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
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THE ROOTS AND CAUSES
OF THE WARS (1914-1918)

Volume II

THE ROOTS AND
CAUSES OF THE WARS
(1914-1918)

BY
JOHN S. EWART, K.C. LL.D.

IN TWO VOLUMES
Volume II

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THE ROOTS AND CAUSES OF THE WARS: VOL. II



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CHAPTER XIX

THE GERMAN RIVALRY ROOT

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INTRODUCTORY

INTERNATIONAL rivalry has been a cause of many wars. It engenders dislike and distrust. It creates a predisposition to quarrel. Subconsciously, it is predetermining that some little incident which, between friends, would be easily and satisfactorily adjusted, shall be the signal for an outbreak of hostilities. Wars are not frequently produced (as some of the supporters of an international court imagine) by difference of opinion as to legal right in relation to some well-defined issue. They spring, at a touch, out of tension.

The United Kingdom maintained friendly relations with Prussia and, afterwards, with Germany, until rivalry became acute. British and Prussian troops co-operated in the time of Frederick the Great. And between 1898 and 1901, on at least four occasions, efforts were made by the Duke of Devonshire, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne, and others to frame a war-alliance with Germany.¹ They failed, and, probably as early as 1902, the negotiations which ended in the Anglo-French treaty of 8 April 1904, commenced.

French Rivalry. Until the opening of the present century, France was, for the United Kingdom, the hated rival. M. Tardieu's reference to the situation is worth transcription.

“This friendship, so strong and true, is at times difficult of practice. The past accounts for that. History has now and then recorded Franco-British agreements. But as a rule they had no morrow. In 1801, the people of London cheered Bonaparte's envoy, Colonel de Lauriston,

¹ *Ante*, cap. V, pp. 157, 158, 158-9.

come to ratify peace; but a few months later, war broke out again and lasted until Waterloo. In 1838, the city enthusiastically welcomed Maréchal Soult, the Ambassador of Louis-Philippe at Queen Victoria's coronation; but, less than two years later, came the crisis of 1840. Under Napoleon III, English and French troops together won the Crimean war, but this alliance did not last, and, in 1860, Queen Victoria advised 'a regular crusade against France.' One of our historians, Albert Sorel, wrote thirty years ago: 'There may be — there have been — understandings between France and England to preserve the existing order; but England never has been and never can be an ally of France so long as France does not renounce expansion.' Lord Chatham, a century earlier had expressed the same idea in another form when he said: 'The only thing England has to fear here below is to see France become a commercial and colonial maritime power.' For a century and a half, from 1688 to 1815, sixty-one years of war — the war of the Augsburg League (1688-1697), the war of the Spanish Succession (1701-1711), the war of the Austrian Succession (1742-1748), the Seven Years War (1756-1763), the American War (1778-1783), the wars of the Revolution and of the Empire (1793-1815) — pitted France and England against each other. Wars separated by periods of precarious peace, and in peace deep and mutual distrust. Such was the law of the past.

"Circumstances on the other hand, the will of a man of genius on the other, modified this situation which seemed destined by historical fates to last forever. After a century in which Algeria, Tunis, Western and Central Africa, the Niger, the Congo, Madagascar, Oceania, Indo-China, Egypt, Morocco, had in swift succession brought the two countries into conflict, less than ten years sufficed to establish, consolidate and seal their entente on the field of battle."²

This may be supplemented by an extract from an earlier work (1908) by the same able writer:

"Moreover, in Europe as it is, the Franco-German antinomy is not the only source from which war may arise. And in the world at large it is not now France but England which principally is opposed to Germany. Economic rivalry, naval rivalry, moral rivalry, equally *intransigent*, all suggest the fear of conflict."³

GERMAN RIVALRY

Attention to a few figures will make clear some of the well-founded reasons for the transfer of British dislike from France to Germany.

Population. As a result of war with Austria-Hungary in 1866, Prussia engulfed Schleswig, Holstein, and Lunenburg, together with Hanover, East Friesland, the Electorate of Hesse, Nassau, part of the

² *The Truth about the Treaty*, pp. 437-8. The "ten years" are those between 1904, the date of the Anglo-French *entente* treaty, and the outbreak of the 1914-18 wars.

³ *La France et les Alliances*, p. 350. And see pp. 51, 66, 77.

Grand Duchy of Hesse, and the city of Frankfort. At the close of the war with France in 1870-71, Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, and the unattached part of Hesse⁴ united with Prussia in the formation of the German Empire with a total population of 41,058,792. In 1900 this had risen to 56,367,168. And in 1914 it had almost reached 66,000,000.⁵ These figures, taken approximately, compare with those for the United Kingdom and France as follows:

	1871	1900	1914	Percentage of increase 1871 to 1914
Germany	41,000,000	56,000,000	66,000,000	67.
United Kingdom	32,000,000	44,000,000	46,000,000	43.75
France	36,000,000	39,000,000	40,000,000	11.

Colonization. German political unification, attained in 1871, was followed by German economic consolidation and German imperialistic development. Yielding to pressure from the *Deutscher Kolonialverein*, Bismarck, in 1884, inaugurated German territorial expansion by sending a telegram to the German Consul at Cape Town:

“According to a communication from Herr Lüderitz, the British Colonial officials doubt whether his acquisitions north of the Orange River can claim German protection. You will declare officially that he and his settlement are under the protection of the Empire.”⁶

Within six years, the whole of what has since then been known as German Southwest Africa was brought under German sovereignty; and:

“The occupation of Togoland, Kamerun, and German East Africa followed that of Southwest Africa in less than a year,”⁷ with an aggregate area of over a million square miles.⁸ Comparison with the possessions in Africa of other European countries prior to the war (much acquired prior to 1884) was as follows:

	Area — Sq. Miles	Population
United Kingdom ⁹	3,038,441	50,124,800
France ¹⁰	3,733,400	36,381,000
Portugal	794,770	8,743,000
Italy	449,100	1,300,000
Belgium ¹¹	85,082	521,000
Germany	1,032,700	11,218,000 ¹²

⁴ Comprising, in the aggregate, about 27,500 English square miles of territory and nearly three and a quarter millions of people: Ward and Wilkinson, *Germany*, II, p. 323.

⁵ Von Bülow: *Imperial Germany*, p. 15. Cf. *Round Table*, March 1915, p. 384.

⁶ Herbert Adams Gibbons: *The New Map of Africa*, p. 174. Cf. Gibbons: *The New Map of Europe*, cap. ii. ⁷ Gibbons: *The New Map of Africa*, p. 174.

⁸ J. Ellis Barker: *The Foundations of Germany*, p. 212.

⁹ Including Egypt, the Soudan, and the African islands.

¹⁰ Including the African islands. ¹¹ Including the African islands.

¹² Estimates vary widely. Cf. Harris: *Intervention and Colonization in Africa*, p. 368; Woolf: *Empire and Commerce in Africa*, p. 68; British Empire Series: *British Africa*, p. 414; Morel: *Africa and the Peace of Europe*, pp. 12-15.

Production and Trade. Not many figures will be necessary to remind readers of Germany's unprecedented economic expansion after her unification in 1871. The following may suffice: Production in coal between 1871 and 1906, quadrupled; between 1875 and 1913, it increased from 48,530,000 to 273,650,000 tons. Production in pig iron, between 1871 and 1901, quintupled. Production in steel rose from a half million tons in 1871 to twelve millions in 1907. The relative production of iron in Germany and the United Kingdom was as follows:

	Germany	United Kingdom
1865	975,000	4,896,000
1890	4,658,000	8,033,000
1913	19,292,000	10,260,000. ¹³

Germany's volume of trade rose from six billion marks in 1878 to ten and a half billions in 1900; to fifteen billions in 1906; and to nineteen billions in 1914.¹⁴ Writing in 1914, von Bülow could say:

"With its foreign trade of 19,000 millions, Germany is to-day the second greatest commercial power in the world; for it is second only to the United Kingdom with her 25,000 millions, and surpasses the United States with her 15,000 millions."¹⁵

To the rapidity of German development, several things contributed: First, modern machinery, by which output rapidly rises beyond sales and forces search for foreign markets. Second, highly trained technical skill. Third, application of scientific discoveries to production. Fourth, willing adaptation to the wishes of purchasers. Fifth, improved methods of selling. Sixth, governmental assistance. As Sir Charles Lucas said (prior to the war), "It is a wonderful work of a great people."¹⁶ And that the United Kingdom resented the work in seen in the widely expressed desire to put an end, if possible, to what was said to have been Germany's "unscrupulous competition in finance and commerce."¹⁷ While economically calamitous, this competition was by itself politically innocuous. Associated with other reasons for antipathy, it was not without effect. A prominent English writer has said:

"There was in the world only one menace to peace and that menace was the increasing population, the increasing prosperity, and the increasing unrest of the German."¹⁸

The unrest of the German was not so unmistakably obvious as were the population and the prosperity; and if one should ask, Why should those

¹³ *Nineteenth Century*, April 1918, p. 710; *Current History*, XIII, Pt. II, p. 16.

¹⁴ Seymour: *The Diplomatic Background of the War*, pp. 66, 67, 75. And see *Nineteenth Century*, April 1918, p. 698.

¹⁵ *Imperial Germany*, p. 17.

¹⁶ *United Empire*, Feb. 1914, p. 138.

¹⁷ *Fortnightly Rev.*, April 1915, p. 733.

¹⁸ Harold Begbie, in *The Vindication of Great Britain*, p. 49. Quoted by von Bethmann-Hollweg, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

have been a menace? the answer may be found in Bethmann-Hollweg's statement that the British:

"looked upon a Germany, that kept on growing, as an unwanted and troublesome intruder on the sanctity of British supremacy over the commerce and oceans of the world."¹⁹

Quite true, but quite unavoidable, for perfectly natural. The man in possession never likes disturbance of the *status quo*.

Shipping. The absence of other contributory reasons explains why the ever-developing trade-rivalry of the United States was unaccompanied in the United Kingdom by increasing enmity. British ships carried the bulk of American commerce. German commerce, on the other hand, was being provided for by the construction of German ships — ships which, moreover, were competing with the British in the neutral trade. In 1871, the German fleet consisted of a few sailing vessels plying the Baltic. In 1900, over 4,000 ships carried merchandise everywhere, and of these 1,300 were steam-driven. The Hamburg-American line became the largest in the world; and the North German Lloyd speedily raised its fleet to the formidable number of seventy-three.²⁰ Competition in shipping was to the United Kingdom much more serious than rivalry in trade. Remembering that a mercantile navy has always been regarded as a nursery of men for the fighting navy, the United Kingdom could not fail to view with apprehension the rapid expansion of German naval activity.

"Hamburg, Germany's chief port, was in 1872, not so much a German as a British harbor: of the ships that put into that port the British vessels surpassed the German by two to one. But by 1887, the German ships entering Hamburg slightly surpassed the British in number and tonnage, and in 1900 the German shipping of Hamburg was more than double that of the British. A decade later the entire trading fleet of France was less than that of Hamburg alone."²¹

War-Navy Rivalry. To all these various rivalries must be added that which was much the most important, namely, war-navy rivalry. The rapid development of the German navy is dealt with in another chapter.²² At this place, we note its effect. Supreme on the ocean for a hundred years, the United Kingdom felt that rivalry in warships was not only a menace as indicative of intended attack,²³ but an unwarranted

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 66.

²⁰ Seymour, *op. cit.*, pp. 77, 78. Cf. *Ann. Reg.*, 1900, p. [287. Von Bülow says: "In the year 1910, 11,800 German ships and 11,698 foreign ships entered the German ports, while 11,962 German and 11,678 foreign ships sailed from them. On an average the German shipyards build seventy new steamers and forty new sailing ships a year. With rapid strides, we Germans have won a place in the front rank of the seafaring nations who carry on oversea trade": *Imperial Germany*, p. 17.

²¹ Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

²² Cap. XVII.

²³ Cf. Asquith, *The Genesis of the War*, cap. X. Mr. Churchill endeavored to get the Dominion premiers to believe something of the sort: *ibid.*

encroachment upon her rightful prerogative. Some of her people resented the construction of a German navy as a "challenge," while others proposed its inhibition by force. German rivalry in colonization, in production, in trade, even in shipping, might grudgingly have been tolerated, but the appearance of a competitor in naval power reduced friendly relations to a matter of diplomatic pretence. Antagonism found expression in such statements as the following: In the autumn of 1904, *The Army and Navy Gazette* said:

"Once before, we had to snuff out a fleet which we believed might be employed against us. There are many people, both in England and on the Continent, who consider the German fleet the only serious menace to the preservation of peace in Europe. Be that as it may, we are content to point out that the present moment is particularly favorable to our demand that the German fleet shall not be further increased."²⁴

On 3 February 1905, Mr. Arthur Lee, the First Lord of the Admiralty, declared that the British fleet should concentrate in the North Sea, and in anticipation of war, should:

"strike the first blow, before the other side found time to read in the newspapers that war had been declared."²⁵

Commenting upon this speech, the *Daily Chronicle* said:

"If the German fleet had been smashed in October 1904, we should have had peace in Europe for sixty years. For this reason we consider the statement Mr. Arthur Lee uttered, assuming that it was on behalf of the Cabinet, a wise and pacific declaration of the unalterable purpose of the Mistress of the Seas."²⁶

Lord Fisher, who at one time was Naval A.D.C. to King Edward, and on terms of friendship with him, tells us in his recent book of *Memories* that, as early as 1908, he (Fisher) was of opinion:

"that we have eventually to fight Germany, is just as sure as anything can be, solely because she can't expand commercially without it."²⁷

And his proposed method of dealing with the situation is noteworthy:

"This letter to King Edward," he said, "followed upon a previous long secret conversation with His Majesty in which I urged that we should 'Copenhagen' the German Fleet at Kiel, à la Nelson, and I lamented that we possessed neither a Pitt nor a Bismarck to give the order."²⁸

"It seemed to me simply a sagacious act on England's part to seize the German Fleet when it was so very easy of accomplishment in the manner I sketched out to His Majesty, and probably without bloodshed."²⁹

²⁴ Von Bülow: *Imperial Germany*, p. 37.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ P. 4.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

Referring, in a letter to Lord Esher (15 March 1909) to a paper known as E.5, which dealt with Lord Haldane's proposed Expeditionary Force, Lord Fisher said:

"The General Staff criticism is on the other hand the thin end of the insidious wedge of our taking part in Continental War as apart absolutely from Coastal Military Expeditions in pure concert with the Navy. . . . However, the point of my letter is this — Ain't we d——d fools to go on wasting our very precious moments on these abstruse disquisitions on this line or that, or the passage of the Dutch-German Frontier River, and whether the bloody fight is to be at Rheims or Amiens, until the Cabinet have decided the great big question raised in your E.5; Are we or are we not going to send a British army to fight on the Continent, as quite distinct and apart from Coastal Raids and seizures of Islands, et cetera, which the Navy dominate?"³⁰

Lord Fisher's views were known in Germany. He tells us that, in 1905, Mr. Beit had a conversation with the Kaiser, which he (Beit) reported to the King:

"The Emperor said to Beit that 'England wanted war; not the King — not perhaps, the Government, but influential people like Sir John Fisher.' He said that Fisher held that because the British fleet was in perfect order, and the German fleet was not ready, England should provoke war."³¹

To what extent these views represented public opinion is uncertain, but we know that German naval rivalry not only rendered impossible the existence of friendly relations between the two countries but made maintenance of cordial relations with France and Russia the pivot of British foreign policy. In a former chapter³² has been noted that, from time to time (after 1907), advances by Berlin failed because they encountered "a stone wall"; "because the naval question forms an insurmountable barrier"; because, in British official opinion, continued German construction would necessarily produce:

"a most alarming and strained situation . . . in seven or eight years"; because, in British public opinion:

"so long as the question of naval armaments exists, the establishment of normal relations between Germany and England, however desirable in themselves, will not be possible";

because, in short, the United Kingdom would not permit encroachment upon her ocean-predominance. Upon that point, British statesmen were inflexible. Britain "rules the waves." She had dominated them for a hundred years. And, as Mr. Asquith declared in the House of Commons on 29 March 1909:

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 188-9.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 33; also pp. 35, 182. See further quotations in chapter XVI.

³² Cap. V.

“Great Britain would not permit her supremacy to be challenged.”³³ Mr. Haldane said the same thing directly to the German Chancellor in Berlin in February 1912. He relates as follows:

“I said that the increasing action of Germany in piling up magnificent armaments was, of course, within the unfettered rights of the German people. But the policy had an inevitable consequence in the drawing together of other nations in the interests of their own security. This was what was happening. I told him frankly that we had made naval and military preparations, but only such as defence required, and as would be considered in Germany matter of course.”

Continuing, Haldane said that:

“owing to our dependence on freedom of sea-communications for food and raw materials, we could not sit still if Germany elected to develop her fleet to such an extent as to imperil our naval protection. She might build more ships, but we should in that case lay down two keels for each one she laid down.”³⁴

During the same visit, Haldane said to von Tirpitz:

“Germany was quite free to do as she pleased, but so were we, and we should probably lay down two keels for every one which she added to her programme. The initiative in slackening competition was really not with us, but with Germany.”³⁵

Alleged Distinction. British statesmen constantly affirm that possession of predominant sea-power is rightfully theirs because of its necessity to the existence of their Empire. Sir Edward Grey, for example, speaking in the House of Commons (29 March 1909) said:

“There is no comparison between the importance of the German navy to Germany, and the importance of our navy to us. Our navy, to us, is what their army is to them. To have a strong navy would increase their prestige, their diplomatic influence, their power of protecting their commerce; but as regards us — it is not a matter of life and death to them that it is to us. No superiority of the British navy over the German navy could ever put us in a position to affect the independence or integrity of Germany, because our army is not maintained on a scale which, unaided, could do anything on German territory. But if the German navy were superior to ours, they, maintaining the army which they do, for us it would but be a question of defeat. Our independence, our very existence would be at stake.”³⁶

And Mr. Winston Churchill, in a speech at Glasgow (9 February 1912), said:

“The British navy is to us a necessity, and, from some points of

³³ Asquith, *op. cit.*, cap. X.

³⁴ Haldane: *Before the War*, pp. 58-9.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 60. Mr. Haldane's visit to Berlin is more fully dealt with in cap. V, pp. 171-4.

³⁶ *Round Table*, March 1915, pp. 374-5.

view, the German navy is to them more in the nature of a luxury. Our naval power involves British existence. It is existence to us, it is expansion to them.”³⁷

The United Kingdom desires a navy for four reasons: (1) protection of its coasts; (2) protection of its commerce; (3) protection of its over-sea possessions; (4) diplomatic influence in the settlement of international disputes. And it was for precisely the same four reasons that Germany desired a navy. Replying to the contention that their army affords them ample protection, Germans pointed out that, as against naval attack upon their coasts, commerce, and colonies, their army was helpless. Mr. Churchill on one occasion supported his opinion that there could be no war between the United Kingdom and Germany, with the assertion that there was no place in which they could fight—the one was not equipped for fighting on land, and the other was powerless at sea. But he overlooked that which to Germans was obvious: that the United Kingdom could do enormous damage to her enemy, while Germany could do nothing in return. Failing to recognize this point, Dr. J. Holland Rose has said:

“The rôle of the British fleet was necessarily defensive; that of the German fleet, on its very limited coasts, could, after the recent huge additions, well be offensive. In truth, the danger of the situation lay in the fact that the greatest military Power in the world aspired to rival on the oceans the Power for which maritime supremacy is the first law of existence.”³⁸

The annihilation of the German merchant marine; the conquest of all the German colonies; and the food and other blockades of German ports in the 1914–1918 war form a striking commentary upon Dr. Rose’s idea of the “necessarily defensive” “rôle of the British fleet.” If British people were unable to understand the German attitude, it was obvious enough to Russian diplomats. Isvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister, for example, said (2 July 1909):

“The only clouds on the horizon were the relations with England; in this direction the atmosphere was charged with electricity. Of course, Germany could not admit that a foreign Power should dictate the extent of her naval armaments; but the present situation would become dangerous, if protracted; for that reason an amicable solution must be found.”³⁹

No amicable solution could be found. At a later date (24 May 1912), the Russian Chargé at Berlin, when referring to the Anglo-German relations, truly said:

³⁷ Quoted by Rohrbach: *German World Policies* (von Mach translation), p. 178.

³⁸ *Nationality in Modern History*, p. 192.

³⁹ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 497.

“These relations, which in our day constitute one of the main, if not the main, features of ‘Weltpolitik,’ arise from the unusual economic strength of Germany, and the corresponding development of her land, and, above all, her naval forces. In the latter, England sees a threat not only to her own naval supremacy, but, at the same time, to her existence as a world Power. The situation did not originate at one blow, and cannot be changed in a day, however much this may be desired by the one, and by both, and however capable the statesmen may be who assume the task of bringing about an Anglo-German agreement. A task of this sort is not easy, for in order to achieve a result of this kind, England would be, for once and for all time, obliged to renounce the idea of opposing the commercial expansion of Germany in all parts of the world, and the incidental increase of her merchant fleet and her navy.”⁴⁰ The United Kingdom would not surrender her ocean-predominance; and Germany declined to be content with permanent inferiority. Until Alsace and Lorraine should be returned to France, normal relations between her and Germany could not be restored.⁴¹ And until Germany ceased naval competition with the United Kingdom, relations between these Powers must remain dubious. Sir Charles Hardinge very slightly overestimated the period of the *dénouement* when, in 1908, he placed it in 1915 or 1916.⁴² M. Tardieu represented King Edward as having said:

“We cannot remain indefinitely at the mercy of the German hold-up,” and added: “This phrase is the birth-certificate of what has come to be known as the Entente Cordiale. For once it was decided to oppose German plans for supremacy, an understanding with France was obligatory.”⁴³

To which the Kaiser might have replied: “We cannot remain indefinitely at the mercy of the British fleet.” Was either of them wrong? Sir Edward Grey, when addressing the Dominion premiers, in camera, during the Imperial Conference of 1911, put the matter fairly enough (26 May) when he said:

“The cause of anxiety now in public opinion here as regards Germany arises entirely from the question of German naval expenditure, which is very considerable, which may be increased, and which, if it is increased, will produce an impression on the world at large that the object of Germany is to build a fleet which shall be bigger than the British fleet, and if people once get that impression, they will say that can only be done with one object, which is the object of eventually taking the command of the sea from us. Therefore it is on naval expenditures that we have been trying especially to come to some agreement, if we can,

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 639.

⁴¹ See cap. XVIII.

⁴² *Ante*, cap. X, p. 165.

⁴³ *The Truth about the Treaty*, p. 439.

with the German Government; such an agreement will make it clear that there is no rivalry between the two nations. It is an exceedingly difficult matter to deal with, because Germany feels it due to herself to have a large navy, and no one can but feel that it is perfectly natural on her part."⁴⁴

The United Kingdom, Sir Edward added, was:

"quite ready to give every possible guaranty that can be given that we are building with no aggressive purpose."

But inasmuch as he could give no guaranty that, within two months, Mr. Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, would not deliver a speech which would be rightly regarded as a war-warning to Germany,⁴⁵ he could hardly have expected that Germany would be content with his assurances.

"The German Naval Scare" of 1909. The effect in the United Kingdom of the German rivalries came to climax in 1909 in the form of "the German naval scare" — a scare based upon nothing but suspicion, dislike, and apprehension. The episode may be said to have had its origin in connection with British construction of the first of the Dreadnought class of ships — launched 10 February 1906.⁴⁶ Prior to that time, the Cawdor programme of British construction provided for laying down four ships in each year. A new government — the Campbell-Bannerman — had, however, omitted one ship from the work of both 1906 and 1907, and two from the work of 1908. The German navy law, on the other hand, had provided for an annual increment of three ships, but in 1906 only one keel had been laid. Whether the British reason for reducing its programme was that Germany might be induced to do likewise, or that the tests of the new ship should be awaited before proceeding with others, is not known. But there is little doubt that von Tirpitz's reason for delay was that, if he were to build new ships to match the Dreadnoughts, he would need not only time for designing, but for reorganization of his shipyards, his ports, and the Kiel canal.⁴⁷ In the summer of 1907, feeling himself secure, von Tirpitz proceeded with the programme of the year — three ships, and construction of the two ships omitted in 1906; and thus Germany was laying down five ships within the year, while the British Admiralty was laying down only three. The reason, unfortunately, did not always accompany the fact. The British government had itself to blame for the ensuing hysterics.

⁴⁴ Asquith, *op. cit.*, cap. XVI.

⁴⁵ It was delivered on 21 July.

⁴⁶ Previous construction is dealt with in chapter XVII.

⁴⁷ Lord Fisher was of that opinion. He said: "The German Admiralty wrestled with the 'Dreadnought' problem for eighteen months, and did nothing. Why? Because it meant their spending twelve and a half million sterling on widening and deepening the Kiel Canal, and in dredging all their harbors and all the approaches to their harbors, because if they did not do so it would be of no use building 'Dreadnoughts' because they could not float": *Memories*, p. 15.

British timidities, commenced during the debate in the House of Commons in March 1908 on the naval estimates and were afterwards played upon in a series of articles in *The Clarion*, *The Daily Mail* and *The Times*. On 6 March *The Times* published a letter from its military correspondent declaring that the German Emperor had addressed a letter to Lord Tweedmouth (First Lord of the Admiralty):

“amounting to an attempt to influence, in German interests, the minister responsible for our navy estimates”;

and, editorially, demanded production of the letter. Supremely silly as was the suggestion, it was widely and readily believed. Tweedmouth had to pledge his honor, and Lord Rosebery found it necessary to point out, to an excitedly undiscerning public, the impossibility of the existence of such a stupid attempt upon a British statesman. During the discussion in parliament, he said:

“I am quite sure that it never would have entered his” (the Emperor’s) “head, or the head of any educated person outside of a lunatic asylum in Germany, that by a private communication to my noble friend he could exercise any influence whatever on the progress of British armaments.”⁴⁸

The incident was followed by presentation to crowded theatres of “An Englishman’s Home,” depicting a successful German invasion of England. It was received with enthusiasm, —

“It was patronized by the Court, and the censor refused to allow it to be parodied.”⁴⁹

“The effect of the scare had perhaps been heightened by an ingenious experiment carried out by the Automobile Association in conjunction with the War Office. On March 17, a battalion at war strength, made up from various regiments of the Guards, was conveyed by motor from London to Hastings and back again, the idea being that the agents of a foreign Power had destroyed part of the railway between these points and that the troops were required to repel a raid. The cars, which took four men each, beside the driver — though not all were filled — were lent by members of the association and numbered 286, and were accompanied by twenty-eight *chassis*, the latter carrying machine-guns and stores. The cars met at the Crystal Palace, starting thence at 10 A.M., and despite the difficulties caused by a rapid thaw, there was no accident and no delay *en route*. The second line transport was not so successful.”⁵⁰

It was under such circumstances as these that the British government, misled by some very erroneous assertions as to the extent of German

⁴⁸ Hansard, 9 March 1908, cols., 1075-6.

⁴⁹ Hirst, *op. cit.*, p. 67. See *Ann. Reg.*, 1909, pp. [8, 104. The play opened at Wyndham’s, 28 January 1909.

⁵⁰ *Ann. Reg.*, 1909, p. [58.

activity,⁵¹ determined not only to resume construction according to the Cawdor programme, but to take authority to build rapidly four extra Dreadnoughts, and to expedite the completion of the naval base at Rosyth by offering the contractors a bonus of £800 for each week saved from the contracted time. Anticipating opposition in the Commons from government supporters,⁵² Mr. McKenna, First Lord of the Admiralty, supplied, in his speech of 16 March (1909), ground for the impression that, by concealing its activities, Germany had almost reached equality in naval power with the United Kingdom. The speech was followed by an Opposition attack, led by Mr. Balfour, who, skillfully emphasizing what he termed the:

“alarming circumstances in which this country finds itself,” declared: “that the programme as presented by the government is utterly insufficient,” declared that:

“On the two years’ basis of building we shall in December 1910, as I calculate, have ten, and only ten Dreadnoughts. But the Germans at that date, as I calculate, will have thirteen.”⁵³

Upon the assumption that further accelerations of programme would supervene, Mr. Balfour calculated that, by April 1912, Germany would have twenty-five Dreadnoughts. In truth, there never had been wilder calculating and prophesying. In 1912, Germany had only nine.⁵⁴ And the respective naval expenditures of the United Kingdom and Germany, from 1901 to 1912, in pounds sterling, were as follows:

Great Britain	456 millions
Germany	179 “

Observing that Mr. McKenna had succeeded better than sufficiently well in forfending opposition to his proposed expenditure; that the country was becoming delirious; and that his government was being heavily censured, Mr. Asquith, a few days after the above speeches had done their work, deprecated excitement by saying (22 March) that:

“there was no occasion for anything in the nature, I will not say of panic, but of alarm or even disquiet.”

Explaining why he was then addressing the House, Mr. Asquith said:

“It is to dissipate as far as I can — and I think I shall be able to do

⁵¹ See Hirst, *op. cit.*, pp. 96–8; Perris, *Our Foreign Policy*, p. 154.

⁵² Hirst, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–71, 98–9

⁵³ Hansard, 16 March, cols., 950, 954.

⁵⁴ Hirst, *op. cit.*, p. 77, notes; p. 79, note. The First Lord of the Admiralty who succeeded Mr. McKenna in that office — Mr. Winston S. Churchill — tells us in his recent book (*The World Crisis*, I, pp. 32–3) that: “The gloomy Admiralty anticipations were in no respect fulfilled in the year 1912. The British margin was found to be ample in that year. There were no secret German Dreadnoughts, nor had Admiral von Tirpitz made any untrue statement in respect of major construction. . . . The Admiralty had demanded six ships; the economists offered four; and we finally compromised on eight.”

so completely—the absurd and mischievous legends to which currency is being given at this moment as to the supposed naval unpreparedness of this country. A more unpatriotic, a more unscrupulous misrepresentation of the actual situation than that which is now being presented, I have never experienced.”

“If I may say so, the old women of both sexes whose slumbers are at present being disturbed by fantastic visions of flotillas of German Dreadnoughts sufficient to land an invading army on our shores, may dream without any real apprehension for another twelve months.”⁵⁵

The appeal was as to a wind-blown prairie fire; and there was no limit to the stupidity of the stories which filled the newspapers, and the conversations of the readers.

“Mysterious air-ships were seen at night at various places as far apart as Lowestoft and Cardiff, and one was even discovered at night on a Welsh mountain accompanied by two men who spoke in some foreign tongue. . . . Another story . . . was that there were 50,000 stands in Mauser rifles and 160 rounds of ball cartridge for each stored in a cellar within a quarter of a mile of Charing Cross, ready for the 66,000 German soldiers supposed to be in England.”⁵⁶

The scare spread to the British Dominions, where resolutions were passed which induced the British government to summon a special Imperial Conference “on the naval and military defences of the empire.”⁵⁷ The excitement subsided, but its effect upon British attitude toward Germany remained as one of the not unimportant Fear Roots of the war. Much of the story may be seen in Mr. F. W. Hirst’s book, *The Six Panics*, pages 59–102.⁵⁸ As interesting comment upon the episode, we may note that in February 1909, King Edward VII was in Berlin, and said to the Kaiser (as reported, 19 February, by the Russian Ambassador there) that:

“he considered the excitement of British public opinion and the press concerning the increase of the German fleet as ridiculous. The King expressed himself as follows: ‘You have the vote of assent of the Reichstag for the programme which you decreed necessary for the naval forces of Germany and you must carry out this programme.’”⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Hansard, 22 March; Hirst, *op. cit.*, p. 89. It was in this connection that Mr. Lloyd George, in a speech on the eve of an election in Edinburgh, said (according to Mr. Runciman): “We do not want Dreadnoughts to deal with mythical Armadas. We cannot afford to build navies against nightmares”: *Common Sense*, 1 May 1920.

⁵⁶ *Ann. Reg.*, 1909, p. [117].

⁵⁷ Cd. 4948.

⁵⁸ Reference may also be made to *Cam. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, III, pp. 430–2; Neilson, *How Diplomats Make War*, pp. 114–31, 135, 149, 170, 325; G. H. Perris, *Our Foreign Policy*, pp. 152–60; J. T. Walton Newbold, *How Europe Armed for War*, pp. 62–4, 69–71; and the *Kingdom Papers*, by the present writer, II, pp. 26–35.

⁵⁹ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 491.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin said (28 May):

"Symptomatic, on the one side, is the English dread of a German attack upon England, reproduced by phantastic rumors of German spies and air-ship raids."⁶⁰

Fantastic enough; but, nevertheless, responding to the cry, "We want eight and we won't wait," the Admiralty laid down eight capital ships in 1909 — laid them down while the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd George, was saying:

"We know how little foundation existed for the last scare. In the light of established facts the fright which shook Britain and convulsed the Colonies looks rather foolish."⁶¹

CAUTION

Although all that has been said as to German rivalry is true, it must be applied with discrimination. Mr. David Jayne Hill (at various times American Ambassador to Germany, Minister to Switzerland, Minister to the Netherlands, and Assistant Secretary of State) for example, has said that:

"no one aware of the origin of the present world-war can doubt for a moment, when the drapery of excuse and explanation is swept aside, that it is fundamentally a war for trade and for trade-routes in which the resources of industry and the possession of markets play the conspicuous rôle."⁶²

Desire for trade and trade-routes was not the motive which actuated Austria-Hungary in presenting her ultimatum to Serbia on the 23d July 1914. It was not trade reasons that Russia championed Serbia. It was not trade reasons which actuated France, or Italy, or Roumania, or Bulgaria, or Japan, or the United States. And it was only one of the motives which led to the participation of the United Kingdom. Again, Také Jonescu (a Roumanian statesman) in his pamphlet, *The Origins of the War*, said:

"Once more, I assert it, the prime cause of the events which have led to the war is the Anglo-German rivalry."⁶³

But, once more, while German rivalry was that which induced the United Kingdom to join France and Russia in the Triple Entente, it had no relation to the outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans. Finally, Mr. Woodrow Wilson, when President of the United States, said:

"The real reason that the war we have just finished took place was that Germany was afraid her commercial rivals were going to get the better of her, and the reason why some nations went into the war against

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 494.

⁶¹ *Cam. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, III, p. 433.

⁶² *Am. Soc. Int. Law, Prcdgs.*, 1916, p. 148.

⁶³ Pamphlet issued by the Council for the Study of International Relations.

Germany was that they thought that Germany would get the commercial advantage of them. The seed of the jealousy, the seed of the deep-rooted hatred was hot, successful commercial and industrial rivalry."⁶⁴

Without better analysis than that, "the war we have just finished" cannot be understood.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing observations, supplemented by others in the chapter on *Germany and Preparation*, we may safely draw the following conclusions:

1. Germany had very rapidly in recent years become, in various respects, the most formidable of the European rivals of the United Kingdom. Unprecedented development in population, territory, production, trade, shipping, and war-navy had aroused British apprehensions and consequent enmity. The very capable Russian Ambassador at London, reporting (26 July 1914), a few days after the delivery to Serbia of the Austro-Hungarian note, very accurately said:

"What frightens England is less the Austrian hegemony in the Balkans than the German hegemony in the world."⁶⁵

2. German rivalry in these respects, plus other causes dealt with in the next two chapters, (1) induced the United Kingdom to drop her historic hostility to France and Russia and to concentrate her apprehensions on Germany; (2) impelled her to enter into *entente* relations with France (1904) and Russia (1907); (3) explains the reason for the pivoting of British foreign policy upon the maintenance and development of these relations; and (4) finally was the reason for the participation of the United Kingdom in the great war.

3. German rivalry may, therefore, be regarded as one of the roots of the war — the war between two of the Accessories.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Speech at St. Louis, Mo., 5 Sep. 1919: Quoted in *The Nation*, 6 Oct. 1920. See *ante*, cap. I, p. 7.

⁶⁵ *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 330. The Ambassador had made a similar observation in his despatch of the preceding 25th February: *ibid.*, p. 309.

⁶⁶ *Ante*, p. 1.

CHAPTER XX

THE GERMAN MENACE IN THE WEST ROOT

FOUR CONCEPTIONS OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 693. — A Monroe Doctrine, 695. — War against Louis XIV, 1689-1697, 695. — War against Louis XIV, 1702-13, 697. — War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-8, 703. — The Seven Years' War, 1756-63, 705. — War of the French Revolution, 1793-1815, 705. — Parallelism, 710. — Balance of Power — More Recent Diplomacies, 712. — Freedom from Menace on the North Sea Coasts, 714. — France formerly the Danger, 716. — German Menace succeeds French, 716. — Conclusions, 717. — The Future, 718.

GERMAN rivalries in commerce, manufactures, peace vessels, and war fleets (dealt with in the next preceding chapter) formed one of the roots of the war between the United Kingdom and Germany. The German menace to the North Sea coasts — by German contiguity to Holland and Belgium, and by the certainty that in war between Germany and France, German troops would take possession of Belgium, if not Holland also — was another of those roots.

Four Conceptions of British Foreign Policy. Although maintenance of the balance of power has often been said to be the pivot of British policy in Europe, there is difficulty not only in defining the meaning of the phrase, but in demonstrating the truth of the assertion. Professor Seeley, for example, has posited for a very important period, a widely different conception.

“I shall venture to assert,” he wrote, “that . . . the main struggle of England from the time of Louis XIV to the time of Napoleon was for the possession of the New World, and that it is for want of perceiving this that most of us find that century of English history uninteresting.”

“This fact then that, both in America and in Asia, France and England stood in direct competition for a prize of absolutely incalculable value, explains the fact that France and England fought a second Hundred Years' war.”¹

In perhaps too eager devotion to this second principle of action, the Professor overlooked a third, which may be expressed as determination to maintain freedom from menace on the North Sea coasts; and a fourth, which may be expressed as secular enmity between England and France — the product of cumulative rivalries, of which competition in colonial expansion was one.

¹ *The Expansion of England*, pp. 13-14, 31.

Reasons for difference of opinion are obvious. Even if attention be limited to dates subsequent to the accession of William III, it is clear that no well-defined conception of foreign policy directed the multiplied and sometimes contradictory actions of British governments. National jealousies and rivalries, divergent interests, clashing imperialisms, fears, reasons and emotions of all sorts, actuated in varying degrees the various policy-framing men who, if they agreed upon adoption of some line of action, usually reached their conclusions by devious routes. Judgments of the few, moreover, were often overruled by the passions of the many. And, on the other hand, in order to arouse popular enthusiasm, the leaders always imported some high-sounding ethical or other irrelevant considerations by which the crowds, and indeed many of the *intelligenza*, were misled and made noisy. Investigation of the causes of even the recent war is arduous, and every conclusion is subject to impeachment. Assertions with reference to remoter conflicts are more hazardous, and, even when best formulated, are, almost necessarily, lacking either in specification of some of the actuating considerations, or in assignment of their relative importance.

Confining attention to the four principles of action above referred to, and disengaging them as far as possible from the crowd-emotions of the different periods, it may safely be asserted that the third (maintenance of freedom from menace on the North Sea coasts) has been a continuous, although usually a latent element in policy; that the fourth (secular enmity between England and France) was, until the inauguration of the Anglo-French entente, not only a continuous, but an ever-present element in foreign policy; that had maintenance of the balance of power been the pivotal consideration, persistent efforts to continue the equipoise would be a strikingly conspicuous and rapidly recurring feature in English history, whereas, on the contrary, it has been thought to explain action only upon occasions in which danger of establishment of a menace on the North Sea coasts made their protection necessary; that maintenance of freedom on the North Sea coasts may, in some sense, be regarded as the concrete expression of the conception concealed in the phrase "the balance of power"; that failure to observe this fact accounts, in large measure, for the frequent denunciation of that which Bright in 1865 assailed as "a foul idol, fouler than any to which heathen ever bowed"; and that (although this point is for present purposes immaterial) colonial annexations at the expense of France were (speaking generally) the results of Anglo-French European wars, rather than were the European quarrels mere pretexts for renewal of the "competition for a prize of absolutely incalculable value." The confusion in the customary phrase may be seen in the following quotation from Viscount Milner:

"We may build ships against one nation, or even against a combination of nations. But we cannot build ships against half Europe. If western

Europe, with all its ports, its harbors, its arsenals, and its resources, was to fall under the domination of a single will, no effort of ours would be sufficient to retain the command of the sea. It is a balance of power on the continent, which alone makes it possible for us to retain it. Thus the maintenance of the balance of power is vital to the security of the British Empire.”²

The first part of the paragraph is true — western Europe, including as it does the North Sea coasts (that is what was in Lord Milner’s mind — not Spain and Portugal) must not “fall under the domination of a single will.” But the reference to the balance of power is erroneous; for British statesmen would find little comfort in western Europe, “under the domination of a single will,” being balanced, ever so nicely, by the domination of another single will in the east.

A Monroe Doctrine. The American policy which passes under the name of the Monroe Doctrine³ is by no means unique. In effect, it was (in part) a declaration that establishment of any of the monarchical Powers in any part of the Americas would constitute a menace to the United States, and, for that reason, must not be undertaken. Whether such an attitude can be justified upon general principles may be doubtful; but that it has many analogies is indisputable. A classic instance was the British objection to the establishment of Russian influence at Constantinople. And British determination to be free from menace on the North Sea coasts is of still earlier origin. The “balance of power” is not “a foul idol” if that is its meaning. A few notes from the history of the subject may be of interest.

War Against Louis XIV, 1689-1697. The wars against Louis XIV have frequently been referred to as conspicuous illustrations of British determination to maintain the balance of power in Europe. In so far as that view is not erroneous, it is superficial.

Until the British revolution of 1688 and the ensuing flight of James II to the Continent (22 December), Great Britain and France had been at peace since 1678, and, if the relations between them were not warmly cordial, their sovereigns, at least, were on the same side of the religious controversies of the time, and James II was not insensible to the advantages of donations from Paris. On the other hand, prior to 1688, the country of William of Orange, the Dutch Stattholder, had been at war with France, intermittently, for sixteen years (from 1672), and accession to the British throne gave him (William) a welcome opportunity for endeavors to engage British assistance. One of his first acts was to break off diplomatic relations with France; but, for further progress, he was

² *The United Service Magazine*, Jan. 1912. Quoted by Oliver in *Ordeal by Battle*, p. 248; and see p. 301.

³ It might, more fittingly, be called the Canning Policy, for it was only with difficulty that Canning succeeded in inducing Monroe to formulate his “doctrine.” See the present writer’s book, *The Kingdom Papers*, I, p. 149.

indebted not to British dread of French predominance in Europe, but to the landing of James II in Ireland (12 March 1689); to French assistance in the protracted war there (till Limerick in 1691); and to the belief that Louis intended to re-establish James upon the throne.

It was a Tory parliament that William had to deal with. It was the Tories who had opposed his accession to the throne. Half of them were Jacobites. And not liking them, William instituted elections which resulted in the substitution of the more friendly Whigs, who, justified by French patronage of James, assured William of their support against Louis. Thus reassured, William on 12 May (1689) entered into war alliance with the Emperor; and on 9 December, he as King of Great Britain, adhered to the union, thus completing the formation of the first Grand Alliance. In the treaty there is no suggestion of dread of French predominance. Its *raison d'être* (as it recited) was as follows:

“Whereas the French King has lately, without any lawful cause or pretext, attacked as well his Imperial Majesty, as the States General, by a most grievous and most unjust war.”

And, as their object, the parties to the treaty, declared that:

“There shall by no means any peace be concluded, before the peace of Westphalia, and those of Osnabrug, Munster, and the Pyreneans have, by the help of God, and by common force, been vindicated; and that all things, both in church and state, are restored to their former condition, according to the tenor of the same.”

But these provisions were largely blinds. The true purpose of the treaty was contained in a secret separate article as follows:

“France having openly declared, in several places and courts, that notwithstanding the most solemn renunciation, they still pretend by force of arms to assert, for the Dauphin, the succession of the Spanish monarchy, in case his Catholick Majesty should die without lawful issue, and publicly aiming to make the said Dauphin king of the Romans: the States General of the United Provinces, maturely considering what a blow either of these pretensions would give to their state, and what prejudice it would bring to the publick affairs and quiet, do promise by these separate articles, which are as valid as if they had been inserted word for word in the principal treaty: first, That in case the present king of Spain should die without lawful issue (which God forbid) they will with all their forces, assist his Sacred Imperial Majesty, or his heirs, in taking the succession of the Spanish monarchy, lawfully belonging to that house, together with its kingdoms, provinces, dominions, and rights; and in their obtaining and securing the quiet possession thereof against the French and their adherents, who shall directly or indirectly oppose this succession; and with force repulse the force they bring against them.”

In his adhesion to the treaty, William, as King of Great Britain, gave as his motive:

“we who desire nothing more than to lay hold of all those means which

are necessary and most useful for restoring and preserving the publick peace and quiet, do the more readily come into the same, that we may give this proof of our sincere affection and friendship for his Imperial Majesty and the said States General."

Inasmuch as the estates of the Spanish monarchy included not only Spain itself, but Sardinia, Milan, Naples, Sicily, the Balearic islands, the Spanish Netherlands (Belgium), and large American and Caribbean possessions, and inasmuch as the Emperor's own dominions bulked largely in Central Europe, the effect of the union of the two crowns (Imperial and Spanish) would have been the establishment of a power in Europe ⁴ much more menacing to European interests than would have been created by the accession to the Spanish throne of a son (the Dauphin) of a monarch reigning at Paris. It would indeed have placed the Spanish Netherlands under the governance of Vienna, instead of leaving it at Madrid, but transfer from one far-away Power to another—even a predominant Power—was evidently much more acceptable to Great Britain and Holland than the risk of addition to the strength of limitrophe and aggressive France. The war ended with the treaty of Ryswick (20 September 1697), which, among other things (not now important), provided for cessation of French connivance at conspiracies or plots aimed at William as King of Great Britain. It contained no reference to the impending difficulty with reference to the succession to the Spanish throne.

Very evidently, this first war against Louis had no relation to the balance of power. British people were actuated by resistance to French attempts to restore the exiled King; by objection to the deference paid to him as King at St. Germain; and by the strong will of William, of whom it was complained that, to him, Great Britain was of importance only in so far as she lent support to Holland. On the other hand, it would not be correct to say that the sole object of Louis was to maintain the balance of power by preventing the enthronement of the Emperor in Madrid. That would be a somewhat novel assertion, but citation of the secret separate articles of the treaty above quoted would furnish for it some support. Possession of the Netherlands was not at stake. That territory, at the time, belonged to Spain and was, therefore, not in question.

War Against Louis XIV, 1702-13. As indicated in the secret separate article above quoted, both the Emperor Leopold and the French Dauphin (son of Louis XIV) asserted claim to the Spanish throne in the event of the death of the reigning monarch, Charles II.⁵ The

⁴ The union would have created a predominant Power, from a military point of view. Union of the French and Spanish navies would have been another matter. And that illustrates one of the difficulties of giving to "the balance of power" precise definition. Cf. Macaulay, *History of England*, V, p. 340.

⁵ For present purposes, the claim of the Electoral Prince of Bavaria may be disregarded.

Emperor passed his claim to his son, Archduke Charles; and the Dauphin passed his to his son, Philip, the Duke of Anjou. Out of this clash came the war of eleven years (1702-13), usually referred to as the War of the Spanish Succession.

Charles of Spain having died (1 November 1700), Louis at once declared Philip to be King of Spain, and sent him off to Madrid. Austria, of course, objected, and William, jealous, personally and politically, of his arch-enemy, commenced preparations for reopening the struggle intermitted at Ryswick five years before. Not liking that parliament should be under the control of the Tories, who:

"were inclined to regard the will of Charles II" (under which Philip claimed) "not merely as a lesser evil but almost as a positive good."⁶

William dissolved it (December 1700 — a few weeks after the death of Charles) and brought on general elections, but got little profit from them. The Tories were still in majority. But Louis, most opportunely, came to his assistance. Although the Netherlands appertained to the Spanish crown, the Dutch had obtained permission to garrison certain fortresses as protection — as a barrier, as it was called, against French aggressiveness. Louis determined to oust these garrisons. And the British parliamentary session (opened 6 February 1701) had not far advanced when the members were made aware that, acting under the authority of his grandson, Louis had sent troops into the Netherlands, and had taken the Dutch soldiers into custody.

"There was one point," wrote Lecky, "on the Continent, however, which no patriotic Englishman, whether Whig or Tory, could look upon with indifference. The line of Spanish fortresses which protected the Netherlands from the ambition of France was of vital importance to the security of Holland, and if Holland passed into French hands it was more than doubtful whether English independence would long survive. To preserve these fortresses from French aggrandisement had been for generations a main end of English policy; during the last fifty years torrents of English blood had been shed to secure them; and with this object, William had agreed with the Elector of Bavaria, who had governed them as the representative of the Spanish King that they should be garrisoned in part with Dutch troops."

Referring to Louis' action, Lecky added:

"It would be difficult to exaggerate either the arrogance or the folly of this act. The Tory party, which in the beginning of 1701 was ascendant in England, was bitterly hostile to William; the partition treaties⁷ excited throughout the country deep and general discontent, and the ardent wish of the English people was to detach their country as far as possible from continental complications, and to secure a long

⁶ *The Political History of England, 1660-1702*, p. 437.

⁷ Treaties of 1698 and 1700 which William had arranged with Great Britain and France for the partition of the possessions of the Spanish crown upon the death of Charles II.

and permanent peace on the basis of a frank acceptance of the will of Charles II. But it was impossible that any English party, however hostile to William, could see with indifference the whole line of Spanish fortresses, including Luxemburg, Mons, Namur, Charleroi, and the seaports of Nieuport and Ostend occupied by the French, the whole English policy of the last war overthrown without a blow, and the transfer of the Spanish monarchy to Philip immediately employed in the interests of French ambition.”⁸

With this and other arguments for action, William plied his unwilling parliament. Giving way (April) so far as to recognize Philip as King of Spain, he:

“communicated to parliament all that took place in the conference at the Hague, all the aggressive acts and irritating words of Louis, all the appeals and memorials from the States General, and, on occasion, some evidence of Jacobite hopes and intrigues. By these means he hoped to convert the commons from their original eagerness to maintain peace at any price to at least an admission that war might be forced upon the country.”⁹

To a large extent, he succeeded. The House expressed its readiness to support him in:

“such alliances as he should think fit to make, in conjunction with the Emperor and the States General, for the preservation of the liberties of Europe, the prosperity and peace of England, and for reducing the exorbitant power of France.”¹⁰

But, on the other hand:

“No such supplies had been given him as would be needed for a war, and his success, such as it was, had not been gained without a good deal of serious friction. The discussion of foreign policy had brought up the question of the recent partition treaty, which was vehemently condemned by the House of Lords. . . . Passions were strongly stirred by the discovery that the king had employed foreigners to negotiate treaties affecting the vital interests of England, and that ministers had not had the courage to make an effective protest. The second treaty had been signed while parliament was actually sitting, and no one had even suggested that it should be consulted in the matter.”¹¹

With such authority as he had, William proceeded to arrange the terms of the second Grand Alliance—the treaty of 7 September 1701 between the Emperor, Great Britain, and Holland—which recited, as its *raison d'être*, that Louis:

“has usurped the possession of the entire inheritance, or Spanish monarchy, for the aforesaid duke of Anjou, and invaded by his arms the

⁸ *History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, I, pp. 32-3, 33-4.

⁹ *The Political History of England, 1660-1702*, p. 441.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 442.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 443.

provinces of the Spanish Low Countries, and the Dutchy of Milan; has a fleet ready fitted in the port of Cadiz; has sent several ships of war to the Spanish West Indies; and by this and many other ways the kingdoms of France and Spain are so closely united and cemented, that they may seem henceforward not to be otherwise considered than as one and the same kingdom: so that it sufficiently appears, unless timely care be taken that his Imperial Majesty will be destitute of all hopes of ever receiving satisfaction in his pretension; the Sacred Roman Empire will lose its rights in the fiefs belonging to it in Italy and the Spanish Netherlands; the free intercourse of navigation and commerce which the English and Dutch have in the Mediterranean, the Indies, and other places, will be utterly destroyed; and the United Provinces will be deprived of the security, which they enjoyed by the provinces of the Spanish Netherlands lying between them and the French, which is commonly called a barrier. Lastly, that the French and Spaniards, being thus united, will within a short time become so formidable to all, that they may easily assume themselves the dominion over all Europe."

Of the union of "French and Spaniards" with a view to joint "dominion over all Europe," there was little cause for fear. Philip (17 years of age) might or might not have been influenced, at first, by the strong will of his grandfather,¹² but that the Spanish people would range themselves under a French king for imperialistic purposes in Germany or Italy or the Netherlands — particularly that they would assist the French to oust themselves from there — was highly improbable.¹³ It was not possibility of that sort which induced the British government to assent to the treaty. And its objects were, not to turn Philip out of Spain and substitute the Austrian Archduke, but, as it indicated:

"the procuring an equitable and reasonable satisfaction to his Imperial Majesty for his pretension to the Spanish succession; and that the King of Great Britain and the States General may obtain a particular and sufficient security for their kingdoms, provinces, and dominions, and for the navigation and commerce of their subjects . . . and no peace shall be made, unless an equitable and reasonable satisfaction for his Imperial Majesty, and the particular security of the kingdoms, provin-

¹² Interpreting the views of the Tories of the period, Lecky said: "The strong national sentiment of the Spanish people, who have been pre-eminently jealous of foreign interference, might fairly be relied on to counteract the French sympathies of their sovereign; and Spanish jealousy had been rendered peculiarly sensitive by the participation of Lewis in the partition treaties. Nor was it likely that a prince, placed at a very early age on a great throne, surrounded by Spanish influences and courted by every great Power in Europe, would be characterized by an excessive deference to his grandfather": *op. cit.*, I, p. 32.

¹³ In the war which ensued, although Louis was being defeated, Spain took but a passive part. A few years after France had withdrawn from the war by the treaty of Utrecht (1713), she entered into treaty (4 January 1717) with her erstwhile enemies, for the purpose of enforcing peace on Spain. Two months afterwards, France and Great Britain declared war against Spain.

ions, navigations, and commerce for his Majesty of Great Britain, and the States General, be first obtained; and unless care be taken by fitting security, that the kingdoms of France and Spain shall never come and be united under the same government; nor that one and the same person shall be king of both kingdoms; and particularly” (What follows is immaterial).

Philip was in the line of French succession, but he had, at the time, little chance of arriving.¹⁴ Charles, moreover, by his will had expressly provided that if Philip became King of France, his brother, the Duke of Berry, was to become King of Spain; and if the Duke succeeded to the French throne, the Austrian Archduke Charles was to occupy the Spanish, &c. Specifying “the reasonable satisfaction” which was to be procured for the Emperor, the treaty stipulated that:

“The confederates, in order to the procuring the satisfaction and security aforesaid, shall, amongst other things, use their utmost endeavors to recover the provinces of the Spanish Low Countries, that they may be a fence and rampart, commonly called a barrier, separating and distancing France from the United Provinces, for the security of the States General, as they have served in all times until of late, that the most Christian King has seized them by his forces; as likewise the dutchy of Milan” &c.

William could make his treaty, but not being as yet quite sure of sufficient support from Great Britain, he stipulated for postponement of action under it for two months, to be employed in “endeavours to obtain by amicable means” the desired objects. Whether he would have been successful with his parliament may be a question, but Louis again came to his aid and made prompt and satisfactory settlement of his troubles. Ten days after the date of the treaty, James II, the dethroned King of England, died at St. Germain, and thereupon Louis, in plain breach of his Ryswick promise,¹⁵ made ostentatious recognition of James’ son as James III, King of England.

“The effect in England,” wrote Mr. David Jayne Hill, “of the imprudent and wholly useless act of recognizing James Edward was as much of an offence to Parliament, which had just determined the royal succession, as to William III. The whole nation was aroused. The new parliament voted large appropriations for the conduct of the war, and passed a bill of attainder, which declared that James Edward would be guilty of high treason if he ever set a foot on English soil, and a bill of abjuration, by which all officers of the Crown were required to repudiate his claims. Thus, at last, the hostility of William III to Louis XIV was transformed into a permanent traditional opposition on the part of the English nation.”¹⁶

¹⁴ He never became entitled to the throne.

¹⁵ *Ante*, p. 697.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, III, p. 287.

The war was terminated by the treaties of Utrecht (11 April 1713), Rastadt (6 March 1714), and Antwerp (15 November 1715). Philip remained on the throne of Spain, but made cession to the Emperor of important territories. A clause in the transfer (through the Dutch) of the Netherlands provided as follows:

“Whereas the safety of the Austrian Netherlands will chiefly depend upon the number of troops that may be kept in the said Netherlands, and places that are to form the barrier which has been promised to the lords the States General by the grand alliance, his Imperial and Catholick Majesty, and their High Mightinesses, have agreed constantly to maintain therein, at their own expence, a body of from 30 to 35,000, whereof his Imperial and Catholick Majesty shall provide three-fifths, and the States General two-fifths.”¹⁷

Complying with the demand of the allies, Philip, the Duke of Berry, and the Duke of Orleans, made elaborate but quite insincere (for in their view quite invalid) renunciations of their rights of succession to the French throne; and Louis, with equal dishonesty, declared his ratification.

In view of the foregoing, it is impossible to say that determination to maintain the balance of power — to thwart French attempt at domination — was the British motive for engaging in this second war against the French king. The utmost that could be pretended is that Great Britain was impelled to action by the fear that (in the words of the treaty above quoted):

“the French and Spaniards, being thus united, will within a short time become so formidable to all that they may easily assume to themselves the dominion over all Europe.”

Acknowledging the peril of confident assertion as to national motives, one might, nevertheless, presume to suggest that if this idea was a factor it was one of relatively minor importance. The major factors were: (1) resentment at what was termed the French invasion of “the Spanish Low Countries”; (2) the consequent impairment of both Dutch and British security; (3) the hope of securing the transfer of the Low Countries from Spain to Austria; (4) alarm at the new display of Louis’ interest in the exiled Stuarts; (5) dread of increased interferences with British commerce, and the grant by Spain to French ships of preferential privileges;¹⁸ and (6) the strong will and skillful *finesse* of Wil-

¹⁷ Treaty of Antwerp, art. III.

¹⁸ Not only was security in this respect a permanent feature of the peace-treaty, but by it Great Britain obtained further advantageous liberties. Commercial considerations were on all occasions a very substantial factor. The influences which instituted the navigation acts of 1581 and 1590; which gave to them their chief enlargement in 1651; and which moulded, from time to time, English commercial policy, were sufficiently powerful to prescribe that, in the diplomacies and peace-treaties, careful provision for the interests of British merchant-shippers should be treated as of first-rank importance.

liam. When, in 1711, the British public, somewhat tired of war, commenced to ask its purpose, Henry St. John (Secretary of State for the Northern Department) answered:

“To win the Spanish inheritance for the Hapsburgers; to conquer a protecting barrier against France for the States General; and to secure English commerce.”¹⁹

“Preservation of the balance of power” was not the object of the war.

War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-8. By pragmatic sanction (19 April 1713), the Emperor Charles VI declared that, upon his decease, his estates should pass to his daughter, Maria Theresa. After his death (20 October 1740), Charles Albert, the Elector of Bavaria, and others claimed the throne. Hence the War of the Austrian Succession.

Great Britain's action in guaranteeing (by treaty, 16 March 1731) the succession had been in no way motived by hostility to France or Spain,²⁰ or by considerations with reference to the balance of power. These countries had themselves given similar guarantees, and, only sixteen months previous to the British guarantee, the three countries (Great Britain, France, and Spain) had entered into a treaty (treaty of Seville) guaranteeing:

“reciprocally their kingdoms, states, and dominions under their obedience, in what parts of the world soever situate,”

and re-establishing their commercial relations upon the footing of earlier treaties.

“The Treaty of Seville,” as Lecky said, “has been justly regarded as one of the great triumphs of French diplomacy. It closed the breach which had long divided the Courts of France and of Spain, and at the same time it detached both England and Spain from the Emperor, and left him isolated in Europe.”

Shortly afterwards, difficulties having arisen between the Emperor and Spain:

“there was much danger that England would find herself forced, in conjunction with France and Spain, into a war which would, most probably, ultimately extend to the Austrian Netherlands, and might result in acquisitions by France very dangerous to England. The resignation of Townshend had, by this time, made Walpole more prominent in foreign affairs, and he opened a secret negotiation with the Emperor in order to avert war. England undertook to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, by which the Emperor was endeavoring to secure for his daughter the inheritance of his hereditary dominions, and on this condition he consented to the admission of the Spanish troops”²¹

— consented, that is, to the requirements of Spain. The treaty between

¹⁹ Hill, *op. cit.*, III, p. 317.

²⁰ Lecky: *England in the Eighteenth Century*, I, pp. 411-3.

²¹ *England in the Eighteenth Century*, I, pp. 412-3.

Great Britain, France, and Spain, with its reciprocal guarantee, continued in force. But the secular enmities soon re-asserted themselves, and France and Spain, at the close of 1733, entered into a secret treaty (the Family Compact) directed against British commerce and British possession of Gibraltar. Confident of support, Spain became more active, and less considerate in her suppression of the endeavors of British merchants illegally to push their trade with the Spanish colonies. Walpole, the Prime Minister, did what he could to maintain peace, but public opinion, inflamed by stories such as the lopping of the ear of Captain Jenkins, insisted upon war, and war was declared against Spain — 23 October 1739.²²

During the hostilities, the Emperor died and the vultures descended upon his estates. Frederick the Great swooped down upon Silesia (December 1740) and he having defeated Maria at Mollwitz (10 April 1741), France and Spain also attacked the young Queen — France wanting her Netherland estates, and Spain some of those in Italy. Great Britain, on the other hand, summoned (end of 1741) to fulfill her treaty-engagement by the despatch of troops for the protection of the Netherlands against the French, readily complied.

“For this the king and nation were equally zealous; the king because it promised additional security to Hanover, and because he was bound to enforce the pragmatic sanction; the nation at large out of sympathy with the young Queen of Hungary.”²³

Upon the whole, France was the more successful in the Netherlands, but, as part of the peace treaty, she made restitution of them to the Austrian crown. Prussia kept Silesia and Glatz, but, apart from that, reciprocal restitution was the chief feature of the settlement.²⁴

“It had been,” said Locky, “a war for the maintenance of the Pragmatic Sanction and of the integrity of Austria. It had become” (by Maria’s successes) “a war for the conquest and dismemberment of France.”²⁵

“Thus small were the changes effected in Europe by so much bloodshed and treachery, by nearly nine years of wasteful and desolating war. The design of the dismemberment of Austria had failed, but no vexed questions had been set at rest. International antipathies and jealousies had been immeasurably increased, and the fearful sufferings and injuries that had been inflicted on the most civilised nations had not even purchased the blessing of an assured peace. Of all the ambitious pro-

²² “A war with Spain was a war for plunder”: *The Political History of England, 1702-1760*, p. 363.

²³ *The Political History of England, 1702-1760*, p. 372. George II, King of Great Britain (who followed the troops), always insisted that they were acting as “the Pragmatic Army,” and not as a British force against France: *Ibid.*, p. 378, note. France did not declare war on Great Britain until 15 March 1744.

²⁴ Aix la Chapelle, 18 Oct. 1748.

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, II, p. 9.

jects that had been conceived during the war, that of Frederick alone was substantially realised, and France, while endeavoring to weaken one rival, had contributed largely to lay the foundation of the greatness of another.”²⁶

From a purely British point of view, it was a war of the secular enmities against France and Spain; a war for the protection of the Netherlands and (now that a Hanoverian had replaced a Dutchman on the British throne) of Hanover; and a war for the expansion of British commerce. “Preservation of the balance of power” was not the object of the war.

The Seven Years’ War, 1756-63. The Seven Years’ War was, as between England and France, “a struggle” (in Professor Seeley’s phrase) “for the possession of the New World,” but a struggle for India also, and, as it developed, a struggle for Hanover. Pitt might have had peace in 1761 upon terms much the same as those agreed to in 1763, but he rejected all proposals.

“Some time ago,” he said, “I would have been content to bring France to her knees, now I will not rest till I have her laid on her back.”²⁷

He wanted to deprive France of all her colonial possessions and all participation in the Newfoundland fisheries. The fate of the Netherlands was not involved in the war, for France was fighting on the side of their owner, and from Prussia no danger threatened. Frederick was busy enough in Silesia and Saxony. “Preservation of the balance of power” was not Pitt’s object.

War of the French Revolution, 1793-1815. In the circumstances which preceded the war of the French revolution, as well as in the reasons, both ostensible and real, assigned for it, there exists most striking parallelism to the war of 1914-18. The reader, as he proceeds, will observe the various points of similarity. A summary of them will close the treatment of the subject.

Prior to the outbreak of the revolution in 1789, the United Kingdom and France were the great outstanding world-rivals. Commotion in France meant anxiety in England. Pitt was Prime Minister, and, shortly after the fall of the Bastille (14 July 1789), outlined his attitude in a memorandum in which he said that the prevention of a union of Belgium with France was an object “worth the risk or even the certainty” of a war.²⁸ At the moment he did not anticipate the necessity for war, but he thought that if:

“either the rashness of their councils, or the enthusiasm of the present spirit which prevails among them should lead them to measures of this nature, a war would be in any case inevitable.”²⁹

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 438.

²⁸ *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, I, p. 188.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 189. Later in the same year (1 Dec. 1789), King George clearly

The flight from Paris of the French King (20–21 June 1791), his pursuit, capture, and return to Paris, having clearly marked the termination of his authority, Prussia and Austria agreed (21 August 1791) to take:

“the most efficacious means, relative to their forces, in order to enable the King of France to consolidate, in the most perfect liberty, the basis of a monarchical government suitable both to the rights of sovereigns and the welfare of the French nation.”³⁰

After some hesitation, the armies of the two Powers proceeded to invade France, and the Duke of Brunswick, the Commander in Chief, announced (25 July 1792) that:

“The city of Paris and all its inhabitants, without distinction, shall be called upon to submit instantly and without delay to the King; to set that Prince at full liberty; and to ensure to him, and to all the royal persons, the inviolability and respect which are due by the laws of nature and of nations to sovereigns.”³¹

Pitt refused to join in the enterprise, holding that French internal affairs were matters for the French people.³² But when the French armies, with astonishing rapidity, not only repelled the invaders, but scored their first success on Belgian soil, at Jemappes (6 November 1792), he saw that, unless British traditional policy — preservation of Belgium and Holland from the grip of a strong neighboring Power — was to be abandoned, intervention would probably be necessary. Accordingly, he sent despatches (13 November) to the British representatives at Vienna and Berlin, stating that:

“Unforeseen events, and more particularly the success of the French army in Flanders, have brought forward considerations in which the common interests of England and Prussia are deeply concerned. There are grave reasons to fear for the security and tranquillity of the United Provinces, and the Government now asks for confidential communications from the Court of Berlin/Vienna.”³³

stated the English view of the democratic opposition in Belgium to Emperor Joseph when he said that it would never be in the interests of Great Britain “either that the Emperor should become absolute, or that a Democracy should be established there, as either must probably unite that country more with France” (*ibid.*, p. 187).

³⁰ Convention of Pilnitz: *Ann. Reg.*, 1791, p. 72, note. See also the treaty of Pilnitz, 27 Aug. 1791: *ibid.*, p. [210].

³¹ *Ibid.*, 1792, p. 230. See also the additional declaration of 27 July: *ibid.*, p. 232.

³² As late as 25 Jan. 1793, the British Government said to the Dutch Government: “But true to his principles, his Majesty could not allow himself to intermeddle in the internal affairs of a foreign nation. He has never deviated from that principle of neutrality which he first adopted”: *Ann. Reg.*, 1793, p. 132. See also p. [46].

³³ Eversley: *Partitions of Poland*, pp. 148–9. Observe that these despatches were sent prior to the happening of the events afterwards alleged as causes for the war. No real reply was given until 12 January: Lecky, *op. cit.*, VII, p. 115.

But Pitt was a little late. He found that the allies had become more interested in schemes for territorial annexations in Poland and Bavaria than in war against France; and he was plainly told that Prussia would no longer act as a principal in the war if he made objection to the spoliation of Poland. Frightened by the continuously rapid advance of the French armies, and the likelihood of an attack upon Holland, Pitt gave the assurance that:

“though his Majesty never can consider it but with disapprobation and regret, he has no intent to oppose himself to its execution by any measure on his part.”³⁴

Antwerp, Belgium's chief port, finds access to the North Sea by the river Scheldt, which, rising in France, traverses Belgium, and embouches through Holland. Three treaties related to the controversy which arose between the United Kingdom and France with reference to the river: (1) The treaty of Munster established the right of Holland to prohibit the passage of ships through her territory. (2) As late as 1785, by treaty of that year with Holland, France recognized the existence of the right. (3) By treaty of three years afterwards, the United Kingdom (then in rivalry with France for alliance with Holland) guaranteed to Holland the form of her government, and the two Powers made mutual promises of military succor:

“in case either of the high contracting parties should be hostilely attacked by any enemy Powers.”³⁵

French occupation of Belgium having quickly followed the victory at Jemappes, and annexation of it having become a national object, the French Convention assumed to decree (16 November) that the Dutch right of obstruction of the Scheldt should cease. Basing itself, fairly enough, upon “the imprescriptible laws of universal justice,”³⁶ the Convention, nevertheless, was censurable for the method by which it sought to terminate rights secured by treaty. The United Kingdom was quite as much interested as was France in “the freedom of the Scheldt,” and, under other circumstances, might have welcomed the co-operation of France in an endeavor to establish it. But when the decree was followed within a week (22 November) by the passage up the river of French warships in order to assail Antwerp and so complete the subjugation of Belgium, the British government made strong objection. France was now impinging:

“on territory which for naval and commercial reasons England has never, since the days of Edward III, allowed to pass into the hands of a great rival Power.”³⁷

³⁴ Eversley, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

³⁵ *Ann. Reg.*, 1788, p. [273].

³⁶ *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, I, p. 225.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 226. Three days after the issue of the decree with reference to the Scheldt, the French government promulgated another, offering assistance to all

From that moment, war — made more probable by acrimonious correspondence — became almost inevitable.

“This government,” wrote Grenville, the Foreign Secretary, “adhering to the maxims which it has followed for more than a century, will also never see with indifference that France shall make herself, either directly or indirectly, sovereign of the Low Countries, or general arbitress of the rights and liberties of Europe. If France is really desirous of maintaining friendship and peace with England, she must shew herself disposed to renounce her views of aggression and aggrandisement, and to confine herself within her own territory, without insulting other governments, without disturbing their tranquillity, without violating their rights.”³⁸

Replying to this last point, the French Executive said (7 January 1793):

“But she [France] has renounced, and again renounces every conquest, and her occupation of the Low Countries shall only continue during the war, and the time which may be necessary to the Belgians to ensure and consolidate their liberties; after which they shall be independent and happy; France will find her recompence in their felicity.”³⁹

Diplomatic relations (of a properly accredited character) had been terminated by the United Kingdom on 10 August 1792. Immediately after the execution of the King (21 January 1793), Chauvelin (the French representative of the revolutionary government) was required to “retire from this kingdom within the term of eight days.”⁴⁰ On 1 February, France declared war,⁴¹ and, in doing so, anticipated a British declaration. For Grenville (as has been said) had on 15 January agreed to shut his eyes to the dismemberment of Poland; British preparation was under way;⁴² and definite proposals had been made to Austria and Prussia regarding a formal war-alliance.⁴³

Referring to the debate in parliament as to the cause of the war, Lord Eversley has said that:

“The war was justified and defended mainly on the ground of the breach by France of its treaty obligations to Holland, by the opening of the navigation of the River Scheldt. It is on this ground, also, that it

countries suffering from monarchical oppression. To British protests, unsatisfactory explanations were offered. The incident added to British animosity, but was not in itself a *casus belli*.

³⁸ Grenville to Chauvelin, 31 Dec. 1792: *Ann. Reg.*, 1793, p. 118. And see letter of 18 Jan. 1793: *Ibid.*, p. 125.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁴⁰ Grenville to Chauvelin: *Ibid.*, p. 128.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

⁴² Lecky, *op. cit.*, VII, p. 96.

⁴³ The proposals were contained in Grenville's despatch of 5 February, which was prior to knowledge of the French declaration of war: Eversley, *The Partitions of Poland*, p. 152; Lecky, *op. cit.*, VII, p. 164.

has been justified by the greater number of historians who have written on the revolutionary period.”⁴⁴

Lord Rosebery has said that:

“It was impossible for Pitt to pass by his own treaty of 1788 without a violation of good faith, so signal as to be remarkable even at the time of the second partition of Poland.”⁴⁵

And Lecky has stated that one of the motives for the war was:

“the formal and open violation of the treaty relating to the Scheldt, which England had guaranteed.”⁴⁶

But there was no applicable British guarantee, and the existence of a treaty between France and Holland was immaterial. The United Kingdom did not engage in war for the purpose of punishing France for breach of an agreement with another Power. Occupation of Belgium and a threatened invasion of Holland—the establishment of a menace on the North Sea coasts—were the actuating motives. Nevertheless (as in 1914) the British Foreign Minister pretended that action was being taken in pursuance of British treaty-obligation, and so misled many—then and since. One of his complaints to Chauvelin was (31 December 1792) of the violation of rights “which the faith of treaties obliges us to maintain.”⁴⁷ But the sole obligation of the United Kingdom was that she would assist Holland in case she “should be hostilely attacked by an enemy Power,” and Holland had not been attacked. Indeed, Pitt had to admit that no application for military assistance had been made;⁴⁸ and it may well be believed that the little Dutch republic was indisposed to issue a challenge to the French armies upon her borders.⁴⁹ During the debate, Fox said:

“The plain state of the matter was that we were bound to save Holland from war, or by war, if called upon; and that to force the Dutch into a war at so much peril to them, which they saw and dreaded, was not to fulfil, but to abuse the treaty.”⁵⁰

Among the various other reasons alleged for engaging in the war—

⁴⁴ Eversley, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-5.

⁴⁵ Pitt, p. 125.

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, VII, p. 168.

⁴⁷ *Ann. Reg.*, 1793, p. 118.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. [47]. Fox insisted upon this point: *ibid.*, p. [50]. Writing, sixty years afterward, Cobden said: “Besides, the Dutch Government abstained from making any demand upon England to sustain its claim to the exclusive navigation of the Scheldt, and wisely so—for it probably foresaw what happened in the war which followed, when the French having taken possession of Holland (where they were welcomed by a large part of the population as friends) and having turned the French fleet against us—in less than three years we seized all the principal colonies of that country, and some of them (to our cost) we retain to the present day” (quoted in Hirst: *The Political Economy of War*, pp. 50-1).

⁴⁹ See Lecky, *op. cit.*, VII, p. 133.

⁵⁰ *Parlt. Hist. of England*, XXX, p. 305; *Ann. Reg.*, 1793, p. [50]. Cf. Eversley, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-6.

reasons by which the people were misled in 1793 (as, similarly, in 1914) — may be noticed that of Mr. William Windham (shortly afterwards Secretary of State for War), who, during the debate in parliament, argued that:

“in all probability the French had no wish at this moment to go to war with this country, as they were not yet ready to do so; their object seemed to be to take all Europe in detail, and we might be reserved for the last.”⁵¹

Lord Porchester said that:

“it was a war, not of choice, but of necessity; it was a war for everything that was dear to us; perhaps for our very existence.”⁵²

Mr. Dundas, the Secretary for War, said:

“They were going to war to secure the best interests of this country, by effectually opposing a set of principles which, unless they were crushed, would necessarily occasion the destruction of this and of every country.”⁵³

And Pitt inserted in the reply to the speech from the throne, the customary frenzy-provoking phraseology:

“That we are persuaded, that whatever his majesty’s faithful subjects must consider as most dear and sacred, the stability of our happy constitution, the security and honor of his majesty’s crown, and the preservation of our laws, our liberty, and our religion, are all involved in the issue of the present contest; and that our zeal and exertions shall be proportioned to the importance of the conjuncture, and to the magnitude and value of the objects for which we have to contend.”⁵⁴

Lecky was undoubtedly right when he said:

“if, as Pitt believed, the war had become inevitable, it was a matter of high policy to enter into it supported by a wave of strong popular feeling. Nothing can be more certain than that neither the murder of the King, nor any other change in the internal government of France, would have induced him to commence it; but when for other reasons it had become unavoidable, he naturally sought to carry with him the moral forces of indignation and enthusiasm which might contribute to its success.”⁵⁵

Pitt, in 1793, acted upon the principle avowed by Ollivier (French Prime Minister) in 1870 with reference to war: “*Puisque nous ne pouvons l’empêcher, notre devoir est de la rendre populaire.*”⁵⁶

Parallelism. The foregoing has made apparent several interesting points of parallelism between the events of 1793 and those of 1914.

⁵¹ *Parlt. Hist. of England*, XXX, p. 314.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 325.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 378.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 360-1.

⁵⁵ *Op. cit.*, VII, pp. 157-8.

⁵⁶ *L’Empire Liberal*, XIV, p. 382.

In both cases there was a breach of a treaty by the enemy — in 1793, by France of a treaty with reference to the Scheldt; and in 1914, by Germany of a treaty with reference to Belgium. In both, there was an alleged but non-existent obligation on the part of the United Kingdom to withstand violation of the treaty. In both, there was high appeal to the obligation of observance of “the sanctity of treaties.” In both, there was astute misrepresentation by the governments for the purpose of exciting “the moral forces of indignation and enthusiasm which might contribute” to success in the war. In the one case, there was denunciation of the French political “system,” and in the other, of German autocracy and militarism. In 1793, there was assertion of French design “to take all Europe in detail, and we might be reserved for the last”; and in 1914 assertion of Germany’s determination to “dominate the world.” At both periods, wild catch-phrases submerged all argument:

“the preservation of our laws, our liberty” — whatever we “must consider as most dear and sacred . . . our liberty and our religion are all involved” — perhaps “our very existence,” &c.

Behind these, in both cases, was the real reason for action — “the security of this country”; the traditional policy of freedom from menace on the North Sea coasts. The episodes supply good examples of the uncertainties as to the motives for war which usually accompany its inception, and of the customary play upon the passions and prejudices of bamboozled peoples. And there is authority for asserting that, in both cases, the nations drifted or glided into a war which might, by better statesmanship, have been avoided. Referring to 1793, Dr. J. Holland Rose has said:

“But Ministers allowed their good intentions to be shrouded by old-world reserve; and Grenville met the pert insistence of Chauvelin with an aristocratic *hautewor* which irritated that Envoy and played into the hands of the aggressive party at Paris. Pedantic insistence there [at Paris] on the imprescriptible laws of nature, and rigid adherence here [London] to the text of treaties complicated a question which, with goodwill and tactfulness on both sides, might have been settled in a month. As it was, the two great nations of the West drifted into a conflict which stirred the dying embers of Continental strife into a mighty conflagration, destined to rage over the whole of Europe and finally to bring back the exhausted principals to the original point of dispute — Antwerp.”⁵⁷

More recently, Sir Walter Runciman said that:
 “had members of the British Government been guided by reason and sound judgment instead of by blind prejudice; had they accepted overtures made to them from time to time by the head of the French nation during his rule, we would not now be engaged in a world war, watering

⁵⁷ *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, I, p. 236.

the earth with the blood of the boldest and brightest young men of Europe." ⁵⁸

In language curiously similar to that of Dr. Rose, Mr. Lloyd George said of the recent great war:

"The more one reads memoirs and books written in the various countries of what happened before the first of August 1914, the more one realizes that no one at the head of affairs quite meant war at that stage. It was something into which they glided, or rather staggered and stumbled, perhaps through folly, and a discussion, I have no doubt, would have averted it." ⁵⁹

Note the "drifted" in the one quotation, and the "staggered and stumbled" in the other.

Balance of Power — More Recent Diplomacies. If the balance of power ever was a pivotal factor in British foreign policy in Europe, no trace of its influence can be noted in connection with the rise of Germany prior to 1904 — after that, as we shall see. In 1864, Palmerston was on the point of engaging in war against Prussia and Austria in defence of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, but, after the defeat of the Danes, he wrote to Lord John Russell, his Foreign Minister:

"Prussia is too weak, as she now is, ever to be honest or independent in her action; and, with a view to the future, it is desirable that Germany, in the aggregate, should be strong, in order to control these two ambitious and aggressive Powers, France and Russia, that press upon her east and west. As to France, we know how restless and aggressive she is, and how ready to break loose for Belgium, for the Rhine, for anything she would be likely to get without too great an exertion. As for Russia, she will, in due time, become a Power almost as great as the old Roman Empire. She can become mistress of all Asia, except British India, whenever she chooses to take it; and when enlightened arrangements have made her revenue proportionate to her territory, and railways have abridged distances, her command of men will become enormous, her pecuniary means gigantic, and her power of transporting armies over great distances most formidable. Germany ought to be strong in order to resist Russian aggression, and a strong Prussia is essential to German strength." ⁶⁰

In Prussia's defeat of Austria (1866), France saw dangerous portent, but the United Kingdom perceived no cause for anxiety. Even when Prussia easily defeated France (1870-1), and when Bismarck had welded the German states into an overwhelmingly powerful empire, British susceptibilities remained unstirred.

For all this may be offered, as explanation, that the British secular enmities against France rendered her debasement not altogether regrettable.

⁵⁸ *Contemporary Rev.*, Dec. 1917, p. 674.

⁵⁹ *Empire Parliamentary Association*, 23 Dec. 1920.

⁶⁰ Quoted in *Fortnightly Rev.*, Feb. 1917, pp. 242-3.

But when Bismarck, through his alliance of 1879 with Austria, his Triple Alliance of 1882, and his Quadruple Alliance of 1883, had established such a predominance of power as had never theretofore (in time of peace) been imagined, nations which believed that their safety depended upon the maintenance of a balance of power would surely have taken fright and commenced to sympathize with France. Not only, however, was the United Kingdom undisturbed, but her ministers were among the friends and admirers of the great German Chancellor. Referring to the Dual Alliance shortly after its formation, Lord Salisbury (Foreign Secretary), speaking at Manchester (17 October 1879), said:

“To all those who care for the peace of Europe and take an interest in the independence of nations, I would exclaim ‘A crowning mercy has been vouchsafed to the world.’”⁶¹

On 6 March 1885, Lord Granville (Foreign Secretary), speaking in the House of Lords, after formation of the Quadruple Alliance, said that:

“There seems to be suspicion in Germany that we are not fully cognizant of the present position of that great nation. I believe, on the contrary, that there is no country in which not only politicians but all classes more fully and cheerfully appreciate the immensely important position in Europe that Germany occupies since her own union.”⁶²

Mr. Gladstone, also, was pleased with Germany’s expansion. He said:

“If Germany is to become a colonising power, all I can say is, God speed her. She becomes our ally and partner in the execution of the great purposes of Providence for the advantage of mankind. I hail her in entering upon that course, and glad will I be to find her associating with us in carrying the light of civilisation, and the blessings that depend upon it, to the more backward and less significant regions of the world.”⁶³

So far from objecting to Germany’s military predominance, the United Kingdom added materially to its transcendancy by entering into two treaties (by exchange of letters February/March and December 1887) with Austria-Hungary and Italy (two members of the Triple Alliance) aimed at France and Russia — arrangements which have aptly been referred to as a moral extension of the Triple Alliance across the English Channel.⁶⁴

Indication of British adhesion to the political objects of the Alliance was one of two reasons for the formation of the war-union between France and Russia in 1891-4, by which some approach to a balance of power was established; but within a few years afterwards, upon several separate occasions (1898, 1899, and 1901), the British government endeavored to arrange with Germany a war-alliance which would very

⁶¹ Rose: *The Origins of the War*, p. 10.

⁶² Hansard, CCXCV, col. 229; *Fortnightly Rev.*, 1896, p. 910.

⁶³ Rose: *The Origins of the War*, p. 19.

⁶⁴ The subject is dealt with *ante*, cap. V, pp. 155-6.

completely have destroyed any balance which might have been thought to exist.⁶⁵ These efforts having failed, the United Kingdom enabled Japan (1902), by promise of contingent assistance, to attack and vanquish Russia, and in that way to extinguish even an appearance of a balance of power in Europe.

It cannot be said that the United Kingdom entered into the *entente*-treaties with France (1904) and Russia (1907) in order to restore the balance of power which, by the methods just recited, her statesmen had either ignored or successfully stifled. Rather is it true that the German rivalries referred to in the next preceding chapter were producing their natural effect; that, under the influence of King Edward, Lord Lansdowne, and an important section of the press, Germany had, to some extent, become substitute for France as the potential enemy; that what was now desiderated was not a balance of power, but an anti-German military preponderance in preparation for the European war which lay (in Bismarck's phrase) in "the logic of history"; that government realized that the consequences of defeat would be overwhelmingly disastrous, and that among these would be the occupation of the North Sea coasts by a Power not only immeasurably mighty but intensely inimical.

To all this, the observation may be added that if ever there was in Europe a balance of power which the United Kingdom was engaged in maintaining, there is none now. Germany was unassailably predominant between 1871 and 1891. France is equally predominant now.

Freedom from Menace on the North Sea Coasts. The phrase "freedom from menace on the North Sea coasts" may not be familiar, but its content was expressed as early as 1632 by Grotius, who, in a letter to his brother, said:

"The King of England will stand anything save the passing of the ports of Flanders into the hands of the French."⁶⁶

Lord Castlereagh (British Foreign Secretary) wrote (November 1813) in the same strain to the British Ambassador at Vienna:

"To leave Antwerp in the hands of the French would impose on us the necessity of a perpetual state of war."⁶⁷

Disraeli, in 1870, said in the House of Commons:

"Viewing it from a very limited point of view, it is of the highest importance to this country that the whole coast from Ostend to the North Sea should be in the possession of free and flourishing communities from whose ambition the liberty and independence neither of England nor of any other country can be menaced."⁶⁸

⁶⁵ The subject is dealt with *ante*, cap. V, pp. 157, 158, 158-9.

⁶⁶ Quoted by Fuehr, *The Neutrality of Belgium*, p. 14.

⁶⁷ Quoted *ibid.*

⁶⁸ Hansard, III, vol. 203, col. 1704; Fuehr, *op. cit.*, p. 14. And see *Ann. Reg.*, 1870, p. [98]. From a geographical point of view, Disraeli's statement may have been imperfect, but his meaning is sufficiently clear.

Professor Thorold Rogers, after referring to the ardent desire of Henry IV for:

“the acquisition of the whole of the Netherlands, from the French to the German border,”

wrote as follows:

“Up to our own times, French governments have inherited and striven to give effect to the policy of Henry of Navarre, and nearly every great European war has found that the conquest or the defence of the Low Countries was the real object of the combat. It was so in the Thirty Years' War. It was so during the incessant struggle of Louis the Fourteenth's wars, down to the treaty of Utrecht in 1712. In 1793 war was waged again with the same object; and in 1815, the battle of Waterloo settled the question for a time. The interference of France in the affairs of Belgium in 1830 had the same ultimate object, and had the war of 1870 been followed by French victories it is certain, in my opinion, that the frontier of France would have been extended to the farthest mouth of the Rhine, as well as to the upper and middle stream.”⁶⁹

Dr. J. Holland Rose has given us the following:

“Since the reign of Edward I, no English ruler, endowed with energy and patriotism, has allowed a great Power to conquer or annex the Flemish and Dutch provinces. Our first important naval battle, that off Sluys (1340), was fought to keep the French out of Flanders. The names of Sir Philip Sidney, Cromwell, Marlborough, and Wellington, further recall to us the numerous campaigns whereby Britons assured either the independence of those provinces, or, at least, their governance by Austria on terms not unfavourable to them and productive of security to England. On the other hand, hostile Powers have from early times sought to possess those coasts whence an invasion of our shores can most readily be attempted.

“... the defence of the Low Countries against aggression by any Great Power is the most prominent and persistent feature of British foreign policy from the time of Edward I to that of George V. The events leading to the many battles fought in the Netherlands, from Sluys to Waterloo, were manifestations of the same motive, which led us to protest against the construction of Dutch forts dominating the Scheldt estuary, while Holland did not defend her eastern frontier against Germany. This guiding principle of British policy is, I repeat, so obvious, so well known to every historical student, that it cannot be unknown to statesmen and publicists in Germany.”⁷⁰

History fully confirms the accuracy of this view. Lord Castlereagh's efforts at the close of the Napoleonic war were not so much (as is some-

⁶⁹ *Holland*, pp. 206-7.

⁷⁰ *The Origins of the War*, pp. 176-7.

times said) to arrange a balance of power in Europe,⁷¹ but to provide for the union of Holland and Belgium, with the hope that they would be able to maintain control over their own coasts. When these two countries fell apart, and Belgium became an independent state, the United Kingdom insisted (1839) upon her neutralization — her freedom from attack. When France and Prussia engaged in war in 1870, the United Kingdom secured immunity of Belgium from invasion, by agreeing to take arms against the one who should intrude. And although the German invasion of Belgium in 1914 was not the reason for the United Kingdom's participation in the war (that was certain before 4 August), it was, from a popular point of view, the precipitating cause.⁷²

France Formerly the Danger. Enough has been said to establish the thesis above referred to, and to indicate that, from Louis XIV to Napoleon, France was the chief danger to British freedom from menace on the North Sea coasts — that France was the traditional enemy. Since Waterloo, the United Kingdom and France have never been at war, but nevertheless their various rivalries were sufficient to continue, into the commencement of the present century, the antipathetic emotions produced in the sanguinary struggles of the earlier days. Each country felt itself thwarted in its "legitimate aspirations" by the "unwarranted assumptions" of the other. And clashing interests in Egypt, in the Soudan, in Morocco, in Siam, and in elsewhere, put ever-recurring strain upon international temper.

German Menace Succeeds French. With the overwhelming defeat of France by Prussia in 1871, British apprehension of French menace on the North Sea coasts terminated. For thirty years, menace from any quarter was not regarded as imminent. But as German rivalry in manufactures, in trade, in commerce made itself increasingly unpleasant; as German persistence in warship construction came to be regarded as a challenge to British supremacy; as German military power came to be associated with visions of German world-domination; and, finally, as Germany's intention, in case of war with France, to launch her attack through Belgium became clear, the danger once more appeared — this time from the east. All difficulties with France were settled by treaty in 1904, and from that year the British government pursued a policy based upon the idea that the only uncertainty as to the outbreak of war with Germany was its date. The word "encirclement" need not be insisted upon,⁷³ but undoubtedly the activities of King Edward VII had for result that, in the war of 1914-18, Germany was confronted by the United Kingdom and France on the west, Russia and

⁷¹ France was left with her 1790 boundaries, and it would have been futile as well as foolish to attempt to set up an equipollent Power. France was to be kept in order by the continued co-operation of the Allies.

⁷² The subject is dealt with in cap. XIV.

⁷³ The subject is dealt with in cap. XVII, pp. 494-7.

