national aspirations of Serbia.

This policy was constantly adhered to by France until the summer of 1914. In Serbia's reply to Austria France also had a hand. As Poincaré reports in his memoirs, Viviani sent a telegram on the 24th from aboard the "France" to St. Petersburg, London and Paris, wherein he made concrete suggestions concerning Serbia's attitude toward the Austrian demands.<sup>180</sup> Since in this telegram the demand for an international investigation was contained, which was incorporated at the close of the Serbian reply, it is natural to assume that in the interview mentioned by the French expert Renouvin<sup>181</sup> as having

taken place between Berthelot and the Serbian minister in Paris, Vesnich, the French views concerning the reply to Austria were discussed and transmitted by Vesnitch to Belgrade.

Hence in the attitude of Russia and France toward the policy to be pursued by Serbia we clearly detect a deliberate hostility against Austria.

Since we have now seen that the charge of deliberate plotting and execution of the events which led to the war applies to Serbia, Russia and France, we shall examine the question how far Austria revealed a premeditated will to war in her action against Serbia.

If Germany and Austria-Hungary had had the premeditated idea of availing themselves of a conflict between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia to conjure up a European war, they could easily have found an opportunity during the London ambassadors' conference of 1912-1913. But precisely during this period of conflict Germany was striving zealously, in conjunction with England, to preserve peace in the Balkans. This fact is openly acknowledged by Grey also.<sup>182</sup>

The propaganda-makers of Germany's enemies soon realized this flaw in their argument. The attempt has been made to compensate for it by inventing the legend that during Emperor William's visit with Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June, 1914, at Konopischt, the war was plotted.

Although this legend has now been discredited, we will for the sake of completeness repeat the outstanding facts known about the interview in Konopischt. A detailed report was sent by minister von Treutler on June 14 to Undersecretary of State Zimmermann. From this report

it appears that on the second day of the stay in Konopischt two political conversations took place between Emperor William and the archducal heir apparent, one before dinner and another after dinner. The conversation did not concern Serbia, nor was there any discussion of any war-like plans or intentions.<sup>183</sup>

In the "Proletarian Revolution," No. 30, extracts of which are published under the title "Aus russischen Quellen" in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, March, 1925, there is on p. 169 a report of the Russian minister in Vienna, Schebeko, to Sazonov concerning the meeting in Konopischt of June 13-16, 1914. The Russian Professor Pokrowski approves this report in the following words:

The German investigators of the question of war guilt have immediately cited a whole mass of evidence to prove that at the last meeting of Franz Ferdinand and William in Konopischt only Roumania was discussed and Serbia was not mentioned. The simultaneous secret report of the Russian ambassador in Vienna confirms the German version.

In Fieldmarshal Conrad's work *Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906 bis 1918*, Vol. IV, p. 36, the following is said about an audience of Conrad with Emperor Franz Joseph at Schönbrunn on July 5, 1914:

The conversation immediately turned to the political situation. His Majesty understood it completely and realized its seriousness. I also told His Majesty that I believed war against Serbia was inevitable.

His Majesty: "Yes, that is quite right, but how are you going to wage war if they all pounce upon us, especially Russia?"

I. "We are protected in the rear by Germany."

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His Majesty looked at me questionably and said: "Are you sure of Germany?" He added that he had instructed the heir-apparent, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, to ask the German Emperor in Konopischt whether we could depend absolutely upon Germany. But the German Emperor evaded the question and did not answer.

This also shows that the German Emperor did not desire to discuss in Konopischt the matter of supporting the Dual Monarchy in a war with Russia nor the question of a war against Serbia.

That Emperor William's political view was not turned against Serbia at all, and that he was indeed prejudiced in favour of Serbia, appears from the utterance of the Hungarian premier Count Tisza of July 1, 1914 (*Austrian Red Book*, 1919, Part I, No. 2):

These are the principal points which in my opinion make energetic action an absolute necessity, and since the pending visit of Emperor William may offer the opportunity, I considered it my duty to approach Your Majesty with the most humble request to use the presence of Emperor William in Vienna as an occasion to combat the prejudice of the latter in favour of Serbia by means of the recent revolting occurrences and to urge him to support actively our own Balkan policy.

In the authentic reports on the interviews in Konopischt there appears not the slightest evidence that in Konopischt a war against Serbia was plotted or that the question was even touched upon.

Nor is there any evidence in the new documents now published by Germany that on any other occasion Ger-

many and Austria engaged in any negotiations for the alleged purpose.

If therefore it is out of the question that in Konopischt Germany and Austria deliberately plotted war against Serbia, and if it is true that such a war was not even discussed there, yet a war between Austria and Serbia became imminent after the assassination at Serajevo and the mission of Count Hoyos in Berlin.

There is no doubt that in the discussions on July 5 in Potsdam the possibility of war between Austria and Serbia was considered and that the chances for the spreading of the conflict over Europe were realized—though insufficiently. In consequence of the assassination at Serajevo and in the light of Serbia's attitude toward the Dual Monarchy, there existed undoubtedly a *justa causa belli*, which would have justified Austria-Hungary in making stern ultimative demands upon Serbia and in invading Serbia upon rejection of these demands. It was not at all necessary, as the ultimatum states, to invent a series of events, since Serbia had herself furnished good grounds for an active policy on Austria's part.

But that Austria, despite all these circumstances, considered warlike action against Serbia only as an *ultima ratio regis* and hoped to settle the conflict in a peaceful manner, though realizing the slight possibility of doing so, appears from the following facts.

Upon presentation of the memorial which the Austrian chief of section in the Foreign Office, Count Hoyos, handed to Count Szögyény on July 5 for transmission to the German Emperor, the possibility of a war between Austria and Serbia was not mentioned. The memorial stated only that a radical change would have to take place



in the Balkan policy, and that the Monarchy was confronted by the dire necessity "of tearing with a resolute hand the threads which its opponents would fain weave as a net over its head." Therein lay the possibility of war with Serbia, but surely not the deliberate intention of bringing about a war with the help of definite events.

In agreement with the Imperial Chancellor, the conflict was regarded by the Emperor as a matter which Austria would have to settle according to her own decision. Count Hoyos in his work *Der deutsch-englische Gegensatz* entertains the view that Count Berchtold would have been ready, in opposition to the public sentiment prevailing in Austria, to commit himself to "a program of waiting and of avoiding the struggle with Serbia provided he had been advised to pursue such a policy in connection with his question in Berlin." But this would have been equivalent to a renunciation on Austria's part of her position in Europe and would have deprived her of all prestige in the South Slavic parts of the Monarchy.<sup>184</sup> Meanwhile it remains an open question to what extent the interpretation of Count Hoyos is correct. Berchtold's determination after the presentation of the Serbian reply, to proceed with the action against Serbia despite the energetic protest of the Imperial Chancellor, does not indicate that Austria was very prone to comply with Germany's advice to accept this humiliation from Serbia.

Austria's resolution to bring about a war with Serbia at any cost is usually taken for granted on the ground that her ultimatum to Serbia was entirely unacceptable for the latter and indeed intended by the Dual Monarchy to be so. But this view is refuted by the very reliable testimony of the chief of the section on ecclesiastical policies in the

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Austrian foreign office. In his book *Das Haus am Ballplatz* Musulin writes as follows: <sup>185</sup>

I must make certain statements here which are essential in the interests of historical truth.

The legend generally accredited today has it that Count Tisza entertains scruples against the draft of the note from the very beginning. In reply thereto I can say that Count Tisza was not opposed to the draft as such, and that he merely suggested modifications of individual points in the draft as it gradually took definite shape. These modifications were readily accepted by the other ministers. On the other hand it is a fact that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia had to be preserved even in case of war. A third statement which I must make here is that although the final text of the note was gradually made much sharper than that of the original draft, yet the ministers in their confidential conversations at no time expressed the thought that the conditions of the note were to be made unacceptable for Serbia. On the contrary—I can speak only of what I know and of what I myself have heard—, in the formulation of each individual point in the list of demands and in the note to Serbia the query was raised whether the demand in question, which had to be made on Serbia in order to win more than a mere shallow diplomatic victory, would and could be accepted by Serbia. And in every case the formulation of the point in question was not considered final until this query had been answered in the affirmative.

In regard to the acceptability of the Austro-Hungarian demands by Serbia I should like to add a few remarks.

After the text of the draft had been finished and the day approached on which the note was to be presented in Belgrade, the popular opinion in the Ministry for

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Foreign Affairs was that Serbia would surely accept the conditions. There were only a few pessimists who thought that Russia would not permit Serbia to accept our demands. No one thought that Serbia would reject them of her own accord.

Even if we refuse to accept the statement of Musulin concerning the guiding motives of the authors of the ultimatum, there can be no doubt that the attitude of Austria from the time before the assassination up to the moment of the presentation of the declaration of war on Serbia, was subject to decided fluctuations, and that there was no thought of any determined programmatic will to war.

Although at first the German Government believed in the probability of a war between Austria and Serbia, yet it had no deliberate intention of bringing about such a war between the Dual Monarchy and the restless Balkan power. The characteristic trait of the policy pursued by Germany in the Austro-Serbian conflict was the desire to leave to Austria-Hungary full freedom in choosing the measures necessary for destroying the backbone of the Serbian propaganda. "Austria wishes," we read in the telegram of Bethmann Hollweg to Prince Lichnowsky of July 28—"and she has not only the right but also the duty—to have assurance that her existence will not be further undermined by the Pan-Serbian agitation which has finally found its expression in the crime of Sarajevo." It was not considered a matter of concern for Germany in what way Austria-Hungary might carry out this intention. Moreover Germany continually strove, though in vain, to localize the Austro-Serbian conflict. How little interested the German Government was in a warlike encounter between Austria and Serbia is seen most clearly in the

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advice which the German Government gave Vienna after the arrival of the Serbian reply. The proposal "Halt in Belgrade" is incontestable proof of this. And it should be emphasized that, although the documents do not contain it, there was a strong feeling that Austria would be able to occupy Belgrade and several other points without any important struggle. That such occupations of foreign territory are possible without a struggle and without a declaration of war when the attacked party is considerably weaker than the other was proved by the Ruhr occupation of Poincaré in 1923. At that time Essen was occupied by the French troops without firing a single shot.

When the Austro-Serbian conflict threatened more and more to develop into a war between Austria and Russia and between Germany and Russia, the German Government left no stone unturned to forestall this possibility. The German warnings to Russia to undertake no mobilization measures which would call forth counter-measures on Germany's part are eloquent testimony for the fact that Germany was not at all interested in bringing about an armed conflict. The entire exchange of telegrams between the Emperor and the Tsar proves beyond a doubt that Germany strove with might and main to avoid a general war.

Since during the last days of the crisis it became very manifest that Germany was working for the maintenance of the peace of Europe, the allegation was invented that Germany only began pursuing a peace policy after she realized that Great Britain would participate in the war on the side of Russia and France. In other words, it is charged that not love of peace was the motive of the German policy but rather the fear of being compelled to wage

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the desired war against a coalition superior in military strength to herself by virtue of England's participation.