Roumania on the east, and Italy and Serbia on the south. Of the commencement of that policy—the treaty with France in 1904, M. André Tardieu has well said:

“It is in neither England nor France, it is in Germany, that it is necessary to look for the principle of this accord. It is in fact the fear of Germany which determined England, not only her King and her government, but the whole of her people, to draw closer to France.”⁷⁴

“It is the fear of Germany which has produced the *entente cordiale*.”⁷⁵

Indeed, the fear of Germany expanded British foreign policy from freedom from menace on the North Sea coasts to freedom from extension of that menace by German occupation of the northern coast of France. For, in his speech of 3 August 1914, Sir Edward Grey said:

“If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often—still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone’s words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power?”

Conclusions. From the foregoing observations, and others in the next-preceding and next-succeeding chapters, we may safely draw the following conclusions:

1. The most important element in British policy in western Europe, in modern times, may be expressed as a determination to maintain freedom from menace on the North Sea coasts.

2. Until the war of 1870–1, France was the chief Power from which danger to that freedom was apprehended.

3. German rivalry in various respects (dealt with in the next preceding-chapter); the German menace in the west; and the German menace in the east (dealt with in the next-succeeding chapter), (1) inclined the United Kingdom to drop her historic hostility to France and Russia and to transfer her antipathies to Germany; (2) impelled her to enter into *entente* relations with France (1904) and Russia (1907); (3) supplied the reasons for the maintenance and development of these relations; and (4) explain the participation of the United Kingdom in the great war.

4. Not maintenance of a balance of power in Europe, but prevention of the creation of a balance of power upon the oceans was the principal reason for the formation and development of *entente* relations with

⁷⁴ *La France et les Alliances*, p. 51.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 77. And see pp. 66, 350; *ante*, cap. XIX.

France and Russia. Until the rivalry of Germany in this respect appeared, German military predominance created no alarm.

5. The German menace in the west was one of the reasons for the change in British European policy, and may therefore be regarded as one of the roots of the war — the war between the two accessories.

The Future. For the first time in history,⁷⁶ a neighbor-nation of Belgium — France — is, at once, the strongest Power in continental Europe, and in military alliance with the erstwhile neutralized nation. The precise form of the alliance is secret,⁷⁷ and its existence has not yet aroused much objection in the United Kingdom. For the moment, the state of Europe demands continuation of *entente* relations between the United Kingdom and France. But as the fear of Germany wanes, the cordiality produced by mutual antagonism to Germany is being rapidly replaced by the rivalries and divergencies inseparable from the existence side-by-side of the two most mighty of the imperialistically inclined peoples.⁷⁸ Once more, as prior to 1870, British freedom from menace on the North Sea coasts is endangered by French rather than German enterprise. For by her occupation of German territory to the east, not only of Belgium but of Holland, France, through her relations with Belgium and her military control of Holland, can, in case of quarrel with the United Kingdom, bring to speedy realization the establishment of that menace on the North Sea coasts which British foreign policy for centuries struggled to avoid. Already (October 1923), General Smuts, when discussing the Franco-German antagonism, could say, with apparently somewhat general British approval:

“We can give Germany the moral support which will mean very much indeed, perhaps everything to her in her hour of adversity. It is not enough merely to express pious opinions favorable to her.”⁷⁹

⁷⁶ With the exception of a few years during the Napoleonic period.

⁷⁷ The *Toronto Globe* and the *New York Times* of 15 Sept. 1920 published the following: “As regards the content of the agreement, *The Daily News* quotes the Brussels correspondent of *L'Europe Nouvelle*, who suggests — no doubt with authority, says *The Daily News* — that it provides for the virtual incorporation of the Belgian army in the French military system under a single command, which will, of course, be French, and that Belgian fortresses are similarly to be linked up with French defenses.”

⁷⁸ Elimination of the common enemy has already produced various friction-points. See an article in the *Fortnightly Rev.*, Dec. 1920, p. 890.

⁷⁹ Speech as the guest of the South African Luncheon Club, London, 23 Oct. 1923.

CHAPTER XXI

THE GERMAN MENACE IN THE EAST ROOT

- MENACE TO CONSTANTINOPLE**, 719. — Russian Desire, 719. — British Objection, 719. — Russian "Aggression," 720. — The Straits Treaties, 721. — The Crimean War, 1854-6, 721. — Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, 1878, 722. — British Agreement with Austria-Hungary and Italy, 1887, 722. — Substitution of the German Menace, 722.
- MENACE TO INDIA**, 724. — Competitive "aggression," 724. — Mutual Timidities, 724. — British-Japanese Treaty, 1902, 726. — The German Menace — Russian Treaty — Renewal of Japanese Treaty, 728.
- THE BAGDAD RAILWAY**, 729. — Germany and the United Kingdom, 729. — Germany and the Railway, 730. — Concession of 1903, 733. — Anglo-Russian Treaty, 1907, 734. — Germany and the United Kingdom, 1907-9, 736. — Germany and Russia — Potsdam, 738. — Germany and Turkey, 1911, 741. — The United Kingdom and Turkey, 1911, 741. — The United Kingdom and Turkey, 1913, 742. — Germany and France, 1914, 742. — Germany and the United Kingdom, 1914, 743. — Application of the story, 743.
- CONCLUSIONS**, 745. — The Future, 745.

AS the German menace in the west was preceded by the French, so the German menace in the east followed upon the Russian. Toward both Constantinople and India did the United Kingdom fear foreign advancement — first by Russia and afterwards by Germany. The German menace in the east forms the third of the reasons for the United Kingdom joining the Dual Entente, and entering the war.

MENACE TO CONSTANTINOPLE

Russian Desire. From both peace and war points of view, Russia has been and is deeply interested in the water-way between the Black Sea and the Ægean, and in Constantinople, the city dominating that passage. While insisting that it should always be open to her commercial vessels, and willing that other nations should in that respect enjoy equal privilege, her great desire has been that no warships but her own should enter the narrow waters, and hers should go and come as she pleased. Very comfortable would be her naval situation could she, upon occasion, dodge out to attack and in again for security.

British Objection. That Russian domination at Constantinople would be an intolerable menace to British interests in the eastern end of the Mediterranean, was, for many years, a cardinal maxim of British foreign policy. The integrity of the Turkish Empire must be maintained, it

was said, not for love of the Turk, but because of dread of the Muscovite.

“In the minds of most Englishmen it had become established doctrine that the integrity of the Turkish Empire must be maintained, because either the Russians at Constantinople, or the French in Egypt, would be a menace both to our Indian empire and to British naval ascendancy in the Mediterranean.”¹

The policy was similar to that underlying what is now known as the Monroe Doctrine, namely, prohibition upon territorial expansion in a certain direction, upon the ground that the advance would be a menace to the security of the objecting nation. British determination to prevent the establishment of a dangerous Power on the North Sea coasts, and her determination to exclude Russia from Constantinople, are applications of the same purpose as that which actuated President Monroe. A short summary of British opposition to Russia may be useful.

Russian “Aggression.” Using an appropriate term (from a British point of view), the *Encyclopædia Britannica* tells us that “Russian aggression began somewhat early in the 18th century.” Among his other enterprises, Peter the Great captured Azov in 1696, Derbent in 1722, and Baku in 1723. These conquests were, however, restored at Peter’s death. In 1774, by treaty with Turkey, Russia secured:

“a firm hold on the Black Sea and the lower Danube . . . Azov, Kinburn, and all the fortified places of the Crimea were ceded to Russia; the Bosphorus and Dardanelles were opened to merchant vessels; and Russian ambassadors obtained the right to intervene in favor of the inhabitants of the Danubian principalities.”²

“In 1784 the Crimea was annexed; in 1792 the frontier was advanced to the Dniester, and in 1812 to the Pruth — thereby securing the north-western shores of the Black Sea. The north-eastern and eastern shores were secured by a gradual advance towards the Caucasus and the Caspian.”³

By the treaty of Tilsit (7 July 1807), the Czar agreed to help Napoleon in Europe in return for French assistance toward the accomplishment of Russian designs upon Constantinople. Fortunately for Turkey, the autocrats quarrelled; the Russian advance was stayed; and a peace was arranged (treaty of Bucarest, 28 May 1812). Russia had made an approach, only, toward her objective. In 1800, Georgia became a Russian province, and Imeretia in 1810. As a result of wars with Persia, cession was made to Russia in 1813 of several districts in eastern

¹ Innes: *England and the British Empire*, IV, p. 251.

² *Ency. Brit.* (11th ed.), XXIII, p. 902; and see XXVII, p. 454. It was in spite of the protests of the United Kingdom, Prussia, and Holland, that Catherine II established the port of Odessa in 1794.

³ Robertson & Bartholomew: *An Historical Atlas of Modern Europe from 1789 to 1914*, p. 19.

Caucasia; and in 1828 she received the important Khanates of Erivan and Nakhichewan. Russian power may be said to have been fully established, down to the Persian boundary, between 1859 and 1864.

The Straits Treaties. The United Kingdom scored a success when, by treaty with Turkey — the Treaty of the Dardanelles (1809) — it was agreed:

“As it has at all times been forbidden for vessels of war to enter into the canal of Constantinople, that is into the Straits of the Dardanelles and into that of the Black Sea, and as that ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire should be observed henceforth in times of peace with reference to any Powers whatsoever, the Court of Britain promises also to conform to this principle.”

By the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (8 July 1831), Russia secured the promise of Turkey that the Straits were to be open to Russian warships exclusively. But the treaty was short-lived. The other Powers intervened and, by the treaty of 1841, between the United Kingdom, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Turkey, “the ancient rule” was revived:

“as long as the Porte is at peace, His Highness will admit no foreign ships of war into the said Straits.”

That was a severe blow to Russia. The treaty inhibition affected her alone. For practically no other Power ever desired, during peace, to send its warships through the Straits.

The Crimean War, 1854–6. Russia was not at all satisfied with the new arrangements, and, as has been said:

“the germ of the Crimean war may in a sense be found in the Convention of the Straits.”⁴

For, as between the United Kingdom and Russia, there was no cause for quarrel other than the designs of the Czar upon Constantinople, and the British declaration of war was the outcome of the policy rather of an intense Russophobe — the British Ambassador at Constantinople — than of the British Prime Minister.⁵ At the close of the war, by the treaty of Paris (30 March 1856), the prohibition with reference to the passage of warships through the Straits was continued, the signatory Powers engaging:

“each on his part to respect the independence and the Territorial Integrity of the Ottoman Empire; guarantee in common the strictest observance of that engagement; and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation as a question of general interest.”⁶

Certain other stipulations neutralized the Black Sea, and prohibited the establishment or maintenance of “any military-maritime arsenal” on the

⁴ Skrine: *The Expansion of Russia*, p. 139. Quoted by Hassall: *History of British Foreign Policy*, p. 260.

⁵ Cf. Morley: *Life of Gladstone*, I, pp. 476–95.

⁶ Oakes & Mowat: *The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century*, p. 177.

coast.⁷ Russian ambition was checked;⁸ but it had by no means disappeared. Domination at Constantinople was as firmly rooted a determination as in the days of Peter the Great. The Czar awaited another opportunity.

Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, 1878. With a view to enforcement of reforms in the Turkish administration of European territories, but not forgetting the Constantinople objective, Russia reopened war against Turkey in 1877, and, by the treaty of San Stefano in 1878, compelled submission to a re-arrangement of the Balkan map. All that need be said, however, at this place, with reference to the war and the treaty, as well as the revision of it at Berlin, is that the prospect of a much extended Bulgaria, under Russian patronage and consequent facilitation of Russian approach to Constantinople, was thwarted by the action of the Powers at Berlin—principally at the instance of the United Kingdom.⁹

British Agreement with Austria-Hungary and Italy, 1887. By an exchange of notes (12 December 1887), the United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary and Italy declared their agreement upon certain principles of international relationship, and among them:

“4. The independence of Turkey, as guardian of important European interests (independence of the Caliphate, the freedom of the Straits, etc.), of all foreign preponderating influence.”¹⁰

“5. Consequently, Turkey can neither cede nor delegate her rights over Bulgaria to any other Power, nor intervene in order to establish a foreign administration there, nor tolerate acts of coercion undertaken with this latter object, under the form either of a military occupation or of the despatch of volunteers; neither will Turkey, who has by the treaties been constituted guardian of the Straits, be able to cede any portion of her sovereign rights, nor delegate her authority to any other Power in Asia Minor.”¹¹

The alignment of the Powers in this treaty is noteworthy: The United Kingdom is associated with two of the war-allies of Germany against Russia, with whom she afterwards entered into *entente* relations as against Germany.

Substitution of the German Menace. Aimed as it was at Russia and

⁷ During the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, Russia threw off the fetters, declaring that the prohibitions were unreasonable and therefore inoperative. France was not in a position to object. The United Kingdom did not deem itself strong enough to proceed beyond protest, and Prussia had been mollified.

⁸ The treaty of 1871 modified the restrictions of the treaty of 1856.

⁹ These episodes are dealt with in cap. II.

¹⁰ Austrian note to the United Kingdom: Pribram, *op. cit.*, I, p. 125.

¹¹ Pribram, *op. cit.*, I, p. 129. Further reference to this treaty may be seen *ante*, cap. VIII. Germany was a party to the negotiations, though not a signatory of the agreement: Pribram, *op. cit.*, II, p. 83; *Cam. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, III, p. 246; *The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi*, II, p. 162.

Turkey, the agreement of 1887 indicates the continuation, until that time, of the British dread of the Great Slav state. It evidences, also, the passing of British influence at Constantinople. As long as the United Kingdom had acted as champion of Turkish interests, her influence remained supreme. But when she taught the Sultan that, against her too, protection was needed — when she stole Cyprus (1878);¹² bombarded Alexandria and took military possession of Egypt (1882) — a vacancy in the office occurred. Eventually, German influence became dominant in the city of the Straits, and a re-orientation of British attitude toward both Turkey and Russia commenced. British eyes opened to realization of the fact that Turkey (as the protégé of Germany) was quite unworthy of moral support; and that, so far as was necessary to thwart German designs, Russia might very well receive encouragement rather than opposition. Between Slavic and Teutonic control, the United Kingdom much preferred the former. M. Larmeroux, in his excellent work *La Politique Extérieure de l'Autriche-Hongrie*, put the idea in this form:

“Great Britain herself considerably modified her oriental and general policy. This Power which, up to 1878, had been one of the traditional defenders of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and of the sovereignty of the Sultan, had changed little by little her political line. She appeared — extraordinary thing — to make herself the protagonist of the policy of intervention, even at the risk of dismembering the Ottoman Empire. The reason for this attitude was that Germany after a certain time had acquired at Constantinople a preponderating influence which, tended more and more, if not to eliminate the maritime Powers, at least to diminish considerably their influence.”¹³

The arrival of the German menace produced, for the United Kingdom, embarrassing perplexity. The question whether Turkey was to remain a sovereign and independent state became transformed into a question as to which of two mighty Powers — Russia or Germany — should dominate her. British statesmen aligned themselves¹⁴ with the less dangerous of the two (Russia), but, in doing so, subjected themselves to pressure for discontinuation of their traditional objection to the accomplishment of Russia's “historic mission” — a pressure which, prior to the war,¹⁵ they felt difficulty in avoiding, and which during the war, compelled their acquiescence in Russian design.¹⁶

¹² See cap. XXIII.

¹³ P. 456.

¹⁴ Primarily by the treaty of 1907.

¹⁵ See cap. II, pp. 42, 43, 44-5, 46-7; and cap. XXII, pp. 877-911.

¹⁶ In March of 1915, under pressure of war-necessities, the United Kingdom and France joined in an agreement by which, at the close of hostilities, Russia was to have possession of Constantinople and large areas in its vicinity.

MENACE TO INDIA

Competitive "aggression." Beyond the Caspian, the Russians advanced steadily from the north toward Afghanistan; while, from their Indian base, the British approached toward the south and east of that neutral territory. In her progress, Russia captured Tashkent in 1865; Samarkand in 1868; Khiva, the Amu Daria, and the Trans-Caspian Province in 1873; Akhal Tekke in 1881; Merv in 1884, Penjdeh in 1885, and the Pamirs in 1895. Meanwhile the British pushed on from the Punjab, occupied what is now known as the North-West Provinces, and reached the Hindu Kush in 1896. Imperialisms were once more in clash, with possibilities of war as the solvent.

"Those fears and suspicions on the part of the British nation were caused by the continuous advance of the Russian power in Asia—an advance which, it was generally believed, constituted a menace to our position in India—and also by the conviction that Russia was aiming at the possession of Constantinople. In 1868, Russia's annexation of Samarkand had caused anxiety in ministerial circles; while in 1870 the Tsar declared that he would no longer be bound by the Treaty of Paris, concluded at the close of the Crimean War in 1856, and by which the Black Sea was declared neutral. . . . It seemed by no means unlikely, as indeed it turned out, that Russia would intrigue in Afghanistan if she did not actually interfere with our communications with India. In 1878 and 1879, Russian intrigues in Afghanistan led to action on the part of the British Government, and to two invasions of the country, whereby the British position in the country was strengthened."¹⁷

"Early in 1885, Russia, in spite of the most explicit pledges to the contrary, seized Penjdeh, and for a moment war with England seemed unavoidable."¹⁸

Mutual Timidities. In November 1902, Lord Kitchener arrived in India as Commander-in-Chief, having as his principal object, the reorganization of the military system. He at once proceeded to a personal examination of the frontier situation, and, before six months expired, had completed a more thorough survey of the districts than had ever previously been made.¹⁹ His activity, however, including, as it did, surveys for railways through the newer districts, aroused apprehension in Russia. The authorities there learned:

"that the Commander-in-Chief had been riding up and down the frontier, and had examined every pass from the Gomal to the Pamirs. They read in the papers that he was designing new cantonments, and meant to concentrate the bulk of the Indian army on the frontier. They fan-

¹⁷ Hassall, *op. cit.*, pp. 291-2; 301.

¹⁸ *Fortnightly Rev.*, 1896, p. 911.

¹⁹ Lovat Fraser: *India under Curzon and After*, p. 404.

cied he had come to India with warlike intentions, and credited him — I believe quite erroneously — with a strong antipathy to Russia. At last they grew thoroughly alarmed, for it seemed to them that their defeat in Manchuria gave him the opportunity he appeared to be seeking.”²⁰

The United Kingdom, on the other hand, had become apprehensive of the existence of Russian designs upon Afghanistan. On 2 December 1904, Mr. Brodrick (then Secretary of State for India) said in a despatch:

“The danger of complications on the north-west frontier has been rendered far greater by the completion of an additional strategic railway from Central Asia to the northern boundary of Afghanistan.”²¹

“On May 11, 1905, Mr. Balfour, then Prime Minister, in a memorable speech in the House of Commons upon Imperial Defence, took occasion to discuss the extent of Indian military resources in the event of war with Russia. He said he did not regard the Indian problem [of defence] as otherwise than grave, and he declared that Great Britain would not tolerate the slow absorption by Russia of Afghanistan. Such a warning, uttered at such a moment, had only one meaning. It showed that the Imperial authorities, in common with the Government of India, regarded with anxiety the reports of Russian military activity in Central Asia.”²²

Russia at this time was engaged in desperate struggle with Japan; but, notwithstanding her commitments there, the Orenburg-Tashkent railway, which, prior to the war, had been approaching completion, was pushed forward — a line which would enable:

“troops entrained at Moscow to alight within ten days, and without changing carriages at a point only eighty miles north of Herat. That the Government of India was deeply exercised about the Tashkent railway, and the simultaneous reports of Russian activity on the line of the Upper Oxus, was well known at the time. That Lord Kitchener shared these apprehensions to the full was no secret.”²³

Over this railway, Russia despatched some troops toward Afghanistan. It was declared that she contemplated massing 200,000 men for operations there, and, although the figures were largely exaggerated, it was undoubtedly true that, notwithstanding the pressure in Manchuria, transportation had commenced.²⁴ That further reinforcements did not fol-

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 401-2.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 400.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ It is interesting to observe that on 17 Nov. 1904, the Kaiser wrote to the Czar: “Last not least, an excellent expedient to cool British insolence and overbearing would be to make some military demonstrations on the Persia-Afghan frontier — where the British think you powerless to appear with troops during the war”: *The Kaiser's Letters to the Czar*, p. 147.

low is to be attributed to the critical situation in which Russia found herself in the east. They were not needed. The United Kingdom had no intention of attacking Afghanistan. Nor needed Kitchener have been fearful that Russia would choose, for a slap at the United Kingdom, the moment when her full strength was being tested by Japan. Nevertheless, it may truly be said that, during these and the preceding years:

“the possible developments of Russian policy were the dominating consideration in the minds of those responsible for the defence of India, both at home and on the spot.”²⁵

British-Japanese Treaty, 1902. Apprehensive of the approach of Russia toward the Pacific, by her threatened occupation of Manchuria,²⁶ whence a descent upon Korea would be but a matter of time, Japan, after appearing to waver between making terms with Russia and arranging for war against her by an alliance with the United Kingdom, adopted the latter course and signed the treaty of 30 January 1902. Negotiations with the United Kingdom and Russia had been carried on simultaneously — with Russia probably for the purpose of frightening the United Kingdom into agreement;²⁷ and the extent to which the possibility of a Russo-Japanese alliance terrified the British government may be seen by observation of the terms which it agreed to:

“*Article I.* The high contracting parties having mutually recognized the independence of China and of Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically, as well as commercially and industrially, in Korea, the high contracting parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the high contracting parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

“*Article II.* If either Great Britain or Japan, in defense of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another power, the other high contracting party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

“*Article III.* If in the above event any other power or powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other high contracting party will

²⁵ Lovat Fraser, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

²⁶ Cf. *Ann. Reg.*, 1900, pp. 1304, 1330-1; Gibbons, *The New Map of Asia*, pp. 409-13.

²⁷ *The Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi*, pp. 127-9 and *passim*.

come to its assistance and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

“*Article IV.* The high contracting parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another power to the prejudice of the interests above described.

“*Article V.* Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

“*Article VI.* The present agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years from that date.”²⁸

Unless this document be viewed as contemplating, to the advantage of, the United Kingdom, the diminution of Russian military power by a probable defeat at the hands of Japan, the treaty was an altogether one-sided affair. Count Hayashi, who negotiated it, has said:

“When the first alliance was signed, its honest *ultima ratio*, so far as England was concerned, was fear of Russian aggression on India and Constantinople.”²⁹

Yet there was not a word in the treaty with reference to either India or Constantinople. Japan, on the other hand, not only obtained recognition that she was:

“interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea;”

and not only secured assent to the taking of:

“such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened” &c.,

but received the promise of war-assistance in case Russia should be joined by “any other Power” — presumably by France. Lord Lansdowne had endeavored to include British interests in India within the scope of the treaty.

“I am afraid,” he said, “there will be criticism that the benefits derived by Japan and Great Britain are not proportionate.”³⁰

But Japan was obdurate. Lord Lansdowne got nothing.³¹ Any special “interests” which the United Kingdom had in China were, indeed, within the purview of the treaty but they were in no danger of attack.

To what has been said with reference to British apprehensions of Russian advances to Constantinople and India may fittingly be added quotation from a speech by Mr. Asquith at a dinner in London to representatives of the Russian Duma on 27 April 1915 — after the United Kingdom and France had agreed that, at the end of the war,

²⁸ *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, I, Supp., p. 14.

²⁹ *The Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi*, p. 68.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 186-7.

Russia should have Constantinople and much more. He remembered, he said, the days when in Europe and Asia:

“the interests of the two Empires were supposed in both cases to be irrec-
oncilably antagonistic. Our normal attitude toward one another was
one of sleepless vigilance, and I may almost say sensitive suspicion, and
more than once there was a possibility of an actual rupture of our
relations. Those days of misunderstanding are happily over.”³²

The German Menace—Russian Treaty—Renewal of Japanese Treaty. The purpose of the first British-Japanese treaty was accom-
plished. War between Japan and Russia was commenced on 8 Feb-
ruary 1904; Russia was vanquished at Mukden in March 1905; and
peace was signed on 8 September of the same year. But Japan’s success
was disastrous to her ally. And the Morocco incident of 1905-6³³
made very clear to British statesmen that by Russia’s military effacement,
France had been deprived of effective support, and German military
predominance had been heavily enhanced. Japan had destroyed “the
balance of power” in Europe. British interests appeared to demand
that the United Kingdom should undertake its re-establishment. Her
historic antipathy to Russia disappeared, and these two erstwhile an-
tagonists entered into the treaty of 31 August 1907, declaring that
they:

“animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement different
questions concerning the interests of their states on the continent of
Asia, have determined to conclude agreements destined to prevent all
cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard
to the questions referred to — ”³⁴

namely, those relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet.³⁵ The treaty
was followed by manifestations of friendship.

“In 1908 was founded the semi-official Russo-British Chamber of
Commerce. In 1909, Great Britain gave strong support to Russian
diplomacy in the Bosnian crisis. In the same year the leaders of six
Russian parties were entertained in England; and in 1912 a number
of representative Englishmen were given a historic welcome in Russia.”³⁶
The Russian menace to India was being succeeded by the German. Mean-
while, the United Kingdom and Japan entered into a new alliance (12
August 1905). This time it included India; was to last for ten years;
and had for its principal provisions the following:

“*Article II.* If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action,

³² *The Times*, London.

³³ The quarrel between France and Germany: See cap. XXII.

³⁴ *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, I, Supp., p. 400; Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia*,
p. 25. Reference to “the balance of power” may be seen *ante*, cap. V, pp. 147-8.

³⁵ The Persian Gulf was not included: Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson,
29 Aug. 1917: *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, I, Supp., p. 398.

³⁶ Prof. Bernard Pares: *Edinburgh Rev.*, 1906, p. 106.

wherever arising, on the part of any other power or powers, either contracting party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this agreement, the other contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

“*Article III.* Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.

“*Article IV.* Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.”³⁷

The first treaty, of 1902, had been aimed at Russia. At the date of the second, Russia had been defeated. Germany had become the menace, and the new treaty was aimed chiefly at her. Count Hayashi has said:

“The second alliance treaty was the reiteration of the first on a broader basis, except that Germany was the enemy feared, and that it included the enunciation of Japan’s reward for her services against Russia.”³⁸

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY

Germany and the United Kingdom. It is probable that the development of Germany’s purposes with reference to the construction of a line of railway in Asia Minor, reaching from the Bosphorus to the Persian Gulf, was the culminating cause of the change in the relations between the United Kingdom and Russia. The United Kingdom had been accustomed to regard the Persian Gulf as within her exclusive sphere of influence. She had secured special navigation privileges on the river system emptying there. German establishment in the waters would mean an even greater menace to India than Russian approach to the borders of Afghanistan. The railway and its accompanying concessions and associated German activities³⁹ threatened British interests in Constantinople and India. Apprehension probably commenced with the location in 1897 of a German Vice-Consul at Bushire. Other incidents followed,⁴⁰ and increased timidity kept pace with German suc-

³⁷ *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, I, Supp., p. 16.

³⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 69. The treaty was again renewed in 1911.

³⁹ Cf. Edward Mead Earle: *Turkey, The Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway*, pp. 98-109.

⁴⁰ Lovat Fraser: *India under Lord Curzon and After*, pp. 93-6.

cesses. The Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 was an avowal of the substitution, in British opinion, of Germany for Russia as a menace to India.

On 5 May 1903, Lord Lansdowne, in the House of Lords, when complying with a request for a statement of government policy with reference to the Persian Gulf, said that:

"we should regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf, by another power, as a very great menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal."⁴¹

It is another case of what is termed *Monroe Doctrine*. Seeking security, British statesmen changed the main direction of their policy.

Freedom from military menace was not, however, the sole reason for British opposition to the German enterprise. To that must be added the jealousy with which one great imperializing Power always regards the exploitations of a rival. It was when discussing British policy with reference to the Bagdad Railway that Mr. Arthur Balfour (then British Prime Minister) said:

"It is to our interest that countries which we cannot absorb should not be absorbed by others."⁴²

Russia and France being actuated by policies somewhat similar to that of the United Kingdom, the history of the clashing imperialisms connected with the Bagdad Railway is both interesting and instructive. Only a sketch of it can be presented in a single chapter.⁴³


Germany and the Railway. Bismarck's absolute indifference to Balkan affairs has frequently been affirmed, but it was during his time, and not without his cognizance and assistance, that German financiers, headed by the *Deutsche Bank*, commenced their activities in Turkish territory both in Europe and in Asia Minor. In 1888, they purchased a controlling interest in 1500 kilometres of railways in the Balkans, including the direct line from the Austro-Hungarian border to Constantinople.⁴⁴ And about the same time (6 October 1888), they obtained for their company — The Ottoman-Anatolian Railway Company — a concession for the construction of a railway from Haidar Pasha

⁴¹ Quoted by Earle, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

⁴² House of Commons, 8 April 1903. Quoted, in the same connection, by *Cam. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, III, p. 300.

⁴³ The subject has been specially treated by Professor Jastrow in *The War and the Bagdad Railway*; by Evans Lewin in *The German Road to the East*; by Professor Earle in *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway*. Reference may also be made to *The Quarterly Rev.*, Oct. 1917 and April 1921; *The Fortnightly Rev.*, Oct. 1921; *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, III, pp. 299-300, 386-7, 461, 478-81; and the other authorities mentioned in succeeding foot-notes.

⁴⁴ Earle, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-3.



THE BAGDAD RAILWAY, 1911

The Anatolian Railway extended from Scutari to Konia and Angora. The completed portions of the Bagdad Railway extended from Konia to the Taurus Mts. The uncompleted portions to Basra are indicated by a line of dashes.

Other solid lines indicate independent enterprises. Lines of dots indicate international boundaries.

(Scutari — immediately across the Bosphorus from Constantinople) to Angora, a distance of 300 miles. British, as well as German, capital was represented in this undertaking, but the Germans afterwards purchased the British shares, and the enterprise became almost entirely German. The line was completed in 1893, and in that year a new concession was obtained for an extension from Eskishehr, a point on the Angora line, to Konia — a distance of 280 miles. That line was completed in 1896. Thus far the financiers had been notably successful.

“In coöperation with the Austrian and German state railways, they could establish through service from the Baltic to the Bosphorus and, by ferry and railway, into hitherto inaccessible parts of Asia Minor. Almost overnight, as history goes, Turkey had become an important sphere of German economic interest. Thus was born the idea of a series of German-controlled railways from Berlin to Bagdad, from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf — ”⁴⁵

the system sometimes referred to as “the B. B. B.” — Berlin-Byzantium-Bagdad Railway.⁴⁶

Concession of 1903. In 1898 the Kaiser made his second visit to the Sultan (first in 1889), notable chiefly for a speech at a Damascus function (8 November) in which he said:

“May the Sultan and the three hundred million Mussulmans scattered over the earth be assured that the German Emperor will always be their friend.”

This visit may be regarded as the initiation of negotiations which induced the Sultan to announce (27 November 1899) his determination to award a concession to the *Deutsche Bank* for a railway from Konia to Bagdad and the Gulf — negotiations which were brought to successful termination only in 1903 by the arrangements contained in the document known as the “Bagdad Railway Convention” of 5 March, and the “Statutes” of the same date. The Ottoman-Anatolian Railway Company now became merged in the Imperial Ottoman-Bagdad Railway Company. The Porte granted a concession to the Company for the extension of the line from Konia to Basra — a distance of 1,250 miles — thence to a port on the Persian Gulf “to be determined.” The concession also included certain navigation privileges on the Tigris and the Shatt-el-Arab, and a right to work all minerals within 20 kilometres of the railway.

Seeking assistance for the execution of the work, the Germans instituted negotiations with British capitalists, and nearly succeeded in framing an agreement which would have united German, British, and French interests in the prosecution of an international enterprise. From a disposition to accept the proffered terms, the British government ap-

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

pears to have been driven by violently expressed public opinion.⁴⁷ It was in vain that Mr. Balfour, the Prime Minister, said (8 April 1903):

"I have no doubt that, whatever course English financiers may take and whatever course the British Government may pursue, sooner or later this great undertaking will be carried out. There is no difficulty in point of money. Whether the English Government assist or do not assist, it is undoubtedly in the power of the British Government to hamper and impede and inconvenience any project of the kind; but that the project will ultimately be carried out, with or without our having a share in it, there is no question whatever."⁴⁸

Almost unanimously, the press condemned the proposal. British opposition to the scheme continued.

"As events turned out," comments Professor Earle, "the failure of the Balfour Government to effect the internationalization of the Bagdad Railway was a colossal diplomatic blunder. If the proposed agreement of 1903 had been consummated, the *entente* of 1904 between France and England would have taken control of the enterprise out of the hands of the Germans, who would have possessed, with their Turkish collaborators, only fourteen of the thirty votes in the Board of Directors. Sir Henry Babington Smith assures the author that there was nothing in the arrangement suggested by the *Deutsche Bank* which would have prevented eventual Franco-British domination of the line. Surely, as Bismarck is said to have remarked, every nation must pay sooner or later for the windows broken by its bellicose press."⁴⁹

Anglo-Russian Treaty, 1907. The Anglo-Russian Treaty of 31 August 1907, dividing Persia into spheres of influence (and settling outstanding questions relating to Afghanistan and Tibet), may be regarded as the Anglo-Russian reply to German activities in Turkish territory. Russian statesmen theretofore had purposed (quoting from the:

"Protocol of Deliberations of the Russian Ministerial Council of February 1, 1907, on the Project of a Treaty with England on Persian Affairs"): "that Persia must come entirely under Russian influence, and that Russia must press onward to the Persian Gulf, which would necessitate the building of a trans-Persian railway and a fortified terminal station on the shores of the above-mentioned Gulf. The events of the past few years, however, have shown this plan to be impossible of realization and that everything must be avoided that might lead to a con-

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 180-95.

⁴⁸ Hansard, cols. 1371-2. On 7 April, Mr. Balfour had declared in the House that the railway was not "to be a German railway": Hansard, col. 1247. The next day, he repeated the assertion: Hansard, cols. 1358, 1360.

⁴⁹ Earle, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-9. It must be remembered, however, that the Anglo-French *entente* not having at the time been formed, probable conjunction with the French might not have been a weighty consideration with the Balfour government.

flict with England. The best means for achieving this purpose is the demarcation of the spheres of influence in Persia."

The chief of "the events" was the construction of the Bagdad railway: "which Russia has hitherto attempted to prevent by all possible means, relying on the support of France and England."

The main line of the railway would affect Russia's interests only indirectly, but:

"The branch lines mentioned above," "especially those touching Persian territory, signify a direct menace to us, as they would open the North Persian markets, which we have hitherto controlled, to foreign goods."

It was impossible, moreover, to reconcile the Bagdad railway "with Russian strategic interests."

"We cannot, however, disguise the fact that we do not possess the power to prevent the construction of the Bagdad railway, or to defer it for any length of time. The only means at our disposal — our influence on France — are not reliable, and we would hardly succeed in restraining French capital from participation in this enterprise."

Another of the "events" above referred to was that:

"Germany has already turned her attention to Persia, and apparently intends creating important interests for herself there . . . the fact of German interests in Persia cannot be denied."⁵⁰

The Council approved the project of a treaty with the United Kingdom and, six months later, the contract was signed, its purpose being, as afterwards declared:

"that of uniting our efforts to prevent Germany from obtaining a foothold in Persia."

But the interests of the two monopolizing Powers were not identical. Each was open to proposals disliked by the other. Loyalty and interest were apt to conflict, and Germany (had not the unfolding of the story been interrupted) would, by separate approaches, have secured something much more substantial than "a foothold in Persia." The two Powers, well aware of the danger, agreed, at one time, that all diplomatizings should be shared by themselves and France;⁵¹ but Germany being unwilling to embarrass herself in that way, the others contented themselves with:

"separate negotiations, the final result of which was, however, to be determined by 'all Four.'"⁵²

⁵⁰ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 474-7. Cf. Isvolsky's despatch of 24 April 1915: *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 73.

⁵¹ Upon this subject see Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 486, 507, 509, 528, 536, 542, 573. French financiers encouraged expenditure upon the railway, and, even politically, "France's opposition" to the railway "was from the very beginning not very categorical" (*ibid.*, p. 557).

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 536.

The arrangement was of unsatisfactory and, to some extent, of impracticable character. It involved a veto by France and Russia of an agreement laboriously consummated between the United Kingdom and Germany, and that incident induced its practical disregard. Patiently and effectively, Germany pursued her separating diplomacies. And when Sir Edward Grey had succeeded in preventing emergence of a German railway on the Gulf, he found (as we shall see) that he had but turned it, by arrangement with Russia, into northern Persia—the geographical neighbor of Afghanistan.

Germany and the United Kingdom, 1907-9. Germany held the concession for the railway, but financially, her success depended (in the absence of British and French support) upon Turkish subsidies. Turkey could be managed, but her power was limited by the fact that, without the sanction of the Powers, her customs tariff could not be increased, and that for assistance to the railway more revenue from that source was essential.

“The opposition of the Powers on this point has, however, placed insurmountable difficulties in the way of the German enterprise.”⁵³ Germany believed that, in the “dime,” Turkey possessed a source of revenue sufficient for the financing of the railway, but of that there was not sufficient assurance, and, somewhat blocked, Germany proceeded in other ways.

Recognizing that the main reason for the opposition of the United Kingdom was German control of a railway debouching on the Gulf, Germany determined to offer renunciation, in British favor, of the section of the line between Bagdad and the Gulf—usually referred to as the southern or Gulf sector.⁵⁴ Lord Haldane has related that, during the visit of the Kaiser to England in November 1907:

“The Emperor took me aside and said he was sorry that there was a good deal of friction over the Bagdad Railway, and that he did not know what we wanted as a basis for co-operation. I said that I could not answer for the Foreign Office, but that, speaking as War Minister, one thing I knew we wanted was a ‘gate’ to protect India from troops coming down the new railway. He asked me what I meant by a ‘gate,’ and I said that meant the control of the section which would come near to the Persian Gulf. ‘I will give you the gate,’ replied the Emperor.”⁵⁵

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 508. And see pp. 502, 504, 508, 512, 514, 515, 522, 544, 572, 573.

⁵⁴ Germany may have been influenced in this respect by the fact that the United Kingdom was pressing Turkey for the grant of a separate concession to herself for a railway from Bagdad to Koweit—a port on the Gulf over which the United Kingdom claimed to have established something of a protectorate interest: Siebert & Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 501-2.

⁵⁵ *Before the War*, p. 48. The German proposal, Sir Charles Hardinge declared, was “unexpected,” but its being “in absolute keeping with England’s

The offer appeared to open a good prospect of conciliation, but the British Foreign Office required that the negotiations should be carried on in the presence of the representatives of France and Russia; and Germany, after consideration of the subject in Berlin, declined to enter a conference which (as Lord Haldane relates):

"would probably fail and accentuate the differences between her and the other Powers. The matter thus came to an end."⁵⁶

That is not, however, the whole story. Documents now available reveal that, immediately following the Kaiser's communication, unofficial negotiations proceeded between Herr Gwinner of the *Deutsche Bank* and Sir Henry Babington Smith representing a group of British financiers; that, as early as the 19th November (the day after the termination of the Kaiser's visit), a memorandum containing the particulars of the German proposal was delivered to the French and Russian governments;⁵⁷ that both governments expressed their disappointment at the contemplated action; and that it eventually foundered, not because Germany declined to agree to a four-Power conference, but because Turkey (supported, probably, by France and Russia) refused to give her assent.⁵⁸ The *entente* allies of the United Kingdom did not desire that by her obtaining her object they should lose her support.

Gwinner's later negotiations with British financiers (in 1909)⁵⁹ were regarded by the French and Russian governments as amounting to an attempt at a political settlement between the German and British governments, and were resented accordingly. The projected agreement (wrote the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, 8 December 1909): "is of the greatest importance; it is equivalent to the partition of Turkey into a British and a German sphere of interest: England granting Germany freedom of action in Turkey in Europe and in Asia Minor, and claiming such for herself only in the Turkish territories in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf."⁶⁰

Referring to the negotiations, the French Ambassador at Constantinople (as the Russian Ambassador reported, 24 December 1909):

"attributes to them not only local, purely Turkish, but rather a general European significance. In these negotiations, he discerns an express desire on the part of England and Germany to improve their present relations, the Bagdad Railway question offering a favorable opportunity.

political interests renders it hardly possible for the London Cabinet not to take it into consideration . . . there will be one important question less between England and Germany—the only concrete question" (Siebert & Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 513-4).

⁵⁶ *Before the War*, p. 51. Cf. *Current History*, VII, Pt. 1, p. 328.

⁵⁷ Siebert & Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 502-3.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 516-17.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 509.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 512. See also pp. 506-9.

The possibility of an Anglo-German rapprochement is disadvantageous and harmful to France and Russia. In any case, both Powers will lose the English support at Constantinople on which they were hitherto able to rely."⁶¹

French and Russian opposition prevented completion of the Anglo-German negotiations.

Germany and Russia — Potsdam. British negotiations with Germany induced in Russia a reconsideration of the whole subject — Would she, too, endeavor to develop a plan of separate arrangement? On 26 November 1909, Isvolsky (the Russian Foreign Minister) wrote to the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople as follows:

"The significance of the Bagdad Railway from a political, strategical, and economic point of view, so far as Russia is concerned, has already been exhaustively investigated. Our standpoint remains unaltered. The construction of this railway will have injurious consequences for us, and we must take measures to mitigate these results. It will hardly be possible to prevent the execution of the German project, first, because Germany's expenditure for this enterprise has already been a very large one; secondly, because, on the whole, French financial circles regard the undertaking favorably; and, thirdly, because England now seems inclined to give her consent upon certain conditions. Thus, it is now principally a matter for determining on what conditions we could declare our readiness to cease opposing the German undertaking. . . . Our further resistance might continue to hamper the German intentions in the future. A change in our attitude might be made by us dependent on the yielding attitude shown by Germany on the question of defining our mutual interests in connection with the Bagdad Railway. Thus we have the possibility to use the measure now proposed by Turkey to further our own important interests in the eastern districts of Turkey."⁶²

Germany had desired that her railway should have its terminus on the Persian Gulf (south from Bagdad) but, blocked by the United Kingdom, she turned (early in 1911), for an outlet, to the northeast, proposing to build ninety miles to Khanekin (the German terminus on the Persian border) and there to connect with Russian railways in Persia.⁶³ The bases of such an agreement with Russia (who, by the terms of the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907, claimed northern Persia as her exclusive sphere of influence and interest) were arrived at during a visit of the Czar to Berlin (November 1910), and were carried into a written agreement on 19 August 1911. It is usually referred to as the Potsdam agreement.⁶⁴ Germany, on her part, declared that she had no intention

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 515. And see p. 512.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 508.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 547, 557.

⁶⁴ It may be seen in *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, VI, Supp., pp. 120-2. Reference to the negotiations may be seen in Buchanan, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 94-8.

of seeking concessions for the construction of railways, &c., in the Russian sphere in Persia.⁶⁵ On the other hand, Russia agreed to construct a road from Khanekin to Teheran (the Persian capital), there to connect with "a network of railways" in northern Persia for which Russia "intends to obtain from the Persian Government a concession."⁶⁶

"Article II. . . . The two governments shall favor international traffic over the lines from Khanikine to Teheran and from Khanikine to Bagdad and avoid all measures that might interfere therewith, such, for instance, as the creation of transitory customs duties or the application of differential tariffs. If at the end of a period of two years after the completion of the Sadijeh branch to Khanikine of the railway from Koniah to Bagdad, the construction of the line from Khanikine is not commenced, then the Russian Government shall inform the German Government of its renunciation of the concessions of this latter line. The German Government, in that case, shall have the right to solicit on its part the concession of said line."

"Article III. In view of the general importance which the realization of the Bagdad railway has for international commerce, the Russian Government engages itself not to take any step that might prove an obstacle in the construction of the railway or prevent the participation of capital in this enterprise. Always, of course, with the understanding that no pecuniary or economic damage would thereby accrue to Russia."

Pendency of the negotiations was openly avowed, and a draft of the agreement was submitted to Sir Edward Grey shortly after the Potsdam meeting.⁶⁷ The Russian Ambassador, reporting a conversation (17 January 1911), said:

"Grey then declared that England's position in her future negotiations with Germany is weakened in any case, as the latter has obtained two extremely important concessions from Russia:

"(1) The Bagdad Railway has found an outlet in Northern Persia, a fact that offers great economic and financial advantages and is furthermore of incontestable political importance to Germany.

"(2) Germany has obtained that Russia ceases her opposition on principle to the Bagdad project. Sir Edward regards this result as all the more important for Germany as hitherto the reverse was the case. . . .

"These two points according to Sir Edward, signify a great relief for

⁶⁵ In the previous May, Germany had voluntarily made a somewhat similar statement: See *post*, cap. XXII.

⁶⁶ The Russian government, however, determined that, "in order to prevent this line" — Khanekin to Teheran — "exercising an injurious influence on our" (Russian) "commerce, it is necessary to build a new line right to the centre of Persia, either connecting Teheran with the net of Russian railways, or with a Persian port on the Caspian Sea." This must be accomplished, too, before the Khanekin-Teheran line reached Teheran: Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 552.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 528. Cf. von Bethmann-Hollweg, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

Germany and render England's position more difficult in precisely the same degree."⁶⁸

The effect of the proposed Anglo-German agreement would have been to deprive Russia of further British support. Now Sir Edward Grey was apprehensive of losing Russia. He saw, moreover, political danger in the possibility of the Khanekin-Teheran line passing under German control. On 6 February 1911, Nicolson (British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs) said to the Russian Ambassador (as he reported):

"In order to render possible the Anglo-Russian Convention" (of 1907), "England had renounced all advantages in the Russian sphere of interest and could not now permit that we grant Germany a concession which would be regarded here as dangerous to England's vital interests."⁶⁹

The Ambassador further reported (7 February):

"No doubt exists for me that this question has become the pivot of the political situation, and that England attributes to it such great importance that in case we cede the line to Germany, England would alter her entire policy. Nicolson's anxiety has a personal side, since both Grey and he gave guarantees on the occasion of general anxiety of public opinion, following the Potsdam meeting, that you had made no promises at Potsdam which ran counter to British interests. Grey told Cambon that if no way out could be found, this would mean the collapse of the entire British policy of the last six years."⁷⁰

Grey was so perturbed that he contemplated resigning his office:

"He has now" (9 February 1911) "renounced this idea, but the impression produced on Grey proves the great importance which England, chiefly for strategic reasons, attaches to Germany's progress in these regions. Nothing of this has been made known, neither to the general public nor to the press."⁷¹

Again reporting on the same subject, the Ambassador said (21 June):

"The Anglo-Russian Convention" (of 1907), "does not afford any basis upon which an English protest against German control of the said line might be raised; England, however, so greatly fears such a control that, should the German control come into effect, our Convention with England would become shaken and its political effect would be called into question, because, according to the whole spirit of the Convention of 1907, Russian influence in Northern Persia is intended to be exclusive, just as English influence is in the South. A railway line under German control would give this Power first-class political influence in Persia. Therefore, England would also have to reckon with Germany at Te-

⁶⁸ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 537-8. And see pp. 540, 541, 557. Sazonoff's report of his conversations at Potsdam is in *Un Livre Noir*, II, pp. 331-4.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 549.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 550.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 550-1.

heran, and this would involve negotiations which, it is believed here, would be most welcome to Germany.”⁷²

Notwithstanding all objection, the Potsdam agreement was signed on 19 August 1911. France, influenced by the attacks of the parliamentary Opposition, had been somewhat inclined to resent it as subversive of her arrangements with Russia. Pichon (the French Foreign Minister), however, declared that he had no such anxiety, although he had to admit that he had not been treated with the consideration which he might have expected. His successor, Cruppi, was more reserved.⁷³

Germany and Turkey, 1911. Having in this way eliminated the opposition of Russia, but well aware that the United Kingdom would never agree to a German railway reaching the Gulf, Germany entered into an agreement with Turkey whereby she made conditional renunciation of her interest in the Gulf sector of the railway — Bagdad to Basra, near the Gulf — and received in exchange a concession for a branch to Alexandretta, a port on the Mediterranean.⁷⁴ In pursuance of the arrangement, the Turkish government proposed internationalization of the Gulf sector:

“Germany, England, and France each participating with 20 per cent., and Turkey with 40 per cent.”⁷⁵

But the United Kingdom would not agree. She replied (1 August 1911) with a proposal for:

“an equal participation of the four Powers named, and a fifth share for Russia, as we desired at the time.”⁷⁶

No agreement was reached.

The United Kingdom and Turkey, 1911. Contemporaneously with the negotiations just referred to, the United Kingdom had been endeavoring to obtain a concession to herself from Turkey for the Gulf sector.⁷⁷ She failed because, as the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople reported (11 May 1911):

“The Turks have declared that they are under legal and moral obligations to Germany as regards the entire Bagdad line down to the Persian Gulf;”⁷⁸

and, save for the purpose of installing international control, Germany

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 574.

⁷³ The following of Isvolsky's despatches in 1911 relate to the subject: 18 Jan., *Un Livre Noir.*, I, pp. 23-4, 27; 15 Feb., *ibid.*, p. 35; 16 March, *ibid.*, p. 56; 26 March, *ibid.*, p. 61; 13 April, *ibid.*, pp. 70-2.

⁷⁴ Upon this subject, see Siebert and Schreiner, pp. 567, 569, 577, 592; Dawson, *The German Empire*, II, p. 471; Evans Lewin, *The German Road to the East*, p. 68; Earle, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-12, 228-9. The branch was opened for traffic on 1 Nov. 1913: *ibid.*, p. 113.

⁷⁵ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 558.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 576.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 501, 517, 522, 523.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 522; and see p. 523.

would not withdraw. As a bargaining lever and to forestall similar action on the part of Germany, Sir Edward Grey made demands upon the Shah for concessions for railways in southern Persia,⁷⁹ especially for a line through the neutral zone from Mohammerah (on the Shatt-el-Arab) northerly to Khoramabad⁸⁰ near the southerly limit of the Russian zone.⁸¹ To this Russia raised objection (23 February 1911): "such a railway would be directly harmful to our economic interests and would arouse grave misgivings in Russia."⁸²

"The English Government," Sazonoff said (16 March 1911), "apparently needs such a concession principally to soothe public opinion in England, and perhaps to be able to exert pressure upon Germany on the matter of the southern end of the Bagdad railway."⁸³

The Persian government settled the question by declining to grant the concession, on the ground that it was of political rather than commercial character.⁸⁴ German and Russian influence was too strong for the British Foreign Minister.

The United Kingdom and Turkey, 1913. We are now near the end of the diplomatizings. After some months of negotiation in London in 1913, comprehensive arrangements between the United Kingdom and Turkey upon a variety of subjects were embodied in documents of 29 July and 21 October 1913. The substance of two of the clauses was as follows:

"1. Turkey recognized the special position of Great Britain in the region of the Persian Gulf. Therefore, although Great Britain acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan over Koweit, the Ottoman Government pledged a policy of non-interference in the affairs of the principality. The existing treaties between the Sheik and Great Britain were confirmed.

"2. The terminus of the Bagdad railway was to be Basra, unless and until Great Britain should give consent to an extension of the line to the Persian Gulf."⁸⁵

Commenting upon the agreement, Sir Edward Grey said that it: "justifies us in saying that it is no longer in British interests to oppose the line."⁸⁶

Germany was well pleased.

Germany and France, 1914. The opposition of the United Kingdom being in this way to a large extent eliminated, Germany succeeded in placating France by agreeing with her upon a distribution between the

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 554, 556, 568. "The era of concessions and enterprise has now dawned: *ibid.*, p. 556.

⁸⁰ Capital of Luristan, in 33°, 32' N.; 48°, 15' E.; about 138 miles N.W. of Ispahan.

⁸¹ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 556.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 568-9.

⁸² *Ibid.*; and see pp. 556, 567-8.

⁸⁵ Earle, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 566.

⁸⁶ Hansard, LIII, col. 393; Earle, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

rival financiers of "spheres of influence"—northern Anatolia and Syria to France, and "the regions traversed by the Anatolian and Bagdad railways" to Germany.⁸⁷

Germany and the United Kingdom, 1914. The way was now clear for agreement between Germany and the United Kingdom. First, came a contract (23 February — amended 27 March 1914) by which, *inter alia*, the Railway Company recognized certain monopolistic privileges of Lord Inchcape in connection with the Mesopotamia rivers, and guaranteed him a certain quantity of freight.⁸⁸ Next came an agreement (26 March) between the Railway Company and the British-owned Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company. Next, an Anglo-German syndicate organized the Turkish Petroleum Company, upon which the Sultan conferred certain exclusive rights of exploitation.⁸⁹ And all these "vested interests" having been carefully protected, Sir Edward Grey and the German Ambassador in London initialed (15 June) a convention embodying settlement of all matters relating to the railway. Formal ratification was postponed, as Sir Edward informed the House of Commons:

"until Turkey and Germany have completed their own separate negotiations."⁹⁰

The substance of the principal clause of this agreement (for the purposes in hand) was as follows (as summarized by Professor Earle):

The terminus of the Bagdad Railway was to be Basra. Both of the signatory Powers declared that under no circumstances would they "support the construction of a branch from Basra or any other point on the main line of the Bagdad Railway to the Persian Gulf, unless a complete understanding be previously arrived at between the Imperial Ottoman, the Imperial German, and His Britannic Majesty's Governments."

The German Government furthermore pledged itself under no circumstances

"to undertake the construction of a harbor or a railway station on the Persian Gulf, or support efforts of any persons or companies directed toward that end, unless a complete agreement be previously arrived at with His Britannic Majesty's Government."⁹¹

Outbreak of the war prevented completion of the agreement.

Application of the Story. Taking perhaps a somewhat exaggerated view of the importance of the subject (a careful study of which he has made), Professor Jastrow has said:

⁸⁷ Earle, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 259-60.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 260-1.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 263. The full text of the agreement was published by Professor Earle in *The Political Science Quarterly*, XXXVIII (1913), pp. 24-44.

“The railway has been a nightmare resting heavily on all Europe for eighteen years—ever since the announcement in 1899 of the concession granted to the Anatolian Railway Company. No step ever taken by any European Power anywhere has caused so much trouble, given rise to so many complications, and has been such a constant menace to the peace of the world. No European statesman to whom the destinies of his country had been committed has rested easily in the presence of this spectre of the twentieth century. In the last analysis, the Bagdad Railway will be found to be the largest single contributing factor in bringing on the war, because, through it more than through any other cause, the mutual distrust among European Powers has been nurtured, until the entire atmosphere of international diplomacy has become vitiated. The explanation for this remarkable phenomenon, transforming what appeared on the surface to be a magnificent commercial enterprise, with untold possibilities for usefulness, into a veritable curse, an excrescence on the body politic of Europe, is to be sought in the history of the highway through which the railway passes. The control of this highway is the key to the East—the Near and the Farther East as well. Such has been its rôle in the past—such is its significance to-day.”⁹²

We ought rather to say that the explanation of the disrupting influence of the German project is to be found in the fact that it impinged upon the varied imperialisms of the rival Powers. Russia resented the approach of Germany to Persia, which, and, after 1907, the northern part of which, she regarded as lying within her exclusive sphere of interest—interest in trade, in oil, in concessions, &c. France regarded the intrusion of Germany in Syria as an encroachment upon a French preserve, and the whole railway scheme as something which ought to be arranged so as to afford an opportunity for French financial exploitation. And the United Kingdom was determined (1) that no German railway should debouch on the Persian Gulf, and (2) that the advent of German competition and influence in Persia should be postponed to as late a date as possible.

For the purpose of the present chapter, the important fact is that, from 1903 to 1914, the United Kingdom regarded Germany rather than Russia as the menace to Constantinople and India, and even (through the increasing influence of Germany at Constantinople) to Egypt and the Suez Canal. That, eventually, agreement was reached would have been important, from a European point of view, had peace for some further years prevailed. It came much too late to modify existing tension; and it left untouched the two main predisposing causes or roots of the great war—Alsace-Lorraine and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

⁹² *The War and the Bagdad Railway*, pp. 114-5.

CONCLUSIONS

From the foregoing recital, the following conclusions may safely be drawn:

1. Until a few years ago Russia was regarded as the menace to British interests with reference to Constantinople and India.

2. In later years, Germany, in these respects, became substitute for Russia.

3. The German menace in the East — Constantinople and India — was one of the reasons for the United Kingdom joining the Dual Entente and entering the war. The other two have been dealt with in the two preceding chapters.

The Future. Whether the ante-war diplomacies and the war itself have ended, for any considerable period, the earlier Russian and the later German menace, is extremely doubtful. Possibly all that has been accomplished is the re-establishment of the Russian in aggravated form. For Russia, although as yet only in process of reconsolidation, has already made approaches to India which, prior to the Anglo-Russian *entente* of 1907, would have produced war. Her influence in Persia (with frontage on the Gulf) and in Afghanistan has become predominant. And that Mr. Lloyd George has not forgotten the old-time Russian menace was made clear by his speech in the House of Commons (17 November 1919) in which he said:

“Denikin and Koltchak are fighting for two main objects. The first is the destruction of Bolshevism and the restoration of good government. Upon that he could not get complete unanimity amongst all the forces, but the second is that he is fighting for a reunited Russia. Well, it is not for me to say whether that is a policy which suits the British Empire. There was a very great statesman, a man of great imagination, who certainly did not belong to the party to which I belong (Lord Beaconsfield), who regarded a great, gigantic, colossal, growing Russia, rolling onwards like a glacier towards Persia and the borders of Afghanistan and India, as the greatest menace the British Empire could be confronted with.”⁹³

Possibly, also, the future has in store a *rapprochement* between Slav and Teuton. Much that has occurred points to that eventuality. But the present writer eschews prophecy.

⁹³ *The Times* (London), 18 Nov. 1919.

CHAPTER XXII

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THE ARGUMENT

DISCUSSION in previous chapters has made clear that the circumstances which induced the United Kingdom to enter into *entente* relations with France (1904) and Russia (1907) were: (1) German rivalry in various respects; (2) German menace in the west; and (3) German menace in the east. We are now to observe how the friendship with France and Russia developed into active support — how (as M. Tardieu puts it) the relations passed “from the static to the dynamic state.” Perhaps a preliminary sketch of the argument — somewhat lengthy — may assist in comprehension of it.

1. By treaty of 8 April 1904, the United Kingdom gave to France a practically free hand in Morocco, in exchange for equal liberty in Egypt, and:

“The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplo-

matic support in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.”¹

In effect, the United Kingdom agreed to support, diplomatically, whatever France might do in the way of preserving order in Morocco and providing:

“assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.”

2. In 1905, the United Kingdom supported France in her refusal to submit her quarrel with Germany about Morocco to an international conference—although as Mr. Winston Churchill afterwards said, “France had not a good case.”² President Roosevelt, at the request of the Kaiser, pressed France to agree, and, ultimately, she did.

3. Throughout the proceedings of the conference, the British representative supported France, even when Russia advised her to make concessions which she afterwards agreed to.

4. In Sir Edward Grey’s opinion, the United Kingdom would, at these periods, have supported France in war with Germany.

5. In 1911, the United Kingdom again supported France in her quarrel with Germany about Morocco, and would, had it been necessary, have joined France in war against Germany. Upon this occasion, Spain, while herself pressing her imperialistic designs upon part of Morocco, assumed, toward French aggression, an attitude similar to that presented by Germany.

6. The incidents of 1905 and 1911, and others elsewhere referred to, mark the stages by which the *entente* between the United Kingdom and France developed into a practical alliance.

7. Parallel development, commencing in 1907, between the United Kingdom and Russia—principally in connection with operations in Persia—will be dealt with in the latter part of the present chapter.


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German Designs. Probably very many English-speaking people believe (for it has been well pressed upon them) that Germany never had any special interest in Morocco; that she had no *status* from which she could properly interfere with such policies as France might choose to pursue there; and that the landing of the Kaiser at Tangier on 31 March 1905, and the appearance of the German warship at Agadir on 3 July 1911, were mere shakings of the “mailed fist,” incitements to war, and tests of the solidity of the Franco-British *entente*.³ Professor

¹ Art. IX: Morel, *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 233-4.

² *The World Crisis*, I, p. 26.

³ For example, see N. D. Harris: *Intervention and Colonization in Africa* (p. 254): “The German Emperor’s real motive in forcing this meeting of the Powers, in addition to a desire for the participation of Germany in the final set-



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Seymour, for example, in a book of many merits, describes each of these actions as a "blow" struck by Germany "to reinforce her prestige and destroy the Triple Entente."⁴ Not one of these assumptions has any foundation in fact.

Value of Morocco. Morocco is a splendid imperial prize — by far the best that France has (in large part) acquired. With an area of 219,000 square miles (Great Britain has only 121,391), it occupies a commanding position on the northwest corner of Africa, having a frontage on both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The population may be about 7,000,000, the most important being the Berbers of the hill districts; then the Arabs on the plains; and finally the European pioneers. Endowed with fine agricultural lands and well stocked with minerals, Morocco will yield rich return to French and Spanish (if Spain persists) exploitation.

"Morocco," said M. André Tardieu, "is a rich country . . . well watered by the rains from the ocean which the high mountains attract, irrigated in the driest parts by the waters of the streams which come down from the summits of the Atlas, and it is by its climate and its situation more favored than Algeria and Tunisia."⁵

But perhaps the chief benefit which France has had heretofore, and will in the future derive, lies in the man-supply, for purposes of war, which Morocco affords. During the recent hostilities she was able to draw from her various possessions, for services in her army and for labor in connection with her army operations, the following numbers of colored men:⁶

tlement of the Moroccan question, does not appear to have been the humiliation of the French Republic. It was rather a move to test the Franco-British *entente* and to force the diplomatic isolation of France, Russia being then occupied with the Russian-Japanese war." To much the same effect is the statement by Mr. A. L. Kennedy, *Old Diplomacy and New*, p. 124. In *The Contemporary* of September 1911, Dr. Dillon spoke of "Germania herself brandishing the flaming sword," and referred to "the brutal and incongruous overt act" of sending the *Panther* to Agadir as an endeavor "to separate Great Britain from France" (pp. 408, 409, 421). A good article upon the subject appears in *The Contemporary* of August 1911, p. 187. See also Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 87.

⁴ *The Diplomatic Background of the War*, pp. 246, 247, 286. Sir Valentine Chirol, also, has said: "So, as in 1905, Germany had made a desperate attempt to break up, over Morocco, the Anglo-French understanding before it had had time to consolidate. . . .": *Germany and the Fear of Russia; Oxford Pamphlets*, 1914, III.

⁵ *La France et les Alliances*, p. 127. The writer is quoting partly from René Pinon: *L'Empire de la Méditerranée*.

⁶ Taken from an article by Col. Réquin in *The Times* (London), 6 Sept. 1919.

	<i>Army</i>	<i>Labor</i>
Western and Equatorial Africa	181,512	
Indo-China	48,922	48,981
Madagascar	41,355	5,535
Somaliland and Pacific	3,501	
Algeria	177,800	75,864
Tunisia	54,000	19,538
Morocco	37,800	35,010
Totals	544,890	184,928
		544,890
Grand Total		729,818

Add to all this, the fact that these African and other troops were specially used in attack rather than defence — out of the 544,890 no fewer than 115,000 being killed — and one may see that the design of supplementing French manhood-inferiority by heavy drafts from outside is in rapid process of accomplishment. It is especially worthy of note that it was Colonel Mangin (whose book had presented strong plea for the effective prosecution of that policy) who was sent to Morocco to organize a police force under French instructors, and who developed his work into the reorganization of the Chérifién army under his own command.⁷ It may also be observed that while article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, relating to mandates, declared that the principle to be applied is:

“that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization,”

the French mandate for the Cameroons contains the following provision:

“*Article III.* The Mandatory shall not establish in the territory any military or naval bases, nor erect any fortifications, nor organize any native military force except for local police purposes and for the defence of the territory. It is understood, however, that the troops thus raised may, in the event of general war, be utilized to repel an attack or for the defence of the territory outside that subject to the mandate.”⁸

French war-regulations provide for incorporation of Moorish forces in the French army.

IMPERIALISMS IN NORTH AFRICA

Practice of the Powers. Along the south shore of the Mediterranean lie — from east to west — Egypt, Cyrenaica, Tripoli, Tunis,

⁷ The *Nineteenth Century*, July 1911, pp. 171 ff. The Review writer endeavored “to expose the futility of Col. Mangin’s scheme” (p. 179); and protested against “the Arab-Berbers” being “transported from their country like chained tigers, to be loosed against Europeans.” It was Disraeli who first furnished precedent.

⁸ *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, July 1923: Supp., p. 146.

Algeria, and Morocco, the first five, in the 1820's, semi-independent (owing but nominal allegiance to the impotent Sultan of Turkey), and the last governing herself as she pleased. To the north of these were the Great Powers engaged in developing their imperialistic interests. Egypt now pertains to the United Kingdom; Cyrenaica and Tripoli to Italy; Tunis and Algeria to France; and Morocco has been divided between France and Spain. How did that happen? Until it is understood, we shall not understand the Morocco Root of the war.

Speaking, for the moment, somewhat generally, it may be said that while in former days the imperializing Powers fought for territory, in later times they have proceeded by bargainings and threatenings and compromisings. Here, for example, is helpless China: You take Port Arthur; you take Kiao-Chou; you take Wei-hai-wei and the territory opposite Hong-Kong; and you take Indo-China, Tonquin, Annam, and Kwang Chao Wan. Or here is helpless Siam: You take this, and you take that. Or here is helpless Africa: Germany may take territory near Zanzibar, but she must compensate the United Kingdom by the cession of Heligoland; the United Kingdom may take Egypt, but, as compensation, she must give to Germany, Angra Pequena and other territory, and to France, a free hand in Morocco; Italy may take Tripoli and Cyrenaica, but, as compensation, she too must declare herself "disinterested" in Morocco and Egypt, and supply other compensations; France may take Morocco, but she must buy off the others with compensations of some kind, and if she refuse to buy any of them, there will probably be trouble — and there was.

Algeria. Algeria was the first of the North African communities to undergo seizure. Commencing (1827) with a squabble over the alleged non-payment by the Dey of Algiers to two Algerian Jews who had shipped corn to France at the time of the Directory; and proceeding, through a slap by the Dey of a French Consul's face, bombardment of the port of Algiers, and landing of troops (14 June 1830), France completed her purpose (politically, although not militarily) by the adoption of the ordinance of 22 July 1834, providing for the organization of the "French possessions in the north of Africa."

Tunis. At that date, Italy was only a distracted geographical expression, and was not in position to object or to demand compensation. Union of her north and south was achieved only in 1861; Venetia was acquired in 1866; and Rome not until 1870. Internal consolidation and population-congestion bred imperialism — as usual — and directly to the south, across the Mediterranean, lay helpless Tunis. Italy wanted it; but France took it; for Bismarck and Disraeli, the two arch-plotters at the Berlin Conference of 1878, in pursuit of their own purposes, had pointed the way. Bismarck wanted to turn French thought from Alsace-Lorraine, and to provide an African rather than a European field for the exercise of French energies and activities. And Salisbury

(Disraeli's Foreign Minister), in order to obtain French support for his Balkan plans, declared, in a letter to the French Foreign Secretary (7 August 1878), that the British government would not:

"view with distrust the legitimate and increasing influence of France in that region," and hinted "that even the fall of the Bey's Government, were it to come about, would in no way change the attitude of England, who has no interests of her own there."⁹

After the close of the conference, when France commenced operations, Lord Salisbury's successor, Lord Granville, repudiated the arrangement, and, writing to Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador at Paris (5 April 1881), said that:

"The French cannot be allowed to seize Tunis without the consent of Turkey, and communication with the rest of Europe."¹⁰

But to this irruption little attention was paid. A French military expedition arrived at the Tunisian capital on 11 May, and on the next day the Bey signed a treaty by which Tunis became in reality a French protectorate.¹¹ The episode is interestingly referred to by Lord Newton in his *Lord Lyons*.¹² Italy was resentful, and both Italy and the United Kingdom were apprehensive that Tripoli would soon be assailed by France. Italy took precautions, as hereinafter mentioned.

Egypt. Khedive Ismail was a spendthrift. He sold his Suez Canal shares to the United Kingdom (1875), and, to keep the financial wells flowing, he and his successor, Tewfik (1877), submitted to dual control — to British and French oversight and direction. In 1882, as nationalistic protest against the foreigner, a rebellion broke out under Arabi; and the United Kingdom, to restore the power of the Khedive, suppressed the movement and deported its leader. British occupation was, of course, to be merely temporary.

"Although for the present a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquillity, Her Majesty's Government are desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the state of the country, and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority will admit of it."¹³

So ran Lord Granville's circular to the Powers (3 January 1883); and so on various subsequent occasions the British government declared and promised. But the fitting time never arrived. And France, witnessing the gradual disappearance of her equal position, remained resentful and

⁹ Dawson: *The German Empire: 1871-1914*, II, p. 109. Cf. *The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi*, II, pp. 114-18.

¹⁰ Dawson, *op. cit.*, II, p. 109.

¹¹ It is noteworthy that while in the treaty of the Triple Alliance of 1882 provision is made against French expansion in Tripoli and Morocco, no reference is specially made to Tunis. In the renewals of 1891, 1902, and 1912, on the other hand, the countries named are Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Tunisia.

¹² II, pp. 238-49.

¹³ Cromer: *Modern Egypt*, I, p. 340.

truculent. In 1904 (as will shortly appear) she acquired a free hand in Morocco in exchange for concession of similar liberty in Egypt.

Tripoli. Between 1878 and 1909, Italy, for various considerations, obtained, as already noted,¹⁴ assurances from the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and France, of *désintéressement* in Tripoli. When ready, Italy, by successful war with helpless Turkey, took possession.

Morocco. Desiring to possess herself of Morocco, France, by agreement got rid of Italy and the United Kingdom, and made arrangements with Spain (as will be explained), but determined to ignore Germany.

GERMAN INTERESTS IN MOROCCO

Four days after the date of the Anglo-French treaty of 8 April 1904 (providing for British *désintéressement* in Morocco), the German Chancellor, von Bülow, said with reference to Morocco:

“We are interested in that country, as, moreover, in the rest of the Mediterranean, principally from the economic standpoint. Our interests therein are, before all, commercial interests; also we are specially interested that calm and order should prevail in Morocco, and we shall protect them. We have no reason to fear that they will be set aside or infringed by any Power.”¹⁵

Admission by M. Tardieu. While some English-speaking publicists have declared that Germany never had any special interests in Morocco, or any *status* there entitling her to consideration at the hands of exploiting France, M. André Tardieu (the principal apologist for France's actions in Morocco) has very frankly confessed contrary opinion. Writing in 1907, he said:

“It would be unjust to contest the increasing importance of the economic interests of Germany in Morocco.”

After a reference to Bismarckian colonial ideas, he continued:

“Since that declaration, already twenty-six years old, Germany has been born into world policy. And ‘seeking her future on the water,’ she has spread over Africa, as over Asia and America, an army of commercial travellers. In Morocco, indeed, she has obtained notable results. Above all, it is since 1890 that these results have become appreciable, following two events of different kinds. The first of these events was the founding by Dr. Jannasch, President of the *Central Verein für Handels geographic* and Director of the *Deutsche Exportbank*, of the direct line of navigation — *Atlas* — between Hamburg and Morocco. The second was the conclusion by the Count de Tattenbach of a treaty of commerce the most complete of all those signed by the Maghzen, which fixed at 10 p. 100 *ad valorem* the duties of importa-

¹⁴ Cap. VII, pp. 225-9, 236.

¹⁵ Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 84.

tion; established the duties of exportation; authorized the exportation of cereals; and became the basis of the general tariff of Morocco. Since then, Germany displaying in Morocco the qualities—extreme reduction of price, even at the expense of solidity; ingenious adaptation to local manners and preferences; activity of the commercial representatives—which have conquered for her so many markets, has obtained striking success. We have seen the position which has been occupied in the eight open ports by German commerce. This position, although more and more inferior to that which we hold there, cannot but be admitted to be considerable. From the point of view of general commerce and maritime tonnage, Germany in 1903, 1904, and 1905, reached the third rank. Five German companies, the *Oldenburg-Portugiesische Damchiffsrhederei*, the *Deutsche Ost-Afrika Linie*, the *Robert Sloman Junior Linie*, the *Norddeutscher-Lloyd*, and the *Hamburg Amerika Linie*, stopped regularly at Morocco. There exist in the Chérifien empire two score of German houses representing (outside of the navigation companies) a capital of about 10 millions of marks. The number of resident Germans is estimated at 150. The imperial military post is very well organized. Of the European doctors established in the Chérifien empire, the Germans are, with the French, the most highly reputed. There is there, then, a totality of interests falling far short assuredly of the value of ours, but eminently respectable, and of which the German government ought to safeguard, not only the present, but the future.”¹⁶

Germany's trade with Morocco expanded from 5,196,000 marks in 1901 to 15,404,000 in 1910.

“German merchants are to be met with in nearly every trade centre, such as Fez, Mogador, Marakesh, Agadir, Tangier, Larash, Casablanca, Saffi, etc. In 1907, the Germans held 40 per cent. of the trade of Casablanca, where there are a German bank and some fifty German residents. Three German steamship companies call at Moroccan ports, and in 1907 three hundred and twenty-four German vessels, with a combined tonnage of 350,777 tons, were registered as having entered or cleared at eight Moroccan ports.”¹⁷

¹⁶ *La Conférence d'Algéiras*, pp. 47-8. See also Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 20-1. On the eve of the assembling of the Conference of Algéiras, M. Rouvier, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said in the Chamber of Deputies (16 December 1905): “Each Power has rights in Morocco; they are not contested. Each Power benefits from all treaties; there is no question of injuriously affecting them. Each Power may, in short, in appropriate measure, assert its interests. These interests ought to be respected. But what we have the duty to show to the Conference is the special quality of our rights and the importance of our distinctive interests”: *Fr. Yell. Bk.*, Algéiras Conference, No. 1, p. 3. The statement was quoted with approval after the Conference by M. Bourgeois (Foreign Minister) in the Chamber of Deputies, 12 April 1906: *ibid.*, p. 289.

¹⁷ Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 23-4. Useful statistics upon the points above referred to may be seen in Tardieu: *La Conférence d'Algéiras*, pp. 499-504.

Other Considerations. Not only had Germany these substantial interests in Morocco, but, prior to the date of M. Tardieu's writing, she had become a party to the Madrid Convention of 1880 (shortly to be referred to), and to a commercial treaty between herself and Morocco of 1 June 1890, in which it was declared:

"that the subjects of the two parties will have the same rights and advantages as those which exist, or may come to exist, as regards subjects of the most favored nation."¹⁸

In 1892, Germany supported the British attempt, through Sir Charles Euan-Smith, to claim for all the Powers still wider commercial intercourse with Morocco.¹⁹

In 1911, M. Deschanel, President of the French Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs which recommended ratification of the agreement arrived at with Germany after the Agadir incident, said:

"Could we affect to ignore the efforts of Germany in Morocco for half a century, the travels of her explorers, the activity of her colonists, her agricultural and mineral enterprises, her steamship lines, her post-offices, and especially that movement of ideas which gravitated towards the Shereefian Empire, not in Pan-German circles and colonial committees alone, but in intellectual circles among the *élite* which, to the honor and power of that nation where all co-operate for the same ends, prepares the work of the diplomatists and soldiers."²⁰

Treaty of Madrid — 1880. That Morocco was among the countries predestined for foreign exploitation was made clearly apparent when twelve of the "higher" Powers²¹ met with the Sultan's representative in Madrid on the 15th May 1880, for the purpose (among other things) of determining the rights of foreigners in Morocco with reference to freedom from control by Moroccan authorities. On 3 July a convention was agreed to. Its seventeenth clause was as follows:

"The right of most-favored nation treatment is recognised by Morocco for all the Powers represented at the Conference of Madrid."²²

Of the twelve signatory Powers, five only — France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany — had substantial interests in Morocco. In order to establish a protectorate there, it was necessary that France should in some way secure the acquiescence of the other four Powers. She bought off three of them. Germany she attempted to disregard.

Of this Madrid treaty, von Bülow, the German Chancellor, said at the time of the Kaiser's visit to Tangier (31 March 1905):

¹⁸ May be seen in *ibid.*, p. 228.

¹⁹ See *Br. Blue Bk.*, Morocco, 1892; *The Times* (London), 19 July 1892; Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 5-7, 17.

²⁰ Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 20.

²¹ France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, United States of America, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Italy, Holland, Portugal, and Sweden and Norway. Russia was not represented.

²² May be seen in Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 221.

“This Convention is not to be construed as an accord between Morocco on the one part, and the rest of the signatory Powers on the other, but as an accord of all the signatory Powers, the ones with the others in such manner that each Power is placed under obligation to all the other Powers to consider the clauses of the contract as determining its conduct. France has then, to the extent that she wishes to acquire some special rights in contradiction with the clauses of the accord, to obtain not only the assent of Morocco, but also that of all the other signatory Powers. Particular rights sought by France would, without doubt, have, as result, an infraction of the Madrid Convention.”²³

The Chancellor dwelt especially upon clause 17 of the treaty (above quoted). M. André Tardieu has argued that that clause refers merely to the clause preceding, which limited the number of protected persons to twelve. But it is clear that, if that had been the intention, the provision of clause 17 would have appeared not separately, but as part of 16. The interpretation is, however, for present purposes, immaterial. All that need be said is that Germany was one of the parties to a treaty which made an inroad upon Moroccan independent sovereignty, and that she had the same *status* with regard to Morocco as had any other Power.

THE ANTI-FRENCH TREATIES

Morocco being an extremely valuable property, as yet unappropriated by the imperialistic Powers, but certain to fall to one or some of them, precautionary arrangements as against separate action were in order. From France the other great Powers anticipated a repetition in Tripoli and Morocco of her Tunis exploitation, and entered into safeguarding treaties.

Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. For mutual protection against France and Russia, the two Central Powers—Germany and Austria-Hungary—formed an alliance in 1879. In 1882, for protection against French designs in Africa, Italy joined Germany and Austria-Hungary, and received assurance that:

“In case Italy, without direct provocation on her part, should be attacked by France for any reason whatsoever, the two other Contracting Parties shall be bound to lend help and assistance with all their forces to the Party attacked.”²⁴

The year 1887 was in France one of political “crises, struggles, and dislocation of the public service,”²⁵ and, as between France and Germany, one of anxiety. It was the year of Boulanger, Schnaebele, and Deroulède. It was, moreover, the year of three treaties affecting North Africa. By one of these treaties (the renewal of the Triple Alliance,

²³ Tardieu: *La Conférence d'Algéras*, p. 38.

²⁴ Art. 2. Pribram: *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary*, I, p. 67.

²⁵ *Ann. Reg.*, 1887, p. [204.

20 February 1887), Italy received specific assurance of German protection against French encroachments upon Tripoli and Morocco:

Article III. "If it were to happen that France should make a move to extend her occupation, or even her protectorate or her sovereignty, under any form whatsoever, in the North African territories, whether of the Vilayet of Tripoli or of the Moroccan Empire, and that in consequence thereof Italy, in order to safeguard her position in the Mediterranean, should feel that she must herself undertake action in the said North African territories, or even to have recourse to extreme measures in French territory in Europe,"

Germany, with all her forces, would aid Italy. And not merely so, but:

Article IV. "If the fortunes of any war undertaken in common against France should lead Italy to seek for territorial guaranties with respect to France for the security of the frontiers of the Kingdom and of her maritime position, as well as with a view to the stability of peace, Germany will present no obstacle thereto; and, if need be, and in a measure compatible with circumstances, will apply herself to facilitating the means of attaining such a purpose."²⁶

United Kingdom, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. Another of the treaties of 1887 took the form of an exchange of letters (February-March) between the United Kingdom, Italy, and Austria-Hungary in which these Powers expressed:

"the desire that the shores of the Euxine, the Aegean, the Adriatic, and the northern coast of Africa shall remain in the same hands as now. If, owing to some calamitous event, it becomes impossible to maintain the absolute status quo, both Powers desire that there shall be no extension of the domination of any other Great Power over any portion of these coasts. It will be the earnest desire of H.M.'s Government to give their best coöperation, as hereinbefore expressed to the Government of Italy in maintaining these cardinal principles of policy." "Italy is entirely ready to support the work of Great Britain in Egypt."²⁷

The "other Great Power" was France, or Russia.

Italy and Spain. The third of the 1887 treaties — that between Italy and Spain (acceded to by Austria-Hungary) of 4 May — provided that:

"1. Spain will not lend herself, as regards France, in so far as the North African territories among others are concerned, to any treaty or political arrangement whatsoever which would be aimed directly or indirectly against Italy, Germany, and Austria, or against any one of these Powers."

"3. In view of the interests involved in the Mediterranean, and for

²⁶ Pribram, *op. cit.*, I, p. 113.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 94-103. A later treaty (December 1887) between the same Powers related, principally, to the Orient: *Ibid.*, pp. 124-33.

the principal purpose of maintaining there the present *status quo*, Spain and Italy will keep in communication with one another on this subject, by conveying to each other all information of a kind to enlighten each other concerning their respective dispositions, as well as those of other Powers.”²⁸

Effect of the Treaties. These treaties, it will be observed, were all aimed at France or Russia. Germany, Austria-Hungary, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy were all more or less pledged to uphold the *status quo* in Morocco, while some recognition was given to the claims of the United Kingdom in Egypt, and of Italy in Tripolitania and Morocco. Evidently what remained to be done before France could quietly possess herself of Morocco was that, in some way or other, (1) the effect of the Madrid Convention of 1880 should be obliterated, and (2) the claims of Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Germany should be extinguished. Austria-Hungary made no pretensions. In the course of the exchange of letters of February–March 1887 (above referred to), she had said that:

“the questions of the Mediterranean in general do not affect the interests of Austria-Hungary,”

and she acted upon that principle.

The United Kingdom and Germany. In connection with these anti-French treaties must be noted that, while France was aiming at engulfment of Morocco, the United Kingdom was seeking arrangements with Germany for joint exploitation of the same place. Baron Eckardstein of the German Embassy at London tells us that at a meeting at the Duke of Devonshire’s country-house in January 1901, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain (then Colonial Secretary), after intimating that the day of a policy of “splendid isolation” was for England a thing of the past, declared (as Eckardstein, who was present, reported) that:

“he was rather convinced that a combination with Germany and an association with the Triple Alliance was preferable. He himself would do everything to bring about a gradual advance in this direction. For the present he was in favor of arranging a secret agreement between Great Britain and Germany with reference to Morocco on the basis that had already been put forward. His advice was that the matter should be taken up as soon as Lord Salisbury left for the South, and that the details should be negotiated with Lord Lansdowne and himself.”²⁹

²⁸ Pribram, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 116–123. The treaty was prompted by Germany; *ibid.*, II, p. 83.

²⁹ *Ten Years at the Court of St. James*, p. 185. Mr. A. L. Kennedy (*Old Diplomacy and News*, pp. 116–7) relates that, in order to get relief from French pressure, the Sultan of Morocco, in the early summer of 1901, sent a special Ambassador to London with an offer of a virtual British protectorate in return for services in restoring order. Lord Lansdowne declined the offer.

Treating of the subject, Eckardstein in his book says:

"In my discussions as to the Moroccan question in 1889, with Chamberlain and Cecil Rhodes, as also in those of January 1901, with Chamberlain and the Duke of Devonshire at Chatsworth, we had laid down the broad outline of a solution. This was to the effect that Great Britain was to occupy Tangier and assume control of the whole Mediterranean coast of Morocco, with the exception of the Spanish possessions. Germany was to have coaling and trading stations on the Atlantic coast such as Casa Blanca, Mogador, and Rabat. A joint peaceable penetration of Morocco was then to be begun, and, if necessary, military operations to be undertaken. Eventually the country was to be finally partitioned between Great Britain and Germany. I understood from Chamberlain and the Duke that in 1899 Lord Salisbury was quite ready to agree to this solution of the Morocco question. It was only later that he began to consider Morocco as a suitable *quid pro quo* in a possible deal with France."³⁰

Eckardstein tells of a visit, at a later date, from Sir Arthur Nicolson, then the British representative at Tangier and afterwards Under-Secretary of State for War:

"He told me of the perpetual intrigues and encroachments of the French in Morocco with the object of bringing about a French protectorate over the whole country. On behalf of Lord Lansdowne, he then proposed to me an agreement between Great Britain and Germany for the maintenance of the *status quo*. He also suggested a joint Anglo-German peaceful penetration of Morocco. This plan was to be initiated by a commercial treaty between Great Britain and Germany. A convention was to be concluded between the two Governments, defining exactly the commercial concessions that Great Britain and Germany were respectively to receive. Among many other concessions to be assigned to Germany was the supply of all material for future railway construction, and of all electrical enterprises, including telegraphs and telephones. In general all necessary measures, whether political, commercial, or financial, were to be carried out in combination between Great Britain and Germany."³¹

After attempt at agreement of that sort, it ought to have been difficult for a British minister to assert that France, for the exploitation of Morocco, had a claim superior to that of Germany.

FRENCH ARRANGEMENTS WITH OTHER POWERS

France and Italy. Italy was the first Power that France got rid of. Had she (Italy) been strong enough in 1881, she would have endeavored to prevent France's seizure of Tunis. Strengthened by her incorpora-

³⁰ Eckardstein, *op. cit.*, p. 222. And see p. 126.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

tion in the Triple Alliance (1882), and by the treaties of 1887, she was able to arrange for a free hand in Tripoli in exchange for similar freedom to France in Morocco. The protocol of December 1900, amended by that of 1 November 1902, sealed the bargain. In making the arrangements, M. Delcassé, the powerful Foreign Minister of France, not only removed Italian opposition to French proceedings in Morocco, but materially loosened the attachment of Italy to the Central Powers.

France and the United Kingdom. In turning from Germany to France, Lord Lansdowne appears to have been actuated by: (1) recognition of the difficulty of making any agreement with Germany; (2) the necessity for keeping France inactive in the Russo-Japanese war;³² and (3) the French offer of withdrawal of opposition to British domination in Egypt. British progress toward engulfment of the land of the Pharaohs (commenced by military occupation in 1882) had been obstructed by the constantly repeated French demand for restoration of the *status quo ante*—the dual control. In 1904, the rivals agreed to reciprocal renunciation of their competing North African claims, as well as to the settlement of all outstanding differences in other parts of the world. The treaty (8 April 1904) took the form of a public Declaration and secret Articles. The more important clauses of the former were as follows: The British government declared that it had:

“no intention of altering the political status of Egypt,” and France agreed not “to obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation of Egypt.”

“*Article II.* The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco. His Britannic Majesty’s Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are coterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require. They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, by virtue of treaties, conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting trade between the ports of Morocco, enjoyed by British vessels since 1901.”

“*Article IV.* The two governments being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs, duties, or other taxes, or of railway transport charges.

³² Eckardstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 243, 250.

“The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa. An agreement between the two Governments shall settle the conditions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry.

“The mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced at least one year in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time.

“Nevertheless, the Government of the French Republic reserve to themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty’s Government reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over those great undertakings of public interest.”

“*Article VII.* In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla³³ and the heights which command the right bank of the river Sebou.³⁴

“This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.”

“*Article VIII.* The two Governments, inspired by their feeling of sincere friendship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which that country derives from her geographical position and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. In regard to those interests the French Government will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government.

“The agreement which may be come to on the subject between France and Spain shall be communicated to His Britannic Majesty’s Government.”

“*Article IX.* The two Governments agree to afford one another their diplomatic support in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.”³⁵

Not wishing to disclose the full extent of their bargain, the two Powers, by secret Articles attached to the public Declaration, made provision for much more extensive reciprocal freedom of action. The Articles were as follows:

“*Article I.* In the event of either Government finding themselves constrained by the force of circumstances, to modify the policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco, the engagements which they have undertaken towards each other by Articles IV, VI,³⁶ and VII of the Declaration of to-day’s date would remain intact.”

³³ On the Mediterranean coast toward the eastern limit of Morocco.

³⁴ On the Atlantic coast about 100 miles south from Tangier.

³⁵ Morel, *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 231-4.

³⁶ Relates to free passage of the Suez Canal.

“*Article II.* His Britannic Majesty’s Government has no present intention of proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the capitulations, or in the judicial organisation of Egypt.

“In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce in Egypt reforms tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in force in other civilised countries, the Government of the French Republic will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the understanding that His Britannic Majesty’s Government will agree to entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic may have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms in Morocco.”

“*Article III.* The two Governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other *présides* should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including the heights on the right bank of the Sebou shall be entrusted to Spain.

“Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent to the provisions of Articles IV and VII of the Declaration of to-day’s date, and undertake to carry them out.

“She would also have to undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under her authority, or in her sphere of influence.”

“*Article IV.* If Spain, when invited to assent to the provisions of the preceding article, should think proper to decline, the arrangement between France and Great Britain, as embodied in the Declaration of to-day’s date, would be none the less at once applicable.”³⁷

Comment upon the Documents. These documents present a fair example of the devious methods of modern diplomacy:

1. The United Kingdom, notwithstanding all her protestations, intends to engulf Egypt, and France entertains the same purpose with reference to Morocco, with the exception of the portion which she is willing to throw to Spain.

2. Having for many years thwarted each other, they at last agree to frank disclosure—to each other—of their respective purposes; to reciprocal withdrawal of opposition to each other; and to respective abandonment of two little nationalities to the mercy of their imperializing invaders.

3. But considerations of national reputation and freedom from international objection make necessary the concealment of the full extent of their projects.

4. They publish to the world a Declaration in which, quite contrary to the truth, they declare that they have “no intention of altering the political status” of the two victim nations.

³⁷ Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 234-5.

5. And by contemporary secret Articles, they assign to each other perfect freedom to modify their policy and, specifically:

“to introduce . . . reforms tending to assimilate the . . . legislative system” of the victim nations “to that in force in other civilized countries,”

—introduction that could be accomplished only by military force.³⁸

France and Spain. Contemporaneously with his negotiations for the elimination of Italian opposition to French operations in Morocco, and contemporaneously with the countervailing Anglo-German negotiations for the exclusion of France, Delcassé endeavored to make arrangements with Spain, and with such success that, prior to the fall of the Sagasta ministry (3 December 1902), the terms of the treaty had been put in writing. It provided for the division of Morocco into French and Spanish “spheres of influence,” and assigned to Spain north Morocco, including Fez and Taza, and the Mediterranean coast.³⁹ Señor Silvela, the new Prime Minister in Spain, for some reason thought that the United Kingdom ought to be made aware of what was being done. Endeavoring to dissuade him, Delcassé offered to sustain Spain against any British objection by the “diplomatic support” of France. But Silvela was afraid; revealed the project; and, by doing so, ended it⁴⁰ — to his subsequent sorrow.

Although compassed by difficulties, Delcassé was not to be baffled. Turning to the United Kingdom he found that its government was quite willing to magnify the concession which it was prepared to make to France in Morocco by reducing the extent of the share offered by France to Spain. Thereupon, the two dominating Powers agreed that the Spanish allotment should be reduced to a somewhat narrow strip of coast territory; and that the United Kingdom would “afford” France “diplomatic support” in her endeavor to come to an understanding upon that basis with the Spanish government.⁴¹ Spain protested,⁴² but the weak must give way. On 3 October 1904, she agreed to the arrangement provided for her by the stronger Powers. Two documents — a public

³⁸ When France and Germany came to grips in 1911, France sought (20 July) British support upon the ground that the effect of the Declaration and Articles was a denial on the part of the United Kingdom of the right of Germany to establish herself in Morocco. On that date, the following note was handed by France to the United Kingdom: “The English Government by the Accord of 1904 recognized that France and Spain alone had spheres of political influence in Morocco, and, in consequence, denied to other Powers all political pretension with regard to the country” (Fr. Yell. Bk.: Morocco, 1910-12, No. 462). The note is more fully quoted on a subsequent page.

³⁹ The document may be seen in *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, VIII, p. 869.

⁴⁰ See M. Rouard de Card: *La Question marocaine et la Négociation franco-espagnole de 1902*; *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, VIII, pp. 867-73; Morel, *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 57-60; Farrer, *England under Edward VII*, p. 121.

⁴¹ *Ante*, p. 763.

⁴² Cf. Tardieu: *La France et les Alliances*, p. 116.

Declaration and a secret Convention—contained her agreement with France. One was a simple enough and quite innocuous document of a single paragraph, by which (1) Spain:

“adhered to the Anglo-French Declaration of the 8th April 1904, respecting Morocco and Egypt,”

and (2) the two governments hypocritically declared that they:

“remain firmly attached to the integrity of the Moorish Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan.”⁴³

The secret Convention was an elaboration, in sixteen articles, of arrangements for the partition of Moroccan territory into “spheres of influence”; for exercise of sovereign powers there; for joint exploitation, etc. The more important provisions were as follows:

1. To Spain were allotted two spheres of influence: one—the coast strip on the north,

“which falls to Spain by virtue of her possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean” (*Art. II*);

the second—a delimited territory in the south, with which we are, at present, not concerned (*Art. IV*).

2. Within the coast territory, Spain was to have “the same right of action” as was conceded to France by the Franco-British public Declaration, namely, the right (*Art. II*)

“to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.”

But, in view of “present difficulties,” Spain was to refrain, for a period not exceeding fifteen years, from exercising that right—it meanwhile being left in the hands of France.

“*Article II.* France, on her part, being desirous that the rights and interests reserved to Spain by the present convention shall always be respected, will, during the same period, inform the Government of the King previously of the advice she may tender to the Sultan of Morocco so far as the Spanish sphere of influence is concerned.”

After the period of fifteen years, and during the *status quo* of the Moroccan government, the right was to be exercised by France “in agreement with the Spanish Government.”

“*Article III.* In case the continuance of the political status of Morocco and of the Shereefian Government should become impossible, or if, owing to the weakness of that Government and to its continued inability to uphold law and order, or to any other cause the existence of which is acknowledged by both parties, the *status quo* can no longer be maintained, Spain may freely exercise her right of action in the territory defined in the preceding article, which henceforward constitutes her sphere of influence.”

⁴³ May be seen *ibid.*, pp. 117-8; Morel, *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 236.

3. Provision was made for monopolization by the two countries of certain economic advantages in Morocco:

“*Article X.* So long as the present political status lasts, schemes for public works, railways, roads, and canals running from some point in Morocco into the territory defined in Article II., or *vice versa*, shall be executed by such companies as may be formed by Frenchmen and Spaniards.

“In the same way, Frenchmen and Spaniards in Morocco shall be free jointly to form companies for the purpose of working mines, quarries, and economic undertakings in general.”⁴⁴

The Secret Convention was communicated in confidence to the British Foreign Office,⁴⁵ and that office promised that “the confidential character of the ‘Convention’ . . . will be duly respected.”⁴⁶

Comment upon the Documents. These documents present a further example of modern diplomatic methods:

1. The public Declaration gave the world to understand, quite contrary to the fact, that Spain had simply agreed to the Anglo-French public Declaration, which provided that Morocco was to remain intact and without alteration of her political status.

2. The real arrangement was that Morocco was to be divided into “spheres of influence.”

3. But in order that that might not for the present be revealed, France, for a prescribed period was to exercise “the right” over the whole territory.

4. From the date of the agreement, certain public works: “shall be executed by such companies as may be formed by Frenchmen and Spaniards.”

Publication of the Secret Documents. Both the Anglo-French secret Articles and the Franco-Spanish secret Convention remained unpublished until, having been discovered by the Parisian newspapers *Le Matin* and *Le Temps*, they were disclosed to the world in November 1911. But, although unpublished, and uncommunicated to the Powers (with the exception of the United Kingdom), the existence of the Convention was announced, at the time of its signature, in a Reuter despatch as follows:

“Every detail of the negotiations has been made known to the British Government, and the terms of the new treaty are regarded with satisfaction by the Governments of London, Paris, and Madrid. The treaty contains a number of secret clauses which will not be made public.”⁴⁷

⁴⁴ May be seen in Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 236-242.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

⁴⁷ Quoted, *ibid.*, p. 98.

COMMENCEMENT OF FRENCH OPERATIONS

Germany having in 1890 effected (as we have seen) a commercial treaty with the Sultan, the United Kingdom endeavored (1892) to secure for all the Powers still wider commercial arrangements. France, exercising influence at Fez, successfully thwarted the attempt.

"What it really means," said *The Times*, "is that, even for a great common gain to Europe, France will not permit Great Britain to obtain influence at Fez, lest, perchance, at some future time the claims of the mistress of Algeria to succeed to the Sultan's dominions should find themselves barred."⁴⁸

In 1900, France took possession of the Tuat, Igli, and Figuig oases,⁴⁹ deciding in her own favor the dispute as to whether they formed parts of Algeria or of Morocco. During the next year, she complained of frontier aggressions by the Moors; and a French subject having been opportunely murdered, an agreement with the Sultan was signed (1901) based upon:

"respect for the integrity of the Shereefian Empire on the one hand, and, on the other, an improvement in the situation affecting the close neighborhood (*de voisinage immédiat*) which exists between them by all the special arrangements which the said neighborhood necessitates."⁵⁰

On 20 April 1902, a further agreement with reference to frontier conduct was signed, by which the Moorish government agreed to:

"consolidate its authority by every possible means throughout its territory from the mouth of the Kiss to Figuig";⁵¹

and the French government undertook to render assistance in the work.

That was all prior to the Anglo-French treaty of 8 April 1904. After elimination of the United Kingdom, and a short delay which was very displeasing to M. Tardieu,⁵² Delcassé proceeded, as Tardieu expressed it, "to the realization of the principles posited the 8 April." On the following 11th January, the French Minister at Tangier, M. Saint-René-Taillandier, was ordered to Fez, the Moroccan capital, "where he was to submit to the Sultan our programme of reforms."⁵³ These "reforms," principally of a financial and military character—with France acting as general adviser, instructor, and regulator—were quite unacceptable to the Sultan. The French Minister argued and urged from the 15th February to the end of March, going so far (as alleged) as to assert that he was acting as mandatory of Europe.⁵⁴ But

⁴⁸ 19 July 1892. And see Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 5-9.

⁴⁹ *Ency. Brit.*, tit. *Morocco*.

⁵⁰ Quoted by Morel, *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 12-13.

⁵¹ Quoted, *ibid.*, p. 52.

⁵² *La Conférence Algéciras*, p. 3.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 6

⁵⁴ Delcassé denied the truth of the allegation (Tardieu: *La Conférence d'Al-*

the Sultan declined to put his neck into the noose, and, his former British friend having withdrawn support, he turned to Germany, and was advised that the proposed reforms ought to be submitted to "the signatory Powers of the treaty of Madrid."

Among the other proceedings of M. Delcassé in the way of "reforms," Tardieu notes the following:

"The 27 May 1905, the French captain Fournier was charged by the Sultan with the organization of the Tangier police. The 12 June, a group of French banks made a loan to the Sultan of 62½ millions, guaranteed by the receipts from the customs, with option for the lenders to exercise over these receipts in the eight ports open to commerce, a control and a priority and right of preference for later loans. The creation by us of a state bank was equally kept in view. In May 1904, we lent to the Makhzen, at its request, our diplomatic assistance in order to release from the hands of the brigand Raisouli an American, M. Perdicaris, and an Englishman, M. Varley, who had been imprisoned by him. In spite of the reservations which Ben-Sliman had formulated in connection with the Franco-English accord to its 'difficult points,' to those of its terms which 'might present something ambiguous and contrary to its object,' we were then justified in thinking that the programme of reforms elaborated — too slowly — by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Tangier legation, would be considered at Fez as a logical development of the political friendship which Ben-Sliman himself, Minister of the Sultan, had defined in saying (July 1904): 'His Majesty knows that the strongest reason for your insistence is the community of interests which the governments of the two neighboring countries possess, and also the evils which they may encounter in common.'"⁵⁵ "In July (1904), M. Regnault, Consul General, Chargé of the Mission, and delegate of the subscribers of the loan, organized in the ports the levying of the customs receipts provided for by the contract, and did not meet with any difficulty."⁵⁶

DELCASSÉ AND GERMANY

Although, as a party to the treaty of Madrid and having interests in Morocco, Germany, according to diplomatic usage, was entitled to receive from France special notification of the Franco-British Declaration of 8 April 1904 (above referred to), Delcassé discourteously refrained from following established custom. After the Kaiser's landing at

géciras, pp. 6, 43), but the disclaimer "seemed to conflict with Taillandier's own pronouncement; and this pronouncement had been confirmed from many other sources and from the Moroccan Sultan himself 'with great decisiveness'": Farrer, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

⁵⁵ *La France et les Alliances*, pp. 137-8. Cf. *La Conférence d'Algéciras*, p. 5.

⁵⁶ *La Conférence d'Algéciras*, p. 5.

Tangier 31 March 1905), the German Chancellor, in a despatch to the German Ambassador at Paris (1 May), said:

"It was conformable to international usage that France, after the conclusion of the Anglo-French Accord concerning Morocco, should communicate this Accord in the customary form to all the interested Powers. M. Delcassé has declared, it is true, that this communication had become superfluous by the fact of the publication of the convention in the French *Journal officiel*. The Minister will not omit to notice, however, that these two methods of notification possess a character essentially different. The direct communication is not a simple act of courtesy. The French Government, in deciding to make it, would have declared itself ready to enter into discussion with the persons to whom it is delivered with reference to their interests, in case they estimated themselves to be affected. Publication in a French official paper, on the contrary, places the other persons interested who have not been interrogated in presence simply of an accomplished fact."⁵⁷

The reply of M. André Tardieu, France's chief apologist, is that:

"even admitting that M. Delcassé had deserved it" (the reproach of Germany), "his dismissal" from the French Cabinet "ought to have been for Germany a sufficient satisfaction."⁵⁸

The dismissal was not because of the incivility. It did not occur until June of the next year. And M. Tardieu fails to observe the difference between a simple discourtesy and an act which, by its discourteousness, announces intention to disregard asserted interests. Professor Gilbert Murray, in dealing with the Franco-British treaty, said:

"Next there is the criticism that a treaty of this kind could not properly or safely be made without consultation with Germany. This was pointed out by Lord Rosebery, I believe, at the time, and seems to me a just criticism. . . . It was for France to communicate the Morocco Treaty, since she was the interested Power."⁵⁹

And, after referring to one of the possible excuses for Delcassé's omission, Professor Murray added:

"But in the case of Morocco, Germany had some solid interests involved."⁶⁰

It will be well at this stage to know a little more of M. Delcassé, for to him, as French Foreign Minister in five successive governments between 1898 and 1905, must be assigned a not unimportant share of the responsibility, or credit, for the hardening of the antagonisms among the Powers as the war of 1914-18 approached. He foresaw war, and well prepared for it. To him, more than to any other Frenchman, must

⁵⁷ Tardieu: *La Conférence d'Algéiras*, pp. 37-8. Another part of the despatch is quoted in Morel, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

⁵⁸ *La Conférence d'Algéiras*, p. 38. As to the dismissal, see *post*, 781-2.

⁵⁹ *The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, 1906-1915*, p. 57.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

be attributed the accommodation with Italy; the formation of the *entente* with the United Kingdom; and the exacerbation of hostile feeling between France and Germany both in 1905 and 1911. Whether he did well or ill, is not here discussed. It is the effect of his policy with which we are at present concerned.

The Fashoda incident of 1898 might well have produced war between France and the United Kingdom. Delcassé, realizing that such a war would add enormously to German predominance, submitted to British demands. France acknowledged that the whole of the Nile valley lay within the British sphere of influence; and the United Kingdom made acknowledgment with reference to France's interests in the hinterland of Tripoli.

It was Delcassé who, by his "mysterious visit" to St. Petersburg in August 1899, took, in the opinion of Sir Thomas Barclay: "the first official step towards the Anglo-French *entente* which was ultimately to follow as soon as public opinion was ripe for diplomatic action."⁶¹

It was Delcassé who, by terminating Italy's resentment over the French seizure of Tunis in 1881 (by exchanging Tripoli for Morocco), removed the principal reason for her adhesion to the Triple Alliance. Italy's neutrality in case of war between France and Germany thus made probable, was formally agreed to⁶² in the treaty of 1 November 1902.

It was Delcassé who arranged with Lord Lansdowne all outstanding differences between France and the United Kingdom, and who introduced the *Entente Cordiale* with the comprehensive treaty of 8 April 1904.

It was Delcassé who, assured (as we shall see) of British support, determined to ignore German interests in Morocco, and resigned from the French cabinet (June 1905) rather than forego a quarrel with Germany.⁶³

It was Delcassé who was Minister of Marine and a very influential

⁶¹ *Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences*, 1876-1906, p. 171, and see pp. 165, 166, 169, 171. A despatch from Nekludoff, State Councillor at the Russian Embassy in Paris of 14 Dec. 1910, contained the following: "Our first failures in the war [with Japan] theatre, by alarming and surprising in the extreme French public opinion, had, as repercussion in the exterior policy of France, the decisive triumph of the plans which MM. Loubet and Delcassé had for a long time cherished with reference to a *rapprochement* of France and Great Britain and to the desire to draw Russia herself into this new entente": *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 14. See also pp. 29, 30, 41.

⁶² The obligation was not to exist if the war was the result of direct provocation by France.

⁶³ Delcassé and Hanotaux in 1894 "sat side by side for the first time in office and worked together in the promotion of that fateful African policy which since 1893 has played such a conspicuous part in the affairs of France": Barclay, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

personage, in 1911, when France precipitated the second of the Morocco incidents by sending troops to Fez.⁶⁴

It was of Delcassé that the London *Times* said (4 October 1915) that:

"his appointment in February 1913 to be French Ambassador to the Russian court was greeted with gnashing teeth in German and Austrian official circles. In Petrograd, M. Delcassé succeeded in linking the interests of Russia even more closely than before to those of France, and in helping to promote the intimacy of Anglo-Russian relations."

Shortly after the outbreak of the 1914-18 war, Delcassé was again at the Foreign Office (27 August);⁶⁵ and in the negotiations which brought Italy into participation on the side of the Entente Powers, he took an important and, possibly, indispensable part.

Delcassé was one of the three outstanding French chauvinists of the years under consideration. M. Millerand and M. Poincaré may be regarded as the other two.⁶⁶ The death of Delcassé furnished occasion for a review of his political activities by Mr. G. P. Gooch. His last two sentences are noteworthy:

"Morocco poisoned the life of Europe for seven years, and in 1911 France yielded, at the threat of war, the compensations to her formidable neighbor which she had neglected to offer in 1904. Had Delcassé treated Berlin as he treated London, Rome and Madrid, the subsequent history of Europe might have been less tragically interesting."⁶⁷

The comment upon the crises of 1905-6 and 1911 of *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* is as follows:

"The root of the trouble lay in the fact that M. Delcassé had not purchased Germany's assent in advance. . . . 'With incredible blindness,' wrote M. René Millet, 'the Government took precautions with everybody except the only one of its neighbors whom it had serious cause to fear.'⁶⁸ M. Delcassé, echoed M. Hanotaux, offered Germany a pretext for conflict, and chose the moment when Russia was locked in deadly conflict in the Far East."⁶⁹ In England, Mr. Gibson Bowles

⁶⁴ Delcassé's accession to office evoked (as Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, reported, 2 March 1911) "strong approbation in England, and an unconcealed discontent in Germany" (*Un Lièvre Noir*, I, p. 43). He at once declared to Isvolsky that "his entry in the ministry is a guarantee of the special care which would be bestowed upon the military power of France." He promised "redoubled activity" in that regard (*ibid.*, p. 45. Cf. p. 14).

⁶⁵ *Ann. Reg.*, 1914, p. [289]. Delcassé resigned from the ministry on 13 October 1915, because of some difference of opinion with reference to the Salonica expedition (*Ann. Reg.*, 1915, p. [201]).

⁶⁶ During the Balkan war of 1912, Isvolsky's view was that, in case of crisis, Russia would have to do "with the three strong personalities who are at the head of the cabinet — Poincaré, Millerand, and Delcassé" (*Un Lièvre Noir*, I, p. 364).

⁶⁷ *Contemporary Rev.*, April 1923, p. 457.

⁶⁸ *Notre Politique Extérieure*, p. 224.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, Introduction.

had foretold that Germany would send in her bill. It is regrettable that the British cabinet did not perceive — or at any rate did not help France to perceive — the wisdom of securing German consent by a *solatium*. Through the Secret Treaties of 1904 reserved no share for Great Britain in the contingent partition of Morocco, and though it has been argued that it was reasonable for the contracting parties to make alternative arrangements in the event of Morocco collapsing from internal weakness, our share in a transaction which suggested double dealing involves the British Government in partial responsibility for the crises of 1905 and 1911.”⁷⁰

THE KAISER AT TANGIER

As protest against Delcassé's proceedings, the Kaiser landed (31 March 1905) at Tangier on the Morocco coast, and, in conversation with the representatives of the Sultan, said in substance:

“The object of my visit to Tangier is to make known that I am determined to do all that is in my power to safeguard efficaciously the interests of Germany in Morocco. I look upon the Sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign, and it is with him that I desire to come to an understanding as to the best means to bring that result about. As for the reforms which the Sultan intends to introduce into his country, I consider that he should proceed with much precaution, and should take into account the religious feelings of his subjects, so that at no moment shall public order be troubled as a consequence of these reforms.”⁷¹

At the date of this visit, the Kaiser knew that a secret Convention between France and Spain with reference to Morocco existed. He knew⁷² that the United Kingdom had been kept informed of the negotiations which led to it. He knew that Germany had been treated as though negligible by Delcassé — by omission to notify the existence of the treaty with the United Kingdom. It is probable that he knew the contents of the secret Articles of the Franco-British treaty, and of the secret Franco-Spanish Convention.⁷³ In any case, he knew that they related to Morocco. He knew that they contained arrangements with reference to the relative rights of France and Spain in Morocco. He knew that these arrangements had purposely been concealed from him. He could have had no doubt that they were such as Germany, an interested Power, could not approve. And he was aware that a series of “reforms” had been provided for the Sultan's acceptance — reforms which were plainly incompatible with the maintenance of independent sovereignty.

These things having happened without his concurrence, he replied in

⁷⁰ III, p. 340.

⁷¹ Quoted by Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 84-5.

⁷² By the Reuter despatch: *ante*, p. 767.

⁷³ *Camb. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, III, p. 340.

the same way, rather than by asking for information which the other Powers were treating as private. He met the situation created by Delcassé by saying publicly (1) that the reforms which were being pressed on the Sultan by Delcassé should be undertaken "with much precaution"; (2) that he regarded the Sultan "as an absolutely independent sovereign"; (3) that Germany's interests in Morocco would be safeguarded; and (4) that, with that view, an understanding was desired, not with France but with the Sultan. The Kaiser's visit was followed by the despatch to Fez of Baron von Tattenbach (arrived 12 May) as representative of Germany.⁷⁴

British and French Resentment. In almost perfect ignorance of the facts by which the action of the Kaiser could properly be judged, the British and French press burst into vehement denunciations of him. He was seeking quarrel with France. He was endeavoring to destroy the *entente*. He was attempting to establish Germany on the south shore of the Mediterranean, and thus endanger British communications with the East. Only at much later date (1923) would it have been proper for a man who had been First Lord of the British Admiralty (Mr. Winston S. Churchill) to say:

"Early in 1905 a French mission arrived in Fez. Their language and actions seemed to show an intention of treating Morocco as a French Protectorate, thereby ignoring the international obligations of the Treaty of Madrid."

"France was quite unprepared for war; the army was in a bad state; Russia was incapacitated; moreover, France had not a good case."⁷⁵

Germany Suggests a Conference. Almost immediately after the landing of the Kaiser at Tangier, the German Chancellor, von Bülow, by a circular despatch to the Powers (12 April) made explanation and proposed reference of the matter to an international conference. He said:

"The German Government took no action [*i.e.* upon the publication of the Anglo-French public Declaration of April 8, 1904], seeing that the Anglo-French arrangement postulates the *status quo*, and that, consequently, we thought ourselves entitled to suppose that the Powers interested in the Morocco Convention [*i.e.* the Madrid Convention] would be consulted by France in case France had in view in Morocco innovations tending to circumscribe the rights and liberties of the other signatory Powers of the Convention, in their extent or their duration. We perceived, however, that this opinion was erroneous, and that the time had come to think of the protection of German interests, when the Morocco Government inquired if it were true that the Minister of France at Fez was, as he professed, the mandatory of the European Powers,⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 102.

⁷⁵ *The World Crisis*, I, pp. 25-6.

⁷⁶ That is in January-March 1905, when Delcassé presented his programme of reforms to the Sultan: *Ante*, p. 768-9.

and it became known that different features of the French alleged programme of reforms were in contradiction with the maintenance of the *status quo*. . . . Seeing that we must now reckon with the possibility of a French Protectorate over Morocco, that is to say with the complete expulsion of non-French economic enterprises, such as has taken place in Tunis, the interests of foreigners are threatened in their totality and a Conference would be more than ever advisable. That is an issue which should not infringe the legitimate sensibilities of any one, seeing that it only means recourse to an expedient already often employed.”⁷⁷

Morocco asks for a Conference. Acting upon the advice of von Tattenbach (German Envoy), who had reached Fez on 12 May, and adopting the proposal of von Bülow’s circular,⁷⁸ the Moorish Government made final reply to Delcassé (27 May 1905) as follows (*Italics now added*):

“The Moorish Government has already communicated to your Excellency⁷⁹ that the population of Morocco made it a condition of the acceptance of military reforms that the Powers who were signatories of the Madrid Convention should share in the negotiations regarding these reforms. We have submitted to His Shereefian Majesty the reply which the French Government vouchsafed, and from our answer your Government should have perceived that we did not desire, as they pretended to be the case, to bring about any alteration in the relations which result from the fact that France and Morocco are neighbors, when we suggested that a third Power should act as mediator in carrying out the reforms. We have submitted to His Shereefian Majesty your Excellency’s demands that the Maghzen⁸⁰ should reconsider their position, which, you said, was dictated by want of confidence in the French Government.

“After mature consideration, his Shereefian Majesty has directed me to reply to you that he has never forgotten that Algeria is a neighboring country, and that he, like his ancestors, has always desired to have friendly relations with the French Government, to have confidence in them, and to give every consideration to their rights as the neighbors of Morocco. But when the negotiations carried on with your Excellency were submitted to the assembly of Moorish notables, they most decisively declared that *they would allow no reform, either civil or military, to be carried out by any one foreign Power, if such reforms had not been previously discussed by an international conference at Tangier,*⁸¹ at which the Powers who were signatories of the Madrid Convention should be

⁷⁷ Quoted by Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 103-4.

⁷⁸ The German press warmly supported the proposal: Tardieu: *La Conférence d’Algéciras*, p. 9.

⁷⁹ The French representative at Fez.

⁸⁰ The Moorish Government.

⁸¹ Tangier was suggested as the place at which the Conference should take place, and Germany supported that view. France opposed. It was ultimately held at Algéciras in Spain.

represented; and that it should be the duty of this conference to discuss how these reforms should be introduced, and that a unanimous decision should be come to on the question; and also that the Powers should agree that regulations regarding the introduction of reforms should be rigorously kept to; and, in order to avoid further difficulties, that these regulations should not ever be transgressed.

“His Shereefian Majesty is unable to act against the will of the people, especially regarding questions of such vital importance in which the people of Morocco certainly have a right to be heard. It has often been made clear that Foreign Powers desire to see reforms introduced into Morocco with which treaty rights are so closely connected. The decision of the notables can in no way alter the friendly relations existing between the two countries, and, therefore, the Shereefian representative at Tangier has received orders *to invite through their representatives at Tangier the Powers who were signatories of the Madrid Convention to summon a conference to discuss with the Moorish Government the reforms which His Shereefian Majesty desires to see introduced into Morocco.*”⁸²

On the same day, the indicated invitation was sent to the Powers who had signed the Convention of Madrid.

German Support. On 5 June the German Chancellor issued another circular despatch⁸³ to the Powers, advocating acceptance of the Morocco proposal, in which, as a ground for objection to French action, he said:

“In this way France might, as in Tunis, take into her own hands all the administrative apparatus of the country and all the administrative decisions of the Moroccan government, thus putting Morocco under her political and economic domination.”⁸⁴

British and French Attitude. Suggestion of a conference met with contemptuous rejection by both the British and the French press. *The Times* correspondent in Paris telegraphed between 7 April and 5 June as follows:

⁸² Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 244-5.

⁸³ Referred to by Tardieu: *La Conférence d'Algéciras*, p. 10.

⁸⁴ Tardieu: *La Conférence d'Algéciras*, p. 42. See also, p. 215. At a later date (- Dec. 1905), in a speech in the Reichstag, the Chancellor said: “The French Minister Saint-René-Taillandier was sent to Fez to submit to the Moroccan government some propositions, the acceptance of which would have put Morocco in a situation analogous to that of Tunis. . . . The sovereignty of Morocco, guaranteed by international treaties, would have been placed in debate” (*ibid.*). Combating this interpretation of Taillandier's instructions, Tardieu declared (*ibid.*) that the French object “was to reinforce the sovereignty of the Sultan,” and not to affect it prejudicially. But true characterization of the object intended can be safely founded only upon the nature of the claim made; and it is difficult to believe that French interposition in the government of Morocco, and the consequent diminution of the Sultan's authority, was really a method by which that sovereignty might have been reinforced.

“There is no Moroccan question. It was finally settled by the Anglo-French *entente*.”

“The idea of a Conference can never have been seriously entertained even in Berlin. If Germany wants to court another failure, she has only to propose, or get it proposed by the Sultan of Morocco.”

“Germany is evidently retiring as gracefully as she can . . . and as to M. Delcassé’s position, it has certainly not been weakened.”

“The international Conference which it is suggested should be proposed by the Sultan of Morocco, and which Count von Tattenbach says will be supported by Germany, will probably never take place. . . . Its object could only be to revise or stultify the agreement recently concluded by France, and to give Germany a voice in matters with which she has nothing to do.”

“Consequently it may be announced with confidence that the Moroccan proposal for a European Conference will be entertained by only one of the Great Powers—namely, Germany. On all sides it is recognized that Germany must have foreseen that an invitation coming from Morocco would meet with no response, and this confirms the general opinion as to Germany’s whole Moroccan policy being a mere blind for something else.”⁸⁵

The Belgian Ambassador at Berlin, Baron Greindl, afterwards, in a despatch of 23 September 1905, referred to the:

“astounding efforts made by the British Press to prevent a peaceful settlement of the Morocco affair”; and argued therefrom that British public opinion: “is prepared to welcome any combination hostile to Germany.”⁸⁶

The Baron was right, as we shall see.

Supported in this way, and urged on by the Delcassé group, M. Rouvier, the President of the French Council, at first argued strongly against the utility of a conference. He declared that it would be a “complication rather than a solution” and that (as summarized by M. Tardieu) if negotiators:

“went to it without previously coming to an agreement, it would be hurtful; but if they went after an agreement, it would be useless.”⁸⁷

Germany persisted;⁸⁸ Delcassé remained immovable; the United Kingdom, in pursuance of her promise to afford France diplomatic support,⁸⁹ met the Sultan’s proposal with distinct although tentative refusal,⁹⁰ leaving final decision to the French government, and instituted “conversations” between the British and French, and between the British and Bel-

⁸⁵ Quoted by Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 89. See also, *The Times* of 6 April and 16 June.

⁸⁶ Morel: *Truth and the War*, p. 87.

⁸⁷ *La France et les Alliances*, p. 215.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ante*, p. 763.

⁹⁰ *Ann. Reg.*, 1905, p. [173. See also p. [165.

gian military Staffs by way of preparation for war with Germany.⁹¹ Fortunately, Rouvier, much less truculent than Delcassé, relented. Shrinking from the prospect of war because of refusal to agree to an international conference, and yielding to the representations of the President of the United States, Mr. Roosevelt, he entered into negotiations with Germany with a view to agreement upon a basis for reference.

Delcassé's Justification. As part of his justification for withstanding Germany, Delcassé gave an interview to *Le Gaulois* (12 July 1905) in which he said:

"Of what importance would the young navy of Germany be in the event of war in which England, I tell you, would assuredly be with us against Germany? What would become of Germany's ports, of her trade, of her mercantile marine? They would be annihilated. That is what would be the significance of the visit of the British squadron to Brest, while the return visit of the French squadron to Portsmouth will complete the demonstration. The *entente* between the two countries and the coalition of their navies, constitute such a formidable machine of naval war that neither Germany, nor any other Power, would dare to face such an overwhelming force at sea."⁹²

According to a well-known publicist, M. Stéphane Lausanne, Delcassé declared that the United Kingdom had offered:

"if a rupture occurred between France and Germany, to mobilize her fleet, seize the Kiel Canal, and land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein."⁹³

Making no allusion whatever to Delcassé's interview in *Le Gaulois*, Mr. Asquith has declared, with reference to the Lausanne statement:

"that no such offer was ever made by the British Foreign Office, or by, or on behalf of the British Government."⁹⁴

It is highly probable that the intended attitude of the British government was not communicated in the form of an offer; but that Delcassé had some assurance of British support is now indisputable.⁹⁵ Observe the following: Colonel Repington, in his book *The First World War*, relates that on 29 December 1905, Major (afterwards General) Hugué, French Military Attaché in London:

"told me that his Embassy people were worried because Sir Edward Grey, who had just taken over the Foreign Office, had not renewed the assurances given by Lord Lansdowne."⁹⁶

⁹¹ *Ante*, cap. V, pp. 115-6, 163-4, 170.

⁹² Quoted by Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 107.

⁹³ As summarized *ibid.*, p. 108.

⁹⁴ *The Genesis of the War*, cap. XI. If an offer was made, it was by Lord Lansdowne prior to Mr. Asquith's accession to office.

⁹⁵ Since the above was written, Mr. Winston Churchill has said that Great Britain "in no way encouraged France to refuse the conference" (*The World Crisis*, I, p. 27). He was not a member of the British Government at the time.

⁹⁶ P. 2.

Colonel Repington further says that on 30 December Admiral Fisher: "told me that he had seen on paper Lord Lansdowne's assurances to M. Cambon, and that they were quite distinct in their tenor. He had shown them to Sir Edward Grey, and declared that they were part of the engagements taken over from the last Government, and would hold good until denounced."⁹⁷

Two days afterwards, Sir Edward Grey wrote a letter to Colonel Repington in which was the following:

"I am interested to hear of your conversation with the French Military Attaché. I can only say that I have not receded from anything which Lord Lansdowne said to the French, and have no hesitation in affirming it."⁹⁸

Colonel Repington's testimony is supported by that of M. Poincaré (now Prime Minister), who relates that:

"In the month of April, 1905, Lord Lansdowne had seemed disposed to make a further step forward, and had proposed to M. Paul Cambon a general formula for an *entente*; a formula, however, that was even a little more vague than that by which the Franco-Russian Alliance had been precluded in 1891."⁹⁹

After referring to Germany's demand that the quarrel should be referred to an international conference, Poincaré continues:

"On June 6, 1905, the serious question of whether France should take part in this conference was considered by the Ministerial Council. M. Delcassé, the Foreign Minister, advised abstention and, at the same time, laid before his colleagues the written proposition for an agreement which had been transmitted to him a few days before by M. Paul Cambon on behalf of Lord Lansdowne. M. Rouvier, who had still confidence, at this date, in certain promises that had come from Berlin, insisted that Germany's demand be accepted and that, on the other hand, the British offer be declined."¹⁰⁰

Very recently, Delcassé himself has lifted a corner of the veil. In a letter to M. Jean Berbard of 20 March 1922, he said:

"At the Council of June 6, I had supported my statements by information which I was qualified to obtain. I was met by contradictory information. What was its source? By what direct relations was it obtained? or through what intermediaries? On June 6, the British offer of assistance had been only 48 hours in my possession. The President of the Republic and the President of the Council alone had been informed of it by me. I was assured that Germany knew it. How did Germany know it? and how did they know that Germany knew it? You see it is easy for me to keep silence; the full truth will come

⁹⁷ P. 4.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *The Origins of the War*, p. 72.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 82. Cf. Farrer, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-8.

out, perhaps without my having to interfere. But I have not renounced the right to speak."¹⁰¹

In his speech of 3 August 1914, Sir Edward Grey made approach to admission of the truth of Delcassé's statement. He said:

"I . . . was asked the question whether if that crisis" [the same crisis as that referred to by Delcassé] "developed into war between France and Germany, we would give armed support. I said that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France, then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agreement, war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France."¹⁰²

According to Baron von Grootven, Belgian Chargé in Paris, Sir Edward Grey's assurances were much more definite. Writing to his Foreign Office on 14 January 1906, the Baron reported that Sir Edward had:

"recently repeated several times to the different Ambassadors in London that Great Britain was under certain obligations as regards Morocco, and that she would fulfil these obligations at whatever cost to herself in the event of a Franco-German war breaking out."¹⁰³

Throughout the crisis, the British King gave clear intimation of his sympathy with France. On 6 April 1905, on his way to his yacht at Marseilles, he remained at Paris as the guest of President Loubet. On the 29th, he again remained at Paris, and, at a luncheon given by the Marquis de Breteuil, met M. Delcassé, "with whom the King had a long conversation."¹⁰⁴ Reporting upon these visits, M. Leghait, the Belgian Minister at Paris, said that doubtless the King intended to emphasize the solidarity of France and England, but he:

"did not content himself with expressing his feelings and his views to M. Delcassé and other French politicians; he took care that the Court in Berlin should know them also, and with this object in view he had a long conversation with the German Ambassador after the dinner at the Elysée; and it seems he spoke very clearly."¹⁰⁵

During the sittings of the subsequent conference at Algeciras, British support of France was conspicuously consistent. Baron Greindl, the

¹⁰¹ *The Times* (London), 27 March 1922.

¹⁰² Rebutting the allegation of a British "offer," *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* (III, p. 343) has the following: "How little weight was attached to it in Downing Street, is revealed by the fact that in his retrospect of August 3rd, 1914, Sir Edward Grey made no reference to the incident." Sir Edward Grey said as above quoted.

¹⁰³ Farrer, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

¹⁰⁴ *Ann. Reg.*, 1905, p. 14.

¹⁰⁵ Farrer: *op. cit.*, p. 123.

Belgian Ambassador at Berlin, reporting to his Foreign Office on 5 April (1906), said that the English Press:

"did all it could to prevent the Conference being successful. It showed itself to be more irreconcilable than the French Press. . . . It is not apparent that the British Ambassador made the slightest effort at Algeciras with a view to discovering a solution equally acceptable to Germany and to France."¹⁰⁶

During these sittings, King Edward once more evidenced his sympathy by remaining (3 March 1906) in Paris (on his way to Biarritz), where he entertained, not only on one occasion M. Fallières, the President of the Senate,¹⁰⁷ but also, on another, M. Loubet, the President of the Republic, and M. Delcassé, who by this time was suffering the penalty of his anti-German policy. It was needless, wrote the Paris correspondent of the *Times*:

"to insist on the suggestive significance of this fact" (the lunch) "at the present moment. Few things more tactful have ever been done by Edward VII than this invitation, which proves the sincere esteem of His Majesty for the President and the Minister, who did so much to facilitate the realisation of his own efforts to bring about the *entente cordiale* between England and France."¹⁰⁸

"On his way from Biarritz to London, King Edward told French Ministers that in case of need Great Britain would intervene on their side."¹⁰⁹

Had not Russia, the ally of France, been engaged in war with Japan, war between Germany and France, with the United Kingdom supporting France, would almost certainly have been the result of Delcassé's imperialistic proceedings.

Delcassé's Resignation. Delcassé having maintained his truculent attitude,¹¹⁰ and the choice being between persistence in his policy and assent to negotiations regarding a conference, the French government on 6 June 1905, by unanimous vote (less one), adopted the latter of the alternatives. Delcassé thereupon resigned. The *Annual Register* of 1905 referred to the incident as follows:

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

¹⁰⁷ On 3 May, the King again met M. Fallières at Luncheon in Paris, where "cordial toasts" were exchanged. *Ann. Reg.*, 1906, p. 13; Farrer, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

¹⁰⁸ Farrer, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

¹⁰⁹ *Cam. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, III, p. 343, referring to Eckardstein, III, p. 105.

¹¹⁰ Delcassé's attitude was well represented by the distinguished French publicist, M. de Pressensé, — a strongly pro-British writer: "We know by what a series of faults an excellent situation was compromised. M. Delcassé, inebriated by the *entente* with England, of which he had been but an eleventh-hour partisan, hypnotized by the favor of the Tsar, thought that the hour had struck for heroic enterprises. He dreamed, if he did not consciously project, a sort of *revanche* by the humiliation of Germany." Quoted by Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 106.

"The festivities" (in connection with the visit of the King of Spain to Paris — 31 May to 4 June) "were hardly over when M. Rouvier, at the Cabinet meeting on June 6, as was subsequently understood, reproached M. Delcassé with having been imprudent in his diplomatic tactics, and having unnecessarily run the risk of a war. After a heated discussion, M. Delcassé gave in his resignation, which this time was definitely accepted."¹¹¹

It has been said that Germany arrogantly demanded the resignation of M. Delcassé. The facts are not all known, but the assertion of Princess Bülow, the wife of the then German Chancellor, has received some support.

"We did not," she said, "demand the head of M. Delcassé; it was offered to us."¹¹²

M. Paléologue, who was closely associated with Delcassé at the Foreign Office in 1905, in a letter published in *The Times* (London) on 16 March 1920, sustained that view. He said that in a telegram of the 27th April 1905, from the Russian Ambassador at Paris to his Foreign Office at St. Petersburg (intercepted by the French authorities), the Ambassador said that the French Prime Minister had told him that France desired:

"peace at any price. . . . I received a call from a person in the confidence of M. Rouvier, who informed me that the President of the Council would willingly permit M. Delcassé to fall."

Responding to this hint, the German government (it is said) did press for Delcassé's displacement, and two emissaries of the German Chancellor sent the following message to the French Prime Minister:

"The German Government is aware that M. Delcassé is negotiating an alliance with the British Government. If this alliance is concluded, Germany will immediately attack France."¹¹³

Agreed Basis for the Conference. Delcassé out of the way, the negotiations between the governments soon resulted (8 July 1905) in agreement as to the basis upon which a conference (to be held at Algeciras, a town in the south of Spain) should proceed. Germany:

"would not pursue in the Conference . . . any course which would compromise the legitimate hopes of France in that country, which would be contrary to the rights of France resulting from her treaties or arrangements, which rights are in harmony with the following principles: Sovereignty and independence of the Sultan; integrity of his Empire; economic liberty without any inequality; utility of police reforms and financial reforms, the introduction of which would be settled for a

¹¹¹ P. [262. And see p. [165.

¹¹² *N. Y. Times*, 30 March 1920.

¹¹³ Cf. article in *N. Y. Times*, 30 March 1920. Further discussion of the subject may be seen in Professor Schieman's *Deutschland und die grosse Politik*, pp. V, 295, 383; and in Dr. Dillon, *The Eclipse of Russia*, p. 400.

short period by international agreement; recognition of the situation created for France in Morocco by the continuity of a vast extent of territory of Algeria and the Shereefian Empire, and the special relations resulting therefrom between the two adjacent countries, as well as by the special interest for France due to the fact that order should reign in the Shereefian Empire.”¹¹⁴

Both countries were to withdraw their missions from Fez, and advice to the Sultan was to be given:

“through their representatives in common agreement with a view to the fixing of the programme which he will propose at the Conference.”¹¹⁵

Afterwards, on 28 September, the two Powers agreed to submit to the Sultan a programme for the Conference, of which the only item of present importance was:

“Organization, *par voie d'accord internationale*, of the police, outside the frontier region.”¹¹⁶

On 25 October, the Sultan indicated his concurrence in the programme; and on 1 December, the formal invitation was issued to a:

“Conference in which their honorable representatives and the representatives of the Moorish Government shall take part in order to treat of the manner of putting into execution reforms which His Shereefian Majesty has decided to introduce into his Empire, and the taking into consideration of affairs of the moment, and to consider also the question of the expenses which the introduction of these reforms will necessitate.”¹¹⁷

FRANCE AND SPAIN — NEW SECRET AGREEMENT

The Conference approaching, and the secret clauses of the Franco-Spanish Convention of 3 October 1904¹¹⁸ being in danger, France and Spain entered into a new secret agreement (1 September 1905) containing terms quite inconsistent not only with Moroccan sovereignty, but with the Franco-German agreement of the previous 8 July.¹¹⁹ The more important clauses, for the purposes in hand, were as follows (*Italics now added*):

¹¹⁴ Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 246-7; Tardieu: *La Conférence d'Algéçiras*, pp. 482-3.

¹¹⁵ Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 248.

¹¹⁶ Tardieu: *La Conférence d'Algéçiras*, pp. 484-5. *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* interprets the clause as meaning: “The organization of the police, except on the Algerian frontier, was to be international” (III, p. 244) — a meaning which, if accurate, would have relieved the Conference of its chief difficulty, and a meaning quite inconsistent with the Franco-Spanish agreement of a few days afterwards (3 October) referred to in the text. Cf. Tardieu's statement quoted post p. 788.

¹¹⁷ Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 245-6.

¹¹⁸ *Ante*, p. 766-7.

¹¹⁹ *Ante*, p. 782.

" *Article I.* The military police bodies, which shall be organized as soon as possible in the ports of the Shereefian Empire, must be composed of native troops. France, in accord with Spain, admits that all the chiefs, officers, and non-commissioned officers who will be invested with the instruction and command of said troops in the ports of Tetuan and Larash *must belong to the Spanish nation*; on its side Spain, in accord with France, admits that all the chiefs, officers, and non-commissioned officers who will be invested with the instruction and the command of the police bodies in the ports of Rabat and Casablanca *must be of French nationality*. As regards the port of Tangier, in virtue of the stipulations of Article IX of the Treaty of 3rd October 1904, it is understood that the police of this town will be confided to a *Franco-Spanish corps commanded by a Frenchman*. This régime will be subject to revision upon the expiry of a period of fifteen years foreseen in the Convention of 3rd October 1904.

" *Article II.* Conformably with the spirit of Article XIII of the said Treaty, and in order to insure its execution, it is understood that on land the supervision and the repression of the smuggling of arms will remain under the charge of France in the sphere of her Algerian frontier, and under the charge of Spain in the sphere of all her African places and possessions. The supervision and repression of smuggling by sea will be confided to a naval division of the two Powers, who will agree upon the units. This division will be alternately commanded for a year by a naval officer of one of the two Powers and the following year by a naval officer of the other Power. The command will be exercised during the first year by a French naval officer. The two governments will establish by common accord the rules to be observed for the repression of this smuggling trade when the right of visitation is exercised, in the event of the exercise of this right becoming indispensable to insure the efficacy of repression.

" *Article III.* In order to insure on both sides, in the most friendly sense, the exact interpretation of Articles X, XI, and XII of the Convention of 3rd October 1904,¹²⁰ it remains understood:

" (a) That all enterprises in connection with public works, railways, roads, and canals, the exploitation of mines and quarries, and all other enterprises of a commercial or industrial character *on the territory of Morocco may be carried out by groups composed of Spaniards and Frenchmen*. The two Governments mutually undertake to favor by the means of which they dispose the founding of these mixed enterprises on a basis of equality of rights of the participants in the proportion of the capital employed. Upon the expiry of the delay of fifteen years, foreseen

¹²⁰ Reference is to the former Franco-Spanish Convention. Article X provided for joint advantage in the construction of only certain railways, canals, &c. (*ante*, p. 767). Articles XI and XII referred to Spanish and French schools.

by the Convention of 3rd October 1904, the two high contracting parties will be able to carry out the public works referred to in the preceding paragraph in conformity with the rules indicated *in their respective zones of influence*.

“(b) . . . The merchandise of the two countries will enjoy an identical treatment with regard to their imports, circulation and sale in the Empire. The two high contracting parties will employ every pacific means in their power, and will lend themselves mutual assistance with the Sultan and the Moorish Government, in order to prevent that now, or in the future, this clause should be modified by the Moroccan authorities through the establishment of different rules as regards the juridical condition of the persons and the conditions to which the merchandise of the two nations will be subject.

“(c) Spanish silver coinage will continue to be freely imported as heretofore in the Empire, and neither directly nor indirectly, nor as the result of an existing or potential measure, either the medium of import, the circulation or the current value of the said coinage shall be affected. The two Governments respectively undertake not to permit obstacles directly or indirectly to be created as concerns the preceding paragraph, through commercial or industrial organisations instituted in the Moroccan Empire by their respective subjects and to employ all the pacific means of which either disposes *in order to secure that the participation in the capital and the work of all public enterprises shall be offered to the subjects of both nations*.

“(d) The Spanish and French Governments have agreed as to the necessity of creating in Morocco an establishment for credit under the name of *the State Bank or any other name, establishment whose presidency will be reserved for France on account of the greater number of shares subscribed by her*, and also agree upon the following points:

“(1) Participation in profit-bearing shares of all kinds to be reserved to Spain *will be in excess of the portion of each of the other Powers taken separately, France excepted*.

“(2) The Spanish *personnel* in the administration of this establishment and its branches will be proportionate to the capital subscribed by Spain.

“(3) This establishment may take charge of works of public services in the Empire of Morocco with the assent of or by virtue of an accord with the Sultan. It can carry them out directly or transfer their execution to other groups or enterprises. Nevertheless, *as regards the execution of all these works and public services, the stipulations of (1) and (2) above stated shall be observed*.

“(4) The Spanish and the French Governments will increase by common agreement the existing number of Spanish subjects delegated to the services of the Customs of the Empire, re-organised as a guarantee for the last loan contracted by the Sultan, with the French banks, loan in

which is absorbed the loan contracted previously by His Shereefian Majesty with the Spanish banks.

“Article IV. “The two Powers undertake to observe this accord *even in a case where the stipulations of Article XVII of the Madrid Convention of 1880*¹²¹ *might be extended to all economic and financial questions.* They will attempt by their constant pacific action with the Sultan of Morocco and the Moorish Government to insure the loyal accomplishment of all that is stipulated by the present accord. Moreover, *Spain has formally decided to endorse wholly French action in the course of the deliberations of the projected Conference, and France agreeing to act in the same manner towards Spain,* it is understood between the two Governments that they *will mutually assist each other* and will proceed in accord in the said deliberations, as regards the different objects of the present accord. Finally, they undertake to assist one another in the most pacific manner on all general questions concerning Morocco as the cordial and friendly understanding which exists between them in regard to the affairs of the Shereefian Empire implies.”¹²²

This document discloses the purposes with which France and Spain entered the Conference of Algeciras. Comparison of it with the completed work of the Conference — that is with the Act of Algeciras — will indicate the degree of success or failure of the opposing parties, will demonstrate whether, in the estimation of the neutral Powers, Germany had acted properly in insisting upon submission of Moroccan affairs to a Conference.

THE CONFERENCE AND THE ACT OF ALGECIRAS¹²³

The Conference lasted from the 15th January to the 7th April. The countries represented were Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Spain, the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Morocco, Holland, Portugal, Russia, and Sweden. A writer in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* has said that the representatives were to be:

“engaged in the delicate task of reconciling French claims for predominance with the demand of equality for all.”

But reconciliation was not the object of some of the representatives. It was King Edward himself who said to the French Ambassador at London:

“Tell us what you want on each point, and we will support you without restriction or reserves.”¹²⁴

¹²¹ *Ante*, p. 757-8.

¹²² May be seen in Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 248-52.

¹²³ The French Yellow Book of 1906 contains the *Protocoles et Comptes Rendus de la Conférence d'Algéçiras*. The book of M. Tardieu, *La Conférence d'Algéçiras*, supplements the official record. The text of the Act is in both of these publications, and also in Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 252-302.

¹²⁴ *Cam. Hist., Br. For. Pol.*, III, p. 348; *Lémonon, op. cit.*, p. 373.

And Count Witte (Russian Prime Minister) tells us that, while advising the French government:

“to be more yielding . . . our representative . . . was instructed to vote for France in all cases.”¹²⁵

The Threefold Principle. Adopting the language of the Franco-German arrangement, the agreement entered into — usually referred to as the Act of Algeciras — recited that:

“the interest which attaches to the reign of order, peace, and prosperity in Morocco . . . could only be attained by the introduction of reforms based upon the threefold principle of the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan; the integrity of his dominions; and economic liberty without any inequality.

Police. Organization of the police force in the open ports of Morocco was the principal subject of negotiations. Broadly speaking, Germany insisted upon (1) retention of the sovereignty of the Sultan, and (2) equality as between the European Powers. Her claim was formulated at the Conference (13 February) as follows:

“It would be *à propos* that the Conference should ask the Sultan to undertake the organization of the police. It would be his duty to maintain, in the places agreed upon, a troop of police which would be organized and commanded by foreign officers chosen voluntarily by the Sultan. The money necessary for the maintenance of the troop would be placed at the disposal of the Sultan by the new State Bank. The Diplomatic Corps at Tangier would have to exercise control over the functioning of this organization. A foreign superior officer belonging to one of the secondary Powers would be charged with the inspection and with the rendering of reports to the Diplomatic Corps. The whole organization would be undertaken tentatively for a duration of three to five years.”¹²⁶

Alternatively, Germany was willing that France might choose one of the ports, and appoint her officers as “masters of the police”; that in each of the other seven ports there should be officers of different nationalities; and that France alone should have her port to herself.¹²⁷ France and Spain, on the other hand, were opposed to internationalization of any kind.¹²⁸ Their wish was that their officers, exclusively, should organize and command the police, without outside inspection or control. In advance of the Conference, they had provided by their treaty of 1 September 1905¹²⁹ for the organization of not merely police, but “military police” of which all “the chiefs, officers, and non-commissioned offi-

¹²⁵ *The Memoirs of Count Witte*, p. 298.

¹²⁶ *La Conférence d'Algéciras*, p. 175.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 102. The French declaration of March contained the following: “Internationalism of the police would add no guarantee and would entail the greatest practical inconvenience.” Fr. Yell. Bk., *Algeciras, Conference*, 1906, p. 175.

¹²⁹ *Ante*, pp. 783-6.

cers" should be French or Spanish; they had divided, for police purposes, the sea-ports between themselves; and had agreed that "this régime" should be subject to revision after fifteen years. It was revised at Algéciras within seven months.

Through a wearisome process of bargaining, both parties found it necessary to modify their claims—Germany by conceding that the instructors should be exclusively French and Spanish;¹³⁰ and France accepting (1) organization by the Sultan, (2) command by Moroccan officers, (3) international supervision, and (4) a short period for operation of the agreement. The negotiations proceeded somewhat as follows: On the 8th February, Germany refused to agree to the French and Spanish monopoly.¹³¹ On the 13th, Germany made the proposal above quoted. France, in consultation with the American Ambassador, and no doubt influenced by communications from President Roosevelt,¹³² prepared a proposal, to be presented at a subsequent period of the proceedings, of which M. Tardieu said:

"Of our original demands, we should in consequence retain the essential, the Franco-Spanish police. But from the German note of the 13th February we borrowed the organization of the police by the Sultan, and the principle of the control."¹³³

Not altogether disclosing his disposition in this respect, the French representative, in his reply (17 February), accepted (1) organization by the Sultan, and (2) "the short duration of this institution," provided that the officers to be chosen by the Sultan should be French or Spanish, and added:

"The point of the German proposal relative to a supervision over the working of this organization could be examined only if the question of the nationality of the officers had been decided as above indicated."¹³⁴ This was a very considerable advance, but Germany, not ready to agree to it, replied (19th February) that:

"The signatory Powers, being equally interested in this organization, ought to be called to take part in it."¹³⁵

The French representative was similarly uncompromising. On the 8th March at another séance, France presented a formal proposition:¹³⁶ There was to be a troop of "police," under Moroccan commanders, in the eight ports; with French and Spanish instructors for a period of three years.

¹³⁰ In order that there should, at the Conference, be some appearance of concession by France to internationalization, she first claimed exclusive association with the police, and afterwards, in pursuance of the Franco-Spanish agreement, conceded that Spain should share it.

¹³¹ Tardieu: *La Conférence d'Algéciras*, pp. 171-2.

¹³² See *post*, pp. 804-5.

¹³³ Tardieu, *La Conférence d'Algéciras*, p. 180.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 286; Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Algéciras Conference*, 1906, p. 173.

¹³⁶ Tardieu: *La Conférence d'Algéciras*, p. 286.

Germany being now ready to concede that the instructors should be exclusively French and Spanish, subject to the previous French concessions plus international oversight, her representative, in the course of a confused declaration, permitted his attitude to appear in the following sentences:

“But we cannot possibly admit that such a co-operation should be limited to these two nations, without other control or guarantee of international oversight. . . . We demand, then, for the organization of the Moroccan police, a foreign co-operation which assures, to all the nations interested, equality of economic treatment, and the policy of the open door.”¹³⁷

Thereupon, no doubt by arrangement with the German representative, the Austro-Hungarian representative submitted a formal proposal:¹³⁸ French officers at four ports; Spanish at three; and at Casablanca an officer named by the Sultan with the assent of the signatory Powers or of Switzerland or Holland, who would function also as Inspector-General of all the police. He would report to the Diplomatic Corps at Tangier, who would have control of the working of the organization; the arrangement to last for five years. On the 9th, the French representative received the following instructions:

“With reference to the question of the police: to accept, if that police is Franco-Spanish, the creation of an inspection. To agree that this inspection may be as efficacious and as powerful as possible. But, on the other hand, not to admit, at any price, that it transform itself into a collaboration, and to refuse categorically that the inspector may be the direct commander of a port.”¹³⁹

This concession of inspection was followed by Germany's withdrawal of the proposal with reference to Casablanca;¹⁴⁰ and minor points having been arranged the Act of Algeciras provided substantially as follows:

“*Article II.* The police shall be under the sovereign authority of His Majesty the Sultan. It shall be recruited by the Makhzen from among Moorish Mussulmans, commanded by Moorish Kaid, and distributed in the eight ports open to commerce.

Article III. In order to assist the Sultan in the organization of this police, Spanish officers and non-commissioned officers acting as instructors, and French officers and non-commissioned officers, acting as instructors shall be placed at his disposal by their respective Governments, which shall submit their nominations for the approval of His Shereefian Majesty.”

For five years these officers were to have important duties, including the general “administration of the force,” and the rendering of:

¹³⁷ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Algeciras Conference*, 1906, p. 185; Tardieu: *La Conférence d'Algéciras*, p. 302.

¹³⁸ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Algeciras Conference*, 1906, pp. 187-8.

¹³⁹ Tardieu: *La Conférence d'Algéciras*, p. 328. ¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 345.

“ *Article IV.* . . . technical assistance to the Moorish authorities invested with the command of these forces, in the exercise of that command.

“ Regulations for the proper working of the recruiting, discipline, instruction, and administration of the police force shall be drawn up by common agreement between the Shereefian Minister of War or his delegate, the Inspector referred to in *Article VII*, and the French and Spanish instructors of the highest rank.

“ The regulations shall be submitted to the Diplomatic Corps at Tangier, which shall formulate its opinion within one month. On the expiration of such period the regulations shall come into force.

“ *Article V.* The total strength of the whole effective police force shall not exceed 2,500 men, nor be less than 2,000. It shall be distributed according to the importance of the ports, in detachments varying from 150 to 600 men. The number of Spanish and French officers shall be from 16 to 20; that of the Spanish and French non-commissioned officers, from 30 to 40.”

The “ general inspection ” of the police was (*Art. VII*) to: “ be entrusted by His Shereefian Majesty to a superior officer of the Swiss Army, the choice of whom shall be submitted for approval by the Swiss Federal Government.”

This “ Inspector-General ” was to report to the Makhzen; and:

“ Without intervening directly in the command or the instruction of the force, the Inspector-General shall take note of the results achieved by the Shereefian police as regards the maintenance of order and security in the districts in which such police shall be installed.”

Copies of the reports and communications of the Inspector-General were to be sent to the Diplomatic Corps at Tangier in order that that body:

“ may be in a position to satisfy itself that the Shereefian police are working in accordance with the decisions arrived at by the Conference, and to observe whether they afford, in a manner effective and in conformity with the Treaties, security to the persons and property of foreigners as well as to commercial transactions ” (*Art. VIII*).

“ In case of complaints which may be brought before the Diplomatic Corps by the Legation interested, the Diplomatic Corps may, on advising the Sultan’s representative, request the Inspector-General to make an inquiry and to draw up a report on such complaints, available for any purposes ” (*Art. IX*).

It will thus be seen that, while the Act embodied a compromise between the claims of the opposing Powers, its provisions amply justified the submission of the subject to a conference. Germany’s assertion of internationalization was recognized — not indeed by admitting participation in police affairs of a variety of nations, but by reducing France and Spain to the position of international mandatories upon terms internationally arranged: (1) The police were to be “ police ” recruited “ from among Moorish Mussulmans,” instead of being, as contemplated

by the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1 September 1905, "military police bodies . . . composed of native troops." The distinction between "police" and "military police of native troops" was (as we shall see) important. (2) The police were to be "commanded by Moorish Kaidis," and the function of the French and Spanish officers was to be that of "instructors," with administrative power; whereas the Franco-Spanish agreement had provided that:

"the chiefs, officers, and non-commissioned officers, who will be invested with the instruction and command of said troops," should be either French or Spanish. (3) The "proper working" of the police, and, consequently, the work of the instructors, was to "be subject to a general inspection" by a Swiss army officer, who was to report to the Makhzen and the Diplomatic Corps; and the Corps was to have the right of complaint and investigation; whereas France and Spain had contemplated freedom of their officers from all outside control. (4) The association of the instructors with the police was to cease at the end of five years; whereas, by the Franco-Spanish agreement, the arrangements contemplated were limited to no period of time — one clause of it provided that "upon the expiry of a period of fifteen years," the arrangements agreed to "should be subject to revision."

Smuggling of Arms. By the Franco-Spanish secret agreement — "the supervision and the repression of the smuggling of arms will remain under the charge of France in the sphere of her Algerian frontier, and under the charge of Spain in the sphere of her African places and possessions. The supervision and repression of smuggling by sea will be confided to a naval division of the two Powers, who will agree upon the units."¹⁴¹

By the Act of Algeciras, on the other hand, enforcement of the smuggling regulations was, on the Algerian frontier, declared to be "the exclusive concern" not of France, but "of France and Morocco"; and in the Mediterranean coast country, "the exclusive concern of Spain and Morocco." Ships arriving in Moroccan ports were to be reported by:

"the Shereefian Customs Officers" to "the competent consular authority, in order that the latter may, with the assistance of an officer delegated by the Shereefian Customs, proceed to such inquiries, inspection, or search as may be deemed necessary."¹⁴²

A State Bank. France and Spain were not more fortunate with reference to their desire (as contained in their agreement) for the establishment of a State Bank¹⁴³ under French presidency, "on account of the greater number of shares subscribed by her," to be balanced by an excess of "profit-bearing shares for Spain over the portion of each of the other Powers, taken separately, except France."

¹⁴¹ *Ante*, p. 784.

¹⁴² Art. 24: Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 262.

¹⁴³ *Ante*, p. 785.

Contrary to this pre-arrangement, the Act provided as follows:

- 1- "The initial capital of the Bank shall be divided into as many equal portions as there are participants amongst the Powers represented at the Conference."¹⁴⁴

Two extra shares were assigned to a previously existing syndicate of French banks in consideration of the renunciation of privileges acquired in connection with the French loan of June 1904.¹⁴⁵

- 2- "Each of the following institutions, viz. the German Imperial Bank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Spain, and the Bank of France, shall, with the approval of its Government, appoint a Censor to the State Bank of Morocco."¹⁴⁶

- 3- "The staff of the company shall, as far as possible, be recruited from among the nationals of the several Powers which have participated in the subscription of the capital."¹⁴⁷

"The Shereefian Government shall exercise its high control over the Bank through a Moorish High Commissioner, whom it shall appoint after previous agreement with the board of directors of the Bank. . . . He shall not be at liberty to interfere in the administration or business of the Bank, but he shall always have the right to attend the meetings of the Censors."¹⁴⁸

These and other provisions make abundantly clear that the German principle of internationalization was adopted as the basis for the constitution of the bank. M. Tardieu indeed so admits:

"One might argue that in accepting the principle of internationalization of its capital, we had gone farther than required by the accord of 28 September 1905,¹⁴⁹ which said only, 'financial assistance given to the maghzen by the creation of a State Bank.' On this point, as on that of the police, we should have been well within our rights, in holding that 'the introduction of reforms by way of international accord' did not signify international execution of these reforms. But, in fact, we should not have been able to obtain that either the bank or the police should be exclusively Franco-Spanish. . . . We had consented to sacrifices in form, but saved the fundamental; admitted that, for the introduction of measures to be taken, Europe was interposed between the Sultan and us; but, for the execution of these measures, we had claimed and obtained recognition of the special interest which, from the first day, we had asserted."¹⁵⁰

This last sentence M. Tardieu seeks to justify by alleging that the English, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, and Italian members of the Board

¹⁴⁴ Art. 56: Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 273.

¹⁴⁵ *Ante*, p. 769.

¹⁴⁶ Art. 51: Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 271.

¹⁴⁷ Art. 49: *ibid.*, p. 270.

¹⁴⁸ Art. 42: *ibid.*, pp. 268-9.

¹⁴⁹ That is the accord with Germany: *ante*, p. 783.

¹⁵⁰ *La Conférence d'Algéiras*, pp. 453-4.

had promised subsequent co-operation with the French, and that, of the four censors, the English and Spanish would certainly unite with the French.

“By another route,” the writer says, “we arrived at the same end, without suffering too much from the thorns of a difficult road.”¹⁵¹

In other words, although France had been beaten upon the question of internationalization, she might be able to secure a majority of the participants and censors for any schemes which she might propose. To that, of course, nobody would object. That is what internationalization means.

Public Works. With respect to economic exploitation, France and Spain sustained severe disappointment. They had purposed:

“That all enterprises in connection with public works, railways, roads and canals; the exploitation of mines and quarries and all other enterprises of a commercial or industrial character in the territory of Morocco, may be carried out by groups composed of Spaniards and Frenchmen . . . and to employ all the pacific means of which either disposes in order to secure that the participation in the capital and the work of all public enterprises shall be offered to the subjects of both nations.”¹⁵²

In subversion of all that, and proceeding upon the basis of equal rights for all the Powers, the Act provided:

“*Article CVII.* The validity of such concessions as may be granted for the purposes specified in Article CVI, or for furnishing supplies to the State, shall, throughout the Shereefian Empire, be subject to the principle of public awards on tenders, without respect of nationality, as regards all matters which, by the rules observed under the laws of foreign countries, admit of the application of that principle.

“*Article CVIII.* So soon as it shall have been decided to proceed to the execution of particular public works by calling for tenders, the Shereefian Government shall notify such decisions to the Diplomatic Corps, to which it shall, in due course, communicate the plans, specifications, and all documents annexed to the call for tenders, so that the nationals of all the Signatory Powers may obtain information respecting the projected works, and be in a position to compete for them. A sufficient time limit shall be fixed for this purpose in the call for tenders.

“*Article CIX.* The specifications shall not contain, either explicitly or implicitly, any condition or provision of a nature to violate the principle of free competition, or to place the competitors of one nationality at a disadvantage as against the competitors of another.

“*Article CX.* The contracts shall be made in the form and according to the general conditions prescribed by regulations to be drawn up by the Shereefian Government, with the assistance of the Diplomatic Corps. The contract shall be awarded by the Shereefian Government to the

¹⁵¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 454.

¹⁵² *Ante*, pp. 784-5.

person or persons who, while complying with the terms of the specifications, shall have submitted the most generally advantageous offer.”¹⁵³

Internationalization. The principle of international, as opposed to merely French and Spanish participation in the regulation of affairs in Morocco, is embodied in very many other articles of the Act. Remembering that “the Diplomatic Corps” was composed of the representatives of the various Powers, observe the following:

1. The trade in certain kinds of arms was to be regulated:

“by a Shereefian Order made in conformity with the advice of the Diplomatic Corps at Tangier.”¹⁵⁴

2. The number of retail stores in certain places was to be regulated in the same way.¹⁵⁵

3. The *tertib* (a tax regulation) was not to be imposed, except:

“Under the conditions prescribed by the regulations made by the Diplomatic Corps at Tangier under date of the 23rd November, 1903.”¹⁵⁶

4. With reference to a tax on town buildings:

“Regulations made by common agreement between the Shereefian Government and the Diplomatic Corps at Tangier shall fix the rate of the tax, lay down the manner of collecting and applying it, and determine what proportion of the resources thus created shall be devoted to meeting the cost of improvements and of conservancy in the towns.”¹⁵⁷

5. With reference to difficulties connected with Crown Lands held by foreigners:

“The Conference desirous of remedying this state of affairs, charges the Diplomatic Corps at Tangier to bring about an equitable settlement with the Special Commissioner whom his Shereefian Majesty may be pleased to appoint for this purpose.”¹⁵⁸

6. The Diplomatic Corps was to be entrusted with discretion as to the extension to foreigners of “new taxes on certain trades, industries, and professions.”¹⁵⁹

7. Taxes of other kinds were to be introduced by the Sultan, “with the co-operation of the Diplomatic Corps.”¹⁶⁰

8. “The programme of the works and the order of their execution,” with reference to the development of navigation and trade, “shall be settled by agreement between the Shereefian Government and the Diplomatic Corps at Tangier.”¹⁶¹

9. Estimates, plans, &c., for the work were to be:

“prepared by a competent engineer appointed with the concurrence of the Diplomatic Corps by the Shereefian Government.”

¹⁵³ Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 292-93.

¹⁵⁴ Art. xviii.

¹⁵⁵ Art. xviii.

¹⁵⁶ Art. lix.

¹⁵⁷ Art. lxi

¹⁵⁸ Art. lxiii.

¹⁵⁹ Art. lxiv.

¹⁶⁰ Art. lxv.

¹⁶¹ Art. lxvi.

The form of contracts was to be regulated by the Diplomatic Corps conjointly with the representatives of the Sultan.¹⁶²

10. The scale of berthage or anchorage dues was to be drawn up by the Diplomatic Corps in agreement with the government,¹⁶³

11. Warehouse dues were to be regulated by the government in agreement with the Diplomatic Corps.¹⁶⁴

12. The maximum quantity of opium and kiff which might be imported was to be settled by common agreement between the government and the Diplomatic Corps.¹⁶⁵

13. Any modification of the declaration with reference to taxes was to be arrived at by agreement between the government and the Diplomatic Corps.¹⁶⁶

14. A "Customs Committee," with certain powers, was to be organized, consisting of a Special Commissioner of the Sultan, of a member of the Diplomatic Corps, and of a delegate of the State Bank.¹⁶⁷

15. Some of the other prescribed activities of the Diplomatic Corps and of other international bodies are referred to upon various pages of the French Yellow Book of 1906-7, for example: Nos. 82, 84, 109, 115, 147, 274, 303, 305, 400, 403, 404.

Existing Treaties, &c. The last clause of the Act is important as indicating that no special agreements between any of the Powers were to be permitted to affect the arrangements provided for by the Act.

"All existing treaties, conventions, and arrangements between the Signatory Powers and Morocco remain in force. It is, however, agreed that, in case their provisions shall be found to conflict with those of the present General Act, the stipulations of the latter shall prevail."¹⁶⁸

Position of France and Spain under the Act. Before passing to a relation of the subsequent occurrences which culminated in French military occupation of parts of Morocco; in a French military expedition to Fez; and in Spanish military occupation of various parts of the coastal territory, it will be well to emphasize the fact that, according to the terms of the Act, the only special rights enjoyed by France and Spain were as follows:

1. The attachment of "instructors," with certain powers, to the Morocco police in the eight open ports. Regulations, however, for "the proper working" of the police had to be arranged with the Sultan, and to be submitted to the Diplomatic Corps. And the system was to lapse at the end of five years.

2. Repression of the smuggling of arms was, on the Algerian frontier, to be in the charge of France and Morocco; and on the coastal frontier, in the charge of Spain and Morocco.

¹⁶² Art. lxvi.

¹⁶³ Art. lxx.

¹⁶⁴ Art. lxxi.

¹⁶⁵ Art. lxxii.

¹⁶⁶ Art. lxxv.

¹⁶⁷ Art. xcvi.

¹⁶⁸ Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 295-6.

In all other respects, Germany was on the same footing as France. And it is worthy of special observation that the French purpose of introducing, at the end of the thirty-year period provided for in the Franco-British Declaration of 8 April 1904, discriminatory customs and railway rates, was dissipated by the establishment of "economic liberty without any inequality," without limit of time. To this extent, the United Kingdom took profit out of the German *démarche*.

Notwithstanding the above easily ascertained facts, the popular British view of the result of the Conference is probably that expressed by Dr. Dillon:

"The Conference ended in a brilliant victory for France, and a loss of prestige for Germany."¹⁶⁹

M. Clemenceau, on the other hand, on 16 July 1909, laid the blame for the humiliation of France at Algeciras upon M. Delcassé.¹⁷⁰

JUSTIFICATION OF GERMANY

That Germany was justified in insisting upon the questions in dispute being submitted to a conference may now be regarded as generally admitted by students. Professor Gilbert Murray, in his book *The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, 1906-1915*, written during the war and after he had come to believe "in the unalterably aggressive designs of Germany" (p. 9), has said:

"France had made an arrangement about Morocco with her two neighbors alone, Great Britain and Spain. It was quite a good arrangement, but the future of Morocco was a matter of public interest, and the rest of Europe had the right to be consulted. . . . Germany was wrong on most of the matters at issue, and violently wrong in her method of raising the question; but she was justified in asking for a conference. France, to whom we had promised our diplomatic support, seemed, in her indignation at being bullied, to be inclined to refuse a conference. And we took our stand firmly at her side."¹⁷¹

Germany's justification is to be found (1) in the circumstances existing prior to 1905; (2) in the French concessions contained in the agreement with Germany of 8 July 1905;¹⁷² and (3) in the result of the Conference—in the Act of Algeciras. Dealing with the second of these points, M. Tardieu, France's chief and best advocate, has said:

"Undoubtedly, in admitting on 8 July 1905, the intervention of Europe, our Moroccan policy had sustained a change of form, and this change was a check. Instead of negotiating, as we had done with Italy in 1900, with England and with Spain in 1904, protocols of disinterest-

¹⁶⁹ *Contemporary Rev.*, Sept. 1911, p. 413.

¹⁷⁰ *Ann. Reg.*, 1909, p. [291.

¹⁷¹ P. 61.

¹⁷² *Ante*, pp. 782-3.

edness which left our hands free, we had agreed that all the Powers should participate in the introduction of reforms.”¹⁷³

But, grudging the admission, Tardieu added:

“Nevertheless, with that exception, we had maintained, as they were, the fundamentals of our claims. And after, as before the Franco-German accords, the nature of things obliged us to make sure the safeguarding of our interests founded on history and geography, of our rights inscribed in unassailable contracts — ”¹⁷⁴

a resolution which, when put into operation, made further trouble. Dealing with the third of the above points — the result of the Conference — M. Poincaré has admitted that:

“Germany also succeeded in safeguarding the complete sovereignty of the Sultan, which enabled her to carry on intrigues with him. She also brought about the establishment of international regulations for the organization of the police; she arranged the creation of a State Bank that was also international; and she assured the open door to German enterprise in Morocco. As Prince Bülow wrote: ‘In future dealings with Moroccan affairs, Germany has reserved for herself a decisive vote — a vote which she will not relinquish without adequate compensation.’ ”¹⁷⁵

After France had agreed to the Conference, the German Emperor, in a speech in the Reichstag (28 November 1905), said:

“The difficulties which have arisen between us and France on the Morocco question have had no other source than an inclination to settle, without our co-operation, affairs in which the German Empire has also interests to maintain.”¹⁷⁶

After the Conference had finished its work, and even the United Kingdom had obtained benefit by the action of Germany, any question as to the propriety of German action was but a survival of previous feeling.

Significance of the Dates. To M. Tardieu, for example, the fact of Germany’s success was an aggravation of her fault rather than an evidence of her justification. In his view, Germany had been awaiting the arrival of the most opportune moment for an attack upon France, and, in proof, he asks us to observe the dates:

“In the month of September, General Kouropatkine sustained at Liao-Yang a first check. In the month of February 1905, Moukden aggravated Liao-Yang. The hour had arrived, the hour in which to defend, against the pretensions of the balance of power in Europe, ‘the edifice of the grandfather,’ the hour in which to break nascent coalitions, the hour in which to curb the vanquished of yesterday or the aggressors of to-morrow” (de mâter les vaincus de la veille ou les agresseurs du

¹⁷³ *La Conférence d’Algéciras*, p. 17; and see p. 214.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-8.

¹⁷⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 83-4.

¹⁷⁶ *Ann. Reg.*, 1905, p. [294; Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 105.

lendemain). On 31 March 1905, William II, in landing at Tangier, proclaimed his hostility towards France."¹⁷⁷

At another place, M. Tardieu says that Germany:

"had waited until the war in Manchuria, in paralysing the Russian alliance, delivered France to her blows."¹⁷⁸

Dr. J. Holland Rose has reiterated M. Tardieu's contention,¹⁷⁹ but, curiously enough, has, at the same time, admitted that Germany had ground of complaint:

"Meanwhile France, Great Britain, and Spain were gaining over Morocco the control of the purse. . . . France, Great Britain, and Spain undertook to play the part of a maleficent Providence. As might be expected, these dealings of France, Great Britain, and Spain caused annoyance at Berlin."¹⁸⁰

"Now, Germany had certainly grounds for annoyance. But the question arises—Why did she veil that annoyance and take no action until March 1905? The answer is clear. Her action was based on the fact that Russia, and therefore France, were now weak. While the Franco-Russian alliance retained its original strength, Germany said not a word about Morocco. She bided her time; and, so soon as the opportunity came, she shot her bolt."¹⁸¹

Let us look at the relevant dates. The Russo-Japanese war commenced on 8 February 1904; France got rid of British pretensions in Morocco two months afterwards (8 April); the Japanese victory at Liao-Yang was attained on 4 September; others of less importance followed as the Russians were falling back on Mukden; and Port Arthur was taken on 2 January. It was with knowledge of these facts that Delcassé issued his challenge to Germany by sending Taillandier to Fez. Without delay, Germany gave intimation of her dissatisfaction. Tardieu has recorded it in this way:

"The first note of this dissatisfaction had been given at the beginning of February 1905 by M. de Kuhlman, German Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier, when he said to his French colleague: 'We perceive that we are put aside systematically. We have, in consequence, fixed upon our attitude. . . . I believed it to be my duty to obtain from my Government formal instructions. And it was then that Count Bülow told me that the Imperial Government was unaware of all the Accords arranged with reference to Morocco, and that he did not consider himself bound in any manner relative to that question.'¹⁸²

¹⁷⁷ *La France et les Alliances*, p. 192. Cf. *La Conférence d'Algéiras*, p. 54.

¹⁷⁸ *La France et les Alliances*, p. 27; *Ann. Reg.*, 1905, p. [292; Rose: *The Origins of the War*, p. 74.

¹⁷⁹ Rose, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-6.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

¹⁸² *La Conférence d'Algéiras*, p. 37.

The delay in raising the issue appears, then, to have been that of France rather than Germany, and of that fact Tardieu himself complained. After referring to the Anglo-French agreement, he said:

“By a vexatious error, M. Delcassé lost much time before drawing from this new situation the necessary conclusions. It was only on the 18th May that our Minister at Tangier, M. Saint-René-Taillandier furnished Ben-Sliman explanations of the Franco-English treaty. It was in January 1905 that, after nine months, he went to Fez to see the Sultan.”¹⁸³

And, quite in accordance with the facts, Tardieu, on another page, affirms that it was Delcassé, and not the Kaiser, who deferred action until after the defeat of the Russians:

“In Morocco he had lost ten months on the morrow of the Franco-English accord, as if he had arranged an absolutely serene future. He had deferred acting until the defeat of the Russians at Liao-Yang, aggravated by what followed at Mukden, deprived us of the best of our cards, of our sole alliance, of our only continental support.”¹⁸⁴

It may be added, however, that the overthrow of the Russians at Mukden did not occur in February of 1905. It cannot be placed at an earlier period than 8 March.¹⁸⁵ In his later book, M. Tardieu himself puts it on 10 March.¹⁸⁶ And it was on 12 March (M. Tardieu agrees) that public announcement was made of the Kaiser's intention to land at Tangier.¹⁸⁷ These dates are much too close to make it probable that the announcement was in any way due to the Russian defeat. And it may very well be suggested that if Germany had wished to take advantage of Russian embarrassment, she would have chosen some time during the earlier periods of the war, when Russian forces were fully engaged in the Far East, rather than have awaited an approach to its termination, when any remaining strength would have been available for operations in Europe. *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* has the following:

“M. Delcassé, echoed M. Hanotaux, offered Germany a pretext for conflict, and chose the moment when Russia was locked in deadly conflict in the Far East.”¹⁸⁸

After noting that Germany made no objection to the Anglo-French treaty, the author adds:

“The despatch of the French Envoy to Fez with a comprehensive programme of reforms was the signal for a change of front at Berlin.”¹⁸⁹

¹⁸³ *La France et les Alliances*, pp. 136-7.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

¹⁸⁵ *Ann. Reg.*, 1905, p. [392.

¹⁸⁶ *The Truth about the Treaty*, p. 6.

¹⁸⁷ Tardieu: *La France et les Alliances*, p. 202; Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

¹⁸⁸ III, p. 340.

¹⁸⁹ P. 338.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE QUARREL

The popular British opinion with reference to the landing of the Kaiser at Tangier has been (as already noted) that it was "a shaking of the mailed fist" at France, "a bullying threat of war," "a test of the solidity of the Franco-British *entente*." Adopting the general view, Mr. Roscoe Thayer, in his recent biography of Theodore Roosevelt, said that:

"when the German Emperor threatened to make war on France, a letter from Roosevelt to him caused William to reconsider his brutal plan, and to submit the Moroccan dispute to a conference of the Powers at Algeciras."¹⁹⁰

Amply refuting that statement, by the publication of Roosevelt's letter of 28 April to Mr. Whitelaw Reid; and proving that the President's pressure was directed, not to the Kaiser, but to France at the request of the Kaiser, Mr. J. B. Bishop (in a later biography) himself falls into error by placing Roosevelt's alleged compelling power upon Germany at a subsequent date, namely, during the sitting of the Conference. He says:

"In the end, the President fairly compelled the Kaiser to accept the terms upon which the final agreement was reached by the Convention."¹⁹¹

Both biographers are wrong. For the truth, one needs not search far beyond Roosevelt's letter. The following quotations are taken from it.

Mr. Thayer's Assertion. On the 6th of March 1905 (the Kaiser's landing on Tangier was on the 31st) the German Ambassador at Washington, Baron Speck von Sternburg (Roosevelt always called him Speck), asked that the President would (as Roosevelt relates):

"join with the Kaiser in informing the Sultan of Morocco that he ought to reform his government, and that, if he would do so, we would stand behind him for the open door, and would support him in any opposition he might make to any particular nation (that is to France) which sought exclusive control of Morocco."¹⁹²

The President declined the invitation. After the Kaiser's landing, Speck sent (5 April) to Roosevelt a memorandum from the Kaiser stating:

"that he" (the Kaiser) "must insist upon a conference of the Powers to settle the fate of Morocco . . . ; that Germany asked for no gains in Morocco; she simply defended her interests and stood for equal rights to all nations there."¹⁹³

After the German Chancellor had, by circular despatch (12 April), proposed the holding of a conference,¹⁹⁴ Speck, on 25 April:

¹⁹⁰ *Theodore Roosevelt*, p. 202.

¹⁹¹ *Theodore Roosevelt and his Time*, I, p. 467.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 468.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁴ *Ante*, pp. 774-5.

“wrote me again,” Roosevelt narrated, “saying that the Emperor would be most grateful to me if I would intimate to England that I would like to see her and Germany in harmony in their dealings with Morocco. On May 13th he sent me another memorandum, insisting that there must be a general conference and complaining of England for opposing this conference.”¹⁹⁵

On 31 May, another memorandum from the Kaiser reached Roosevelt, declaring that:

“England is the only power which opposes such a conference, though it seems sure she will drop her objections in case you should participate in the conference.”¹⁹⁶

Roosevelt’s attitude during this time was expressed in a letter to Mr. Taft, then Secretary of State, as follows:

“I do not feel that as a Government we should interfere in the Morocco matter. We have other fish to fry, and we have no real interest in Morocco. I do not care to take sides between France and Germany in the matter.

“At the same time if I can find out what Germany wants I shall be glad to oblige her if possible, and I am sincerely anxious to bring about a better state of feeling between England and Germany. Each nation is working itself up to a desperate hatred of the other; each from sheer fear of the other. The Kaiser is dead sure that England intends to attack him. The English Government and a large share of the English people are equally sure that Germany intends to attack England. Now, in my view this action of Germany in embroiling herself with France over Morocco is proof positive that she has not the slightest intention of attacking England. I am very clear in my belief that England utterly over-estimates, as well as mis-estimates, Germany’s singleness of purpose, by attributing to the German Foreign Office the kind of power of continuity of aim which it had from ’64 to ’71. I do not wish to suggest anything whatever as to England’s attitude in Morocco, but if we can find out that attitude with propriety and inform the Kaiser of it, I shall be glad to do so.”¹⁹⁷

About the end of May, Roosevelt had an interview with Sir Mortimer Durand, the British Ambassador:

“I saw Sir Mortimer,” Roosevelt wrote, “on the matter, but could get very little out of him. He was bitter about Germany, and, so far as he represented the British Government, it would appear that they were anxious to see Germany humiliated by France’s refusal to enter a conference, and that they were quite willing to face the possibility of war under such circumstances.”¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ Bishop, *op. cit.*, I, p. 469.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 471.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 472.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 475. “On June 5th, Mr. Whitelaw Reid, the American Ambassa-

On 11 June, Speck sent in another memorandum from the Kaiser:

"My people are sure that England would now back France by force of arms in a war against Germany, not on account of Morocco, but on account of Germany's policy in the Far East. The combined naval forces of England and France would undoubtedly smash the German navy and give England, France, Japan and Russia a more free hand in the Far East, and Russia might try to cede a portion of China to Japan as a war indemnity, instead of parting with the island of Saghalien. The previous destruction of the German navy undoubtedly would be welcomed by these powers.

"As regards a conference to be held in Morocco, the British Government has asked for time to consider the question. The Emperor feels sure that if you could give a hint now in London and in Paris that, all things put together, you would consider a conference as the most satisfactory means of bringing the Morocco question to a peaceful solution, you would render the peace of the world another great service without encountering any risk."¹⁹⁹

Roosevelt now (as he wrote):

"took active hold of the matter with both Speck and Jusserand" (the French Ambassador), "and after a series of communications with the French Government, through Jusserand, got things temporarily straightened up."²⁰⁰

"I urged upon the French Government, in the first place, the great danger of war to them, and the fact that British assistance could avail them very little in the event of such a war, because France would be in danger of invasion by land; and in the next place, I pointed out that if there were a conference of the Powers, France would have every reason to believe that the conference would not sanction any unjust attack by Germany upon French interests, and that if all the Powers, or practically all the Powers, in the conference took an attitude favorable to France on such a point it would make it well nigh impossible for Germany to assail her. I explained that I would not accept the invitation of the conference unless France was willing, and that if I went in I would treat both sides with absolute justice, and would, if necessary, take very strong grounds against any attitude of Germany which seemed to me unjust and unfair."²⁰¹

Explaining why he approached France rather than the United Kingdom (as suggested by the Kaiser), Roosevelt wrote to Speck (25 June):

"As you know, I made up my mind to speak to France rather than

dor in London, telegraphed that Lord Lansdowne regarded the proposal for a conference as unfortunate, and as, possibly, designed to embarrass France." *Camb. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, III, p. 342.

¹⁹⁹ Bishop, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 476-7.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 477.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 478.

to England, because it seemed to me that it would be useless to speak to England, for I felt that if a war were to break out, whatever might happen to France, England would profit immensely, while Germany would lose her colonies and perhaps her fleet. Such being the case, I did not feel that anything I might say would carry any weight with England, and instead I made a very earnest request of France that she should do as the Emperor desired, and agree to hold the conference. The French Government have now done just what, at His Majesty's request, I urged should be done."²⁰²

France having, at length, agreed to the conference, Roosevelt had the satisfaction of receiving from Jusserand (25 June) communication of a despatch from the French Foreign Minister in which was the following:

"Be so good as to tell the President that his reflections and advice have received from us due consideration, and have caused us to take the resolution we have just adopted."²⁰³

The Kaiser also sent his thanks through Speck (18 June):

"Your diplomatic activity with regard to France, the Emperor says, has been the greatest blessing to the peace of the world."²⁰⁴

Roosevelt, on his part, warmly acknowledged the diplomatic success of Germany. In a letter to Speck of 23 June, he said:

"Let me congratulate the Emperor most warmly on his diplomatic success in securing the assent of the French Government to the holding of the conference. . . . It is a diplomatic triumph of the first magnitude."²⁰⁵

In a further letter to Speck (25 June), offering some advice, Roosevelt said:

"I venture to give the advice at all only because, as I took the action I did on the Emperor's request, it seems but right that in reporting the effect of this action I should give my views thereon. I say with all possible emphasis that I regard this yielding by France, this concession by her which she had said she could not make and which she now has made, as representing a genuine triumph for the Emperor's diplomacy; so that if the result is now accepted it will be not merely honorable for Germany but a triumph. . . . He [the Kaiser] has won a great triumph; he has obtained what his opponents in England and France said he would never obtain, and what I myself did not believe he could obtain."²⁰⁶

When again acknowledging the beneficial effect of Roosevelt's intervention, Speck wrote to him (28 June):

²⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 483-4.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 483.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 481.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 482.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 484.

“The Emperor has requested me to tell you that in case during the coming conference differences of opinion should arise between France and Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up the decision which you consider to be the most fair and the most practical. In doing this he wants to prove that the assistance, which you have rendered to Germany has been rendered in the interest of peace alone, and without any selfish motives.”²⁰⁷

Whether, as Mr. Thayer alleges, Roosevelt caused the Kaiser “to reconsider his brutal plans” and to submit to a conference; or whether, “in response to the earnest and repeated appeals of the Kaiser,” (as Mr. Bishop says) Roosevelt persuaded France to agree to it, is, by the foregoing narrative, made sufficiently clear. If not, look at M. Poincaré’s book, *The Origins of the War*:

“France herself had been drawn by Germany into the Algeciras Conference.”²⁰⁸ “Germany undoubtedly, from July 8, 1905, when she brought us to accept the principle of a conference. . . .”²⁰⁹

Mr. Bishop’s Assertion. With reference to Mr. Bishop’s assertion that:

“In the end, the President fairly compelled the Kaiser to accept the terms upon which the final agreement was reached by the Convention” several observations are necessary.

1. The language is much too strong. The only appearance of compulsion was an indication of a disposition “to publish the entire correspondence” — not a very terrifying menace.

2. The language is much too wide. Among all the matters discussed and arranged at Algeciras, the single point upon which Roosevelt differed with the Kaiser was as to whether the instructors of the Morocco police should be French and Spanish at all the ports, or whether, at one of them, the instructor should be German, or (as afterwards suggested) Dutch or Swiss.²¹⁰

3. As argument for German concession upon this point, Roosevelt urged (7 March 1906) that the Kaiser had promised that at the Conference:

“he, in every case, will be ready to back up the decision which you should consider to be the most fair and the most practical.”²¹¹

Answering this, the Kaiser suggested (13 March) adherence to the proposal offered by Austria.²¹² And on the same day (17 March) that Roosevelt said that he did “not approve that proposal,”²¹³ and before the

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 487.

²⁰⁸ P. 69.

²⁰⁹ P. 83.

²¹⁰ Bishop, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 489-500.

²¹¹ *Ante*, p. 804.

²¹² Bishop, *op. cit.*, I, p. 496.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 498.

statement could have reached Algeciras, Germany had made the necessary concession.

4. While, unquestionably, Roosevelt's opinion very materially influenced German action, it had, undoubtedly, similar effect upon France, with, as result, the compromise above referred to.

5. The representative of the United States at Algeciras accompanied the placing of his signature to the Act with the following declaration:

"The Government of the United States of America, having no political interests in Morocco, and having taken part in the present Conference with no other desires or intentions than to assist in asserting to all the nations in Morocco the most complete equality in matters of commerce, treatment, and privileges, and in facilitating the introduction into that Empire of reforms which should bring about a general state of well-being founded on the perfect cordiality of her foreign relations, and on a stable internal administration, declares: that in subscribing to the Regulations and Declarations of the Conference by the Act of signing the General Act, subject to ratification according to constitutional procedure, and the Additional Protocol, and in consenting to their application to American citizens and interests in Morocco, it assumes no obligation or responsibility as to the measures which may be necessary for the enforcement of the said Regulations and Declarations."²¹⁴

"The most complete equality" of "all the nations in Morocco" had been the object of Germany, and was now, largely by the action of the United States, the fate of France. In a speech in the Reichstag (14 November 1906), the German Chancellor said:

"Our friendly relations with America are based on historic and natural grounds. In order to adjust our economic interests, conciliation and goodwill are naturally required on both sides. For the attitude of America at the Morocco Conference, I tender my thanks."²¹⁵

In all this there is very little appearance of the compulsion upon the Kaiser by Roosevelt alleged by Mr. Bishop.

COUNT WITTE AND THE CONFERENCE

In his Memoirs, Count Witte claims to have persuaded the Kaiser to agree to the reference of the quarrel to an international conference, but he has been most unusually unfortunate in fixing the date of his activities. Remembering that it was upon the repeated requests of the Kaiser that President Roosevelt urged France to agree to a conference; that on 25 June the President was told by the French government that:

"his reflections and advice have received from us due consideration, and have caused us to take the resolution just adopted";²¹⁶

²¹⁴ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Algeciras Conference*, 1906, p. 254; Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 298-9.