It hardly needs proof that a government deliberately desiring war with its neighbours in order to attain certain political objectives makes its necessary preparations in the most careful manner. In particular it may be assumed that the German general staff, which had always unjustly been charged by the propagandists with plotting and inciting war, would have prepared every detail of the stroke had the German Government planned war. But in the following pages we shall see that in spite of the political tension which the crime of Serajevo brought with it, the General Staff made no special preparations for the war. Its affairs went on just as they did in days of political calm. The holders of the responsible military positions in the army, the chief of the general staff and the minister of war show in their letters during this period that the danger of a threatening war was hardly realized by them and that they were far from wishing to conjure it up. Even during the final days of the crisis the reports of the Great General Staff to the Foreign Office reveal an objectivity in the judgment of conditions such as no general staff would have displayed had it been animated by the intention of bringing about a war. We quote the following facts to support this contention.

After his audience with Emperor William during the afternoon of July 5 the minister of war von Falkenhayn sent the following letter to the chief of general staff von Moltke, who was in Karlsbad for treatment:

July 5, 1914.

This afternoon His Majesty the Emperor and King commanded me to the New Palace in order to inform

me that Austria-Hungary seemed resolved to tolerate no longer the machinations carried on against her in the Balkan peninsula. For this purpose she plans to invade Serbia if necessary. In case Russia is unwilling to tolerate this, Austria does not intend to yield.

His Majesty believed that this was the correct interpretation of the words of the Austrian ambassador when he presented a memorandum of the Viennese government and a holograph letter of Emperor Franz Joseph this morning.<sup>186</sup>

I did not hear this conversation, hence I can not express an opinion on it. But His Majesty read to me the letter and the memorandum, and from these documents I gained the impression, as far as it was possible to gain any impression where the matter was presented so hastily, that the Viennese government had reached no firm decision. Both documents paint the situation of the Dual Monarchy as the result of the Pan Slavic activities in very gloomy colors. But neither of them speaks of a decision through war; they mention only "energetic" political steps, e. g. the conclusion of a treaty with Bulgaria, for which the support of the German Empire is requested.

This support is to be granted with the understanding that it is Austria-Hungary's own affair to take the steps necessary to her own welfare.

The Imperial Chancellor, who was also in Potsdam, seems to agree with me in discrediting the idea that the Austrian Government is serious in the tone of its language, which to be sure sounds more stern than usual. At any rate the Chancellor expressed no scruples against the planned trip to the Northland; indeed he recommended it. Surely the next few weeks will not bring any decision. It will be a long time before the treaty with Bulgaria is concluded. It will hardly be necessary for Your Excellency to cut short your stay at the baths. At any rate I deemed it advisable, though I have no instructions to that effect, to inform you that

the situation has become more tense, so that surprises which are always possible may not come entirely unexpectedly.

In expressing my sincere wish that your treatments at the baths may be successful, I remain in old respectful devotion and genuine esteem

Your

(Sgd.) von Falkenhayn.

On July 21 Moltke writes to his wife:

Now Thursday [i. e., July 23, the day on which the ultimatum was sent] is supposed to bring the decision. I am beginning to grow a little skeptical in this matter.

On the 26th Moltke writes:

The situation is still rather vague. The further development of the situation depends entirely upon Russia. If the latter undertakes no hostile act against Austria-Hungary, the war will remain localized.

And on July 27:

The situation is still very vague. It will not be clarified very soon. About two weeks more will elapse before one can tell anything definite. During this time you can stay peacefully in Bayreuth. You need not worry about me.

In these words written by the chief of the general staff to his wife there is no indication, either, that the German Government or the general staff had any intention of bringing about a war.

In the published transactions of the Parliamentary Committee of Investigation we find in the appendices to

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the military reports of Count Montgelas, dated December, 1920, several documents which show in a convincing manner that the German general staff and ministry of war took no steps during July, 1914, which would indicate deliberate planning of the war.<sup>187</sup> Of special value for the refutation of the charge that the war was deliberately premeditated are several letters of the Great General Staff between July 27 and 30. Upon the receipt of the telegram of Count Pourtalès<sup>188</sup> wherein the statement of Sazonov was contained "that nothing lay farther from Russia's mind than the desire for war," the Great General Staff informed the German military attaché in St. Petersburg that on the strength of this statement "no military measures on this side are planned."

How the Great General Staff itself interpreted the political situation is revealed by its letter to the Imperial Chancellor of July 29. We take the following passage from it:<sup>189</sup>

It cannot be denied that the affair has been cunningly contrived by Russia. While giving continuous assurances that she was not yet "mobilizing," but only making preparations "for an eventuality," that "up to the present" she had called no reserves to the colors, she has been getting herself so ready for war that, when she actually issues her mobilization orders, she will be prepared to move her armies forward in a very few days. Thus she puts Austria in a desperate position and shifts the responsibility to her, inasmuch as she is forcing Austria to secure herself against a surprise by Russia. She will say: You, Austria, are mobilizing against us, so you want war with us. Russia assures Germany that she wishes to undertake nothing against her; but she knows perfectly well that



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Germany could not remain inactive in the event of a belligerent collision between her ally and Russia. So Germany, too, will be forced to mobilize, and again Russia will be enabled to say to the world: I did not want war, but Germany brought it about. After this fashion things must and will develop, unless, one might say, a miracle happens to prevent at the last moment a war which will annihilate for decades the civilization of almost all Europe.

This document, too, certainly fails to reveal any intention of bringing about a war. To be sure, a later paragraph states that in case the conflict between Russia and Austria should prove inevitable, Germany would mobilize and be prepared to take up the war on two fronts. This document clearly shows the fear that a general war will develop from the "events" brought about by Russia.

Among the reports of the Great General Staff which were sent to the Foreign Office regularly between the 28th and the 30th,<sup>190</sup> the one of the 30th in particular gives evidence of that impartiality which we have already mentioned. Whoever reads this report without any pre-conceived notions will gain the distinct impression that the German General Staff was trying to pour oil upon the troubled waters and was not fanning the flame. Concerning France we read in this report:

Freight traffic on the frontier still partially intact. The work of equipping the factories continues. Reservists not yet called in. Those on furlough ordered back to the colors. Around Paris and at certain points along the railways in the interior the structures are under military guard apparently to protect them against sabotage.

Concerning England we read:

To judge by a remark of Grey, England does not seem willing to remain neutral in case of war between France and Germany. No reports received on mobilization of troops. Precautionary measures being taken by the English. Admiralty staff measuring all transport vessels.

Had the German General Staff really intended to stir up war deliberately or to place into the hands of its government reports which would have made it easier for the latter to incite the people to war, these reports could of course have been written in a quite different tenor. But as it is, the reports give evidence of the feeling of great responsibility which their authors had.

The charge that Germany deliberately plotted war is frequently made on the basis that the widening of the Kiel Canal was completed just at the time when the war broke out. But this was a pure coincidence.<sup>191</sup>

The widened channel of the canal, which had been finished on June 25, had not even been tested. On July 25 the "Kaiserin" was called back from the Northland trip in order to test the canal. The fleet returning from Norway did not use the canal. The first squadron crossed the North Sea to Wilhelmshaven, while the second and third squadrons went through the Skagerrak to Kiel. As late as the 31st the second and third squadrons were slowly towed, vessel by vessel, through the canal on account of the British fleet, which had been marshaled in battle array. Had there been any thought of a war early in July the trial voyage through the canal would certainly have taken place during the middle of July.

We shall not close this section without showing by an example the unscrupulous manner in which the hostile propaganda even after the war tried to bolster the thesis that the General Staff deliberately plotted the war. On July 30, 1914 "L'Homme Libre" published the following report:

We are assured that there was a meeting in Karlsbad between the Austrian chief of staff, General Conrad von Hoetendorff, and the German chief of staff, General von Moltke, prior to the presentation of Austria's note in Belgrade. General von Hoetendorff arrived in Karlsbad by automobile on the 22nd and talked with General von Moltke for almost two hours. Thereupon he immediately left Karlsbad, while Moltke left on the day of the presentation of the note in Belgrade. Upon leaving Karlsbad General von Moltke said: When we meet again, important changes will have occurred.

This strange, adventurous story was published in greater detail after the war, on May 1, 1922, by the London "Times." A former British vice-consul in Karlsbad wrote to the "Times" as follows:

"AFTER SERAJEVO."

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.

Sir,—You publish in to-day's issue of *The Times*, under the heading "After Serajevo," "What the Germans Knew," an interesting letter alleged to have been sent by Count Lerchenfeld to Count Hertling. Whatever this letter may prove, there can be little doubt but that the Germans knew, even before the ultimatum was sent by Austria to Serbia, what that ultimatum was to contain.

At the time of the outbreak of war I was British Vice-Consul at Karlsbad, and had held that position for four years. It was the custom of Count von Moltke and one or two of his brothers (two, if I am not mistaken) to come to Karlsbad every spring during the month of May for the "cure." In 1914 they arrived as usual and stayed the full 27 days, leaving again towards the end of the month.

Imagine our surprise, therefore, when General Count von Moltke reappeared a few weeks later. (I cannot at the moment give the exact date as I have not my records with me, but the essential facts are correct.) This surprise was still further increased when General Konrad von Hoetzendorf also appeared on the scene. General von Moltke gave out that he had come to make another cure, but he and General Konrad only stayed one week or less. This meeting occurred between the dates of the murder of the Archduke and the delivery of the ultimatum to Serbia.

Moreover, when leaving Karlsbad after this meeting, General von Moltke said to his landlord—an old friend with whom he had stayed for many years in succession.—"The next time we meet there will be great changes." This was known long before the Great War broke out, and it seems to prove that Germany was already bent on setting, not only Serbia, but the whole of Europe in flames.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

H. M. Gann.

Hotel, Cecil, Strand, W.C., April 29.

The "Zentralstelle für Erforschung der Kriegsursachen" thereupon investigated this statement, which found its way also into the American press. Investigation showed that it was not based upon facts. To prove its groundlessness we quote a letter from General von Conrad of December 15, 1922, to the present writer. It reads as follows:

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Your esteemed letter is the third inquiry which I have received concerning the Gann article.

I am astonished that such mendacious gossip should excite so much attention. Certainly the anxious desire of our opponents to exploit even the most obvious lies for the sake of proving their innocence shows how guilty they feel.

I had one single meeting with General von Moltke in Karlsbad, namely on May 12, 1914. It lasted from 6.30 P. M. to 10 P. M. and was in the nature of a polite, friendly call which I made upon the German comrade who was tarrying upon Austrian soil for treatment. It was the *last time* that I ever saw General von Moltke. All further details are to be found on p. 667, vol. 3 of my memoirs *Aus meiner Dienstzeit*.

This volume appeared early last November. All statements published about any meeting between me and General von Moltke after May 12, 1914, are fabrications pure and simple, like so many other things.

In justice to the "Times" we may say that this report of the alleged meeting of Moltke and Conrad during the critical days of July, 1914, found currency in German circles, too. But we must reproach the "Times" for having failed to publish a rectifying article which we handed to the representative of the paper in Berlin in 1922. We have not been able to ascertain how Mr. Gann, the "obedient servant" of the "Times," got the materials for his story.

The above example shows how zealously the hostile propaganda tried even after the war to prove Germany guilty of deliberate plotting.

If there is no proof that Germany made military preparations for a world war, there is just as little evidence

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that the German Government, in the endeavour to plot a war, took steps to win allies for its side.