²¹⁵ *Ann. Reg.*, 1906, p. [293].

²¹⁶ See *ante*, p. 803.

and that on 8 July the basis of the conference was agreed to between France and Germany, observe the assertions of Count Witte: On his way back from the United States, where, on 5 September (two months after the conference had been agreed to), he had signed the treaty of Portsmouth, Witte visited Paris, and while there, he suggested (as he alleges) to the French Prime Minister that he should:

“propose to Germany the arbitration of the main issues by an international conference. . . . Rouvier remarked that the scheme had occurred to him, but that it had been rejected by the German plenipotentiary.”

Afterwards Witte, as he says:

“informed both Prince Radolin and Rouvier that I would try to convince Emperor William of the desirability of turning the Morocco conflict over to an international conference for arbitration.”²¹⁷

Subsequently, at Berlin, Witte presented his views to the Kaiser. He says:

“In my explanations I went into great detail, for I noticed that the Kaiser was not abreast of the negotiations which his plenipotentiary was conducting in Paris. I then repeated the arguments I had expounded to Ambassador Radolin in favor of having the matter arbitrated by an international conference, and I reported that both the German Ambassador and Rouvier approved of this plan. Should France reach an understanding with you as a result of the present parley, I added, some other country, for instance the United States of America, might object to that agreement, and thereby place both parties to the treaty in a very awkward position. Under the circumstances, I concluded, an international arbitration conference is the best possible solution. A pause ensued, at the end of which, His Majesty took a blank, penned a telegram to Chancellor Bülow and showed it to me, saying: ‘You have convinced me. The matter will be settled in accordance with your views.’”²¹⁸

It is to be hoped that not many of the Count’s reminiscences are so entirely devoid of verisimilitude.

BETWEEN THE ACT OF ALGECIRAS AND THE FRANCO-GERMAN AGREEMENT OF 8 FEBRUARY 1909

French Progress. The inevitableness of the progression from mere contact of superior and inferior civilizations (as we may call them) to the domination of the higher over the lower is now sufficiently understood. France had pursued the usual course in Algeria and Tunis; and the “solemn” (to use customary phraseology) engagements of the Act of Algeciras as to:

²¹⁷ *The Memoirs of Count Witte*, p. 417. Radolin was the German representative in Paris. Rouvier was French Prime Minister.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 421.

“the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his dominion, and economic liberty”

could not, in Morocco, render the inevitable avoidable. The sovereignty of the Sultan had been impaired; his control (sufficiently difficult at all times) had been destroyed; and an international Conference had assumed to regulate him and his government. Intrusion of the hated foreigners provoked (as always) fierce resentment; resentment produced disturbances; and disturbances, although crushed by military force, furnished excuses for further interference. The Act of Algeciras, which was to arrange everything, produced ever-increasing confusion. Look at the following from the *Annual Register* of 1906:

“The internal condition of Morocco has made the execution of the reforms impracticable. There was a revolutionary movement in the South led by a pretender to the throne, and the notorious Raisuli and his following came and went as he willed in the Tangier district. Only scraps of news have been reported from the interior, and the general impression is that the country is in a chaotic condition, the one substantial fact being that the Sultan retains his throne rather than his authority. At the bottom of the disturbances there seems to be an anti-infidel movement which has not yet reached its climax and against which France has made little headway. In May, a Frenchman, M. Charbonnier, was murdered in Tangier. An apology and indemnity were offered by the Sultan and the matter was arranged. A French mercantile agent, M. Lassallas, while travelling from Safi to Marakesh, was attacked by soldiers and badly wounded in September. The incident gave urgency to the question of applying the reforms. Haj Mohammed el Mokri was sent from Fez to Tangier to concert practical measures with the representatives of the Powers. The European population at the coast ports remained under the joint protection of the French and Spanish Governments. Disturbances occurred in September at Casablanca, Maclain, ‘a fanatical sorcerer from the Sahara,’ with influence over the Sultan inciting the inhabitants to attack the Christians and looting a French store. Early in the same month a panic occurred at Mogador, a Berber chief entering the town and threatening to loot the Jews, whom he confined within the Sheik quarter. A French gun-boat was despatched and the chief retired with his forces. In October, it was reported that there were preparations for a holy war, Mulai Abu, cousin of the Sultan, having persuaded the tribes to drop their feuds and combine to take the field in mid-November. An armed camp was formed on the Wad Shir. Meanwhile a revolt was reported to have broken out at Kehamna, and all communication between Marakesh and the coast suspended.”²¹⁹

Arzila. In October 1906, Arzila, a small coast town twenty-five miles from Tangier, having been occupied by a few brigands, France and Spain despatched three war vessels to that port.²²⁰

²¹⁹ Pp. [420-1.

²²⁰ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1906-7, Nos. 82, 85.

Tangier. Toward the end of the year (1906), the French Foreign Minister found it necessary to arrange for intervention at Tangier itself. Writing to the French Ambassador at Madrid (19 November), the Minister said:

“The events of which the town of Tangier and its neighborhood has been the theatre during the last two years indicate a progressive enfeeblement of the authority of the Chérifien Government in this region, and are of a nature to excite the foreign colony.”²²¹

He indicated the necessity for the despatch of a second war vessel; suggested permanent and effective arrangements at all the open ports; proposed, when necessary, the landing of detachments from the ships, and the institution of a corps of police under Franco-Spanish instructors; care should be taken, he said, that all action should have the appearance of:

“a necessary and temporary intervention against anarchy, as protection for foreign lives and interests, and as a re-establishment of the regular authority of the Sultan over the town of Tangier.”

Proper appearance is always part of the programme. Spain having agreed to cooperate with France, a joint note to the Powers was despatched on 6 December.²²²

“According to circumstances,” the circular said, “the French and Spanish Ministers, already in accord to this effect, will be able, after having arranged with their colleagues of the diplomatic corps, at Tangier, to require the Commander-in-Chief of the naval forces to disembark detachments for the maintenance of order in the town and neighborhood.”²²³

No objection was made by the Powers.

Casablanca. On 11 February 1907, complaint was made of the insecurity of *protégés* of Europeans outside of the town, and desire for “the organization of the new police” was expressed.²²⁴ On 10 April, the French Consul at Casablanca reported:

“that the situation in this port has become disquieting because of the warlike attitude of the Chaouya and the malevolent helplessness of the Pacha.”²²⁵

On 23 April, a negro murdered a Moroccan Jew — a Portuguese *protégé*.²²⁶ On 2 May, 300 French soldiers left Tangier for Casablanca: “for the purpose of restoring order in the neighborhood of the town.”²²⁷

On 14 May, the Consul reported:

²²¹ *Ibid.*, No. 102. See also No. 104.

²²² *Ibid.*, No. 134.

²²³ *Ibid.*, No. 123. And see Nos. 124, 128.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 195.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 246.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 265.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 274.

“that anarchy was developing among the neighboring tribes. The tribe of the Rahamna have invited the Doukkala and the Chaouya to arrange with it a general revolt.”²²⁸

On 31 July, it was reported from Casablanca that:

“nine Europeans, of whom three were French, the others, without doubt, Spanish and Italians, were assassinated yesterday by the natives under circumstances particularly tragic. The victims were all workmen of the port.”²²⁹

This was followed by the departure for Tangier of a number of foreigners, including 386 Jews. Thereupon the French ship *Galilée* left Tangier for Casablanca.²³⁰ The Spanish government also sent two warships.²³¹ On 3 August, arrangements were made to send two battalions of infantry and a detachment of mountain artillery from Oran, and also a squadron of cavalry and 800 infantry from Algiers.²³² General Drude was given command, and Commandant Mangin was to assist him.²³³ The number of troops was to be 3000 men, with 300 horses and a battery of artillery.²³⁴ The instructions to the General contemplated:

“the chastisement of the guilty tribes, even to their customary cantonments. In order to reach them, our troops will, no doubt, have to penetrate to the extent of some kilometers from the coast. General Drude has been entrusted with discretion as to the moment and the mode of executing this operation, which will be rapidly accomplished.”²³⁵

The General was directed to open an enquiry as to:

“the authors of the troubles and the outrages of 30 July,” and also as to “the responsibilities incurred as much by the authorities as by the native population —”²³⁶

not by the troops. He was directed to proceed to prompt and vigorous repression,²³⁷ and:

“to inflict without delay severe chastisement on the tribes responsible for the massacres of 30 July.”²³⁸

When the French troops landed, they were fired upon by some of the Moroccan guards, who were easily subdued and disarmed.²³⁹ As reprisal, the ships bombarded the town with destructive energy.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 285.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, Nos. 333, 338.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 334.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, No. 353.

²³² *Ibid.*, No. 350.

²³³ *Ibid.*, No. 351.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 356.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 412.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, Nos. 358, 359.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 359.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 358, *Annexe*. And see No. 368.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 368. And see Nos. 377, 384.

"Nearly every inhabitant had been killed or wounded, or had fled; the dead alone numbered thousands. The European colony was, however, saved."²⁴⁰

The French troops—15,000 strong—having scoured the Chaouya country, imposed as a term of submission the payment of a war-indemnity (the amount fixed by France), a damage-indemnity (the amount to be arranged with the Sultan), and, as mere punishment, the sum of two and a half million francs. Certain of the tribes (one of the documents reads):

"engage to hand over to the French Government their share of the two millions and a half of francs which are to be paid by the Chaouyas within two months, for the enlargement of the port of Casablanca, without prejudice to the indemnity which will be fixed by the Chérifien Government for the losses caused by the events, and to the war indemnity fixed by the French Government. As guarantee for the preceding articles, each of the aforementioned tribes will give two hostages, who will be" (naming them).

In explanation of this, Régnault, the French representative at Tangier, said (26 September 1907):

"Indemnity of two millions and a half has been added to our first demand, in order to show to the tribes, who, in spite of their promises, had allowed the extensions of the first truce to elapse, that our exactions would increase with their delays. This indemnity will be paid by the Chaouyas—that is jointly by the 11 tribes which made war against us."²⁴¹

As was quite inevitable, the action of the French troops aroused still greater indignation among the tribes. It had its repercussions even in the eastern districts of Morocco.

"The action of France at Casablanca aroused the fanaticism of the tribes of Tafilalt and those dwelling near the Algerian border."²⁴²

Extending his investigation as to the responsibility for the episode beyond the limited scope of the instructions issued to the General, and inquiring into the actions of the French troops, the French representative at Tangier reported that the origin of the trouble was to be found in:

"the exasperation produced among the natives by the extraction of stones from an old cemetery for the works of the port. The agent of the Morocco Company has just communicated to me a letter from Casablanca which confirms this allegation."²⁴³

²⁴⁰ *Ency. Brit.* (11th ed.), XVIII, p. 859.

²⁴¹ *Fr. Yell. Bk.: Morocco, 1906-7, No. 497.*

²⁴² *Ency. Brit.*, XVIII, p. 859.

²⁴³ *Fr. Yell. Bk.: Morocco, 1906-7, No. 509.* Particulars of the subsequent incident at Casablanca in 1908—the assistance given by the German Consul to some escaping French deserters, and their forcible recapture—and the reference to the Hague Tribunal may be seen in the *Annual Register, 1908*, pp. [298-9; 1909, p. [311. See also Poincaré: *The Origins of the War*, pp. 85-8.

One would think that allowance ought to have been made for exasperation under such circumstances.

Marakesh — Dr. Mauchamp. On 19 March 1907, Dr. Mauchamp, a French physician, was killed at Marakesh ²⁴⁴ by an excited mob. His unpopularity seems to have come to climax with his erection of a flag pole. One account indicates that the pole was to carry a white flag — emblem of the Doctor's profession; ²⁴⁵ other accounts would lead to the belief that, from it, the French flag was to be floated ²⁴⁶; while the population were convinced that the installation of wireless telegraphy was the purpose, ²⁴⁷ and that possession of the place was being taken. The French authorities made protest to the Sultan, ²⁴⁸ and determined to send a punitive expedition; the Powers were notified of French military intention ²⁴⁹; Germany approved ²⁵⁰; and the troops were despatched with appropriate orders. ²⁵¹

Oudja. In the same month of March, the French government determined to take possession of Oudja, a town not far from the Algerian frontier, and to remain there until satisfaction for the various outrages had been given. ²⁵² They remained until the end of the story.

Police. The disturbances above referred to and others ²⁵³ appeared to make necessary the organization of the contemplated police force, but for a time progress was blocked by refusal of coöperation by the French until the Makhzen had "admitted in principle, and without restriction," the demands for reparation which had been made by the French. ²⁵⁴ On 5 April 1907, this condition was satisfied. ²⁵⁵ As required by article 4 of the Act, the parties named in it met as a commission for the purpose of agreeing upon:

"regulations for the proper working of the recruiting, discipline, instructions, and administration of the police force."

After no less than twenty-four meetings, the regulations were agreed to on 31 May. ²⁵⁶ Subsequently, as required by the Act, they were

Referring to the affair on 3 February 1909, the Russian Ambassador at London said that the Anglo-French relations "stood a severe but convincing test in the Casablanca incident": Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 484.

²⁴⁴ About 225 miles S.W. of Fez and about 80 miles inland from the Atlantic coast.

²⁴⁵ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1906-7, No. 214.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 261, p. 236.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Nos. 243, *Annexe*; 244.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 228. The reply is in No. 243, *Annexe*.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 220.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 223.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Nos. 233, 238.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, No. 219; *Ann. Reg.*, 1907, p. [428.

²⁵³ In addition to the references cited, see Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1906-7, Nos. 256, 283, 290, 399, 418, 454, 455, 528.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, Nos. 245, 247.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 241.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 293.

submitted to the Diplomatic Corps at Tangier, and were approved by them (8 and 10 June) — although the question of armaments was not quite settled.²⁵⁷ Then the French authorities required that the Shereefian Minister of War should:

“personally guarantee that the troops assigned by him would be faithful and disciplined — our instructors being in this way guaranteed by his personal responsibility. . . . We wished to be certain, under this caution, that our instructors would run no risk of being abandoned and massacred by their soldiers.”²⁵⁸

The reply was that it was “impossible to give such a further assurance.”

Further French Progress. In truth, the French did not like the arrangements of the Act of Algeciras for the establishment of mere “police.” They desired (as provided in the Franco-Spanish agreement) the establishment of “military police bodies . . . of native troops” under the command of French and Spanish officers.²⁵⁹ Hence the raising of the difficulties just mentioned, and hence the French Foreign Office circular to the Powers of 27 August 1907, which declared that it was necessary that:

“The two Governments which are charged with the responsibility to assure the security of foreigners in the ports should take counsel as to the method of constituting, provisionally but without more delay, a police out of their own resources, that is to say, with the assistance of their men — ”²⁶⁰

namely, French and Spanish soldiers. Two days afterwards (29 August), a further circular letter was despatched, indicating that reinforcements were necessary for eventualities at Casablanca, Rabat, Mogador, Safi, or Mazagan:

“In all cases the programme of our intervention remains unchanged: Concerted action with Spain, with a view to the prompt and complete organization of a police in the ports designated by the Act of Algeciras; dispersion of the gatherings around Casablanca; no expedition in the interior.”²⁶¹

Germany replied (9 September) by recognizing “the right of France to obtain satisfaction for the Casablanca events,” but, at the same time remarking that:

“the establishment of a corps of foreign police not provided for by the Act of Algeciras might, under present circumstances, produce an attack from the mountain tribes against the town, and serious danger for the life and property of the Europeans.”²⁶²

The warning was well justified by the sequel.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, Nos. 400, 410.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 437.

²⁵⁹ *Ante*, p. 784.

²⁶⁰ *Fr. Yell. Bk.: Morocco, 1906-7, No. 437.*

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, No. 446.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, No. 472.

Contraband Arms. By a circular of 21 September 1907, the French government requested the sanction of the various interested governments to the assumption by France of the position of mandatory of the Sultan in the application of articles 24, 25, 80, and 91 of the Act of Algeciras in order to deal with the illegal importation of arms.²⁶³ Germany assented.²⁶⁴

Moulay Hafid. Attributing the encroachments of the French to the feebleness of the Sultan, Abd-ul-Aziz, and taking advantage of the general dissatisfaction, Moulay Hafid, his half-brother, instituted rebellion, and proclaimed his candidature for the throne.

"The occupation of Casablanca" (by the French) "intensified the disorder in the country. Moulay Hafid was proclaimed Sultan in other cities, and the heads of the tribes and sects were reported to be clamoring for him to lead a Holy War against the infidel."²⁶⁵

At Moulay's inauguration meeting at Marakesh (13 August 1907) a cousin of the Sultan explained the necessity for the movement as follows:

"You have heard that the Sultan has sold us to the Christians; you know the ravages which they have committed at Casablanca, and what they have done to our brothers the Chaouya. For that reason we ought to assist and deliver our brothers from the hands of their enemies who, to-day at Casablanca, will be to-morrow, and will do the same, at Marakesh. It is necessary to constrain ourselves to fulfill the duties of the Holy War. For that it is necessary to have a head, a chief, a king."²⁶⁶

Announcing to the Pacha at Tangier his acceptance of the Sultanate, Moulay Hafid said:

"God has required us to protect the territory of the Mussulmans, above all at the moment of the invasion of enemies the news of which has been spread. And as he who has charge of the Mussulman interests is manifestly powerless, and he abandons himself to inaction, the Holy War has become a necessity for every one."²⁶⁷

In his letter to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps at Tangier, announcing his accession to the Sultanate, Moulay Hafid protested (13 September):

"against the bombardment of Casablanca, which he considers as an event contrary to international usages, without historic precedent, and which is not justified by any sufficient reason."²⁶⁸

Shortly afterwards, Abd-ul-Aziz retired, and Germany, very promptly, recognized Moulay Hafid as Sultan. Before receiving the same recogni-

²⁶³ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1906-7, No. 488.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 504.

²⁶⁵ *Ann. Reg.*, 1907, p. [430.

²⁶⁶ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1906-7, No. 428, *Annexe*.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 453.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 479.

tion from France, Spain, and the United Kingdom, he was required to give satisfactory assurances as to his proposed policy. He gave them, became a French puppet, and eventually paid the same penalty as the man he supplanted.

FRANCO-GERMAN AGREEMENT OF 8 FEBRUARY 1909

The rapidly increasing activity of the French in Morocco having made somewhat certain that the result would be the establishment of a preponderating political influence there, Germany declared that the situation rendered advisable a clearer definition of the interests of the two countries.²⁶⁹ She intimated that she was willing to recognize that France possessed special political interests in Morocco. In exchange for that valuable concession, France was ready to give Germany assurance of certain economic advantage. And after short negotiation, the following "Declaration" was agreed to—8 February 1909. (The words now italicised are important):

"The Government of the French Republic and the Imperial German Government, being equally anxious to *facilitate the execution of the Algeciras Act*, have agreed to define the meaning which they attach to the articles of that Act with a view to avoid in the future all sources of misunderstanding between them.

"Therefore,

"The Government of the French Republic, firmly attached to the maintenance of the *independence and integrity of the Sherrefian Empire*, being resolved to safeguard the principle of economic equality, and, consequently, not to obstruct German commercial and industrial interests in that country;

"And the Imperial German Government, pursuing only economic interests in Morocco, recognizing on the other hand that the special political interests of France are closely bound up with the consolidation of order and internal peace, and being resolved not to impede those interests;

"Declare that they do not pursue nor encourage any measure of a nature to create in their favor, or in that of any Power, an economic privilege, and that *they will endeavor to associate their nationals in affairs for which the latter may obtain a concession.*"²⁷⁰

On this occasion, the German government displayed a conciliatory attitude which astonished the French diplomats. The Russian Ambassador at London relates the story (10 February 1909) as given to him by Paul Cambon (the French Ambassador there):

"Cambon told me, that during the early days of last week the German Government urged the French Cabinet to conclude a Supplementary Treaty to the Algeciras Act; that the French Government did not originally wish to go beyond the latter, as they were of opinion that

²⁶⁹ Mermeix: *Chronique de l'An 1911*, p. 8.

²⁷⁰ Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 303-4.

this Agreement was one of mutual concessions; that, however, Pichon had left Jules Cambon complete freedom of action in this matter. Jules Cambon drew up the documents in question, which were then accepted by the German Government without discussion of any kind. Thereupon, Jules Cambon went to Paris, and the signatures were exchanged, as my French colleague said to me, much to the astonishment of the French Government, a privileged position in Morocco being thus suddenly accorded them by Germany, after objections had repeatedly been made by her against such a position; objections which seemed, even, to threaten peace. Cambon tells me that they are still wondering at Paris how the German attitude can be explained."²⁷¹

Simultaneously with the signing of the Declaration, two letters, intended to be secret, were exchanged. M. Mermeix believes that they made stipulations in favor of France.²⁷² They have never been published. But secrecy was not altogether maintained. The French Government immediately handed copies to the Russian and British governments.²⁷³

This Declaration justifies, to some extent, the German protest,²⁷⁴ against the French designs of 1904-5. As stated upon a previous page,²⁷⁵ France and Spain, in preparation for the Algeciras Conference, had agreed (1 September 1905):

"(a) That all enterprises in connection with public works, railways, roads and canals, the exploitation of mines and quarries and all other enterprises of a commercial or industrial character in the territory of Morocco may be carried out by groups composed of Spaniards and Frenchmen."

"(c) . . . and to employ all the pacific means of which either disposes in order to secure that the participation in the capital and the work of all public enterprises shall be offered to the subjects of both nations."²⁷⁶

Now it is France and Germany who agree:

"that they will endeavor to associate their nationals in affairs for which the latter may claim a concession."²⁷⁷

What practical satisfaction Germany received in that respect, in return for her concessions, is the next subject for inquiry.

The Consortium. Coöperation commenced hopefully. A French company—La Compagnie de N'goko-Sangha—having already been

²⁷¹ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 487.

²⁷² By one of the clauses, Germany renounced the right to demand employment of her nationals in the direction of the public service. By the other, Germany recognized that French economic interests were greater than those of Germany (Mermeix, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-18).

²⁷³ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 487.

²⁷⁴ The landing of the Kaiser at Tangier.

²⁷⁵ Pp. 784-5.

²⁷⁶ Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 249-50.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 304.

incorporated, and concessions given to it, Germany proposed that a French and German consortium should undertake the contemplated work. In response, France suggested that, by way of compensation, a consortium should similarly exploit some territory within the German possessions. Unfortunately, before negotiations could be completed, the French government (Briand) resigned, and was succeeded (2 March 1911) by another (Monis), the members of which had formerly opposed all participation with Germany in the regions affected.²⁷⁸ The negotiations ceased. Germany was disappointed.²⁷⁹

La Société Marocaine. On 17 February 1910, a practical method of association in the working of concessions had been agreed to.²⁸⁰ A company known as *La Société Marocaine de Travaux Publics* was incorporated, in which France was given 50 per cent. of the shares; Germany 25 per cent.; England and Spain $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. each; Austria 5 per cent.; Sweden and Belgium $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. each.²⁸¹ The United Kingdom and Spain were not quite satisfied with their allotments²⁸²; and the former indicated that British subjects would be at liberty to enter competition with the company.²⁸³ The objections, however, were not pressed, and the company was organized. It did nothing. The change in the French government, above referred to, practically ended it. Again, Germany was disappointed.

Moroccan Railways. For military purposes, in connection with the territory which she had occupied, France had constructed two light railways, one in the east and one in the west. Desire to convert these into lines suitable for commercial purposes, and to continue them farther into the interior, brought her into negotiation with Germany — January 1911²⁸⁴; and by the middle of February the two countries had arrived at an understanding of which Germany had submitted a written sketch.²⁸⁵ But this project, too, was frustrated by the change in the French ministry above referred to. For a few days, indeed, the new Foreign Minister — Cruppi — continued the negotiations,²⁸⁶ and then (the ministry not liking the scheme or, at all events, feeling themselves embarrassed by their previous opposition to the consortium proposal), determined to adopt dilatory methods.²⁸⁷ Accordingly, Cruppi asked

²⁷⁸ Mermeix, *op. cit.*, p. 191 ff.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 29, 192; *Contemporary Rev.*, Feb., 1912, p. 266.

²⁸⁰ Poincaré, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

²⁸¹ Mermeix, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

²⁸² *Fr. Yell. Bk.: Morocco, 1910-12, No. 84.*

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, Nos. 109, 120.

²⁸⁴ *Fr. Yell. Bk.: Morocco, 1910-12, Nos. 34, 45, 49, 56, 57, 75.*

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, Nos. 71, 77. Cf. Dr. Dillon: *Contemporary Rev.*, Feb. 1912, pp. 265-6.

²⁸⁶ *Fr. Yell. Bk.: Morocco, 1910-12, Nos. 84, 88, 91.*

²⁸⁷ Mermeix, *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 40, 41, 196. Cruppi denied "any intention having a dilatory tendency" (*Fr. Yell. Bk.: Morocco, 1910-12, No. 203*), but the evidence is strongly against him.

Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin (7 March) to come to Paris for consultation,²⁸⁸ and sent (9 March) the correspondence to London for submission to the Foreign Secretary,²⁸⁹ from whom he may have hoped to receive some helpful word of disagreement. He was disappointed — 16 March.²⁹⁰ Then, after nearly a month's delay, from his last interchange with Germany, Cruppi sent to Cambon (5 April) a new *projet*, which, he said, might be taken as a basis for discussion.²⁹¹ Two points were raised by Kiderlen,²⁹² and Cambon, in reporting to Paris, said:

“It would be desirable that this affair, which has already lasted too long, should not be further retarded.”²⁹³

Declaring himself dissatisfied with the German suggestions, Cruppi terminated the negotiations, telling Cambon that the contemplated construction would be limited to the work necessary for military purposes; and that the cost would be defrayed by France alone, while the operations would be entrusted to the Société Marocaine.²⁹⁴ Cambon so notified Germany, but, in reporting (21 April), said:

“I ought not to hide from you that it would appear to me to be preferable to give Germany more general satisfaction for a fixed period.”²⁹⁵

Once more, Germany was disappointed. If, says M. Mermeix in *Chronique de l'an 1911*, the French government:

“had given their approbation to the convention which M. Pichon had prepared, and which they themselves had happily amended, M. de Kiderlen would not have been able to say, as he afterwards did to our ambassador: ‘After the interruption of the affair of the railways, I saw that you wished to have nothing to do with us.’”²⁹⁶

On another occasion, Kiderlen said:

“You have not wished to deal with us; without speaking of the Bagdad [railway], to which you still make opposition, and which will be built without you, you have dropped La N’goko-Sangha, and you refuse to sign the convention relating to the Morocco railways.”²⁹⁷

Even from some of their own publicists, the French government has not escaped blame. M. Philippe Millet, for example, writing in the *Nineteenth Century*, with reference to the failure of “every one of the Franco-German economic schemes,” said:

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, Nos. 92, 95, 97.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 98.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 120.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, No. 155.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, Nos. 165, 173.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, No. 173.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 188.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 207.

²⁹⁶ Mermeix, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

"It would be unfair to deny that the French Government was responsible for a number of those failures. Such was especially the case with the Franco-German *consortium* in the Congo. The scheme provided for the investment of German capital in a large part of French territory; it included the payment of a considerable compensation to a French company. It was bitterly attacked, in a more or less direct way, by several parliamentary groups, mainly by Mr. E. D. Morel's French friends. The French Cabinet did not feel strong enough to resist these attacks, and dropped the scheme after the Germans had been led to believe, for a whole year, that the matter was satisfactorily settled. Under those circumstances, it is not surprising that the Germans should have thought they were being cheated. They had already found French diplomacy in their way in the Bagdad railway question, where France stood by England and Russia, and also in the Ouenza affair in Algeria, which has been at a standstill for many years owing to parliamentary opposition. They had, it must be confessed, certain good reasons to be dissatisfied with the working of the economic side of the 1909 agreement.²⁹⁸

FRANCO-MOROCCAN RELATIONS

Whatever may be thought of German complaints in these respects, there can be little doubt that the actions of the French government subsequent to the Franco-German agreement of 8 February 1909, violated the stipulated basis of the agreement, namely, "the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Shereefian Empire." Observe the following.

Franco-Moroccan Agreement, 4 March 1910. The new Sultan, Moulay Hafid, sank rapidly and ever more deeply, into helplessness. Between August 1909 and 4 March 1910, he committed himself to arrangements²⁹⁹ which, as he was well aware, would excite resentment among his people. The three principal matters dealt with, preliminarily on 14 August-25 December 1909, and finally on 4 March 1910, were as follows:

First. Ever since the troubles in 1907, French troops had remained in Casablanca and the district of Chaouya. Now, it was agreed, the latter was to be evacuated when:

"the Makhzen will have brought into this region a Moroccan force of 1,500 men, organized and trained, under the direction of the French military mission in conditions analogous to those of the harbor police, and capable of maintaining in the province the safety of persons and of property, as well as of all commercial transactions" (Art. 1).

Collection of the:

²⁹⁸ June 1912, p. 1049.

²⁹⁹ *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, VI, Supp., pp. 31-49.

“fine of two and a half million francs imposed upon the Chaouya tribes because of their attitude during the events at Casablanca and approved by them”

was provided for (Art. 5). The amounts:

“shall be applied to the enlargement of the construction works in the harbor of Casablanca after the contract relative to this enlargement shall have been concluded between the Makhzen and the French Company, ‘The Moroccan Company’ in conformity with the plan that will be presented by the construction engineer of the Makhzen for the approval of His Shereefian Majesty” (Art. 6).

“The Shereefian Government declares that it agrees to pay the war costs occasioned by the French military occupation in the Moroccan Empire; a special agreement shall be reached regarding the manner in which these expenses shall be paid” (Art. 8).

Evacuation of Casablanca was to take place when France:

“shall have been convinced that the organization specified for Chaouya is able to secure efficient order within the borders, and when sufficient guarantees shall have been given to it by the Makhzen relative to the refunding of the military expenditures mentioned in Article 8, and for the payment of indemnities to the victims of the Casablanca troubles” (Art. 10).

—*Second.* France was to remain in occupation of certain places in the region adjoining Algeria, paying an indemnity “to be subsequently determined by mutual agreement.” Certain other places were to be evacuated by her upon certain conditions:

“The Makhzen shall designate a Shereefian High Commissioner in order to reach an understanding with the French High Commissioner with a view of enforcing the agreements of 1901 and 1902” (Art. 3³⁰⁰).

“The Shereefian High Commissioner shall receive without delay the powers necessary to the execution of his attributions, especially the right to propose, after a preliminary understanding with the French High Commissioner, the appointment and the removal of the caïds and other Moroccan functionaries” (Art. 4).

“The number of French troops stationed in the frontier region shall be reduced in proportion to the increase of the effective force of the Makhzenian police, which is to be organized on the basis indicated in Article 9. When this Makhzenian troop shall have reached the number

³⁰⁰ There was to be no further dealing with the Makhzen. That had been dilatory and difficult. Power thenceforth was to be placed in a single hand — friendly, no doubt, to France. “A treaty of 1845 had defined a boundary which had been very imperfectly surveyed and had never existed for practical purposes. On 20 July 1901, a protocol was signed between France and Morocco looking to the policing and control of the frontier region and to the establishment of markets in it. It was supplemented by an agreement of 20 April 1902, and additional articles thereto of 7 May 1902” (*Am. Jour. Int. Law*, VIII, p. 867).

of 2,000 effective men, the number indicated in Article 1 of the treaty of 1844, and when it shall have been deemed capable of maintaining security and of facilitating commercial transactions, in short, capable of insuring the collection of imposts and other taxes, the French troops shall then be returned to the Algerian side of the frontier line" (Art. 6).

"The Makhzenian force referred to in Article 6 shall be organized on the following basis: It shall be composed of Moroccan Mussulman soldiers, recruited through enlistments, trained and commanded by a sufficient number of French and Algerian officers and sub-officers; it shall have a list of Moroccan officers. It shall be self-governing and placed under the authority of a French commandant, approved by the Makhzen; and the commandant shall be under the immediate authority of the French Shereefian High Commissioners" (Pt. II, Art. 9).

"With regard to Bou Denib and Bou Anane, the French Government is willing to vacate these posts without waiting until the Makhzen shall have located there an organized force, but on the condition that the freedom of commercial relations, and the security of caravans be sufficiently assured. . . . As soon as this system shall operate in a satisfactory manner the number of French troops will be gradually decreased and returned to Algeria" (Art. 10).³⁰¹

Third. With reference to finance, the Sultan's debts were recited as amounting to eighty million francs, and "the military expenses to be refunded to France" were stated to be seventy millions more. France proposed to arrange a loan for the eighty millions, and to take the seventy millions in seventy-five annual payments of 2,740,000 francs. As security, all customs revenues still unappropriated were to be handed over, France demanding that:

"While thus respecting the wishes of the Makhzen regarding his sovereign authority, it will be necessary to reserve exclusively to the French delegate all administrative powers necessary for him to insure the regularity of the administration of these revenues and to enable him to fully secure the bondholders and the French Government."³⁰²

Military Reorganization. These matters settled, Colonel Mangin proceeded (as he said) to:

"submit all the troops present at Fez to a reorganization based upon the provisional regulation which I established at his" (the Sultan's) "request in March 1909."³⁰³

but was met by unexpected difficulties. Out of 5,547 soldiers, only 3,997 would accept service on the new conditions. The Colonel was nevertheless not altogether dissatisfied. He said (9 November 1910):

"The ensemble of these arrangements, the authority which is con-

³⁰¹ The agreement is to be found in *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, VI, Supp., pp. 42-9.

³⁰² *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, VI, Supp., p. 37.

³⁰³ *Fr. Yell. Bk.: Morocco, 1910-12, No. 17.*

ferred upon us, the adoption by the Makhzen of the following principles: proportion between the soldiery and the financial resources, permanence of the soldiery, guarantee of the rank for officers and sub-officers, necessity for rules of discipline and of military justice, really constitute a sort of military revolution. Some progress will result from it. Conditionally, however, upon the Makhzen, the versatility of which is known, retaining its present goodwill and assuring the regularity of the payments. Nevertheless, the progress will be of real importance only on the day that the troops are placed in barracks, their pay improved, and their chiefs entirely subordinated to the European instructors.”³⁰⁴

For the work in hand, the Colonel needed four officers and seven sub-officers,³⁰⁵ and shortly afterwards (12 December 1910) he asked for an additional supply of ten officers and twenty sub-officers.³⁰⁶

Helplessness of the Sultan. The Sultan's impotence was now complete. His position, as against his people, could be maintained only by military forces under French direction; for the maintenance of the forces he needed French gold; and French gold could be obtained only at the cost of further and still further surrender of authority. A report from M. Gaillard, the French representative at Fez (8 February 1911), makes clear the effect of French intervention:

“I believe him [the Sultan] sincerely convinced that his country is obliged by the force of circumstances to enter upon a new course, and that he himself would not be able to retain his throne in repeating past mistakes. He has commenced the military reorganization in a spirit of determination which we must not overlook, but he is well aware that that is a means and not an end. He said to me himself in the course of a conversation, and I have found in Si Tayeb the same preoccupations, that it will not suffice to re-establish the authority of the Makhzen over the tribes: the old system of the collection of the imposts would tend very strongly to reproduce disorder, and the Makhzen, whose fixed revenues have all been alienated, could not content itself with aleatory resources. It will therefore be necessary to reform completely the imposts upon the tribes, which will necessitate a modification of the internal administration and of the methods of the Makhzen.

“It would be premature to draw from this state of things precise conclusions, because the attitude of the Sultan and the political orientation of the Makhzen will depend upon what may have been settled in Paris. But what I see at Fez, and the general state of the country, confirm me in the opinion which I have indicated in several preceding reports; I am persuaded that the Government of Moulay Hafid, paralysed by the abuse of protection and deprived of the revenues of the ports, is destined to be overwhelmed in a short time, if the military reorganization is not

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.* And see No. 39.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 14.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 27. And see No. 66.

complemented by administrative and financial reform; the Sultan, who knows the situation, will do what is necessary, but only if he is sustained by me, and if he receives the assurances which he asks."³⁰⁷

Meanwhile, the Sultan must manage as best he can:

"up to the moment that he will know exactly the nature and the effectiveness of the support we can give him."³⁰⁸

Franco-Moroccan Agreement, March-April 1911. Very soon the Sultan realized that the financial arrangements of 1910³⁰⁹ were inadequate, for by them no provision had been made for his future expenses. He had, indeed, been offered an annual loan of three million francs until his revenue would provide the amount necessary, but he had declined to accept it. The next year he was plunged into still greater financial difficulty. "Reforms," as they were called—in reality, further military organization, construction of railways, &c., upon elaborate scales—were pressed upon him and agreed to. For these money was needed. France was willing, and a new Franco-Moroccan agreement was entered into, under which advances were to be made as follows:

(1) The State Bank was to advance

2,350,000 francs for police purpose, and

5,000,000 francs per annum for three years, for the reorganization of a military force under French direction.

(2) France was to advance

43,000,000 francs for public works including a railway from Tangier to El Ksar; and

15,000,000 francs for liquidation of the Sultan's debts.

Among other securities, France was to have the lighthouse dues, and the taxes at the ports.³¹⁰ The troops were to

"be organized according to a military budget fixed by the Sultan for a period of three years, and established by the Shereefian Minister of Finance with the concurrence of the Chief of our Military Mission, and that the powers of this officer will be determined by a regulation embracing all the points of the new military organization. The Shereefian force, which will consist of about 5,700 men, will be employed to induce respect for the authority of the Makhzen and to ensure, in case of necessity, the collection of the impost."³¹¹

The Accompanying Letters. The letters which accompanied the signing of this agreement created a military alliance between France and the Sultan as against the subjects of the Sultan. The letter of the repre-

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 65, *Annexe*.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁹ *Ante*, pp. 818-20.

³¹⁰ *Fr. Yell. Bk.: Morocco, 1910-12, Nos. 67, 104, 105.*

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, No. 104.

sentative of the Sultan (13 March 1911) was as follows (Italics now added):

“His Majesty Moulay Hafid has resolved to proceed to the reorganization of his fortunate army. Recognizing the eminent services rendered to the Makhzen by your military Mission since the reign of Moulay el Hassan, His Majesty will make appeal only to France for aid in order to attain these results. The powers confided by His Majesty to the chief of the French military Mission and to the French instructors are confirmed and will be completed by a regulation established between the Shereefian Makhzen and the French Legation at Tangier. . . . If some misunderstandings arise, and if on the occasion of these reforms some ignorant rebels arouse excitements, His Majesty Moulay Hafid will employ all his efforts to hinder the propagation of the disorder and to chastise the authors of the troubles by means of his fortunate army. In case the troubles assume a character of such gravity as to endanger the general security, His Majesty, recognizing the great desire of your Government to see peace and tranquillity established in the Empire, on account of the common interests which unite the two countries by reason of their neighborhood, will examine with the Government of the Republic the methods which it will be advisable to employ to root out the origin of the troubles. His Majesty Moulay Hafid has confidence that *if, in these conditions, he shall be led to ask the support of France, the Government will assure it to him with a view to the maintenance of his throne and the independence of his sovereignty, conformably to the principles of the Act of Algeciras.*”³¹²

In reply, the Foreign Minister said on 16 March:

“If serious troubles arise which might prove prejudicial to the general security, the Government of the Republic will examine the situation with His Majesty Moulay Hafid, and will lend its assistance in the regions where French agents and authorities have the right to exercise their activity, in such a way as to avoid propagation of the troubles and to maintain the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty conformably to the Act of Algeciras. An entente will be arranged between the two governments with reference to the means by which these results may be obtained.”³¹³

The terms were arranged by Mokri, the Sultan's representative at Paris. They were immediately confirmed by the French government,³¹⁴ and by the Sultan on 8 April.³¹⁵ Very clearly, they were quite incompatible with the specified basis of the Franco-German agreement of 8 February 1909 — “the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Shereefian Empire.” But of that, Germany, for the moment,

³¹² *Ibid.*, No. 106.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, No. 121.

³¹⁴ *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 54.

³¹⁵ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, Nos. 172, 410.

cared less than for fulfillment of the arrangement for Franco-German association in concessions, and, pending negotiations as to these, she declared that discussion of the effect of the Franco-Moroccan agreements ought to be deferred.³¹⁶

The Franco-Moroccan agreement was of importance in another respect, for it may be regarded as the commencement of the antagonism between France and Spain—an antagonism which lasted, as we shall see, during the greater part of the period of the Franco-German crisis of 1911. The agreement was, very clearly, prejudicial to the position assigned to Spain by her arrangements with France.

THE SULTAN IN TROUBLE

The Sultan and the Tribes. The reason for the somewhat general revolt against Abd-ul-Aziz in 1907 had been his subservience to foreign influence; and his half-brother, Moulay Hafid, had recommended himself as successor by declaring a holy war against the infidels. Depending upon French support and French money, the new Sultan, in his turn, encountered similar opposition. As his difficulties increased, so increased also his dependence on the French; and further French support inflamed still more the opposition of the tribes. Thus the Sultan and France became leagued against the people, and a French expedition in support of the Sultan at Fez, his capital, was necessitated by the successes of the "rebels."

The Grand Vizier, El Glaoui, disapproved the Europeanizing policy of the Sultan, and did what he could to thwart it. In a letter of 4 March 1911, M. de Billy, the French representative at Tangier, reported as follows:

"It is necessary to add that the Grand Vizier, who dreads to see the power of the Sultan impaired, will do what he can to combat the authority of our instructors. Already it is he who has sought to spread the belief, in Europe as at Fez, that the discontent of the tribes is due to the military reorganization and to the preponderant situation which the Sultan has given to France. It is likewise the Glaoui who, after having incited the Sultan to execute two soldiers recently shot, has relied upon that execution as a pretext for placing all the responsibility on Commandant Mangin. Moulay Hafid, who has permitted the Glaoui to destroy or annihilate practically all of the Grand Caïds of the South, counts eventually on our support and on the reorganization of the troops to place the Grand Vizier in the situation of vassalage which he is very much disposed to forget."³¹⁷

In a later letter (5 April), M. de Billy said that the tribes: "are persuaded that if they make peace, Moulay Hafid will press the

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 139.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 83.

organization of his troops and afterwards avenge himself for the injuries to which he sees himself forced to submit to-day. It is possible also that the Berbers, if they have the upper hand, will demand the departure of the Europeans or at least that of the instructors. . . . The Chief of the military Mission ³¹⁸ attributes the gravity of the situation to the general disaffection, to the lack of money, and to the antagonism which exists between the Sultan and his Grand Vizier.” ³¹⁹

In a still later letter (18 April), M. de Billy said:

“The movement among the Arab tribes is above all anti-Makhzénian; It is, among the Berbers, very clearly anti-European; now, it is the Berbers who are at the head of the insurrection.” ³²⁰

The Berbers, M. de Billy said (13 April):

“wish no more of the Glaoui, no more regular army, no more instructors.” ³²¹ A month later (5 May), when the revolt in the vicinity of Fez had become general, he reported:

“The suppression of the reforms is now demanded, and also the extrusion of the Europeans who are at Fez.” ³²²

In a report (7 August 1911) with reference to the causes of the insurrection of the tribes in the Fez region, M. Gaillard, the French representative at Fez, said:

“But the determining causes of the rising were the exactions of the Grand Vizier, and the brutality of the agents whom he sent among the tribes to transmit abusive contributions.” ³²³

“These proceedings had irritated above all the influential and rich personages who were the principal victims. These, in order to move the popular masses, were exploiting among them the fact that Moulay Hafid, a former champion of the holy war, was making a friend of Europe. Above all, they laid stress on the military reforms: the Makhzen, they said, wished to create a powerful army commanded by the Christians, in order to be able to crush the tribes: they are exploiting also the fact that the Sultan had caused a soldier and a native of the Hayaïna to be shot in the month of January last, for desertion and for theft of military effects. This propaganda gave to the rebellion a character of xénophobia which became accentuated in the sequel.” ³²⁴

³¹⁸ Colonel Mangin.

³¹⁹ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 153.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 193.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, No. 174.

³²² *Ibid.*, No. 254.

³²³ That the exactions were not always imposed in the most tactful way may be judged from the fact that on one occasion, in order to strengthen his authority with four of the tribes, the Sultan decided to place over them Caïds from other tribes; and when he met with opposition, he proceeded to impose his will by force, and “to profit by their revolt to exact the payment of penalties” (The French representative at Tangier to the French Foreign Minister, 10 January: *Ibid.*, No. 37).

³²⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 493, *Annexe*, 1.

To the same effect was the report (24 July 1911) of the French Commandant Brémont:

"Caused by the exactions of the men from the South, the revolutionary movement, from the time of the engagement of 7 March, acquired a character of holy war against the Sultan, sold, they said, to the Christians, and against those. The propaganda during the month of March was very active, and the engagement of 12 April, at the Tselfat, clarified the situation completely: fury of the adversary, imprecations thrown at our soldiers, enemy having made the ablutions and put on new garments before the combat."³²⁵

The Sultan and "the new policy." A conversation between the Sultan and M. Gaillard, the French representative at Fez (14 March), as reported by the French representative at Tangier, reveals the embarrassment of the Sultan. Being counselled by the French officials to pursue a policy of conciliation toward the revolting tribes:

"Moulay Hafid replied that it was necessary above all things to avoid allowing himself to be intimidated as was his predecessor. At the same time he admits that while avoiding the appearance of feebleness, it was necessary to seek an opportunity for negotiation. M. Gaillard added that for the future it would be necessary to discontinue those government proceedings which had caused the present insurrection. Moulay Hafid, while recognizing that certain of these proceedings had not been of a happy character, observed that the reason for the fiscal exigencies of the Makhzen had, in large measure, been the military reorganization. He had hoped that his good-will would have merited him the support of the government of the Republic. Mokri³²⁶ has, however, been at Paris for four months without being able to make arrangements and without any one showing even the least eagerness to hear his proposals, which are intended, nevertheless, only to establish and to regulate the policy of collaboration to which the Shereefian government has been insistently urged. It is because the financial resources are insufficient that the Makhzen has been obliged to show itself more exigent than it had desired. 'If I consented to adopt a reactionary policy,' said Moulay Hafid, in closing, 'the rebellion would be quickly quieted; in reality, I fight in order to be able to pursue the reforms and to keep my promises. If we have success, the impression produced will be considerable, and the military reorganization, of which the efficacy has been demonstrated, will be accepted without contest. In that case, I am resolved to push even still further the new policy, for I feel that it will be necessary to have railways and telegraphs in order to impose completely the makhzénian authority, and I know that for this purpose your aid is necessary for me. If this aid should fail, there would remain only a

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, *Annexe*, 2.

³²⁶ The representative of the Sultan.

single method by which to withdraw from the affair: It is to accept the condition of the Berbers and to adopt an anti-European policy. When such was my line of conduct, all Morocco was with me; but I do not see any middle course between the two policies, and I will try not to act like my predecessor, wavering back and forth to final and inevitable downfall." ³²⁷

Very clearly, Moulay Hafid had lost all sympathy (as had previously, his half-brother) with Moroccan sentiment. He, too, had ceased to be "anti-European" — had become, in the estimate of his people, a traitor. And he was suffering the penalty. If he had consented to what he had learned to call "a policy of reaction," all Morocco would have been with him. Not having consented, all Morocco was about to demand his deposition. Upon France he relied for protection and support. For protection he needed money. For money he imposed taxes. Collection proceedings were not always "of a happy character." Hence rebellions. Railways and telegraphs were wanted "in order to impose completely the makhzénian authority." For these, too, money was needed and taxation a necessity. The Sultan was in trouble.

The Loyal Troops go to Fez. Commandant Brémond (a French instructor), at the head of some of the Sultan's troops who as yet remained loyal (about 2,500), had been engaged principally in suppressing the Cherarda. Shall these men be brought to Fez to support the Sultan against the "rebels"? And what will be the effect? Upon these points the French representative at Fez reported (2 April 1911):

" . . . all the tribes of North Morocco from Rabat to El Ksar are very hostile to the Makhzen, and those who support it are ready to leave it as soon as they are convinced of its weakness. . . . The Sultan thought, last evening, of requiring the return of the Cherarda méhalla, but he has not given effect to his idea. I agree with Commandant Mangin in the opinion that it would be an inopportune measure. Up to the present, this méhalla has assured our communications with Tangier and the coast; its return to Fez would be followed by an uprising of all the tribes which at this moment it holds in check. We would find ourselves here with a force which would be sufficient for the defence of the town, but very much too weak to reduce the rebels, and famine would rapidly compel us to capitulate." ³²⁸

Colonel Mangin, reporting from Fez on the same day, said:

"the few troops who are here are entirely demoralized. Their chiefs are hostile to the régime." ³²⁹

A few days afterwards, however, circumstances changed, and the Colonel directed (11 April) Commandant Brémond to return his méhalla to

³²⁷ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 129.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 144.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 143.

the capital.³³⁰ Surmounting difficulties, they arrived on 26 April.³³¹ But communication with the coast was in this way surrendered,³³² and the "loyal troops, fraternizing with their fellows at Fez (almost all of whom were in revolt),³³³ soon became likewise unreliable."³³⁴ They did not relish being called "the méhalla of Christians."³³⁵ And M. de Billy reported from Tangier (5 and 7 May):

"Suppression of the reforms is now demanded, as also the sending away of the Europeans who are at Fez. . . . It results from all this that Moulay Hafid, if he is left to his own resources, is destined fatally to succumb. This intervention, in case it takes place, ought, in my opinion, to be undertaken immediately, and under the following conditions. . . ."³³⁶

"The chiefs declare to me that they regard the cause of Moulay Hafid as lost, now that the blockade cannot be broken, and that the town cannot hold out more than a fortnight. The total absence of news from Tangier, as well as the recent instructions, places us in the greatest confusion."³³⁷

Moulay Zin. As climax to his troubles, Moulay Hafid now heard that his deposition had been proclaimed at Mekinez, and that his half-brother, Moulay Zin, had been proclaimed as his successor to lead in the holy war.³³⁸

"It was necessary," Moulay Zin said, "to send back all the Europeans living in the interior, and forbid them for the future to remain outside the ports."³³⁹

Sultan asks Assistance. Thoroughly alarmed, Moulay Hafid formally requested, on 27 April, that French troops should be sent to his assistance at Fez. He said:

" . . . conformably with the promises of your friendly government to lend its support in case of necessity, we have asked that the méhalla in question may be supported by a French force designed to second it and to render it assistance, in order to obtain the desired end, that is to say, to re-establish peace in these regions, and remove the causes of trouble and agitation by preserving our Shereefian authority and the independence of our Empire."³⁴⁰

This request was, of course, the inevitable result of "the new policy"

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 182.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, No. 252.

³³² "*Nous sommes bloqués à Fez*": *ibid.*, No. 193.

³³³ *Ibid.*, No. 254. Cf. *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 102.

³³⁴ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 260.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 252.

³³⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 254.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 260.

³³⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 253.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 280, *Annexe*. Cf. *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 82.

which had been pressed by the French government upon the Sultan. Welcoming its arrival, France agreed: ³⁴¹

“to relieve the town of Fez, under siege by the rebels, and to safeguard the foreign colonies,”

saying, somewhat hypocritically (16 May), that she had:

“never ceased to consider that the maintenance of the Shereefian power is, for our policy, an essential principle; that the Act of Algeciras has equally posited it as the condition of all reform.”

France required, nevertheless, the prior assent of the Sultan to various stipulations, namely: (1) that an end should be put to the administrative abuses, thus inaugurating a civilized government; (2) that the new tax, the *tertib*, should be put in operation; (3) that the finances should be administered with probity and prudence, under French control; (4) that public works should be undertaken; and (5) that reorganization of the army, under French direction, should be commenced without delay, &c. In other words, that French control should be still further established.

FRANCO-GERMAN CONVERSATIONS PRIOR TO THE FEZ EXPEDITION

German Warning. Having heard rumors of proposed military action in Morocco on the part of France, von Kiderlen (German Foreign Minister) asked Jules Cambon (the French Ambassador) as to the intentions of France (13 March 1911). Kiderlen said that he had no observation to make with reference to the administration of necessary punishment to aggressors, but added the warning (as reported by Cambon) that:

“by small successive military operations, we might be progressively drawn into a sort of occupation, always more extended, which would finish by annulling the Act of Algeciras. In these conditions it would seem desirable to the Secretary of State that the Government of the Republic should make known its intentions, as soon as they are formulated, to the governments who are signatories of the Act of Algeciras.”

Cambon replied:

“that the Government of the Republic had not made any resolutions, and that our intention was to respect, as we have always heretofore done, the Act of Algeciras.” ³⁴²

French Notification of Proposed Action. German Warning. On 4 April 1911, Cambon notified von Kiderlen that the French government proposed to occupy Rabat, a port on the Atlantic, for two purposes: first, in order that they might attack the Zaer, to whose account was charged the murder of Captain Marchand; and second, in order to be in a position to send a military column to Fez, to protect the Eu-

³⁴¹ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 292.

³⁴² *Ibid.*, No. 102.

ropeans there.³⁴³ After some conversations,³⁴⁴ Kiderlen replied in writing (7 April), saying that:

“The occupation by France of a second important port,³⁴⁵ close to that of Casablanca, would be considered as a step toward the elimination of the Convention of Algeciras, for all is quiet at this moment at Rabat, and the occupation of the town could only have an indirect object. I fear that this occupation, in place of quieting feeling, would excite passions on one side and on the other, and would be, in Morocco, a cause of unrest and trouble. It is not necessary to recall what took place after the occupation of Casablanca.”

He hoped that the Republic would not proceed to the act of military occupation except under necessity. During one of the conversations, Kiderlen said:

“Be sincere, I pray you, and let us throw our cards on the table! When you are at Fez, you will not leave it.”

Asked by Cambon why he asserted that the French would not leave Fez, Kiderlen replied:

“Even if you wish to leave Fez, you will not be able to do it. Remember what happened in China. You will be accused of bad faith, when you will be kept there in spite of yourselves.”³⁴⁶

At the date of the French notification, communication with Tangier and the coast was uninterrupted, and the Europeans could have withdrawn had they so desired.³⁴⁷ If the idea was that they were to remain under the protection of French troops, military occupation of the town would necessarily be permanent. It was.

On the 19th of April, Cambon had a long conversation with the German Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg.³⁴⁸ Cambon intimated that his government had two intentions: (1) to form a Shereefian méhalla destined to march on Fez, and (2), “in the case of absolute necessity,” to send French troops to the succor of the Europeans residing in that city. Bethmann said:

“You know what the German opinion is with reference to Morocco. I cannot refrain from taking account of it. If you go to Fez, you will not withdraw, and in that case it is the question which will then be presented in its entirety that, at any cost, I wish to avoid.”

Cambon said:

“Who says to you that we will not withdraw from Fez as soon as we have saved the Europeans? In this affair, the truly important point

³⁴³ *Ibid.*, Nos. 154, 166. Cf. *Un Livre Noir*, II, No. 478.

³⁴⁴ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 166: the *Annexes*.

³⁴⁵ France had been at Casablanca since Aug. 1907. Rabat was not occupied. See *ibid.*, No. 219.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 166, *Annexes*.

³⁴⁷ *Ante*, p. 827. France indicated that the French troops were to conduct the Europeans back to the coast. See speech of von Bethmann-Hollweg, 9 Nov. 1911: *post*, p. 834.

³⁴⁸ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 200.

is that it may not be said, either in France or in Germany, that, at the instance of the German government, the French do not occupy Fez, for if you have to manage the pride of your compatriots, we have on our side to take account of that of the French.”³⁴⁹

Bethmann insisted on the fact that in Morocco the insurrection was not aimed at the Europeans, but was directed against the Sultan. Cambon replied that one could not tell what would follow upon the fall of the Makhzen:

“It is possible that the Arabs seek only to depose the Sultan, but the Berbers hate the Europeans without making any distinction, and I do not know who will restrain them.”

Bethmann replied:

“In fine, I can only insist upon the importance that there is to observe the Act of Algeciras, for the difficulties will commence from the moment that the French troops are at Fez. It is not possible, therefore, for me to encourage you. All that I can do is to counsel you to be prudent. . . . I do not say to you No, because I do not wish to take the responsibility for your compatriots; but — I repeat it — I do not encourage you.”³⁵⁰

On 25 April, another conversation took place between Cambon and the Chancellor at which the latter repeated his impression that, according to his advices, there might be danger to the Sultan but not to Europeans, and that:

“‘the situation did not appear to justify the emotion of the French despatches.’ Cambon replied ‘that the dangers which menaced Moulay Hafid were sufficient to prove to what extent order in Morocco was in danger.’ The Chancellor added: ‘When you are at Fez, will you be able to abandon Moulay Hafid? Will you be able to leave Fez? But if you do not leave it, do you estimate that the independence of Morocco will be unaffected? It is then that will commence the difficulties of which I cannot at this moment realize the extent, but which will go far, and which may destroy all the work which the two Governments have labored to accomplish during the last three years.’”³⁵¹

The British Foreign Office was of the same opinion as to the difficulty of withdrawal, the Under Secretary saying (9 May 1911):

“that the experience of all European States, beginning with England, shows that it is easier to occupy a city than to withdraw again.”³⁵²

³⁴⁹ At this period, as at others, the good intentions of the diplomats were much embarrassed by articles in the newspapers of both sides: Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, Nos. 207, 235. Cambon himself had to deplore the articles in the French journals, especially when they spoke of the intended “Tunisianization of Morocco” (*Ibid.*, Nos. 207, 210).

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 200.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, No. 220. The report of the above conversations by the Russian Ambassador at Berlin may be seen in Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 579-80.

³⁵² Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 581.

Nevertheless, Sir Edward Grey, in pursuance of treaty promises to give France diplomatic support in Morocco, approved the expedition.³⁵³

French Notification of Preparation. On the same date as the last conversation with the Chancellor, above referred to (25 April), a French circular despatch was sent to the various Powers, indicating the spread of the rebellion accompanied by an attack on Fez, and announcing that the Republic had deemed it:

“a duty to take, without further delay, new measures in order to put itself in a situation, in case circumstances demanded, to send to the relief of the foreign colonies residing at Fez, French instructors, as also Shereefian troops.”

At the same time:

“new French troops, designed eventually to support the light column, are now being sent to Casablanca.”

The government protested that there was no intention to occupy new territories:

“but only to serve as support of the Shereefian *harka*, to bring succor to the menaced foreign colonies, and to establish order under the authority of the Sultan in opposing himself to violence and disorder. It will not prejudice in any way the principles of the Act of Algeciras.”³⁵⁴

Further Conversations. In a conversation of the 26th April, Zimmermann (acting in the absence of Kiderlen) said to Cambon:

“I am persuaded that the French Government is sincere, but the forward march on Fez is none the less a new fact which may become grave inasmuch as no one is in a position to foresee what circumstances may be produced in Morocco. A prolonged occupation of Fez is of a nature to give to the Act of Algeciras the blow which you wish to avoid; if the Act of Algeciras, as well as our agreements which followed it, is broken, it is not possible to foresee what may happen.”

Cambon reported that Zimmermann:

“then insisted on the state of opinion in Germany, which at the moment is very nervous on the question of Morocco.”³⁵⁵

In a further conversation of the 28th April, Kiderlen said to Cambon (as the latter reported):

“that the events had always carried us, since the commencement of the Morocco affairs, farther than we said we wished to go, and that, notably, we had passed, since the last incident, from a Moroccan *méhall*a to a *méhall*a directed by French officers; from this *méhall*a to an expeditionary column; and that the French journals spoke only of the generals who were to take command; he added that, in consequence, he feared that it would be at Fez as in the past. The best course is to speak frankly. If when you have entered Fez you will not be able to withdraw;

³⁵³ *Ibid.*; *Cam. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, III, 439.

³⁵⁴ *Fr. Yell. Bk.: Morocco, 1910-12, No. 219.*

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 225.

if to maintain the power of the Sultan requires the bayonets of the French soldiers, we shall not consider that the conditions of the Act of Algeciras will be respected, and we shall resume our liberty.”

Cambon replied:

“You do not imagine that we would enter Fez in order to remain there only twenty-four hours; we will remain at Fez for the time necessary to re-establish order, that is to say some weeks, then the Government of the Republic will withdraw its troops, as soon as their task is terminated.”

Kiderlen rejoined:

“That is precisely the point; I do not at all wish to doubt the intentions with which your Government is animated, but the question is to know when the French agents in the locality will conclude that the task is accomplished and that order is re-established.”³⁵⁶

Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, had little difficulty in foreseeing the result. Not doubting Cruppi's good intentions, he said (6 June 1911):

“This programme is, as one sees, without reproach. The only question is whether it will be possible to execute it, and whether it will not involve France in a prolonged struggle against Moroccan anarchy, and finally will lead her to take possession of the whole country and to correlative international complications.”³⁵⁷

All of which happened.

German Chancellor's Speech. The above extracts are taken from the *French Yellow Book*. With them may be read a few sentences of the speech of the German Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, in the Reichstag on 9 November 1911 — after settlement of the difficulty had been arrived at. He said:

“The Algeciras Act was intended to maintain the independence of Morocco with a view to the economic development of the country for the benefit of the trade of all the Powers parties to it. It was soon evident that one of the essential conditions was lacking, namely, a Sultan who was actual ruler of the country, and was in a position to carry out the reforms contemplated. Even Sultan Moulay Hafid could not do so in spite of his personal qualities. He became more and more dependent upon foreign influence, and came into constantly increasing conflict with the tribes of his own country in consequence. This led to ever-growing influence on the part of France, for of the four Powers which since the seventies possessed treaty rights to maintain military missions at the Sultan's Court, only the French Mission had succeeded in establishing its position. In the same way France had for long supplied Morocco with money. The position of the Sultan, surrounded by hostile tribes and shut up in Fez, became eventually so precarious that France informed

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 239.

³⁵⁷ *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 119. Cf. pp. 102-3.

the Powers that grave apprehensions must be felt for the lives and property of her officers at the Sultan's Court and of the European Colony.

"France accordingly declared that she proposed to send troops to Fez, and to conduct the Europeans back to the coast. We had received no such threatening reports from Fez and, therefore, declared that our colony did not require foreign assistance. Since, however, we could naturally assume no responsibility for the lives of the French citizens who were apparently threatened, we raised no objection to the advance to Fez to bring back the threatened French citizens to the coast. We added the explicit reservation, however, which we also announced publicly, that we retained our liberty of action should the French expedition go beyond its alleged object, even should such action be merely the result of circumstances arising out of the expedition."³⁵⁸

French Notification of Expedition. On 14 May, by circular despatch, the French government notified the Powers that instruction had been given to General Moinier:

"to press the march of the relief column without delay, in order to break the Fez blockade. The occupation of this town would last only during the period strictly necessary . . . the object of the action of the French forces is, as always, to assure the sovereignty of the Sultan, territorial integrity, and freedom of commercial transactions, which are intimately connected with the maintenance of security and order in Morocco."³⁵⁹

There was no suggestion, it will be observed, of danger to Europeans. The tribes were insisting that the foreigners should be sent back to the coast.³⁶⁰ And neither the British nor the German government had any apprehension for the safety of their nationals. On 25 April 1911, the following questions were put in parliament to the British government, and the following replies given:

"*Mr. Dillon:* Has the government any information which would give them cause for believing that there is any danger to Europeans?

Mr. McKinnon Wood: No, we have no such information.

Mr. Remnant: May I ask whether any representations have been made to the French Government to carry out the suggestions?

Mr. McKinnon Wood: No representations have been made to the French Government."³⁶¹

In the *Annual Register* for 1911 is the following:

"Whether the need for the French expedition was so great as it was represented to be in Paris, and by such news as found its way to Tangier, is a doubtful matter."³⁶²

³⁵⁸ Br. White Paper: *Morocco*, 1911, No. 1.

³⁵⁹ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 284.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, Nos. 253, 254.

³⁶¹ Neilson: *How Diplomats Make War*, p. 194.

³⁶² P. [452.

The danger to the Europeans—the death of some of them—occurred after the arrival of the French, and directly because of it—as we shall see.

On 24 May, the Russian Ambassador at Paris reported:

“I telegraphed you this morning that the French troops under General Mouanier marched into Fez last Sunday. They met with no resistance from the Moors in Fez, and the European colonies are unharmed.”³⁶³

French Single Purpose. The official documents make clear that the Fez expedition was undertaken for the single purpose of sustaining the Sultan as against the rebellious tribes.³⁶⁴ He was the puppet of France. They resented French interference. He had agreed to borrow French money, to be applied partly in the reorganization of his military forces under French directions. They were the men as against whom those forces were to be employed. In the struggle between the Sultan and his people, democratic France upheld autocracy. During a debate in the Chamber on 24 March, Cruppi, the Foreign Minister said, as reported by Isvolsky (30 March):

“The obligations of France with reference to Morocco flow from this principle: to maintain the prestige and power of the Sultan, to place at his disposal such military reinforcements as are indispensable for the pacification of the tribes and the financial assistance required by military reforms, unavoidable construction of railways, ports, and other works.”³⁶⁵

That was prior to the first suggestion of sending French troops to Fez. For the maintenance of “the prestige and power of the Sultan,” the military expedition was no doubt necessary. The presence of Europeans in Fez, or their absence, was immaterial. When endeavoring to placate Spain, Cruppi declared, as reported by Isvolsky (18 May 1911), that the “single purpose” of the expedition was “the consolidation of the power of the Sultan.”³⁶⁶ And the day after the arrival of the French troops at Fez, Cruppi made the following declaration:

“The French Government has declared to the Powers, that it would keep within the limits of the Algeciras Act, and that the French troops would occupy Fez only ‘so long as is absolutely necessary.’ France will not deviate from this declaration. The occupation of Fez will last only as long as is necessary to strengthen the position of the Sultan, Moulay-Hafid, and of the Maghzen. For the attainment of this object France has one means at her disposal—namely, the French military mission under Colonel Mangin which already exists under the terms of former agreements in Morocco. With the assistance of this mission,

³⁶³ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 587.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁵ *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 67.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

a sufficiently strong Moroccan Army can be created; there can be no doubt after the magnificent French expedition to Fez that the prestige of the French representative, and of the French Government, will be greatly enhanced, and this is a guarantee for public security and order. As soon as this object has been attained, the French Government will withdraw its troops to Casablanca, and the Paris Cabinet is certain that all the Powers without exception will be convinced of its sincerity and loyalty."³⁶⁷

To his report of this declaration, the Russian Ambassador added:

"My question as to whether he [Cruppi] could tell me, even approximately, how long the French would occupy Fez, he answered evasively, and I believe he does not take into account how difficult it will be to carry out the contemplated programme."³⁶⁸

There was no longer any pretence of conducting the endangered Europeans to the coast. Cruppi must have been well aware that suppression of all the tribes would, as Colonel Mangin said, necessitate long delays. Thirteen years have not sufficed.

Delcassé. Were one to speculate as to the chief reason for the Fez expedition, reasons could be adduced for ascribing it to the presence of Delcassé in the French government. He had become Minister of Marine in the Monis ministry in March 1911.³⁶⁹ Cruppi was Foreign Minister, but he was weak and without experience,³⁷⁰ while Delcassé, who had retired from the ministry in 1905 rather than forego war with Germany (in connection with the previous Morocco incident),³⁷¹ was forceful and dominating. Referring to the advent of the Monis government, the Ambassador reported (3 March 1911):

"After Cruppi, I received a visit from the new Naval Minister Delcassé, the most prominent member of the Cabinet, whose return to power has aroused such lively discussion in the European press. Delcassé repeated to me everything that Cruppi had said regarding the unshakeable nature of the foreign policy of France and the radical tendencies wrongly attributed to the Cabinet. In addition to this, he declared to me that his entrance into the Cabinet formed the guarantee that special care would be devoted to the military power of France. His first task would be the creation of a strong fleet, and he hopes to be able to have at his disposal six new armoured vessels not later than August or September. He also guarantees that the new Cabinet will redouble its efforts regarding the land forces. It is not at all his intention to exceed the competency of his office, and to arouse suspicion on the part of Germany, yet he has assured me that he, on his part, will do everything in order

³⁶⁷ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 587: *Un Livre Noir*, I, pp. 105-8.

³⁶⁸ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 588.

³⁶⁹ When Caillaux succeeded Monis on 28 June, Delcassé retained his office.

³⁷⁰ Isvolsky's despatch, 11 May 1911: *Un Livre Noir*, I, pp. 103-4.

³⁷¹ *Ante*, p. 781.

to make the relations between France and Russia as close as possible, and he has begged me to lay his sentiments of sincere devotion to Russia at the foot of the throne.”³⁷²

A few days afterwards (14 March), the Russian Ambassador again reported:

“Although Delcassé emphasized that he did not wish to exceed the competency of the Ministry of the Navy, it is nevertheless assumed that he will influence the activity of Cruppi, since the latter has little experience in foreign questions. Delcassé has sought to convince me that the new Government will not only not permit any weakening of the military power of France, but will develop the land and naval forces to a still higher efficiency.”³⁷³

Cruppi was planless. On 11 May 1911, the Russian Ambassador again reported as follows:

“With regard to the diplomatic state of the Morocco affair I fear that Cruppi, who has absolutely no diplomatic experience, is indulging in a dangerous, and in no way justified, optimism. As you have observed, he replies in answer to all my questions concerning the course of negotiations in Berlin, that he notes no inclination on the part of the German Government to oppose the actions of France or to demand compensations of any kind. His attitude towards Spain is quite as optimistic, even if much more discontented. . . . Here lies a danger, which Cruppi does not sufficiently take into account. This danger is all the greater because Cruppi, so far as I can judge, has no fixed programme in the Morocco affair, and is influenced by various currents and circumstances. In this respect, Pichon’s resignation is greatly to be regretted; it is true he is being sharply criticised at present, but he knew exactly what he wanted in Morocco, and did not allow himself to be influenced by the chauvinistic circles, which exist here as everywhere. In conclusion, I would say that my fears are shared by these Ambassadors here who are most sincere with me, namely, the representatives of England and Italy.”³⁷⁴

The most influential member of “the chauvinistic circles” at the moment was Delcassé. And it is probable that German newspapers were not far astray when they regarded him “as the true originator of French Moroccan policy.”³⁷⁵ It may also be true that the reason Europe escaped war over the Morocco affair of 1911 was that, on the 28th June, Monis, as Prime Minister, gave place to Caillaux, and Cruppi was succeeded by de Selves. Delcassé indeed retained his post as Naval Minister, but he was no longer “the most prominent member of the Cab-

³⁷² Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 558-9.

³⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 559: *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 48. See also Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 560, 562.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 581-2.

³⁷⁵ Russian Chargé at Berlin to Sazonoff, 28 April 1911: *Ibid.*, p. 580.

inet." It was now Caillaux who encroached upon the activities of the Foreign Office, and interested himself in separate negotiations with Germany.

THE FRENCH AT FEZ

The Outlook. Leaving Casablanca on 27 April 1911, the French troops arrived at Fez on 21 May,³⁷⁶ and it soon became apparent that extensive and protracted military operations would be necessary in order "to assure the sovereignty of the Sultan" — indeed, that it could not be assured at all. The French representative at Fez reported (25 May):

"In my view, it will be necessary, for the establishment of order, to adopt an energetic attitude towards the tribes in the region of Fez."³⁷⁷

And Colonel Mangin reported (31 May):

"2d. Completely in accord with our Consul, I endeavor to safeguard the sovereign independence and prestige of the Sultan, and apply myself to conform strictly the operations of military authority to the dispositions of the international conventions.

"3d. I have endeavored to show that we do not purpose the occupation of new territories. Particularly, no force has entered Fez; there is not even an entry of goums. The camp is located at Dar Debibagh, in a position which commands the town, but which is situated at a distance of three kilometres.

"4th. The negotiations with the tribes and the political measures which have been the object of my preceding communications have tended precisely to avoid all extensions of the operations. But it would be dangerous to deceive oneself as to the character of the submissions which have been thus obtained in the outskirts of Fez, and which tend above all, at this moment, to safeguard the harvest. Furthermore, the more distant tribes, judging that their territories are beyond attack, direct against us some gatherings of which the dispersal is or will be necessary.

"5th. I will defer intervention at Mékinez as long as possible. It appears, nevertheless, to be inevitable, as much for the purpose of breaking the nascent power of Moulay Zin, as for opening the direct route from Rabat to Zemmour. In order to facilitate this action, I ask you now to authorize the Chaouya to advance a provisional post among the Zaër, with a view to repress those, and also to restrain the Zemmour. Their incessant enterprises against our line of halting places from the Atlantic to the Rdom gravely increase the difficulties of revictualling, and we are exposed equally to encounter them in the direction of Mékinez.

"6th. With a view to the reinforcement of the Mission, I am summoning to Fez the instructors located at El Ksar or at Larba, and I am examining with the Chief of the Mission and our Consul, methods of

³⁷⁶ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 307.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 314.

reinforcements, in particular by the Mussulmans and the Morocco contingents. But it is a problem which presents serious difficulties and which, in any case, will necessitate long delays during which the corps of debarkment will support all the weight of the operations."³⁷⁸

The occupation of Fez had become — like the occupation of Egypt in 1882, and all other military occupations for the purpose of supporting a potentate against his people — permanent. The Act of Algeciras had been abrogated, for its chief principle, "the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan," had been superseded by the military domination of the French Republic.

Grand Vizier Dismissed. The Grand Vizier having taken, as already noted³⁷⁹ the nationalists' view of the situation, in opposition to the Sultan who favored French advancement, it was not to be expected that he would long retain his post after the advent of the French troops. And he did not. He was almost at once (26 May) dismissed.³⁸⁰ And the dismissal created new difficulties, especially in the Marakesh region.³⁸¹

THE PANTHER AT AGADIR

The French troops entered Fez on 21 May, and it was not until six weeks afterwards (2 July) that the German government issued the following announcement:

"The German Government maintains strict reserve towards the French military operations. It has no intention of creating difficulties for the French Government, but, on the other hand, events in Morocco have taken, by the force of circumstances, such a turn that it appears to be doubtful that the protection of the international interests provided for by the Act of Algeciras can be accomplished sufficiently. Under these conditions, the German Government, answering an appeal made by important German houses for the protection of German interests in South Morocco, is sending a warship to Agadir, in order to assure the security of the goods and the life of the German subjects and protégés established in these regions until the moment when order shall have been re-established in the Shereefian Empire. It is hardly doubtful that it will not be possible for the interested Powers to return to the *statu quo ante*. The conception of the Act of Algeciras as to the sovereignty of the Sultan and the integrity of the Moroccan Empire is incompatible with the situation created by the march of events. The German government is quite ready to enter upon an amicable exchange of views in order to obtain a solution of the Morocco question satisfactory to all the Powers, and to eliminate it, once and for all, from

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 329.

³⁷⁹ *Ante*, pp. 826-7.

³⁸⁰ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 328.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*, No. 359.

international politics. It is altogether disposed to examine in a friendly spirit every proposition made by the French Government."³⁸²

A few days previously (28 June), M. Caillaux had succeeded M. Monis in the premiership. And there may be something in the suggestion that Germany delayed her action until, with Caillaux's accession, all hope of recurrence to the Briand policy had passed. But in view of the nature of the German warnings as to the certain effect of sending French troops to Fez, it is more probable that the German Chancellor desired that his prediction as to the effect of the French action should pass into fact before taking a step which might have been rendered inexcusable by the withdrawal which the French had promised. A few days after the German announcement, a German warship, the *Panther*, anchored at Agadir³⁸³ — a port, to the south, on the Atlantic coast of Morocco.

Probably there was as little danger to German life and property at Agadir as there was to Spanish life and property at the points occupied by Spain, and as there was at Fez, or, at all events, as there would have been at Fez but for the resentment aroused by French military action. Allegation of danger is, however, a part of the recognized language of diplomatic courtesy, and the true significance of the proceeding is usually to be looked for elsewhere. Germany's reasons for intervention were that: (1) French action was incompatible with two of the foundation principles of the Act of Algeciras, namely — "the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan," and "the integrity of his dominions"³⁸⁴; and (2) as M. Philippe Millet³⁸⁵ has expressed it:

"There is not much doubt that the main reason for the violent way in which Germany intervened after the Fez incident was that she was bitterly disappointed by the result of the Franco-German agreement of February 1909. . . . The economic condominium, which the German Government had tried to establish in Morocco, had fallen to pieces before it had ever worked, owing to the resistance of France, backed up in the matter by England. The political ascendancy of France over Morocco was, per contra, fostered by the events themselves. Germany was disappointed in a twofold way. Hence the crisis."³⁸⁶

³⁸² Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 421. And see Nos. 418, 431. In the preceding year, France had sent a warship — the *Du-Chayla* — to Agadir, and of that fact Germany had taken official notice in a manner which gave France "to understand that it had not passed unperceived" (Mermeix, *op. cit.*, p. 82). The French Ambassador at Berlin had, moreover, advised his government to develop French interests in that region, in order to present "a counter-weight to German interests and to the pretensions which Berlin might some day found upon those interests" (*Ibid.*). France offered some explanation of the *Du-Chayla* incident. Its only effect was the rousing of German apprehensions: *Fr. Yell. Bk.*, Morocco, 1910-12, Nos. 26, 28, 33, 53.

³⁸³ Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 133-4.

³⁸⁴ *Ante*, p. 787.

³⁸⁵ Colonial Editor of *Le Temps*.

³⁸⁶ *Nineteenth Century*, June 1912, pp. 1048, 1052.

To these two reasons may fairly be added the Spanish military operations in the coastal regions which, there too, had resulted in the termination of "the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan."

That Germany did not intend permanent occupation of Agadir is clear. That she did not seek political position in Morocco is also clear. She intended to say that the situation there was undergoing change to her disadvantage, and that the time for new negotiations had arrived. M. Mermeix, after referring to the dilatory and unsatisfactory diplomatic interchanges subsequent to the Franco-German agreement of 8 February 1909,³⁸⁷ formulated the German idea in this way:

"It was necessary, then, in order to constrain France to renounce the evasions in which she had wandered for four months, to make her come to terms (*lui mettre le marché en main*). The sending of a ship to Agadir, and the menace of debarkment which that fact implied, obliged the Quai d'Orsay to reply clearly and definitely yes or no, to explain itself with reference to the engagement contained in the declaration made on the 21st June to M. de Schoën, and, our engagement once fixed, to stand to it."³⁸⁸

The *Annual Register's* interpretation of the arrival of the *Panther* at Agadir was that:

"This was the method adopted by Germany of protesting against the march of troops to Fez, of declaring that the Act of Algeciras had broken down, and of annulling the special Franco-German agreement of February 8, 1909."³⁸⁹

Neratoff, the Russian Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, understood the situation. Telegraphing to the Russian Ambassador at London on 2 July 1911, after referring to the announced German intention of sending a warship to Agadir, he said:

"We have therefore to reckon with a fact. The military side is of secondary importance; the object is a diplomatic one — the protection of Germany's political interests, since the formal terms of the Act of Algeciras have already been violated. Germany is probably desirous of conducting new negotiations with France regarding Morocco, and wishes, in this connection, to be supported by a *fait accompli*."³⁹⁰

The German Ambassador at London, in announcing the despatch of the ship (3 July), made the situation clear:

"German reports," he said, "do not substantiate the occurrences which have provoked the action of France and Spain. The conduct

³⁸⁷ *Ante*, p. 814.

³⁸⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 88. The declaration referred to occurred during the conversations consequent upon the expedition to Fez and, according to Mermeix, was a suggestion by Cruppi that "if the elements of an accord with Germany could be found in equatorial Africa, it was in that part of the world that it would be advisable to search for them" (*Ibid.*, p. 71).

³⁸⁹ 1911, p. [312.

³⁹⁰ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 588-9.

of these two Powers makes the Algeciras Act illusory. The German warship will be withdrawn as soon as the French and Spanish forces are recalled. Germany is prepared to enter into fresh negotiations with France, Spain, and, also, England in respect of Morocco. The German Government admits that these negotiations will be difficult, but it does not regard the difficulties as insurmountable."³⁹¹

Referring to this statement, the Russian Ambassador at London reported (6 July):

"This second declaration represents the situation in a very different light. The protection of German citizens is not even mentioned. The sending of the German warship to Agadir is justified by the French and Spanish military intervention, which was a violation of the Algeciras Act and has made this Act illusory."³⁹²

In the opinion of the Ambassador, as stated in his letter of 29 August:

"As concerns the question itself raised by Germany, she, undoubtedly, has legal arguments in her favor."³⁹³

Probably these extracts have made sufficiently clear the German reasons for sending the *Panther* to Agadir. To them, however, may well be added the statement of Mr. Winston Churchill in his recent book:

"The French Government fully realized that the advantages they were gaining in Morocco justified Germany in seeking certain colonial compensations in the Congo area."³⁹⁴

FRANCO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS

In pursuance of the statement in the German circular despatch of 2 July 1911 to the effect that the German government:

"is altogether disposed to examine in a friendly spirit every proposition made by the French government."³⁹⁵

negotiations for a settlement were immediately commenced. The basis upon which they proceeded was afterwards stated by de Selves (the French Foreign Minister) in his testimony before a parliamentary committee. He said that the French government had insisted, from the outset, that France must be the predominating power in Morocco, and could not tolerate the acquisition by Germany of a foothold there. To this, according to the testimony of de Selves, the German government replied:

"Right! (*Soit!*) We accept. Take Morocco, establish therein your protectorate. But since you have made a treaty with England in this matter, have made a treaty with Italy, have made a treaty with Spain, on

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 590.

³⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 592.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 600.

³⁹⁴ *The World Crisis*, I, p. 39.

³⁹⁵ *Ante*, p. 840.

what basis will you treat with us? Our public opinion will not permit that we should not obtain compensation elsewhere for our abandonment in your favor and the undertaking that we shall give you that our diplomacy will assist in getting the Powers to ratify the arrangement we arrive at."³⁹⁶

Conversations. On 8 July, de Selves wrote to Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin, saying that the German Ambassador told him that: "his government did not entertain any pretensions of a territorial character regarding Morocco, but that the Congo appeared to offer a subject for negotiation. I should be obliged if you would verify whether the Congo is, in effect, the country with reference to which the German government is desirous to converse with us."³⁹⁷

On the 9th, the French Ambassador reported that:

"the German government agreed to renounce all territorial pretension to Morocco, and to seek, with the French government, its colonial satisfactions in the Congo."³⁹⁸

On 15th July occurred a conversation which afterwards acquired an unwarranted significance. Having been instructed (in effect) to ascertain what the German government "have on their stomachs"³⁹⁹ — that is, how much they wanted — Cambon put the question to Kiderlen, who, as Cambon reported (16 July):

"replied that he had only very general indications, and, having sent for a map, he showed me the French Congo between the Ocean and the Sangha. I immediately replied to him that that demand would, without doubt, have for a consequence the termination of the negotiations, for French opinion might consent to large compensations, but not to the loss of a whole colony."⁴⁰⁰

Cambon argued that France was receiving nothing commensurate with the proposed cession. Kiderlen then proposed, as makeweight, a transfer to France of Togoland and the north part of the Cameroons; and he insisted upon the value to France of a free hand in Morocco, adding:

"You have bought from Spain, England, and even Italy your liberty in Morocco; as to us, you have left us aside."

Closing the interview, Cambon said:

"It is necessary to know whether you wish to come to an agreement. Speak to your colleague of the colonies. When shall I see you again? 'Tomorrow,' he replied."⁴⁰¹

Cambon and de Selves. Before meeting again, and fearing a rupture in the negotiations, Cambon wrote to de Selves (19 July):

"But it would appear to me to be very necessary to examine now what

³⁹⁶ *Journal Official*, 14 Dec. 1911. Quoted by Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 177.

³⁹⁷ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 439.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 441.

³⁹⁹ Mermeix, *op. cit.*, p. 100. The expression had been used by M. Cruppi on a former occasion: *ibid.*, p. 68.

⁴⁰⁰ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 455.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*

measures ought to be taken, and what diplomatic situation contemplated, in case the conversation is broken off definitely.”⁴⁰²

On the next day, de Selves wrote to Cambon:

“We are firmly determined to refuse the demand which M. de Kiderlen formulated in his conversation with you, but, on the other hand, we would be disposed to consent to give Germany the advantage of certain frontier rectifications,”

if Germany, on her part, would make certain recognition of the French position in Morocco. De Selves, after referring to a possible rupture of the conversations, added:

“You may now allow M. de Kiderlen to understand that that rupture might entail the transformation into an international question of the private question which is being negotiated between our two countries alone.”⁴⁰³

Conversation of 20 July. On the 20th, Cambon reported an unpleasant interview of that day: Kiderlen made strong complaint that, although it had been agreed that the conversations should be kept secret, the French newspapers had been supplied with the gist of them. He complained also of the tone adopted by the French press toward the negotiations. He indicated that such proceedings might make impossible continuation of the conversations, in which case, he said:

“We will resume our liberty of action, but we will demand the application of the Act of Algeciras in its entirety, and we will go, if necessary, to the end.”

Cambon made such excuses as he could for the Press, and replied to Kiderlen (as he reported):

“that he might be sure that we should support the blow, and that if he wished to go far, we should go as far as he. . . . I asked him if he meant that there were definitive demands. ‘We will discuss the application of them,’ he said to me. ‘I am myself awaiting,’ I replied, ‘my instructions, but before entering upon the discussion I should wish to know what you count upon doing with reference to Morocco. If you will not disinterest yourselves clearly, there is no use in negotiating, for there is no reason why next year some incident like the present should not occur.’—‘I believe,’ he replied, ‘that we will demand only what is reasonable; we will disinterest ourselves in Morocco. I believe that sensible men among both your people and ours will be satisfied with our agreement.’”⁴⁰⁴

Agreement. These are all the diplomatic exchanges necessary for the appreciation of Mr. Lloyd George’s speech, which will be dealt with on a later page. We need not follow them further. They resulted in two conventions—one respecting Morocco, and the other respecting

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, No. 461.

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*, No. 463.

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 464.

the Congo — and accompanying letters (4 November 1911). Germany, in the first of these conventions, gave to France a free hand in Morocco, subject only to certain economic reservations. By the second of the conventions, France ceded to Germany territory in the Congo district estimated at from 180,000 to 250,000 square kilometres. Germany ceded to France territories north of the frontier of the French possessions in the Chad region estimated at about 14,000 square kilometres.⁴⁰⁵ The settlement was almost as unpopular in France as in Germany: Not only had French territory been ceded without consideration, but it was said that the improper private interference of M. Caillaux (the Prime Minister) in the negotiations had been the cause of their untoward turn. The Chambers confirmed the agreement, but an investigation by a Senate committee led to the resignation of the Foreign Minister, de Selves, and precipitated the fall of Caillaux.⁴⁰⁶

Persons who believe that the Kaiser precipitated the incident for the purpose of producing war, and was restrained only by the fear of British intervention, may profitably peruse the report of the Russian Ambassador at Berlin of 13 October 1911:

“After three months tedious negotiations, in the course of which the situation several times became so acute that it almost brought about a rupture, an agreement in regard to Morocco has at last been reached. It is to be ascribed mainly to two circumstances: First, Emperor William, at the first outbreak of the crisis, resolved not to let it come to war; and, secondly, the Ambassador of the French Republic here has displayed unusual cleverness and tact. He had to fight simultaneously with an exceedingly strong opponent at Berlin, the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and a very strong opponent at Paris — the influence of those political circles whose object was to prevent an understanding with Germany.”⁴⁰⁷

To the pacific attitude of the Kaiser, Pichon (French Foreign Minister), in an elaborate report upon opinion in Germany, bore testimony as follows:

“Why then did not Germany go to war during the summer of 1911, since public opinion, although not so unanimous and determined as French public opinion, was certainly favorable? Apart from the pacific disposition of the Emperor and the Chancellor, military and financial reasons made themselves felt.”⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁵ *Ann. Reg.*, 1911, p. [454.

⁴⁰⁶ *Contemporary Rev.*, Feb. 1912, p. 261 *et seq.* The story of the hostility between these two men, and of the secret workings of Caillaux during the negotiations, may be seen in three French official papers of 1919; in Mermeix, *Chronique de l'An 1911*; and in *The Times* (London) of 27 Feb. 1919, summarizing interesting matter from *L'Eclair* of Paris.

⁴⁰⁷ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 609.

⁴⁰⁸ *Fr. Yell. Bk.*, 1914, No. 5. A translation may be seen in *Coll. Dip. Docs.*, p. 137.

BRITISH INTERVENTION

Speech of Mr. Lloyd George. The conversations between Kiderlen and Cambon at Berlin on the 15th and 20th July had brought the negotiations to something of a crisis. There had been no rupture, but there were strain, uncertainty, and apprehension. And it was under these circumstances (and others not yet disclosed) that Mr. Lloyd George, on the 21st (having consulted only Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, and Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary), in a speech at the Mansion House, after referring to the benefits of peace, said:

"But I am also bound to say this: that I believe that it is essential in the highest interests, not merely of this country but of the world, that Britain should, at all hazards, maintain her place and her prestige amongst the great Powers of the World. . . . If a situation were to be forced on us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by the centuries of heroism and achievements, by allowing Britain to be treated, where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations, then I may say emphatically that peace at that price would be humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure."⁴⁰⁹

The speech startled the world. Everybody knew that it was a threat aimed at Germany,⁴¹⁰ the charge being that in a matter in which British:

⁴⁰⁹ *The Times* (London), 21 July 1911. Quoted by Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 165-6. Mr. Churchill in his recent book declares that Mr. Lloyd George "intended to make it clear that if Germany meant war, she would find Britain against her" (*The World Crisis*, I, p. 43). Four days after the speech, Lloyd George said to Churchill: "That's my speech. The Germans may demand my resignation as they did Delcassé's" (*Ibid.*, p. 44. See also p. 186). "The Mansion House speech," Mr. Churchill says, "was a surprise to all countries: it was a thunder-clap to the German Government" (*Ibid.*, p. 45).

⁴¹⁰ Among those startled by the speech were some of Mr. Lloyd George's own colleagues, who "keenly resented . . . that a step of such importance should have been taken on the spur of the moment without reference to the Cabinet. . . . It was precisely the same claim to be considered that the Kaiser had championed at Tangier in 1905, and it provoked the same explosion in Germany as the Tangier declaration had provoked in England" (*Camb. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, III, p. 446). In the course of a speech in the Reichstag on 9 Nov. 1911, the German Chancellor said: "Now it has been asserted—and this assertion has eaten deep into the people—that we retreated before England. A speech made at a banquet by the British Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, has specially served in this connection. (Laughter and cheers on the Left.) Gentlemen, I am speaking of a grave matter, and I beg you to allow me to finish my speech without interruption. One of the Conservative papers, indeed, by substituting 'Germany' for 'England' right through the speech, brought out clearly that the speech taken by itself, might equally have been made by a German statesman without giving occasion for criticism. What gave significance to the speech was the fact that the whole of the French Press, and a great portion of the English Press, interpreted it in a chauvinistic sense, and in a manner spiteful towards Germany, and that this

“interests were vitally affected,” the United Kingdom was being treated “as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations.”

A little investigation will supply demonstration (1) that the charge was groundless, and (2) that had there been any reason for complaint, it would have involved France—the friend and ally of the United Kingdom—in deeper degree than Germany.

The Facts. For the facts, let us refer, principally, to the speech of Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, four months afterwards (27 November 1911). On 3 July (a few days prior to the opening of the negotiations between France and Germany), Sir Edward said to the German Ambassador that:

“we considered the situation so important that it must be discussed in a meeting of the Cabinet”; and that “he wished the German Government to learn at once that, in our view, the situation was serious and important.”⁴¹¹

The next day (the 4th), after the cabinet meeting, Sir Edward explained to the Ambassador that, having to consider British interests and British treaty obligations to France, the United Kingdom could not be “disinterested.”

..“A new situation had been created by the despatch of a German ship to Agadir. Future developments might affect British interests more directly than they had hitherto been affected, and therefore we could not recognize any new arrangements that might be come to without us.”⁴¹²

Three days afterwards, Mr. Asquith said in the House of Commons that:

“a new situation” had arisen “in which it is possible that future de-

interpretation was in no way repudiated from the English side. I found myself constrained to instruct the Imperial Ambassador in London to speak about the matter. My representation was to the effect that we were discussing the Morocco question with France; that England's interests were not, so far, affected thereby; and that if England should consider her interests to be affected by the result of the discussions, we expected the British Government to urge those interests upon the two contracting Governments only through the usual diplomatic channel. The British Government, after this, intimated no more desire of any kind to take part in our negotiations with France. For all that, the ill-effects of that after-dinner speech remained. Owing more particularly to the interpretation given to it by the English and French Press, it produced, in wide German circles, a very bitter feeling, which naturally found expression in a more or less forcible manner in our Press. To judge by its effect, this speech was, it must be admitted, not such as to further a good understanding with England.” (Quoted by Morel, *op. cit.*, pp. 345-6.) Mr. F. S. Oliver, in his *Ordeal by Battle* (p. 286), wrote: “But Mr. Lloyd George's speech was capable of only one interpretation— if Germany had persisted in her encroachment, this country would have gone to war in August or September 1911, in support of France.”

⁴¹¹ Professor Gilbert Murray: *The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey*, 1906-15, p. 68.

⁴¹² *Ibid.*

velopments may affect British interests more directly than has hitherto been the case."

On the 20th (the day prior to the Lloyd George speech), the French Foreign Minister sent to the French Ambassador at London the following:

"I have been interrogated by the English Ambassador relative to the proposition of summoning an international Conference, in the eventuality of a rupture of the negotiations. The British Government desired to know what, in that case, would be the principal views of the Government of the Republic, and the principles which might serve as bases for the programme of such Conference. I have replied to the English Ambassador by the note a copy of which is annexed."

The note was as follows:

"The conversations engaged in between the French and German Governments on the subject of French equatorial Africa have not been broken off, and according to all appearance, will be prolonged for some time. If these conversations should fail, the French Government will not overlook the idea that the British Government should take, not only with regard to the German Government but with regard to all the Governments signatories of the Act of Algeciras, the initiative as to a conference; and in its opinion, it would be preferable that the British Government, in taking that initiative, should itself draft the programme of such conference.

"The English Government, by the Accord of 1904, recognized that France and Spain alone had spheres of political influence in Morocco, and, in consequence, denied to other Powers all political pretension with regard to that country. To allow the German Government to-day to create a new state establishment on any part whatever of Moroccan territory would be contrary to the Accord of 1904, as also, moreover, to the official declaration made by Germany to France in the month of February 1909. The French Government could not then admit that the proposed conference should be called to consider the cession, by any title whatever, to the German Government of a portion, no matter how small, of Moroccan territory; but faithful to the principles stated in the preamble of the Act of Algeciras, as in its special accords with the Powers, it is quite ready to recognize that the foreign Powers, and notably Germany, are entitled to all the economic advantages which would be compatible with the acts above mentioned."⁴¹³

Anglo-French Co-operation. It will be observed that the British and French foreign offices were in close communication, even as to eventualities in case of rupture of the negotiations, but that there was no prospect of immediate break—"to all appearance" the negotiations "will be prolonged for some time." Note also that there was no request to the French Minister, either by Sir Edward Grey or by the British Amba-

⁴¹³ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 462 and Enc.

sador, for information as to the state of the negotiations. Either London was well aware of their progress or was confidently content to leave them in the hands of the French Foreign Office. That Sir Edward Grey had been kept fully informed is made certain, not only by the character of the relations between the Foreign Offices but by other circumstances. Among them may be mentioned that at the commencement of the conversations at Berlin, Kiderlen said that they must be confined to the two Powers—that it would be impossible to admit a third party to the discussions without involving all the signatories to the Act of Algeciras. Cambon agreed, but stipulated that France must keep her friends and allies informed.⁴¹⁴ Sir Edward Grey must have been aware of that arrangement. We know, also, that in anticipation of a possible outbreak of war, the “conversations” between the General Military Staffs of the two countries, which had been inaugurated during the first of the Morocco incidents (1905–6), were being pressed.⁴¹⁵ Mr. Lloyd George made reference to them in a speech at Toronto on 10 October 1923:

“I remember three or four years before the war there was trouble on the continent of Europe. Germany had seized a port in Morocco and war seemed to impend. And I remember meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence. I was then Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Sir Henry Wilson, who afterwards became Field Marshal, and whose tragic death you no doubt know of in Toronto, came there to explain what was the part of the British army if there were a great irruption through Belgium into France, with a view to destroying the liberties of those two countries. The utmost effort the French expected, the utmost effort the French asked of us—for, recollect, Sir Henry Wilson was there, coming straight from the French General Staff, where he had been making arrangements for the assistance which Great Britain was to give—the utmost effort they ever expected from us was six divisions.”⁴¹⁶

A report of the Russian Ambassador at London⁴¹⁷ lets in some light:

“This opposition” (the parliamentary) “attacked, first of all, the speech which Lloyd George delivered, which was based on information received from the French government, which fact Grey could not have communicated to parliament without committing an indiscretion.”⁴¹⁸

Not being able to state the source of information, a familiar expedient had been adopted—the fact to be made use of had been given to *The*

⁴¹⁴ *Camb. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, III, p. 442.

⁴¹⁵ *Ante*, pp. 160, 528–9.

⁴¹⁶ *The Globe* (Toronto), 11 Oct. 1923. Cf. Asquith: *The Genesis of the War*, cap. XI.

⁴¹⁷ Count Benckendorff, an able diplomatist who merited and enjoyed close relations with Sir Edward Grey.

⁴¹⁸ 30 Nov. 1911: Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 611.

Times and was quoted from it. On the 20th, the newspaper had the following — a perfectly correct statement, obtained from some authoritative source:

“We understand that the conversations which have been conducted in Berlin between Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador in Germany, have now resulted in the formulation of extensive demands. These amount to the complete cession by France of the coast and interior of the French Congo up to the Sangha River, together with the contingent reversion held by France over the Congo State.”⁴¹⁹

As the effect of this statement would have been somewhat diminished by adding that Germany, on her part, was willing to make cessions to France in Togoland and the Cameroons, reference to Kiderlen’s offer in that regard was omitted.

Sir Edward Grey’s Speech. With this amount of information, we may return to Sir Edward Grey’s speech of 27 November:

“A little later it appeared in the Press, and indeed it was the case, that the German Government had made demands with regard to the French Congo of an extent to which it was obvious to everybody who thought of it that neither the French Government nor the French Chamber could agree. That at once made me anxious as to the development of the situation. If Germany was going to negotiate with France an arrangement by which Germany received from France something in the French Congo, and left France in Morocco as she was under our Agreement in 1904, then, of course, we were prepared to stand aside and not to intrude. If, however, Germany, starting negotiations on that basis with France, made demands, not for a portion, but for the greater part of the French Congo, or for anything of that kind, it was quite clear France must refuse those demands, the negotiations would be thrown back on some other basis, and the question of the possible partition would arise again. That is why I became anxious.

“I therefore asked the German Ambassador to see me again on July 21. I said to him I wished it to be understood that our silence in the absence of any communication from the German Government — our silence since the Cabinet communication of July 4, and since the Prime Minister’s statement of July 7 in this House — our silence since then must not be interpreted as meaning that we were not taking, in the Moroccan question, the interest which had been indicated by our statement of the 4th of that month. We knew that a rectification of the frontier of the French Congo had been proposed as the basis for negotiations with France. We thought it possible that a settlement might be come to between Germany and France on this basis without affecting British interests. We would be very glad if this happened, and in the hope that it would happen at a later stage we had hitherto put it aside.

⁴¹⁹ Quoted by Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 323.

But I had been made anxious by the news which had appeared the day before as to the demands which the German Government had made on the French Government; demands which were in effect not a rectification of the frontier, but a cession of the French Congo, and which it was obviously impossible for the French Government to concede. I heard that negotiations were still proceeding,⁴²⁰ and I still hoped that they might lead to a satisfactory result, but it must be understood that if they were unsuccessful, a very embarrassing situation would arise. I pointed out to the German Ambassador that the Germans were in the closed port of Agadir; that according to native rumours, they were landing and negotiating with the tribes, so that for all we knew they might be acquiring concessions there, and that it might even be that the German flag had been hoisted at Agadir, which was the most suitable port on that coast for a naval basis. We could not say to what extent the situation might be altered to our disadvantage, and if the negotiations with France came to nothing we should be obliged to watch over British interests and to become a party to a discussion of the matter. The longer the Germans remained at Agadir, the greater the risks of their developing a state of affairs which would make it more difficult for them to withdraw, and more necessary for us to take some steps to protect British interests. I wished to say all this now while we were still waiting in the hope that the negotiations with France would succeed, for if I did not say this now, it would cause resentment later on if the German Government had been led to suppose by our previous silence — our silence since July 4 — that we did not take an interest in the matter. The German Ambassador was not in a position to give me any information, but he deprecated the assumption that what I had sketched as a possible damage to British interests was accomplished. He was sure that his Government had no intention of acquiring commercial monopolies and unfairly prejudicing our interests. On this I observed that the fact that Germany remained in occupation of a closed port involved at least a monopoly of commercial opportunities. I waited before saying anything further between July 4 and July 21. I made that statement on July 21 because I was getting anxious, because the situation seemed to me to be developing unfavorably, and the German Ambassador was still not in a position to make any communication to me from the German Government.”⁴²¹

The principal points in this speech, for observation, are as follows:

1. Sir Edward Grey made no complaint of the United Kingdom being “treated . . . as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations.”
2. Nor of secrecy of the negotiations between France and Germany.
3. Nor of any diplomatic neglect upon the part of Germany. He

⁴²⁰ He had been so informed by the French Government.

⁴²¹ Quoted in Morel, *Morocco in Diplomacy*, pp. 332-4.

wished merely to remove any erroneous impression which might have been derived from his own silence.

4. He knew that the negotiations were proceeding, and he "hoped that they might lead to a satisfactory result."

5. He had no immediate desire to participate in the negotiations. It was only in the event of their rupture that:

"we should be obliged to watch over British interests, and to become a party to a discussion of the matter."

6. That was Sir Edward Grey's position on 21 July — the same day upon which Mr. Lloyd George made his speech complaining of Britain being treated as "if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations."

In a subsequent part of Sir Edward's speech, he said:

"On July 24, three days after the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the German Ambassador came to see me. He informed me that the German intention in sending a ship to Agadir had not changed. Not a man had been landed there. The German Government regretted the credence which was given to the insinuations as to the intentions of Germany that came from hostile quarters. Germany had never thought of creating a naval port on the coast of Morocco and never would think of it. Such ideas were hallucinations."⁴²²

Explanation of the Lloyd George Speech. Mr. Lloyd George's complaint that the United Kingdom was being:

"treated where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations,"

being without foundation, and Sir Edward Grey having made no complaint of that sort to anybody, what reason can be assigned for Mr. Lloyd George's speech?⁴²³ The answer is not difficult. In the treaty of 1904, the United Kingdom promised to give diplomatic support to France in order that she might "obtain the execution" of the clause of the treaty regarding Morocco. In pursuance of that promise and of a developing hostility to Germany, the United Kingdom had supported France in her quarrel with Germany in 1905-6. And in the 1911 quarrel she was playing the same part. She was saying to Germany in effect: It would be well for you to moderate your demands and come to agreement with France, for (in the words of Sir Edward Grey):

"if the negotiations came to nothing, we should be obliged to watch over British interests, and to become a party to a discussion of the matter."

⁴²² Quoted by Morel: *Morocco in Diplomacy*, p. 341.

⁴²³ Mr. Asquith's only suggestion is that, after Sir Edward Grey had "informed" the German Ambassador on the 5th, that the United Kingdom would not be disinterested, "no notice was taken of our communication by the German Government whose intention and objective were still veiled in obscurity" (*The Genesis of the War*, cap. XI). Sir Edward Grey's communication being merely in the nature of a notification, no reply to it could have been expected.

The Entente was being hardened into an alliance. In his speech of 3 August 1914, Sir Edward Grey said that in the 1911 crisis he "took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906," at which time:

"in my view, public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France."⁴²⁴

Sir Edward did not think that the Kaiser wanted war, either when the second of the Morocco incidents commenced or afterwards;⁴²⁵ but France was to be supported diplomatically, and, if necessary, by arms. And the great significance of that attitude was, and is, that (as in 1914) the merits of the quarrel were immaterial. Whether France or Germany was right, the British government was determined to support France. When arguing with the German Ambassador, Grey maintained, indeed, that France:

"was not only justified, but obliged, to protect the interests of the French, English and other foreigners in the capital of Morocco."⁴²⁶

but when pressed with the contingency of the French occupation proving to be one "of considerable duration," he replied (as related by the Russian Ambassador, 23 May 1911):

"that, even in this case, the English standpoint would remain unchanged, and that he did not believe that German interests would be in any way violated, for, according to the Agreement concluded between Germany and France, Germany had renounced all political influence, under the condition that her economic interests in Morocco should be protected against all political entanglements. Hereupon, Count Metternich assured him of the conciliatory and peaceful intentions of the German Government, expressing, however, the fear that unexpected events might jeopardize the situation. Sir Edward responded that England, in any case and under all circumstances, would fulfil her obligations to France."⁴²⁷

Relating (as given to him by both the French Ambassador and Grey) a further part of the same conversation, the Russian Ambassador said:

"Count Metternich had asked what the consequences would be if the Morocco Government came under French influence, and the Aleg-

⁴²⁴ *Ante*, pp. 115, 184.

⁴²⁵ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 599. British intervention made maintenance of a conciliatory attitude by the Kaiser much more difficult. The Russian Ambassador at Berlin declared that the feeling in Germany "is directed chiefly against England" (*ibid.*, p. 600), and the Russian Ambassador at London reported (29 August 1911): "I believe this all too unexpected attitude on the part of the London Cabinet was bound to stir up hostile feeling in Germany against England." (*Ibid.*)

⁴²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 583.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.* It was quite true that Germany had "renounced all political influence" in Morocco, but she had not agreed to the rescission of the Act of Algeciras, which specifically provided for maintenance of "the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan."

ciras Act were violated. Sir Edward replied that, in the event of entanglements, all English obligations would become 'operative.'"⁴²⁸

After the arrival of the *Panther* at Agadir, the Russian Ambassador again reported (5 July) as to Grey's attitude as follows:

"Grey told Count Metternich personally, yesterday, that under no circumstances could England remain disinterested in the Morocco question, as English interests in Morocco are more important than those of Germany, and, in addition, England has assumed obligations towards France which she would fulfil under all circumstances."⁴²⁹

After the Lloyd George speech, the same Ambassador reported (1 August) that:

"there is no use concealing the fact — one step further, and a war between England and Germany might have broken out as the result of the Franco-German dispute, although independent of it."⁴³⁰

On the 16th of the same month, the same Ambassador reported a conversation with Sir Edward Grey as follows:

"Thereupon Sir Edward said: '. . . In the event of war between Germany and France, England would have to participate. If this war should involve Russia, Austria would be dragged in too, for, although she has not the slightest desire to interfere in this matter, she will be compelled by force of circumstances to do so. . . . Consequently, it would no longer be a duel between France and Germany — it would be a general war. I do not believe Emperor William wanted war when this incident occurred; I do not believe he wants war to-day.'⁴³¹

Commenting upon all this, the shrewd Ambassador said (29 August):

"The British Government does not want war, nor do they believe Germany wants war. In Morocco, England has been more French than France, but nowhere else; England is not interested in the Congo, not even in regions beyond the Congo; and she would joyfully welcome a solution of the crisis, if it could be found in these latter regions."⁴³²

It will now be worth the reader's while to turn back and read again the British proposals to Germany of 1899-1901 with reference to Morocco, by which:

"eventually the country was to be finally partitioned between Great Britain and Germany."⁴³³

British Reflections. "Reaction after a tremendously severe strain"

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 584. The Russian Ambassador evidently took the same view as the German Chancellor with reference to the proposed operations in Morocco, for, in the report containing the above, he said: "The occupation of Fez, by the French, and of Tetuan, by the Spanish, would open the door for the dismemberment of Morocco, which might have dangerous consequences."

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 590.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 595.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 598-9.

⁴³² *Ibid.*, p. 601.

⁴³³ *Ante*, pp. 760-1.

in Great Britain soon arrived, and pacifist voices blended into a "movement" which, as related by the Russian Ambassador (21 November 1911), argued that:

"Twice in two years, England had been almost compelled to resort to arms, in regard to questions which did not affect her interests. Two wars might have been the result of the Entente. A political isolation would have been more advantageous."⁴³⁴

Reporting on 20 December, the Ambassador said:

"But now this Alliance" [the Anglo-French] "which originated under the influence of historical necessity, has not only demonstrated its inner strength, but has also shown that it is in a position to act in favor of the preservation of general peace. In this respect, it is extremely noteworthy that, in those critical summer days, England, without being bound to France by a formal act, was prepared to mobilize not only her entire Fleet, but also her Expeditionary Army against Germany."⁴³⁵

Reporting again on 8 February of the next year (1912), the Ambassador said:

"Above all, the English public, now that the European crises are at an end, and good temper has been restored, is astonished at the perception that twice England has been on the brink of a terrible war, and this for reasons which—in a rather shortsighted way—it could only indirectly connect with the interests of England, whilst the rôle of France in the Balkan crisis appears rather dubious, and Russia's attitude during the Morocco question, also, was not as determined as that of England."⁴³⁶

The English public would have been much more astonished had they been aware that their government had not so much been "almost compelled to resort to arms," as it had been a contributor to the development of the crisis.⁴³⁷

SPAIN

We must now turn back in order to trace the course of Spanish activity in Morocco; to note that in her "sphere of influence,"⁴³⁸ Spain

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 610.

⁴³⁵ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 611.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 616.

⁴³⁷ Upon this point, the following despatches of Belgian diplomats will repay perusal: of Baron Grindl, Ambassador at Berlin, of 23 September 1905; 5 April 1906; 6 May 1908; 20 April 1911; 1 May 1911; 10 May 1911; 17 June 1911; of M. Leghait, Minister at Paris, of 10 February 1907; of Baron Guillaume, Ambassador at Paris, of 29 April 1911; 28 July 1911; of M. Cartier, Chargé at London, of 28 March 1907; and of Count de Lalaing, Ambassador at London, of 24 May 1907. All the foregoing are referred to in E. D. Morel: *Truth and the War*, pp. 81-90.

⁴³⁸ According to the Franco-Spanish agreement of 3 October 1904: *ante*, pp. 765-7.

encountered the same opposition from the tribes as experienced by France; that she met it, as did France, by military suppression, the exaction of penalties, the occupation of territory, and the imposition of debasing terms; that she offered strenuous objection to the actions of the French, as being breaches of the Act of Algeciras — defending herself as best she could against allegations of *tu quoque*; and that, as response to the French military expedition to Fez, she took similar action in other places. The fact that Spain made strong and persistent protest against French assumptions in Morocco territory may be taken as some evidence that in offering like protest, Germany was not actuated by desire either to provoke war or to test the solidarity of the Franco-British Entente. The close parallel between the French objections to Spanish actions and the German objections to similar French actions, as also between the insincerities of the Spanish excuses to France and the French excuses to Germany will be observed as the story proceeds.

To appreciate what follows, we must recall that France and Spain had, by their secret agreement of 3 October 1904, assumed to divide Morocco into French and Spanish "spheres of influence"; that, in order to mask the arrangement, they had agreed that during fifteen years:

"Spain will not exercise the right of action except with the consent of France"; but that:

"If, owing to the weakness of that Government" [the Shereefian], "and to its continued inability to uphold law and order, or to any other cause the existence of which is acknowledged by both parties, the *status quo* can no longer be maintained, Spain may freely exercise her right of action in the territory defined in the preceding article, which henceforth constitutes her sphere of influence."⁴³⁹

We must remember also, the terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1 September 1905.⁴⁴⁰ And above all we must bear in mind the Act of Algeciras (7 April 1906) which by its provisions overrode all "treaties and arrangements" which conflicted with it.

Melilla Operations. The construction, in 1909, by the Spaniards of a railway from the port of Melilla (77,000 inhabitants) to the mines of the interior provoked serious opposition from the tribes. Heavy fighting ensued (July) in which Spain lost 90 officers and 1,000 men. After an interlude, hostilities were resumed in September, when the tribes were reduced to submission.⁴⁴¹ The Sultan complained to the Powers, but obtained no satisfaction. He was compelled to agree to dictated terms of arrangement.⁴⁴²

Agreement with Morocco, 17 November 1910. By the convention of

⁴³⁹ *Ante*, p. 766.

⁴⁴⁰ *Ante*, pp. 783-6.

⁴⁴¹ By that time Spain had 50,000 troops in her "sphere" at a daily expenditure of £37,000.

⁴⁴² *Ann. Reg.*, 1909, pp. [423-4.

17 November 1910 (following closely the lines of the Franco-Moroccan agreement of 4 March of the same year⁴⁴³), the Sultan, under heavy pressure, surrendered large portions of his sovereignty in Spain's "sphere of influence."⁴⁴⁴ Spain and Morocco were each to appoint a "High Commissioner" vested with the powers necessary for carrying out previous agreements, and especially for the recommending to the Sultan:

"the appointment and replacement of the caïds and other Moorish officials in the occupied region, and of the tribes of Temsaman, Beni Urriaguel, and Bokkoia."⁴⁴⁵

"In order to meet the new exigencies, the Shereefian force provided by the treaties shall be increased to one thousand two hundred and fifty men: it will be organized with the assistance of Spanish instructors in accordance with the Harbor Police Regulations; the officers of all grades shall be Moroccans; it shall be autonomous; it shall be freely under the control of the Spanish and Moorish High Commissioners who will communicate their decisions through the proper Spanish instructor and at the same time make them known to the Moorish authorities."

"In the proportion of the increase of the remainder of the Maghzen's police force, organized in accordance with the principles above indicated, the Spanish troops now occupying part of the Riff will be gradually reduced. When the said Maghzen's force reaches the above stated number of 1,250 men, and when it is deemed capable of enforcing the agreement between the two countries, insuring safety and promoting commercial transactions, and finally of securing the collection of the taxes and imposts, the Spanish troops shall withdraw within the limits of the Spanish territory."

"His Shereefian Majesty shall reopen the custom house in the Melilla district. The guard houses forming the customs line shall be placed as jointly decided by the Spanish and Moorish High Commissioners and the duties there collected shall not be different from, or higher than those collected at any part of the boundary line of the empire.

"The Government of His Catholic Majesty shall place at the disposal of His Moroccan Majesty an employé of the Spanish trained corps of customs for the purpose of supervising the appraisements of merchandise, collection of duties, keeping of accounts, &c."

"The collection of the Maghzen's taxes and revenues shall be effected by the *umanas* and *caïds* assisted by a Spanish official as long as the evacuation shall not be completed."

With reference to the Ceuta district, the Sultan agreed that he:

"will not erect fortifications, mount artillery, construct strategic build-

⁴⁴³ *Ante*, pp. 818-20.

⁴⁴⁴ The agreement may be seen in *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, VI, Supp., pp. 54-60; and in *Fr. Yell. Bk.: Morocco, 1910-12, No. 21, Annexe*.

⁴⁴⁵ An example of the operation of this provision may be seen in *Fr. Yell. Bk.: Morocco, 1910-12, No. 330*.

ings or works, or station forces in any place where it may constitute a danger or a menace to Ceuta, and also to prevent others from so doing." The appointment of the caïd of the Ceuta district (as described): "shall go to him whose special qualifications offer sufficient guaranty for the maintenance of the relations of good understanding and friendship with the authorities of the fortress and camp of Ceuta. The Moorish Government shall give previous notice of his appointment or removal to the Government of His Catholic Majesty. The said caïd may, in agreement with the Governor of Ceuta, pass himself upon exclusively local cases or complaints, and, if the two authorities should disagree, the decision shall be referred to the representatives of the two nations at Tangier, except those cases whose importance may demand the direct intervention of both governments."

The Caïd was to be supplied with a force of 250 men, and:

"In order to promote the organization of that force destined to secure order, tranquillity and free commercial transactions in the regions placed under the administration of the said caïd, His Catholic Majesty's Government will place at the disposal of his Shereefian Majesty a captain, one lieutenant and four sergeants whose designation shall be submitted to the Sultan's approval."

"In order to assist His Shereefian Majesty in organising and properly conducting the said custom house, His Catholic Majesty's Government will place at its disposal an employé of the Spanish trained corps of customs officers, who will supervise the appraisement of merchandise, collection of duties, bookkeeping, &c, during the whole period of reimbursement of the military and naval expenses in the Riff."

With reference to finance:

"In view of the financial condition of the Moroccan Empire and in evidence of the interest taken in its welfare, His Catholic Majesty's Government only claims sixty-five million pesetas⁴⁴⁶ for the military and naval expenses incurred in the Riff until the 31st October 1910, for the military and naval expenses incurred in connection with the events at Casablanca in 1907, and for the relief extended to the Moors and Hebrews sheltered in Melilla from 1903 to 1907. His Shereefian Majesty's Government undertakes to pay annually a sum of two million five hundred and forty-five thousand pesetas during a period of seventy-five years.

"The payment, of a preferential character, is guaranteed: *first*, by fifty-five per cent. of the taxes and profits provided by the Mining Regulations referred to in Article 112 of the Act of Algeciras, accruing to the Maghzen; *second*, by the residue of the proceeds of the Ceuta custom house."

The more noteworthy items of this agreement are: (1) Intervention

⁴⁴⁶ A peseta equals 19.3 cents, or about 9½ pence.

of Spain in the appointment of all officials. (2) The Moroccan police force was to be largely increased, and to be organized "with the assistance of Spanish instructors." (3) Spanish forces were to remain until unexpected things should happen. (4) Intervention of Spain in the collection of taxes. (5) A Moroccan force was to be provided for the Ceuta district; and, for its organization, Spain was to supply certain officers. (6) As indemnity for damages, Morocco was to make seventy-five annual payments of an amount which it could not pay. (7) Morocco, in effect, ceded to Spain a large share in the government of the coastal territory. A conspicuous rent had been made in the Act of Algeciras.

Spain and France. Having heard that France intended to lend money to Morocco for the purpose (among others) of enabling the Sultan to increase the number of French military instructors already attached to the Moroccan army,⁴⁴⁷ Spain, on 26 January 1911, announced that, for her part, she purposed installing a military mission at Fez.⁴⁴⁸ Under the Act of Algeciras, France had no right to meddle in any way with the Moroccan military forces. She had authority to supply instructors for a police force, but only in certain of the ports, and only for a period of five years from the date of the Act—7 April 1906. And if France intended, by means of her military officers at Fez, to take control of a Shereefian military force, Spain determined that, in so far as her zone of influence was concerned, she would pursue the same course. France objected, upon the ground that such action would derogate from "the rights officially attributed to France."⁴⁴⁹ Spain insisted and notified the Sultan.⁴⁵⁰ France was immovable.⁴⁵¹ Spain was unable to proceed, but (11 May 1911) complained of the French opposition to her proposed mission:

"although the Madrid cabinet had declared that its desire is limited to the organization of the Shereefian troops in the sphere of influence of Spain, by officers of its nationality, without intermeddling in the other military affairs of the Empire. The exclusive privilege that France claims with reference to the instruction of Shereefian troops is not conformable to the Accord of 1904."⁴⁵²

As already said, it was the Franco-Moroccan agreement of March-April 1911⁴⁵³ which had first produced antagonism between Spain and

⁴⁴⁷ *Post*, p. 822.

⁴⁴⁸ *Fr. Yell. Bk.: Morocco, 1910-12, No. 59, Annexe.*

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 59 *Annexe* II. And see No. 62. The French Foreign Minister described Spain as a "poor but proud relation": *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 121. *Cf.* p. 118.

⁴⁵⁰ *Fr. Yell. Bk.: Morocco, 1910-12, Nos. 68, 136.*

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Nos. 70, 100, 180.

⁴⁵² *Ibid.*, No. 275. The Accord referred to is the Franco-Spanish secret Convention of 3 Oct. 1904: *Ante*, pp. 783-6.

⁴⁵³ *Ante*, p. 824.

France; but to this statement must be added, in explanation, that Spain was aware of the negotiations which preceded it and raised objection prior to its signature. Her contentions may shortly be summed as follows: It was a breach of the Act of Algeciras; it was a breach of the secret Franco-Spanish convention of 3 October 1904⁴⁵⁴ and of the Hispano-Moroccan agreement of 17 November 1910;⁴⁵⁵ in view of the fact that certain Franco-Spanish conversations were pending, it was an act of discourtesy; the French government was acting singly, and without Spanish co-operation, although both zones of influence were being dealt with; arrangements were being made for French instructors, although the period fixed by the Act of Algeciras for employment of instructors was elapsing;⁴⁵⁶ its extension was a matter for international agreement; imposts upon the tribes inhabiting the Spanish zones were being prescribed; provision was being made for construction of a railway lying within the Spanish zone⁴⁵⁷ — a rather formidable set of objections. During the ensuing altercation, the French Ambassador at Madrid reported (4 March 1911) that the Spanish President of the Council had said to him with reference to the military side of the Franco-Moroccan agreement:

“that this organization constituted a new development of French power in Morocco, to which no development of Spanish power corresponded; that we had already the finances, the customs in our hands; that public opinion in Spain had begun to concern itself seriously”; and “that in order to establish the ‘equilibrium,’ it will be necessary that Spain also have a military mission in Morocco.”⁴⁵⁸

In the course of a formal protest (16 March 1911), the Spanish Minister said:

“To sum up, the Cabinet of Madrid holds as contrary to the engagements of the Makhzen on the one side and of France on the other, and as not conforming to the Act of Algeciras, the combination projected, as far as it concerns the advance⁴⁵⁹ for the police and the Shereefian military forces. . . . And finally, it is clear that, from the instant that the Government of the Republic considers it legitimate to regulate directly with the Makhzen that which relates to a public work which has never been discussed by the Committee of the Special Funds, nor in the Diplomatic Corps at Tangier, the Government of His Majesty will recover its liberty of action.”⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁵⁴ *Ante*, pp. 766-7.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ante*, pp. 856-9.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ante*, p. 789.

⁴⁵⁷ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, Nos. 123, 124.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 82. See also No. 416, quoted *post*, p. 870.

⁴⁵⁹ The financial advance.

⁴⁶⁰ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 124, *Annexe*. The following documents may also be referred to: Nos. 123, 140, 147, 151, 189, 275, 342, 459.

Reporting a later conversation with the Spanish Foreign Minister, the French Ambassador at Madrid said (7 April 1911) that:

"Either the two Governments should communicate reciprocally what they decide to do, or else they should act independently, each on its own side. They allow it to be clearly understood that if we occupy Taza, the Spaniards will occupy Tetouan."⁴⁶¹

Spanish Complaint of Civil Administration. On 28 April, Spain complained "of the hostility which Spaniards were encountering throughout Morocco" at the hands of the French.⁴⁶² In a letter of the following day, the Spanish Foreign Minister said:

"You are well aware that the Madrid cabinet does not regard as satisfactory the situation which has been maintained up to the present concerning the Hispano-French collaboration in the administrative organisms of the Makhzen. To its great regret, it has many times been obliged to complain that its rights and its interests were not fully recognized either in the Franco-Moroccan accords, or in the attitude of the French agents and functionaries toward their Spanish colleagues. An understanding, in the form that may be found opportune between the two Powers, in order to avoid these misunderstandings and to co-ordinate their respective actions toward the Makhzen is to-day, for very strong reasons, necessary."⁴⁶³

Requested to furnish particulars, the Spanish government embodied the specifications in a long document of 11 May 1911.⁴⁶⁴ Among other things, the French Foreign Secretary was reminded that during the Conference of Algeciras he had said, with reference to French troops at Tangier, that:

"As soon as the police had been organized, he would give orders that the French officers who were instructing the troops of the Sultan would withdraw from the town.' Nevertheless French officers have continued to instruct the Tangier artillery; they have extended their activity to the payment of the garrisons at Arzila and El Ksar, and, at this hour, they are organizing the troops of this latter place in a manner which has caused serious Spanish observations."

Spain Proposes Separation of Zones. With these complaints, the Spanish government submitted the form of a proposed agreement, the principal clause of which was as follows:

"The first period to which the Convention of 3 October 1904 applies is declared terminated, Spain henceforth remaining free to exercise her action in the sphere of influence which is recognized to be hers by the said Convention."⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid.*, No. 157.

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*, No. 236.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*, No. 242.

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 275. Cf. *Un Livre Noir*, I, pp. 63, 65, 105-7.

⁴⁶⁵ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 275.

The effect of this would have been to bring to an end the right of France to operate within the Spanish "sphere of influence" during the fifteen-year period,⁴⁶⁶ and to release Spain from her effacement in that regard. France refused to countenance the Spanish proposal.⁴⁶⁷

Isvolsky, the very competent Russian Ambassador at Paris⁴⁶⁸ reported (28 March 1911) the state of the controversy between France and Spain during this period as follows:

"Based on the provisions of the Algeciras Act, but still more on the semi-public, semi-secret Franco-Spanish Agreement of 1904, the Madrid Cabinet now protest against the endeavors of France, not only to exclude Spain from Moroccan questions in general, but even, to a certain extent, to make difficulties for her in her own zone. These attempts make themselves chiefly felt in respect of financial control, of military organization, and the building of the railway from Tangier to Fez. As the Spanish Ambassador said to me, France's endeavors to subjugate Morocco are becoming more and more apparent in opposition to the spirit of the Algeciras Act and to the various separate Franco-Spanish Treaties. France, on her part, contends that the measures taken by her are solely for the purpose of creating such conditions in Morocco as would be equally advantageous for all European countries, and are thus absolutely in accordance with the Algeciras Act. The French Government is inclined, as Cruppi himself declares, to treat Spain like a poor relation; even counter-protests are raised in France, accusing Spain of maintaining an unnecessarily large number of troops in the Spanish zone, and of not observing the principle of the open door. It is very difficult to say who is right and who is wrong."⁴⁶⁹

It would have been easier to say that, upon the basis of the Act of Algeciras, both were wrong. The Russian Ambassador at London (23 May 1911) found:

"it fairly natural that Spanish public opinion should be aroused by occurrences in Morocco."⁴⁷⁰

On 6 July, he said:

"The sending of the German warship to Agadir is justified by the French and Spanish military intervention, which was a violation of the Algeciras Act, and has made this Act illusory."⁴⁷¹

Spanish Objection to Fez Operations. After intimations as to its attitude with reference to the purposed French military expedition to

⁴⁶⁶ *Ante*, p. 766.

⁴⁶⁷ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, Nos. 303, 352.

⁴⁶⁸ Previously Russian Foreign Minister.

⁴⁶⁹ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 577-8; *Un Livre Noir*, I, pp. 63-4. And

see p. 117.

⁴⁷⁰ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 583.

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 592.

Fez,⁴⁷² the Spanish government, in a *note verbale* of 29 April 1911, made its objection clear by declaring, among other things:

"That, in consequence of the occupation of Fez and some other important points, the Sultan and his Government would find themselves practically in the hands of France; the result would be a real protectorate which would not perhaps conduct itself in a manner profitable to the interests of Spain, and which, in invoking and interpreting in its own fashion the integrity and administrative unity of the Empire, would come to understand our rights even less than formerly."⁴⁷³

(One is reminded of the German predictions.) Spain asserted that: "the second of the eventualities provided for by Article 3 of the Accord of 1904⁴⁷⁴ has arrived," and that "Spain, therefore, is free to pursue her activities in her zone without France having a right to intermeddle, either civilly or militarily, or to use her resources for financial operations, or to raise obstacles to our decisions in utilizing the administrative organization of the Makhzen."⁴⁷⁵

To this, the French Minister replied (as related by himself in a despatch to the French Ambassador at Madrid) that:

"If circumstances absolutely necessitated our entry at Fez, this occupation, we repeat it, will not have a permanent character, and could not be thought to give the appearance of a seizure or of a protectorate to an act of succor. We will show, when the question of the reforms is reached, that, far from thinking to deprive Spain of her rights and of her influence, we seek, on this point also, only to arrange with her a policy of friendship and association. With reference to Article 3 of the secret Accord, I insisted energetically against its application. One cannot possibly classify as anarchy the present condition produced in Morocco by the rebellion of certain tribes. Article 3 of the Act of Algeciras, regulating that which concerns the police at the ports, says that it is proper to come to the aid of the Sultan, and characterizes in this way the Shereefian sovereignty. It is just the same when outside the Empire and in our zone, we come to the aid of the Sultan."⁴⁷⁶

The French Minister contended also that the arrival of the period referred to in Article 3 of the secret convention:

"cannot be fixed except by common agreement between the Spanish and French governments."⁴⁷⁷

Spaniards at Ceuta.⁴⁷⁸ Whether Spain was or was not, as between her and France, legally:

⁴⁷² See Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, Nos. 159 (6 April 1911); 204, 205 and *Annexe*.

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*, No. 241: *Un Livre Noir*, I, pp. 117-18.

⁴⁷⁴ Quoted *ante*, p. 766.

⁴⁷⁵ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 241. And see No. 159, *Annexe*.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 241.

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 221. Cf. *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 479.

⁴⁷⁸ A coast town of 13,000 inhabitants.

“free to pursue her activities in her zone without France having a right to intermeddle,”

she proceeded to act as though neither France nor Sultan held any curb upon her actions. On 7 May 1911, she notified France that her government:

“having become aware of the impossibility of actually establishing, conformably with Article 9 of the Hispano-Moroccan treaty of last November, the service of the native police who ought to operate in the environs of Ceuta, has the intention of having this service performed provisionally by the native soldiers belonging to the royal army.”⁴⁷⁹

To this, the French government at first made no objection,⁴⁸⁰ but soon, becoming suspicious, intimated that the operations of the troops should not extend beyond the limits which had been prescribed for the police.”⁴⁸¹

Spaniards at l'Andjera. Early in May, possession was taken of the territory of the Andjera, wherein were situated some valuable mineral properties. On 10 May, the French representative at Tangier reported that:

“The notables of the Andjera have protested against this invasion of their territory and demanded explanations. The Governor declared that it was because they had sold their mines to the French, who wished to possess themselves of Morocco; and that it was for the defense of the Shereefian Empire that the Spaniards occupied these points.”⁴⁸²

In another communication, the reason assigned was that:

“certain natives of the Andjera, who had sold their lands to Spaniards and received part payment, had refused to sign the deeds.”⁴⁸³

Any excuse would do. Simultaneously with the departure of the troops for the Andjera, some of the tribes who happened to be in the town (Ceuta) were arrested and held as hostages in case of opposition to the troops.⁴⁸⁴ To this military expedition, the French Foreign Minister instructed the French Ambassador at Madrid (8 May) to make objection.

The district invaded, he said, lay outside the zone in which, by the Hispano-Moroccan convention of 16 November 1910, the Ceuta police under Spanish officers were permitted to operate; the arrests:

“will have for effect the provocation in the tribe of an agitation likely to lead to conflicts, and would perhaps serve as a pretext for an extension of the military operations, which are already announced as imminent in the region. . . . Every enterprise outside of the territory specified in Article 9 would have a grave repercussion in Morocco, and would produce serious complications from an international point of view. In

⁴⁷⁹ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 258.

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, Nos. 259, 266.

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*, Nos. 268, 269.

⁴⁸² *Ibid.*, No. 274.

⁴⁸³ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 267.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Nos. 267, 274.

consequence, we could not possibly agree to it"; the agitation would result in "the occupation of Tetouan. Now it follows from news received, from Tetouan even as from Tangier, that this region of Tetouan is absolutely tranquil and does not justify any disquietude."⁴⁸⁵

(One is again reminded of the observations on French conduct). Spain replied (17 May) with counter-complaints of excursions of extra-urban police under French officers outside their district, and their appearance at El Ksar, Andjera, and other places.⁴⁸⁶

Spaniards at Monte Negro. For the purpose, it was said, of preventing the repetition of an attack upon the fishermen of Monte Negro,⁴⁸⁷ the Spanish government announced (22 May 1911) its determination to establish a police-post there. "One step more in the direction of Tetouan," commented the French Ambassador at Madrid.⁴⁸⁸

Spaniards at Tetouan. The Ambassador was right. Early in June, Spanish troops took possession of Tetouan, a town of 30,000 inhabitants, and the second in importance on the Mediterranean coast.⁴⁸⁹ The United Kingdom, probably at the instance of France, objected to this (15 May 1911), and:

"called the attention of M. Garcia Prieto to the peril threatened by the Spanish action in Morocco. Neither at Tetouan nor in the Andjera has order been disturbed, and measures taken unseasonably may lead the tribes to take up arms."⁴⁹⁰

The United Kingdom made no objection to the French operations which, on a much larger scale, were producing the same effect. Two weeks before the occupation of Tetouan, Cruppi said to the Russian Ambassador at Paris:

"Every action on our part calls for a like action on the part of Spain, even where there is not the slightest reason for it. For example, the Spanish troops have just taken up positions a few kilometers distant from Tetouan. Should they next occupy Tetouan itself, it would call forth a protest from France, and from the other States as well, chief among them, England."⁴⁹¹

Germany was of the same opinion.

Spaniards at Larache. While thus spreading to the east along the Mediterranean coast, Spain was preparing to occupy Larache, a port of 6,500 inhabitants on the Atlantic, and the hinterland there. On 3 June, she notified France that, because of agitation near El Ksar — inland from Larache — Spanish warships would be sent to the port.⁴⁹²

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 268.

⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 295.

⁴⁸⁷ See *ibid.*, No. 310.

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 306.

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, Nos. 337, 345.

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 289.

⁴⁹¹ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 588; *Un Livre Noir*, I, pp. 107, 117.

⁴⁹² Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 338. On 28 April, the French

There was, of course, no idea "of landing troops, but simply to reassure the population."⁴⁹³ On 8 June, the French Foreign Minister protested against Spanish action. He said that:

"The fact that General Zubia, accompanied by an escort of native soldiers of the garrison of Ceuta, has arrived at Tetouan, and the presence of Spanish cruisers in the waters of Larache, have produced in Morocco a lively impression. On the 6th of this month, El Mokri⁴⁹⁴ approached the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Paris in order to explain the disquietude of his Government. A Spanish military intervention which would be undertaken, as the language of El Mokri proves, contrary to the wishes of the Makhzen, would not fail, the troubles of the Fez region having menaced neither Tetouan nor Larache, to be considered as an attempt upon the sovereignty of the Sultan. In the eyes of the native population, it would be of a nature to discredit him."⁴⁹⁵

The Minister added that "a military occupation, even temporary, would be contrary to the Act of Algeciras." (This from the representative of the Power which had been in military occupation of Fez for about eighteen days.) Spain replied (9 June):

"I can assure you in most categorical fashion that if this excursion had a political view, it would be quite simply that of connecting more directly than heretofore the relations between the Spanish authorities of Ceuta and the Moroccan authorities of Tetouan, in order to avoid all occasion of conflict."⁴⁹⁶

On the same day, Spain notified France that a Spanish protégé, Ben Malek, and his two sons, had been assassinated.

"In presence of such a great attack, the inaction of the Spanish government, at the precise moment when two of its warships were stationed before Larache, would have been interpreted as an abandonment of the duty of protection which rests upon the Madrid cabinet."

For this reason, the government had decided:

"to disembark a part of the equipment of the two ships, giving it the character of a demonstration. . . . The Government of His Majesty hopes that it will not be obliged to push this action farther. . . . The Chargé d'Affaires, in transmitting these communications, is invited to say to the French Government that if the gravity of the circumstances justify our action, it will be pursued with the sustained energy which public opinion demands."⁴⁹⁷

Of Ben Malek, the French representative at Tangier said (10 June): "that if it be true that Ahmed Malek was a protégé" (of Spain), "it

representative at Tangier had reported that the Spaniards were about to land at Larache (*Ibid.*, No. 238).

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*, No. 339.

⁴⁹⁴ Representative of the Sultan at Paris.

⁴⁹⁵ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 351. And see No. 357, *Annexe*, 2.

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 357, *Annexe*, 3.

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 353. And see also Nos. 355, 357, 370.

is not the less true that he was a brigand; that his bad conduct had cost him German protection.”⁴⁹⁸

Possession of Larache was taken on 8 June,⁴⁹⁹ and by that action Spain completed her possession of the coasts of her “sphere of influence,” both on the Atlantic and on the Mediterranean. France being in military occupation of other ports, of interior districts, of the capital, and, in some real sense, of the Sultan himself, was Germany wrong in asserting that the chief principles of the Act of Algeciras—“the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan”—had been not only violated but nullified?

Spaniards at El Ksar. Both France and Spain appear to have had designs upon El Ksar—a small inland town not far from the port of Larache, and within the Spanish “sphere of influence” but near its border. On 10 April 1911, Spanish complaint was made of the appearance there of the French Captain Moreaux. The explanation offered was the necessity for maintaining communications from the coast with Commandant Brémond, who was keeping the peace farther on, in the French sphere. Moreaux, it was said, had instructions to remove to a more distant point, but had been detained by “the recent rains.”⁵⁰⁰ On the same day, Spain proposed to send some Spanish military instructors to El Ksar, but to this France made pointed objections,⁵⁰¹ and the idea was abandoned. Whether excessive rains continued we do not know, but Moreaux, for some reason, prolonged his stay. On 6 May, it was explained that he was:

“solely employed in the protection and preservation of the munitions and arms,” and was under instructions “to consider the means of evacuating the Spanish zone with his officers.”⁵⁰² Later in the month (17 May), Spain again made objection to military movements at the town—this time to the presence of a detachment of the Tangier extra-urban police under French instructors:

“Your Government will not fail, I hope, to recognize that these convoys of men in places so far from Tangier, or which appertain to Spain’s sphere of influence, and even in the frontier region of Ceuta, can be with difficulty conformed to the Act of Algeciras and to that of our special accords. They produce, moreover, the most painful impression in the Spanish colony of Morocco, which cannot understand what the situation is, and what the rights of their country are, if troops of police, instructed by French officers, are still permitted to participate in measures concerning the tranquillity of El Ksar, the Andjera, etc.”⁵⁰³

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 362.

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, Nos. 167, 180. And see No. 266.

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*, No. 180. And see No. 62.

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, No. 257.

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*, No. 295, *Annexe*.

The rather unsatisfactory French reply was that nothing unusual had occurred. Taking advantage of a disturbance at El Ksar (or alleging its existence), a Spanish troop of 450 men were sent there immediately after their disembarkment at Larache (7 June). Protesting, the French Foreign Minister wrote to the French Ambassador at Madrid (11 June):

"You will say to the Minister of State, in amicable terms but in the clearest fashion, that the measures taken by the Royal Government cannot possibly have our assent."⁵⁰⁴

The protest was delivered, the Ambassador saying that:

"The government of the Republic could not acquiesce in measures contrary to the Accord of 1904 and the Act of Algeciras."⁵⁰⁵

On the 15th, the Spanish Minister returned a complaint as follows:

"I shall not finish this letter without calling your kind attention to the attitudes of MM. Boisset and Moreaux. The presence of the latter, under existing circumstances, with the Makhzénian forces within the zone of Spanish influence, and at a short distance from El Ksar, cannot be explained in a satisfactory manner. I should like to hope that M. Cruppi would be good enough to make the French agents understand that it is not by excessive zeal, and by provoking difficulties and complications, that we shall succeed in removing misunderstandings."⁵⁰⁶

In reply, the French Ambassador said (16 June) that Moreaux was with a Shereefian Mehalla, and was regularly in the service of the Sultan. France, therefore, was not responsible for his movements.⁵⁰⁷

Sultan's Protest. On 11 June, the Sultan delivered a reasoned protest against the Spanish operations at Larache and El Ksar. He declared that Ben Malek was not a Spanish protégé.

"Besides, the person Ben Malek was known by his wicked intrigues, and by his efforts to create trouble in the region — he and his sons."⁵⁰⁸ The Sultan put the blame for the disturbance at El Ksar upon the Spanish landing at Larache. He said that no complaint had been made to him by the Spaniards, and that he was taking remedial proceedings.⁵⁰⁹ A few days afterwards (16 June), he again "entered energetic protest," saying:

"that the Spanish troops have established their camp in the middle of the cemetery which surrounds the sanctuary of Sidi-Aissa Ben Kacem, outside El Ksar. Your Excellency is not unaware that this action is a serious blow to religious sentiment; it has, in a high degree, aroused the feelings of the Mussulmans living at El Ksar, who attach the greatest religious importance to this fact, and who consider it as contempt for their religion and a blow at their belief, to such a point that it has

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 364.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 384, *Annexe*, 1. And see No. 373.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 384, *Annexe*, 2.

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 386. And see No. 392.

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 371, *Annexe*.

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 387.

produced on them a disagreeable impression which will have deplorable consequences.”⁵¹⁰

Spain's Attitude. Employing language customary under such circumstances, Spain sent formal declaration to France (20 June) to the effect that the steps taken at Larache and El Ksar were due to:

“the necessity of obtaining reparation for the affair of the Spanish protégé Ben Malek and his sons, and of chastising the guilty, as also to assure the tranquillity of the country.” “When this object has been attained, some effective guarantees for order secured, the normal situation re-established, these measures, which are only provisional, will reach their termination.”⁵¹¹

On the next day (21 June), Spain landed more troops at Larache — 100 artillery, 150 infantry, with two cannon and a supply of ammunition — on their way to El Ksar.⁵¹² Six days afterwards, 62 more men, besides horses, mules, and munitions, were landed.⁵¹³ By this time, 500 Spanish troops were at El Ksar.⁵¹⁴ The time for withdrawal has not yet (October 1924) arrived.

It is well worthy of observation that, in the quarrel between France and Spain, Russia, through her Ambassador at Paris, supported the Spanish contention.⁵¹⁵ As between France and Germany, Russia supported France,⁵¹⁶ and, in payment, sought French support elsewhere.⁵¹⁷ The merits of the various operations were never thought to be of practical importance.

Curtain Drawn. Here then we have a pretty quarrel between France and Spain. They had agreed, a little prophetically, to a partition between them of Morocco. Each was violating not only her agreement, but, at the same time, the Act of Algeciras. Each was throwing protests at the other. And each, under various pretences, was taking military possession of important tracts of territory. The enlightening revelations of the French Yellow Book (from which the above narrative has been compiled), terminate with the German announcement of intention to send a warship to Agadir. On the day prior to that announcement, France had expressed her surprise (quoting from the French Chargé at Madrid):

“at seeing the Royal [the Spanish] Government proceed to military operations and to new occupations, while our Government was seeking in amicable conversations the means of giving it the satisfactions of a practical character to which it appeared to attach value.”

and the Spanish Minister had:

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 390, *Annexe*. And see No. 351.

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*, No. 395.

⁵¹² *Ibid.*, No. 405.

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*, No. 414.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁵ Isvolsky to Sazonoff, 28 March 1911: *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 62.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 93, 94, 101.

⁵¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

“delivered a criticism equally keen of our [French] last arrangement with the Sultan, an arrangement which put into our hands the financial administration and the Shereefian army without distinction of zone; there remained, therefore, nothing for Spain.”⁵¹⁸

THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE

Germany out of the way, France proceeded freely to the fulfillment of her purposes. On 30 March 1912, the Sultan signed a treaty by which any remaining appearance of his “sovereignty and independence” was extinguished. Morocco, by the overborne will of Moulay Hafid, became a French protectorate.

“*Article I.* The Government of the French Republic and His Majesty the Sultan have agreed to establish in Morocco a new régime admitting of the administrative, juridical, educational, economic, financial, and military reforms which the French Government may deem useful to be introduced within the Moroccan territory.”

“*Article II.* His Majesty the Sultan consents that henceforth the French Government, after it shall have notified the Makhzen, may proceed to such military occupation of the Moroccan territory as it might deem necessary for the maintenance of good order and the security of commercial transactions, and to exercise every police supervision on land and within the Moroccan waters.”

“*Article VI.* The diplomatic and consular agents of France shall be charged with the representation and protection of Moroccan subjects and interests abroad. His Majesty the Sultan pledges himself not to conclude any act of an international nature without the previous approval of the French Republic.”⁵¹⁹

A few weeks afterwards, Moulay Hafid, with the help of the French forces, escaped from Fez, fled to the coast, abdicated at Rabat, and took ship for Gibraltar.

“The correspondent of *The Times* at Tangier wrote of the Sultan as having been released by General Lyautey from a state of servitude, impotence, and fear of assassination, and stated that the French troops alone would protect him from being torn to pieces by his own infuriated countrymen on his way to the coast. The formalities of the abdication were carried out at Rabat, and Moulay Hafid left for Gibraltar on August 12 for France. On August 14 his successor, Mulai Yusef, a brother, was proclaimed in the Mosques. Mulai Yusef had held the Khalifate of Fez and was described as a man of ‘moderation and piety,’ of whose personality in other respects little was known.”⁵²⁰

As Moulay Hafid journeyed to the coast, El Hiba, the new leader of a Holy War, took possession of Marakesh.

⁵¹⁸ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Morocco*, 1910-12, No. 416.

⁵¹⁹ *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, VI, Supp., pp. 207-9.

⁵²⁰ *Ann. Reg.*, 1912, p. [442. Cf. *Un Livre Noir*, II, pp. 530-2.

“At this time the entire country between Fez and Marakesh was in a ferment. At the end of August, Colonel Mangin took the aggressive, and after an engagement, chiefly by artillery, outside Marakesh, entered the city. He found the nine Frenchmen safe. El Hiba, who was said to have been disavowed by the populace on the arrival of the French, escaped in disguise.”⁵²¹

Meanwhile the operations of French troops had had their predicted effect—tribes fighting fiercely for their freedom, and European civilians paying with their lives part of the penalty for French aggression. The *Annual Register* of 1912 contains the following:

“Morocco has continued in a disturbed condition. The narrative of events for the year is one of extensive military operations. . . . Meanwhile sharp fighting had occurred in the Zemmur district and serious disturbances were reported from Marakesh, Europeans being attacked by the mob. The ministry at Paris sanctioned the creation of a reserve brigade of black troops in West Africa for the ‘relief’ of those already serving in Morocco. . . . On April 20, news came from Tangier that Europeans had been murdered in Fez on the 17th by mutineer soldiers, that two regiments had remained loyal and had saved the remaining French officers, but that there had been three days’ street fighting in the city. On the following day it was known that seventeen French officers had been slain, and that nine French civilians had lost their lives. In the Jewish quarter there had been heavy loss of life and much pillaging. . . . Reinforcements were called up from Mekinez and 4,000 troops brought in by forced marches. The French troops then in Morocco were estimated at 38,200—2000 in Fez itself. Simultaneously with these affairs, General Lyautey, formerly High Commissioner on the Morocco-Algerian frontier, was appointed Resident General. . . . As time passed all the news pointed to seething unrest in the country and severe fighting. Reinforcements were sent from Algeria and Senegal. General Lyautey arrived at Rabat and entered Fez on May 26. Meanwhile there had been an attempted concentration of tribesmen with a view of entering the capital, and in the Sus district a new Sultan had been proclaimed. He was reported to be a ‘fanatic’ of reputation, who was drawing to his standard all the influential tribes in the South. In the North the situation appears to have been made worse by an edict by General Moinier fining Fez a million francs because of the mutiny, but this edict was withdrawn as soon as its evil effect was realized.”⁵²²

For all this the Sultan disclaimed responsibility. He said:

“I have put up with everything. I have been thrown into the water with my hands tied, and now they blame me for getting wet.”⁵²³

With these extracts from the *Annual Register* may be read the reports

⁵²¹ *Ann. Reg.*, 1912, p. [443.

⁵²² Pp. [400-1. Cf. *Un Livre Noir*, II, pp. 532-3.

⁵²³ *Ann. Reg.*, 1912, p. [441.

of Isvolsky, the able Russian Ambassador at Paris. On 8 April 1912, nearly eleven months after the arrival of the French troops at Fez, he said:

“The French Minister of War is, at this moment, very much occupied with the organization of a permanent Cherifian army. For it may be supposed that a complete pacification of the country will not soon be achieved. . . . These rumors testify to the agitation which this agreement has created among a section of the population of Morocco, and make apparent that France will have not a few difficulties to surmount in order thoroughly to accomplish her work of pacification.”⁵²⁴

On 25 April, the Ambassador said:

“Even in the heart of this country, in its capital, a revolt broke out suddenly, in the course of which a large number of French subjects perished. According to the latest information, there are 70 dead, of whom 15 are instruction officers, 40 private soldiers, and 13 civilians; among the wounded are 4 officers and 66 private soldiers. In addition, it appears that massacres have taken place in the Jewish quarter of Fez, and that Jewish houses and shops have been pillaged. The number of Jews killed exceeds one hundred, and terror and total misery reign among the survivors.”⁵²⁵

Ten weeks later (4 July), the Ambassador said that:

“at Paris everybody is now aware that the pacification of the country constitutes, as formerly, a heavy and very serious task, which General Lyautey will not succeed in finishing at an early date.”⁵²⁶

After another six weeks (29 August), the Ambassador said:

“The events which have taken place in the course of these last days in Morocco have attracted the attention of the French public, who to-day recognize clearly the gravity of the future military task which devolves upon France.”⁵²⁷

Down to the moment of the proof-reading of these pages,⁵²⁸ the work of “pacification” — of trampling down the tribes — continues. In every year of the thirteen which have elapsed since the extrusion of Germany, the soldiery have been at work — intermittently during the European war, but since then with vigor. On 21 September 1920, *The Times* (London) had the following:

“Perhaps the most important military operations since the institution of the French Protectorate in Morocco are now taking place. About 12,000 or 14,000 Protectorate troops are advancing into the mountainous country in the region of the holy city of Wazzan for the pur-

⁵²⁴ *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 227. The argeement referred to is the one constituting the protectorate.

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 235-6.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 313. And see pp. 245, 255-6, 321.

⁵²⁸ October, 1924.

pose of occupying a large district which has never yet submitted to the French."

On 10 March 1921, Lyautey declared (according to the report in *The Times*) that:

"in his opinion the major part of the work of pacification in Morocco had already been accomplished, and should no external complications intervene he thought that in two years at most Morocco would be entirely peaceful. Two conditions were, however, necessary. The first was that he should be left in command of the 80,000 men he now has. Out of the 80,000, 35,000 were French, only 6,000 of whom are in combatant units, the others being employed in administration and organization. Secondly, he must have granted him credits for 500,000,000*f.*"

With the triumphal entry into Fez of the French President (May 1922), the military subjection of the more easily accessible tribes may be said to have been substantially completed. For that achievement, a milliard of francs, it is declared, has been "profitably spent."⁵²⁹ But the suppression is far from complete. On 5 July 1922, Marshal Lyautey said:

"It was an error to suppose that Morocco was entirely peaceful. One-third of the country had not yet come under the influence of the Sultan and the Protectorate. The people in these regions were courageous, proud, and independent. They lived in a mountainous region and frequently raided the submissive people on the plains below. These recalcitrant tribes were less disposed to surrender because they profited by the prosperity which the Protectorate brought to the country, without having to contribute to the cost of administration. The work of pacification must be pursued, for the cost in men and money of repressing these unruly people was far greater than that of the work of pacification."⁵³⁰

Defending the bestowal of a marshal's baton on General Lyautey, a recent writer has said (June 1922) that:

"he has manœuvred an army of 80,000 men from the Atlantic to the Atlas in a war which, begun in 1912, is not yet finished."⁵³¹

On 13 July 1923, an army of 20 infantry battalions, 12 squadrons of cavalry, 10 battalions of artillery, and 5 aeroplane escadrilles commenced an encircling attack on the Berbers,⁵³² while:

"expeditions of less importance . . . to the Wesgha Valley . . . in the north, and to the middle Atlas and the Sus district in the south "

were to be undertaken.⁵³³ Within six days after the commencement of

⁵²⁹ *Fortnightly Rev.*, June 1922, p. 910.

⁵³⁰ *The Times* (London).

⁵³¹ *Fortnightly Rev.*, June 1922, p. 911.

⁵³² *The Times* (London), 19 July 1923.

⁵³³ *The Times* (London), 9 April 1923.

the main operations, the French were reported to have lost no less than 2,000 men.⁵³⁴

The Holy War of the Moroccans in defence of their country against the French is still unfinished.

THE SPANISH POSITION

From her political contest with France, Spain has emerged a poor second. Removal of Germany left the two Powers free to quarrel over their irreconcilable ambitions, France wanted general control over the whole of Morocco,⁵³⁵ while Spain, in relation to her sphere of influence, was unwilling to accept a subordinate position.⁵³⁶ Negotiations between them having made little progress, France sent an envoy to Fez with instructions to procure the assent of the Sultan to the establishment of a French protectorate over the whole territory.⁵³⁷ Within two weeks (30 March), the helpless Sultan signed the demanded treaty (above quoted), reserving with regard to Spanish interests only as follows:

“The Government of the Republic will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government regarding the interests which this government has in virtue of its geographical position and territorial possessions on the Moroccan coast.”⁵³⁸

Short of provoking war, of which there was little danger, France could now dictate as she pleased to Spain.⁵³⁹ Agreement was signed on 27 November 1912.⁵⁴⁰

Spain has not been more fortunate from a military point of view than from a political. Year after year she has suffered ignominious defeat. A campaign of two months in the autumn of 1920 failed:

“owing to the difficulties of the country and the opposition of the tribesmen. Much reduced by losses and sickness, this column, after some courageous fighting, was obliged to abandon the advance when still about 15 miles from Sheshawan, and has now returned to its base at Larache.”⁵⁴¹

In the summer of 1921, the Spanish troops encountered severe reverses.⁵⁴²

⁵³⁴ *The Montreal Star*, 19 July 1923.

⁵³⁵ Cf. *Fortnightly Rev.*, Aug. 1923, p. 195.

⁵³⁶ Cf. *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 105.

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 208, 219-20.

⁵³⁸ *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, VI, Supp., p. 208.

⁵³⁹ Reporting upon the Franco-Moroccan treaty, Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, said (8 April 1912): “By this agreement, France has acquired, unmistakably, a situation much more advantageous for her negotiations with Spain, which are moving slowly”: *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 226.

⁵⁴⁰ It may be seen in *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, VII, Supp., pp. 81-99. Cf. *Fortnightly Rev.*, Aug. 1923, pp. 196-204. References to the negotiations may be seen in *Un Livre Noir*, I, pp. 170, 207, 245, 246, 274, 286-9, 309.

⁵⁴¹ *The Times* (London), 25 Nov. 1920.

⁵⁴² Cf. *Current History*, XIV, p. 1051.

General Silvestre appears to have commenced, early in the year, extensive and ill-considered operations in the central and eastern districts. For a time, with the aid of backsheesh, all went well — the troops advancing farther west and farther north. But by July the world became aware that of the invading 25,000 men, about 5,000 natives had deserted; that less than 1,000 had escaped from the Arabs into French territory; that about the same number had found refuge in Melilla; that Silvestre and his staff had committed suicide at Anual (six miles from the mouth of the river Kebia); that the survivors had retreated first to Batel (the terminus of the railway which runs from Melilla, first south along the coast and then about twenty-seven miles southwest into the interior), thence to Arruit, a point on the railway, where a stand was made, but to which no help was sent; and that such forces as remained were hemmed in around Melilla and a short strip of coast to the south.⁵⁴³

“Some seventy fortified Spanish posts soon fell into the hands of the enemy, including even that of Nador, six miles from Melilla, and by August 11, the last of the columns holding out had surrendered, and the disaster was complete. It was subsequently stated officially that the total Spanish losses from July 20 were 14,772 men, 29,504 rifles, 392 machine guns, and 129 guns. Thus the work of twelve years was undone in three weeks, and the Spaniards were thrown back exactly to where they were in 1909, when they began the occupation of the Riff.”⁵⁴⁴

Reinforcements, bringing the force up to 75,000, with reserves of 100,000 and 120 guns, effected some improvement (from a Spanish point of view) in the situation. Although the Spanish disasters of 1923 and 1924 have not been so serious as those of the previous year, the “rebels” continue to make good their defence. All of which brings vividly back to memory that, according to Mr. Asquith, one of the two reasons for which the United Kingdom entered the war of 1914–18 was:

“to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power.”⁵⁴⁵

⁵⁴³ *The Times* (London), 20 Aug. 1921.

⁵⁴⁴ *Ann. Reg.*, 1921, p. [295. Cf. *Contemporary Rev.*, Jan. 1923, p. 49.

⁵⁴⁵ Speech in House of Commons, 6 Aug. 1914: *ante*, p. 197. As these pages pass the press, comes the news of Spain's effort to arrange terms with the “rebels.” Willing to concede them “a large measure of economic and administrative independence” in respect to a large part of “the Spanish zone,” she asks, in return, recognition, “even if purely nominal,” of the Sultan's sovereignty and the Spanish Protectorate. Abdel Krim (the capable leader of the “rebels”), on the other hand, demands: (1) evacuation by the Spanish of a still larger part of the “zone”; (2) “the complete and absolute independence of the Rif and the recognition of this independence by Spain and the Powers”; (3) “an indemnity, and reparations

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing recital, taken in conjunction with the three preceding chapters, makes clear that the United Kingdom joined in the war of 1914-18, not because of any incident of the moment, but in pursuance of a policy partially concealed, frequently repudiated, but rigidly pursued during the ten years prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

1. Germany's rivalry in manufactures, in commerce, in finance, in mercantile shipping, and in war-navy, added to her predominance in military power, aroused British apprehension, and created British antagonism. That was one root of the war between the United Kingdom and Germany.

2. British policy in western Europe had for many years pivoted upon the determination to maintain freedom from menace on the North Sea coasts. While France was the danger in this regard, France was the potential enemy. As Germany waxed, and France relatively waned, British apprehension became fixed on the Power to the east of Belgium and Holland, instead of, as formerly, on the Power to the west. That was another root of the war between the United Kingdom and Germany.

3. British traditional policy in eastern Europe and the Near East had been the protection of Constantinople and India against the advances of Russia. The advent of Germany as a competitor for domination at Constantinople, and for political as well as economic expansion in Asia Minor, Persia and Mesopotamia, diverted British apprehension from Russia to Germany. That was another root of the war between the United Kingdom and Germany.

4. Dread of Germany induced the United Kingdom to enter into *entente* relations with France and Russia. All outstanding difficulties with these countries were settled by comprehensive treaties. Afterwards, as questions arose between either of them and Germany, the United Kingdom supported them diplomatically, and, had occasion required it, would have lent them military assistance. The Morocco incidents of 1905-6 and 1911, being the most notable of these occasions, and the evidence of British attitude toward them being indisputably clear, they may be regarded as having marked the transition from *entente* relations to practical military alliance, "from the static to the dynamic state" of these relations. In that sense, Morocco was another root of the war between the United Kingdom and Germany.

for the losses suffered by the Rif and the Jabala tribes during these twelve years of warfare, and ransom for the Spanish prisoners — said to number several hundreds — at present in captivity at Abdel Krim's headquarters"; (4) "the right to imprison or to exile Raisuli and all tribal leaders who had fought for Spain": *The Times* (London), 18 September 1924. Meanwhile, the military operations proceed, Spain endeavoring to relieve her 6,000 troops beleaguered in Sheshuan.

5. Germany was within her rights in insisting in 1905 upon a reference of her dispute with France concerning Morocco to an international conference. President Roosevelt was of that opinion. He warmly congratulated the Kaiser on his success in that regard. And the result of the proceedings of the conference — the Act of Algeciras — was to a large extent a declaration in favor of the German contention for international equality in Morocco, and a denial of the claim of France and Spain to exclusive domination.

6. French and Spanish military operations in 1911 were subversive of the chief principle of the Act of Algeciras, namely, "the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan." France so regarded the Spanish actions, and Spain so regarded the French. Germany, as a party to the Act was within her rights in objecting to these proceedings. Kiderlen-Wächter, in saying to the French Ambassador:

"You have bought from Spain, England, and even Italy your liberty in Morocco; as to us, you have left us aside,"

did but remind France of the international customary practice that when one imperialistic nation wishes to seize some territory in the possession of a people too weak to defend it, "compensations" (the technical word) must be offered to other nations of imperializing proclivities. France wanted to leave Germany aside, and was forced to a conference in 1905. Persisting in the same course, she, in 1911, after bringing Europe to the verge of war, complied with the rules of the imperialistic game.

The International Effect. With the passing of the crisis, European peace was for the moment secured. But there were probably few well-informed diplomats who did not share the opinion of Isvolsky,⁵⁴⁶ the Russian Ambassador at Paris (20 December 1911):

"After the crisis just experienced, the political situation of Europe is less secure than ever. Beyond all doubt, any local collision between the Powers is bound to lead to a general European conflict, in which Russia, like every other European Power, will have to participate. With God's help, the conflict may be postponed for a while, but that it may come at any moment we must bear in mind, hour by hour, and we must also arm against it, hour by hour."⁵⁴⁷

All the Great Powers were of the same opinion, and acted accordingly.

PERSIA

Morocco and Persia. As the Morocco incidents developed and inspired the *entente* relations between the United Kingdom and France, so events in Persia strengthened the political attachment between the United Kingdom and Russia. Or, perhaps it would be better to say

⁵⁴⁶ Formerly Russian Foreign Minister.

⁵⁴⁷ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 611-12.

that British determination to support France in Morocco was paralleled by British determination to support Russia in Persia; and that British action was motived in both cases by resolve to consolidate the Triple Entente in anticipation of the day when unity of action against Germany would become essential. In both cases, Sir Edward Grey would have wished to be able to justify all the actions which he found it expedient to support. But justification was a secondary consideration. It was required, principally, for his defence against parliamentary attacks. Necessity for *entente* solidarity compelled acquiescence in those things which in themselves were regrettable. That was frequently the case in his relations with Russia.

Russo-British Treaty, 1907. Afghanistan was one of the buffer states between Russia and British India, and Persia was another. Thanks to their mountains and fighting qualities, the Afghans had been able to maintain their independence. Persia was less fortunate. Guarded, topographically, to some extent, against Turkey on the west, her provinces in the north lay open to Russian invasion by both land and sea. On the south, her territory touched the Persian Gulf, where the United Kingdom asserted maritime control; and on the southeast, Beluchistan, a British protectorate, was the adjoining territory. At first, the great rival empires, Russia and the United Kingdom, in search of economic advantages (commercial agreements, loans, concessions), proceeded, competitively — bullying and buying as best they could. But when dread of German expansion appeared to make necessary the establishment of *entente* relations, the two governments agreed to arrangements which, it was hoped, would eliminate friction between themselves, and, at the same time, baffle the intruder. Speaking in the House of Commons on 27 November 1911, Sir Edward Grey said:

“What was the object of the Anglo-Russian Agreement? The object was to prevent the two nations mining and countermining against each other in the somewhat squalid diplomatic struggle which has gone on for years — one trying to gain the advantage at the expense of the other — troubling the Indian frontier on the one side, and the Russian Government always afraid we were going to obtain some advantage toward their frontier. The object of the agreement was to put a stop to that. It has put a stop to it.”⁵⁴⁸

By treaty of 31 August 1907, the United Kingdom agreed with Russia to divide Persia into three parts, taking to herself the southeastern (abutting on Beluchistan) as her sphere of “special interest”; assigning the much more valuable northern (including Teheran, the capital) to Russia as her sphere; and leaving untouched, for the moment, a “neutral zone,” with its frontage on the Gulf, in the middle. The introductory words of the treaty — as truthful as usual — were as follows:

⁵⁴⁸ *Hansard*, XXXII, col. 153.



PERSIA

Showing the spheres of interest according to the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 31 August 1907. Lines of dots indicate international boundaries

“The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations.”⁵⁴⁹

The treaty having been strongly resented in Persia, the British Foreign Office transmitted to the Teheran government (4 September 1907) a declaration containing the following assurances:

“Firstly, neither of the two Powers will interfere in the affairs of Persia unless injury is inflicted on the persons or property of their subjects. Secondly, negotiations arising out of the Anglo-Russian Agreement must not violate the integrity and independence of Persia.”⁵⁵⁰

A week afterwards (11 September), a joint Anglo-Russian note was presented to the Persian government summarizing the contents of the treaty and saying:

“In that agreement, the two Governments mutually agree to the strict integrity and independence of Persia, and testify that they sincerely desire the pacific development of that country as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the commerce and industry of all other nations.”

Repeating and emphasizing the previous assurance, the Powers said:

“In signing the arrangement, the two States have not for a moment lost sight of the fundamental principle of absolute respect of the integrity and independence of Persia.”⁵⁵¹

In the same sense, but making use of the word “sovereignty,” Sir Edward Grey said in the House of Commons (17 February 1908) that the spheres were not to be regarded as:

“political partition.” “These are only British and Russian spheres in a sense which is in no way derogatory to the independence and sovereignty of Persia.”⁵⁵²

Comment on the Treaty. How little sincerity was behind these words, every diplomat knew. The assumption of the power to make the partition was of itself sufficient evidence of the real intention. Shortly after the treaty was made, Lord Curzon, a former Viceroy of India and afterwards British Foreign Minister, commented upon it in this way (6 February 1908):

“I am almost astounded at the coolness, I might even say the effrontery, with which the British Government is in the habit of parcelling out the territory of Powers whose independence and integrity it assures them, at the same time, it has no other intention than to preserve, and only informs the Power concerned of the arrangement that has been made

⁵⁴⁹ *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, I, Supp., p. 400.

⁵⁵⁰ W. Morgan Shuster: *The Strangling of Persia*, p. 28.

⁵⁵¹ Br. White Paper, Persia, 1912, No. 1.

⁵⁵² Hansard, CLXXXIV, col. 494.

after the arrangement has been concluded. I have no means, first hand, of ascertaining what the impressions of the Persians are about the Agreement; but from the information of friends who have, I should think their feelings must be of a somewhat disquieting nature.”⁵⁵³

The diplomatic correspondence of the subsequent years makes very clear the worthlessness of the assurances given to Persia. For not only does it disclose that Russia proceeded to act as a dictator⁵⁵⁴ in her sphere of interest, but here and there in the despatches may be seen statements indicative of the ulterior purposes of the treaty. For example, when Russia was proposing to sanction the construction by Germany of a railway from Bagdad to Khanekin⁵⁵⁵ and herself to continue the line to Teheran, the Russian Ambassador at London wrote (26 February 1911) as follows:

“The Anglo-Russian Convention, the wording of which was intentionally so formulated as to render protests by other nations impossible, aimed — I do not believe that this can be controverted — at the purpose which has so frequently been revealed, namely, that of uniting our efforts to prevent Germany from obtaining a foothold in Persia.”⁵⁵⁶

At a later date, referring to the same subject, the Ambassador reported (21 June 1911):

“The Anglo-Russian Convention does not afford any basis upon which an English protest against German control of the said line might be raised; England, however, so greatly fears such a control that, should the German control come into effect, our Convention with England would become shaken and its political effect would be called into question, because, according to the whole spirit of the Convention of 1907, Russian influence in Northern Persia is intended to be exclusive, just as English influence is in the South.”⁵⁵⁷

After every pretence of regard for Persian independence had disappeared, Sir Edward Grey defended Russia and himself (14 December 1911) in this way:

“Persia is weak and disorganized, and the very fact that she requires foreign advisers shows that her independence is not that some independence which can do without leaning on someone else.”⁵⁵⁸

In other words, the political independence of a weak state is something quite different from the independence of the strong. It was a poor defence against the charges to which it was pleaded.

Russian and British Actions. Russia, after the treaty of 1907, made no pretence of respecting the independence of Persia. The story

⁵⁵³ Hansard, CLXXXIII, col 1013

⁵⁵⁴ So Lord Curzon: *post*, p. 883.

⁵⁵⁵ About 90 miles northeast of Bagdad.

⁵⁵⁶ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 557.

⁵⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 574.

⁵⁵⁸ Hansard, XXXII, col. 2603. And see col. 2605.

of the next seven years — that is down to the outbreak of the war of 1914 — is one of rapid reduction of Persia to vassalage; of private diplomatic protests by Sir Edward Grey against Russian procedure; and of public defence of it by the same man. In 1920 (16 November), after Anglo-Russian association in Persia had ceased, and the supposed necessity for condoning Russian aggression there had terminated, Lord Curzon (then Foreign Minister) in explaining the British project of a purely British treaty with Persia, did not exaggerate when he said that, after the treaty of 1907, Russia:

“proceeded to act as though she were a dictator in the northern part of Persia.”⁵⁵⁹

Counting upon Sir Edward Grey’s determination to maintain, at all hazards, *entente* solidarity, the Russian Foreign Minister made little of the British protests. It must have been with small satisfaction that Grey read the despatch from that Minister to the Russian Ambassador at Teheran of 8 October 1910:

“Considerations, which are based on a firm foundation, prompt me to say that the London Cabinet looks upon the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 as being important for the Asiatic interests of England; but that this Convention possesses a still greater importance for England from the viewpoint of the policy which is being pursued by England in Europe. . . . These considerations are of great moment for us, as we may rest assured that the English, engaged in the pursuit of political aims of vital importance in Europe, may, in case of necessity, be prepared to sacrifice certain interests in Asia in order to keep a Convention alive which is of such importance to them. This is a circumstance which we can, of course, exploit for ourselves, as, for instance, in Persian affairs.”⁵⁶⁰

Some of the more important of the episodes between 1907 and 1914 will now be passed in short review.⁵⁶¹

Constitutional Government and Russia. After determined agitation, the Persian people had succeeded in the year previous to the treaty in securing the substitution of constitutional for autocratic government.⁵⁶² Shortly afterwards (January 1907), Muhammad Ali Shah Qajar, a “vice-sodden monster,”⁵⁶³ came to the throne. Having withstood popular demands and flouted the provisions of the new constitution, revolu-

⁵⁵⁹ *Hansard*, (Lords) XLII, col. 280.

⁵⁶⁰ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

⁵⁶¹ The relevant British diplomatic correspondence is in *Accounts and Papers*, 1912-13, CXXII. The subject is dealt with in Buchanan, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 98-102, 109-118.

⁵⁶² The firman of the Shah providing for a National Consultative Assembly was dated 5 Aug. 1906, and the fundamental law embodying the constitution was passed 30 Dec. 1906. The law may be seen in Shuster, *op. cit.*, pp. 291-9. A supplementary fundamental law (*ibid.*, pp. 299-309) was passed on 7 Oct. 1907.

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

tion accomplished his removal (July 1909). Meanwhile, Russia (after the Anglo-Russian treaty) had lent him assistance as against the Nationalists. On 30 April 1909,⁵⁶⁴ the Russian troops occupied Tabriz⁵⁶⁵; and early in July, other troops arrived at Kasvin — only 86 miles north of Teheran.⁵⁶⁶

Grey's Embarrassment. Appearance of foreign troops naturally provoked resentment and disorder, and thereby Sir Edward Grey experienced his first embarrassment. What was he to say in parliament? By his treaty, he was assumed to have secured the independence of Persia. What reason could be offered for its invasion by Russian forces? Benckendorff, the very able Russian Ambassador in London, in reporting to St. Petersburg (3 June 1909), said that Sir Charles Hardinge, British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs:

"is very much disturbed by the sharp measures taken by us at Tabriz; as for example, the destruction of dwellings. He is expecting questions in Parliament which might prove very awkward for the Government."⁵⁶⁷

Two days afterwards (5 June), Isvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister, informed Benckendorff that Nicolson (the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg) had explained "the concern caused in London," and had stated that if Russia took sides against the Nationalists, the United Kingdom:

"might be obliged to proceed against the Shah. . . . Grey is prompted by the wish to maintain the closest co-operation with Russia in all Persian questions."

In reply, Isvolsky offered the explanation always advanced on such occasions — the same as in 1914 was offered by Germany for occurrences in Belgium:

"that the Russian general has considered it his duty to resort to vigorous measures to put down deeds of violence, of pillaging, and of provocation of our troops."⁵⁶⁸

Sir Edward was not misled, but when questioned in parliament (6 July) replied that the advance of the Russians to Kasvin was "to insure communication between Kasvin and the Caspian Sea"; that further advance would be made only if necessary to protect European lives, etc., at Teheran, and:

"I must add that we have been kept informed by the Russian Government of what steps they considered necessary, and in view of the chaos which exists in the north of Persia and close to the Russian frontier, I see no ground for saying that any precautions which have been taken hitherto are unreasonable."

⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁵⁶⁵ A provincial capital city of 200,000, in northwestern Persia, not far from the Russian border.

⁵⁶⁶ Shuster, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

⁵⁶⁷ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

Kasvin is more than 225 miles south of the frontier and only about eighty-six from Teheran. In answer to a further question, Sir Edward said:

“No, Sir, we have received no representations that the lives of British subjects are in danger, but there have been reports that there may be danger for some European subjects.”⁵⁶⁹

While Sir Edward was speaking, the Russian troops were approaching Teheran. At Tabriz and Kasvin they remained until after the commencement of the war of 1914-18. The next day (7 June), Benckendorff reported as follows: “Sir Edward told me that he wished to have it clearly understood that if the prolonged presence of our troops in Tabriz disturbed him, this did not mean that the British Government feared any strengthening of our influence in North Persia. This natural influence had been taken for granted in the Convention; it had already previously existed, and England was far from offering any opposition thereto. He told me that he had been obliged to consider recent events mainly from a parliamentary point of view. . . .” Sir Edward added that “his position would be rendered very difficult if the Russian force would remain on the spot after order had been again established, and that, since such a contingency had not been provided for by our Convention, he would make no statement to the contrary and declare that the permanent Russian occupation was the result of an agreement.”⁵⁷⁰ This communication throws light on the Russo-British treaty, and the sincerity of the assurances given to Persia. The strengthening of Russian influence in the north, even by military intervention, as against an internal agitation for constitutional government “had been taken for granted in the convention” — that is, in the treaty. Invasion by Russian troops did not appear to militate against “the integrity and independence of Persia.”

Discussion as to Withdrawal. After the dethronement and flight of Muhammad Ali Shah (16 July 1909), Sir Edward Grey desired the withdrawal of the Russian troops, and broached the subject during the Czar's visit to England in August. Reporting from there on 16 August, Benckendorff said:

“However, it was a question of solving the rather difficult problem under what conditions our troops would be recalled. . . . Public opinion in England began to fear that, notwithstanding good intentions on the part of the Russian Government, the temporary presence of Russian troops might actually lead to the permanent occupation of Persia, which might have re-opened the question of strategic security of the Indian frontier and would have paralyzed the effect of the Convention.”

To this, the Russian reply (during the conversation) was:

“that even if we were now able to withdraw our troops they would

⁵⁶⁹ Hansard, VII, cols. 1010, 1011.

⁵⁷⁰ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 52, 3.

perhaps have to enter Persia a second time, and that a second withdrawal would prove much more difficult than the first. . . . This part of the conversation, at which Asquith, Sir A. Nicolson, and I were present, was, so to speak, merely the prelude to the drawing up of the joint program to be followed by us in the future. Grey began by pointing out that Great Britain, naturally, laid weight upon preserving her prestige within her sphere of influence, but that she was far from wishing that the Russian influence in the North should be in any way impaired by present events; that it was in England's own interests that the Russian prestige which had always existed, even before the Convention had been concluded, be maintained, and that, consequently, the Russian Government might count upon Great Britain's assistance in all questions in which Russian interests were at stake. Sir Edward cited three examples: He admits that the foreign officers in Persian service can only be Russians; that the Russian governor of the young Shah must not be replaced by an Englishman, neither by Lindley, nor any one else; that England is prepared to assist us to balk Zilli's intentions to take possession of the throne. When Iswolsky pointed to the anomaly of a Caucasian revolutionary, who was a Russian subject, acting as chief of the Persian police, Grey fully agreed." ⁵⁷¹

It was about a so-called independent Persia that these diplomats were conversing.

Foreign Officials — Germany. The assertion by two foreign Powers of a right of supervision over the exercise of the liberty of an "independent" state to employ such officials as it chose produced difficulty. A Frenchman, Bizot, had been the administrative head of financial affairs, and when it was proposed, with the concurrence of the two treaty-Powers, that he should have assistants from his own country, Germany intervened, acknowledging the special position of Russia and the United Kingdom, but insisting that:

"as soon as other nationals enter into question, they must all be treated equally." ⁵⁷²

The two Powers declined to agree, although, as the Russian Ambassador at London reported (2 February 1910), the German principle:

"Sir Edward maintains, may be easily defended because it is not unjustified, and, on the other hand, it is difficult to assail." ⁵⁷³

Following a later conversation with Sir Edward, the Ambassador further reported (15 March) that:

"He believes that our arguments in favor of the appointment of Frenchmen lack a solid foundation, since the appointment neither of British nor of Russian subjects was contemplated. Grey accordingly believes that any such condition should be dropped." ⁵⁷⁴

⁵⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 59, 60, 61.

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 65. And see pp. 61, 66, 69, 72.

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

On the 16th March, the German government handed to the Russian government a memorandum indicating that the reserve theretofore observed:

“ must not be understood as though the German Government had ceased to regard Persia as an independent country, where Germany has the right to look to her own interests without previously asking the permission of other Powers. . . . The German Government feels bound to state that this reserve cannot go to the extent of rendering it impossible for German commercial and financial circles to find a field of activity in Persia.”⁵⁷⁵

Germany and Railways. Feeling that Germany's next move would take the form of railway activity, the two Powers agreed:

“ that in this question Russia and England must remain particularly firm.”⁵⁷⁶

Germany confined her claim to the “ neutral zone,”⁵⁷⁷ where the two Powers had asserted no special interest; but from there, too, Germany was, if possible, to be excluded.

“ In these circumstances,” wrote Isvolsky (16 April 1910) “ there seems only one solution possible, namely, to bring strong pressure on Persia in order to prevent her from granting concessions to the Germans which would be incompatible with our interests. Russia and England must therefore not hesitate to employ extreme measures, and we suggest that an exchange of views as to the nature of these measures be begun.”⁵⁷⁸

A week afterwards, Isvolsky added (23 April):

“ we should have to declare to the Persian Government that Russia and England will stop at nothing in order to force the Persians to make their policy agree with the demands of the said note.”⁵⁷⁹

In Sir Edward Grey's opinion (26 April), the proposed note to Persia ought to indicate that:

“ any action on the part of the Persian Government injurious to the interests of the two Powers would be considered by the latter as an act of hostility, and would have the worst consequences for Persia; without, however, adding any definite threats.”⁵⁸⁰

The two Powers accordingly consulted as to the form of a note in this sense.⁵⁸¹ Shortly afterwards, for some unexplained reason,⁵⁸² Germany

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 73. And see pp. 75, 76, 77.

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 81-2.

⁵⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 83. And see p. 87.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 85, 6, 7.

⁵⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 91. The suggestion that the Kaiser wished, on the occasion of his contemplated visit to London, to make a good impression is inadequate. At the Potsdam meeting of the Czar and the Kaiser, six months afterwards, Germany as part of a bargain assumed the same attitude as that indicated in the text.

relieved the perplexity of the two Powers by declaring (22 May) that she:

“had never attempted to secure concessions in Persia which might prove objectionable to Russia and England, and that, moreover, she had also no intention of doing so in the future.”⁵⁸³

Loan Negotiations. Illustrating the modified form of independence enjoyed by the poor and weak Powers, Russia endeavored to exact new concessions as conditions of a further loan—among them, an agreement to employ only British or Russian nationals as officials; but, owing to the incursion of the Russian troops, she met with objection and delay. For remedy, Sir Edward Grey said to Benckendorff (15 March 1910):

“that he saw no other solution but that we recall our” (Russian) “Kaswin division, since Teheran is not at all threatened.”⁵⁸⁴

The next day, Benckendorff reported that the “main obstacle,” in Sir Edward’s opinion, to conclusion of the negotiations:

“is the presence of our troops at Kaswin. At least it appears to him doubtful whether the negotiations will lead to any result while our troops remain there, without their presence being in any way warranted by the prospect of an outbreak of disturbances either at Kaswin or at Teheran.”⁵⁸⁵

Regarding the presence of the troops as a lever for enforcement of compliance with her wishes, Russia offered withdrawal as a term of agreement. Persia would not submit. Indeed, in British eyes, Russia had worsened her position, as pointed out by Benckendorff in his report of 17 August:

“Just as with us, there is a certain disappointment noticeable here with regard to the course matters are taking at Teheran. . . . England has not so much an interest in what is going on in Persia as that she wants to prevent any other Power (excepting herself and Russia) from playing a part in that country. This refers in the first place to Germany and to Turkey, for political reasons, be it understood. . . . Her political interests do not coincide with her commercial interests. In the eyes of the British Government, the former constitute the decisive factor.”

“Owing to the fact that we have made the occupation of Kaswin the subject matter of negotiations with the Persian Government, the numerous political schemers at Teheran have secured a weapon dangerous for us; for these people cannot fail to understand that the occupation of Kaswin cannot but further their cause. It is to their interest that the savage and blind fanaticism of the masses against us shall continue to increase. The Persian Government thereby obtains an argument which it can use at one moment in the Persian Parliament and at the next

⁵⁸³ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 88. And see pp. 90, 91.

⁵⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁵⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

moment with the other Powers. And if, in reply, we should say that the presence of Russian troops only serves to maintain general order and security, the Persian Government is now in the position to respond that this is not true, because Russia is making use of the negotiations concerning the withdrawal of the troops in order to secure further advantages for herself." ⁵⁸⁶

In other words, it was clear that the troops were being retained on Persian soil in order to exact concessions in return for their withdrawal.