Although the German Government knew that after the Balkan War Roumania showed strong inclination to ally herself with Russia and France, yet the *Deutsche Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch* reveal the fact that Germany made no energetic move to keep Roumania in the Triple Alliance.

The desire of Austria to win Bulgaria for the Triple Alliance in place of the uncertain ally Roumania was not considered in Germany prior to the presentation of the memorial by Count Hoyos on July 5. But the negotiations were soon dropped. And negotiations looking toward an alliance with Turkey were not begun until after the ultimatum had been sent.<sup>192</sup> Not even the pending Anglo-German agreement on the Bagdad railway and Mesopotamia was clenched when the war broke out. If Germany had prepared the war against Russia and France over a long period of time, as the authors of the ultimatum believe, it would have been natural for the German Government to make every effort to ratify the agreement prior to the outbreak of the war. Not until July 22 did the Secretary of State turn to Count von Wedel, the counselor in the Imperial suite, and request the Emperor to give the ambassador in London the necessary full powers to sign the agreement.<sup>193</sup> Although the agreement offered no guarantees that in case of a conflict between the Central Powers and the Dual Alliance England would remain neutral, yet the publication of the agreement would certainly have had a strong effect upon public opinion in England.

But the most convincing refutation of the charge that

Germany deliberately plotted war is found in the fact that the German Government had absolutely no objectives which it might have attained through a war with Russia and France. To this day the Allies have failed to prove that Germany had any definite, fixed war aim. This failure is covered over by the statement that Germany began the war in order to attain world domination. But even for this fantastic objective there is not the slightest concrete evidence. On the contrary, it requires no statesmanlike vision to realize that Germany, as Lichnowsky once put it, "had nothing to win and everything to lose" in this war.

In this connection we are reminded of a statement by a Turkish army leader, who was in diplomatic service for a long time. In a conversation which took place during the war he said, referring to Germany's position before the war, that Germany had made a mistake by failing to express any definite desires relative to territorial acquisition. Since the Germans had no desires, he said, her opponents could accuse her of desiring everything.

A documentary reflection of this view is found in a report of the American ambassador in London, Walter H. Page. He writes to Washington on August 4 that Sir Edward Grey has explained the alleged plans of Germany. Grey said that "once Germany has annexed Belgium, Holland and later Denmark will follow." And in his letter to Wilson of September 22, 1914, Page, speaking of the German war aims, has the effrontery to say that the German military party is consciously planning the actual conquest of the world. But after a few lines he must admit that the English will not take part in any peace negotiations except in Berlin. In other words, he continues, they will reject all conditions proposed by Ger-

many so long as the basis for her destruction has not been found.<sup>194</sup>

The situation among the Allies was quite different. Even a few months after the outbreak of the war we were in the possession of documents which revealed their real war aims in great detail. It was the constant striving of France to regain possession of the provinces lost in 1871. And it was the desire of St. Petersburg to get possession of the Straits by means of a European war.<sup>195</sup> Moreover the Allies wished to shatter completely Germany's position as a world power. Incontestable documents prove the existence of these objectives. We quote extracts from a few.

In a letter of the French ambassador Paléologue to the French minister for foreign affairs Delcassé, dated September 14, 1914, the following war aims are given "for the minister alone:"<sup>196</sup>

Lettre de M. Paléologue à M. Delcassé, à Bordeaux.

Nr. 613. Pétrograd, le 14 septembre 1914.

En chiffres.

Secret.

Pour le ministre seul.

Pendant un entretien tout amical, M. Sazonof a développé devant sir George Buchanan et moi ses idées nonofficielles sur la conduite que la Russie, l'Angleterre et la France devraient tenir si le succès actuel de leurs armées était couronné par une victoire décisive. "Nous devons, nous a-t-il dit, élaborer immédiatement un projet." J'ai dit que, selon moi, les ministres des affaires étrangères de Russie, de France et d'Angleterre devraient encore se concerter entre eux pour fixer les bases générales de l'ordre nouveau à établir en Europe. Ils communiqueraient ces bases à leurs alliés secondaires—Belgique, Serbie,



Monténégro. Ils les notifieraient ensuite collectivement à l'Allemagne et à l'Autriche. Le projet n'établirait que les bases pour fixer les conditions de paix et résoudre les difficultés. M. Sazonof, a, de son côté, approuvé cette manière de voir. Allant plus loin dans la voie des confidences, M. Sazonof nous a communiqué, à grands traits, comment il conçoit les remaniements que les trois alliés auraient intérêt à opérer dans la carte et la constitution de l'Europe.

1. L'objet principal des trois alliés serait de briser la puissance allemande et sa prétention de domination militaire et politique;

2. Les modifications territoriales doivent être déterminées d'après le principe des nationalités;

3. La Russie s'annexerait le cours inférieur du Niémen et la partie orientale de la Galicie. Elle annexerait au royaume de Pologne la Posnanie orientale et la Silésie et la partie occidentale de la Galicie;

4. La France reprendrait l'Alsace-Lorraine en y ajoutant à sa guise une partie de la Prusse rhénane et du Palatinat;

5. La Belgique obtiendrait dans <sup>197</sup> . . . un accroissement important de territoire;

6. La Sleswig-Holstein serait restitué au Danemark;

7. Le royaume de Hanovre serait restauré;

8. L'Autriche constituerait une monarchie tripartie, formée de l'empire d'Autriche, du royaume de Bohême et du royaume de Hongrie. L'empire d'Autriche comprendrait uniquement les "provinces héréditaires." Le royaume de Bohême comprendrait la Bohême actuelle et les Slovaques. Le royaume de Hongrie aurait à s'entendre avec la Roumanie au sujet de la Transylvanie;

9. La Serbie s'annexerait la Bosnie, l'Herzégovine, la Dalmatie et le nord de l'Albanie;

10. La Bulgarie recevrait de la Serbie une compensation en Macédoine;

11. La Grèce s'annexerait le sud de l'Albanie, à l'exception de Valona qui serait dévolue à l'Italie;

12. L'Angleterre, la France et le Japon se partageraient les colonies allemandes;

13. L'Allemagne et l'Autriche payeraient une contribution de guerre.

M. Sazonof nous a instamment priés, sir George Buchanan et moi, de n'attribuer aucune importance officielle "à cette esquisse d'un tableau dont la trame n'est pas encore tissée." Mais quelques mots qu'il m'a glissés à part m'ont fait comprendre qu'il tient à nous mettre d'ores et déjà dans l'ordre de ses idées et qu'il attache plus de prix que jamais à être en étroit contact avec nous."

#### Translation.

Letter from M. Paléologue to M. Delcassé in Bordeaux.

No. 613.

Petrograd, September 14, 1914.

In cipher.

Secret.

For the Minister alone.

During a very friendly conversation M. Sazonof developed before Sir George Buchanan and myself his unofficial ideas on the conduct which Russia, England and France should adopt if the present success of their arms were crowned by decisive victory. "We should immediately work out a draft," he said to us. I said that in my opinion the ministers for foreign affairs of Russia, France and England would have to come to an understanding among themselves in order to establish the general foundations of the new order to be established in Europe. They would communicate these foundations to their secondary allies, Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro. They would then announce them jointly to Germany and Austria. The

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project would establish only the bases for fixing the peace conditions and settling the difficulties. M. Sazonof for his part approved this view. Going still farther in the way of confidential revelation, M. Sazonof communicated to us in large outlines his idea of the changes which the three allies would be interested in effecting on the map and in the make-up of Europe.

1. The principal objective of the three Allies would be to break the German power and its claim to military and political domination;

2. The territorial modifications would have to be determined according to the principal of nationalities;

3. Russia would annex the lower course of the Niemen and the eastern part of Galicia. She would annex for the Kingdom of Poland eastern Posen and Silesia and the western part of Galicia;

4. France would regain Alsace-Lorraine and add to it a part of Rhenish Prussia and the Palatinate;

5. Belgium would obtain an important territorial acquisition in . . .<sup>198</sup>

6. Schleswig-Holstein would be restored to Denmark;

7. The Kingdom of Hanover would be restored;

8. Austria would form a tripartite monarchy composed of the Austrian empire, the kingdom of Bohemia and the Kingdom of Hungary. The Austrian empire would comprise only the "hereditary provinces." The kingdom of Bohemia would comprise present Bohemia and the Slovacks. The kingdom of Hungary would have to come to an understanding with Rumania on the subject of Transylvania;

9. Serbia would annex Bosnia, Herzegowina, Dalmatia and northern Albania;

10. Bulgaria would receive from Serbia a compensation in Macedonia;

11. Greece would annex southern Albania with the exception of Valona, which would fall to Italy;

12. England, France and Japan would divide the German colonies;

13. Germany and Austria would pay a war contribution.

M. Sazonof begged us earnestly—Sir George Buchanan and myself—not to attach any official importance “to this sketch of a portrait whose canvas has not yet been woven.” But certain words which he whispered to me aside gave me to understand that he is anxious to initiate us even now into his ideas and that he attaches more value than ever to close contact with us.

Yet the very confidential letter of Iswolski to Sazonov of October 13, 1914, shows that these war aims were not conceived in September, 1914; they originated before the war. We quote verbatim from this letter: <sup>199</sup>

In this connection Delcassé, alluding to the negotiations which took place at St. Petersburg in 1913, begged me insistently to call your attention to the fact that the demands and wishes of France had remained the same except for the unalterable desire to destroy the political and economic power of Germany.

A letter from Colonel House to President Wilson written from Europe on May 29, 1914, shows how well known these hostile designs of Russia and France were throughout the diplomatic world. House wrote: <sup>200</sup>

Whenever England consents, France and Russia will close in on Germany and Austria.

How the leading officials in the Foreign Office thought about the general war appears clearly from various passages in British documents. Sir Eyre Crowe wrote the

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following remark concerning a report of Buchanan dated July 24: <sup>201</sup>

The moment has passed when it might have been possible to enlist French support in an effort to hold back Russia.

It is clear that France and Russia are decided to accept the challenge thrown out to them. Whatever we may think of the merits of the Austrian charges against Serbia, France and Russia consider that these are the pretexts, and that the bigger cause of Triple Alliance versus Triple Entente is definitely engaged.

I think it would be impolitic, not to say dangerous, for England to attempt to controvert this opinion, or to endeavour to obscure the plain issue, by any representation at St. Petersburg and Paris.

The Undersecretary of State in the Foreign Office, Arthur Nicolson, agreed with these sentiments in the following words:

The points raised by Sir Eyre Crowe merit serious consideration, and doubtless the Cabinet will review the situation. Our attitude during the crisis will be regarded by Russia as a test and we must be most careful not to alienate her.

And Sir Edward Grey added:

Mr. Churchill told me to-day that the fleet can be mobilized in twenty-four hours, but I think it is premature to make any statement to France and Russia yet.

In a memorandum of July 31 Crowe expresses the English will to war even more forcibly, saying: <sup>202</sup>

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The question at issue is not whether we are capable of taking part in a war, but whether we should go into the present war. That is a question firstly of right or wrong, and secondly of political expediency.

But since, as we have seen, Crowe had already expressed the opinion that the question of right or wrong should be set aside as unessential, the only assumption which remains is that England entered the war for reasons of "political expediency."