Russia's Drastic Actions. The Persian government being desirous of obtaining the administrative assistance of foreigners other than the nationals of the two oppressing Powers, a bill was introduced into the Medjlis providing for such appointments. Reporting upon this action, the Russian Ambassador at Teheran said (18 August 1910) that it had been undertaken by the Persian Government:

"without having previously communicated with the two Legations. Without exerting strong pressure it will be impossible to obtain a withdrawal of the Bill." ⁵⁸⁷

The incident appeared to indicate to Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister (8 September):

"that the Persians do not desire to follow the advice given by Russia and England." ⁵⁸⁸

And the Russian Ambassador at Teheran regretfully declared that:

"to constantly tender advice to this Government which is never followed, only lessens our prestige." ⁵⁸⁹

Further reflection convinced Sazonoff that something must be done. Writing to London (26 September), he said:

"I have recently told the British Chargé d'Affaires that in view of the disinclination shown by the Persians to comply with our just demands, and the impossibility of settling even unimportant current questions, I anticipate that we shall have to exert pressure upon Persia; and I have asked him whether the London Cabinet were of the same opinion. O'Beirne has asked Grey, and then told me that the latter was rather adverse to any project of exerting joint pressure. I replied in return that I shall not insist upon maintaining my view in order not to disturb the existing understanding in Persian affairs, but that I shall probably be compelled to resort to coercive measures on my own account; thus for example we should refuse to make an exception to the general rule forbidding any transit trade through the Caucasus in favor of Persians and the like." ⁵⁹⁰

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 92, 3, 4.

⁵⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁵⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 97. O'Beirne was British Chargé at St. Petersburg.

Thereupon, for the sake of the preservation of cordial *entente* relations, Sir Edward Grey indicated concurrence, the Russian Chargé at London reporting as follows (28 September):

“In consideration of the fact that it will be most undesirable to allow anything to interfere with the Anglo-Russian agreement in Persia, Grey wired to the British Minister at Teheran instructing him to support his Russian colleagues in the negotiations with the Persian Government, on the understanding, however, that our troops shall be recalled in the near future.”⁵⁹¹

British Attitude Exploited by Russia. It was this easy success in overcoming British scruples which led Sazonoff, in writing to the Russian Ambassador at Teheran (8 October), to suggest (as above noted (p. 883)) the exploitation of Sir Edward Grey's view of the necessities of British foreign policy in Europe. To this Sazonoff added a reference to the prospect of Persian submission, and then continued as follows:

“In no case, however, can we allow things to go on in the way they have done up to the present. We can no longer permit a state of affairs to continue in which not only the interests but also the authority and the prestige of Russia are bound to suffer. For this reason we shall have to adopt coercive measures, as already stated in my telegram No. 1420, if this our last attempt should prove futile. To repeat, I do not think matters will pass off without our having been obliged to exert pressure on the Persian Government. In any case, the exact plan to be followed in carrying these measures into effect must be worked out in order to be able, if necessary, to employ it at once. In this connection, we must in the first place keep in view the fact that these measures are not intended to obtain satisfaction in certain concrete questions, but that they are rather intended to convince the Persians that our wishes must not be constantly opposed, and that they must give up their demonstrative, unfriendly policy towards Russia. For this reason, these measures must by no means assume the character of our wishing to arrive at an understanding with the Persians. We must not begin to bargain with them, but we must convince them that we do not intend to resume friendly relations with Persia merely on this or that concession being granted, but only when their entire policy toward us has undergone a radical change.”

Sazonoff then proceeded to indicate how best to enforce submission upon an “independent” country. He would commence with “a system of petty annoyances” — specifying five such.

“After this, one might proceed to more weighty measures,” among which he instanced “creating difficulties in the import of Persian products into Russia on the pretence of their violating sanitary regulations; sending small detachments of troops for the protection of landed prop-

⁵⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 97-8.

erty belonging to all our subjects in Persia. . . . Finally, if all these measures should prove vain, we might then resort to the extreme measures proposed by you in your telegram No. 177, namely, of refusing to keep up any diplomatic relations with the Ministry; of stating that our troops, far from being recalled, would be reinforced," &c., &c.

"We could, of course, count upon quicker results if the pressure to be exerted on Persia were brought to bear upon her not only by us, but also by England. However, I see no prospect in the present situation of affairs of inducing England to take part in the system of coercive measures contemplated by us."⁵⁹²

No progress having been made by 26 October, the Russian Ambassador reported that:

"In order to force the Persian Government to yield to our wishes, I deem it necessary to insist on my present demands, and at the same time to abstain from discussing all other current questions."⁵⁹³

Mr. Shuster. A hiatus in the documents supplied by Siebert and Schreiner occurs at this point. We pass on to the 28th January 1911 — a period after the request of Persia for the assistance of the American government in the selection of a Treasurer-General, and the choice of Mr. W. Morgan Shuster⁵⁹⁴ for the office. On the date mentioned, Sazonoff declared that:

"The appointment of American experts is contrary to our convention with England —"⁵⁹⁵

a statement that was true only if the convention meant a great deal more than it said. He was reminded that in the previous September he had agreed to "raise no difficulties" in that respect,⁵⁹⁶ and on 9 May 1911 Mr. Shuster commenced his struggle with the "difficulties" which Russia heaped upon him.

The Stokes Affair. In order effectively to collect the taxes, Mr. Shuster found it necessary to organize a gendarmerie, and offered the command to Major Stokes, British Military Attaché at Teheran. At first (22 July 1911), the British government made no objection further than requiring that Stokes should resign from the army.⁵⁹⁷ But Russia raised vigorous protest. It:

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 99-102.

⁵⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁵⁹⁴ Shuster was "a very able American gentleman," who, in Sir Edward Grey's opinion, "set about his task in Persia with ability and good intentions and with single-mindedness. He had no political axe of his own to grind, and he was quite innocent of any political intrigue" (*Hansard*, XXXII, col. 154).

⁵⁹⁵ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁷ The note of the British Ambassador at Teheran to Mr. Shuster (22 July) was as follows: "Dear Mr. Shuster — I am authorized by my Government to tell you that Major Stokes, before accepting the command of the gendarmerie, will have to resign his commission in the Indian Army" (Shuster, *op. cit.*, p. 331).

“would run counter to the principle that only the subjects of minor Powers shall be allowed to accept such posts.”⁵⁹⁸

A British subject functioning within the Russian sphere of influence:

“would have an unfavorable effect on public opinion in Russia, and would cause rumors to arise as to differences of opinion between Russia and England in regard to Persia.”

And so instructions from St. Petersburg went to the Russian Ambassador at London (17 July):

“Please ask the London Cabinet whether it would not care to exert a pressure on Stokes in order to induce him to refuse the post offered him. We fear that otherwise we should be under necessity of demanding compensations, such for example, as the reorganization of the Persian forces by Russian officers.”⁵⁹⁹

Grey was unwilling. On 26 July, the Russian Ambassador at London reported that:

“Grey told me to-day, Stokes had been asked to quit the English service. He thinks this was sufficiently plain. Grey does not wish to take any further steps, as this might cause Shuster to resign, and he might then be accused of having put obstacles in the way of the financial reorganization of Persia as he otherwise looks upon Shuster as the proper person. However, Grey also appreciates your point of view, and has no objection to offer if we were to demand compensation and were to refer to the fact that Stokes is an Englishman. Grey will not oppose this point of view at Teheran, which would prove that both Governments are acting in concert.”⁶⁰⁰

But this was not enough for Russia, and, after further pressure (“the extreme gravity of the situation” being pointed out to him,⁶⁰¹) Sir Edward made complete submission. Reporting on 17 August, the Russian Ambassador said:

“Stokes has been refused his discharge until the entire incident is settled. It thus follows that the personal interests of Stokes play no part in influencing Grey’s attitude; he, Grey, had found the Persian reply inadequate, and had at once informed Shuster that a subject of a minor Power would have to be appointed in place of Stokes; he had seconded all our protests at Teheran.”⁶⁰²

In this way the appointment of Stokes was thwarted: As a condition, he must resign from the British army; but permission to resign was refused; Shuster was informed that he must get a subject of a minor Power; and Grey, although he had seen nothing amiss in the appointment of Stokes, seconded all the Russian protests in Teheran. Grey was not

⁵⁹⁸ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁵⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

⁶⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁶⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 106; and see p. 112.

far wrong, as we shall see, in saying that action of that sort "might cause Shuster to resign." Shortly afterwards (22 August), the Russian Ambassador at Teheran reported as follows:

"Shuster called on me yesterday and informed me that in view of the recent steps undertaken by the two Governments in the Stokes affair, there was nothing left for him to do but to publish a statement explaining the reasons which paralyse his activity in Persia. The main reason is the change of attitude taken up by England, which has taken place as a result of our influence; and this circumstance prompts him to hand in his resignation. . . . Shuster points to the fact that any exercise of generosity in this question could only serve to heighten Russia's prestige, and he, for his part, was prepared to engage himself that Stokes would only remain six months at Teheran and will then be sent to the South, while the control of the gendarmerie in Northern Persia will be handed over to the charge of officers belonging to one of the smaller Powers, or even to Russia, provided the Russian Government should so desire. . . . I must confess that I have been impressed by the conversation with Shuster; there certainly can be no doubt that Shuster's resignation would cause many difficulties to the British Government, both in the English, and particularly, in the American press. Perhaps our Government will consider it possible to accept Shuster's proposal, seeing that we have obtained full satisfaction in the Stokes affair. Should this be the case, we might ask Shuster to give us his written promise that he will fulfil the conditions relating to Stokes and the conclusion of the loan. Besides, it would be preferable to allow Stokes to remain in the British service, in order to enable the British Government likewise to exercise an influence upon his actions in the future."⁶⁰³

The comment of the Russian Ambassador at London (20 October) is illuminating:

"It cannot be disputed that the British Government, from the beginning, attached too little weight to the importance of the Stokes affair. Still, it must be admitted that as soon as its attention was directed to the significance of the matter, Grey at once drew the necessary conclusions. He even went so far as to employ means — namely, the refusal to grant Stokes his discharge — the legality of which may be challenged. I do not doubt but that, in so acting, he was prompted by the desire strictly to maintain our *entente* in Persia, whereby he can scarcely have had any illusions as to the difficulties which would thereby result for himself. For I believe that he personally considered acceptable the proposal made by our Minister at Teheran."⁶⁰⁴

⁶⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. 107-8. Grey expressed his "anxiety that the possibility of Shuster's resignation would once again render questionable any serious reform of Persian finances; this in itself would be very regrettable, and would call forth strong opposition" (*Ibid.*, p. 109).

⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

When attacked in parliament (27 November 1911) upon the subject, Grey defended Russia's opposition to the appointment of a British subject to office in northern Persia (Persia, a supposedly independent state) on the ground that Stokes's headquarters would be at Teheran and that Teheran was in the Russian sphere of interest. To Shuster's proposal in that regard — the proposal which the Russian Ambassador at Teheran and Grey himself approved — he made no reference.

The Lecoffre Affair. Among the various officials of the Finance Department in Persia, prior to the arrival of Shuster, was a Mr. Lecoffre, of French extraction but a British subject. His post was that of *Contrôleur*. In Shuster's opinion, he possessed:

"more information as to the supposed source of revenue and the supposed expenditures of the different ministers and departments of the Government than could be accumulated from all the other so-called records and accounts put together."⁶⁰⁵

Persuaded that gross frauds were being perpetrated by the revenue officers at Tabriz,⁶⁰⁶ Shuster sent Lecoffre to make investigation. To that, there would appear to be little ground for objection. It was a case of sending an official⁶⁰⁷ from one part of the Russian "sphere of interest" (Teheran) to another (Tabriz) to ascertain what was being done with revenue receipts. But Russia did object, and, having persuaded Sir Edward Grey to object, the British Ambassador at Teheran was instructed to say to Shuster that his action would result in a protest by Russia in order "to preserve her interests there," and would create the danger of her seizing northern Persia. Shuster declined to admit the right to raise objection. To have submitted would have been to make impossible the effective functioning of departmental work.

One of Russia's second set of demands upon Persia required (as we shall see) dismissal of Lecoffre from Persian service. No reason was assigned; and none, save that he was carrying out Shuster's instructions, has been suggested. Yet Sir Edward Grey, in his elaborate defence of Russia in the House of Commons on 27 November 1911, said:

"It is impossible for me to say that the attitude of the Russian Government was unreasonable."

⁶⁰⁵ Shuster, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

⁶⁰⁶ In his book, Shuster wrote: "The revenues of the province of Azarbaijan were computed to be about 1,000,000 tumans. Yet for months before I took charge, and during the entire summer when I was Treasurer-general, *not a single cent* had been collected there for the Government, according to the Persian *pishgar*, or tax-collector" (p. 196).

⁶⁰⁷ He was well qualified for his work. Shuster said: "He was one of my few European assistants who could speak Persian, who understood the intricacies of the Persian taxation system, and he had been at Tabriz before and knew the situation there. I frankly confess that I was surprised to find that even Russia had raised any objection, since Mr. Lecoffre had been in the Ministry of Finance at Teheran for nearly two years, and was occupying an important and rather influential position there" (p. 160).

The Shuau's-Sultana Affair. Prince Shuau's-Sultana was a supporter of the ex-Shah, and when the desposed monarch attempted his restoration, the Prince notified Shuster's tax-collector to pay his receipts to the appointee of the ex-Shah under pain of death.⁶⁰⁸ The Prince having, afterwards, by military activity, placed himself in open rebellion, the Persian government (4 October) ordered the confiscation and seizure of his estates, and placed the matter in the hands of Shuster,⁶⁰⁹ having first: "sent an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to notify the British and Russian Legations of the contemplated measures, as a mere matter of courtesy, with the information that if any foreign interests should be found to exist in connection with these estates, all rights of foreigners should be fully safeguarded and guaranteed by the Government. Neither Legation offered the slightest objection. The order of confiscation contained a clause to the same effect."⁶¹⁰

After seizing, under Shuster's directions, one of the properties (9 October), the Persian gendarmerie were attacked and ousted by Russian Cossacks under the leadership of two officers of the Russian Consulate.⁶¹¹ Thereupon, Shuster by telegram requested the intervention of the Russian Ambassador,⁶¹² informing him that re-possession of the property would be taken. The Ambassador replied:

"Your wire, letter received. Dawlatabad is a property rented by two Russian subjects, and no measures against it ought to have been taken without previously assuring Consulate-general that all rights of Russian subjects will be safeguarded and their contract not interfered with. It is on this explicit condition that measures taken by Persian Government against property of Shuau's-Sultana will not be opposed by Russian Legation, which will also hold Persian Government responsible for any claims subjects may have against Shuau's-Sultana."⁶¹³

Before commencing action against the Cossacks, appeal for peaceable possession was made to the Russian Consul-General (then in the city). It was refused, but the Cossacks offered no resistance, and possession was retaken. About two hours afterwards, the two officers from the Russian Consulate presented themselves at the gate of the property, and, as Shuster says:

"commenced abusing the Persian sentries there, telling them that they would be killed, and employing vile insults—all in an endeavor to provoke these ignorant guards into losing their temper and taking some action which these consular officials could construe into an insult to the Russian Government."⁶¹⁴

⁶⁰⁸ Shuster, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁶⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 146, 7.

⁶¹² He was at his country estate a few miles from the city.

⁶¹³ Shuster, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-8. Shuster had made no reference to Dawlatabad. As to the proceedings there, see *ibid.*, pp. 149, 150.

⁶¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

Thereupon either the sentries took no notice of the officers (as Shuster declares) or (as the Russian Consul reported):

“aimed their rifles at employeés of the Consul-General and threatened to shoot.”⁶¹⁵

No complaint of anything worse than that was made.

Shuster and The Times. Having, as he thought, found his work blocked by the objections to the Stokes and Lecoffre appointments, to negotiations for a loan, and to proceedings against Prince Shuau's-Sultana, Shuster determined upon publicity. In his book he recounts as follows:

“The loss of Major Stokes' services and the blocking of the permanent improvements and revenue-producing expenditures which were to be financed with the funds derived from the proposed loan of £4,000,000, practically nullified all hope of my accomplishing any constructive financial work in behalf of Persia. I deemed it but fair that these facts should no longer remain hidden, and on October 17th, in the course of an interview with the correspondents of the London *Times* and Reuter's News Agency, I took occasion to say that the final refusal of Russia to withdraw from her unwarranted attempt to coerce the Persian Government in the case of Major Stokes, and the complete acquiescence of England in the coercion, plainly showed that there was no genuine friendly feeling on the part of these two Governments towards the financial reformation and the general progress of Persia.”⁶¹⁶

Russia's Military Demonstration. With a view to supporting a contemplated demand with reference to the Shuau's-Sultana affair, Russia commenced preparations for a military demonstration in Persia. Grey was once more “disturbed.” On the 24th October, Benckendorff reported as follows:

“Thereupon Grey went on to say that he had been very much disturbed to learn from O'Beirne⁶¹⁷ that Russia reckoned with the possibility of a military expedition or the occupation of Northern Persia. He explained to me the extraordinary and momentous consequences of such a step: Persia's independence would be violated; the Anglo-Russian Convention would become void, and the necessity of its revision under extremely difficult circumstances would have to be taken into consideration. He pointed out that whatever Shuster's attitude might be, it had so far been merely a question of certain tendencies and not of measures already adopted, such, for example, as concessions, running counter to our interests or loans. Shuster had actually done nothing to warrant the necessity of a military expedition. . . . Grey then added his personal opinion that it would be impossible for Shuster to remain. He was not equal to the situation. He (Grey) as yet knew of the charges

⁶¹⁵ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

⁶¹⁶ P. 155.

⁶¹⁷ British Chargé at St. Petersburg.

brought forward by Shuster against the two Governments only what was published in the newspapers. He deems it beneath the dignity of the two Governments to reply to these charges officially, and he intends to maintain this view most energetically in Parliament.”⁶¹⁸

In a despatch of the same date, Benckendorff reported as follows:

“Sir Edward thereupon told me that one should not entertain any illusion as to the fact that a fresh military occupation of Persia would violate the principle of the integrity and independence of that country, and that the Anglo-Russian Convention, being based on this principle, would hence become void.”

“Above all, the fact must not be lost sight of that if the effect of the Russian understanding with England is to-day constantly tending to expand, Persia remains the basis of our understanding with England. This is a circumstance of the very greatest importance.”⁶¹⁹

Before the end of the month, the Russian government was landing troops at Enzeli, and assembling a still larger force.

Russia's First Demands. Diplomatic Rupture. It was not until after the Russian demonstration had commenced, namely, on the 2d of the next month (November), that Russia made complaint of the Shuau's-Sultana incident. On that day, the Russian Ambassador demanded that the gendarmes in possession of the seized property should be replaced by Cossacks, and that the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs should express his regret at the action of the gendarmerie.⁶²⁰ On the 6th, the Persian government declined to accede to the demands; requested that the Russian Consul-General should be recalled;⁶²¹ and proposed an impartial investigation of the incident.⁶²²

On the 8th, the Persian Chargé at St. Petersburg asked that Russia should:

“be satisfied with the military police being replaced by Cossacks, and not to insist on an apology for the insults offered to the consular officers. He asked that this request be submitted to the Czar.”

The reply was:

“that the Czar had already given his orders and that the Russian Government insists on all its demands being complied with.”⁶²³

On the same day, Neratoff of the Russian Foreign Office wrote to Benckendorff (evidently in reply to a British suggestion of the propriety of agreeing to the proposed investigation):

“We are convinced that, under similar circumstances, the British Government would never allow the action of a British official to be made the subject of an inquiry in which Persians would be allowed to take

⁶¹⁸ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

⁶²⁰ Shuster, *op. cit.*, p. 157; Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

⁶²¹ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

⁶²² Shuster, *op. cit.*, p. 159. ⁶²³ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

part: We, for our part, are of the opinion that we alone are entitled to form a judgment with regard to an action committed by our official. . . . This measure is, however, intended to have the character of a punitive expedition, and not that of a permanent occupation." ⁶²⁴

In reply (11 November), Benckendorff warned St. Petersburg of the danger of counting too confidently on Grey's complacency, although:

"It is true, Grey has repeatedly assured me that he would not sacrifice the principle of the *entente* to the difficulties existing in Persia. This has been Grey's line of conduct in difficult circumstances, notably when he had to take action against British subjects, the most thankless task for a Minister of Foreign Affairs." ⁶²⁵

On the 11th, the Russian demands were renewed, this time in writing, and notice was given that non-compliance within forty-eight hours would result in rupture of diplomatic relations. ⁶²⁶ On the 16th, Neratoff, in advising Benckendorff of the details of the Shuaa's-Sultana affair, said that:

"the Russian Government has decided to order a Russian division, composed of different arms of the service, to advance on Kaswin, and it is left to the discretion of the Minister to cause the said division to proceed on to Teheran, should he think this necessary, in order forcibly to expel the Persian gendarmerie from the Shoa's estate. This measure is naturally only of temporary character, and as soon as the incident shall have been closed, and we have secured the necessary guarantees that the attitude of the Persian Government will in future be correct, our troops will be recalled." ⁶²⁷

The next day, Neratoff related a conversation with the British Ambassador from which he had learned as follows:

"Grey considers our demands but natural; however, in our place he would have contented himself with some other measure, such as, for instance, the occupation of the Persian custom houses. He looks upon the sending of troops as a perilous measure, both as regards Persian affairs *per se*, as also with respect to its reaction on the Anglo-Russian agreement. Grey has instructed Buchanan to tell me and Kokowtzeff that he attached great importance to maintaining good relations with us, and that he had defended our point of view not only in Persia, but also in England. He laid stress upon the point that there did not exist a single world question in which Russia and England did not act hand in hand. . . . In conclusion, he referred to the behaviour of our Consul-General and his men, and expressed doubt as to whether their conduct could be justified." ⁶²⁸

In reply, Neratoff said:

⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁶²⁶ Shuster, *op. cit.*, 161: Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-7.

⁶²⁷ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 117. ⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 117-8.

“As concerned the conduct of our officials in the Shoa incident, I explained to Buchanan that our Consul-General had, throughout, acted only in accordance with our rights and the customs of the country, with which he, owing to his many years’ activity in Persia, was well familiar. A similar incident took place last summer and caused no complications whatsoever. If perhaps one of the Consul-General’s subordinates had shown too much zeal, then this may result in his being reprimanded in a disciplinary way, but it does not in any way affect the international character of the incident. I added that the British subordinates had also sometimes failed to properly attend to their duties, as for example, Major Stokes.”⁶²⁹

On the 18th, Russia gave notice of severance of diplomatic relations with Persia. On the 20th, the Russian Minister was advised from St. Petersburg that he should:

“only receive the Foreign Minister provided he informs you that the Persian Government is prepared to comply with our demands. Still it is desirable to make the Persians understand without delay, in one way or the other, that we shall no longer be satisfied with a mere fulfilment of our former demands, but that we have the intention of raising some other questions the settlement of which we now esteem necessary in order to prevent the possibility of constant friction in future and in order to form a basis for permanent friendly relations. We have already informed the London Cabinet that the withdrawal of our troops would depend upon guarantees being received that the behaviour of the Persians towards us in future would be such as we are entitled to expect.”⁶³⁰

Reporting on 21 November, Benckendorff said that Grey was about to be assailed in parliament with reference to Russian actions, and added:

“Yet it will cost Grey some trouble to justify our present military expedition, since no proof has been brought forward to show that we are wholly in the right in the incident which provoked military measures on our part. I say this because I do not believe that Grey has evidence to show that the Persians are wholly at fault. I myself do not possess the possibility of forcing him to accept our view.”⁶³¹

The Shuster Pamphlet. *The Times* having commented unfairly (as Shuster thought) upon his newspaper interview above referred to, he sent to the editor a long account of the Persian situation. It was published on 10 and 11 November, and was shortly afterwards circulated (not by Shuster, he said⁶³²) in pamphlet form⁶³³ in Persia. That

⁶²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 119-20.

⁶³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 121-22.

⁶³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁶³² Shuster, *op. cit.*, pp. 161, 173.

⁶³³ The document may be seen in *ibid.*, pp. 313-26.

the contents were displeasing to the Russian government is not surprising. On 23 November, Neratoff telegraphed to Benckendorff:

"We learn that Shuster has caused a pamphlet to be distributed among the population containing a violent attack upon us. We are of opinion that such an act on the part of a foreigner in Persian service — an action plainly directed against us — conjointly with the fact that the Persian Government has obliged us to resort to such a grave step as the sending of an armed force, creates a situation of such a nature that we are obliged to make new demands, and that until these are complied with, our troops cannot be recalled."⁶³⁴

Grey in Parliament, 27 November 1911. Anticipating parliamentary criticism, Sir Edward Grey endeavored to obtain some assurance of Russian relaxation. His embarrassment may be seen in the contents of a telegram sent by Benckendorff on 23 November:

"I deem it necessary to give you an exact description of the situation here. It is becoming more and more evident that next Monday, Grey will be attacked much more severely in the Persian question than could be at first foreseen. The attacks will be founded on the fact that the Persian Government had declared itself prepared to satisfy the terms of our ultimatum. Grey has no other possibility than to completely justify our action. He has firmly decided to do so now, but he will be unable to declare himself as being in accord with us as to using a military occupation for the purpose of making fresh demands on Persia. The entire incident and the ultimatum are represented as being but a pretext advanced by us, and Grey will be charged with having permitted himself to be carried by us far beyond the bounds of our former declarations. In order to secure the further support of Grey in the Shuster question, we must therefore afford him the possibility of justifying his policy before Parliament. I see no other way to accomplish this than by withdrawing our troops as soon as satisfaction has been given us."⁶³⁵

In another telegram of the same date, Benckendorff said:

"Grey repeats his resolve to support us if we should demand Shuster's dismissal. . . . He insists on the necessity of arresting the further advance of our troops, when the Persian Government shall have complied with our first demands."⁶³⁶

The next day, the Ambassador sent still another message:

"As concerns the general trend of his policy, Grey is sure to have Parliament on his side, though not as regards the Persian question. What he stands in need of is a good argument based on a joint diplomatic action agreed upon between us and having clearly defined aims. For this reason, Grey insists that the Shoa incident be dealt with independently

⁶³⁴ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-5.

⁶³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

of the Shuster affair, and that the latter shall not be made a pretext for our military expedition."⁶³⁷

These appeals met with little sympathy in St. Petersburg, Sazonoff believing that British "political aims of vital importance in Europe" rendered Grey easily amenable to Russian exploitation in Persia.⁶³⁸ On 26 November, accordingly, Neratoff telegraphed to Benckendorff:

"We have by no means the intention of rendering the demands we shall lay before the Persians dependent on the approval of the British Minister."⁶³⁹

Grey's speech in the House of Commons (27 November) did not in all respects quite realize the Ambassador's expectations. Unable to "justify our action," Grey referred to the Shuau's-Sultana incident as:

"a dispute between the Russian Consul-General and Mr. Shuster with regard to certain property in which we had no interest. Into the merits of that dispute I do not enter."⁶⁴⁰

Benckendorff's report (4 December) of the debate was the following:

"The small fraction of the ultra-Radical party specially interested in Persian questions has been driven to extremes by Grey's statements on the Russian standpoint in Persia. This part of Grey's speech made in fact a deep impression. *It had indeed been assumed that he would place himself on our side, but it was not expected that he would attempt to explain the Russian standpoint.*

"*The idea that the Russian Government desires to violate the integrity or the independence of Persia—however little real importance these terms may possess so far as the two Powers are concerned—is not credited by Sir Edward Grey. Yet this is assuredly the point from which the opposition starts. Grey has repeatedly pointed to the fact that the continuous increasing of our demands tends to strengthen the opposition. He is fully aware that his resignation would undoubtedly lead to a thorough change of English policy. In order to be able to maintain the Entente with England we, in my opinion, must inform the British Government that we shall at Teheran strictly adhere to the agreements contained in the Anglo-Russian Convention and that the integrity and independence of Persia, as understood by the two Powers, will not be violated. Otherwise it is certain that Grey will have to resign, whatever he may say or do.*"⁶⁴¹

Independence, "as understood by the two Powers," was close akin to subjection.

Persia's Apology—Russia's new Demands. On 21 November (1911) Grey was informed that Persia was prepared to accede to the

⁶³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 125-6.

⁶³⁸ *Ante*, p. 883, 890.

⁶³⁹ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

⁶⁴⁰ *Hansard*, XXXII, col. 155.

⁶⁴¹ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-3.

Russian demands.⁶⁴² On the 24th, the appropriate proceedings took place.⁶⁴³ In accepting the apology, the Russian Minister said that he was instructed to declare that a further ultimatum was being prepared.⁶⁴⁴ On the 26th (the day before Grey's speech) Neratoff instructed the Ambassador at Teheran to frame the new demands as follows:

" 1. The dismissal of Shuster and Lecoffre.

" 2. The assurance of the Persian Government that they will not appoint foreigners without having previously obtained the approval of the Russian and English Legations at Teheran.

" 3. The costs of the expedition to be borne by the Persian Government. The sum total and method of payment will be decided upon later.

" Whilst formulating these claims in writing, you will point in your note to the fact that we are forced to take this step in order to obtain satisfaction for the military expedition forced upon us, and for the provocative actions committed by Shuster; that we most earnestly desire to remove the causes that have hitherto led to conflicts in order to establish in future friendly relations between both Governments and to bring to a solution the many problems still pending.

" Will you furthermore add that we expect the fulfilment of our claims within 48 hours, during which period our troops would be held back in Resht. Should, at the expiration of this period, no answer have been received, or should such answer be of an unsatisfactory nature, then our troops would advance, this *inter alia* naturally increasing the costs the Persian Government must repay."⁶⁴⁵

On the 29th, the demands were presented. Grey again expressed disapproval. In a note to Benckendorff (1 December), he said:

" I feel greatly alarmed by the further development of affairs in Persia. It appears that still further demands are in question. Should Russia be driven to use force in order to compel the acceptance of the three demands just presented — then this would be a great misfortune."⁶⁴⁶

The next day, Benckendorff warned Neratoff of the possible effect in Grey's opinion, of Russian procedure:

" Should the unity of our action in Persia come to an end, this would necessarily mean the disruption of the Entente. It would result — in a far shorter period than generally believed — in a new orientation of English politics, with respect to which he made no further statements."

In that event, Grey:

" would tender his resignation. . . . I believe this would portray the

⁶⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁶⁴³ Shuster, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

⁶⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

⁶⁴⁵ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-8.

⁶⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

general feeling here, which is astounded at the rapidity of our decisions. This haste seems to preclude the possibility of a satisfactory solution and must lead to results to which one could not reconcile oneself here. I have never seen Grey so alarmed, and Cambon confirmed this impression to me." ⁶⁴⁷

Sending (2 December) an account of the conversation with Benckendorff to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Grey said:

"I spoke very seriously to Benckendorff to-day on the disquieting situation in Persia. I told him that it was regrettable that the Russian ultimatum based itself on the question of the propriety of the Shoas-Es-Sultana. The entire question was somewhat trivial, and the Russian standpoint not wholly justifiable. Furthermore, it was regrettable that after Russia had declared — we have in fact received a formal assurance on this point from Kokowtzeff — that the Russian troops would be withdrawn as soon as the two demands ⁶⁴⁸ referring to the incident be fulfilled, and after the British Minister had prevailed on the Persian Government to accept these conditions, the Russian troops had not been withdrawn; on the contrary new demands had been formulated. It is true that the conditions were accepted by Persia with a few days' delay; nevertheless, the circumstances under which Russia has acted have not been very happy.

"Three new demands have been presented. With regard to the two first I have no objections to raise. Shuster did not follow the advice we gave him; he has brought us into a very difficult position, and we shall have to come to some agreement with the Persian Government on the question of the foreign councillors in order to obviate again being placed in such a position. . . .

"I regret that an indemnity has been demanded. English trade has suffered more than the Russian. I even believe that Russian trade in the North has gained as a consequence of the fact that English interests have suffered in the South. Money is necessary in order to re-establish order in the South, and the Russian demands for reimbursement would be regarded here as an injury to English interests. As the claim has been put forward, the Persian Government must agree to it, but I trust that payment will not be insisted on by Russia, or will be made later in one or the other form by means of compensation.

"I directed the Ambassador's most serious attention to the fact that the Russian troops should occupy Teheran only in case of the most extreme necessity, and that no further more stringent claims should be presented without having first communicated with us. I fear that the Petersburg Cabinet does not sufficiently take into account how unexpectedly the Persian question, if it be not properly handled, may bring about a discussion of foreign policy as a whole. If demands be made

⁶⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 128-9.

⁶⁴⁸ *Ante*, pp. 897-8.

which we cannot declare to be covered by the Anglo-Russian Convention, then the Persian question would be lost sight of, and the question of foreign policy in general, Russia's as well as England's, would take its place. This would be regrettable, and I am in the greatest anxiety.

"If, on the other hand, the Russian Government will confine itself to its present demands and only proceed to Teheran in case of extreme necessity, then I hope to be able to overcome the present difficulties. We could perhaps form a Persian Government which would recognize the necessity of taking Russia's interest into account, instead of continually setting up opposition. We should be ready to support such a Government by the appointment of foreign advisers, and the granting of a loan through Seligmann or some other bankers. The situation in Persia would be better than it has been hitherto. But at the moment we shall have great difficulties to overcome, and I am afraid the Russian Government does not consider how great are the stakes, and what great efforts we must make in order to avoid a separation in our policy."⁶⁴⁹

Grey's complaints were not liked in Russia. On 4 December, Neratoff telegraphed to Benckendorff:

"We cannot quite understand for what reason Grey is alarmed by our actions in Persia as these are not contrary to our agreement with England. We have no intention of insisting on the immediate indemnification of our expenses? We have pointed out that this question will form the subject of further discussion. . . . As for new demands, should such be rendered imperative in consequence of, for instance, armed resistance and bloodshed, then they will refer solely to specifically Russian interests in our zone, *i.e.*, railways in Northern Persia, the organization of an armed troop in Tabriz under Russian control, to allow us to recall our military there, etc., etc. It is understood that we shall present no claims of a general political nature without a previous understanding with England."⁶⁵⁰

Grey in Parliament, 14 December 1911. Suppressing his real views, Grey, in his speech in the House of Commons of 14 December, boldly approved parts of the new Russian demands. Insistence upon the dismissal of Shuster, he defended upon the sole ground of the Lecoffre incident. But he completely (probably unwittingly) misrepresented the facts, saying that Shuster had appointed Lecoffre as a "Treasury official" to an "administrative post" in the Russian sphere of interest; whereas (as above mentioned) Lecoffre had been a Treasury official for two years prior to Shuster's appearance in Persia, had always performed his duties at Teheran — in the Russian sphere of influence — and had been sent to Tabriz on the temporary work of inspection of the offices there. After making his statement, and adding that Shuster had refused to retract, Grey said:

⁶⁴⁹ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-31.

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 134-5.

“In face of that, however great Mr. Shuster’s abilities, however good his intentions, it is impossible for us to object to the Russian demands which have been put forward concerning him.”⁶⁵¹

Sir Edward said nothing about the demand for the dismissal of Lecoffre. No charge had been made against him, and he appears to have been guilty of nothing but obedience to the direction of his official chief. Defending the Russian demand that Persia should not:

“appoint foreigners without having previously obtained the approval of the Russian and English Legations at Teheran,”

Grey insisted that it did not encroach upon the independence of Persia, for the independence of a weak and poor country was something different from the independence of the United Kingdom or Russia — making use of the language quoted upon a previous page.⁶⁵² Sir Edward objected to the third of the Russian demands — payment of an indemnity — upon the grounds already referred to. Passing to the consideration of the future, Grey said that he had submitted six points to the Russian government of which the first was as follows:

“I recognize that the outcome of the present situation must be to secure a Persian government that will not disregard the special interests of Great Britain and Russia respectively, and will conform to the principle of the Anglo-Russian agreement.”⁶⁵³

To that necessity, “Persian independence” must conform. Metternich is reported to have said that non-intervention in the diplomatic sense was the same thing as intervention. Later diplomats appear to use independence and subordination interchangeably.

New Demands Rejected — Afterwards Submission. Disregarding Grey’s complaints,⁶⁵⁴ Russia persisted in her new demands. The Medjlis having at first declined to submit,⁶⁵⁵ the Russian Ambassador declared (15 December) that if, within six days the conditions of the ultimatum had not been complied with, the Russian troops at Kasvin, about 4,000 in number, would start for Teheran.⁶⁵⁶ On the 24th, the Persian government (after something of a *coup-d’état*) determined to submit, and notified Shuster of his dismissal.⁶⁵⁷ On 11 January 1912, he left Teheran for America.

⁶⁵¹ Hansard, XXXII, col. 2603.

⁶⁵² *Ante*, p. 882.

⁶⁵³ Hansard, XXXII, col. 2605. *Cf. Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 172.

⁶⁵⁴ On 8 December, Grey submitted to Russia, through her Ambassador at Paris, a memorandum of six points which ought, in his opinion, to form the basis of future co-operation between the Powers. One of them was the appointment of a successor to Shuster — a matter which ought to be arranged immediately (*Un Livre Noir*, I, pp. 171-3. *Cf.* pp. 165, 170-1). Russia thought otherwise. No successor was appointed until 1922.

⁶⁵⁵ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

⁶⁵⁶ Shuster, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

⁶⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

Atrocities. In reply to a complaint by the Persian representative at St. Petersburg of Russian military attacks, Sazonoff said (22 December): "that according to our information the Persians had attacked, and that we were not as yet in possession of any information, but that in any event the future action of our troops in both these towns was not dependent on the orders of the central institutions but on those of the military officers in command."⁶⁵⁸

The chief of the "central institutions" was the Russian Viceroy of the Caucasus, and judgment in the placing of blame for ensuing atrocities will be aided by perusal of his report to Sazonoff of 23 December:

"Up to the present day, I have issued no orders regarding the actions of our troops in Persia. The commanding officers of the separate units have acted in agreement with our Consuls. I consider, however, that such a state of affairs under the present acute conditions is improper and cannot be maintained. The commanding officers must be given instructions exactly circumscribing the object of the expedition and granting them entire freedom of action in its attainment. In my opinion these instructions should be: Advance on Teheran without halt; occupy the town and place yourself at the disposal of our minister there. March the entire route to Teheran and leave the necessary relays at Enseli, Resht, and Kaswin; take energetic measures against refusal to work, boycott and robbery; the Fidais must be taken prisoners; should they resist, they must be destroyed. The opinions of the Consuls can be taken into consideration, but the commanding officers must act independently and only take into account the orders of the minister. The lengthy stay of our troops at Kaswin has proved to the revolutionaries that a certain foreign influence is restricting our freedom of action. This has heightened the courage of the Fidais and led to fights with our detachment in Tabriz."⁶⁵⁹

Among the persons arrested and executed by the Russians was the Sikat ul Islam, the chief priest of Tabriz, who, with two other priests and five officials of the Provincial Government, was hanged on 1 January 1912.⁶⁶⁰ British opinion naturally disapproved proceedings which were:

"all the more deplorable as it was a question of the peaceful local population which on the whole had behaved with civility towards Russia."⁶⁶¹

Benckendorff reported (3 January) that he had been advised by the British Foreign Office of the view of the British Ambassador at Teheran as follows:

"Barclay expresses his dismay. The priest was the object of special

⁶⁵⁸ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

⁶⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 136-7.

⁶⁶⁰ Shuster, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

⁶⁶¹ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 137. And see p. 138.

reverence in a great part of Persia. His execution was nothing less than a catastrophe, and the consequences could not be foreseen. He believes the fall of the Persian Cabinet possible. The news has been published here to-day.”⁶⁶²

Telegraphing two days afterwards, Benckendorff said:

“The execution of the Sikat must be regarded from two viewpoints. First, the choice of the day. The date chosen seems to me to have been a regrettable error on the part of our officials. The measures we took had the sole purpose of punishing in an exemplary manner the originators of the disturbances. Should priests be among these, then a religious fête-day should obviously not have been chosen for their punishment, in order clearly to show that such punishment has nothing to do with religious sentiment and the Islamic religion. By carrying out this execution on the very day of religious prayers, the entire affair has taken an anti-Islamic character. The second point to be considered is that the impression called forth by the execution of the Sikat is so extraordinarily strong that the Russian Government should put a stop to all further executions.”⁶⁶³

In Shuster’s opinion:

“the effect of this outrage on the Persians was that which would be produced on the English people by the hanging of the Archbishop of Canterbury on Good Friday.”⁶⁶⁴

The Entente. Sir Edward Grey’s anxieties as revealed in the foregoing story must be attributed to the ever-present danger of European war. The Balkan crisis commenced on 27 January 1908, became more acute on 7 October of the same year, and did not end until 31 March 1909; the German naval “scare” in the United Kingdom occurred in 1908–9; and the second of the Morocco incidents commenced on 21 May 1911 and lasted until 4 November of that year. In the following January (28th), Benckendorff (Russian Ambassador in London) reported as follows:

“We must not conceal from ourselves the fact that the opposition is growing in England. The Persian question looms largest in the public eye; but it is not the only one. In reality, the relations to Germany are most prominent; they are deemed too strained and Grey is held responsible — in my opinion wrongly so.”⁶⁶⁵

As the strain from year to year increased, Sir Edward Grey’s anxiety to maintain the most cordial of relations with Russia and France deepened. The rapidly developing power of Germany, — swelling population, expanding manufactures, trade, and commerce, enlargements of mercantile and war navies — had motived the British determination to join with France (1904) and Russia (1907) in relations which to British

⁶⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 138.

⁶⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 202.

⁶⁶⁵ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

statesmen seemed to be essential to national security. And it was under the influence of swiftly recurrent dangers of war with the mightiest of the European Powers that Sir Edward learned to associate himself with the rough aggressiveness of Russia in Persia. The methods of the Czar might be regrettable, or even indefensible, but, in order that rupture of the Entente might be obviated, they were to be tolerated, condoned, and — defended. Sir Edward, we may be sure, did not like the courses which he felt himself bound to pursue. Was he furnishing a good illustration of the Machiavellian maxim: The safety of the state is the supreme law?

For later developments of Russian activities in Persia, reference may be made to the language addressed by Sir George Buchanan (British Ambassador at St. Petersburg) to the Czar in June 1914. Referring to a conversation of the previous year, Sir George said:

“Events had since been moving fast, and North Persia was now to all intents and purposes a Russian province. . . . Unforeseen events had led to the occupation of certain districts in North Persia by Russian troops, and, little by little, the whole machinery of the administration had been placed in the hands of the Russian consuls. The Governor-General of Azerbaijan was a mere puppet who received and carried out the orders of the Russian consul-general, and the same might be said of the Governors at Resht, Kazwin, and Julfa. They were one and all agents of the Russian Government and acted in entire independence of the central government at Tehran. Vast tracts of land in North Persia were being acquired by illegal methods, large numbers of Persians were being converted into Russian-protected subjects, and the taxes were being collected by the Russian consuls to the exclusion of the agents of the Persian financial administration. The above system was being extended to Ispahan and even to the neutral zone. We had not the slightest desire to dispute Russia's predominant interests and position in the north, but we did take exception to the methods by which that predominance was being asserted and the attempts which were being made to extend it to the neutral zone.”⁶⁶⁶

Sir Edward Grey had to content himself with protests. As Sir George Buchanan said, “Necessity is a hard taskmaster.”⁶⁶⁷

Later British Treaties. During the great war — in March 1915 — the United Kingdom and Russia entered into an agreement by which “the right of Russia to the Straits and Constantinople” was “established in the most definite fashion,” and, in exchange, Russia agreed that “the neutral zone in Persia was to be included in the British sphere of influence”⁶⁶⁸ stipulating that:

“The Imperial Government expects that in future its full liberty

⁶⁶⁶ *Op. cit.*, I, p. 115.

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

⁶⁶⁸ Cocks: *The Secret Treaties*, p. 15.

of action will be recognized in the sphere of influence allotted to it, coupled with the right of preferentially developing, in that sphere, its financial and economic policies.”⁶⁶⁹

There were to be no further British protests against Russian encroachments upon Persian independence. Sir Edward, under pressure of altered character, gave Russia *carte blanche*.

Two years afterwards a still more important change supervened. The Russian proletariat revolted and in March 1917, Lenine issued a statement of principles of which the following was an item:

“The Bolsheviks are against the predatory international treaties concluded between the Czar and England, France, &c., for the strangling of Persia, the division of China, Turkey, Austria, &c.”⁶⁷⁰

Assuming political control in November, the Lenine-Trotsky government announced their intention of withdrawing all Russian troops from Persia so as to terminate the:

“acts of violence which Tsarism and the Bourgeois Governments of Russia have committed against the Persian people.”⁶⁷¹

Referring to this announcement, Lord Curzon said (21 January 1918) that:

“the great change produced in the situation by recent events in Russia has given to His Majesty’s Government a welcome opportunity of testifying their sincerity in this respect. In the absence of a stable Government in Russia, it has not so far been found possible to discuss the matter with that country. But we have informed the Persian Government that we regard the agreement as being henceforward in suspense, and as soon as the conditions to which I have referred are satisfied we shall be ready to reconsider the whole question.”⁶⁷²

Inasmuch as the British government refused to acknowledge the Lenine-Trotsky government, Lord Curzon’s attitude was no doubt perfectly correct, but he did not adhere to it. Prolongation of constitutional difficulties in Russia provided him with an opportunity of expanding the British sphere of influence to the limits of the Persian boundaries. Fomenting the difficulties with one hand,⁶⁷³ he signed, with the other, a

⁶⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 24. Cf. Buchanan, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 224–7.

⁶⁷⁰ *Current History*, VII, p. 16.

⁶⁷¹ Cocks, *op. cit.*, p. 25; and see *Ann. Reg.*, 1917, p. [47].

⁶⁷² Hansard (Lords) XXVII, col. 823. Mr. Balfour repeated the statement on 13 May 1918: *Hansard*, CVI, cols. 7–8. The agreement referred to was that the United Kingdom and Russia.

⁶⁷³ In the fighting which followed the establishment of the Soviet Government, the United Kingdom sided with the forces of reaction — Deniken, Koltchak, Korniloff, and Wrangel; furnished them with munitions and money; and sent a military expedition to Murmansk. Why? Mr. Lloyd George, in the House of Commons (17 November 1919), supplied the explanation: “Deniken and Koltchak are fighting for two main objects. The first is the destruction of Bolshevism and the restoration of good government. Upon that he could get complete unanimity amongst all the forces, but the second is that he is

treaty with Persia (9 August 1919) which, commencing with the customary dishonest phraseology:

“The British Government reiterate, in the most categorical manner, the undertakings which they have repeatedly given in the past to respect absolutely the independence and integrity of Persia,”⁶⁷⁴ provided for British “expert advisers . . . for the several departments of the Persian Administration”; for British military officers, munitions, and equipment; for a “substantial loan” with “adequate security”; for British co-operation in railway construction, &c.; and for joint revision of the customs tariff. This accomplished, the Persian government was induced to enter into an agreement with “a powerful British Syndicate” (February 1920) with reference to the construction of a trans-Persian railway (the dream of Russia) passing from the southwest boundary through Hamadar, Kasvin, Teheran, to the Caspian Sea at Enzeli.⁶⁷⁵ Significantly, the chairman of the syndicate was to be “Sir Charles Greenway, Chairman of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.”⁶⁷⁶

The Curzon attitude of January 1918 — that the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 was in suspense — being in sharp conflict with these later proceedings, Mr. Bonar Law, answering the question in the House of Commons (2 August 1920), What about the Anglo-Russian Agreement? said:

“The war obviously put an end to that” —⁶⁷⁷

a reply that was obviously incorrect. War does not terminate treaties between two nations fighting as allies against a common enemy.

fighting for a reunited Russia. Well, it is not for me to say whether that is a policy which suits the British Empire. There was a very great statesman, a man of great imagination, who certainly did not belong to the party to which I belong, Lord Beaconsfield, who regarded a great, gigantic, colossal, growing Russia, rolling onwards like a glacier towards Persia and the borders of Afghanistan and India, as the greatest menace the British Empire could be confronted with”: Hansard, LXXI, col. 723. During the earlier part of the war, the United Kingdom had been helping the glacier onward. Russia having ceased to be of service, the United Kingdom turned sharply to her former policy of obstruction. In the *Annual Register* of 1917, p. [258, may be seen the following: “In other regions [of Russia], however, local executives were established, and since these required a semi-independent status, it came about that at the end of the year the Petrograd Government was immediately responsible only for Great Russia. . . . At the end of the year it was impossible to foretell whether what had been the Russian Empire would be reorganized into a stable federation of republican states or would break up as the Roman Empire broke up fifteen centuries ago, into a number of independent nations taking divergent paths. The vast territories were in a condition not far removed from anarchy. A great system of governance had vanished utterly from the earth, and something had been lost with it.”

⁶⁷⁴ Br. White Paper, Persia, 1919.

⁶⁷⁵ *The Times*, 16 Feb. 1920.

⁶⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 18 Feb. 1920.

⁶⁷⁷ Hansard, CXXXII, col. 2110.

Unfortunately for Lord Curzon and the "powerful British syndicate" above referred to, the new treaty needed confirmation by the Medjlis, and that could not be secured. Sir Percy Cox, the British Minister at Teheran, urged as he could, but left to his successor the task "in a state of suspended animation" (May 1920). The treaty had been signed while Mushaver-el-Mamelik, the Persian Foreign Minister, was in attendance at the Paris Peace Conference, seeking an opportunity to present his views to the Council there.⁶⁷⁸ On the 11th August 1919, he received a telegram from Teheran saying that Prince Firoux had been appointed to succeed him at the Foreign Office, and that the mission to Paris had been withdrawn.⁶⁷⁹ In October, the young Shah (accompanied by the Prince) arrived in England to be impressed with the necessity for maintaining friendship with the United Kingdom. But the Medjlis was not summoned; the treaty remained unratified; and on 23 July 1920, *The Times* published the following communication from Teheran:

"Mushaver's political friends have now returned to power at Teheran. Although they are prepared to submit the Anglo-Persian Agreement to the Medjlis, the clouds of hostility which have rolled up against the Agreement during the last few months still persist."

On 24 November, the British Ambassador presented to the Persian government a note requesting the immediate summoning of the Medjlis in order to settle the matter.⁶⁸⁰ Eventually (April 1921), a new government declared against ratification of the treaty, and Lord Curzon submitted, offering as a rather incriminating reason for his failure that:

"The withdrawal of British forces from Kasvin and the neighborhood . . . was attended by an inevitable weakening in the influence we have been able to exercise at Teheran."⁶⁸¹

Another reason was the pendency of Persian negotiations for a treaty with Russia which were soon to fructify. Lord Curzon found that he had good reason to regret his disregard of British treaty obligation to Russia. It cost his country two spheres of interest in Persia, and somewhat stained the British diplomatic record.

⁶⁷⁸ *The Times*, 23 July 1920.

⁶⁷⁹ *The Globe* (Toronto), 20 Aug. 1919.

⁶⁸⁰ *The Times*: editorial note to a telegram from Teheran of 27 Nov. 1920.

⁶⁸¹ Hansard (Lords) XLVI, col. 15.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA ROOT

- THE ARGUMENT, 912. — Revolt and Freedom, 913. — Reichstadt Agreement, 8 July 1876, 913. — Treaty of Budapest, 15 January 1877, 914. — Treaty of San Stefano, 3 March 1878, 915. — Treaty of Berlin, 13 July 1878, 915. — Austro-Hungarian Bargain with Turkey, 13 July 1878, 916. — Austro-Hungarian Bargain with Russia, 13 July 1878, 916. — Austro-Hungarian Bargain with the United Kingdom, May 1878, 917. — Alleged Reasons for the Subjection of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 917. — Attitude of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 919. — Austro-Russian Treaty, 18 June 1881, 919. — Serbia, 920. — Austro-Serbian Treaty, 28 June 1881, 920. — Austro-Serbian Treaty, 9 February 1889, 921. — Change at Belgrade, 922. — Austro-Russian Agreement, 8 May 1897, 922. — Summary, 923.
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✓ **The Argument.** We have now the great Powers formed into two immense military groups — one might almost say camps, for they were all making ready for the war which their very preparations made inevitable. The occasion upon which the armies were to commence their operations was the only uncertainty. It might have occurred at any moment. It was imminent at various times between 1898 and July 1914. It came at length as a historical effect and climax; and we must now, under the headings, *The Bosnia-Herzegovina Root* and *The Balkan Map Root*, examine the political and economic situation out of which hostilities arose. As Alsace and Lorraine were at the root of the European military combinations, so were Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bucarest map of the Balkans at the root of the outbreak of war. Serbia wished to take from Austria-Hungary the Slav provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina; while Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, not only insisted upon maintaining her integrity, but desired to recast other parts of the map.

The present chapter will tell of the methods by which Austria-Hungary acquired the provinces, and obtained certain rights in the Sanjak of Novibazar; will point out that the first step in the process — the occupation by Austria-Hungary (1878) — was agreed to first by Russia

and shortly afterwards imposed upon the provinces by all the Great Powers; that Serbia, in a settlement with Austria-Hungary, promised (1881 and again in 1889) that she would not tolerate within her territory intrigues directed against her neighbor; that the final steps — the annexation by Austria-Hungary of the provinces, and the simultaneous surrender of the Novibazar rights (1908) — were antecedently, in a certain measure, agreed to by Russia and Italy, and were subsequently condoned by Turkey; that, nevertheless, Serbia resented the annexation, and, could she have obtained the assistance of Russia, would have opposed it by war; that Russia, embarrassed by her agreement and by her military weakness, declined to intervene; that, thereupon, Serbia once more promised (1909) to live with Austria-Hungary in friendly and neighborly relations; and that alleged breach of the promise was a precipitating cause of the recent war. Short elucidation of the merits of the quarrel between the two countries will be attempted in a subsequent chapter.

Revolt and Freedom. In July 1875, the little Turkish province of Herzegovina (7,000 square miles, and a quarter of a million of people) revolted against Turkish sovereignty and oppression. In the following month the neighboring province of Bosnia (12,700 square miles, and 1,600,000 inhabitants) joined in the effort for freedom. In November, Bulgaria became restless and, in the next year, was reduced to obedience to Turkey by what are known in history as “the Bulgarian atrocities.” In June 1876, Serbia and Montenegro declared war against Turkey. Then Russia, partly actuated by a desire to relieve Macedonian Christians from the rigorous rule of the Turks, and partly with a view to furtherance of her Constantinople policy, declared war — 24 April 1877. Finally (21 May following), Roumania proclaimed her independence and joined her forces to those of Russia. Turkey was beaten (March 1878). The plucky little provinces, Bosnia and Herzegovina, were free — or rather, they thought they were.

Reichstadt Agreement, 8 July 1876. Many months previously, their fate had been fixed by the arrangements, at Reichstadt and Budapest, between Russia and Austria-Hungary.¹ In June (1876), Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, had made clear statement of his policy:

“Austria ought to consult only her own interests, and rather than allow a South-Slav State to be erected at her gates, she will have to

¹ Bismarck, in his *Reflections and Reminiscences*, said as follows: “Russia, in place of the negotiations with us which were broken off, began similar negotiations with Austria — first of all, so far as I remember, at Pesth — in the sense of the settlement come to at Reichstadt, where the Emperors Alexander and Francis Joseph had met on July 8, 1876, and requested that they should be kept secret from us. This treaty (concluded 15 January 1877), and not the Berlin congress, is the foundation of the Austrian possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and during the war with the Turks secured to Russia the neutrality of Austria” (vol. 2, p. 232).

occupy the country, only indemnifying Russia by compensations. In a word, rather the division of the Ottoman Empire than the autonomy of the Slav Provinces"² — meaning Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The first step in the realization of this policy occurred when, on 8 July 1876, Austria-Hungary and Russia (still a spectator of the fighting) agreed at Reichstadt as to the effects of the war.³ Weaker nations might fight and propose; the stronger assumed the right to make dispositions. They provided for the two possibilities — of Turkey being successful and of Turkey being defeated, in which (latter) case Serbia would acquire an extension of territory in Bosnia, and all the rest of it and all Herzegovina would be annexed to Austria-Hungary. The Sanjak of Novibazar would be divided between Serbia and Montenegro.

Treaty of Budapest, 15 January 1877. Six months afterwards, the Reichstadt agreement was supplemented by the treaty of Budapest (15 January 1877).⁴ A conference of the Powers, endeavoring to effectuate peace, had been sitting at Constantinople. It was on the verge of failure. Russia was contemplating participation in the fighting, and should that occur, Russia and Austria-Hungary agreed to the following (*inter alia*):

1. Austria-Hungary was "to observe an attitude of benevolent neutrality."

2. The Austro-Hungarian sovereign "reserves to himself the choice of the moment, and of the mode of the occupation of Bosnia and of Herzegovina by his troops."

3. Austria-Hungary was not to extend its military action to Roumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, or Montenegro.

4. Russia was not to extend its military action to Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia, or Montenegro.

5. Serbia, Montenegro, and the Sanjak of Novibazar "are to form a continuous neutral zone, which the armies of the two Empires may not cross."

6. Austria-Hungary limited its territorial "annexations": "to Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the exception of the portion comprised between Serbia and Montenegro [the Sanjak of Novibazar], on the subject of which the two Governments reserve the right to reach an agreement when the moment for disposing of it arrives."

7. Russia limited its territorial annexations: "to the regions of Bessarabia which would reëstablish the old frontiers of the Empire before 1856."

For two years prior to this treaty, Bosnia and Herzegovina had pursued their fight for freedom. For fourteen months afterwards they continued the struggle. And then, by decree of the Great Powers — by

² Larmeroux: *La Politique Extérieure de l'Autriche-Hongrie*, 1875-1914, p. 41.

³ Pribram, *op. cit.*, II, 188-91. Larmeroux's account of the treaties (*op. cit.*, pp. 43-4) is defective.

⁴ Pribram, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 191-203.

the treaty of Berlin, the provinces were handed over to Austria-Hungary. It was a disgracefully mean transaction.

Treaty of San Stefano, 3 March 1878. That was not the disposition of them which, after her victory, Russia had proposed. In the treaty (3 March 1878) which she forced upon Turkey at San Stefano (a small town not far from Constantinople), it was provided that:

“The European propositions communicated to the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries at the first sitting of the Conference of Constantinople⁵ will be immediately introduced into Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the modifications determined upon in common agreement between the Sublime Porte, the Government of Russia, and that of Austria-Hungary.”

The “propositions” referred to provided for an autonomous administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a Governor nominated for five years by the Sultan in agreement with the Powers; local militia; municipal government; and occupation by Belgian troops until the completion of certain reforms under the control of an international commission.⁶ Settlement upon that basis would have thwarted the design of Austria-Hungary, and was not in accord with the Budapest agreement.

Treaty of Berlin, 13 July 1878. Other clauses of the San Stefano treaty being objectionable to the United Kingdom and Austria-Hungary, these Powers insisted upon submission of the treaty to a conference. It met in Berlin on 13 June 1878.⁷ Article 25 of the ensuing treaty (13 July), carried into substantial effect the Budapest agreement:

“The Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary.”

That was not the only Austro-Hungarian success at the conference. The Reichstadt treaty had provided for the division of the Sanjak of Novibazar between Serbia and Montenegro, an arrangement which would have blocked the Austro-Hungarian route to the Aegean. By the treaty of Budapest, Russia and Austria-Hungary had reserved “the right to reach an agreement” with reference to the fate of the Sanjak “when the moment for disposing of it arrives.” And now, the treaty of Berlin provided as follows:

“The Government of Austria-Hungary not desiring to undertake the administration of the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar, which extends between Serbia and Montenegro in a south-easterly direction to the other side of Mitrovitza, the Ottoman administration will continue to exercise its functions there. Nevertheless, in order to assure the maintenance of the new political state of affairs, as well as freedom and security of

⁵ Cf. Larmeroux, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-3.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-4.

⁷ The proceedings of the Conference, and the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin may be seen in the Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Berlin Congress*. The Berlin treaty and some of the correspondence which preceded it are in *Ann. Reg.*, 1878, pp. 221-47.

communications, Austria-Hungary reserves the right of keeping garrisons and having military and commercial roads in the whole of this part of the ancient Vilayet of Bosnia. To this end, the Governments of Austria-Hungary and Turkey reserve to themselves to come to an understanding on the details."

As Novibazar was situated between Serbia and Montenegro, the perpetuation of the chief impediment to the dreaded union of these two Slav states was insured.

Austro-Hungarian Bargain with Turkey, 13 July 1878. The provisions of the Berlin treaty were qualified by the contemporaneous execution of two important secret agreements. One, signed by the Austro-Hungarian representatives (13 July 1878), was as follows:

"Upon the request of the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries in the name of their Government, the Austro-Hungarian Plenipotentiaries declared, in the name of the Government of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, that the rights of sovereignty of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan over the Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina will not be prejudiced by the fact of the occupation referred to in the article relative to the said Provinces of the treaty signed to-day; that the occupation will be considered as provisional; and that a precedent agreement as to the details of the occupation will be arrived at between the two Governments, immediately after the closing of the Congress."⁸

After protracted negotiations, the two countries executed a convention (21 April 1879) which, after referring to:

"the fact of the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in no way affecting the rights of sovereignty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan over these Provinces," provided (*inter alia*) that: "The administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be carried on by Austria-Hungary conformably to article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin."

"The name of H. M. the Sultan shall continue to be used in the public prayers of the Mussulmans as in times past. Wherever it shall have been the custom to hoist the Ottoman flag on the minarets, this custom shall be respected."⁹

No definite period was fixed for the duration of the occupation. It was to be "provisional."

Austro-Hungarian Bargain with Russia, 13 July 1878. The other of the contemporaneous agreements well illustrates the wretchedly bad faith of the Powers engaged in the Berlin negotiations.¹⁰ For, by it, Russia agreed with Austria-Hungary (13 July 1878), in derogation of both Article XXV of the main treaty and of the Austro-Turkish agreement:

"not to raise any objection if, in consequence of difficulties which might

⁸ Larmeroux, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 203-4; Geoffrey Drage: *Austria-Hungary*, pp. 805-6.

¹⁰ See also *cap.* XXIV.

result from the maintenance of the Ottoman administration in the Sandjak, Austria might see herself led to occupy that territory definitively as in the case of Bosnia.”¹¹

Well satisfied with his work at the Congress, Count Andrassy, the representative of Austria-Hungary, said to Lord Salisbury, “I have put my foot on the head of the serpent.”¹² He meant Slavism. Russia had enabled him to accomplish the work. Yet, at the outbreak of the recent war, apologists for Russia asserted that disinterested love of the Slavs was her reason for taking arms in defence of Serbia.

Austro-Hungarian Bargain with the United Kingdom, May 1878.

Before condemning the action of Russia in handing over her “little Slav brothers” (who had just earned their freedom) to the domination of Germans and Magyars, one should remember that self-interest has always dominated policy in international relations, and should observe that, on the same occasion, the United Kingdom, for her own purposes, made herself a party to the same iniquity.¹³ Russia in the treaty of San Stefano had provided for such an expansion of the boundaries of Bulgaria as would have given to that state, under Russian patronage, the hegemony of the Balkans. As the arrangement would have constituted a menace to Turkey (then under British protection), the United Kingdom objected, and, in order to obtain the co-operation of Austria-Hungary in the reduction of Bulgaria, agreed to the martyrdom of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The existence of the bargain is indisputable. In a letter to Lord Lyons of 29 May 1878 (the Conference met on 13 June), Lord Salisbury said:

“As there seems no chance of the Porte ceding Bosnia, and as it is necessary to keep Austria with us in the Congress, we have offered to support her in any proposal she makes in Congress on the subject of Bosnia, if she will support us in questions concerning the limits of occupation and organization of Bulgaria. It is not necessary to tell Waddington¹⁴ this, but, as we have advanced a step since he last asked us the question, it is important to avoid language inconsistent with it.”¹⁵

Alleged Reasons for the Subjection of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

That the war against Turkey had been commenced by Herzegovina and Bosnia, and that their enemy was powerless to subdue them, was admitted by the plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers who, at the Berlin Conference, placed the provinces under the domination of Austria-Hungary. Count Andrassy (Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs) said:

“We must not forget that the movement which brought about the

¹¹ Larmeroux, *op. cit.*, p. 161. The later treaty (1881) continued the agreements: *post*, pp. 919-20.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Italy also agreed: Crispi, *op. cit.*, II, p. 95. And see p. 97.

¹⁴ The French Minister of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁵ Newton: *Lord Lyons*, II, p. 143. And see pp. 148-50.

war in the East had its origin in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”¹⁶

Lord Salisbury said:

“It is not at all probable that the Porte would be able to subdue the agitations which it was not strong enough to hinder or suppress, even before the unfortunate events of the last two years occurred.”¹⁷

And Lord Beaconsfield, when addressing the House of Lords upon the subject of the treaty (18 July), said that:

“I inquired into the matter of those most competent to give an opinion, and the result of my investigation was a conviction that nothing short of an Army of 50,000 men of the best troops of Turkey could produce anything like order in these parts, and that were the attempt to be made, it would be contested and resisted, and might finally be defeated.”¹⁸

Inability to maintain their freedom, therefore, was not the reason for giving the provinces new masters. What was it? Lord Salisbury when proposing to the Congress the resolution declaring:

“that the Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary,”

concealed, quite naturally, that he was merely fulfilling a term of his previous agreement with Austria-Hungary, and said that he rested his proposal upon two considerations: first, that Bosnia and Herzegovina:

“are the only Turkish Provinces where the proprietors of the soil have, almost without exception, a religious belief different from that of the peasants”

—a view which, he said, had created keen animosity between them (He did not add “as in Ireland”); and secondly:

“The geographical position of the Provinces is also of high political importance. If a considerable part of them should fall into the hands of one of the neighboring principalities, a chain of Slav States would be formed, which would extend across the peninsula of the Balkans, and the military force of these States would be a menace to the populations of other race occupying the territories to the south. Such a state of things would without doubt be more dangerous to the independence of the Porte than any other combination.”¹⁹

Lord Beaconsfield, in supporting the proposal, declared that:

“one of the principal bases of this peace is the independence of the Sultan as a European sovereign. . . . If the Sultan was not able before the war, when his resources were considerable, to maintain order and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus preserve general peace, there is no reason to believe that to-day, after the struggle which had done it the greatest honor, the Ottoman government would be in a posi-

¹⁶ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Berlin Congress*, p. 131.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

¹⁸ Hansard, CCXLI, col. 1760.

¹⁹ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Berlin Congress*, p. 133.

tion to give the securities for the peace of Europe which it had a right to ask. . . . If the Congress should leave the Provinces in question in the state in which they now are, one would see the predominance of the Slav race reappear, a race which is little disposed to give justice to others.”²⁰ Afterwards the same adroit and versatile statesman said that the provinces were given to Austria-Hungary:

“in order to put another Power, not Russia, on the high road to Constantinople if the succession to the Porte should ever become vacant.”²¹

One of the alleged purposes of the United Kingdom in entering the recent war was *to prevent* “another Power, not Russia” from treading “the high road to Constantinople.” And the effect of the recent peace treaty *has established* “a chain of Slav states . . . across the peninsula of the Balkans.”

Attitude of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina had not been consulted in any way as to the disposition to be made of them at Berlin, and when Austro-Hungarian troops commenced to pour into their country:

“It was very sensibly pointed out that they probably knew nothing on earth about the Treaty of Berlin, and thought that they were being invaded for amusement.”²²

Till then they had been fighting the Turks, and now, to their surprise, they found the Turkish troops helping them to repel the invaders. To the new *régime*, as well as to the old, the heroic Slavs made splendid resistance.

“Gradually the Austrians forced their way into Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the accounts made it more and more manifest that the task they had undertaken exceeded anything which they had calculated upon.”²³

Not until the initial Austro-Hungarian forces had been raised to 208,000 men, 38,000 horses, and 480 guns, was much success obtained. Eventually, the last stronghold fell.²⁴ Bosnia and Herzegovina commenced their forty-year subjection to their northern enemies.

Austro-Russian Treaty, 18 June 1881. How little Austria-Hungary intended to keep her treaty-promise to Turkey with reference to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and how little Russia cared whether she did or not, may be judged from the following clause in the protocol to the treaty between these two Powers and Germany of three years afterwards — the treaty known as *The League of the Three Emperors* of 18 June 1881²⁵; renewed, 27 March 1884, for three years,²⁶ and then allowed to terminate:

²⁰ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Berlin Congress*, p. 138.

²¹ Justin McCarthy: *A History of Our Own Times*, IV, p. 391.

²² *Ann. Reg.*, 1878, p. [313].

²³ *Ibid.*, p. [317].

²⁴ Cf. Larmeroux, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-8; and *Ann. Reg.*, 1878, pp. [315-8].

²⁵ Pribram, *op. cit.*, I, p. 43.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

“Austria-Hungary reserves the right to annex these provinces at whatever moment she may deem opportune.”

The second clause of the same protocol continued the Austro-Russian agreement with reference to the Sandjak of Novibazar:

“The Declaration exchanged between the Austro-Hungarian Plenipotentiaries and the Russian Plenipotentiaries of the Congress of Berlin under date of July 13, 1878²⁷ remains in force.”

Austria-Hungary might occupy the Sanjak if she so pleased.

Serbia. By her wars in the earlier part of the century, Serbia had succeeded in securing a position of political autonomy qualified by undefined Turkish suzerainty. By the treaty of Berlin (article 34), her complete independence was recognized. While thus emerging, she saw herself confronted by two important dangers: First — in pursuance of Russian policy, the San Stefano treaty provided for the establishment of Bulgaria as a predominant Power in the Balkans. British interests (as then regarded) being opposed to projects of that kind, the overriding treaty of Berlin averted the danger. Second — Austria-Hungary was obtaining (and did obtain, as we have seen), momentous foothold in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was in that way interposing obstruction to the realization of Serbia’s “legitimate aspirations” — to the political union of the South Slavs, the creation of a Greater Serbia, and the restoration of the glories of the period of Tsar Dushan. For the moment, Serbia was more affected by the first of these dangers than by the second — the present than the future — and turned her resentment against Russia (the author of the one, and jointly implicated in the other) rather than against Austria-Hungary.

Austro-Serbian Treaty, 28 June 1881. That, at all events, was the attitude of the Serbian Monarch — Prince Milan Obrenovitch IV, who, three years after the time of the Berlin treaties, consummated his friendship with Austria-Hungary by signature of the treaty of 28 June 1881,²⁸ the principal clauses of which (for present purposes) were as follows:

“*Article II.* Serbia will not tolerate political, religious, or other intrigues, which, taking her territory as a point of departure, might be directed against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including therein Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak of Novibazar.

“Austria-Hungary assumes the same obligation with regard to Serbia and her dynasty, the maintenance and strengthening of which she will support with all her influence.

“*Article III.* If the Prince of Serbia should deem it necessary, in the interest of His dynasty and of His country, to take on behalf of Himself and of His descendants the title of King, Austria-Hungary will

²⁷ *Ante*, p. 916.

²⁸ The date was just ten days after Austria-Hungary had acquired (by *The League of the Three Emperors*) the assent of Russia and Germany to the annexation of the provinces.

recognize this title as soon as its proclamation shall have been made in legal form, and will use her influence to secure recognition for it on the part of the other Powers.

“*Article IV.* Austria-Hungary will use her influence with the other European Cabinets to second the interests of Serbia.

“Without a previous understanding with Austria-Hungary, Serbia will neither negotiate nor conclude any political treaty with another Government, and will not admit to her territory a foreign armed force, regular or irregular, even as volunteers.

“*Article V.* If Austria-Hungary should be threatened with war or find herself at war with one or more other Powers, Serbia will observe a friendly neutrality towards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including therein Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novibazar, and will accord to it all possible facilities, in conformity with their close friendship and the spirit of this Treaty.

“Austria-Hungary assumes the same obligation towards Serbia, in case the latter should be threatened with war or find herself at war.

“*Article VII.* If, as a result of a combination of circumstances whose development is not to be foreseen at present, Serbia were in a position to make territorial acquisitions in the direction of her southern frontiers (with the exception of the Sanjak of Novibazar), Austria-Hungary will not oppose herself thereto, and will use her influence with the other Powers for the purpose of winning them over to an attitude favorable to Serbia.”²⁹

Austro-Serbian Treaty, 9 February 1889. Eight years afterwards (9 February 1889), another treaty between Austria-Hungary and Serbia provided (*inter alia*) as follows: (1) The operation of the previous treaty was extended to 13 January 1895. (2) Austria-Hungary agreed to protect Serbia and her Obrenovitch dynasty against incursions from Montenegro. (3) Austria-Hungary agreed “to recognize and support, with other Powers, the recognition” of Serbia’s southern expansion, which:

“may be carried in the direction of the valley of the Vardar as far as circumstances will permit.”³⁰

Salonica is at the Aegean end of the Vardar valley. The treaty was to remain in force for ten years. The interesting points of these two Austro-Serbian treaties, for present purposes, are:

1. Austria-Hungary had not yet fully developed her desire for an outlet on the Aegean and the control of a route to it.
2. Serbia had in view expansion to the south, rather than to the west.
3. Austria-Hungary deemed it advisable to obtain the sanction of Serbia to the Austro-Hungarian inclusion of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and

²⁹ Pribram, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 51-5. With this treaty should be read the explanatory Declaration of Oct. 1881: *ibid.*, pp. 60-3.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 134-41.

Novibazar. In other words, Serbia agreed to renounce expansion to the west in return for assistance in expansion to the south.

4. Serbia promised not to tolerate, upon her territory, intrigues directed against Austria-Hungary with reference to these places. Inasmuch as Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia of 23 July 1914 was based upon alleged breaches by Serbia of a similar promise, made in 1909, it is noteworthy that that undertaking was the third of its kind.

5. Austria-Hungary promised to maintain and strengthen, "with all her influence," the Obrenovitch dynasty in Serbia — the Obrenovitch as against the rival Karageorgevitch. Austria-Hungary's agreement in this respect helps to explain the subservience of Serbia during the continuation of Milan's occupation of the throne.³¹

Change at Belgrade. King Milan abdicated in 1889, and his son Alexander, who succeeded him, having been assassinated in 1903, the Obrenovitch dynasty ended. King Peter Karageorgevitch ascended the throne, and from that time may be dated the rapid development (with Russian encouragement) of the Greater Serbia — the anti-Austro-Hungarian³² — agitation which nearly produced war in 1908-9, and which was the precipitating cause of the outbreak of hostilities in 1914.

Austro-Russian Agreement, 8 May 1897. After the sovereigns of Russia and Austria-Hungary, by interchange of views at St. Petersburg, had arrived at a *modus vivendi* with reference to Balkan affairs, their Foreign Ministers exchanged letters, the relevant parts of which are as follows. The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister wrote (8 May 1897):

"The territorial advantages, accorded to Austria-Hungary by the Treaty of Berlin, are and remain acquired by her. In consequence, the possession of Bosnia, of Herzegovina, and of the sanjak of Novibazar may not be made the object of any discussion whatsoever, the Government of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty reserving to itself the right of substituting, when the moment arrives, for the present status of occupation and of right of garrisoning, that of annexation."³³

In his reply (17 May), the Russian Minister omitted the adjective *territorial* before the word *advantages* and inserted the adjective *military* before the word *occupation*. Under the heading:

"The advantages accorded to Austria-Hungary in the treaty of Berlin are and remain acquired by her," the Minister said:

"In subscribing to this principle, we deem it necessary to observe that the Treaty of Berlin assures to Austria-Hungary the right of military occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The annexation of these two

³¹ Cf. his obsequious letter to the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 24 Oct. 1881: *ibid.*, I, pp. 57-61.

³² Marked in 1906 by the inauguration of a tariff war.

³³ Pribram, *op. cit.*, I, p. 189.

provinces would raise a more extensive question, which would require special scrutiny at the proper times and places. As to the Sanjak of Novibazar, there would also be the necessity to specify its boundaries, which, indeed, have never been sufficiently defined.”³⁴

Both the Ministers agreed to maintain:

“the present *status quo* in the Balkan peninsula as long as circumstances will permit.”

The points to be observed in connection with these letters is that Russia, in the interest of Serbia, had modified, in three important respects, her attitude toward Austro-Hungarian designs upon Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak: (1) Russia declined to agree that the “advantages” which had been “accorded to Austria-Hungary by the treaty of Berlin” were “territorial” advantages. (2) Although, by the treaty of 18 June 1881, Austria-Hungary had reserved:

“the right to annex these provinces at whatever moment she shall deem opportune,”

the treaty had expired; the right had not been exercised; and Russia declined to give it further recognition. (3) Russia had agreed, on 13 July 1878, that she would raise no objection to a definitive occupation of the Sanjak of Novibazar by Austria-Hungary. Now she (Russia) said that the annexation of the Sanjak would require “careful scrutiny.”

Summary. Summarizing the provisions of the documents above referred to, we may say that in 1908 — the date to which allusion will next be made — the international situation was as follows:

As to Bosnia and Herzegovina:

1. By the treaties of Reichstadt (1876) and Budapest (1877) Russia acknowledged the right of Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. In exchange for diplomatic assistance with reference to the boundaries of Bulgaria, the United Kingdom promised (June 1878) to support any proposal which Austria-Hungary might make at the Berlin Conference “on the subject of Bosnia.”

3. By the treaty of Berlin (1878), the Great Powers authorized Austria-Hungary to occupy and administer the provinces.

4. In the same year, Austria-Hungary agreed with Turkey that: “the rights of sovereignty of His Imperial Majesty” (the Sultan) “will not be prejudiced” and that “the occupation will be considered as provisional.”

5. By treaty of 1881, Russia acknowledged the right of Austria-Hungary to annex the provinces “at whatever moment she may deem opportune.”

6. By treaty of approximately the same date, and again in 1889, Serbia practically acknowledged that the provinces were parts of Austria-Hungary.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

7. In 1897, Russia declined to renew her acknowledgment of Austria-Hungary's right of annexation; described the occupation authorized by the Berlin treaty as a "military occupation"; and declared that annexation "would raise a more extensive question."

As to the Sanjak of Novibazar:

1. By the treaty of Reichstadt (1876) between Russia and Austria-Hungary, the Sanjak was to be divided between Serbia and Montenegro.

2. By the treaty of Budapest (1877) the Sanjak was to be part of a neutral zone between Russia's and Austria-Hungary's spheres of interest in the Balkans.

3. By the treaty of Berlin (1878), Austria-Hungary was authorized to maintain military garrisons, and military and commercial roads in the Sanjak.

4. By the treaty of 1878, Russia agreed not to raise any objection to definitive occupation by Austria-Hungary of the Sanjak. This agreement was continued in 1881.

5. By the treaty of 1881, Serbia practically acknowledged that the Sanjak formed part of Austria-Hungary. The treaty was renewed in 1889.

6. In 1897, Russia declined to renew her agreement of 1878.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S NOVIBAZAR RAILWAY

Balkan Railways. At the date of the Berlin treaty (1878), there were in the Balkans only one line of railway touching Constantinople and one touching Salonica. The former extended, in a northwesterly direction, from Constantinople to Bellova,³⁵ with one branch to the Aegean at Dedeagatch and another to Jamboli. The latter lay in the valley of the Vardar from Salonica to Mitrovitza.³⁶ By a convention of 9 May 1883, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Serbia, and Bulgaria agreed to co-operate in construction of lines which would have for effect the continuation of the Constantinople-Bellova line, through Sofia, Nish, and Belgrade, to Budapest, and the connection of this main line with the Salonica-Mitrovitza railway by a branch running from Nish on the former road to the neighborhood of Pristina on the latter. In other words, there were to be: (1) a main line through Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey, connecting Budapest and Constantinople; and (2) a branch to the Salonica-Mitrovitza line, through Serbia and Turkey, connecting Budapest with Salonica.³⁷ These lines were built. The first through express from Budapest arrived at Constantinople on 12 August 1888.

A Novibazar Railway. Bosnia and Herzegovina, after thirty years of occupation and administration, having come to be regarded as Austro-

³⁵ Then in Eastern Rumelia; now in Bulgaria.

³⁶ Then in Turkish territory; now in Serbia.

³⁷ Larmeroux, *op. cit.*, pp. 464-5.

Hungarian territory, Count Aehrenthal desired for them, as well as for other western parts of the Dual Monarchy an outlet on the Aegean at Salonica, and, for that purpose, the construction of a railway connecting Uvatz, on the southern boundary of Bosnia, with the Salonica-Mitrovitza line.³⁸ Disregarding the opposition which he would be certain to encounter from Serbia (and even from the Magyars of Hungary), Aehrenthal obtained the sanction of Turkey; and, on 27 January 1908, in a speech before the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian Delegation, upholding his policy, said as follows:

“When the Bosnian border will have been connected with the Turkish railway, our traffic will go directly by Serajevo toward the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean. On the other hand, there is hope of seeing accomplished at an early date the junction of the Turkish and Greek railways, which would bring Vienna, Budapest, Serajevo, Athens, and Piraeus into direct communication. . . . It is only in this way that will be realized in its entirety our economico-political ideal.”³⁹

The *Annual Register* (1908) summarizes another part of the same speech as follows:

“This, he said, would lay the foundation for the further development of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in the East, a development which was necessary, as ‘her voice in the counsels of peoples would be heard only as long as her arm was strong’ though he asserted that she did not aim at any territorial acquisitions.”⁴⁰

Larmeroux adds to the economic benefits to be derived by Austria-Hungary from the proposed railway:

“Finally, the military and strategic advantage of such a railway was considerable, for then it had been easy for the Cabinet of Vienna to throw troops into the very heart of Macedonia, with a rapidity greater than any other Power.”⁴¹

Serbian Attitude. The construction of such a railway, however, would have had for Serbia unacceptable consequences. As Larmeroux says:

“To separate Serbia from Montenegro by the strong barrier which the Austrian rail constituted, that was to take away from Serbia the possibility of realizing her dearest aspirations. That was to prevent the Serbian Kingdom reaching the sea, which would have permitted her to export and import all the things necessary to the economic life of the country. That was the obvious and material side. But, something more serious, the Austrian project destroyed the dream of a Jugo-Slavia which, commencing in the middle of Macedonia, will run along the

³⁸ By this time there was a narrow-gauge railway between Serajevo (the capital of Bosnia) and Uvatz.

³⁹ Larmeroux, *op. cit.*, p. 467.

⁴⁰ P. [308.

⁴¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 468.

Adriatic shores and terminate at the Isonzo. This dream could be realized only by the union, ardently desired elsewhere, of the two little States of Serbian race, Serbia and Montenegro; and the iron of the rail coming from Austria would separate these two States from their common aspiration as much as would the iron, more distant, of her sword. This consequence was the more obvious to the heart of the Serbian people, because it struck to the depths of their soul, and put in danger their most legitimate aspirations."⁴²

Serbia objected, therefore, to the Austro-Hungarian proposal, and made appeal to Russia.

Russian Attitude. Regarding the railway project as one involving political considerations, Russia might well have complained that the Austro-Hungarian action was a breach of the agreement of 1897 to maintain "the present status quo in the Balkan peninsula as long as circumstances will permit." She met the proposal, however, more effectively by pressing her own scheme for an east-and-west railway which, passing through Roumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Turkish territory, would connect her with the Adriatic.

"This iron road would have been a sort of contact-thread between all the Slavs of the Peninsula; it would have been for Russian influence an excellent means of influence, and would have furnished to the Balkan States an outlet on the sea."⁴³

This railway incident terminated the Austro-Russian eleven-year friendship with reference to Balkan affairs. Aehrenthal's further action, later in the same year (quite superseding his railway project) transformed it into hostility.

ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

To her promise of continuation, unimpaired, of the sovereignty of the Sultan in Bosnia and Herzegovina,⁴⁴ Austria-Hungary paid little attention. Advancing from stage to stage, she not only assumed control of the foreign affairs of the provinces, but enrolled troops there, under allegiance to the Emperor King. Of Turkish rights, nothing remained but:

"(1) The permission given to the Mohammedan Bosniaks to mention the name of the Sultan in their prayers; (2) the permission to hoist the Turkish flag on the minarets of mosques during prayer-time, where it has been customary to do so. At first the Ottoman flag, which is red with a white crescent, was hoisted; later, to avoid misunderstandings a green flag with the Turkish inscription, 'The hour of prayer,' was

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 469. Isvolsky afterwards (5 October 1908) said that his policy was as above indicated: Bogitshevich: *Causes of the War*, p. 114. Cf. Giolitti: *Mémoires de ma vie*, pp. 162-6.

⁴⁴ *Ante*, p. 916.

substituted. . . . The Emperor . . . has exercised complete jurisdiction, and the Great Powers have recognized this by not insisting on the capitulations — that is, the right to have their own consular courts, as is customary in Egypt and Cyprus as well as in Turkey.”⁴⁵

Turkish sovereignty had become an empty word. But while it remained, and while the assertion of Turkish treaty rights continued to be possible, unpleasant situations for Austria-Hungary might supervene. Why not, thought Aehrenthal, make the legal situation conform to the facts?

Aehrenthal and Isvolsky. Notwithstanding Russian resentment over the railway project, or perhaps because of it, Aehrenthal entered into negotiations with Isvolsky (the new Russian Foreign Minister) who, at the moment, had in contemplation the improvement of Russia's position at Constantinople. Preliminary negotiations being encouraging, Isvolsky sent to Aehrenthal, on 19 June 1908, a memorandum in which (as is assumed) proposals, including Russia's assent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, were made.⁴⁶ Then came the Young Turk revolution in July; the issuance of an *irade* ordering elections throughout the Empire (24 July⁴⁷) and, if we are to believe Isvolsky, termination of the negotiations.⁴⁸ On 4 September, however, he appears to have contemplated Austria-Hungary's annexation of the provinces with equanimity; to have informed the Serbian Foreign Minister that it was imminent; and to have suggested that Serbia might comfort herself with “compensations.” A few days later (10 September), the Serbian Minister proposed a compensation scheme of which both Isvolsky and Sir Edward Grey approved.⁴⁹

Buchlau Agreement. What happened afterwards (15–16 September 1908) at Buchlau (in Moravia) between Isvolsky and Aehrenthal is referred to by a recognized authority — Mr. Henry Wickham Steed — as follows:

“Thus it is clear that before starting from Karlsbad on September 15 to meet Baron von Aehrenthal at Buchlau in Moravia — the residence of Count Berchtold, then Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg — M. Isvolsky was prepared to negotiate with Austria-Hungary on the basis of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the proclamation of Bulgarian independence. The details of the Buchlau Meeting have never been divulged though many interesting indiscretions have been committed in regard to them. It is doubtful whether the full truth will ever be known, since the chief conversation took place *en tête-à-tête* between the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Foreign Ministers who com-

⁴⁵ Drage: *Austria-Hungary*, p. 639.

⁴⁶ Steed: *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, p. 244. Cf. Pribram: *Austrian Foreign Policy*, 1908–18, pp. 25–7.

⁴⁷ *Ency. Brit.*, 11th ed., XXVII, p. 464.

⁴⁸ Steed, *op. cit.*, p. 247. Isvolsky stated his case in *The Fortnightly Rev.*, Sept. 1909; Aehrenthal replied in the November number.

⁴⁹ Steed, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

municated only the general results of their negotiations to the diplomatists who accompanied them; but it is certain that on leaving Buchlau, M. Isvolsky believed himself to have attained a complete agreement with Aehrenthal on all points under discussion. Whether Baron von Aehrenthal was of the same opinion is a matter for conjecture. He went to Buchlau with a suite of diplomatists and Foreign Office officials whose functions were intended by him to be those of witnesses in case of subsequent contestation. In after-dinner talk, he skilfully extracted from M. Isvolsky admissions in regard to the agreement privately attained, and quite as skilfully avoided giving any clear understanding as to the manner and moment of the action contemplated. Aehrenthal's apologists aver that he informed M. Isvolsky that Bosnia-Herzegovina would be annexed 'au moment favorable'; and a well-informed pro-Russian writer in the *Fortnightly Review* stated in the autumn of 1909, that when M. Isvolsky insisted on receiving considerable previous notice of the intended date of annexation, Baron von Aehrenthal unhesitatingly replied, 'Why, certainly; that is a matter of course.' This statement has never been and probably could not be challenged by Aehrenthal's apologists. M. Isvolsky consequently left Buchlau in the belief that he would have ample time to prepare for the execution of the part of the agreement in which Russia was mainly interested — probably the question of the opening of the Dardanelles — and to arrange that the projected modifications of the *status quo* in the Near East should take place smoothly with general European assent."⁵⁰

In this he was disappointed. Three weeks afterwards (7 October) without further communication, Aehrenthal announced the annexation of the provinces. A well-informed writer, M. Bogitshevich⁵¹ tells us that Russia's:

"opposition to the annexation became, in the year 1908 and 1909, so strong a one, not because it was a question of purely Serbian population, but because the Buchlau agreements could not be kept, particularly those appertaining to questions of the Dardanelles (principally by reason of England's opposition) and because there had arisen out of these matters a sharp personal conflict between Baron Aehrenthal and Isvolsky, at that time the chief guide of Russian policies."⁵²

Aehrenthal and Tittoni. Italy's Foreign Minister, Tittoni, discussed Balkan questions⁵³ with Aehrenthal at Desio in July 1907, at Salzburg

⁵⁰ Steed, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-9. M. Nekludoff in his *Diplomatic Reminiscences* (pp. 19, 20) gives a somewhat different account of the incident. Cf. Poincaré: *The Origins of the War*, p. 100; Pribram: *Aus. For. Pol.* 1908-18, pp. 26-8.

⁵¹ At one time Serbian Chargé at Berlin. Cf. Poincaré, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

⁵² *Causes of the War*, p. 22.

⁵³ Italy's method of objecting to Aehrenthal's railway proposal was the same as that adopted by Russia, namely, a demand for "the construction of other Balkan railroads running from the Danube to the Adriatic and from Valona to Monastir": Pribram, *op. cit.* II, p. 144.

in 1908, and again at Desio on 29-30 September of the same year — a few days after the Buchlau meeting⁵⁴ — with the result that some agreement for Italian assent to the proposed annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was arrived at. The arrangement probably was that Italy's complacency was to be paid for by similar amiability on the part of Austria-Hungary when Italy's turn came to annex Tripoli; and, meanwhile, that Austria-Hungary was to surrender (to Turkey) her rights in Novibazar.⁵⁵ But for arrangement of that kind, Italy would have proclaimed, more loudly than did either the United Kingdom or France, her opposition to the breach of the treaty of Berlin by the engulfment of the two Slav provinces. Her newspapers, indeed, fulminated, and the Irredentists demonstrated, but Tittoni stood by his bargain.⁵⁶

The Annexation. The Young Turk revolution (July 1908) directed special attention to the anomalous character of the political situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Aehrenthal appears to have endeavored to obtain the assent of its leaders to the desired annexation, and to have met with unpleasant rebuff.⁵⁷ The Turkish proposal, on the other hand, to summon a parliament at Constantinople⁵⁸ would involve the election of deputies in the provinces, and, in that way, produce an assertion of Turkish nationality which Austria-Hungary could not tolerate. Whatever the considerations, only a few days elapsed after the Desio meeting before Austria-Hungary announced (3 October) her intention to annex the provinces, but, at the same time, to surrender to Turkey the privileges in Novibazar secured to Austria-Hungary by the treaty of Berlin. A proclamation to that effect was issued four days afterwards — 7 October 1908. In pursuance of previous arrangements with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria proclaimed her independence of Turkey on the 5th.⁵⁹

Three Objections. To understand the diplomatic interchanges which ensued, distinction must be made between three kinds of objections to

⁵⁴ Steed, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

⁵⁵ Pribram, *op. cit.*, II, p. 145.

⁵⁶ Steed, *op. cit.*, p. 276; Pribram, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 145-6. By the recent publication of the Austro-Hungarian treaties, we know that on 30 November-15 December 1909, Austria-Hungary and Italy agreed that Article VII (referred to *ante*, p. 226) of the then existing Triple Alliance should apply to Novibazar, and that if, "in consequence of the impossibility of maintaining the *status quo*. in the Balkans, Austria-Hungary should be compelled by the force of circumstances to proceed to a temporary or permanent occupation of the Sanjak of Novibazar, that occupation shall be effected only after a previous agreement with Italy, based on the principle of compensation" (Pribram, *op. cit.*, I, p. 241. Cf. Austrian Red Book, *Official Files*, III, No. 11).

⁵⁷ Steed, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

⁵⁸ The *irade* ordering the elections was dated 24 July 1908: *Ency. Brit.* (11th ed.), XXVII, p. 464, *tit.* Turkey. Cf. Goricar and Stowe: *The Inside Story of Austro-German Intrigue*, p. 19.

⁵⁹ Crete declared its independence on the 7th. And on the 8th, Montenegro renounced the limitations imposed upon her by Article 29 of the treaty of Berlin: A. L. Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

the annexation. (1) Turkey objected because of the effacement of her nominal sovereignty over the provinces; (2) Russia (supported to some extent by France and the United Kingdom) objected because of breach of the arrangements of the treaty of Berlin (1878); and (3) Serbia objected because of interference with her Greater Serbia aspirations. She demanded "compensations" for herself at the expense of Austria-Hungary, and, if none could be obtained:

"that Bosnia and Herzegovina shall constitute an autonomous single unit, in order that Serbia be assured of connection with the Adriatic and an open territory as regards the Sandjak."⁶⁰

Turkey's Objection. Turkey's objection was removed (26 February 1909) by promise of payment of £2,250,000; by surrender by Austria-Hungary of the privileges in the Sanjak of Novibazar conceded to her by the treaty of Berlin; and by guarantee of the continuation in the provinces of certain religious practices, etc.⁶¹

Russia's Objection. Had Russia sufficiently recovered from her defeat at the hands of Japan (1904-5) the annexation would, very probably, have precipitated general war. Not being prepared, she contented herself with (1) supporting, diplomatically, Serbia's claims, and (2) contending that, for modification of the treaty of Berlin, a conference of the signatory Powers ought to be summoned. Austria-Hungary admitted the technical validity of this latter contention, but required that the conference should take notice of the accomplished fact, and should confine its proceedings to an endorsement of what had been done.

"The Vienna cabinet is of the opinion that the agreements of Turkey with Austria and Bulgaria finally settle the positive question of the violation of the Berlin Treaty, and that only the formal sanction of the modifications which have already taken place is left to the signatory Powers."⁶²

Russia declined to agree that Turkey's renunciation obviated the necessity for submitting the matter to a conference:

"which would have to examine the Bosnio-Herzegovinian question as well as the other points of the program which has already been accepted by all cabinets."⁶³

Serbia's Objection. From one point of view — the purely legal — Serbia had no right to raise objection to the annexation. Turkey's renunciation of her nominal sovereignty was a Turkish affair. And modification of the treaty of Berlin was a matter for its signatories, of which Serbia was not one. Politically, however, Serbia was well

⁶⁰ Bogitshevich, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

⁶¹ Steed, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

⁶² Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 250. And see Russian Ambassador at Paris to Isvolsky, 3 March 1909: *Ibid.*, p. 241.

⁶³ Isvolsky to Russian Embassy at London, 11 March 1909: *Ibid.*, p. 248. And see *ibid.*, pp. 242-6.

within the limits of customary intervention. For not only was the domination of Austria-Hungary being riveted upon Slavic peoples, but Serbia's proposed union with them was being made more difficult of accomplishment. She was nevertheless in the unfortunate position of a weaker nation dealing with a stronger, and had to depend upon foreign aid for attainment of her two objects — above mentioned.

Formulating her protest, Serbia issued a circular note proposing settlement of the affair — the annexation and her own claims — by the Powers.⁶⁴ She prepared a draft circular note which, after its form had been discussed with her friends⁶⁵ and approved by Sir Edward Grey,⁶⁶ she amended, contrary to advice, and (11 March 1909) circulated.⁶⁷ Reporting from London, the Russian Chargé said (16 March):

“Grey regrets extraordinarily that the Serbian Government in its answer to the Vienna Cabinet has not paid sufficient attention to the advice of Russia and the other Powers and has failed to place itself in a favorable diplomatic position, which might have deprived Austria of every pretext for manifesting displeasure. . . . Grey believes it is rather probable that the Serbian Government, out of considerations of internal policy, will yield only to energetic pressure from the Powers. The British Government will, if necessary, take part in exerting the pressure, and at all events will support by every possible means every Russian initiative at Belgrade, which would be intended to persuade the Serbian Government to return an answer in accordance with the wishes of the Vienna Cabinet. Grey, however, believes that this answer must confine itself to assurances of readiness for peace, to the desire for friendly and neighborly relations, and to the willingness to discuss, by means of direct negotiations, all questions of a purely economic character affecting the interests of both States.”⁶⁸

Reporting again the next day, the Chargé said:

“Everyone was convinced here that the Serbian circular note, couched in the spirit of advice given by the Russian Government, would achieve its purpose. But the dry and negative form which the Belgrade Cabinet gave this diplomatic document has not made a favorable impression on the British Government.”⁶⁹

About the same time, in reply to a friendly suggestion from Austria-Hungary for the opening of negotiations for a commercial treaty, Serbia returned a provoking reply. It had been prepared without Russian participation, and it was “in no sense in accordance with the counsels which were given in Belgrade,”⁷⁰ or with the views of other Powers.⁷¹ Not only so but, as reported by the Russian Chargé at London (17 March):

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 243, 4, 5, 6, 7.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 251-2.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

“After Milovanovitch ⁷² had entered upon an exchange of views with Forgach ⁷³ regarding the editing of the Serbian reply, he suddenly sent this answer to Vienna, ignoring the Austrian Minister in Belgrade, and, moreover, communicated the contents of this answer to the press, before it had become known to the Vienna cabinet. Quite apart from this, the answer in itself was tactless: instead of friendly assurances, the repetition of the expressions of the circular note which had displeased Vienna; and instead of a short exposition of Serbia’s wishes regarding the commercial treaty, the Vienna cabinet is given a lengthy lecture on how this question is to be treated in the two Parliaments of the Danube monarchy. The British Government is fully aware of the fact that Austria might have displayed more friendliness and conciliatoriness towards Serbia. But it is equally well known here that in order to settle a conflict between two States so different in size and power, the weaker must show more good will than Serbia up to now has been inclined to do.” ⁷⁴ The Chargé said that Sir Edward Grey:

“sees absolutely no reason for believing that Austria desires an armed conflict. . . . Lately Grey has become more and more convinced that King Peter and the Serbian Government, out of fear of domestic disturbances, will not act on friendly advice, but wish to show that they have been forced into this yielding attitude by the energetic pressure of the Powers. In the interests of peace, the British Government would be prepared to take part in such an action, but naturally on condition that this would be approved by Russia.” ⁷⁵

Germany’s Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Pourtalès, in conversation with Isvolsky (Russian Foreign Minister), proposed (17 March) that the alteration of the treaty of Berlin, said to be necessary because of the annexation, should be submitted to the signatories of the treaty “for their formal sanction,” and that their assent should be expressed by a mere exchange of notes. ⁷⁶ The reply of Isvolsky, as related by himself, was as follows (17 March):

“I thanked Count Pourtalès for this friendly communication, and limited myself to remarking that, at first glance, the German proposal seemed to exclude a conference and gave Austria the possibility, once the annexation has been recognized by the Powers, to evade a solution of the other points of the programme, and to get Serbia into her power. I added, however, that I recognized the conciliatory spirit of Count Pourtalès’ communication, and that I would give full consideration to the proposal. It seems to me that this effort of Germany to

⁷² Serbian Prime Minister.

⁷³ Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

⁷⁴ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 253-4.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

bring about a relaxation of the tension must be encouraged, and her proposal might be adopted on principle with the provision that the form of the Austrian action must be precisely established, and, furthermore, guarantees for the meeting of the conference be demanded.”⁷⁷

On the same day, having determined to accept the German proposal, Isvolsky made a draft of a reply and sent it to Paris and London for consideration. The draft, after expression of fear that Austria-Hungary had resolved upon war while Russia labored for peace, declared that the Russian government:

“will for this reason likewise accept the present proposals of the Berlin cabinet, and if Austria undertakes an action in the sense mentioned by the German government, that is to say, if she should ask the Powers for a formal sanction of the alteration of Article 25 of the Berlin Treaty by way of an exchange of notes, the Russian government will on its part consider it a duty to meet this procedure with the sincere wish to find in it the elements of a solution which would be equally satisfying to all the signatory Powers of the Berlin Treaty.”⁷⁸

It will be observed that, in this draft, Isvolsky made no reference to a conference as a condition of acceptance of the proposal. Noticing this, Sir Edward Grey said in reply (19 March):

“England’s chief reason for expressing herself in favor of a conference is due to Russian wishes; if the Russian Government now considers it possible to give up this idea, the British Government is also prepared to be satisfied with an exchange of notes regarding the following questions: Bosnia, the Herzegovina, Turkey, Bulgaria, and the abolishing of Article 29 of the Berlin Treaty which refers to Montenegro. Grey is also of the opinion that the Russian Government would have to postpone the answer to the German proposal until the present Austro-Serbian crisis had found a solution.”⁷⁹

Some quotations (that above and those on a later page), indicating that Grey’s rôle was that of a mere supporter of Russia, render his introduction of the condition of this last sentence inexplicable. He disapproved (as we shall see) the attitude of Serbia. He was willing to agree to the Austro-Hungarian annexation by an exchange of notes. But, evidently, he wished, by postponement of that action, to put pressure upon Austria-Hungary in connection with her negotiations, upon fiscal points, with Serbia. That was being more Russian than Isvolsky, and the effect was as might have been anticipated. Counseled to give way, but supported by the postponement of the exchange of notes, Serbia continued her truculent attitude; busied herself with preparation of a new

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 254-5.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 256. For Article 25 see *ante*, pp. 915-6.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 258. The reply of the French government was delayed by a strike of the telegraphists. M. Pichon would have concurred in the form of the Russian draft: *Ibid.*, pp. 265-6.

circular note to the Powers; and widened her breach with Austria-Hungary. War became imminent. Under these circumstances, Germany (23 March) renewed at St. Petersburg, with emphasis, her proposal for "formal sanction" by an exchange of notes, adding:

"that a negative, or even an evasive answer on our" (Russia's) "part would lead to the result that Germany 'would allow things to take their own course and hold us responsible for the consequences.'" ⁸⁰

By this Isvolsky understood, as he said (23 March):

"We have to deal apparently with an action which permits of no contradiction, which has been agreed upon between Vienna and Berlin, and which is to place us before the following alternatives: an immediate regulation of the question of annexation by an exchange of notes, or the invasion of Serbia. In view of the great danger which an Austro-Serbian conflict would mean for us as well as for general peace, and in order to protect Serbia, we have no other choice than to accept the German proposal." ⁸¹

Seeing no sufficient reason for postponement of the exchange of notes, Isvolsky announced acceptance of the German proposal. France assented, ⁸² but Grey, adhering rigidly to his point, insisted:

"that the action of the Powers at Belgrade must precede the recognition of the Austro-Turkish convention." ⁸³

Germany and Vienna gave way, and negotiations with Serbia proceeded. Aehrenthal had objected to Serbia's circular note of 11 March (above referred to) requiring that it should:

"recognize the annexation as a *fait accompli* which cannot further be called in question." ⁸⁴

His wishes in this respect not having been regarded, he himself prepared the draft of a formal submission for Serbia's signature. Sir Edward Grey disapproved its form, saying (22 March) that it:

"would be humiliating for Serbia, and would mean an apology for her former conduct." ⁸⁵

Russia, on the other hand (more accommodating in this respect, as also in the matter of the exchange of notes), accepted it "with very slight alterations." ⁸⁶ On the 31st March (1909) Serbia signed it. It was as follows:

"Servia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the situation established in Bosnia and that she will, therefore, adapt herself to the decisions which the Powers are going to arrive at in reference to Art.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 260.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 262, 265-6.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 259. The Serbian draft may be seen in *Cam. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*

25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the counsels of the Powers, Serbia binds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has assumed since last October relative to the annexation, and she binds herself further to change the direction of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and in the future to live with the latter in friendly and neighborly relations.”⁸⁷

The declaration was, in large measure, a renewal of Serbia’s promises of 28 June 1881 (renewed in 1889) as contained in the treaty of that date:

“Serbia will not tolerate political, religious, or other intrigues, which, taking her territory as a point of departure, might be directed against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including therein Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak of Novibazar.”⁸⁸

Upon correct judgment as to whether or not Serbia fulfilled her later promises, depends the validity of the Austro-Hungarian assertion of justification for her ultimatum of 28 July 1914. That subject is dealt with in a later chapter.⁸⁹

Russia’s Advice to Serbia. The attitude assumed by Russia during the crisis inaugurated by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the counsels and promises which at that time were given to her by Serbia are of importance when considering the circumstances preceding the wars of 1914–18. For it cannot be thought to be a matter of small moment whether Russia regarded the settlement arrived at as a final disposition of Serbia’s claims, or, while persuading Serbia to make submission, pointed to a revival of her claims under more propitious circumstances, and counselled preparation for a happier day. Upon that point the following observations and quotations are conclusive.

After the announcement of Austria-Hungary’s intention to annex the provinces, but two days prior to the issue of the proclamation, the Serbian representative in France reported (5 October 1908) an important conversation with Isvolsky (who at the moment happened to be in Paris), in which, giving the impression that he had agreed to the annexation (as indeed, to some extent, he had), and taking credit for imposing, as a condition, Austria-Hungary’s renunciation of her rights in the Sanjak of Novibazar, Isvolsky said:

“I have foreseen this step of Austria-Hungary’s and it did not surprise me. For that reason I made acceptance of it dependent upon the above-mentioned condition.” (The reference is no doubt to the Buchlau conversation.) “This disclaimer, Austria will proclaim upon our de-

⁸⁷ Ludwig: *Austria-Hungary and the War*, p. 197; the German White Book, 1914, in *Coll. Dip. Docs.*, p. 414. Russia and the United Kingdom had previously handed to Vienna their notes of assent to the annexation — Russia on 24 and the United Kingdom on 28 March: Pribram: *Austrian Foreign Policy*, 1908–18, p. 31.

⁸⁸ *Ante*, p. 920.

⁸⁹ *Cap.* XXVI.

mand, and M. Milowanowich⁹⁰ was already informed of this in our interview at Carlsbad at which he himself expressed the view that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was acceptable to Serbia because of this disclaimer. . . . One thing more: I do not understand your state of agitation. In reality you lose nothing, but gain something: our support.”

Isvolsky's advice to Serbia was acquiescence, and preparation for future action:

“You Serbians surely cannot be thinking of driving Austria-Hungary out of Bosnia and Herzegovina by force of arms. And we Russians on the other hand cannot wage war on Austria on account of these provinces. It is self-understood that I cannot admit that we are not now in a position to do this, and yet that is the main reason. Austria-Hungary gains really nothing by this step, but does indeed lose an established acquisition, for she disclaims her rights to the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar and withdraws from there, which is bound to elevate the spirit of the Serbian people, for it opens up the prospect of bringing closer together the frontiers between Serbia and Montenegro. . . . Russia has hitherto supported Serbia and will continue to support her, however and wherever she can. You must, however, soon come to an understanding with Montenegro. . . . Furthermore, you must come to an understanding with Bulgaria, and in this work we shall honestly support you. . . . I trust the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue as heretofore to labour at its renaissance, and awake as it is, it will never be possible to denationalize it.”⁹¹

On 10 October (1908), the Serbian Minister at Vienna reported a conversation with Prince Urusoff, the Russian Ambassador there:

“In reply to my question as to whether the Russian Government had been informed of Austria's purpose as regards annexation, Prince Urusoff replied that Baron Aehrenthal had spoken in Buchlowitz (Buchlau) with M. Iswolski about the possibility of annexation, but that he had not indicated it as immediately impending. Iswolski had answered him that, in principle, Russia would not oppose such an alteration of the Treaty of Berlin, as Russia had no reason for coming forward as the champion of that Treaty and of its maintenance, but he was of the opinion that such an alteration could not be attempted without the consent of the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Berlin. This consent had not been sought by Aehrenthal, and to this extent therefore his action had been unexpected by Russia. . . . He was able to understand the protest which we had made to the signatory Powers against the act of Austria-Hungary, for we had to make such a protest — indeed this was the only thing that small States could do in such cases; but to go further and to instigate

⁹⁰ Then Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁹¹ Bogitshevich, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-4; *Remarques etc.*, pp. 41-2.

an armed conflict against Austria-Hungary would be unpardonable and fatal to Serbia."

Dealing with the claim to "compensations" which Serbia was making, Urusoff said that he:

"does not see how it can fail to be granted. According to his view, Austria-Hungary's disclaimer of rights to the Sandjak ought to afford a satisfactory compensation to us for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for it opens the prospect of an eventual expansion of Serbia in this direction in the future, and removes the danger of a further expansion of Austria to the South."⁹²

In an interview with the Serbian Chargé at London (13 October), Isvolsky repeated his previous advice. The Chargé summarized it as follows:

"If we Serbians could look at the annexation, now that it has been consummated, more calmly, we would have reason to be satisfied with it, for it is a fact of the highest importance to us that Austria has surrendered the Sandjak to Turkey, and has thereby forever cut herself off from an advance to Saloniki. . . . With the surrender of the Sandjak we are gainers, moreover, in the fact that thereby Austria has lost her rights to her railroad, and ours (the Adriatic) is assured, though for the moment nothing must be said about it. Furthermore the result of the annexation is that it has stirred up the national consciousness among us and among the other Serbians outside the Kingdom, and has at least morally united us. It is due to it (the annexation) that we have forgotten the petty interests that have divided us from Montenegro, and have made up our quarrel."⁹³

With a view to obtaining support for the two Serbian demands, (1) compensation from Austria-Hungary, or (2) an autonomous status for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milowanowich, the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, himself proceeded "upon an Extraordinary Mission" to Berlin and London. Reporting from the first of these places (25 October) he said that he and Isvolsky (whom he had met there) had:

"agreed to insist upon the demand for territorial compensation for Serbia and Montenegro to the uttermost limit of the possible, and secondarily to try and bring it about that the territory in question be conveyed to Turkey which in turn is to transfer it to Serbia; and if we are driven to extremities, that is to say, in the event that we have to renounce the foregoing project, we must insist all the stronger that Bosnia and Herzegovina shall constitute an autonomous single unit in order that Serbia be assured of connection with the Adriatic and an open territory as regards the Sandjak. . . . his [Isvolsky's] policy was directed towards a goal, which, after liquidation of all Russian questions outside of Europe, would lead Russia on to her European objectives; Serbia was an im-

⁹² Bogitshevich, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-6; *Remarques etc.*, pp. 42-3.

⁹³ Bogitshevich, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-20; *Remarques etc.*, pp. 45-7.

portant factor in this policy, said he, as a centre of the Southern Slavs. Bosnia was, in the opinion of Russia and Western Europe, now more certainly assured to Serbia than ever, even if the annexation should be recognized; Serbia must take the first steps towards the realization of her national tasks in the direction of the Sandjak and Bosnia. For the present a conflict must be avoided, as the ground had not yet been prepared either militarily or diplomatically. If Serbia brought on a war, Russia would have to abandon her, and she would be vanquished, although this would be a very severe blow not only for the Russian national sentiment, but also for Russian interests and future plans."⁹⁴

Reporting from London (29 October) his interview with Sir Edward Grey and Sir Charles Hardinge, Milowanowich indicated that he had received little encouragement, and that he had said to them:

"We must prepare for the war which is inevitable in the near future, if they refuse us this compensation."⁹⁵

After returning to St. Petersburg from his visits to Paris, London, and Berlin, Isvolsky, in writing to the Russian Ambassador to France (5 November 1908), said:

"In the midst of all these dangers, I am working on the solution of the Bosnian crisis. My task is rendered particularly difficult by the fermentation of public opinion and of the press; the causes of this fermentation are many and complicated; considerations of internal policy play an important part, and if this movement be attentively examined, one arrives at the conclusion that, properly speaking, Russia is at present not in a warlike mood, and, though people like to create difficulties for their Government in questions of foreign politics, they are, nevertheless, not at all disposed to wage war out of love for Serbia."⁹⁶

Shortly afterwards, Paschitsch, the Serbian Prime Minister, in the course of another "Extraordinary Mission" to St. Petersburg, had a special audience with the Czar. Reporting on 12 November, he said:

"The Tsar expressed great sympathy for Serbia, advised a quiet line of conduct, for our cause was just, but our preparations weak. The Bosnia-Herzegovina question will be decided by war alone; in his opinion Austria-Hungary will consent neither to autonomy nor to a territorial compensation. . . . He believes that Austria-Hungary will not attack Serbia, but we must give no provocation. . . . Our line of conduct should be: — an understanding with Turkey, a calm attitude, military preparations, and watchful waiting."⁹⁷

A few months afterwards, when Serbia realized the hopelessness of her situation, the Czar gave her comfort, saying (6 March 1909 — shortly prior to the settlement):

⁹⁴ Bogitshevich, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-1; *Remarques etc.*, pp. 47-8.

⁹⁵ Bogitshevich, *op. cit.*, p. 111; *Remarques etc.*, p. 49.

⁹⁶ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

⁹⁷ Bogitshevich, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-12; *Remarques etc.*, pp. 49-50.

“the Serbian skies were heavily clouded by this blow, the situation was terrible because Russia was unprepared for war and the defeat of Russia would be the ruin of Slavdom; the Tsar has the feeling that a conflict with Germanism is unavoidable in the future and that preparations should be made for it.”⁹⁸

Two days afterwards, Isvolsky wrote to the Russian Ambassador at Belgrade:

“Please persuade Milovanovitch to accept the Russian draft. Serbia need not hesitate to declare that she does not wish to interfere with the question of annexation. Legally, this is the only invulnerable standpoint, and it does not mean that Serbia thereby loses the right, when the proper time shall have arrived, of acquainting the Powers with her wishes. We, on our part, can only repeat that the act of annexation will in the last resort not receive our signature.”⁹⁹

Serbia complied. She bowed her head, but strengthened her heart for a more propitious occasion. Russia, too, awaited the better time. As M. Poincaré has well said:

“She continued to regret the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; she was able to see, with satisfaction, that Serbia, wounded by that act of violence, drew near to Bulgaria and sought moral support from St. Petersburg; she was able, imprudently, to encourage the aspirations — after all, legitimate — of the Balkan nationalities for independence.”¹⁰⁰

A 1908 AND 1909-1914 PARALLEL

In some respects the attitudes of the Powers in the crisis of 1908-9 present interesting parallel to their attitudes immediately prior to the 1914-18 war. Although Serbia was without legal warrant for complaint in 1908, although her demand for revision of the treaty of Berlin (by the erection of the provinces into “an autonomous single unit”) was unreasonable and impracticable, and although her demand for “compensations” was groundless,¹⁰¹ Russia, had she been ready for war, would have insisted upon Austro-Hungarian submission; France would have joined Russia; the United Kingdom would have sided with these two; and Germany would have supported Austria-Hungary. The merits of the quarrel (as in 1914) would have been immaterial. The 1908-9 episode furnishes one of several illustrations¹⁰² of the extent to which

⁹⁸ Bogitshevich, *op. cit.*, p. 112; *Remarques* etc., p. 52.

⁹⁹ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 247. With the above extracts, indicative of the advice given to Serbia by Russia in 1908-9, should be read those in a later chapter (cap. XXVI) in which the encouragement of Serbia was continued.

¹⁰⁰ *The Origins of the War*, p. 120. And see p. 132.

¹⁰¹ Milovanovitch (Serbian Foreign Minister) was unable to convince any one of the Powers that the demand ought to be supported; Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

¹⁰² See particularly cap. XXII.

Sir Edward Grey's foreign policy was dominated by his view of the necessity of maintaining the war-ready solidarity of the *entente* relations. British participation in the 1914-18 war was the culmination of that policy.

French Attitude. The attitude of Russia has already been dealt with: Austria-Hungary had gained nothing by the annexation; by surrendering the Sanjak, she had indeed worsened her position; to her detriment, she had stirred the Serbian "national consciousness"; nevertheless Russia "will continue to support her . . . whenever she can," for "Serbia was an important factor" in Russian policy with reference to Constantinople; but "Russia is at present not in a war-like mood"; Serbia must await a better moment; her policy must be "a calm attitude, military preparation, and watchful waiting."

France was loath to run the risk of war in "a quarrel in which the vital interests of Russia are not involved," and in support of demands which "are difficult to justify." On 26 February (1909), the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg made formal representation to the Russian government as follows:

"The long duration of the Austro-Serbian crisis and the uncertainty of the final intentions of Austria-Hungary and Russia, occasion general disquiet throughout Europe. . . . The Russian Government will surely agree with the French Government that both must do everything possible to prevent the danger of an armed conflict in a question in which the vital interests of Russia are not involved. French public opinion would be unable to comprehend that such a question could lead to a war in which the French and the Russian army would have to participate.

"Since the conclusion of the Alliance, both Governments and both countries have always shown themselves prepared to fulfil their mutual obligations, as soon as their vital interests were threatened. On the contrary, however, in all other incidents of international activity, they have always endeavored to unite their efforts in the interests of peace and of reconciliation. Such is the case today, and this too was the idea of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when it publicly declared last October that Russia, whatever may be her feelings regarding the causes of the present crisis, could not see in them a *casus belli*. . . . In connection with the Serbian demands — which, as is generally recognized, are difficult to justify — we have expressed our doubt as to whether it be possible to realize them. But we have joined with the Russian Government in demanding that the question be submitted to a conference. This is, in reality, the only difficulty for which another solution must be found than that which the Belgrade Cabinet demands with regard to its claims for territorial compensations."¹⁰³

This communication "made a painful impression" at St. Petersburg,¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-2.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

and shortly afterwards Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, endeavored to remove it by offering strong assurances of support. He said (3 March):

“We shall loyally fulfil the obligations of our alliance, and so long as I remain at this post, this policy, shall be followed. But as this creates an extraordinarily serious situation for the two countries, neither of which wishes war, I have considered it my duty to seek for means by which the danger may be forestalled, and not to have recourse to extreme decisions.”¹⁰⁵

In reporting this statement, the Russian Ambassador at Paris added that Pichon:

“has not ceased to let the Berlin Cabinet thoroughly understand that France follows the policy of the Russian Government in this crisis at all points; and that it will uphold in the most loyal manner the treaty of alliance which binds her to Russia. Of this he has been able to convince Prince Bülow so well, that the Chancellor in a recent conversation, in which possible eventualities were discussed, remarked to Jules Cambon: ‘You will place yourself at the side of Russia, just as we will place ourselves at the side of Austria.’”¹⁰⁶

France shrank from supporting Russia in a war in the Balkans in 1908-9 motivated by the policy that it “would lead Russia on to her European objectives,” just as Russia disliked the prospect of war in 1905-6 and 1911 in support of French imperialisms in Morocco. Nevertheless at these and other junctures, the Power appealed to replied, “We shall loyally fulfil the obligations of our alliance.”

British Attitude. The attitude of the British Foreign Office during the episode was based upon three principles: (1) deprecation of such action on the part of Serbia as would provoke war; (2) disapproval of Serbia’s assertion of a right to “compensations” at the expense of Austria-Hungary; but nevertheless (3) willingness to give diplomatic support to Russia. When reporting his first interview with Sir Charles Hardinge (Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs), the Serbian Minister said (10 October 1908):

“My essential task was so to act that the idea of compensation for Serbia would be placed before everything else. The communications of Sir Charles, if they proved nothing more, are at least proof that for the moment we would not be given a negative reply. There is no doubt that the amicable attitude of England will show itself in her work. Doubtless, it may be that this attention is accorded to us by reason of the very great excitement which exists in Serbia, and that finally no practical account will be taken of our desires. That is all the more probable since, according to the declaration of Sir Charles, England accepts the conference only in case its programme be rigorously defined in advance,

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 238-9.

and I have reason to believe that the English government does not desire the question of compensations to be inscribed even in the programme of any of the other Powers outside of Turkey.”¹⁰⁷

In an interview of the 29th October with Milovanovich, Sir Edward Grey, referring to the demand for compensation, expressed a doubt:

“Whether any success will be had, owing to the fact that Austria-Hungary positively refuses assent.”

And referring to the proposal for an international conference, Grey added:

“In view of the fact that Austria-Hungary refuses, are we on that account to hold a fruitless conference with the prospect that Austria-Hungary stands by the annexation and at the same time retains the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar?”

The Serbian Minister was, however, able to add in his report of the conversation as follows:

“In reply to my renewed and forcible insistence, Grey and Hardinge finally gave me their word that they would persist in supporting our territorial compensation demand for so long as Russia would give it her support.”¹⁰⁸

In the course of an address at the Guildhall on 9 November, Mr. Asquith (then Prime Minister) said:

“Nothing will induce us in this country to falter and fall short in any one of the special engagements which we have undertaken, to be disloyal or unfaithful even for a moment to the spirit of any existing friendship.”¹⁰⁹

On 28 January 1909, the Russian Ambassador at London reported as follows:

“Grey informs me that he has declared to Cambon that he wishes to inform the French Government that the London Cabinet has promised the Russian Government its diplomatic support in the question of the compensation of Serbia and Montenegro. Grey tells me that he has taken this step in order to clear the situation of every misunderstanding; the difficulties which have arisen during the settlement of the questions pending between Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria, prove, however, that the Serbian demands must be limited as much as possible in the interests of Peace.”¹¹⁰

No progress in that direction being possible, the Russian Chargé reported (24 February) that in the opinion of Sir Charles Hardinge:

“the general situation would be under less tension if Russia would declare in Belgrade that Serbia must count neither upon territorial concessions nor upon full autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since Aus-

¹⁰⁷ *Remarques etc.*, p. 45; *Is Germany Guilty?*, II, 29-30.

¹⁰⁸ Bogitshevich, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-11; *Is Germany Guilty?*, II, 34-5.

¹⁰⁹ Asquith: *The Genesis of the War*, cap. I.

¹¹⁰ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 231. See also p. 489.

tria precisely fears that Russia, and possibly certain other Powers, might support the impossible Serbian demand, a step of this nature, undertaken by Russia at Belgrade, would do a great deal to pacify the Vienna Cabinet and thereby increase the possibility of a peaceable solution."¹¹¹ Three days afterwards, the same Chargé reported that:

"Great disquietude prevails here, because the negotiations between the Powers for the prevention of an Austro-Serbian conflict make no progress. In England, at present, special importance is attached to the question of territorial concessions in favor of Serbia in the firm conviction that adhering to such a demand must inevitably lead to war. Here, one would readily feel disposed to support every proposal which might facilitate a final understanding between Austria and Serbia, but with the provision that the Powers that would act in common must be perfectly clear concerning the fact that Austria cannot be expected to make territorial concessions."¹¹²

Nevertheless, with a view to maintenance of *entente* solidarity, Grey continued his support of Russia. Reporting on 18 March 1909 (thirteen days prior to the settlement), the Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg said:

"Grey has declared to the Russian Ambassador that England will continue resolutely to support the Russian policy."¹¹³

As in 1914, Grey avoided promise of war-support. He viewed "the impossible Serbian demands" with disfavor; he would have excluded them from consideration by the proposed conference; but while declaring that "Serbia's demands must be limited as much as possible," he assured Russia of British "diplomatic support in the question of compensation." If it be not quite true that "British policy in the Near East was to follow Russia wherever possible,"¹¹⁴ it may at least be said that in so far as Sir Edward Grey was unable to moderate Russian imperialisms, he subordinated his objections to the necessity for maintenance of cordiality among the members of the Entente.

German Attitude. Germany, on her part, supported her ally, Austria-Hungary, and, as some reply to frequent assertion of her truculent, swaggering manner, note the following: On 3 February 1909, the Russian Ambassador at London reported:

"From one point of view, the mood of the English Government is altered and for the better. Whatever may have been the attitude of German policy at the outbreak of the present Balkan crisis, the English Government to-day is convinced that, for some time at least, the Berlin Cabinet has been advising moderation in Vienna."¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 233-4.

¹¹³ *Remarques* etc., p. 54; *Is Germany Guilty?*, II, 40.

¹¹⁴ *Cam. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, III, p. 475.

¹¹⁵ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 485.

Reporting upon the impression created by the visit of King Edward VII to Berlin (9-13 February), the same Ambassador said (15 February):

"By the next courier I shall send you details concerning the Berlin visit, the main consequence of which is that England has become convinced that Germany wishes no war and is ready to do all in her power to serve the cause of peace."¹¹⁶

During the conversations at Berlin, Prince Bülow (the German Chancellor) frankly declared his disapproval of Austro-Hungarian procedure. In a report of 16 February, the Russian Chargé at London said:

"In this he did not spare Achrenthal; condemned his methods; and complained of the difficult situation of Germany, called upon to support an ally whose policy Germany was not always able to approve of. The Chancellor expressed his extreme satisfaction concerning the Morocco agreement with France; he avowed the peaceful trend of German policy, and stated further that Berlin had often sent moderating advice to Vienna."¹¹⁷

On the other hand, Isvolsky was no doubt right in interpreting the German communication of 25 March (above referred to) as presenting the alternative of:

"an immediate regulation of the question of annexation by an exchange of notes or the invasion of Serbia."¹¹⁸

Indeed, for Germany's successful intervention in this way, the Kaiser, when (the following year) speaking in Vienna, claimed credit, declaring that Germany had stood by her ally in "shining armour."¹¹⁹ Nevertheless, it must be remembered: (1) that prior to the German ultimatum, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France had accepted Germany's proposal that the annexation should be recognized by an exchange of notes¹²⁰; (2) that both the United Kingdom and France, while willing to support Russia, disapproved the attitude of Serbia; (3) that the reason for the delay in the exchange of notes was, merely, British requirement that settlement between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, upon other points, should precede arrangements between the Great Powers; and (4) that the German ultimatum had no reference to the relations

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 489.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 490. Cf. Isvolsky to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, 2 July 1909: *ibid.*, p. 496.

¹¹⁸ *Ante*, p. 934.

¹¹⁹ *Ann. Reg.*, 1910, p. [314. It will be observed that the declaration followed the event, whereas Mr. Asquith's Guildhall speech of the preceding 9 November (*ante*, p. 942) was delivered during the crisis, and, while less theatrical than the Kaiser's, was clear announcement of intention to stand by British friends. Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech of 21 July 1911 (*ante*, p. 846) was a still stronger declaration of similar import.

¹²⁰ Russia at first interposed the condition as to a conference. To that Germany made no objection (Russian Chargé to Isvolsky, 24 March 1909: Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 261), and Russia dropped the idea.

between Austria-Hungary and Serbia — no reference to the terms of Serbia's submission. It required only the exchange of notes between the Great Powers. Von Bethmann-Hollweg has represented the German action as motivated by friendship for Russia:

“Our attitude in the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9 had, as a matter of fact, been intended to offer the Russian Cabinet a way out of the cul-de-sac that it had got into, and had actually done so.”¹²¹

And Isvolsky has related (2 July 1909) that Baron Schoen (when German Foreign Minister), in the course of conversation:

“tried to destroy what German diplomacy calls the legend of German pressure upon Russia, and he wished to convince me that, in the conflict between Austria and ourselves, Germany had acted only from feelings of friendship.”¹²²

Some support for this assertion may be found in the fact that Isvolsky: “had placed his country in a position where the only alternative was a diplomatic humiliation or war, with the certainty of defeat.”¹²³

His misconduct of the whole affair, commencing with his arrangements with Aehrenthal, was one of the reasons for his retirement from office.

On the Verge of War. The incident well illustrates one of the effects of the division of the Great Powers into two hostile groups. The annexation had removed a legal figment. It established that sovereignty was located where for long time it had in reality been. The procedure was wrong. Article 25 of the treaty of Berlin, and the treaty of 21 April 1879¹²⁴ forbade the action. On the other hand, Isvolsky and Tittoni, the representatives of Russia and Italy (the two Great Powers principally interested) had been previously consulted, and had raised objections only so far as was necessary to arrange for “compensations” for themselves; the United Kingdom and France had little interest in the matter; and Turkey made a good bargain out of the business, getting £2,250,000 and a release of all Austro-Hungarian rights in the Sanjak.¹²⁵ Serbia herself had suffered no wrong. Her hope of speedily annexing the provinces, it is true, had been diminished, but the claims which she put forward were, in the opinion of the French government, “difficult to justify”; were, as the Russian government held, more than satisfied by Austro-Hungarian evacuation of the Sanjak; and were such as the British government thought Russia ought to discourage. But — but Russia wished to retain the friendship of Serbia, for Serbia was the geographical bar to her rivals; France needed the friendship of Russia; and the United Kingdom needed the friendship of both, for her impending

¹²¹ *Reflections on the World War*, p. 10.

¹²² Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 496. Cf. Poincaré, *op. cit.*, p. 105: *Cam. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, III, 409, note.

¹²³ *Ann. Reg.*, 1910, p. [334.

¹²⁴ *Ante*, p. 915-6.

¹²⁵ The protocol may be seen in Drage, *op. cit.*, p. 810.

struggle with Germany. Had Russia been as well prepared for hostilities as she was in July 1914, the world-war would have commenced in 1908. And, as in 1914, consideration of the merits of the quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia would have been irrelevant.

EFFECT UPON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The striking diplomatic victory of Austria-Hungary produced inevitably an aftermath of resentment and of determination to meet the next crisis in a better state of military preparation. Reporting from Paris, the Russian Ambassador said (1 April 1909):

"In connection with this, German and Austrian journals have emphasized the success of Austrian diplomacy and the predominant position of the Dual Monarchy in the Balkans. In consequence of this, public opinion in France as well as in England demands more and more a still greater rapprochement between Russia, France, and England, as they have already acted in common during the Austrian-Serbian conflict. Foreseeing the further development of the European situation, many newspapers came to the conclusion that precisely as Germany and Austria have now achieved a brilliant victory, so must the two western Powers, together with Russia, now pay their attention to the systematic development of their forces in order to be able, once they are in a position not to fear a challenge of the Triple-Alliance — and in this case Italy would separate herself from the Triple Alliance — to set up on their part demands which would restore the political balance which has now been displaced in favor of Germany and Austria. . . . This is the direction which the Paris and also, apparently, the London cabinet wish to give to their policy in the firm conviction that Russian policy is also directed towards this end, since the shifting of the European balance of power closely concerns Russia. Public opinion in France is fully in agreement with such a plan and will support the Government, even though there exists the wish to live in peace with Germany and to develop their mutual commercial and financial relations."¹²⁶

Supplementing this, the Ambassador on the same day, said:

"The movement of the Central European States towards the Mediterranean is contrary not only to our own intentions but also to the interests of our allies and friends, the French and the English. . . . The experience of the last crisis has proved that if military measures are already prepared in times of peace, diplomatic questions may all the easier be solved by threats and the exercise of strong pressure. The art of diplomacy consists in selecting the favorable moment and of utilizing a favorable general situation, so that, conscious of one's own strength, one may hold out to the end. Thus we shall undoubtedly be able to weaken the unfavorable impression which the failure of our policy has now pro-

¹²⁶ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 266-7.

duced, and in this way we will gradually succeed in liberating the kindred Balkan States from the Austro-German influence. At the present critical moment I consider it my duty to point to the tendency of our policy which, according to my firm conviction, is alone in accordance with our own interests, and which will be as well supported by the French as, I believe, by the British Government.”¹²⁷

In another report of the same date, the Ambassador said:

“In the meantime, however, the telegraphic agencies have informed all Europe of a secret session of the Ministerial Council at Tsarskoe Selo at which the Ministers of Finance, Commerce and War had shown that it would be impossible for Russia to wage war. A public exposure of this kind of our weakness has made a most painful impression upon our friends and must encourage our opponents to present the most impossible demands to Russia in the firm conviction that we shall yield. The Cabinets of Paris and London have concluded from this that France and England must pay more attention than ever to action in common and must at the same time proceed to the necessary military measures in order to convince their opponents that they are dealing with a political combination which knows how to make itself respected and to carry through its demands. Only thus will it be possible to restore the European Balance of Power which has been disturbed in favor of the Triple Alliance, and only in this manner will Russia be able to win back her influence in the Balkan States, which she has temporarily lost. And, finally, only in this manner will Russia be able to fulfil that great historic mission to which she has been predestined by Providence.”¹²⁸

Two weeks afterwards (15 April), the Ambassador added:

“I cannot but deplore the fact that this moment finds us unprepared not only to solve the oriental question in a sense favorable to ourselves, but even to take part effectively in the regulation of this question, for historical experience, for example the latest events, have again proven that world problems of such a nature cannot be solved without resorting to force. In full recognition of this truth, I have never ceased to insist, during my fifteen years of activity as Ambassador at Constantinople, on Russia’s being prepared for events which may be undeterminable at this time, but which are in any case inevitable. This question seemed definitely settled before my departure from Turkey. All preparations had been made by our Ministry of War and the Staff of Admiralty, to influence matters in the Turkish capital, should disturbances take place. Unfortunately, we were able to convince ourselves, during the recent secret conferences held under your chairmanship last summer, that nothing remains of these precautionary measures. Will you now permit me to give utterance to the hope that, thanks to your efforts, measures will be taken, or the urgency of such at least recognized, to

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 267-8.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 269-270.

enable Russia to fulfil her historic mission and to prevent a world-problem being settled in a manner not in accord with our interests." ¹²⁹ Not for Serbia alone was the policy to be one of "a calm attitude, military preparation and watchful waiting." Historic missions must not fail to become historic.

THE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA ROOT

As already indicated, the sequel of the story related in this chapter is reserved for another ¹³⁰ in which is collected some evidence as to whether Serbia fulfilled her promise of 31 March 1909:

"to change the direction of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and in the future to live with the latter in friendly and neighborly relations."

It was because of alleged breach of this promise — because of Serbian efforts to detach Bosnia and Herzegovina from Austria-Hungary — that the Dual Monarchy sent her ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July 1914. And it thus becomes clear that, as Alsace and Lorraine were at the root of the formation of the European military combinations (between 1879 and 1914), so were Bosnia and Herzegovina at the root of the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. The two little provinces had won their freedom in 1875-8. The Great Powers, by the treaty of Berlin, placed them under the domination of Austria-Hungary. Russia's concurrence in that iniquity was purchased by Austria-Hungary's agreement (Reichstadt 1876, Budapest 1877) to observe neutrality while Russia fought Turkey. The concurrence of the United Kingdom was purchased by Austria-Hungary agreeing to support the British desire to reduce the expansion given to Bulgaria by the San Stefano treaty. The Slavs of the provinces resented their transfer to Austria-Hungary; fought Germans and Magyars, as they had previously fought the Turks; were beaten down; revolted, nevertheless, from time to time, in deeds of desperation; and hailed the rise of Serbia as the Piedmont of the Balkan Slavs.

In 1908, when Austria-Hungary assumed sovereignty over the provinces, Serbia was anxious to withstand by war the completion of the subjection of her fellows; she appealed for assistance; found Russia unprepared; was told to pursue a policy of "military preparation, and watchful waiting"; submitted; and made promises (1909) which she did not intend to fulfil. War for the moment was averted. It came in 1914. Serbia wanted to reverse the action of the Powers in 1878, and the Austro-Hungarian complement of that action in 1908. She wanted political union with her kindred. Was she blameworthy?

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 271-2.

¹³⁰ Cap. XXVI.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE BALKAN MAP ROOT

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DERELICT TERRITORY

AS THE Turkish flood receded from its European inundation, the submerged Balkan nationalities resumed their normal governmental activities — Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Moldavia, and Wallachia (Roumania). But in the southern districts, from the Black Sea to Albania — in Thrace and Macedonia — there were no nationalities, or, rather, there were such conglomerations and inseparable admixtures of nationalities that, for Turkish government, there was no natural substitute. Either the Turk was to continue his maladministration, or the territory was to become the war-prize of the eager imperialisms of the neighboring nations. Since 1878, five rapidly repeated attempts to reconstitute the Balkan map have failed, and the sixth has not produced stability. To each of the first four, some one or two of the Great Powers have said, "We will not have the map like that." The fourth, the Bucarest map of 1913 (the most important for present purposes), was objectionable to Austria-Hungary upon two grounds: (1) because, by it, Serbia had received such territorial expansion as to render much more formidable her secular enmity against Austria-Hungary; and (2) because, by it, the territory through which lay the route for the railway connection of Austria-Hungary with Salonica and Constantinople had passed from the feeble and not unfriendly hands of Turkey to the possession of virile,

ambitious, and self-assertive Powers. The Bucarest map was the Balkan Map Root of the wars of 1914-18. We must understand its antecedents and it. The fifth map — proposed by the *entente* Powers after the war of 1914-18 — has been successfully objected to by Turkey. The ensuing sixth is obnoxious to Bulgaria and Greece. There is as yet no boundary-stability in the Balkans.

THE SAN STEFANO TREATY MAP, 1878

At the end of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8 (preceded by the revolt of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875¹), Russia, by the treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878), secured the withdrawal of Turkey from a large part of her Balkan territory, and gave to Bulgaria (subject to certain reservations) an extension across the southern districts of the Balkan peninsula from the Black Sea to Albania. Bulgaria was to dominate the Balkans,² and Russia counted upon dominating Bulgaria. Serbia and Montenegro also received additions to their areas, the latter encroaching upon the Sanjak of Novibazar — Austria's corridor through Turkish territory to Salonica and Constantinople. Comparison of the maps at pages 952 and 953 will show the effect of the treaty.

To these arrangements, Austria-Hungary and the United Kingdom objected. "We will not have the map like that," they said. And they were strong enough to force Russia to submit it for amendment to an international conference which sat at Berlin, under the presidency of Bismarck, between 13 June and 13 July 1878.

Austro-Hungarian Objections. The objections of Austria-Hungary to the San Stefano treaty appeared (13 May 1878) in a semi-official document containing the following sketch of Hapsburg ambitions:

"Austrian interests dictate the establishment of an army in Eastern Galicia, another in Transylvania, and a third in the Banat, the despatch of an army corps to South Dalmatia, and the occupation of Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and all Turkish territory situate between the Adriatic and the Ægean with a frontier on the south of the Gulf of Valona to the Gulf of Salonica, and on the east from the eastern boundary of Servia to the port of Orfano. Finally, it is necessary that Austria should send an armed squadron to the coast of Albania, and another to the coast of Macedonia. Moreover, it will scarcely be possible any longer to desist from concluding a military convention and offensive and defensive alliances — from, in brief, paving the way for Roumania, Servia, Montenegro, and all other parts detaching themselves from Turkey and infringing [*sic*] upon Austria's interests, to be organized with Austria-Hungary into a confederation of States somewhat on the model of

¹ *Ante*, p. 913.


² Her area would have covered three-fifths of the Balkan peninsula, and would have included four million inhabitants (*Ency. Brit.* 11th ed. IV, 782).



THE BALKANS. PRIOR TO THE SAN STEFANO TREATY OF 1878

The shaded territory was Turkish

Gladys Ashair



Gladys McHair

THE BALKANS. TREATY OF SAN STEFANO, 3 MARCH 1878

The shaded territories remained Turkish

Germany. The territories which have already detached themselves from Turkey, or may still do so, would either unite with Montenegro, Servia, or Roumania, or else constitute themselves into independent members of the confederation.”³

The San Stefano map, with a preponderating Bulgaria under Russian suzerainty, was quite inconsistent with this wide-sweeping ambition.

British Objections. In a circular despatch to the British embassies, Lord Salisbury formulated his objections to the territorial arrangements of the San Stefano treaty as follows (1 April 1878):

“The most important consequences to which the treaty practically leads are those which result from its action, as a whole, upon the nations of South-Eastern Europe. By the articles erecting the new Bulgaria, a strong Slav State will be created, under the auspices and control of Russia, possessing important harbors upon the shores of the Black Sea and the Archipelago, and conferring upon that Power a preponderating influence over both political and commercial relations in those seas. It will be so constituted as to merge in the dominant Slav majority a considerable mass of population which is Greek in race and sympathy, and which views with alarm the prospect of absorption in a community alien to it, not only by nationality but in political tendency and in religious allegiance. The provisions by which this new State is to be subjected to a ruler whom Russia will practically choose, its administration framed by a Russian Commissary, and the first working of its institution commenced under the control of a Russian army, sufficiently indicate the political system of which in future it is to form a part.”

After noting that the provision in the treaty for improved institutions in Thessaly and Epirus was to be:

“accompanied by a condition that the law by which they are to be secured shall be framed under the supervision of the Russian Government,”

Lord Salisbury summarized the situation in this way:

“The general effect of this portion of the treaty will be to increase the power of the Russian Empire in the countries, and on the shores, where a Greek population dominates, not only to the prejudice of that nation, but also of every country having interests in the east of the Mediterranean Sea.”

After commenting upon the effect of other provisions, Lord Salisbury, pursuing British traditional policy of supporting Turkey, proceeded as follows:

“Their combined effect, in addition to the results upon the Greek population and upon the balance of maritime power which have been already pointed out, is to depress, almost to the point of entire subjection, the political independence of the Government of Constantinople. The formal jurisdiction of that Government extends over geographical positions which must, under all circumstances, be of the deepest interest to

³ *Ann. Reg.*, 1878, p. [310.

Great Britain. It is in the power of the Ottoman Government to close or to open the Straits which form the natural highway of nations between the Ægean Sea and the Euxine. Its dominion is recognized at the head of the Persian Gulf, on the shores of the Levant, and in the immediate neighborhood of the Suez Canal. It cannot be otherwise than a matter of extreme solicitude to this country that the Government to which this jurisdiction belongs should be so closely pressed by the political outposts of a greatly superior Power that its independent action, and even existence, is almost impossible. These results arise not so much from the language of any single article in the treaty as from the operation of the instrument as a whole.”⁴

THE BERLIN TREATY MAP, 1878

The arrangements of the treaty of Berlin with reference to Bosnia and Herzegovina; the modifications of the treaty in that respect by contemporaneous bargains; and the share of the United Kingdom in responsibility for the subjection of these provinces to Austria-Hungary, have been dealt with in the preceding chapter. Here we may notice some of the other unsavory imperialisms of the period. The treaty of Berlin cannot be understood in the absence of its side-lights.

British Bargain with Russia. Prior to the meeting of the Conference, the United Kingdom and Russia, by Memoranda of 30 May 1878⁵ came to substantial agreement upon most of the points in dispute. All that is here important to note is that, in consideration of the United Kingdom not opposing Russia's purpose to rob Roumania of part of her territory (one of the meanest transactions in modern history), Russia agreed to British demand for the reduction of the San Stefano Bulgaria to insignificance. First, Bulgaria was to be confined within certain straitened limits, and then:

“4. The Bulgaria replaced in the limits which are mentioned in the points 2 and 3 shall be divided into two provinces, namely: The one to the north of the Balkans shall be endowed with political autonomy, under the government of a Prince; and the other, to the south of the Balkans, should receive a large measure of administrative self-government (*autonomie administrative*), for instance, like that which exists in English colonies, with a Christian Governor named with the acquiescence of Europe for five or ten years.”⁶

Eastern Rumelia was the name given to the southern province.

⁴ *Ann. Reg.*, 1878, pp. 239-40. Gortschakoff's reply (9 April 1878) is in *ibid.*, pp. 241-5.

⁵ To Lord Beaconsfield's great annoyance, *The Globe* (London) published the whole of the document containing the Memoranda on the day after the meeting of the Congress: *Ann. Reg.*, 1878, p. 245; Newton: *Lord Lyons*, II, p. 143.

⁶ *Ann. Reg.*, 1878, p. 246.



Gladye McNeil

THE BALKANS. TREATY OF BERLIN, 13 JULY 1878

The shaded territory to be Turkish. Eastern Rumelia to be partially autonomous. The sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina (covered with cross-hatched lines) remained with Turkey, but the Provinces were to be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary

British Bargain with Turkey. During the ante-Conference negotiations between the United Kingdom and Russia, Lord Salisbury had asked that Russia restore to Turkey that part of Armenia occupied by Russian troops. Upon Russia refusing, the British government, under pretence of protecting Turkey, determined to take measures for British security as against further Russian advances in Asia Minor. Writing to Lord Lyons on 29 May 1878, Lord Salisbury said:

“I have informed Schouvaloff that, against these Asiatic acquisitions, it will be necessary for us to take precautions; and while taking from him a formal engagement that Russia will not extend her position in Turkey in Asia, we shall ourselves give to Turkey a guarantee to the same effect. We shall accept these terms as soon as he receives from St. Petersburg authority to take them in the redaction on which we have ultimately agreed. At the same time we have taken our measures to secure ourselves against the consequences of the Asiatic advance. Layard received on Saturday telegraphic directions in the sense of the private letter which I addressed to him a fortnight ago, and of which I sent you a copy, and with great vigor and skill he procured the signature of an agreement on Sunday last.”⁷

The first article of this hurried Anglo-Turkish agreement (4 June) was as follows:

“If Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them, shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, as fixed by the definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms.”

In return:

“in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagement, his Imperial Majesty the Sultan further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England.”⁸

An annex (1 July) to the treaty provided that “the excess of revenue over expenditure in the island” should be paid to the Porte, and stipulated:

“That if Russia restores to Turkey Kars and the other conquests made by her in Armenia during the last war, the Island of Cyprus will be evacuated by England, and the Convention of June 4, 1878, will be at an end.”⁹

The cession of Cyprus is sometimes said to have been the price paid by Turkey for promised British support, but it will be observed that Lord Salisbury spoke of the arrangements as:

⁷ Newton, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 142-3.

⁸ *Ann. Reg.*, 1878, p. 252.

⁹ *Ibid.*

“measures to secure ourselves against the consequences of the Asiatic advance.”

In Salisbury's opinion, to support Turkey was “to secure ourselves.”¹⁰ As Beaconsfield afterwards said in the House of Lords (18 July 1878):

“In taking Cyprus, the movement is not Mediterranean; it is Indian. We have taken a step there which we think necessary for the maintenance of our Empire, and for the preservation of peace.”¹¹

During the same debate, Lord Derby declared that the idea of the occupation of Cyprus had its origin prior altogether to Russia's refusal to forego her Asiatic conquests. He said:

“When I quitted the Cabinet in the last days of March, it was on account of the decision then taken—namely, that it was necessary to secure a naval station at the eastern part of the Mediterranean, and that, for that purpose, it was necessary to seize upon and occupy the Island of Cyprus, together with a point on the Syrian coast. This was to have been done by a secret naval expedition sent out from England, with or without the consent of the Sultan; although, undoubtedly, a part of the arrangements was that full compensation should be made to the Sultan for any loss of revenue which he might sustain.”¹²

Lord Salisbury denied that the Cabinet had arrived at any such resolution.

“All kinds of contingencies,” he said, “are spoken of, all possible policies are discussed; and it is possible that my noble Friend may have heard some project discussed by this member of the Cabinet or that.”¹³

Whatever may be the truth in this regard, there is no doubt that not only was Turkey required to transfer Cyprus because British interests would thereby be subserved, but that the Sultan:

“was informed that if he did not accept, Britain would abandon her opposition to Russia's advance, and join in the partition of his Empire. Faced with this alternative, and knowing that Salisbury usually meant what he said, the Sultan signed the convention.”¹⁴

In other words, whether Turkey was to be supported or thrown to the wolves was a matter not of benefit or detriment to the populations involved, but of British security.

The United Kingdom, France, and Italy. France, although largely a spectator at the Berlin Conference with reference to Balkan arrangements,¹⁵ did not retire from it empty-handed. Mr. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt has summed her benefits as follows:

¹⁰ And see his circular dispatch: *ante*, p. 955.

¹¹ *Hansard*, CCXLI, col. 1773.

¹² *Hansard*, CCXLI, cols. 1792-3.

¹³ *Hansard*, CCXLI, col. 1810.

¹⁴ Kennedy: *Old Diplomacy and New*, p. 36; and see p. 43. *Cf. Cam. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, III, pp. 127 (and note), 136.

¹⁵ “. . . oddly enough, the Anglo-Turkish Convention appeared to be the only matter relating to the Congress in which the French took any interest”: Newton, *op. cit.*, II, p. 159.

“Waddington, the French Ambassador, threatens to leave the Congress, but is pacified by Bismarck, Salisbury promising Waddington that, in return for Cyprus, the French Government shall be allowed (1) to take possession at its convenience of Tunis, (2) to be given an equal share with England in the financial control of Egypt, and (3) that the French claim to protect Latin Christians in Syria shall be acknowledged by England.”¹⁶

Salisbury secured the complacency of Italy, too, by pointing her to the Turkish provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica as fields for exploitation.¹⁷

The New Map. The effects produced by the protest of the United Kingdom and Austria-Hungary against the San Stefano map (“We will not have the map like that”) appear in the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, which, for present purposes, may be summed as follows:

1. About 30,000 square miles of territory, with two millions inhabitants — predominantly non-Turkish — were returned to Turkey. She still retained her sway in Europe over 60,000 square miles and six millions of people.¹⁸

2. Bulgaria was reduced to about one third of her San Stefano area. Politically, she was to be autonomous, but she was to pay tribute to her suzerain, Turkey.

3. In order that Turkey might have in the Balkan mountains a strong strategic frontier as against Russia, Eastern Rumelia, although almost entirely Bulgarian, was erected into a separate province:

“under the direct political and military authority of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, under conditions of administrative autonomy. It shall have a Christian Governor-General.”¹⁹

4. The “occupation and administration” of Bosnia and Herzegovina — unlimited as to time (save by the other treaty between Austria-Hungary and Turkey referred to in the next preceding chapter) — were entrusted to Austria-Hungary.

5. The Sanjak of Novibazar — Austria-Hungary’s corridor to the Aegean — was restored to something of its former width, by reducing the expansion which had been given to Montenegro. And, in it, Austria-Hungary was permitted to maintain garrisons, and to construct and maintain military roads.”²⁰

6. By way of compensation, Montenegro was given Antivari and its seaboard on the Adriatic, but the cession was accompanied by the following humiliating limitations:

¹⁶ *My Diaries*, II, p. 480.

¹⁷ See *ante*, cap. VII. p. 237.

¹⁸ *Ann. Reg.*, 1878, p. [89; Buckle: *Life of Disraeli*, VI, p. 352.

¹⁹ *Ann. Reg.*, 1878, p. 224. Three years afterwards, Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, in a treaty (18 June 1881), agreed not to oppose the reunion of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia (Pribram, *op. cit.*, I, 43).

²⁰ Art. 25.

"Montenegro shall have neither ships of war nor flag of war.

"The port of Antivari, and all the waters of Montenegro, shall remain closed to the ships of war of all nations.

"The fortifications situated on Montenegrin territory between the lake and the coast shall be razed, and none shall be rebuilt within this zone.

"The administration of the maritime and sanitary police, both at Antivari and along the coast of Montenegro, shall be carried out by Austria-Hungary by means of light coast-guard boats.

"Montenegro shall adopt the maritime code in force in Dalmatia. On her side Austria-Hungary undertakes to grant Consular protection to the Montenegrin merchant flag.

"Montenegro shall come to an understanding with Austria-Hungary on the right to construct, and keep up across the new Montenegrin territory, a road and a railway."²¹

7. The demand of Greece for accession of territory²² was disposed of by the adoption of a resolution inviting the Porte to come to an agreement with her "for a rectification of frontiers," and expressing an opinion as to the nature of the agreement which ought to be arrived at.²³

8. Without pretence of justification, Roumanian territory was given to Russia.²⁴

9. The respective areas in square kilometres before the treaty of San Stefano; according to that treaty; and according to the Treaty of Berlin were as follows:

Before S. Stefano	Areas	After S. Stefano	Areas	After Berlin	Areas
Roumania...	120,973	Roumania.....	123,373	Roumania.....	125,123
Serbia.....	43,555	Serbia.....	52,305	Serbia.....	53,855
Montenegro.	4,405	Montenegro.....	15,355	Montenegro...	8,655
Turkey....	363,542	Bulgaria.....	163,965	Bulgaria.....	64,390
		Turkey in Europe.	168,077	District of Spitsa (ceded to Aus- tria).....	37
		Bessarabia retro- ceded to Russia.	9,400	Turkey in Eu- rope with E. Rumelia.....	271,015
				Bessarabia retro- ceded to Russia.	9,400
Total..	532,475	Total....	532,475	Total.....	532,475 ²⁵

²¹ Art. 29. In 1909, as one of the concessions by which Austria-Hungary placated the Powers for her unwarranted annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the previous year, these restrictions were abrogated.

²² Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Berlin Congress*: pp. 152-4.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 201. Art. 24 of the treaty provided that if agreement was not reached, the six great Powers "reserve to themselves to offer their mediation to the two parties to facilitate negotiations."

²⁴ See *ante*, cap. IX, pp. 302-3.

²⁵ Taken from a table annexed to Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Berlin Congress*.

International Effects. The international effects (apart from the foregoing) traceable in some respects to the Berlin Congress were:

(1) Estrangement between Germany and Russia — partly through the enhanced personal antipathy of Bismarck and Gortschakoff.

(2) Formation in the following year (1879) of the Dual Alliance — Germany and Austria-Hungary.

(3) Consequent *rapprochement* of France and Russia.

Objections to the Berlin Treaty. The treaty of Berlin provoked, in somewhat general chorus — “We will not have the map like that.” Russia had been thwarted. Roumania had been robbed. Bulgaria had been deprived of her Bulgarians. Serbia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina had been outraged by subjection of the two latter Provinces to Austria-Hungary. Montenegro was indignant at her territorial losses, and the limitation attached to her ownership of the Antivari district. Greece complained of desertion by those whom she had accounted her friends.²⁶ France resented the British acquisition of Cyprus and the manner in which it had been accomplished. Turkey rebelled against nearly everything. With the exception of the United Kingdom and Germany, all parties complained of this famous treaty, and

“Almost every signatory Power, and more than one small State, has violated some provision of this solemn international instrument.”²⁷

The second re-casting of the Balkan map had not been a success. Layard, the capable British representative at Constantinople, wrote of it:

“What do you think of the Treaty of Berlin? It appears to me that if ever an apple of discord was thrown among nations, this is the one. I see in it the elements of future wars and disorders without number, and an upsetting of all the principles of justice and right which have hitherto governed the relations and intercourse of states. Force and fraud have triumphed, and when Turkey has been completely destroyed and cut up under the new system, it will probably be applied with similar successful results in other countries.”²⁸

BETWEEN THE BERLIN TREATY MAP (1878) AND THE SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY MAP (1912)

Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. The United Kingdom had succeeded in persuading Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany to agree to the placing of the Bulgarian people in two separate states — Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia; but, within three years, by their treaty of 18 June 1881:

²⁶ This alleged abandonment and the guarantee of Turkish integrity were the principal grounds upon which the treaty was attacked in the British parliament. See the motion of the Marquis of Hartington: *Ann. Reg.*, 1878, p. [101. Eventually Greece acquired about two-thirds of the territory recommended by the treaty.

²⁷ *Cambridge Modern History*, XII, p. 399.

²⁸ Newton: *Lord Lyons*, II, 160.

“The three Powers” — Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany — agreed that they would “not oppose the eventual reunion of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia within the territorial limits assigned to them by the treaty of Berlin if this question should come up by the force of circumstances.”²⁹

Russia and Austria-Hungary, however, soon changed their minds — Russia because of the independent (or the ungrateful, she called it) spirit evinced by Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary because of an increasing dread of Russian influence. When, therefore, in 1885 (18 September), Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia declared their union, Austria-Hungary prevailed upon Serbia to declare war upon Bulgaria, and Russia suddenly recalled her officers who were serving in the Bulgarian army. The two Powers, however, had miscalculated. Notwithstanding her handicap, Bulgaria drove back the Serbians, and her advance was stayed only by Austro-Hungarian threats.³⁰ Union with Eastern Rumelia raised Bulgaria to twice her Treaty-of-Berlin size; and, having repudiated foreign direction, her prestige and self-confidence were greatly enhanced. It may be added, as a curious commentary upon the instability of foreign policies, that, although the United Kingdom, under Beaconsfield and Salisbury, had in 1878 insisted, even by threat of war, upon the separation of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, the Salisbury government in 1885-6 supported the reunion.³¹ At a conference of the Powers (5 November 1885), the United Kingdom took:

“the lead in urging the Sultan to acquiesce in the alienation of Eastern Rumelia.”³²

Other Events. Between the Berlin Treaty map and the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty map, there are to be noted: (1) the Austro-Russian agreement of 1881; (2) the Austro-Serbian agreements of 1881 and 1889; (3) the Austro-Italian agreement of 1887 (an item in the Triple Alliance treaty of that year); (4) the Austro-Russian agreement of 1897; (5) the Austro-Hungarian proposed railway through the Sanjak of Novibazar in 1908; (6) the Achrenthal-Isvolsky agreement at Buchlau in 1908; (7) the Achrenthal-Tittoni agreement at Salzburg in 1908; (8) the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908; (9) the Serbian submission and promise to Austria-Hungary in 1909; (10) the Russo-Italian agreement at Racconigi in 1909. All of these have already been dealt with.

²⁹ Pribram, *op. cit.*, I, 43-5. The treaty was prolonged for three years by the treaty of 27 March 1884: *ibid.*, p. 90.

³⁰ The incident is referred to in Gueshoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-9.


³¹ J. Holland Rose: *The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1914*, pp. 266-75. Cf. Lady Gwendolen Cecil: *Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury*, II, 298.

³² Marriott: *The Eastern Question*, p. 358.



THE BALKANS. PRIOR TO SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY, 13 MARCH 1912

Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia were united in 1885. Bosnia and Herzegovina passed from Turkish to Austro-Hungarian sovereignty in 1908-9. The shaded territory remained Turkish



Gladys McNeil

THE BALKANS. SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY, 13 MARCH 1912
Showing proposed partition of Turkish Territory

THE SERBO-BULGARIAN MAP, 1912

Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty. The Balkan League, composed of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro, was the product not of one but of several independent agreements. The first of them was in the form of a treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria (13 March 1912), which stipulated for mutual aid in defense as against all other states — meaning Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Roumania; for prohibition of annexation, or military occupation, even provisionally, of any Turkish territory in the Balkans by any of the great Powers — meaning Austria-Hungary; for action in case of internal troubles in Turkey endangering the national interests of the contracting states; and for division between themselves of territory to be acquired from Turkey.³³

Of that territory (omitting the suggestion of the creation of an autonomous state), Serbia agreed to assert no claim to the east of a line commencing at Mount Golem (on the southern limit of Bulgaria) and running southwest to Lake Ochrida (see the accompanying map). Bulgaria, on the other hand, recognized the right of Serbia to the territories situated to the north and the west of the Shar Planina — including northern Albania (with its Adriatic frontage) and the Sanjak of Novibazar. She agreed also to accept as the boundary between herself and Serbia the line from Mount Golem to Lake Ochrida, or any other boundary not farther west than the Shar Planina which Russia, as arbitrator, might select — that is any boundary within what was known as the Contested Zone.³⁴

The agreements between Bulgaria and Greece,³⁵ and Bulgaria and Montenegro contained no stipulation with reference to the nature of the partition of Turkish territory which was to be made by the Allies in the event of a successful termination of the contemplated war. The creation of the Balkan League was, to some extent, the work of Russia.³⁶

Territorial Complications. In the war, commenced by Montenegro (8 October 1912) and soon joined in by the other confederates, Turkey went down to rapid defeat, halting only behind her defences at Tschataldja. On 2 December an armistice was arranged by all the belligerents, except Greece, but not before the conquering Serbians had established themselves on the Adriatic at Alessio and Durazzo; the Serbians and Montenegrins had commenced their attack on Scutari; and the Serbian

³³ The negotiations for the treaty may be seen in Gueshoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-36.

³⁴ The treaty may be seen in *Nationalism and War in the Near East* by A Diplomatist, pp. 387-96; in *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, VIII, Supp., pp. 1-11; and in Gueshoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-27.

³⁵ The treaty may be seen in *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, pp. 396-400; in *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, VIII, Supp., pp. 81-5; and in Gueshoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-33.

³⁶ *Ante*, cap. VIII, pp. 288-90.

Premier had given notice to the world of the intentions of his government:

“Servian arms have conquered far more territory than Servia intends to retain; but Servian policy has established a minimum of territorial expansion which does no more than cover her co-nationals and her national necessities. For this minimum, Servia is prepared to make every sacrifice, since not to do so would be to be false to her national duty. No Servian statesman or Government dare betray the future welfare of the country by considering, for a moment even, the abandonment of this minimum. Servia’s minimum requisite to her national development is economic independence, save, possibly, in so far as regards a customs union with her allies, and a free and adequate passage to the Adriatic Sea on the Adriatic coast. It is essential that Servia should possess about 50 kilometres from Alessio to Durazzo. The coastline would be joined to what was formerly Old Servia approximately by the territory between a line from Durazzo to Ochrida Lake in the south, and from Alessio to Djakova in the north.”³⁷

Had the belligerents been left to themselves, the Serbo-Bulgarian map, modified by the claims of Greece and Montenegro, would have gone into operation. Turkey might have been left in possession of the south-east corner of the Balkans, but the rest of her European possessions, including Thrace, Macedonia, Epirus, the Sanjak of Novibazar, and parts (at least) of Albania would have been divided among the parties to the League. The Austro-Hungarian corridor between Serbia and Montenegro would have been closed, and the Slavs and Greeks would have been firmly established on the Adriatic.

But Austria-Hungary and Italy³⁸ were not in the least disposed to agree to that method of settlement. Slav possession of part of the Adriatic coast might be of little interest to the United Kingdom, but, by the two Powers already owning frontages there, the arrival of a third³⁹ was regarded, and justly regarded, as a menace to their security. While Albania was Turkish, it remained as a some-day prize of war between Italy and Austria-Hungary. And to prevent the transfer of the

³⁷ *The Britannica Year Book*, 1913, p. 7.

³⁸ Chekrez: *Albania, Past and Present*, pp. 81-2; Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 391, 395, 411; *Un Livre Noir*, I, pp. 347, 353-5. On 14 May 1904, Count Tittoni, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, said in the Italian Chamber of Deputies: “The proper value of Albania resides in her ports and in her seacoast, the possession of which would mean, for either Italy or Austria, the incontestable supremacy over the Adriatic Sea. That is what Italy would never allow Austria to obtain, nor Austria Italy; in the event that either one of these States should seek to appropriate for itself that region, the other ought to oppose it by every available means”: Chekrez, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-2; Gilbert: *Les Pays d’Albanie*, pp. 299-306.

³⁹ The Montenegrin frontage at Antivari was not of sufficient importance to cause disquiet.

territory to rival Powers, they were ready to fight. Russia, on the other hand, supported, to some extent, the claims of Serbia and Montenegro.⁴⁰

Conferences. Under these circumstances, Sir Edward Grey succeeded in arranging for the meeting of two Conferences (December 1912) — one of representatives of the belligerents, and the other of the Ambassadors in London. A *coup d'état* in Constantinople (23 January 1913) ended the hope of peace and terminated the Conference of the belligerents (1 February), but the Ambassadors continued their work. They had been assembled (as Sir Edward Grey expressed it) to consider "the primary essential," namely, "agreement between the Powers themselves."⁴¹ Shortly after assembling, they agreed to the erection of Albania as an independent state,⁴² with a King to be selected by the Powers. But upon the question of the definition of the boundaries of the new state, and principally with regard to the disposition to be made of the Adriatic frontages, contention between Serbia and Montenegro, with Russia as their supporter on the one hand, and Austria-Hungary and Italy on the other, was so acute that settlement of it by war became probable.

The Little Nations Sacrificed. The little nations were sacrificed. Serbia was required to retire from the Adriatic, and Montenegro to withdraw from Scutari.

"The making of the agreement" by the Powers, Sir Edward Grey said (7 April 1913) "was essential for the peace of Europe, and, in my opinion, it was accomplished just in time to preserve that peace between Great Powers."⁴³

But Sir Edward had little reason for self-gratulation, for, as Mr. A. L. Kennedy has said in his recent book, *Old Diplomacy and New*:

"for the sake of accord between the Powers, the British Minister approved and participated in a policy of dragooning the weak. The Germans may almost have begun to think that they had made a notable convert to their theory that small states had no business to exist."⁴⁴

Nevertheless, with the air of having participated in a noble and generous action, Sir Edward said (25 March 1913) that the Powers:

"have at present shown every disposition to leave everything west of that

⁴⁰ Isvolsky to Sazonoff, 21 Nov. 1912: *Remarques* etc., p. 76. See cap. XXIV.

⁴¹ *Hansard*, LVI, col. 2285; Chekrezi: *Albania, Past and Present*, p. 89. Other subjects than the one above referred to were discussed at the Conference, notably the protection of Constantinople and the disposition of the Ægean islands.

⁴² Chekrezi, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-90.

⁴³ *Hansard*, LI, col. 817; *Ann. Reg.*, 1913, p. [85. Sir Edward Grey, on 7 April 1913, said in the House of Commons that: "the agreement between the Powers respecting the frontiers of Albania was reached after a long and laborious diplomatic effort." See also the speech of Mr. Acland, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on 8 May 1913: *Hansard*, LII, cols. 2324-9. The Russian documents connected with the incident are in Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 383-435.

⁴⁴ P. 200. The subject is dealt with in Buchanan, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 129-32.

line" (the Enos-Media line) "to the decision of the allies themselves, if Turkey sees fit, with the exception, of course, of Albania"⁴⁵ — with the exception of what they were entitled to and specially desired. That they were in a position to press their advance to Constantinople was deemed to be a reason for halting their march. That they had won Albania by force of arms, and were in actual possession of the Adriatic frontages,⁴⁶ was not thought to be a sufficient reason for permitting them to continue there. Overborne, Serbia surrendered; but not until faced (April-May) with the guns of an international squadron of war-ships — British, French, German, Italian, and Austro-Hungarian, but not Russian — did Montenegro withdraw (5 May). The episode illustrates, once more, how completely the smaller nations are the pawns in the political game of the larger.⁴⁷

Russian Apologies. To the sacrifice of the little Slav States, Russia gave unwilling assent. In an official communiqué (10 April 1913), after referring to the constitution of the Conference of Ambassadors at London, she explained as follows:

"As the result of long and persistent negotiations, a compromise was reached on the basis of mutual concessions. Having preserved Prizrend, Ipek, Djakova and Dibra for the Slavs, Russia thought it necessary to concede the annexation of Skutari to Albania. This concession was made in order to preserve peace, the rupture of which for the above cause would have been manifestly absurd, Skutari being a purely Albanian town and the seat of a Catholic Archbishop. . . . King Nicholas broke the understanding into which he had entered to warn Russia in the event of war and to obtain her consent. Nevertheless, the Tsar magnanimously came to the aid of Montenegro by supplementing the resources of her population. When the question of Skutari was settled a friendly notification was sent to King Nicholas, and he was at the same time warned of the grave responsibility which he would assume if he continued his resistance. He was afterwards advised to desist from all recrimination and the pursuit of his personal aims, which would condemn his people to useless massacre. These representations to King Nicholas had proved fruitless. It had become clear that he based his calculations on embroiling Russia and the great Powers in a European War. The Russian Government could not, therefore, oppose the taking of measures which had become necessary since the refusal of King Nicholas to submit to the decree of the Powers. It could not abandon the hope that Montenegro would cease her obstinate efforts and would consider it sufficient for her *amour propre* to submit to the will of Europe, supported by an imposing display of naval force. In this case Europe would be able to find means of alleviating the lot of the Montenegrin people, who

⁴⁵ *Hansard*, L, col. 1500.

⁴⁶ Chekrezi, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

⁴⁷ Upon this subject, reference may be made to *Un Livre Noir*, II, pp. 1-5, 9, 39, 56, 72, 77-91.

had been overwhelmed by the excessive sacrifices demanded by the siege of Skutari. The Imperial Government could not lose sight of its formal responsibility to the Russian people, a responsibility involving the duty that not a drop of Russian blood should be shed unless the interests of the Fatherland demanded it. Russia, a great Slav and Orthodox Power, had never been sparing of help or sacrifice on behalf of her brothers, but on the latter, in their turn, was imposed the duty, on which the Russian Press had not always insisted, of respecting Russian counsels which could not be said to have been given to excess, and of remembering that, if Russia was proud of their successes, these would not have been achieved without Russia, which gave them life and continued to be necessary to them in their joy as in their grief, especially for the purpose of mutual reconciliation, without which they could not acquire power or vigor. These relations of Russia towards the Slav peoples excluded any idea of hostility towards other States and nations. Racial differences did not lead inevitably to racial antagonisms. The cause of peace could scarcely gain by the clash of arms. Conscious of her right and of her strength, Russia had no need to pass from uneasiness to threats which did not express the strength of a people.”⁴⁸

British Apologia. False to her alleged principles, the United Kingdom contributed a battleship to the coercion of Montenegro, Sir Edward Grey explaining to the House of Commons (7 April 1913) as follows:

“His Majesty’s Government have no direct interest in the details of the agreement, and we should not, in all probability, object to any agreement that commanded the consent of the Powers more directly interested than we are. But, because we believe that the agreement is, in its main lines, in accord with humanity, liberty, and justice, and because we know that the peace of Europe depends upon the maintenance of concord between the Powers most directly interested in this region, we have thought it right, and by becoming a party to the agreement we have undertaken the honorable obligation to take part in the international action now proceeding, to uphold and make it respected.”⁴⁹

Of “justice,” in the coercion of the little states, there was not room for pretence. And to Montenegro, as she ruefully surrendered her hard-earned success, Mr. Acland (British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs) administered contemptuous slap when he said (8 May 1913):

“If I may say so, they have climbed down the tree before the tree was blown up by an explosion which might have set all Europe on fire as well as being very uncomfortable for themselves.”⁵⁰

⁴⁸ *Ann. Reg.*, 1913, pp. [339-340.

⁴⁹ *Hansard*, LI, cols. 817-8. For Grey’s previous attitude, reference may be made to Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 399, 400, 403-6, 409, 423-6. French attitude is referred to in *ibid.*, pp. 399, 403, 406-7.

⁵⁰ *Hansard*, LII, col. 2326. Negotiations for peace resulted in the formulation of a treaty (30 May 1913) which, however, was never ratified: *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, VIII, Supp., p. 12.

The Second Balkan War. The action of the Powers had made partition of the Turkish territories according to the Serbo-Bulgarian map and according to the expectations of Greece and Montenegro, impossible. If Serbia was not to be allowed to acquire that part of the conquered territory which had been assigned to her by the treaty with Bulgaria, she was not unreasonable in requiring that the agreed partition should be revised upon that basis.⁵¹ Bulgaria, nevertheless, as might be expected, insisted upon annexing the territory assigned to her by the treaty — with Serbia's disappointment she was not concerned. Russia endeavoured to play the peacemaker (a position assigned to her, under other conditions, by the Serbo-Bulgar treaty), but succeeded only in antagonizing Austria-Hungary by assumption of a right to act as arbitrator and to inhibit war⁵² — an assumption that was immediately countered by the declaration of Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, who said:

“The Balkan States can decide for war; we shall, of course, regret that, but the decision is within their right.”⁵³

The Russian proposal was properly interpreted as an endorsement of the Serbian demand, while Tisza's statement just as clearly indicated an intention to support Bulgaria. This alignment — already of some years' standing — must not be overlooked when dealing with the war of 1914-18.


Efforts at diplomatic adjustment were cut short by the rougher methods of military operations. On 29 June 1913, Bulgaria commenced hostilities against Serbia and Greece.⁵⁴ Then Roumania, covetous of Bulgarian territory, marched on Sofia. And Turkey, anxious for a return of some of the territory recently taken from her, advanced from the south on Adrianople. Bulgaria threw up her hands. Serbia, Greece, Roumania, and Turkey took what they wished. Once more Austria-Hungary was disappointed.

⁵¹ Gorickar and Stowe, *op. cit.*, p. 168. Cf. *Ann. Reg.*, 1913, p. [347].

⁵² The Czar's telegram of 8 June 1913 to the Kings of Serbia and Bulgaria may be seen in *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, pp. 262-3, note. Cf. *Un Livre Noir*, II, pp. 92-3, 97, 100.

⁵³ *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, p. 263, note.

⁵⁴ Gueshoff (who had resigned the office of Bulgarian Foreign Minister on 30 May 1913), while admitting that the 2nd and 4th Bulgarian armies, acting “without the knowledge of the Cabinet,” but “on order from headquarters” (*op. cit.*, pp. 92-4), made attack upon Serbian soldiery (29 June 1913), stresses the provocations of Serbia and Greece, both from a diplomatic and a military point of view (pp. 61-88); refers to Bulgarian and Russian efforts to stop the hostilities; and quotes the order of the Serbian Commander-in-Chief of 1 July directing action against Bulgaria, not upon the ground of a Bulgarian attack (to which there is no reference) but simply because of the dispute as to division of Turkish territories (pp. 99-104).



THE BALKANS. TREATY OF BUCAREST, TO AUGUST 1913

The shaded territory is Turkish

Cindy's Mirror

THE BUCAREST TREATY MAP

Areas. By the peace treaty signed at Bucarest on 10 August 1913,⁵⁵ the Serbo-Bulgarian map was completely changed. Bulgaria lost heavily to all the other Balkan states, and Serbia and Montenegro were deprived of their Adriatic advantages. But all received expansions at the expense of Turkey, as shown in the following table.⁵⁶ The estimates are in square kilometers.

Name of State	Before the War	After the War	Increase
Serbia	48,303	87,303	39,000
Montenegro	5,100	9,080	3,980
Bulgaria	96,345	114,100	17,760 ⁵⁷
Greece	64,457	123,343	61,386 ⁵⁸
Roumania	131,350	139,690	8,340 ⁵⁹

It will be observed that Serbia and Montenegro added about four-fifths of their previous area, and that Greece almost doubled hers. Comparison of the accompanying map with that upon page 967 will sufficiently indicate the territorial changes effected.

Populations. The additions in population received by the different States appear in the following table:⁶⁰

Name of State	Before the War	After the War	Increase
Serbia	3,000,000	4,175,000	1,175,000
Montenegro	280,000	400,000	120,000
Bulgaria	4,500,000	4,750,000	225,000 ⁶¹
Greece	2,750,000	4,750,000	2,000,000 ⁶²
Roumania	7,250,000	7,600,000	350,000

⁵⁵ May be seen in *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, p. 402; and in *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, VIII, Supp., p. 13.

⁵⁶ Taken from *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, p. 298. It will be observed that the figures in the first column of the table do not agree with those in the last column of the table, *ante*, p. 962. Both are estimates.

⁵⁷ Bulgaria received 26,100, and was compelled to cede to Roumania 8,340. After the Treaty of Berlin and prior to the war, Rumelia had united with Bulgaria.

⁵⁸ Of this amount, 42,700 were on the mainland and 18,686 distributed among the Ægean islands.

⁵⁹ This is the quantity received from Bulgaria.

⁶⁰ Taken from *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, p. 299. The figures do not agree with those given by the *Annual Register*, 1885, p. [269.

⁶¹ Bulgaria received 575,000, but was compelled to cede to Roumania 350,000.

⁶² Of this number, 1,300,000 were on the mainland, and 700,000 distributed among the Ægean islands.

It will be observed that Serbia and Montenegro added about three-sevenths of their previous population respectively, and Greece about two-thirds of hers.

"We will not." It was now the turn of Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary to say "We will not have the map like that." Bulgaria had been deprived (1) of that part of Macedonia which by her treaty with Serbia had been acknowledged to be, as in fact it was, predominantly Bulgarian; (2) of that part of Thrace (including Adrianople) assured to her by the unratified treaty of 30 May 1913;⁶³ and (3) of that part of the Dobrudja (including Silistria) which had been seized by Roumania; while, on the other hand, she saw her enemies, Serbia and Greece, immensely strengthened. Austria-Hungary had not been a party to the war. She had been deprived of no territory. But, nevertheless, her position had been seriously damaged in the following respects:

1. All Turkish territory which Austria had hoped to control, if not to annex, was now appropriated by others.

2. The increased strength of Serbia and Montenegro, accentuated by their achieved juxtaposition, involved the probability of their union, the certainty of the exaltation of the Greater Serbia ambition, and the inevitable development of the traditional desire for the establishment of a Jugo-Slav state which would include the Austrian-Hungarian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and eventually expand itself over Croatia, Slovenia, and Dalmatia to the Adriatic.

3. The railway routes, partly in operation and partly projected, to Constantinople and Salonica were now in stronger and less pliable hands. A few days before the commencement of the war (3 October 1912), Count Thurn (Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg) had indicated to Sazonoff (Russian Foreign Minister) the attitude in this regard of the Dual Monarchy.

"Count Thurn added that, even if events resulted in the aggrandisement of Bulgaria up to the frontiers provided by the treaty of San Stefano, Austria-Hungary could view that eventuality with absolute calm. To the question of S. D. Sazonoff: 'And how would Austria view aggrandisement of Serbia?', the Ambassador replied that, for himself, aggrandisement of Serbian territory would not be of special importance; but that Austria could not in any case admit that the Salonica route should be cut; that was why she could not admit an extension of Serbia to the sea. The Ambassador explained that, for Austrian commerce with the East, an outlet on the Aegean sea, with which free communications could always be assured, was necessary. According to the opinion of Count Thurn, these communications might be obtained by means of handing over to Austria the line of railways up to Salonica, under conditions analogous to those under which Russia possessed the

⁶³ The treaty between Turkey and her Balkan enemies. It may be seen in *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, VIII, Supp., p. 12.

Chinese Eastern. . . . The Ambassador remarked that, in Austria-Hungary, people were so habituated to the idea of the necessity for access to Salonica that no government could withstand public opinion if it renounced this object."⁶⁴

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S ACTIONS

Treaty Revision. Austria-Hungary's efforts to escape from the Bucarest arrangements took four forms.

First: She endeavored, during the negotiations, to arrange that any treaty agreed to by the belligerents should be subject to consideration and revision by the Great Powers, and in this purpose both France⁶⁵ and Russia⁶⁶ at first concurred. As the work of the Conference drew to a close, however, the French and Russian views underwent change. By 7 August, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany were agreed in opposition to the summoning of a revising conference;⁶⁷ and Russia adopting the same view,⁶⁸ the Austro-Hungarian demand for revision⁶⁹ was left without support.

Secondly: Relief in that way being unavailable, Austria-Hungary contemplated the exercise of force, and, with that object, sounded her allies as to their willingness to lend assistance. In a speech during the currency of the recent war (5 December 1914), Signor Giolitti (who at the period under review was Italian Prime Minister) said:

"During the Balkan War, on the 9th August 1913,⁷⁰ about a year before the present war broke out, during my absence from Rome, I received from my hon. colleague, Signor di Giuliano,⁷¹ the following telegram:

" 'Austria has communicated to me and to Germany her intention of taking action against Servia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the *casus fœderis* of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to be inapplicable. I am endeavoring to arrange for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that, therefore, we do not consider that the *casus fœderis* arises. Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve.'

" I replied:

" 'If Austria intervenes against Servia, it is clear that a *casus fœderis*

⁶⁴ *Un Livre Noir*, I, pp. 331-2.

⁶⁵ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Balkan Affairs*, II, No. 384. Cf. No. 401.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 410. Cf. No. 398.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 461. And see No. 468.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, III, No. 7.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, II, No. 462. See also, on these points, III, Nos. 7, 8, 17.

⁷⁰ The treaty of Bucarest was signed the next day.

⁷¹ Italian Foreign Minister.

cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure.'⁷²

Germany counselled inaction, and European peace for the moment remained unbroken. Austria-Hungary in this way suffered her third disappointment within two years: (1) the Balkan League — to some extent the creation of Russia — had overthrown Turkey, the friend of Austria-Hungary; (2) the war between the confederates had resulted in the success of Serbia — the friend of Russia; and (3) when Austria-Hungary proposed rectification of the Bucarest arrangements by war, she found herself once more baffled — this time by the disinclination of her allies.

Thirdly: Thwarted in this way, Austria-Hungary tried to pick a quarrel with Serbia. During the course of a frontier episode, Serbian soldiery occupied territory attributed to Albania by the London Conference. Appealed to by the Albanians, Austria-Hungary sent (18 October 1913) an ultimatum to Serbia requiring withdrawal within eight days. The Serbian government had contemplated endeavours to obtain assent of the Powers to temporary continuation of the occupation and to rearrangement of the boundary line. Advised by the Powers, and influenced by intimation that she could not count upon the aid of Roumania, Serbia agreed to withdraw her troops, and the incident closed.⁷³

Fourthly: Meanwhile Austria-Hungary had been endeavouring to mitigate the effect, upon her railway connections with Constantinople and Salonica, of the Bucarest treaty by the acquisition of an interest in the proprietorship of the railways themselves. *La Société des Chemins de Fer d'Orient*, owning all the railways except the Salonica junction, Austro-Hungarian capitalists purchased from German fifty-one per cent of the shares, and in this way secured a position in which they could assert any rights which the company might possess as against Serbia.

“For Austria, it would be absolutely indispensable to be assured of free commercial relations with the port of Salonica and to be guaranteed against the establishment of any differential tariff on the route; to this end, Austria will insist that the existing railways remain in the hands of the Society which at present possesses them, and from which,

⁷² Serb. Blue Bk., 1914, App. No. 2.

⁷³ Reference upon this point may be made to Fr. Yell Bk.: *Balkan Affairs*, III, Nos. 105, 106, 108, 112, 128; Poincaré, *op. cit.*, p. 143; *Ann. Reg.*, 1913, p. [356. Whether Germany had or had not been informed of Austria-Hungary's intention to make the demand, is uncertain: See Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Balkan Affairs*, III, Nos. 112, 128.

as already known, the majority of the shares have been purchased by Austrians.”⁷⁴

The Austrians then entered into negotiations with some French capitalists and, through them, with Russian. The French government proposed internationalization “in order to calm the apprehensions of the Serbian government.” The last that the published documents reveal is the opinion of Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, who, under date of 22 December 1913, said:

“The complete realization of the accord will still require prolonged negotiations between Austria, Serbia, and Greece, as well as between financiers. At the same time, these last believe that it is very improbable that any one of the Governments, after having gone so far, will take on itself the responsibility of a rupture.”⁷⁵

No arrangement was effected. At the outbreak of the wars of 1914–18, the map of the treaty of Bucarest still imposed, in unqualified form, its territorial obstructions to realization of Austro-Hungarian desires with reference to railway communication with Constantinople and Salonica. Referring (23 October 1913) to that situation, M. Pichon (French Foreign Minister) said (and Isvolsky agreed with him) that:

“. . . with reference to the question of railways, a conflict might very soon be expected between Austria and Serbia — a conflict extremely dangerous for the general peace; it would therefore be necessary to undertake at once the practical realization of the plan above referred to.”⁷⁶

THE BUCAREST MAP, A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

In a remarkable book, *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, written between the date of the Bucarest treaty and the outbreak of the war of 1914–18, by “A Diplomatist,” the instability of the Bucarest arrangements was clearly indicated and the inevitability of further hostilities pointed out. The effect of the treaty upon the relations between the Balkan states was referred to as follows:

“But the War of Partition⁷⁷ has left a situation by no means so simple in its main lines or susceptible of so satisfactory a treatment. The Peninsula is now divided by lines of friction between the Balkan nations, due not only to pressure where the partition has been inequitable, but also to pressure caused by the penetrations from the empires outside. As the Balkan nations still have to make front inward against each other, not only cannot they advance outward against the empires, but the latter can push them from behind on to each other’s bayonets. Going from west to east, the first of these friction frontiers is that

⁷⁴ That was the opinion of M. Pichon, French Foreign Minister: Isvolsky to Sazonoff, 23 Oct. 1913, *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 161.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 215; and see pp. 161, 199–201, 214. Cf. Earle, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 162–3.