Briefly summarizing once more the question of deliberate plotting, we reach the conclusion that after the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo Austria did indeed consider a war with Serbia probable. On the other hand there was no deliberate intention of provoking a war with Serbia under any circumstances so long as it was possible to win a sufficient diplomatic victory over Serbia which might in future assure the Dual Monarchy against the machinations directed against the existence of Austria-Hungary. Germany had consented to this action, which she regarded in the nature of a punitive expedition to be conducted with the understanding that the territorial *status quo* in the Balkans was to be preserved. Germany was not at all interested in provoking an Austro-Serbian war, not to mention a European war. On the contrary, she tried at first to localize the war itself to Austria and Serbia and, after the presentation of the Serbian reply, to limit it to the essential measure of an occupation of Belgrade.

So far as Austria-Hungary was concerned, any attempt on the part of her government to incite a war with Russia, not to say a world war, would have been diametrically

opposed to her interests. For Austria-Hungary it was important that she be given an opportunity to solve her difficulty with Serbia without interference on the part of the Great Powers of Europe. Her conditional intention to make war, so far as any existed at all, was limited to Serbia.

But if the charge that Germany deliberately plotted a European war is utterly unfounded, then too the deliberate intention of Russia and France to utilize the Austro-Serbian conflict as an occasion for the great reckoning between the Dual Alliance and the Triple Alliance must be considered established beyond the shadow of a doubt. And the evidence quoted above shows also that England was prompted by the same reason to join in the enterprise undertaken by Russia and France.

## II. GERMANY'S "CRIME" AGAINST HUMANITY

The covering note states:

In the view of the Allied and Associated Powers the war which began on August 1st, 1914, was the greatest crime against humanity and the freedom of peoples that any nation, calling itself civilized, has ever consciously committed.

And further:

The conduct of Germany is almost unexampled in human history.

In substantiation of this remark it is stated:

The terrible responsibility which lies at her doors can be seen in the fact that not less than seven million dead lie buried in Europe, while more than twenty

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million others carry upon them the evidence of wounds and sufferings, because Germany saw fit to gratify her lust for tyranny by resort to war.

In the foregoing sentences the accusations and vilifications of the Allies against Germany reach their climax. Never before in the history of mankind have victorious states stooped so low as to force a glorious opponent, who had laid down his arms in the good faith that he would be given the righteous peace which had been promised him, to sign a treaty of peace in the fact of such insults.

We shall refrain from discussing these indignities and exaggerated assertions. A single reading of these sentences is sufficient to impel one to reject them with indignation. If these words were to be taken seriously, then Germany would have to be held responsible not only for the outbreak of the war but even for its long duration. The unreasonableness of such a procedure is not hard to prove. The very war aims of the Allies which we have discussed in detail were of such a nature that Germany could never have agreed to them voluntarily. But we deem it imperative to emphasize that the idea of Germany's crime against humanity as here expressed is not merely the result of inexact phraseology or of a spontaneous outburst of feeling on the part of the authors of the covering note. Aside from the fact that the ultimatum and the covering note are official documents, which Lloyd George once characterized as parts of the Treaty of Versailles, the idea that Germany is a criminal state was expressed in public meetings not only during the war by statesmen of the Entente, but also in official documents after the war. As recently as 1924 Poincaré wrote to the Swedish bishops:



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France fervently wishes that a day may come when she will be able to forgive Germany the crime which the latter committed when she unchained the horrors of the war. France knows that it is the first prerequisite for forgiveness that the wrongdoer should feel compunction and change his conduct. France cannot help but believe that the wise counsels of the Swedish bishops would incline the hearts of Germany's rulers to such compunction and that thus these counsels will hasten the day of forgiveness.


Meanwhile of course the war psychology is disappearing, and everywhere reason is beginning to stir. However welcome this fact may be, yet it is accompanied by the danger that, carried away by our well-founded desire for a reconciliation with our former opponents, we may lose sight of that goal which for practical and moral reasons we must continue to pursue in the question of war guilt. Consequently it is necessary ever to keep before the attention of our own people and of those foreign countries which are well disposed, that it is no service to Germany to forget or condone Germany's alleged guilt in the war as expressed in the war guilt thesis of Versailles. We desire no mercy: what we require is nullification or revision of the unjust verdict. No matter whether this goal can be attained today or tomorrow or after many years, we shall not, we dare not be prevented from seeing it through to the end. A mere "forgetting" will help us and the rest of Europe far too little in a practical way because the unhappy consequences bound up with the false verdict of Versailles cannot be abolished by such a policy.

The false verdict concerning the responsibility for the war as it was expressed in Versailles is something new in

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the history of mankind. Hitherto it was not customary at the end of a war to examine the question of guilt, to pronounce a verdict and on the basis of the verdict to impose penalties upon the nations that were defeated in the struggle. If such a procedure had been carried out in a just manner, it might be considered a step forward in the development of the relations of the nations to each other. It might even serve as a means of limiting the outbreak of future wars. But since the manner in which the verdict was reached and the verdict itself are just as malicious as they are false, the procedure of Versailles constitutes a very dangerous precedent. In future, if this method remains in good repute, the victor will be able not only to make the vanquished a victim of pillage and servitude, but also to vilify him in the eyes of the world with the help of a one-sided and false verdict regarding the responsibility for the war, and to give even the most brutal conditions of peace the semblance of a righteous penalty.

And the "forgiveness" which Poincaré pictures to himself in his cynical letter to the Swedish bishops is of course even more out of the question for the German people; this would be based upon the supposition that the decisive majority of the German people is convinced that the nation and the government of 1914 must bear the responsibility for the "crime" of the world war. Relying upon the material now available to every one concerning the origin and the outbreak of the world war, the German people hold no such conviction. In words which will not be forgotten the President of the Reich gave expression to this axiom on the occasion of the Tannenberg celebration of September 18, 1927. He said:



MEMORIAL PLATE IN THE FOREST OF CAMPIÈRE



The charge that Germany is guilty of this, the greatest of all wars, we and the German people in all its elements reject of one accord. Not envy, hatred or lust for conquest placed the weapons into our hands. No, the war was for us the last resort, the extreme means of maintaining ourselves against a world of foes, and was bound up with supreme sacrifices on the part of the whole nation. With pure hearts we went out to defend our Fatherland, and with pure hearts the German army wielded the sword. Germany is prepared at all times to prove this before impartial judges.

Accordingly it is not in keeping with the honour of our people that we should pass over in silence the insults and indignities heaped upon us. Germany's position among the nations of the world and the future of our people demand that the insults be retracted and that the unjust verdict in the question of war guilt be nullified.

#### NOTES FOR CHAPTER V

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, loc. cit., Vol. II, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, December, 1926, p. 907.

<sup>2a</sup> The Memoirs of his father, Sir Arthur Nicolson, published by Harold Nicolson under the title "Lord Carnock," have yielded very valuable new material. The revelations made in this work to the effect that England and France in 1910 had already planned to march through Belgium in the event of a war with Germany are corroborated by Lady Warwick in the "Daily Herald" of April 4, 1930, No. 4411.

<sup>3</sup> *Preussen und Deutschland im 19. bis 20. Jahrhundert*, publ. by R. Oldenbourg, Berlin, 1918, p. 481.

<sup>4</sup> *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, April, 1926, p. 324 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Mildred S. Wertheimer, *The Pan-German League, 1890-1914*, New York, Columbia University, 1924, p. 214.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Robert Hoeniger, *Deutschland über alles*, in *Der Weg zur Freiheit*, No. 11, of August 15, 1926. Cf. also Arthur Ponsonby, *Falsehood in War-Time*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1928, Chap. XI.

<sup>7</sup> *Deutschland und die Haager Friedenskonferenz, eine Kundgebung*

*des Parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses. Die Kriegsfrage*, January, 1924.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Friedrich Stieve, *Der diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis 1911–1923*, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, Berlin, 1926. Vol. I: Protokoll über die Konferenz von 1911; Vol. II: Protokoll über die Konferenz von 1913.

<sup>8a</sup> Cf. the comprehensive essay by Gunther Frantz, "Russia's Network of Strategic Railways in 1914," published in the *Berliner Monatshefte*, March, 1930.

<sup>9</sup> Wilhelm Groener, *Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen*. E. S. Mittler u. Sohn, Berlin, 1927, p. 5.

<sup>10</sup> Groener, loc. cit., p. 5.

<sup>11</sup> These figures are taken from the book of Crown Prince William, *Ich suche die Wahrheit* (Chap. 7), J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, Stuttgart and Berlin, 1925. They are given in even thousands.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Colonel W. Nicolai, *Geheime Mächte, Internationale Spionage und ihre Bestrebungen im Weltkrieg und heute*, K. F. Koehler, Leipzig, 1924. The following data are taken from this work.

<sup>13</sup> Krasny archives, Moskow, 1925, vol. 9: *Das Echo der Ereignisse von 1905 im Auslande*. Telegram of Count Osten-Sacken of December 30, 1905/January 12, 1906, No. 104, p. 46.

<sup>14</sup> Maurice Paléologue, *Am Zarenhof*, loc. cit., p. 11.

<sup>15</sup> Raymond Poincaré, *L'Union sacrée*, loc. cit., p. 249. The original French text reads: "Le grand-duc Nicolas m'a dit qu'il croyait y voir la main de l'Allemagne, qui aurait désiré faire tourner en fiasco les fêtes de l'alliance franco-russe. C'est là, sans doute, une pure hypothèse."

<sup>16</sup> Victor Augustin Wroblewski, *Die russischen Arbeiterunruhen im Juli 1914. Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, May, 1925, p. 323.

<sup>17</sup> To what an extent the phantastic notions about Prussian militarism obsessed the leading statesmen is shown on almost every page of Grey's memoirs. An excellent refutation of this false conception of the British minister of foreign affairs is given by Count Waldersee, in 1914 Superior Quartermaster I in the Great General Staff, in Nos. 14 and 15 of the *Deutscher Offizierbund*. There is an English translation of this very instructive article in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, June, 1928.

<sup>18</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 2.

<sup>19</sup> *British documents*, No. 159.

<sup>20</sup> *British documents*, No. 159.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. also Friedrich Stieve, *Deutschland und Europa 1890–1914*, Verlag für Kulturpolitik, Berlin, 1926.

<sup>22</sup> *My Four Years in Germany*, Payot, Lausanne, 1919, p. 188 ff.

<sup>23</sup> *Foreign Relations*, Supplement 1914, p. 50, Reg. No. 763. 72 119/8.

<sup>24</sup> *Tägliche Rundschau*, May 27, 1928, No. 245.

<sup>25</sup> Scheidemann, *Der Zusammenbruch*, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft, Berlin, 1921, p. 16.

<sup>26</sup> Count Max Montgelas, co-author of the memorandum, has declared

that he subscribes to these utterances of Privy Councilor Delbrück.

<sup>27</sup> Dobrorolski, *Die Mobilmachung der russischen Armee 1914*, loc. cit., p. 45 f.

<sup>28</sup> Lulvès, *Wo war der Kriegswille?* Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, Berlin, 1922, p. 43 f.

<sup>29</sup> *Die belgischen Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges 1885. bis 1914*, herausgegeben von Bernhard Schwertfeger, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, Berlin, 1925, I. Ergänzungsband, p. 36.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>31</sup> Bernhard Schwertfeger, *Der geistige Kampf um die Verletzung der belgischen Neutralität*, Verlag Hans Robert Engelmann, Berlin, p. 179.

<sup>32</sup> *Die belgischen Dokumente*, loc. cit., p. 236.

<sup>33</sup> *Das deutsche Weissbuch über die Schuld am Kriege*, loc. cit., p. 173.

<sup>34</sup> Original text: Dans mes années d'école, ma pensée assombrie par la défaite traversait sans cesse la frontière que nous avait imposée le Traité de Francfort, et quand je descendais de mes nuages métaphysiques, je ne voyais pas à ma génération d'autre raison de vivre que l'espoir de recouvrer nos provinces perdues.

<sup>35</sup> Friedrich Stieve, *Iswolski und der Weltkrieg*, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, Berlin, 1925, p. 250.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. also *Indirekte Kriegsschuld*, by Baron Auffenberg-Komaroff in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, wherein the former minister of war shows that the aggressiveness of the enemies of the Dual Monarchy was increased by the insufficient armaments of Austria-Hungary.

<sup>37</sup> *Documents diplomatiques. Les Affaires balkaniques. 1912-1914*. Imprimerie nationale, Paris, 1922, Tome Ier, p. 38 f.

<sup>38</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, Part I, No. 1.

<sup>39</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>40</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>41</sup> *British Documents*, No. 39. No. 67.

<sup>42</sup> *Loc. cit.*, No. 79.

<sup>43</sup> *Loc. cit.*, No. 102.

<sup>44</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, III, No. 19.

<sup>45</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, I, No. 26. In the protocol of the ministerial council of July 19 we read: "The chairman declares that he can agree only with reserve to the view of the royal Hungarian premier. He, the chairman, also has the opinion that, as the political situation now is, we, in case we emerge victorious from a war with Serbia, should not annex anything from this country but should try to diminish it by large cessions of Serbian territory to Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, and possibly to Roumania, so that it will no longer be a menace.

The joint ministerial council decides, on motion of the royal Hungarian premier, that immediately upon outbreak of the war the foreign powers be informed that the Monarchy is not waging a war of aggrandizement and does not plan to annex the Kingdom. Of course strategically

necessary frontier rectifications and the diminution of Serbia in favour of other states, as well as eventual necessary temporary occupation of portions of Serbian territory shall not be excluded."

<sup>46</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, II, No. 23. See also No. 42.

<sup>47</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 160.

<sup>48</sup> *Loc. cit.*, No. 242.

<sup>49</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 279.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Kiszling, *Osterreich-Ungarns Kriegsvorbereitungen im Sommer 1914*, No. 7, *Militärwissenschaftlich-technische Mitteilungen*, Vienna, 1920.

<sup>50a</sup> *Austria-Hungary's Foreign Policy*, Volume VIII, No. 10504.

<sup>51</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 15.

<sup>52</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, I, No. 6.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 291. In the report of General von Chelius to the Emperor we read: "In connection with Poincaré's visit I note most humbly that the Tsar, so far as I could notice, treated him very coolly and superciliously. This attracted general attention. Among the old gentlemen at headquarters there is little sympathy with the entente with France. They incline much more toward a monarchical alliance with Germany."

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *Vossische Zeitung*, August 3, 1927, No. 363.

<sup>55</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 293. See facsimile.

<sup>56</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, new edition, 1927, foot-note 6.

<sup>57</sup> *Loc. cit.*, No. 323.

<sup>58</sup> Rud. Kiszling, *Osterreich-Ungarns Kriegsvorbereitungen*, *loc. cit.*, p. 275 ff.

<sup>59</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 268.

<sup>60</sup> *Loc. cit.*, No. 158, and Conrad, Vol. 4, p. 109 ff.

<sup>61</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, I, No. 27.

<sup>62</sup> *Loc. cit.*, II, No. 47.

<sup>63</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1914, No. 34.

<sup>64</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, I, No. 27.

<sup>65</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, II, No. 47.

<sup>66</sup> How correct this assumption of the Austrians was has now been proved beyond the shadow of a doubt. Cf. Friedrich von Wiesner, *König Alexander von Jugoslawien und die Attentäter von Serajewo. Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, August, 1926, p. 639 ff.

<sup>67</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1914, No. 34.

<sup>68</sup> Friedrich Ritter von Wiesner, *Die Schuld der serbischen Regierung am Mord von Serajewo. Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, April, 1928.

<sup>69</sup> Verlag für Kulturpolitik, Munich, 1924, p. 226.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. p. 213.

<sup>71</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, Nos. 323, 361, 377, 384, 385, 395, 396, 437, 441.

<sup>72</sup> *Loc. cit.*, No. 396.

<sup>73</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 437.



<sup>74</sup> *Der Halt in Belgrad. Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, December, 1923; and Hermann Lutz, *Das Entscheidende über den "Halt in Belgrad."* *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, July, 1927.

<sup>75</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, I, No. 45.

<sup>76</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 384, foot-note 7.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. *British Documents*, No. 101. Point I of the agreement read: "Complete community of views concerning the various problems with which the Powers are confronted relative to the maintenance of general peace and of the balance of power in Europe, especially in the East."

<sup>78</sup> Robert C. Binkley, *New Light on Russia's War Guilt*. Current History, January, 1926.

<sup>79</sup> *Der Beginn des Krieges*, loc. cit., p. 9 ff.

<sup>80</sup> Gunther Frantz, *Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg*, p. 243, annex 91.

<sup>81</sup> Loc. cit., p. 245, annex 94.

<sup>82</sup> *Foreign Relations*, Supplement 1914, File No. 763 72/3, p. 15.

<sup>83</sup> Dobrorolski, *Die Mobilmachung der russischen Armee 1914*, p. 21 f.

<sup>84</sup> In vol. IV of his Memoirs entitled *L'Union sacrée*, Poincaré mentions this fact, but twice he commits a blunder (p. 291 and p. 296) by saying four *army corps* instead of four *military districts*. Thus he gives the false impression that this Russian mobilization measure involved only small fractions of the army.

<sup>85</sup> Sazonov, *Sechs schwere Jahre*, p. 232.

<sup>86</sup> According to the *Temps* of July 30, 1914, No. 19, 381, the Serbian minister in St. Petersburg was informed of the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia at 7 P. M.

<sup>87</sup> *Russian Orange Book*, No. 70.

<sup>88</sup> Sazonov, *Sechs schwere Jahre*, loc. cit., p. 232, and *Russian Orange Book*, 1914, No. 99a.

<sup>89</sup> *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, August, 1926, p. 549 ff.

<sup>90</sup> *British Documents*, No. 251.

<sup>91</sup> Theobald von Schäfer, *Wollte Generaloberst von Moltke den Präventivkrieg? Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, June, 1927, p. 550 ff.

<sup>92</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, III, No. 19.

<sup>93</sup> The expression "partial mobilization" is missing in the telegram and has been inserted conjecturally.

<sup>94</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 245, and *British Documents*, Nos. 165-166.

<sup>95</sup> In Austrian military circles it is believed that the unprepared attack against Belgrade might have been accomplished with the troops available near the city; on the other hand it would probably have been impossible to hold Belgrade against a Serbian counter-attack.

<sup>96</sup> Dobrorolski, *Noch einiges von der russischen Mobilmachung im Jahre 1914. Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, April, 1924.

<sup>97</sup> *Temps*, No. 19, 382, of July 31, 1914.

<sup>98</sup> We will not show in this place that even the bombardment of Belgrade did not justify a general or a partial Russian mobilization. For the

present work is expressly limited to a critique of the foundations upon which the war guilt thesis of the Treaty of Versailles is based.

<sup>99</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 257.

<sup>100</sup> Loc. cit., No. 271.

<sup>101</sup> Loc. cit., No. 293. See also p. 151.

<sup>102</sup> *British Documents*, No. 285.

<sup>103</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 323.

<sup>104</sup> *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1910, p. 82. Cf. Pohl, *Deutsches Landkriegsrecht*, Berlin, 1915, Sec. VII.

<sup>105</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 473.

<sup>106</sup> Loc. cit., No. 499.

<sup>107</sup> Loc. cit., No. 490.

<sup>108</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 473.

<sup>109</sup> *The French Yellow Book* of 1914, No. 102, II, and *British Documents* No. 347.

<sup>110</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 536.

<sup>111</sup> Loc. cit., No. 540a.

<sup>112</sup> Loc. cit. No. 542.

<sup>113</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 546.

<sup>114</sup> Loc. cit., No. 553. The statement that the session of the Federal Council took place between 12 o'clock midday and one in the afternoon should be corrected to the effect that the session began at one o'clock. (Memo. dated Feb. 10, 1930, No. 576, sent by Herr von Boden, the Brunswick-Anhalt Minister, to the Central Office for the Investigation of the causes of the war.)

<sup>115</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 553. The legendary tales, which have been spread broadcast especially in the United States, that officers of the general staff forced the Emperor to sign the declaration of war, are of course inventions, as stupid as they are malicious.

<sup>116</sup> Loc. cit., No. 588.

<sup>117</sup> A. von Tirpitz, *Deutsche Ohnmachtspolitik im Weltkrieg*, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt Hamburg und Berlin, 1926, p. 20 f.

<sup>118</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 629.

<sup>119</sup> Loc. cit., No. 623.

<sup>120</sup> H. von Zuehl, *Erich von Falkenhayn. Eine biographische Studie*. E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1926, p. 58.

<sup>121</sup> Records of the Imperial Archives in Potsdam.

<sup>122</sup> The error arose from the fact that General von Falkenhayn made the entry under date of August 1 instead of August 2. We base this statement upon a personal examination of the memoirs, which are in the possession of the widow of General von Falkenhayn.

<sup>123</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 491.

<sup>124</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 528.

<sup>125</sup> Loc. cit. and *French Yellow Book*, No. 117.

<sup>126</sup> *French Yellow Book* of 1914, No. 118.

<sup>127</sup> Loc. cit.

<sup>128</sup> See the *Russian Orange Book* of 1914, No. 116 and the *French Yellow Book* of 1914, No. 102 II.

<sup>129</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 571. Cf. August Bach: The Alleged "Misunderstanding of Prince Lichnovsky of August 1, 1914," *Berliner Monatshefte*, April, 1930.

<sup>130</sup> Loc. cit., No. 484.

<sup>131</sup> Loc. cit., No. 562.

<sup>132</sup> *Deutsche Ohnmachtspolitik im Weltkrieg*, loc. cit., p. 17.

<sup>133</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 642.

<sup>134</sup> Loc. cit., No. 575.

<sup>134a</sup> *German Documents* No. 578.

<sup>135</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 570.

<sup>136</sup> Loc. cit., No. 590. The exact time of the signing of the French mobilization decree was 4:30 P. M., Central European time. Work of the French General Staff, Vol I, Part I, p. 81.

<sup>137</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 612.

<sup>138</sup> Loc. cit., No. 596.

<sup>139</sup> Loc. cit., No. 631.

<sup>139a</sup> Tirpitz: *Deutsche Ohnmachtspolitik im Weltkrieg*, p. 21.

<sup>140</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 608.

<sup>141</sup> Loc. cit., No. 376. *Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918*, E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1925, vol. 1, p. 105, note 1.

<sup>142</sup> *Deutsche Ohnmachtspolitik im Weltkrieg*, Loc. cit., p. 25.

<sup>143</sup> Count Montgelas, *Der angebliche Bombenabwurf auf Nürnberg, Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, July, 1927.

<sup>144</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 734 a.

<sup>145</sup> In the transmission of the declaration of war there was no indication as to whether 6 P. M. Paris time or 6 P. M. Central European time was meant. The embassy assumed that Paris time was meant, while the Foreign Office had had Central European time in mind. Consequently, since the Foreign Office notified the General Staff in accordance with Central European time, the German forces crossed the frontier one hour earlier than the notification given in Paris would have warranted. But the error must be considered trivial in view of the mutilated text of the telegram which reached Paris.

<sup>146</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 734 b.

<sup>147</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 513.

<sup>148</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 359.

<sup>149</sup> Loc. cit., No. 395.

<sup>150</sup> Loc. cit., No. 396.

<sup>151</sup> *British Documents* (Lutz edition), No. 384. See also No. 422.

<sup>152</sup> *The Russian Orange Book* of 1914, No. 74.

<sup>153</sup> *French Yellow Book*, 67, and *Russian Orange Book* of 1914, No. 70.

<sup>154</sup> Cf. the *Russian Orange Book* of 1914, No. 90, and *French Yellow Book*, No. 67.

<sup>155</sup> On December 11, 1921, Prince Henry recorded the relevant conver-

sation with the King of England. We take the following passage from it:

"In the conversation the King mentioned the possibility of a conference of ambassadors, expressed the hope that the conflict between Austria and Serbia would be localized. When I stated very emphatically that Germany and England, two powers for which no coalition would be a match, must go together, the King shrugged his shoulders and said:

"Ah well, we will try and keep out of it, we shall probably remain neutral."

"With this the conversation came to an end since the King had to go to the early divine services and I was planning to visit my sisters in the country at Maresfield." (*Archiv der Zentralstelle für Erforschungen der Kriegsursachen.*)

<sup>155a</sup> Cf. *British Documents*, No. 239. See also *Lord Carnock*, p. 414.

<sup>156</sup> *Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg, 1914-1918*, vol. 2, p. 47.

<sup>157</sup> The consequent violation of the neutrality of Belgium, of which Germany was one of the guarantors, has not been considered closely in this work because it is not one of the charges falling under the war guilt thesis of Versailles and has nothing to do with the question of the responsibility for the war. In this place we should merely like to state that in judging the violation of Belgian neutrality only the legal side of the question has been dealt with in detail, to the prejudice of the military and political aspects. In particular the political attitude of Belgium during the years before the war and her acceptance of eventual obligations towards England and France have often been overlooked. Through her far-reaching and unneutral secret military agreements with England and France, Belgium had expressed her preference for the side of the Entente in advance. The agreements themselves, since 1906, are tantamount to the inclusion of Belgium in the political front against Germany, if we consider the matter in the light of historical events. Considered objectively, the attitude of Belgium is easy to understand. And one can also understand the reason why England and France, after concluding the Entente, wished to be certain of Belgium's attitude in the event of a European war. For they could assume that Germany would anticipate them and would for her own part include the Belgian forces in the German plan of operation if the English and French should invade that country. Cf. "Lord Carnock," p. 398-9.

<sup>158</sup> Considered from a purely formal point of view and in accordance with Art. 2 of the protocol of the General Staff of April 21, 1906, France was not obliged to mobilize before the German mobilization order had become known. See *Les Alliées contre la Russie*, Andrée Delpuech, Paris, 1926, p. 38. An observance of this agreement between France and Russia would of course have made no practical difference at the outbreak of hostilities since the German mobilization, necessitated by the Russian mobilization, already became known during the evening of August 1.

<sup>159</sup> *Two New Apologies*, by William L. Langer, *The New Republic*, August 1, 1928.

- <sup>160</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 731.
- <sup>161</sup> "La France ne se laisse pas déclarer la guerre." Caillaux, *Les Responsables*, in *Les Documents politiques*, March, 1926, p. 93.
- <sup>162</sup> Foreign Relations, 1914, Supplement.
- <sup>163</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, 1919, Part 3, No. 124.
- <sup>164</sup> Loc. cit., No. 102.
- <sup>165</sup> Cf. Dr. Friedrich Ritter von Wiesner, *Die Schuld der serbischen Regierung am Mord von Sarajewo*, *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, April, 1928.
- <sup>166</sup> *Austrian Red Book*, I, No. 27.
- <sup>167</sup> Wiesner, *Die Schuld der serbischen Regierung*, etc., p. 348, "Die serbischen Attentate in Osterreich-Ungarn von 1910-1914."
- <sup>168</sup> *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, March, 1927, p. 192 ff.
- <sup>169</sup> Géza Herczeg, *Von Sarajewo bis Lodz*, Georg Müller, Munich, 1916, p. 22, and Wiesner, *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, September, 1926, p. 655.
- <sup>170</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 12.
- <sup>171</sup> *British Documents*, No. 80.
- <sup>172</sup> The Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg also knew this fact in 1914 and rightly described it as "suspicious." *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 279.
- <sup>173</sup> *Das deutsche Weissbuch über die Schuld am Kriege*, p. 141, Annex 21.
- <sup>174</sup> Loc. cit., p. 111.
- <sup>175</sup> Cf. the article on "Nicolaus Hartwig" in *Nova Evropa* (Agram, Yugo-Slavia), Vol. XVII, No. 8, of April 26, 1928.
- <sup>176</sup> Sazonoff, *Sechs schwere Jahre*, p. 137.
- <sup>177</sup> Stanojevitch, *Die Ermordung des Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand*, Frankfurter Sozietätsdruckerei, Frankfurt a. M., 1923, p. 54 f. The defence of the Russian general staff attempted by Seton-Watson in the *Slavonic Review*, March, 1923 is not supported by sufficient evidence and fails to prove its point.
- <sup>178</sup> *The Russian Orange Book* of 1914, No. 62.
- <sup>179</sup> Telegram of Hartwig to Sazonov of November 23, 1911. *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, December, 1925, p. 811. Krasny-Archiv, No. VIII.
- <sup>180</sup> Poincaré, *L'Union sacrée*, loc. cit., Vol. IV, p. 288 f.
- <sup>181</sup> Renouvin, loc. cit., 2nd ed., 1927, p. 87.
- <sup>182</sup> *Grey Fünfundzwanzig Jahre Politik*, vol. I, p. 263.
- <sup>183</sup> The full text of this report was published for the first time in *Deutsche Politik*, May 14, 1922. It appears also in *Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage*, by Count Mongelas, as exhibit No. 11, p. 90. Cf. also *Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette*, vol. 39, No. 15, 736, annex.
- <sup>184</sup> Musulin, *Das Haus am Ballplatz*, Verlag für Kulturpolitik, Munich, 1924, p. 227.
- <sup>185</sup> Loc. cit., p. 225-226.
- <sup>186</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, New ed., 1927, Vol. I, pp. XI and XII.
- <sup>187</sup> Parliamentary Committee of Investigation, No. 2, p. 8 ff.
- <sup>188</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, No. 217.

<sup>189</sup> Loc. cit., No. 349.

<sup>190</sup> Loc. cit., No. 431 a.

<sup>191</sup> See the present writer's article in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, July, 1926, p. 469.

<sup>192</sup> *Deutsche Dokumente*, Nos. 144, 285 and 320.

<sup>193</sup> *Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette*, vol. 37, Part 1, Nos. 14 914/14 915 and annex.

<sup>194</sup> *Die Briefe des Botschafters Walter H. Page an Woodrow Wilson*, Verlag für Kulturpolitik, Berlin, 1926, p. 108.

<sup>195</sup> Friedrich Stieve, *Iswolski und der Weltkrieg*, p. 250.

<sup>196</sup> *Un Livre Noir*, Vol. III, p. 11 ff. The same in German: Friedrich Stieve, *Neue Dokumente über die Kriegsziele der Entente*, *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, September, 1927.

<sup>197</sup> *Mots non déchiffrés*.

<sup>198</sup> Undeciphered words.

<sup>199</sup> Friedrich Stieve, *Iswolski im Weltkrieg*, Document No. 225.

<sup>200</sup> Colonel House, Vol. I, p. 255.

<sup>201</sup> British Documents, No. 101, remarks.

<sup>202</sup> *British Documents*, No. 369, annex.

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
APPENDIX

I

DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE WAR GUILT THESIS  
OF VERSAILLES

REPORT PRESENTED TO THE PRELIMINARY  
PEACE CONFERENCE BY THE COMMISSION  
ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS  
OF THE WAR AND ON ENFORCEMENT OF  
PENALTIES

CHAPTER I.—RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS  
OF THE WAR



ON the question of the responsibility of the authors of the war, the Commission, after having examined a number of official documents relating to the origin of the World War, and to the violations of neutrality and of frontiers which accompanied its inception, has determined that the responsibility for it lies wholly upon the Powers which declared war in pursuance of a policy of aggression, the concealment of which gives to the origin of this war the character of a dark conspiracy against the peace of Europe.

This responsibility rests first on Germany and Austria, secondly on Turkey and Bulgaria. The responsibility is made all the graver by reason of the violation by Germany

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and Austria of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, which they themselves had guaranteed. It is increased, with regard to both France and Serbia, by the violation of their frontiers before the declaration of war.

## I. PREMEDITATION OF THE WAR

### *A. Germany and Austria*

Many months before the crisis of 1914 the German Emperor had ceased to pose as the champion of peace. Naturally believing in the overwhelming superiority of his Army, he openly showed his enmity towards France. General von Moltke said to the King of the Belgians: "This time the matter must be settled." In vain the King protested. The Emperor and his Chief of Staff remained no less fixed in their attitude.<sup>1</sup>

On the 28th of June, 1914, occurred the assassination at Serajevo of the heir-apparent of Austria. "It is the act of a little group of madmen," said Francis Joseph.<sup>2</sup> The act, committed as it was by a subject of Austria-Hungary on Austro-Hungarian territory, could in no wise compromise Serbia, which very correctly expressed its condolences<sup>3</sup> and stopped public rejoicings in Belgrade. If the Government of Vienna thought that there was any Serbian complicity, Serbia was ready<sup>4</sup> to seek out the guilty parties. But this attitude failed to satisfy Austria and still less Germany, who, after their first astonishment had passed, saw in this royal and national misfortune a pretext to initiate war.

At Potsdam a "decisive consultation" took place on the 5th of July, 1914.<sup>5</sup> Vienna and Berlin decided upon this



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plan: "Vienna will send to Belgrade a very emphatic ultimatum with a very short limit of time." <sup>6</sup>

The Bavarian Minister, von Lerchenfeld, said in a confidential dispatch dated the 18th of July, 1914, the facts stated in which have never been officially denied: "It is clear that Serbia cannot accept the demands, which are inconsistent with the dignity of an independent state." <sup>7</sup> Count Lerchenfeld reveals in this report that, at the time it was made, the ultimatum to Serbia had been jointly decided upon by the Governments of Berlin and Vienna; that they were waiting to send it until President Poincaré and Mr. Viviani should have left for St. Petersburg; and that no illusions were cherished, either at Berlin or Vienna, as to the consequences which this threatening measure would involve. It was perfectly well known that war would be the result.

The Bavarian Minister explains, moreover, that the only fear of the Berlin Government was that Austria-Hungary might hesitate and draw back at the last minute, and that on the other hand Serbia, on the advice of France and Great Britain, might yield to the pressure put upon her. "Now, the Berlin Government considers that war is necessary." Therefore, it gave full powers to Count Berchtold, who instructed the Ballplatz on the 18th of July, 1914, to negotiate with Bulgaria to induce her to enter into an alliance and to participate in the war.

In order to mask this understanding, it was arranged that the Emperor should go for a cruise in the North Sea, and that the Prussian Minister of War should go for a holiday, so that the Imperial Government might pretend that events had taken it completely by surprise.

Austria suddenly sent Serbia an ultimatum that she had

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carefully prepared in such a way as to make it impossible to accept. Nobody could be deceived; "the whole world understands that this ultimatum means war."<sup>8</sup> According to Mr. Sazonov, "Austria-Hungary wanted to devour Serbia."<sup>9</sup>

Mr. Sazonov asked Vienna for an extension of the short time-limit of forty-eight hours given by Austria to Serbia for the most serious decision in its history.<sup>10</sup> Vienna refused the demand. On the 24th and 25th of July, England and France multiplied their efforts to persuade Serbia to satisfy the Austro-Hungarian demands. Russia threw in her weight on the side of conciliation.<sup>11</sup>

Contrary to the expectation of Austria-Hungary and Germany, Serbia yielded. She agreed to all the requirements of the ultimatum, subject to the single reservation that, in the judicial inquiry which she would commence for the purpose of seeking out the guilty parties, the participation of Austrian officials would be kept within the limits assigned by international law. "If the Austro-Hungarian Government is not satisfied with this," Serbia declared she was ready "to submit to the decision of the Hague Tribunal."<sup>12</sup>

"A quarter of an hour before the expiration of the time limit," at 5.45 on the 25th, Mr. Pashitch, the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs, delivered this reply to Baron Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian Minister.

On Mr. Pashitch's return to his own office he found awaiting him a letter from Baron Giesl saying that he was not satisfied with the reply. At 6.30 the latter had left Belgrade, and even before he had arrived at Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Government had handed his passports to Mr. Yovanovitch, the Serbian Minister, and had pre-

pared thirty-three mobilization proclamations, which were published on the following morning in the *Budapesti Kozlöni*, the official gazette of the Hungarian Government. On the 27th Sir Maurice de Bunsen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey: "This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia."<sup>13</sup> At midday on the 28th Austria declared war on Serbia. On the 29th the Austrian army commenced the bombardment of Belgrade, and made its dispositions to cross the frontier.

The reiterated suggestions of the Entente Powers with a view to finding a peaceful solution of the dispute only produced evasive replies on the part of Berlin or promises of intervention with the Government of Vienna without any effectual steps being taken.

On the 24th of July Russia and England asked that the Powers should be granted a reasonable delay in which to work in concert for the maintenance of peace. Germany did not join in this request.<sup>14</sup>

On the 25th of July Sir Edward Grey proposed mediation by four Powers (England, France, Italy and Germany). France<sup>15</sup> and Italy<sup>16</sup> immediately gave their concurrence. Germany<sup>17</sup> refused, alleging that it was not a question of mediation but of arbitration, as the conference of the four Powers was called to make proposals, not to decide.

On the 26th of July Russia proposed to negotiate directly with Austria. Austria refused.<sup>18</sup>

On the 27th of July England proposed a European conference. Germany refused.<sup>19</sup>

On the 29th of July Sir Edward Grey asked the Wilhelmstrasse to be good enough to "suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used to-

gether to prevent a war between Austria and Russia.”<sup>20</sup> She was asked herself to say what she desired.<sup>21</sup> Her reply was evasive.<sup>22</sup>

“On the same day, the 29th of July, the Tsar dispatched to the Emperor William II a telegram suggesting that the Austro-Serbian problem should be submitted to the Hague Tribunal. This suggestion received no reply. This important telegram does not appear in the *German White Book*. It was made public by the *Petrograd Official Gazette* (January, 1915).

The Bavarian Legation, in a report dated the 31st of July, declared its conviction that the efforts of Sir Edward Grey to preserve peace would not hinder the march of events.<sup>23</sup>

As early as the 21st of July German mobilization had commenced by the recall of a certain number of classes of the reserve,<sup>24</sup> then of German officers in Switzerland,<sup>25</sup> and finally of the Metz garrison on the 25th of July.<sup>26</sup> On the 26th of July the German Fleet was called back from Norway.<sup>27</sup>

The Entente did not relax its conciliatory efforts, but the German Government systematically brought all its attempts to nought. When Austria consented for the first time on the 31st of July to discuss the contents of the Serbian note with the Russian Government and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador received orders to “converse” with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs,<sup>28</sup> Germany made any negotiation impossible by sending her ultimatum to Russia. Prince Lichnowsky wrote that “a hint from Berlin would have been enough to decide Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success and to

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declare that he was satisfied with the Serbian reply, but this hint was not given. *On the contrary they went forward towards war.*"<sup>29</sup>

On the 1st of August the German Emperor addressed a telegram to the King of England<sup>30</sup> containing the following sentence: "The troops on my frontier are, at this moment, being kept back by telegraphic and telephonic orders from crossing the French frontier." Now, war was not declared till two days after that date, and as the German mobilization orders were issued on that same day, the 1st of August, it follows that, as a matter of fact, the German Army had been mobilized and concentrated in pursuance of previous orders.

The attitude of the Entente nevertheless remained still to the very end so conciliatory that, at the very time at which the German fleet was bombarding Libau, Nicholas II gave his word of honour to William II that Russia would not undertake any aggressive action during the *pour parlers*,<sup>31</sup> and that when the German troops commenced their march across the French frontier Mr. Viviani telegraphed to all the French Ambassadors "we must not stop working for accommodation."

On the 3d of August Mr. von Schön went to the Quai d'Orsay with the declaration of war against France. Lacking a real cause of complaint, Germany alleged, in her declaration of war, that bombs had been dropped by French aeroplanes in various districts in Germany. This statement was entirely false. Moreover, it was either later admitted to be so<sup>32</sup> or no particulars were ever furnished by the German Government.

Moreover, in order to be manifestly above reproach,

France was careful to withdraw her troops ten kilometers from the German frontier. Notwithstanding this precaution, numerous officially established violations of French territory preceded the declaration of war.<sup>33</sup>

The provocation was so flagrant that Italy, herself a member of the Triple Alliance, did not hesitate to declare that in view of the aggressive character of the war the *casus fœderis* ceased to apply.<sup>34</sup> The war was deliberately planned by the Central Powers as well as by their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and is the outcome of actions undertaken deliberately and with the intention of making war inevitable.

In agreement with Austria-Hungary, Germany deliberately laboured to put aside the numerous offers of mediation put forward by the Entente Powers and to bring to naught their repeated efforts to prevent war.

## II. THE WAR GUILT THESIS IN THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

### a. From the preamble of the Treaty of June 28, 1919:

“The United States of America, The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, These Powers being described in the present treaty as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, The Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, The Serbe-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, Checho-Slovakia and Uruguay, These Powers constituting with the Principal Powers mentioned above the Allied

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and Associated Powers, of the one part; and Germany, of the other part; Bearing in mind that on the request of the Imperial German Government an Armistice was granted on November 11, 1918, to Germany by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in order that a Treaty of Peace might be concluded with her, and The Allied and Associated Powers being equally desirous that the war *in which they were successively involved directly or indirectly and which originated in the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on July 28, 1914, against Serbia, the declaration of war by Germany against Russia on August 1, 1914, and against France on August 3, 1914, and in the invasion of Belgium, should be replaced by a firm, just and durable Peace.*"

b. From the Treaty itself:

## PART VIII

### REPARATION

#### Section I

#### General Provisions

#### Article 231

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

## III. THE ULTIMATUM

## I.

*The Responsibility of Germany for the War*

The German Delegation have submitted a lengthy Memorandum in regard to the responsibility of Germany for the initiation of the war. The burden of the argument in this document is that at the very last moment of the crisis the German Government endeavoured to induce moderation on the part of an ally to whom she had previously given complete liberty of action, and that it was the mobilization of the Russian army which finally made inevitable the outbreak of the general war.

The Allied and Associated Powers, however, wish to make it clear that their view as to the responsibility for the war is not based merely upon an analysis of the events which took place in the last critical hours of the crisis which preceded the actual outbreak of hostilities. They note that the German memorandum is largely occupied with the discussion of one aspect of the European situation in the years preceding the outbreak of the war. The observations contained in it and the documents quoted will no doubt afford valuable material for the historian of the future but they cannot see that any new facts are brought to light or that any new interpretation is given of facts already known which would in the least modify the conclusions already arrived at. They are the more inclined to take this view as they observe that there are considerable discrepancies between the three versions of this document which they have received. There is nothing in it which shakes their conviction that the immediate



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cause of the war was the decision, deliberately taken by those responsible for German policy in Berlin and their confederates in Vienna and Budapest, to impose a solution of a European question upon the nations of Europe by threat of war and, if the other members of the concert refused this dictation, by war itself instantly declared.

The German memorandum indeed admits without reserve the accuracy of this view. The Serbian question was not, and never could have been, purely an Austro-Hungarian question. It affected Germany. It affected all the Great Powers. It was essentially a European question, for it involved the control of the Balkans, and therefore concerned the peace, not only of the Balkans, but of the whole of Europe. It was impossible to isolate it and the authors of the ultimatum of July 23 knew that it could not be isolated.

If, therefore, the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments had desired a pacific settlement, they would have consulted with the other Powers whose interests were vitally affected, and only taken action after making the utmost endeavour to arrive at an agreed solution. Yet the Memorandum of the German Delegation explicitly admits that the German Government authorized its ally to endeavour to solve the Austro-Serbian question on its own initiative and by war. "On the strength," it says, "of statements received from the Cabinet in Vienna, the German Government considered an Austrian military expedition against Serbia essential for the preservation of peace. The German Government considered itself obliged to take the risk of Russian intervention with the resultant *casus fœderis*. She gave her ally Austria a completely free hand as to the nature of the demands to be made by

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her on Serbia. When the ultimatum was followed by an answer which appeared to Germany herself sufficient to justify the abandonment of the expedition after all, she indicated this view to Vienna."

The later action of the German Government was perfectly consistent with this initial policy. It supported the rejection, without consideration, of the extraordinary concessions made by Serbia in response to the insolent and intolerable demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government. It supported the mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army and the initiation of hostilities, and steadily rejected every proposal for conference, conciliation or mediation, though it knew that once mobilization and military action were undertaken by any of the Great Powers it inevitably compelled a response from all the rest and so hourly reduced the chances of pacific settlement. Only at the eleventh hour, when all chance of avoiding war had practically vanished, did the German Government counsel moderation on her ally. Even on this single point in Germany's favour, the Memorandum of the German Delegates is forced to admit a doubt. "The reason," it says, "for the delay in the reply of the Cabinet at Vienna to this proposal is not known to us," and then they go on to say in words which are underlined. "This is one of the most vital points which still require elucidation." May it not be that, as was not uncommon with the German Foreign Office, unofficial communications of a previous understanding between those who had the real power, differed somewhat from the messages which travelled over the official wires.

The German Government would now throw the blame for the failure of the attempts to procure peace on the

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mobilization of the Russian army. They ignore that this was the immediate and necessary consequence of the mobilization of the Austrian army, and the declaration of war on Serbia, both authorized by Germany. These were the fatal acts by which the decision was taken out of the hands of the statesmen and control transferred to the military. It is on the German statesmen that equally rests the responsibility for the hasty declaration of war on Russia, when Austria herself was apparently hesitating, and for the declaration of war on France. So great was the haste of the German Government that when no plausible reason could be found, allegations were invented, the complete falsity of which has long ago been demonstrated. The German Delegation now admits that the German Government "did not take the trouble to verify" the reported facts which they published as justifying their declaration of war.

After reading what the German Delegation has to say in self-defence, the Allied and Associated Powers are satisfied that the series of events which caused the outbreak of the war was deliberately plotted and executed by those who wielded the supreme power in Vienna, Budapest and Berlin.

The history of the critical days of July 1914, however, is not the sole ground upon which the Allied and Associated Powers consider that the responsibility of Germany for the war must be tried. The outbreak of the war was no sudden decision taken in a difficult crisis. It was the logical outcome of the policy which had been pursued for decades by Germany under the inspiration of the Prussian system.

The whole history of Prussia has been one of domina-

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tion, aggression and war. Hypnotized by the success with which Bismarck, following the tradition of Frederick the Great, robbed the neighbours of Prussia and forged the unity of Germany through blood and iron, the German people after 1871 submitted practically without reserve to the inspiration and the leadership of their Prussian rulers.

The Prussian spirit was not content that Germany should occupy a great and influential place in a Council of equal nations to which she was entitled, and which she had secured. It could be satisfied with nothing less than supreme and autocratic power. At a time, therefore, when the western nations were seriously endeavouring to limit armaments, to substitute friendship for rivalry in international affairs, and to lay the foundation of a new era in which all nations should co-operate in amity in the conduct of the world's affairs, the rulers of Germany were restlessly sowing suspicion and hostility among all her neighbours, were conspiring with every element of unrest in every land, and were steadily increasing Germany's armaments and consolidating her military and naval power. They mobilized all the resources at their command, the universities, the press, the pulpit, the whole machinery of governmental authority to indoctrinate their gospel of hatred and force, so that when the time came the German people might respond to their call. As a result in the later years of the 19th century, and during the 20th century, the whole policy of Germany was bent towards securing for herself a position from which she could dominate and dictate.

It is said that Germany developed her armaments in order to save herself from Russian aggression. Yet it is

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significant that no sooner was Russia defeated by Japan in the Far East and almost paralysed by the subsequent internal revolution than the German Government immediately redoubled its attempts to increase its armaments and to domineer over its neighbours under the threat of war. To them the collapse of Russia was not an occasion to try to reduce armaments and bring peace to the world in concert with the Western Powers. It was the opportunity to extend their own power. Further the whole point of German organization was aggressive. Their scheme of railways, both east and west, their order of mobilization, their long concocted plan to turn the flank of France by invading Belgium, the elaborate preparation and equipment, both within and beyond her borders, as revealed on the outbreak of the war,—all had aggression and not defence in view. The military doctrine that Germany could only be defended by springing first upon her neighbours was the excuse for demanding a military organization and a strategic plan which, when the time came, would enable them to smash all resistance to the ground and leave Germany the undisputed master both in the East and the West.

It is not the purpose of this Memorandum to traverse the diplomatic history of the years preceding the war, or to show how it was that the peace-loving nations of Western Europe were gradually driven, under a series of crises provoked from Berlin, to come together in self-defence. Autocratic Germany, under the inspiration of her rulers, was bent on domination. The nations of Europe were determined to preserve their liberty. It was the fear of the rulers of Germany lest their plans for universal domination should be brought to nought by the

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rising tide of democracy, that drove them to endeavour to overcome all resistance at one stroke by plunging Europe in universal war. The view of the Allied and Associated Powers could not indeed be better expressed than in the words of the German Memorandum itself: "The real mistakes of German policy lay much further back. The German Chancellor who was in office in 1914 had taken over a political inheritance which either condemned as hopeless from the start his unreservedly honest attempt to relieve the tension of the internal situation, or else demanded therefore a degree of statesmanship, and above all a strength of decision, which on the one hand he did not sufficiently possess, and on the other, he could not make effective in the then existing conditions of German policy."

In the view, therefore, of the Allied and Associated Powers Germany's responsibility is far wider and far more terrible than that to which the Memorandum of the German Delegation would seek to confine it. Germany, under the inspiration of Prussia, has been the champion of force and violence, deception, intrigue and cruelty in the conduct of international affairs. Germany for decades has steadily pursued a policy of inspiring jealousies and hatred and of dividing nation from nation in order that she might gratify her own selfish passion for power. Germany has stood athwart the whole current of democratic progress and international friendships throughout the world. Germany has been the principal mainstay of autocracy in Europe. And in the end, seeing that she could attain her objects in no other way, she planned and started the war which caused the massacre and mutilation of millions and the ravaging of Europe from end to end.

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The truth of the charges thus brought against them the German people have admitted by their own revolution. They have overturned their Government because they have discovered that it is the enemy of freedom, justice and equality at home. That same Government was no less the enemy of freedom, justice and equality abroad. It is useless to attempt to prove that it was less violent and arrogant and tyrannical in its foreign than it was in its internal policy, or that the responsibility for the terrible events of the last five years does not lie at its doors.

#### IV. THE COVERING NOTE (EXTRACTS).

##### I

The Allied and Associated Powers therefore feel it necessary to begin their reply by a clear statement of the judgment passed upon the war by practically the whole of civilized mankind.

In the view of the Allied and Associated Powers the war which began on August 1st, 1914, was the greatest crime against humanity and the freedom of peoples that any nation, calling itself civilized, has ever consciously committed. For many years the rulers of Germany, true to the Prussian tradition, strove for a position of dominance in Europe. They were not satisfied with that growing prosperity and influence to which Germany was entitled, and which all other nations were willing to accord her, in the society of free and equal peoples. They required that they should be able to dictate and tyrannize to a subservient Europe, as they dictated and tyrannized over a subservient Germany.

In order to attain their ends they used every channel in their power through which to educate their own subjects in the doctrine that might was right in international affairs. They never ceased to expand German armaments by land and sea, and to propagate the falsehood that this was necessary because Germany's neighbours were jealous of her prosperity and power. They sought to sow hostility and suspicion instead of friendship between nations. They developed a system of espionage and intrigue which enabled them to stir up internal rebellion and unrest and even to make secret offensive preparations within the territory of their neighbours whereby they might, when the moment came, strike them down with greater certainty and ease. They kept Europe in a ferment by threats of violence and when they found that their neighbours were resolved to resist their arrogant will, they determined to assist their predominance in Europe by force.

As soon as their preparations were complete, they encouraged a subservient ally to declare war against Serbia at 48 hours' notice, knowing full well that a conflict involving the control of the Balkans could not be localized and almost certainly meant a general war. In order to make doubly sure, they refused every attempt at conciliation and conference until it was too late, and the world war was inevitable for which they had plotted, and for which alone among the nations they were fully equipped and prepared.

The conduct of Germany is almost unexampled in human history. The terrible responsibility which lies at her doors can be seen in the fact that not less than seven million dead lie buried in Europe, while more than twenty million others carry upon them the evidence of wounds



and sufferings, because Germany saw fit to gratify her lust for tyranny by resort to war.

The Allied and Associated Powers believe that they will be false to those who have given their all to save the freedom of the world if they consent to treat this war on any other basis than as a crime against humanity and right.

#### NOTES FOR APPENDIX

- <sup>1</sup> *Yellow Book*; Mr. Cambon to Mr. Pichon, Berlin, November 22, 1913.
- <sup>2</sup> Message to his people.
- <sup>3</sup> *Serbian Blue Book*, p. 30.
- <sup>4</sup> *Yellow Book*, No. 15; Mr. Cambon to Mr. Bienvenu-Martin, July 21, 1914.
- <sup>5</sup> Lichnowsky memoir.
- <sup>6</sup> Dr. Muehlon's memoir.
- <sup>7</sup> Report of July 18, 1914.
- <sup>8</sup> Lichnowsky memoir.
- <sup>9</sup> *Austro-Hungarian Red Book*, No. 16.
- <sup>10</sup> *Blue Book*, No. 26.
- <sup>11</sup> *Yellow Book*, No. 36; *Blue Book*, Nos. 12, 46, 55, 65, 94, 118.
- <sup>12</sup> *Yellow Book*, No. 46.
- <sup>13</sup> *Blue Book*, No. 41.
- <sup>14</sup> *Russian Orange Book*, No. 4; *Yellow Book*, No. 43.
- <sup>15</sup> *Yellow Book*, No. 70.
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 72; *Blue Book*, No. 49.
- <sup>17</sup> *Blue Book*, No. 43.
- <sup>18</sup> *Yellow Book*, No. 54.
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, Nos. 68 and 73.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 97; *Blue Book*, No. 84.
- <sup>21</sup> *Blue Book*, No. 111.
- <sup>22</sup> *Yellow Book*, Nos. 97, 98, and 109.
- <sup>23</sup> Second report of Count Lerchenfeld, Bavarian plenipotentiary at Berlin, published on the instructions of Kurt Eisner.
- <sup>24</sup> *Yellow Book*, No. 15.
- <sup>25</sup> July 23, *ibid.*, No. 60.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 106.
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 58.
- <sup>28</sup> *Blue Book*, No. 133; *Red Book*, No. 55.
- <sup>29</sup> Lichnowsky memoir, p. 41.
- <sup>30</sup> *White Book*, Annex 32; *Yellow Book*, Annex II bis, No. 2.

<sup>31</sup> Telegram from Nicholas II to William II; *Yellow Book*, No. 6, Annex V.

<sup>32</sup> Statement of the municipality of Nüremburg, dated April 3, 1916.

<sup>33</sup> (a) Patrols of various strengths crossed the French frontier at fifteen points, one on the 30th of July at Xures, eight on the 2d of August, and the others on the 3d of August, before war was declared.

The French troops lost one killed and several wounded. The enemy left on French territory four killed, one of whom was an officer, and seven prisoners. (b) At Suarce, on the 2d of August, the enemy carried off nine inhabitants, twenty-five horses, and three carriages. (c) Four incursions by German dirigibles took place between the 25th of July and the 1st of August. (d) Finally, German aeroplanes flew over Lunéville on the 3d of August, before the declaration of war, and dropped six bombs. (*Yellow Book*, Nos. 106, 136, 139, etc.)

<sup>34</sup> *Yellow Book*, No. 124.



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*This book is composed on the Linotype in Bodoni, so-called after its designer Giambattista Bodoni (1740–1813) a celebrated Italian scholar and printer. Bodoni planned his type especially for use on the more smoothly finished papers that came into vogue late in the eighteenth century and drew his letters with a mechanical regularity that is readily apparent on comparison with the less formal old style. Other characteristics that will be noted are the square serifs without fillet and the marked contrast between the light and heavy strokes.*

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