⁷⁷ The second of the Balkan wars.

between Albania and Serbia, with Austria behind Albania, and Russia behind Serbia. The next runs between Serbia and Bulgaria, the latter having Austrian support; and the next between Bulgaria and Roumania, the latter having Russia behind it. Between Greece and Bulgaria, between Greece and Turkey, and between Greece and Albania, there is a strong line of friction, the short march with Serbia being the only Greek frontier that is not in friction. Thus, the new territories of Serbia in Macedonia are pinched between Albanian and Bulgarian pressure — no good condition for their pacific development.”⁷⁸

“The settlement of Bucarest was imposed against the teachings of equity, of ethnography, and of experience, in professed pursuance of a Balkan balance of power. The balance diplomatically arrived at was no balance when democratically analysed, because it took account of figures of population and acreage only, and took no account of forces of public sentiment and national development. The settlement rested in fact on no popular basis at all, but on a political arrangement between the Governments that profited by it — Roumania, Serbia, and Greece. The preponderance of this triple agreement of victors was enough to impose peace on a broken Bulgaria and a bankrupt Turkey, but it was a pacification by force, not a peace on any permanent foundation.”⁷⁹

“The net result of the Balkan wars and the treaty of Bucarest, so far as the Balkans themselves are concerned, is that they have left an aftermath of wars of ‘extermination’ and the seeds of future wars of annexation.”⁸⁰

The effect of the Bucarest treaty upon the European situation was referred to as follows:

“We shall now see that this settlement has been no help to the peace of Europe, and that the Macedonian question remains as a menace to the civilized world, though it has taken on a different form. . . . Balkan nationalism is still in active eruption — it is hot enough and fluid enough to penetrate any crack and ignite any combustible. Moreover, the War of Partition, by preventing the joint growth of the Balkan nations in co-operation, had forced them to seek growth in competition by entering the field of European politics. They accordingly divided themselves between the two armed camps of Europe — the Triple Agreement and the Triple Alliance. Roumania, Greece, and Serbia ranged themselves with France, Great Britain, and Russia; Turkey, Bulgaria, and Albania with Austria, Germany, and Italy. This arrangement is, at first glance, one of an equipoise of Balkan balance of power added to a European balance of power in stable equilibrium. But it will be suggested that just as we have already seen that the Balkan balance was no balance but a boiler under pressure, so we may suspect

⁷⁸ Pp. 355-6.

⁷⁹ P. 356.

⁸⁰ P. 357.

that the European balance of power is also a compression of living forces by dead weight rather than a counterpoise of equal national energies.”⁸¹ The effect of the treaty upon the relations between Slavs and Teutons was referred to as follows:

“Slav expansion in the Balkan wars has now not only cut off Prussian imperialism from its eastern expansion into Asia Minor but has closed in upon the racial frontiers of German nationalism in Serbia and Croatia. The detachment of Roumania from its political allegiance to Germany and the downfall of Turkey have closed the Prussian outlet to the East by Galicia and the Black Sea, while the aggrandizement of Serbia and Greece and the debilitation of Bulgaria have closed the Austrian outlet by the Vardar valley and the Aegean. It has already been shown that the Slav power may well think that the time has come to meet the economic expansion of German nationalism in the Near East by war; and it is now suggested that the Teutonic Powers may well think that the time has come to reopen by war the outlet to the Near East that war has just closed.”⁸²

The most important effect (for present purposes) of the Bucarest treaty, namely, that upon the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, was referred to as follows:

“Thus the territorial juxtaposition of Serbia and Montenegro is leading rapidly to a joining-up of their military and political forces. A federation of the two states would indeed be beneficial to themselves, and would serve as a nucleus for a future South Slav federation; but it is not a factor making for peace in the future relations of the South Slavs with the Teutons, or the Magyars. Nor is it likely to realize itself without resistance from the Bulgar and Albanian races in the name of the Balkan balance of power. The Serbian domination over Arnauts and Bulgars in its new territories is not of a character calculated to make peace easy to the Bulgarian and Albanian Governments; and the stimulus given to Panserb propaganda in the Slav provinces of the Austrian Empire cannot fail to involve the Serbian kingdom in trouble with its powerful neighbor. The Balkan wars have converted the Serbian state from a peasant community to the political nucleus of a South Slav Confederacy. The change in international status and internal standpoint is scarcely less than in the case of Albania, and is pregnant with diplomatic considerations which will be dealt with in their turn. . . . In any case Bulgarian internal politics and foreign policy will be dominated for many years by a determination to recover, if not Monastir, at least Central Macedonia.”⁸³

Quotation from authorities, as to the effect of the Bucarest treaty, may fittingly be closed with extracts from two elaborate reports to the

⁸¹ Pp. 369-70.

⁸² P. 373.

⁸³ Pp. 347-8.

Czar by Sazonoff (his Foreign Minister) — the diplomatist more vitally interested in the situation than any other statesman of the Great Powers. The earlier of the reports (23 November 1913) contained the following:

“Events in the Balkan peninsula, having created a situation of little stability in the whole of the southeast of Europe and in Turkish Asia-Minor, present to our Minister of Foreign Affairs the problem of our own attitude toward the new political conditions. . . . Now, although the desire for peace seems at the present moment to predominate among the Great Powers, it is nevertheless impossible to feel sure of the stability of the general political situation in Europe. This insecurity is augmented by the very limited stability of the present situation in the Balkan peninsula, resulting from the peace of Bucarest.”

“Two factors are of principal importance in the instability of the present situation in the Balkans; the first is Austria-Hungary, with the enhancement which manifests itself in the movement of the nationalities, provoked by the success of the Serbians and Roumanians and the effect of these successes on their compatriots within the frontiers of the Habsburg Monarchy; the second factor is the impossibility for Bulgaria to resign herself to the painful consequences of the treaty of Bucarest.”⁸⁴

The later of Sazonoff's reports (7 January 1914) contained the following:

“The last reports from our consular representatives in Austria-Hungary mark the change of attitude which the Governments of the two States of the Dual Monarchy manifest in their relations with certain of the nationalities existing within the limits of their frontiers, notably with the Serbians and Roumanians, under the influence of the latest events in the Balkans.”⁸⁵

After reference to the placatory measures adopted by Austria-Hungary, Sazonoff proceeded:

“The tendencies to seek the goodwill of the little peoples who lived badly enough up to this day under the Monarchy of the Habsburgs, as well as the fact of saying nothing about the interventions which might awaken their sympathies for Russia, indicate clearly that the governmental authorities of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy are alive to the importance of the internal national questions in their relation to international interests and, above all, in relation to Russia. The news received from Austria-Hungary with reference to the fermentation which manifests itself among the different nationalities, cannot fail to be connected with the accounts which come to us from Serbia and Roumania touching the extraordinary expansion of the irredentist movement with, as corollary, the increasing gravitation of popular sympathy toward Rus-

⁸⁴ *Un Livre Noir*, II, pp. 363-4, 371-2.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 373.

sia to which are bound the hopes of future realization of popular aspirations. One can foresee that, in connection with these popular movements which act as historic forces and undermine the state organism of Austria-Hungary, this last will perhaps have in a distant future to choose between two ways: the radical transformation of its state organization on the basis of federalism, or, on the other hand, a fight to the death for the final consolidation of the hegemony of the German-Hungarian minority over all the other peoples of the Empire. It is by the hesitation which manifests itself between these two courses, that the instability of the present interior and exterior situation of Austria-Hungary is made clear, an instability big with indubitable dangers, as the experience of the past year has proved. At a given moment, above all if Germany is so disposed, the bellicose course, the partisans of which insist that war is perhaps the sole means of solving the inextricable interior difficulties, may take the upper hand in Austria-Hungary.”⁸⁶

The Russian General Fadejev, with great accuracy predicted (1869) what we now see to have been inevitable:

“The Eastern question can only be solved in Vienna. Austria is like a loaded cannon, which may not go off for centuries if the sparks are not applied. But for her to allow a solution in the Russian sense would be suicide.” “The existence of free Slav kingdoms bounding with enslaved Slav countries is impossible. How can Austria allow a second Slav Piedmont,⁸⁷ whose influence would not be confined to a corner of her Empire, but would extend to its centre? Austria has only two paths — either the Slavs south of the Save⁸⁸ must share the fate of the Hungarian Slavs, or the Slavs north of the Save must attain the position of Serbia to-day.”⁸⁹

THE BALKAN MAP ROOT

From what has been said, we may safely affirm as follows:

1. The principal effect (for the purposes in hand) of the treaty of Bucarest was, as indicated by “A Diplomatist”:

“The Balkan wars have converted the Serbian state from a peasant community to the nucleus of a South Slav Confederacy.”

Serbia became stronger. With her strength, she became (Austria-Hungary contended) more aggressively determined to pursue her mission as the Piedmont of the Balkans. That subject will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.⁹⁰

2. Another effect of the treaty of Bucarest (second in importance for present purposes) was to place in stronger hands the railway routes

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 374.

⁸⁷ The rôle adopted by Serbia.

⁸⁸ Serbians.

⁸⁹ Quoted by R. W. Seton-Watson in *Contemporary Rev.*, Oct. 1916, p. 428.

⁹⁰ Cap. XXVI.

(existing and projected) upon which Austria-Hungary depended for connection with Salonica and Constantinople.

3. Against the map of the treaty of Bucarest, Austria-Hungary, for these reasons, was anxious to protest in 1913 by war; but, failing to obtain the support of her allies, she remained quiescent.

4. Reformation of the map was one of the Austro-Hungarian reasons for the war in 1914 against Serbia. Proof of that assertion may be found not only in what has already been noted, but (1) in observation of the important advantages which would accrue by success; and (2) in the discussions of 1914 in the Austro-Hungarian Council.⁹¹

In the next preceding chapter we saw that Bosnia and Herzegovina were a root of the wars of 1914-18, because Serbia objected to the annexation of these provinces to Austria-Hungary.

In the present chapter we see that the Balkan map as settled by the treaty of Bucarest was a root of the wars of 1914-18, because Austria-Hungary objected to the territorial arrangements effected by the treaty.

⁹¹ See cap. XXVI.

CHAPTER XXV

THE IMPERIALISM AND FEAR ROOT

IMPERIALISM, 987.—Desire for Growth, 988.—The Imperialisms and Fears of 1914, 988.—International Fears, 991.—Imperialism and Fears, 992.—Inter-ally Fears, 994.—The Future, 996.

HAVING dealt with those roots of the war which explain (1) the formation of the two great opposing war-combinations, and (2) the international situation out of which came the conflict, we must devote a few pages to an examination of the spirit which underlay both of these sets of roots, or rather, perhaps, which fed and nourished them — a spirit composed of imperialism and its counterpart, fear.

Imperialism. The word *imperialism* is not here used in an opprobrious or condemnatory sense. The present writer is by no means certain that imperialism — whether it take the form of territorial acquisition; of the pre-emption of sources of natural supply; or of the monopoly of markets for either goods or money — is not an inseparable characteristic of national virility. Possibly the golden rule may have more influence at the end of a further period of time comparable to that which has elapsed since its enunciation, but, in international affairs, no evidence of its moderating effect upon action has yet appeared. At the best, it has produced but an indefinite dislike to the word *imperialism*, and the application, by each nation to the practices of the others, of such epithets as aggression, megalomania, exploitation, domination, and so on. It has produced neither self-condemnation nor self-examination. On the contrary, each nation, with glowing pride, points to its own achievements, sometimes embodying its ecstasies in such books as *The Expansion of England*; ¹ *The Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britian*; ² *The True Temper of Empire*; ³ *Imperial Architects*; ⁴ *Greater Rome and Greater Britain*; ⁵ *The Broad Stone of Empire*; ⁶ and sometimes evincing its gratitude to such "Empire Builders" and "Empire Architects" as Clive, Rhodes, and Chamberlain, by the erection of monuments. But in all this we are not now interested. The existence of the imperialistic instinct, and its effect upon peoples, are what must be noted.

¹ By Professor Seeley.

² By Professor Cramb.

³ By Sir Charles Bruce.

⁴ By Alfred Lefroy Burt.

⁵ By Sir Charles Lucas.

⁶ By Sir Charles Bruce.

Territorial imperialism may be indulged for a variety of reasons: (1) possessory gratification; (2) intrinsic value; (3) trade; (4) military strategic purposes; (5) forestallment of rival nations; or (6) racial affinity of the inhabitants — the last, an imperialism which may not only be excusable but, under certain conditions, laudable. Economic imperialism, on the other hand, may be prosecuted in territories under sovereignties which there is no intention to disturb.

Desire for Growth. A desire for growth is as natural to states as to manufacturing companies or tailoring establishments. The architectonic instinct does not disappear as a man becomes a statesman. On the contrary, it is reinforced by the acquisition of greater power to practice it, by the dissipation of individual responsibility, and by the plaudits which accompany success.

“. . . political philosophy hitherto has been almost entirely based upon desire as the source of human actions.”⁷

First comes national consolidation: The heptarchy is reduced to the English kingdom; the feudal lords give place to the French king; the city states are supplanted by the Italian monarchy; German varieties of sovereignty are largely lost in the German Empire; Russia becomes compacted and centralized. As this first task is finished, foreign expansion commences. Every one of the great aggregations becomes aggressive. Their aspirations conflict. They struggle diplomatically, and fight desperately. Sea-control awards the prize. The British Empire establishes her supremacy. The German designs, Mr. J. A. R. Marriott says, “could be accomplished only by the development of sea-power and by a successful challenge to the world-empire of Britain.”⁸

World Empire of Britain is, in Mr. Marriott's view, something altogether praiseworthy, although gained, as he is well aware, by successful fighting challenges to the empires of Spain, France, and Holland. But when Germany dares (as he quotes from Bernhardt):

“to aspire to an adequate share in the sovereignty of the world, far beyond the limits of its present share of influence,”⁹

Mr. Marriott declares that German philosophy “postulates *Weltmacht oder Niedergang*,”¹⁰ and, erroneously assuming that *Weltmacht* means *World domination*,¹¹ asserts that:

“the Allies are in arms” (1914-18) “to inaugurate and to enforce a new standard of international morality.”¹²

The Imperialisms and Fears of 1914. Let us look at some of the

⁷ Bertrand Russell: *Why Men Fight*, p. 7.

⁸ *The European Commonwealth*, p. 95.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

¹¹ Others made the same mistake: *ante*, pp. 458-60.

¹² *The European Commonwealth etc.*, p. 115.

imperialisms and attendant fears of 1914. Serbian imperialism, from one point of view, was that which precipitated the conflict. In the time of Stephen Dushan, Serbia had been (for that period) a mighty Power, and to a return to the glories of his time patriotic Serbians longingly aspired. But millions of Serbians and other closely related peoples were subjects of Austria-Hungary, and, for the formation of a "Greater Serbia," the "redemption" of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and Dalmatia with its frontier on the Adriatic, was essential. To that end many Serbians were in 1914 diligently applying their efforts. On the other hand, Serbia had good reason to fear her mighty northern neighbor; and she was well aware that Bulgaria would welcome an opportunity to avenge herself for her 1913 defeat, with a view to the acquisition of the Macedonian territory which Serbia had at that time appropriated.

Bulgarian imperialism contemplated the annexation of territory which, in the 1912-13 war with Turkey, Bulgaria had done so much to place at the disposal of the allies (herself, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro) and of which, through her quarrel with her allies, she had been, as she held, wrongfully deprived. Roumania and Turkey had, at the same time, taken Bulgarian territory; and that, too, had to be regained. On the other hand, Bulgaria had good reason to fear all her neighbors; and Russia was, at the moment, endeavoring, with some prospect of success, to form a league against her, composed of Roumania, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro.

Roumanian imperialism looked both to the east and to the west. Part of Bessarabia, which had been scandalously stolen by Russia in 1878-9, was inhabited by Roumanians; and to the west, in Transylvania and Bukovina (Austro-Hungarian territories), were more than two million "separated brethren." On the other hand, Roumania had good reason to fear Bulgaria, from whom she had recently filched some territory in the Dobrudja. And she was apprehensive that Russia would again (as in 1877) attempt to reach Constantinople along the western coast of the Black Sea.

Grecian imperialism desiderated not only Thrace and southern Albania in the Balkans, and not only wide stretches in Asia Minor, but the re-establishment of Greek power in Constantinople, and the reconstruction of the Byzantine Empire. On the other hand, Greece had good reason to fear Austria-Hungary, whose ambition for an Aegean outlet she had recently helped to foil; Germany, as the ally of Austria-Hungary and as a competitor for position at Constantinople; and Bulgaria, because of the nature of the distribution of Macedonian territory effected by the treaty of Bucarest.

The imperialism of Turkey may not have extended to the restoration of all her lost territories; but those, at any rate, which had been taken from her in 1913 she intended to recover. On the other hand,

she well knew that the imperialisms of two great empires were in competition for control of her capital.

Austro-Hungarian imperialism demanded an outlet on the Aegean, and, for that purpose, control of the route thereto through territory recently acquired by Serbia and Greece. On the other hand, Austria-Hungary had good reason to fear the imperialism of Serbia and her "Greater-Serbia" aspirations; Russia, with her designs upon Galicia and her pan-Slavic ambitions; Roumania, with her yearning for expansion in Transylvania and Bukovina; and the unconcealed determination of Italy to annex the districts of Trieste and Trentino.

Russian imperialism had for many years been frankly avowed and persistently pursued. Nothing less than possession of the capital of the Turkish Empire would fulfil her "legitimate aspirations" and "historic mission." For that purpose, as well as in pursuance of her pan-Slavic ambition, Russia insisted upon hegemonic influence among the nations of the Balkans. And she wanted Galicia from Austria. On the other hand, Russia had good reason to fear the counter-efforts of Austria-Hungary to form a Balkan League composed of Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey; and to fear the arch-enemy, Germany, with her designs upon Constantinople and Asia Minor. For over twenty years, Russia had been linked with France because of their mutual fear of Germany.

German imperialism was by no means satisfied with territorial expansion in Africa and China. Asia Minor was regarded as a rich field for economic exploitation; and, for a free hand there, she needed railway accommodation through the Balkans, establishment of predominant influence at Constantinople, and concessions of various sorts beyond. The last two desiderata were already to a large extent hers. But the Balkan situation needed readjustments. On the other hand, Germany had good reason to fear Russia and France. A war upon two fronts had been Bismarck's nightmare. Since his time, its arrival had become more certain; of the good faith of Roumania and Italy, too, Germany had reason to be apprehensive.

Italy's imperialistic eyes, ever since her own consolidation, had been fixed upon the Trieste and Trentino territories, which, though predominantly Italian in population, were subject to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. For strategic reasons, too, Italy desired control of the eastern coast of the Adriatic, including the Albanian littoral, and particularly Valona. She would permit neither German, Magyar, nor Slav menace there. And her greed of empire extended even to Asia Minor, Africa, and China. On the other hand, she had good reason to fear the imperialisms of Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and Russia in the Balkans.

The special imperialism of France was Alsace-Lorraine. The forty-three years which had elapsed since she had been compelled to cede these important provinces had not reconciled her to their loss, or weakened

her determination to regain them. On the other hand, she well knew the strength of her 1870-1 conqueror, and had good reason to fear the consequences of unpreparedness for instant war.

The imperialism of the United Kingdom was fairly well satiated. There was little that she wanted, save to be left in the quiet enjoyment of her world-wide possessions, and her ocean domination. Why do the nations rage, she thought, and the peoples imagine vain things?¹³ On the other hand, the United Kingdom had good reason to fear that the unsatiated would do as she herself had done. And she made preparation accordingly.

The Poles — for there was no Poland — wanted restitution from Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary.

International Fears. That all virile nations are, in one way or another, aggressive — that desire for expansion is known to be a common characteristic — is one reason why every nation harbours a prudent fear of the others. George Canning initiated what is called the Monroe doctrine,¹⁴ because of fear of the expansion of his rivals in South America. British statesmen opposed Russian progress toward the south, because of fear of Slav influence in the Mediterranean, and of an attack upon India. Professor Seeley referred to Anglo-French rivalry in India as follows:

“I find when I study the English conquest of India, that we were actuated neither by ambition nor yet by mere desire to advance our trade, but that from first to last, that is, from the first efforts of Clive to the time when Lord Wellesley, Lord Minto, and Lord Hastings established our authority over the whole vast peninsula, we were actuated by fear of the French. Behind every movement of the native Powers we saw French intrigue, French gold, French ambition, and never, until we were masters of the whole country, got rid of that feeling that the French were driving us out of it, which had descended from the days of Dupleix and Labourdonnais.”¹⁵

Prussia, wisely, made easy her victory-terms to Austria-Hungary in 1866, because of fear of subsequent retaliation. Germany, foolishly, insisted, in 1871, upon the cession by France of Alsace-Lorraine, and then entered into various war-treaties, because of fear of French revenge. Italy joined with Germany and Austria-Hungary, because of fear of France; and afterwards made war-arrangements with France, because of fear of Austria-Hungary. The United Kingdom joined with Japan in 1902, because of fear of Russia; and afterwards made military arrangements with France and Russia, because of fear of Germany. In 1902-4, the United Kingdom believed that Russia was contemplating a descent upon Afghanistan, while Russia, on her part, attributed the same

¹³ Cf. Acts IV, 25; Psalms, II, 1.

¹⁴ *The Kingdom Papers* by the present writer, I, p. 149.

¹⁵ *The Expansion of England*, p. 30.

design to the United Kingdom, the fact being that each was making defensive preparations against the other.¹⁶ During the anxious days in 1905, in connection with the first of the Morocco incidents, President Roosevelt wrote to his Acting Secretary of State as follows:

"I am sincerely anxious to bring about a better state of feeling between England and Germany. Each nation is working itself up to a condition of desperate hatred of the other; each from sheer fear of the other. The Kaiser is dead sure that England intends to attack him. The English Government and a large share of the English people are equally sure that Germany intends to attack England."¹⁷

Perhaps the most curious of such emotional derangements was that of 1909, when the "German naval scare" so shattered British nerves that sensibility as well as sense ceased to be dependable.¹⁸ Finally, Lord Haldane, than whom no one better understood the international situation, speaking only a few months prior to the outbreak of hostilities, rightly ascribed to fear the armament race in which the Great Powers were engaged. He said (at Hoxton, 15 January 1914):

"The Great Powers had grouped themselves; the piling up of armaments had gone on; we had increased our armaments; and Europe was an armed camp, but an armed camp in which peace not only prevailed, but in which the indications were that there was a far greater prospect of peace than ever there was before. No one wanted war. If armaments were piled up it was not for aggression, but for fear."¹⁹

Because of all these fears the nations, during peace-times, trained millions of men in the most modern methods of killing one another. And because Russia was afraid, in July 1914, that Germany would gain advantage by rapidity in war-preparations, control passed from the diplomats to the military chiefs; all possibility of adjustment vanished; and the world-war was inaugurated. While the negotiations for a peaceful solution of the 1914 difficulties were still pending, Sir Edward Grey very truly said (31 July):

"The stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia."²⁰

Imperialisms and Fears. Reduced to tabulated form, the imperialisms and fears of Europe in 1914 were as follows:

¹⁶ *Ante*, pp. 724-6.

¹⁷ Joseph Bucklin Bishop: *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, I, p. 472. The letter is more fully quoted, *ante*, p. 801.

¹⁸ See pp. 687-91.

¹⁹ Neilson: *How Diplomats Make War*, p. 224.

²⁰ Br. Blue Bk., 1912, No. 111.

	<i>Purposed Imperialisms in:</i>	<i>Had fears of:</i>
Serbia	Austria-Hungary Albania	Austria-Hungary Bulgaria
Bulgaria	Serbia Greece Roumania Turkey	Russia Roumania Serbia Turkey Greece
Roumania	Russia Austria-Hungary	Bulgaria Russia
Greece	South Albania Bulgaria Turkey	Austria-Hungary Germany Bulgaria
Turkey	Bulgaria Greece Serbia	Russia Austria-Hungary Germany
Austria-Hungary	Serbia Greece Control in Balkans	Serbia Russia Roumania Italy
Russia	Turkey Austria-Hungary Control in Balkans	Germany Austria-Hungary
Germany	Turkey Route through Balkans	Russia France Italy
Italy	Austria-Hungary Albania Turkey	Austria-Hungary Jugo-Slavs Russia
France	Germany	Germany Austria-Hungary
United Kingdom		Germany Austria-Hungary Russia
The Poles	Russia Germany Austria-Hungary	Russia Germany Austria-Hungary

Inter-ally Fears. In thus scheduling European fears, no account has been taken of the existing alliances and war-preparations, all of which may be attributed to fear. Even within the alliances, timidities respecting possible separated action were constantly recurring. Italy was always under suspicion.²¹ Roumania's fidelity was, in later years, uncertain.²² Russia from time to time, was as doubtful of French support over Balkan quarrels as was France of Russian assistance in connection with Moroccan squabbles. Recent diplomacies have demonstrated the truth of the dictum of Thomas Hobbes:

"Covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all."²³

Historians will agree that:

"It is the universal reign of Fear which has caused the system of alliances;"²⁴

but they will agree, too, that treaties are but precarious securities for promised action. Indeed, one of the conspicuous features of the ten years which preceded the wars of 1914-18 was this never absent doubt as to the trustworthiness of friends. Take a few instances: After 1907, the United Kingdom was in *entente* relations with France and Russia, but when the Anglo-German difficulties in connection with the Bagdad Railway appeared to be in process of solution, the French and Russian Ambassadors at Constantinople saw in the negotiations (as the Russian Ambassador said, 24 December 1909) a fact of:

"general European significance . . . an express desire on the part of England and Germany to improve their present relations, the Bagdad Railway question offering a favorable opportunity. The possibility of an Anglo-German rapprochement is disadvantageous and harmful to France and Russia. In any case both Powers will lose the English support at Constantinople on which they were hitherto able to rely."²⁵

When in 1912, Lord Haldane was endeavoring to mitigate the intensity of Anglo-German antipathy, the Russian Ambassador at Paris reported (29 February) that, although Poincaré expressed freedom from anxiety:

"I, nevertheless, cannot refrain from observing that a different opinion prevails in military circles here; military men fear, that if an agreement be reached between England and Germany, regarding the cessation, or, at least, a diminishing of the rivalry in naval armaments, the German Government would then be able to dispose of redoubled

²¹ *Ante*, pp. 88-91, 242-3.

²² *Ante*, cap. IX.

²³ *Leviathan*, cap. XVI. Quoted in *Nineteenth Century*, April 1920, p. 621, note.

²⁴ Bertrand Russell: *War the Offspring of Fear*; Pamphlet No. 3, published by the Union of Democratic Control, London, Eng.

²⁵ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 515.

means for increasing the army — which would necessarily call forth countermeasures on the part of France and Russia.”²⁶

Later in the same year (6 December), the Russian Ambassador at London reported as follows:

“Cambon” (French Ambassador) “told me, confidentially, that, at first in his own name, then, by order of M. Poincaré, he had directed Grey’s attention to certain press rumours, according to which a certain rapprochement had taken place between England and Germany, with the consequent loosening of the Entente and the Triple Entente. Cambon has been instructed to declare that these rumours were very widespread in Paris, were making a very bad impression there, and that they would result in Poincaré having an interpellation addressed to him on this matter in the Chamber. Grey replied that these rumours had not the slightest foundation in fact, that nothing new had occurred between England and Germany, and that both Governments had but discussed colonial, and other quite subordinate questions in a conciliatory and amicable manner.”²⁷

It was probably owing to French objection to the word “neutral” or “neutrality” in the proposed agreement between the United Kingdom and Germany that the Haldane mission failed of success.²⁸

On 12 February 1913, Sazonoff (Russian Foreign Minister) telegraphed to the Russian Ambassador as follows:

“We are of opinion that an alarming symptom is to be discerned in the last speech of Admiral Tirpitz, and in the effort of German diplomacy to bring about a rapprochement with England. We should be glad to know in what degree machinations of that sort might find a favorable soil in London, and how they would react upon the attitude of the English Government in the present crisis.”²⁹

Hardly had this crisis passed when a visit by the Kaiser’s brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, to London (April 1913) produced a flutter in the Chancelleries. It, however:

“concerned merely private affairs, and the placing of orders for motor-cars.”³⁰

On 22 July of the same year, Sazonoff telegraphed to the Russian Ambassador at Paris complaining of the action of France with reference to her proposed railway arrangements with Turkey, and added:

“We are of opinion that it is time for you to have a friendly, but serious explanation with Pichon. During these last days, it has become more and more difficult for us to reply to the doubts and the questions expressed by the representatives of the press and of society, who observe

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 634.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 666-7.

²⁸ *Ante*, cap. V, p. 173.

²⁹ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 668.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 673.

a constant disagreement between us and our ally upon questions much more essential for us than for her." ³¹

In 1914, von Jagow's declaration to the effect that Anglo-German relations were steadily improving, and the supposed acceptance by von Tirpitz of Mr. Churchill's proposal for a 16 to 10 ratio in battleships, ³² moved the Russian Ambassador at Berlin to consult with the British Ambassador (Goschen) and the French Ambassador (Cambon) there, and to make report as follows (13 February):

"My French colleague, whose opinion Goschen had asked regarding the 'Exempt Year,' replied that he could in no case approve of this idea, since all the savings which Germany would make in consequence of the interruption of shipbuilding would be devoted to the strengthening of the land army; and, in case of future conflicts, this would be directed chiefly against France. Cambon is very much worried by these constant rumours of an improvement in Anglo-German relations, since he agrees that there is a possibility of rapprochement between these two countries in the future." ³³

On 12 March, the same Ambassador wrote:

"No wonder that, in view of such considerations, the Germans are straining every nerve to be ready for war with us, and no wonder that they try to intimidate us, so as to avert the suspicion that Germany is afraid of Russia. Nevertheless, it is my conviction that between all the lines printed about Russo-German relations in the German newspapers of late one may always read fear of Russia." ³⁴

The Future. What has the war yielded? Could the Peace Conference, or the Supreme Council, or the League of Nations have made justifiable distribution of the territory of the world among the nations, and could they have eradicated the imperialistic instinct, much would have been done to ensure future peace. But neither of these things has been accomplished. Some excusable imperialisms have been satisfied, but others, with certainty of vigorous development, have been implanted. And the instinct itself has not only been left unmodified, but has, because of the wide-sweeping success of its practice, been intensified. Once more to the victors have gone the spoils. For later victories, the virile nations will prepare. It is in the nature of things that the defeated and disrupted nations should endeavor to rectify what they regard as the wrongs of the present situation. Germany, Russia, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria — perhaps Turkey — will not accept the positions to which they have been assigned. When ready, they will revolt. Not presently, and not all together; but as soon as practicable and with such assistance

³¹ *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 116.

³² Churchill keeping undisclosed that he did not intend to exclude additions to his 16 by Canadian and other Dominion construction: *ibid.*, p. 710.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 710.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 711.

as may be available. Of that France is well aware. Her present mistaken policy of protection by permanent military suppression of Germany is doomed to inevitable failure.

Germany, prior to the war, had been at peace for forty-three years. She wanted war as little as any other of the Powers. Her development in very many respects had been phenomenal, and its progress depended upon peace. For reasons easily understood, her attitude is now reversed. Much of her territory has been taken from her and distributed among her neighbors. A strip of Poland divides her into separate parts. She has been deprived of her colonies. Obstacles, of various kinds, to her economic activities have been created. Vindictive humiliations have made certain her rebellion. Her sixty millions of human beings, with human characteristics, still exist.

France, prior to 1904, had been the traditional world-rival of the United Kingdom. In that year, moved thereto by mutual dislike of Germany, they settled their differences, and until the end of the war their political relations were those of closest friendship. Now that the British fear of Germany has for the time vanished, the earlier Anglo-French relationship has reappeared. Upon the more important of the questions awaiting settlement they not only disagree but they differ fundamentally. Pre-war cordiality has changed to post-war suspicion, distrust, and animosity.

Russia, too, prior to the war and since 1907, was a friend of the United Kingdom. Now, because, primarily, of British support of Kolchack, Denikin, and Wrangel, relations are ruptured. The United Kingdom, moreover, attempted to oust Russia from her treaty-agreed position in Persia. Russia replied as she could — very effectively in Persia, and fairly well in Afghanistan and elsewhere. She will make reply, some day, to Roumania, Poland, and the little Baltic states which shut her off from Baltic frontages.

Austria has been reduced to a comparatively small area. Her outlet to the Adriatic has been closed. Territory in the Tyrol occupied almost exclusively by Germans has been given to Italy. The remaining six million Germans have been forbidden to unite with the Germans on her frontier. They will pay as little respect to the prohibitions as did the north and south Bulgarians who were separated by the treaty of Berlin in 1878.

Hungary has been deprived not only of her Slav population, but of many of her own people. Roumania took Transylvania and is strong; but the proud, ruling Magyars will not let slip any opportunity that may present itself for revenge.

Bulgaria, by the treaty of Bucarest (1913), lost territory to Serbia, Greece, and Roumania; and, as a result of the last war, her Ægean frontage was given to Greece, and more of the Dobrudja to Roumania. She hates the Serbs and the Greeks. She has exchanged many outrageous

atrocities with them. She will tolerate her present situation until the day when she thinks she can improve it.

Turkey has done fairly well. Beaten by the Entente, she made short work of the Greeks to whom the allies deputed the task of enforcing the acceptance of the terms of a dictated peace, and, by so doing, she has turned the humiliation of the Entente-proposed treaty of Sevres into the Turkey-prescribed treaty of Lausanne.

Jugo-Slavia is not satisfied. She wants Fiume and Albania — or at least the northern part of it. She fears Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. She has made treaty with Italy, but recognizes in the great peninsula a rival and a potential antagonist.

Czecho-Slovakia has unfortunate geographical situation. Inland and elongated, she has Germany and Poland on the north, Austria and Hungary on the south, and Roumania on the east. Engulfment of the self-assertive Czechs would be desiderated by none of the limitrophe nations, but the Moravians and Slovaks are less refractory. Economic considerations will bulk largely in determining the foreign policy of the state. It may side with one or the other of the aggregations of the future.

Roumania, as reward for craftily siding with the victors in the late war, acquired territory not only from the enemy Powers (Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria) but also at the expense of her one-time ally, Russia. Necessity for preparation for the defence of the acquisitions will continue until eventual restoration, or until all swords have been turned into ploughshares.

Italy, in annexing the German part of the Tyrol, took too much. Austria (now almost purely German) has there a *terra irredenta*, and Italy knows well what that means. For her, there remains, too, the Albanian question. Jugo-Slavia and Greece will dispute with her possession of the extremely valuable indented littoral of helpless Albania.

Greece has made acquisitions, but has fallen far short of her ambition — re-establishment at Constantinople. She will not agree to permanent exclusion from Asia Minor. Turkey and Bulgaria are her implacable enemies. Italy will dispute her entrance on the Adriatic, and her naval superiority in the eastern Mediterranean. Ownership of the Ægean islands has still to be settled.

Poland and the Baltic Provinces — Latvia, Lithuania, and Esthonia — are well aware that their continuation depends upon circumstances over which they have little control.

All the states, moreover, realize the instability of the situation, and circumspectly are making such preparations for eventualities as are possible. The former combinations — the Quadruple Alliance and the Triple Entente — have disappeared. Never again will Germany and Austria-Hungary (as it was) on the one hand, and France, Russia, and the United Kingdom on the other, stand ready to fight upon opposite sides, quite irrespective of the merits of the precipitating quarrel. New

combinations (of like ethical value) are being formed. France, conspicuously, is developing her friendships. She has arranged a military convention with Belgium. She upholds Poland as against Germany; wisely (politically) befriends Turkey; and lends assistance to such combinations as may be of future service. The Little Entente — Jugoslavia, Czecho-Slovakia, and Roumania — are leagued for defence against their various potential enemies; and Poland, it is said, tends to association with them. For like defensive purposes, Poland, Latvia, Esthonia, and Finland essayed the formation of a Baltic League, which Lithuania may join when the quarrel about Vilna is settled.

More significantly and ominously, Germany and Russia have been thrown into sympathetic collaboration. In 1891-4, finding themselves isolated in Europe (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Roumania in war-treaty, and the United Kingdom regarding them benevolently), France and Russia, although separated by geography, by constitutional principles, and economic outlook, formed close war-union. For that action, they blamed the earlier combinations; and, retorting, Germany blamed the menace of a restless France. Location of blame is immaterial. For reasons similar to those which actuated France and Russia thirty years ago, Germany and Russia are now in process of war-amalgamation. What, in its full effect, that may mean, no one can foretell.

Some people appear to wonder why the United States endeavors to keep clear of the European maelstrom. In the sweet by-and-by, imperialistic ambitions and international fears may possibly give place to the reign of the golden rule; but until that time arrives, clashing interests will yield their natural fruits — dislike, fear, hostility, hatred, preparation for war, and war — of all which it is advisable to keep clear, as far as may be possible.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE QUARREL BETWEEN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SERBIA

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Analysis. We have now finished with the roots (the predisposing causes) of the wars. As we have seen, there were among the Principals (Austria-Hungary and Serbia) and the Accessories (Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany) eight roots of war in addition to those which may be said to be of the nationally-inherent order. In the case of each of five of the Associates (Japan, Italy, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Greece), the root — the reason for joining in the war — was covetousness of territory belonging to one of the belligerent nations, the opportunity to realize "legitimate aspirations"; two other of the Associates (Turkey and the United States) became involved under special circumstances; while Belgium fought because she was invaded.

Alsace-Lorraine was the cause of the maze of military combinations and counter-combinations which had perplexed European diplomats for over forty years. During the latest ten, reasons for anxiety had rapidly accumulated: the combinations had hardened: the work of the diplomats had become more difficult, more complicated, more continuous, more urgent; the General Staffs of the allied nations, in conference with each other had diligently elaborated their plans of campaign; every year had witnessed an increased expenditure upon war-preparations, of many millions of money; almost every year had witnessed a narrow avoidance of hostilities; no effort had been made, by removal of fundamental disagreements, to escape from the ever-quickening rapids which were certain to tumble into maelstrom;¹ indeed, well-informed statesmen knew that many of the international rivalries could not be peaceably adjusted; all were well aware that some incident might at any moment produce general war.

The causes which eventually did precipitate the fighting may be conveniently divided into (1) the quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and (2) the interruption of the negotiations for adjustment. To each of these a chapter will be devoted. It will be observed, however, that these precipitating causes are of infinitely less importance than are the roots which produced the situation that made the causes momentous and dangerous. The quarrel, too, is much more important than the interruption of the negotiations to settle it. The negotiations might have succeeded in temporarily patching the quarrel, but the thing quarrelled about would have remained.

The Austro-Hungarian Case. The Austro-Hungarian note presented to Serbia on 23 July 1914, was, in part, as follows:

“On March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Minister to the Court of Vienna made the following declaration, by order of his Government:

“ ‘Serbia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt herself to the decisions which the Powers are going to arrive at in reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the councils of the Powers, Serbia binds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has assumed, since last October, relative to the annexation; and she binds herself further to change the direction of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter in friendly and neighborly relations.’²

“The history of the last years, and especially the painful events of June 28th have demonstrated the existence of a subversive movement in Ser-

¹ The Haldane missions to Berlin were merely an endeavor to establish a *modus vivendi*, and, because of British commitments to France, were foredoomed to failure.

² Similar promises had been made by Serbia in 1881 and 1889. See *ante*, cap. XXIII, pp. 920-2.

via whose aim is to separate certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This movement, which developed under the eyes of the Servian Government, has found expression subsequently beyond the territory of the kingdom, in acts of terrorism, a series of assassinations and murders.

“Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in the declaration of March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to suppress this movement. She suffered the criminal doings of the various societies and associations directed against the monarchy, the unbridled language of the press, the glorification of the originators of assassinations, the participation of officers and officials in subversive intrigues; she suffered the unwholesome propaganda in public education; and, lastly, permitted all manifestations which would mislead the Servian people into hatred of the monarchy and into contempt for its institutions.

“This sufferance of which the Royal Servian Government made itself guilty, has lasted up to the moment in which the events of June 28th demonstrated to the entire world the ghastly consequences of such sufferance.

“It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the criminal authors of the outrage of June 28th, that the murder at Serajevo was conceived at Belgrade,³ that the murderers received the arms and bombs with which they were equipped from Servian officers and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transportation of the criminals and their arms to Russia was arranged and carried out by leading Servian frontier officials.

“The cited results of the investigation do not permit the Imperial and Royal Government to observe any longer the attitude of waiting, which it has assumed for years towards those agitations which have their centre in Belgrade, and which, from there, radiate into the territory of the monarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the duty to terminate intrigues which constitute a permanent menace for the peace of the monarchy.”⁴

Upon correct decision as to the truthfulness of these allegations depends the judgment of the world as to whether or not Austria-Hungary

³ Sir Charles Oman, in *The Outbreak of the War of 1914-1918*, says: “The two arrested conspirators were soon identified, they were both local men and Austrian subjects. The young man who had thrown the ineffective bomb before the ceremony at the Town Hall was named Nedelko Gabrinovitch, a printer by trade; the actual murderer of the Archduke was Gabrilo Prinzip, a student. Each was about twenty years of age, and they were old friends and associates; both had been living at Belgrade for some months before the crime, and were well known in the colony of Bosnian exiles there resident. They were reputed to be Socialists or Anarchists, who made no secret of their opinions; Gabrinovitch is described as a restless spirit; Prinzip as a nervous, silent, hard-working student” (pp. 3-4).

⁴ German White Bk., 1914: in *Coll. Dip. Docs.*, pp. 414-5.

was justified in her determination to inflict military punishment upon her neighbor.⁵ As far as the present writer is aware, no book in the English language contains a pretence of serious investigation of the subject. And no exhaustive exposition will be now attempted. The case of Austria-Hungary is stated at some length in the *German White Book*.⁶ The object of the following observations and extracts is to raise doubts in the minds of those persons who have too readily adopted the British and American war-inculcated view that Austria-Hungary had no substantial ground for complaint against Serbia—that she merely availed herself of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand as an excuse for war.

Sketch Notes. As the story is somewhat lengthy, a prefacing synopsis of its principal features will be advisable.

1. For the purposes in hand, we may disregard those of the Slavs who, under the government of Austria, resided in Dalmatia, and those, known as Slovenes, who inhabited Carinthia, Carniola, and Styria; but observe that they were Slavs, and that geographically they were interposed between Austria-Hungary proper and the Adriatic.

2. Croatia and Slavonia (also between Austria-Hungary and the Adriatic) were likewise inhabited by Slavs. They had passed from Hungarian to Turkish, to Austrian, to French, again to Austrian, and, finally, to Hungarian control. From the 1840's, when they commenced to feel the blood-beatings of nationalistic aspirations, down to their release by the peace treaty of 1918, there was always among them a group of nationalists, known at first as the "Illyrists" and afterwards as the "Party of the Right," seeking release from foreign domination.

3. The story of the subjection of the Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina (also between Austria-Hungary and the Adriatic) to Austria-Hungary (1878, 1908) has been told in a previous chapter.⁷ There, too, were men discontented with their political affiliation and working for union with Serbia.

4. The Slavs of these countries present points of distinction, but, racially, all are sufficiently allied to feel the attraction of family friendship. Those in the east are associated with the Orthodox church, while those in the west are Roman Catholic, but their national aspirations dominate their domestic differences.

5. As early as 28 June 1881, as part of a treaty with Austria-Hungary, Serbia promised not to:

"tolerate political, religious, or other intrigues, which, taking her territory as a point of departure, might be directed against the Austro-Hun-

⁵ Whether the justification continued after Serbia's submissive reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is another question.

⁶ In *Coll. Dip. Docs*, p. 414.

⁷ Cap. XXIII.

garian monarchy, including therein Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak of Novibazar.”⁸

The treaty was to last for ten years. By subsequent treaty of 9 February 1889, it was extended to 13 January 1895. The change in the Serbian dynasty in 1903 prevented further extension.

6. During the ten years prior to 1903, the Slavs, Croats, and Slovenes in Austria-Hungary:

“lived in a mood of constantly increasing irritation against their masters, but their irritation was particularist and provincial till comparatively recent times.”⁹

7. In 1903, the Serbian King — Alexander of the Obrenovitch dynasty — was assassinated; the Karageorgevitch dynasty was installed (King Peter); and Russian influence in Serbia superseded that of Austria-Hungary. From that time, the erection of a Jugo-Slavia (South Slavia) state, stretching from the easterly limit of Serbia to the Adriatic and making of Austria and Hungary inland Powers, was the aspiration of the Jugo-Slavs.

8. In 1908-9, Serbia sought Russian assistance for the purpose of resisting by war the annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia advised Serbia to remain quiescent, and, assuring her of sympathy, told her to prepare for a more opportune time.

9. As a result of her two successful wars of 1912-13 — the first against Turkey and the second against Bulgaria — Serbia became much more powerful than previously. Her “Greater Serbia” ambitions — her desire for a Jugoslavia state in which she should be the principal partner — became more articulate and was more openly declared. Propaganda “taking her territory as a point of departure” spread over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The danger to Austria-Hungary of disintegration, by loss of her Slav provinces, and, in consequence, her only access to the Mediterranean through the Adriatic, became imminent.

10. Under these circumstances, on 28 June 1914, Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was assassinated by Slav subjects of Austria-Hungary, in Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia, pursuant to arrangements effected in Serbia.

11. Thereupon, with a view to punitive war upon Serbia, Austria-Hungary presented a set of demands so framed as to ensure failure of compliance.

12. Serbia’s reply was so largely submissive that, in the view of the United Kingdom, Germany and Russia, it might well have formed a basis for negotiation. Why, nevertheless, war ensued will be discussed in the next succeeding chapter.

⁸ Pribram, *op. cit.*, I, p. 51. The treaty is more fully referred to *ante*, cap. XXIII, pp. 920-1.

⁹ Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

ANTI-AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN AUTHORITIES

British "Introductory Narrative" — Prior to, and in 1909. Remembering these points, let us see to what extent the Austro-Hungarian case has been admitted by anti-Austrian authorities. In the British official *Introductory Narrative of Events*,¹⁰ the political situation at the date of the assassination is described as follows (*Italics now added*):

"On the 23rd June, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, left Vienna to attend army manœuvres in the province of Bosnia. On Sunday, the 28th, he visited Serajevo, the capital of the province, and made a progress through the town accompanied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. While passing through the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. Both the Archduke and Duchess were killed.

"No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in any measure, however severe, which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices.

"It immediately appeared from the reports of our representatives abroad, that the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attributed much of the responsibility for the crime to the Serbian Government, which was said to have encouraged a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

"*That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in these two provinces, there is no doubt.* This movement, in an earlier form, had swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection against the Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, culminating in the war of 1877-8 between Russia and Turkey. It had continued when Austria took over the administration of the provinces under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Austria then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation should not 'detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan over these provinces.' Thirty years later, however, in 1908, she suddenly proclaimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 7th October of that year, the annexation was celebrated in Serajevo¹¹ by the firing of salutes and ringing of cathedral bells, mid scenes of official rejoicing and popular apathy. *Servian nationalist feeling immediately asserted itself, and the Servian*

¹⁰ In 1914, the British government issued a pamphlet containing (1) *Introductory Narrative of Events*, dated Foreign Office, Sept. 28, 1912; (2) *Correspondence laid before Parliament*; and (3) *Speeches in the House of Commons of Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith*. The pamphlet may be seen in Price: *The Diplomatic History of the War*.

¹¹ In Bosnia.

Government protested to the Powers against the annexation as a 'deep injury done to the feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people.' Serbia's attitude, coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other Great Powers, nearly brought about a European war; but, after six months of extreme tension, she was induced to make a declaration abandoning her protest and promising to live on good terms with Austria." The declaration was as already quoted.¹²

Sir Charles Oman — Prior to, and in 1909. Of hardly less importance than this official narrative is the semi-official account of Sir Charles Oman, who, referring to the assassination, has said:

"Assassination plots, successful and unsuccessful, had played a prominent part in the history of the South Slavonic provinces of the Hapsburg Empire for some years before 1914. They were a domestic product of the unhappy internal conditions of Croatia-Slavonia and Bosnia under the dual monarchy."¹³

After reference to the evil treatment of the Slavs both by Austria and Hungary, Sir Charles proceeded (*Italics now added*):

"The South Slavs for two generations lived in a mood of constantly increasing irritation against their masters, but their irritation was particularist and provincial till comparatively recent times. The desire for political unity between them, founded on racial affinity, was not conceived till the nineteenth century was far spent and had for many years no great number of followers. The educated classes in which it arose were a smaller proportion of the whole population than in most European countries, and there was an old and fatal schism between the Roman Catholic Slavs of the north and the Greek Orthodox of the south, which took many years to die down. Such tendencies towards national union as first arose were rather literary and cultural than political: for many years Slavonic idealists had been contented with 'trialism' as it was afterwards called, a union of all the South Slav races of the Hapsburg Empire in a third realm, equal in political right to Austria or Hungary. It was only when such ideals showed no signs of getting practical satisfaction in the interminable reign of Francis Joseph, that *a new theory began to crop up, that of a union independent of the Hapsburgs, which should include not only all the Slavs under their rule, but also the independent Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula.*"¹⁴

After reference to the fact that Jugo-Slavic aspirations could make no progress under the Obrenovitch dynasty in Serbia:

"The Obrenovitches were the surest guarantee against the growth of the Pan-Serb idea, and wise statesmen were content to leave them alone in their unpopularity,"¹⁵

Sir Charles continued:

¹² *Ante*, p. 1001.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

“It was practically only after the change of dynasty at Belgrade [1903] that the existing particularist discontents within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy became linked up with the idea of the creation of a South Slav kingdom or federation, which should include Serbia. But within a few years the Jugo-Slav ideal made great headway, and, as was natural, it roused intense sympathy in Serbia. That state was a fractional part of a homogeneous group of peoples, which had achieved independence while the rest remained subject to alien rulers. The analogy to the position of the state of Savoy-Sardinia in the history of the union of Italy was in the mind of every educated man — one of the most popular papers in Belgrade was called the *Piémonte*¹⁶ from a wish to punctuate the idea. The internal troubles of the Austrian Slavs had taken a more acute form since 1905, when the last attempts to find a *modus vivendi* between the peoples and their alien rulers came to an end. *The start of a new movement, which looked to something more than local autonomy under the Hapsburg rule, and took into consideration union with the independent Serbian state beyond the Save, may be traced to that year; its first strong symptom was a meeting of Croatian, Dalmatian, and Istrian Parliamentary representatives at Fiume, who drew up a programme for the restoration of the old triune Jugo-Slav kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, and invited the co-operation of the Serbs of Belgrade in the movement. This was on the 2nd October; a fortnight later twenty-six Serbian deputies met at Zara in Dalmatia, and conferred with their brethren as to co-operation. From that time dates the Serbo-Croat or Pan-Serb propaganda, which continued steadily to increase in strength.*

“The movement did not affect equally all the sections of the Austrian Slavs, but was specially strong in what may be called the ‘directing classes,’ or the ‘intelligenza,’ as they have been styled in other Slav countries, *i.e.*, professional men, journalists, merchants, students, and schoolmasters. The small surviving remnants of the old Illyrian nobility were not much affected; they were largely Germanised, and loyal to the dynasty; nor, naturally, did the bureaucracy sympathize. But the ‘intelligenza’ gradually got hold of the peasantry, playing on old national memories and traditions. And the long-standing breach between the Roman and Greek Orthodox Slavs of Austria did not prove the hindrance to union that the Government had expected. Roman Catholic priests were soon found among the advocates of Pan-Serb propaganda. Nevertheless, there still remained a large section in all the regions which looked to Trialism¹⁷ as the solution of every trouble. By 1907 the South Slav deputies in the Buda-Pest Parliament¹⁸ were at open war

¹⁶ Piedmont is that part of Italy which was principally effective in accomplishing her consolidation. Serbia is often referred to as the Piedmont of Jugoslavia. It was because she was playing that rôle that Austria-Hungary felt insecure.

¹⁷ A proposal for the erection of a third monarchy in association with Austria and Hungary.

¹⁸ The Hungarian parliament.

with the Hungarian Government; they seceded, and refused to sit in that assembly. When, on the other hand, they got complete control of the Agram Diet,¹⁹ for what that control was worth, a new Ban was sent to Croatia and prorogued the Diet indefinitely.

“Internal trouble was now endemic in the lands of the Austrian Slavs, but it flared up with special fierceness after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Hapsburg Empire in 1908. As long as these lands were nominally Turkish, administered by Austria but not legally owned by her, it was the hope both of the Pan-Serb party in Bosnia itself, and of the Serbs of the Belgrade kingdom, that some day political union between them would be achieved. The formal annexation of Bosnia to Austria put an end to this aspiration, and caused the most acute discontent and friction. On the other hand, the new annexation was not joined to the other Slav regions of Austria or of Hungary; and so did not go to strengthen the unionist element either in Croatia-Slavonia or in Dalmatia. The new constitution given, it left it unconnected with all the neighboring regions, as a unit shut up in itself. This pleased no one inside or outside Bosnia, save the Austrian bureaucrats and the Mohammedan minority in certain parts of the province, who feared that they might be swamped by the Orthodox and Serb majority, and be deprived of their feudal rights, hitherto carefully left to them by Austria.

“So bitter was the discontent caused by the annexation of Bosnia that it seemed for a moment as if Serbia would make armed protest against it, and risk everything by setting on foot insurrectionary movements against the Hapsburg rule, both in Bosnia itself and in the Austrian provinces beyond. If Russia had given the least sign of support, there might have been a great European war in 1909 instead of in 1914. But Russia contented herself with a protest against the violation of the Treaty of Berlin, and refused to stir. The South Slavs were obliged to swallow their wrath and submit; the only result of the business was to exacerbate the already existing quarrel.”²⁰

Sir Charles Oman, 1909-14. The exacerbation produced the natural result. Sir Charles Oman has said:

“The years between 1909 and 1912 were full of acts of violence, inexcusable oppression backed by forgery and perjury on the part of the Austrian authorities, deeds of bloody revenge carried out by fanatical Jugo-Slavs.”

“The open warfare against the Croatian and Bosnian Pan-Serbs, which had started in 1908 with the Agram Trial, had a not unnatural result in the outbreak of political crimes of violence against the local Austrian and Hungarian officials, of which the most notable were an attempt at Serajevo in 1910 to assassinate General Varesanin, Governor

¹⁹ A local legislature had been conceded to Croatia. It sat at Agram, the Croatian capital.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

of Bosnia; a second at Agram in 1912 directed against Baron Cuvaj, Royal Commissary for Croatia; and a third and fourth in the same place against his successor in office, Baron Skerlec. In all four plots the murderer was foiled, but in the second, an official seated next Baron Cuvaj was mortally wounded. The assassins were in each case Austrian subjects — one of them had just returned from America. All were declared, and probably with truth, to be members of Jugo-Slav secret societies. The Austrian Government maintained that the central nucleus of political crime was a Belgrade patriotic association called the *Narodna Odbrana* ('National Defence'), which had been established in Serbia at the time of the Bosnian annexation, when open war with Austria had seemed probable. The society was not governmental or official, but many prominent Serbian soldiers and functionaries were members of it. Its heads have always declared that it had no connection with political crime; it was founded in 1908 as an organisation to train volunteers and organise auxiliary services during the expected war with Austria. But when that danger passed over, it was reorganised as a permanent patriotic association, for cultural and educational purposes in time of peace. There was no doubt that it was Pan-Serb in its programme, and that many Austro-Hungarian subjects belonged to it. But it was not a secret society, and worked openly (and not always very prudently) by means of lectures, meetings, and pamphlet propaganda. The Austrian contention, as set forth at great length in the Red Book and other official documents, is that the *Narodna Odbrana*, in addition to its obvious activities, had a secret terrorist organisation, which worked across the frontier and helped or subsidised the Croatian and Bosnian activists. It would appear to be rather the fact that while the association as a body and its responsible chiefs confined themselves to their averred programme, there were certain members, both native Serbs and Austrian subjects, who were cognisant of the various deeds of violence which took place in Croatia and Bosnia. This could hardly be avoided: enthusiasts and fanatics join associations in all countries, but the associations are not responsible for their private doings. That the crimes were a local product, and the natural result of ruthless oppression by the Austro-Hungarian police and bureaucracy is sufficiently shown by the fact that the criminals were invariably Austrian subjects, and not Serbs of the Kingdom."²¹

After a contemptuous reference to the:

"reputation of the Austrian and Hungarian courts as to the manipulation or falsification of the depositions of witnesses,"

and to the consequent unreliability of "evidence taken in court" as to the operations of the *Narodna Odbrana*, Sir Charles Oman proceeded:

"At the same time it is easy to realise the irritation and anger of the Austro-Hungarian bureaucracy, faced with an epidemic of violence, and convinced that the violence was due not to their own policy, but to

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 7.

intangible and malignant influences working from across the Save and the Drina.²² Discontented Croats or Bosnians always betook themselves to Belgrade,²³ and were regarded there as martyrs. Dismissed Jugo-Slav officers and cadets sometimes got commissions in the Serbian army. Exiled teachers joined the Serbian education department; students 'sent down' for disloyalty took degrees at Belgrade, and so forth. The friction was inevitable when an obstinate bureaucracy set to work to dragoon a discontented population, while there was a free state of allied blood just across the border. It might be possible to imagine some parallel for ourselves if Galway had happened to be only fifty miles from New York, and if in the time of some Irish crisis the Hibernian associations of the United States passed their usual resolutions from across a river instead of across an ocean."²⁴

Between 1912 and 1914. In 1909, the South Slavs had been "obliged to swallow their wrath." In the succeeding years, they discharged much of it upon those whom they disliked. Meanwhile, climacteric conditions had accumulated. The Balkan League — Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro — had been formed with the double object (1) of extruding Turkey from the Balkans and partitioning the territory among themselves; and (2) of presenting a united front against Austria-Hungary. The first part of the programme was successfully accomplished: Serbia and Greece were immensely strengthened; Bulgaria fared less well; the boundary of Montenegro was brought into juxtaposition with that of Serbia; and, as the British *Introductory Narrative* (above referred to) indicates, notwithstanding Serbia's promise

"to live with" Austria-Hungary "in friendly and neighborly relations," "her nationalistic aspirations still continued . . . and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13 — successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her territorial expansion. As Serbia grew, Austrian suspicion of her designs deepened."²⁵

The Assassination. Under all these circumstances, the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne was not a matter for surprise. The British *Introductory Narrative*²⁶ has the following:

"In the light of this history, the storm of anti-Servian feeling which swept Austria-Hungary after the Serajevo murders is easily understood. It is a feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its exaggerations and to sympathise with its motives."

Sir Charles Oman has truly said:

"With regard to the Serajevo crime, we must regard it as a normal

²² Across the Save and Drina lay Serbia.

²³ Belgrade was the capital of Serbia, and the headquarters of the *Narodna Odbrana*.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

²⁵ *Ante*, pp. 1005-6.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

and logical successor of the various attempts made against Bosnian and Croatian governors and commissaries between 1908 and 1913.”²⁷ The assassination brought to climax for Austria-Hungary the questions, whether Serbia was breaching her promises of 1909, and, if so, what action ought to be taken.

LATER ANTI-AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN AUTHORITIES

The Jugo-Slav Committee in North America. Much can be found in the literature issued on behalf of the Serbians during the war which supports the Austro-Hungarian view of the unneighborly character of their conduct. For example, in a pamphlet issued by “The Jugo-Slav Committee in North America: President, Dr. Ante Biankini, 3207 Indiana Avenue, Chicago, Illinois,” entitled: *Austro-Magyar Judicial Crimes*, may be seen the following:

“These proceedings [referring to German and Magyar oppression of their Slav subjects] provoked a reaction among the Jugoslavs which the Austro-Magyars strove to paralyse. Hatred of the oppressors roused and strengthened the national sentiment. To free themselves from the foreign yoke, the Jugoslavs realized that they must become strong, and that in order to become strong they would have to unite. And this union would have to include the lands beyond the Sava²⁸ as well. As the national unification could not be accomplished by Austria, it would perforce have to be effected outside the borders and in opposition to her. It was thus that the rôle of a Jugoslav Piedmont devolved upon Serbia. From henceforth, there were two centres of action tending towards Jugoslav Union: one among the Austro-Hungarian Jugoslavs, the other in Serbia.”²⁹

Referring to the change of dynasty in Serbia in 1903 (from the “Obrenovic, who had smirched the good name of Serbia in the eyes of all the world,” to the Karageorgevic), the writer of the pamphlet proceeded in this way:

“The year 1903 ushers in a new period in Jugoslav history. In Serbia it meant a general renaissance, a moral reawakening, and the reorganization, or rather the creation of that marvellous Serbian army which has so justly aroused universal admiration. Above all things, it meant the end of the state of vassalage of Serbia and its dynasty towards the great neighboring Monarchy.”³⁰

Referring to the situation in Croatia, which had been in the enjoyment of some approach to parliamentary institutions, but in which the Serbians

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

²⁸ That is Serbia.

²⁹ P. 4.

³⁰ P. 5.

and Croatians had been in political disagreement, the writer said (*Italics as in the original*):

“The very first effect of the reconciliation of the Serbs and Croats was the collapse of the detested Government of the Magyar Ban and his Magyarophil parliamentary majority. By 1905 *the Croat and Serb Opposition Parties coalesced, proclaiming the national unity of the Croats and Serbs.* The Dalmatian Croato-Serbs joined this coalition; the Slovene patriots endorsed it. Soon the coalition embraced almost the entire Yugoslav population in Austria-Hungary. All attempts to break this coalition proved fruitless. Five times, since 1906, the Croatian Parliament has been dissolved; but the Serbo-Croat coalition has always emerged victorious from the Croatian general elections. Twice the Croatian constitution was suspended. Numerous attempts upon the Royal Commissioner, upon the Ban of Croatia, upon the Governors of Bosnia and Dalmatia were manifest protests on the part of the whole Yugoslav population against the foes of its national unity.”³¹

Indicating that Austria-Hungary wished to represent the incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as “a defensive precaution” against Serbia, the writer contended that the alleged:

“grievances against Serbia were obviously factitious. But there were some real ones as well.”³²

Arguing that the object of the Germanic nations was to secure a route to Salonica and to Constantinople, and, as necessary for that purpose, to make of Serbia “an Austrian vassal,” the writer adds:

“All the more so as, owing to her increasing prestige, she was a dangerous centre of attraction for the Yugoslavs, so disgracefully oppressed by the Austro-Magyars.”³³

Referring to the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1908, the writer said:

“It was therefore obvious that the subjection of these provinces would grievously wound Serbia. As a matter of fact, Serbia protested, and, at the beginning of 1909, Europe was within an ace of war.”³⁴

“After Europe had capitulated before the diplomacy of Count Aehrenthal and the German tyranny that stood behind it, Austria-Hungary, in an attempt to allay the profound unrest of the population as well as out of consideration for international order, imposed upon Bosnia-Herzegovina a ‘constitution’ comparable to that of Alsace-Lorraine. The new Sabor (Diet) was convoked.

“But the youth of the nation refused to acquiesce in this new state of affairs. On the very day of the opening of the Sabor a student from Herzegovina named Bogdan Serajic shot at the Governor of Bosnia-

³¹ P. 6.

³² P. 7.

³³ P. 8.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

Herzegovina, General Varesanin, as a protest against the annexation. This shot was the signal for a whole series of political outrages in Croatia and Dalmatia, the last of which was directed against the person of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Serajevo on June 28th, 1914. The younger generation of Jugoslavs had passed to propaganda by action.”³⁵

Dealing with the society known as the *Narodna Odbrana*, the writer said:

“As a matter of fact, the *Narodna Odbrana* was founded in 1908, at the time of the annexation crisis, in those days of anguish when Serbia found herself face to face with the Austro-Hungarian peril in all its gravity. Serbia was still in the throes of reconstitution, and her military preparations were far from complete. Several patriots decided to supplement this deficiency by private enterprise. Committees were founded all over the country to enroll and train volunteers for the defence of the country. Within a very short time a considerable army of volunteers was created. But as soon as the annexation crisis was over, the activity of the *Narodna Odbrana* came to an end.

“The imminent danger having passed, the society was radically reorganised. Its military programme was replaced by a different, peaceful activity, which entered into the national life. Its chief task now consisted in organising popular lectures, or, at most, rifle clubs in the villages, and in promoting the patriotic education of the people. All existing societies derived moral and material support from it.

“The *Narodna Odbrana* worked quite openly, in the light of day, and its periodic financial reports were regularly published. But its growing activity attracted the enmity of the political leaders of Vienna and Budapest, where nothing was dreamt of but the triumphant march to Salonica.”³⁶

The writer quotes from the evidence of George Ostovic, who was one of those on trial in connection with the Sokols — the athletic associations — (9 November 1915 to 22 April 1916), as follows:

“We Jugoslavs, we dwell on a cross-road where the mighty German and Italian civilisations meet and clash, while our flank is exposed to the Magyars. Thus our position is fraught with the greatest danger, and our nationalism bears a more or less defensive character. From our ancestors we inherit the idea that Croats and Serbs form a single nation; our task is nothing else but to give real meaning to this idea. It is false to say that this idea originated in Serbia. It lives wherever our nation lives. It is with the object of effacing the artificial differences which divide us that we have amalgamated our Croat, Serb and Slovene Students’ Societies in Prague in one single joint society, the *Jugoslavija*.”³⁷

³⁵ Pp. 40-41.

³⁶ P. 57.

³⁷ P. 67.

The trial (the writer said) resulted in ninety-eight persons being pronounced guilty of having:

“desired to change, by violence, the relations and bonds between the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; of having, within the years from 1911 to 1914, joined the organisation of the Serbian revolutionary society, *Narodna Odbrana*, in Belgrade as members thereof and agents in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the full knowledge of the object of the society, which contemplated the reunion by force of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the Kingdom of Serbia, and, to this end, the rising of these provinces at a propitious moment, and notably in time of war; and of having collaborated in this enterprise partaking of the nature of High Treason.”³⁸

The Yugo-Slav Committee of London. In a sort of *pronunciamento* of the Yugo-Slav Committee of London, signed by Dr. Trumbic as President, after reference to the declaration of Corfu of 20 July 1917, the Committee proceeded as follows:

“This declaration, which constitutes a national programme approved of by our whole people, demands complete separation from Austria-Hungary and union with Serbia and Montenegro in one State on the basis of democratic freedom and equal rights for all citizens.

“For this idea our whole people is fighting. For it Serbia and Montenegro have suffered terrible disaster. For it the Southern Slav divisions, formed of volunteers from Austria-Hungary, shed their blood on the side of the Allies in the Dobrudja. For it, with equal self-sacrifice, our volunteers of the Southern Slav division on the Salonika front are dying.

“For this idea tens of thousands of our men and women, subjects of Austria-Hungary, have perished on Austrian gallows and in Austrian prisons, mostly without any form of trial. None but a people fighting for complete freedom and unity can endure such wrong. Persuaded that the very force of things and the inexorable requirements of lasting peace will carry their idea to triumph, our people will never forsake it.”³⁹

A manifesto issued during the war, on behalf of the Southern Slavs, *To the British Nation and Parliament*, contained the following:

“The Southern Slav people aspires to unite its territories in a single independent State. The internal arrangements of the new State will be determined by the nation itself, in accordance with its own wishes and needs.”⁴⁰

Crawfurd Price. In a pamphlet by Crawfurd Price (London, 1917), written in support of the Serbian side of the controversy, and entitled *The Dawn of Armageddon, or The Provocation by Serbia*, may be found the following:

³⁸ P. 83.

³⁹ *The Times* (London), 11 Jan. 1918.

⁴⁰ *The Times* (London).

“The assassination of King Alexander [1903], announcing as it did the end of the Austrian *régime*, was a severe blow to the ambitions of Viennese diplomacy. But its effect was even more marked in Serbia. With the introduction of popular control, the old spirit that had so long languished under Milan and Alexander quickly revived, and there set in a general process of national regeneration which developed rapidly alongside the reorganisation of the army. Further, the return of the Kara-georgevitch dynasty restored Russian influence, and the question of Southern Slav union became once more an important factor of Balkan politics.”⁴¹

Dealing with the trade difficulties of the Serbian government, the writer said:

“Yet, despite this comparative success, the difficulties which had been temporarily overcome by the Government clearly exposed the weak points in Serbia’s position, and the nation realized that the principal cause of its economic dependence upon Austria lay in the lack of communications. To reach any seaport, it was necessary to transport the merchandise either through Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey — a fact which entailed a certain dependence upon them — and this knowledge gave birth to a desire to ameliorate the situation of the Kingdom. There accordingly sprang up that agitation in favor of an outlet to the Adriatic which was one of the principal reasons of Serbia’s participation in the first Balkan war.”⁴²

Referring to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, the writer said:

“Into the situation produced by the renaissance of Serbia, the Russo-Serbian rapprochement, the Young Turk revolution, and the welter of discontent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Habsburgs flung the long-meditated Declaration of Annexation in 1908. In the Kingdom of Serbia itself this critical development created the utmost consternation. Upon receipt of the news in Belgrade the populace gathered *en masse* around the monument erected to the memory of Prince Michel, crying: ‘Down with Austria, who has introduced into Bosnia, not liberty and civilisation, but an iron tyranny.’ The Serbian nation was roused to action, the spirit of Kossovo was born anew, and it was evident that the people were prepared to stake their all rather than be drawn themselves more firmly into the Austrian mesh, see their kinsmen handed over an unwilling prey to the Habsburg vulture, and submit to the ruin of their highest ambitions and aspirations. But Serbia was still in the midst of her regeneration and preparation, and wars cannot be fought with good intentions.”⁴³

Russia had not recovered from the effects of the Japanese war: “whereupon Serbia, thrown upon her own resources, was forced to ac-

⁴¹ Pp. 12-13.

⁴² Pp. 14-15.

⁴³ Pp. 17-18.

cept the *fait accompli* and make a hypocritical and consequently valueless declaration to the effect that none of her rights had thereby been infringed. Yet the Serbs emerged from out the crisis stronger and prouder, and thoroughly roused to the life-struggle which it was now obvious lay before them, it being plainly evident that Austria-Hungary would not rest content with the *status quo*. They therefore had to prepare to meet the inevitable attack under the best possible conditions; and while the Government worked to the completion of the army reorganization, the Narodna Odbrana, which had been formed during the Annexation Crisis to enroll, train and equip volunteers by private effort, cast off its military cloak and devoted itself to the fostering of the patriotic spirit."⁴⁴

Referring to the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and suggesting that the crime might have been abetted by the Austro-Hungarian authorities themselves, the writer added:

"On the opening day of the Diet" of Herzegovina "a student fired at the Governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this shot inaugurated a series of violent outrages which culminated in the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand on June 28th, 1914."⁴⁵

Dealing with the various charges made by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, and particularly the charge of endeavors to detach Bosnia and Herzegovina, the writer said:

"... As to outrages in Bosnia, we have already noted that they were prevalent long before the Serbian renaissance set in, the tragedy of Serajevo being merely the culmination of a series of crimes which illumined the occupation.

"It must, however, be admitted that there was present an unofficial subversive movement having for its ultimate object the union of the Jugo-Slav nation. It could hardly have been otherwise. Indeed, all the other border States had embarked on similar campaigns under considerably less provocation. The weakness of Austria-Hungary lay in the fact that it was an artificial Empire, a negation of the principle of nationality made up of a minority of two ruling castes, and a majority of subject peoples who owned allegiance primarily to forces beyond its frontiers. Its ultimate disintegration had been widely accepted as a political dogma, and, in consequence, it was afflicted not only with a Serbian, but with an Italian, a Russian, a Roumanian, and even a German propaganda, the object of all being to detach their co-nationalists.

"Moreover, the Serbs would have been blind alike to past and to contemporary history had they not realized that the Monarchy was intent upon their destruction, national and economic, and while officially, and as a whole, they sought by diplomatic methods to achieve the unification

⁴⁴ P. 19.

⁴⁵ P. 21.

of their race and an outlet to the Adriatic seaboard, some among them, more strongly imbued with the national idea, were undoubtedly carried beyond the extremes of international courtesy. To this extent, Austria-Hungary had a legitimate grievance."⁴⁶

Dealing with the charge that Serbian journalism had been employed in the interests of the pan-Serbian propaganda, the writer said that, unfortunately, the Serbian government had no control over the Press, and, admitting that "the language of the uncontrolled Serbian publicists was violent," he declared that "the officially inspired scribes of the Monarchy" were quite as vituperative:

"For a whole decade they had unceasingly maligned Serbia, heaped indignities upon the Serbian population, and acted as the instruments of an insidious campaign of calumny and invective . . . there would appear to have been little to choose between the two parties to this regrettable press polemic."⁴⁷

Sir Edward Cook. Sir Edward Cook, in his popular pamphlet *Why the Empire is at War*, wrote as follows:

"It was admitted by Sir Edward Grey that 'one naturally sympathized with many of the requirements of the ultimatum,' and that 'the murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the (Austrian) Note aroused sympathy with Austria.' Russia also admitted that 'the demands were reasonable enough in some cases.'"⁴⁸

Allan Murray Gale. In a pamphlet published by Mr. Allan Murray Gale, entitled *The Serbian and His Country*, published by the Serbian Relief Committee of America, with an Introduction by the Committee, may be seen the following:

"Austria has hated Serbia with a bitter hatred for generations, as well it might, for Serbia not only barred the way to the realization of Austria's dearest dream of adding the whole of the Balkans to her domain, but the example and ideals of the peasant kingdom were the inspiration of hopes of liberty and independence among Austria's great Slav population that Austria in vain tried to crush out with an iron hand."⁴⁹

"The dream of Serbia and of all the Southern Slavs is the formation of a democratic kingdom with Serbia at its head, which shall unite the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes into one homogeneous nation."⁵⁰

British Opinion. In a conversation of 24 July with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, Sir Edward Grey, when referring to the demands made by Austria-Hungary upon Serbia:

⁴⁶ Pp. 47-8.

⁴⁷ P. 49.

⁴⁸ P. 4.

⁴⁹ P. 8.

⁵⁰ P. 15.

"repeated his objections to the short-time limit, but recognized that what was said as to complicity in the crime of Serajevo, as well as many of our other requirements, was justified."⁵¹

In a conversation with the German Ambassador on 25 July, Sir Edward said:

"with reference to the Austrian note, he recognized the good right of Austria to obtain satisfaction, as well as the legitimacy of the demand for punishment of the accomplices in the assassination."⁵²

In a conversation with the German Ambassador on 29 July (the day after hostilities had commenced), Sir Edward said (as he afterwards noted):

"There must, of course, be some humiliation of Serbia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia."⁵³

The German Ambassador, in reporting this conversation to his government, said:

"Sir Edward Grey added, however, that the Government must take account of public opinion. So far this had been, on the whole, favorable to Austria, as the justice of a certain degree of satisfaction was recognised, but now it was beginning to swing round completely as a result of Austrian stubbornness.

"To my Italian colleague, who has just left me, Sir Edward Grey said he believed if mediation were undertaken Austria would be able to procure every possible satisfaction; there would be no question of a humiliating retreat by Austria, as the Serbs would, in any case, be chastised, and with Russia's approval forced to subordinate themselves to Austria's wishes. Austria could thus obtain guarantees for the future without a war which would put the peace of Europe in danger."⁵⁴

Berchtold (the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister), in referring to Sir M. de Bunsen's (the British Ambassador's) explanation of the attitude of Sir Edward Grey, said (28 July):

"The English Ambassador came to see me this morning, and, according to instructions, explained the point of view Sir Edward Grey holds with regard to our conflict with Serbia, which is the following:

"The British Government has followed the course of the crisis with the greatest interest; it sympathises with our way of seeing things and perfectly understands our grievances against Serbia. It did not mind saying that it had no love to spare for Serbia, and knows very well that Serbia has committed a number of misdeeds in the past."⁵⁵

⁵¹ Aus. Red. Bk. (First), No. 10.

⁵² *Kautsky Docs.*, No. 180.

⁵³ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 90.

⁵⁴ Kautsky: *The Guilt* etc., pp. 172-3; *Kautsky Docs.*, No. 368.

⁵⁵ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 90; Aus. Red. Bk. (First), No. 41. Cf. *Kautsky Docs.*, No. 346.

The British Ambassador, referring to the same conversation, reported (28 July):

“In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if, in the course of the present grave crisis, our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Serbia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Serbia, you were anxious in the first instance for the peace of Europe.”⁵⁶

In his final report (1 September), the British Ambassador, again referring to the conversation with the Austro-Hungarian Minister, said:

“I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Serbia.”⁵⁷

In his book *Before the War*, Lord Haldane said:

“It is difficult for us to understand how real the Slav peril appeared to Germany and to Austria, and there is little doubt that, to the latter, Serbia was an unquiet neighbor.”⁵⁸

In his British semi-official exposition *The Outbreak of the War of 1914-18*, Sir Charles Oman, in addition to the statements already quoted from him, referring to the comments of Austro-Hungarian newspapers on the Serajevo murders, said:

“As a matter of fact, this sort of propaganda had an excellent success all over Europe, and more especially in Great Britain, where almost the whole press launched out into condolences with Austria and denunciation of the Serbians.”⁵⁹

Referring to one of the demands of Austria-Hungary, Sir Charles said:

“The Serbian Government was to undertake to suppress newspapers of openly propagandist tendencies, and to dissolve the great society called the ‘Narodna Odbrana’ (National Defence), the patriotic Association which had for the last six years been a most prominent feature in Serbian internal politics, and to which many important civil and military functionaries undoubtedly belonged. There can be no use in denying that the programme of the society, though it called itself a literary association for inspiring the sentiment of Serbian nationality, was that of extending the Jugo-Slav movement over all the regions of Austria where there was a discontented Serbian, Croatian, or Slovene majority. It was undoubtedly an anti-Austrian association, and one can understand the demand for its suppression in the ultimatum of the 23d July. That the Government of M. Pasitch would dread to meddle with such a powerful body, however inconvenient its activities had become, was an undoubted fact, and one reason more for thinking that the ultimatum would be rejected.”⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 62.

⁵⁷ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 161.

⁵⁸ P. 76.

⁵⁹ P. 11.

⁶⁰ P. 25.

Referring to the *dossier* which Austria-Hungary circulated shortly after the murders, Sir Charles said:

"No honest student of the recent history of the South Slavs under Hapsburg rule could deny that there was a home-grown and old-standing agitation against 'Magyarism' in Croatia and the neighboring provinces, which dated back to the disappointment of the Croats after the loyal service they had done to the Emperor Francis Joseph during the great Hungarian insurrection of 1848. . . . It was no doubt true that the Serbian non-official press had taken sides with Bosnian or Croatian nationalists, and had often printed matter that was intensely irritating to the Austrian Government. As the *dossier* plaintively notes, eighty-one Serbian papers had been, first and last, deprived of the right to circulate in Austria because of their political tendencies. It is hard to see how any foreign journal, Serbian, or English, or American, could have found pleasant things to say about the Hungarian administration of Croatia, or such incidents as the Friedjung business and the Agram trial of 1909. . . . The next section of the *dossier* deals with Serbian clubs and societies, especially the Narodna Odbrana, whose avowed objects were the strengthening of the national consciousness, physical culture, increase of material well-being, educational improvements, &c. 'Strengthening of the national consciousness' was interpreted by many members of the Narodna as meaning 'the maintenance of spiritual union with our brothers across the frontier,' and this implied the extension of the work of the society for Pan-Serbian propaganda into Bosnia, Croatia, &c. Some of the extracts from the publications of the societies read harmlessly enough, others (no doubt) are definitely anti-Austrian, and speak of the reunion of all the South Slavs as the great aspiration of the future. Of course, any phrase, however vague, about long-parted brothers or spiritual liberty sounded dangerous to an Austrian or Hungarian official. The very word 'nationality' is distasteful to him of necessity, because it raises the question of race-unity and state-unity. It is difficult for the outside reader to realize the feeling of indignation produced in the Austro-Hungarian official mind by phrases which in the West are the time-honored *clichés* of the patriotic orator, such as 'a free press,' or 'national consciousness.' Hence much of the impropriety which the drafters of the *dossier* detected in screeds produced by the pamphleteers and orators of the Narodna Odbrana does not seem very dreadful to English readers. On the other hand, it would be childish to deny that passages occur which imply an active hope of South Slav unity, to be secured by the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy."⁶¹

Russian Opinion. The Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonoff, was as frank as the other diplomats. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported a conversation with him with reference to the Austro-Hungarian demands, as follows (27 July 1914):

⁶¹ Pp. 46-7.

“As to the Slavs — he ought not to say as much to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador — he had no heart for the Balkan Slavs. They are a heavy burden for Russia, and we had no conception what Russia has already suffered through them. Our aims, such as I have described them, are perfectly legitimate, but in his opinion the way we are taking for attaining them, was not the safe way. . . . The minister then, one by one, discussed all the points of the Note and declared that of the ten points seven were acceptable without great difficulties, but that the two points referring to the collaboration of Imp. and Roy. functionaries in Servia, and the point in which we demand *ad libitum* the dismissal of officers and officials, which we name, are in their present form altogether unacceptable.”⁶²

The report of the French Ambassador of this conversation is as follows:

“‘The intention which inspired this document,’ Sazonoff said, ‘is legitimate if you pursued no aim other than the protection of your territory against the intrigues of Servian anarchists; but the procedure to which you had recourse is not defensible.’ He concluded: ‘Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee you the result.’”⁶³

On the same day (27th), the German Ambassador reported that Sazonoff:

“again recognizes the justified character, in principle, of the Austro-Hungarian action against Serbia, but he does not abandon the hope that Austria-Hungary may be disposed to modify a little the form of her demands.”⁶⁴ “He earnestly requests our co-operation in this regard. One ought to be able to find a means of giving to Serbia a merited lesson while respecting her sovereign rights.”⁶⁵

On the 29th July, the German Military Attaché at St. Petersburg reported:

“Whereas before the publication of the Serbian note of reply it was considered that Austria was in the right in exacting satisfactions from Serbia, now there is the conviction, after the rejection of the response, very conciliatory according to the opinion here, of Serbia, that Austria has acted in bad faith, that she seeks war and that she desires it.”⁶⁶

On 29 July, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, reporting another conversation, said that Sazonoff:

“returned to the question of a discussion of the note, the action of Sir E. Grey, &c., and he desired again to point out to me that Russia recog-

⁶² Aus. Red. Bk., O. F., II, No. 73. In Aus. Red. Bk. (First), this letter appears in quite different form: See No. 31.

⁶³ Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 54. The dates of the two reports vary.

⁶⁴ *Kautsky Docs.*, No. 339. Cf. Nos. 323, 380.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 282.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 344.

nised our legitimate interest and desired to give it full satisfaction, but that this should be clothed in a form which would be acceptable to Servia." ⁶⁷

The French Ambassador at Vienna, on 22 July, reported as follows:

"The Russian Ambassador . . . has confided to me that his Government will not raise any objection to steps directed towards the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the societies which are notoriously revolutionary, but could not accept requirements which would humiliate Servian National feeling." ⁶⁸

French Opinion. On 24 July, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris read to the acting French Minister of Foreign Affairs (M. Bienvenu-Martin) the Austro-Hungarian demands upon Serbia, and, in reporting the interview, said:

"He would not discuss the text, but admitted freely that the events of recent times and the attitude of the Servian government had made energetic action on our part a matter that could be understood. . . . The minister visibly avoided to defend or condone the attitude of Servia in any way whatever." ⁶⁹

That the French Foreign Office correctly appreciated the motives which actuated Austria-Hungary in making war upon Serbia — the fear of "internal disintegration" — is sufficiently evidenced by the following extract from a despatch sent by the Russian Ambassador at Paris (29 July):

"For the information of the President of the French Republic on his return, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had prepared a short summary of the present political situation, approximately in the following terms: Austria fearing internal disintegration, seized upon the assassination of the Archduke as an excuse to obtain guarantees, which may assume the form of an occupation of Servian military lines or even Servian territory." ⁷⁰

In a French circular despatch of the same date, the same view was expressed as follows:

"The Austro-German attitude is becoming clearer. Austria, uneasy concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized the opportunity of the crime of Serajevo in order to punish the Servian intrigues, and to obtain in this quarter guarantees which, according as events are allowed to develop or not, will either affect only the Servian Government and army, or become territorial questions." ⁷¹

⁶⁷ Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 47. See also Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III No 19; post, 1042-3. To similar effect is *Kautsky Docs.*, No. 339.

⁶⁸ Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 18.

⁶⁹ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 9. Cf. *ibid.*, No. 11; and Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 11.

⁷⁰ Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 53.

⁷¹ Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 85.

Serbian Ambassador at Vienna. When entering, on behalf of his country, a plea of not guilty, the Serbian Ambassador at Vienna complained of Austro-Hungarian "obstacles" to "Serbia's access to the Adriatic." The complaint was well founded, but Austro-Hungarian justification was of the same character as that which moved Italy when interposing a similar obstacle, and that which has always justified the United Kingdom in her determination to maintain her freedom from menace on the North Sea coast. The Ambassador said (30 June 1914):

"The Royal Serbian Government, notwithstanding all the obstacles hitherto placed in their way by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy (creation of an independent Albania, opposition to Serbian access to the Adriatic, demand for revision of the treaty of Bucharest, the September ultimatum, &c.) remained loyal in their desire to establish a sound basis for our good neighborly relations."⁷²

The acts complained of were, unquestionably, obstacles to the expansion of Serbia; but Serbian desire for expansion was just as undoubtedly a menace to Austria-Hungary. There was the difficulty: Serbia longed for enlargement; Austria-Hungary could not permit it.

Shortly afterwards, the same Ambassador indiscreetly declared that Austro-Hungarian action in connection with the Serajevo episode was motivated by a desire "to suppress the Great Serbian propaganda and the Jugo-Slav Idea."⁷³ Sometimes the contention is that "the Great Serbian propaganda" was an Austro-Hungarian invention — an excuse for Austro-Hungarian action.

King Nicolas of Montenegro. Four months prior to the outbreak of the war, the Russian Chargé at Cetinje (capital of Montenegro), reported to Sazonoff (26 March 1914) as follows:

"King Nicolas, after having hesitated for long, gave orders these days to deliver to King Peter his autograph letter which had been sent to Belgrade some time ago. In this letter, Serbia is invited to conclude without delay an arrangement with Montenegro concerning the union of the two nations in the military, diplomatic, and financial field, with 'a reservation as to the independence and individuality of both States and their dynasties.' At the close of the letter, King Nicolas emphasizes how very useful such an arrangement would be to the unliberated Serbians and that it will be true to the spirit of Russia, the eternal protectress of the Slavs."⁷⁴

Other Authorities. Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, in his book *The Origin,*

⁷² Serb. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 5. In a despatch of 19 July 1914, the Serbian Prime Minister said: "The Government have given their particular attention to the improvement and strengthening of their relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which had lately become strained as a result of the Balkan wars and the questions which arose therefrom" (*Ibid.*, No. 30).

⁷³ *Ibid.*, No. 25.

⁷⁴ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 444. The prospect of this union caused alarm in Vienna: *Ibid.*, p. 446.

Causes, and Object of the War — a book by no means friendly to the Germans — referring to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, said:

“It is no doubt true that this plot and many others were hatched in Serbia, where the kindred peoples are also threatened by Austrian ambition. It is not regarded there as a crime, but as an heroic act of patriotism. Where we hold meetings in protest, they use bombs. To us it remains a crime.”⁷⁵

A very notable admission has been made by M. Bogitshevich (for a time Serbian Chargé d’Affaires at Berlin), who, in his book, has said:

“As regards the contents and the question of blame, however, I consider it my duty (however hard I find it, and however much I regret that matters turned out as they did) to state in the interests of historical truth that the accusations of the Austro-Hungarian Note, with few slight exceptions, were just and correct.”⁷⁶

The following are excerpts from the *Round Table* of September 1914:

“That there was no provocation on the part of Serbia, it would be idle to assert. Indeed, it may be admitted that the authorities in Belgrade did little or nothing to repress those anarchic and unruly elements which are so much in evidence in all the Balkan capitals, and which are systematically encouraged by a noisy gutter press.”

After a reference to Serbia’s “humiliating submission” in 1909, in connection with the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the writer continued:

“This reverse had a chastening effect upon Serbia and restored her to a sense of hard realities. From that day dates the rapid renaissance of her national spirit, and of its most practical form of expression, the Servian army. No one who visited Belgrade in 1908-9, and returned in 1912-13, could fail to wonder at the transformation. The two Balkan wars revealed Serbia to the outside world as a real military power, revealed, too, the latent possibilities of the Serb race.”⁷⁷

Lord Cromer in a letter to *The Times*,⁷⁸ urging support for the Serbian Society, said:

“Its main object is to elicit British sympathy for the idea with which the public has to a certain extent been familiarized by the writings of competent British and French authors — that one of the most effective means which can in the future be adopted in order to hinder the accomplishment of the ambitious German project of creating an empire stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Baltic is to call into existence a united Southern Slav State. The members of the Serbian Society hold, broadly speaking, that the creation of such a barrier against Teutonic aggression would be in the interests of the whole of Europe.”

⁷⁵ P. 31.

⁷⁶ P. 69.

⁷⁷ Pp. 664, 666-7.

⁷⁸ 3 Oct. 1916.

The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy has the following:

“Unfortunately for the Peace of the World, Vienna was resolved on a final reckoning with her troublesome neighbor, who made no secret of her desire to build up a Greater Serbia and had been encouraged by Russia to find her ‘Promised Land’ in the Habsburg dominions. ‘The integral acceptance of the ultimatum,’ reported Sir Maurice de Bunsen, ‘was neither expected nor desired. . . . The country believed it had before it only the alternative of subduing Serbia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands.’”⁷⁹

To the general view, as indicated by the foregoing extracts, must be added the almost conclusive statement of Professor Pribram:

“It is not at all to my purpose to justify the decision of the Viennese statesmen. They were certainly too hasty. But it must be considered that in all quarters of the realm the opinion prevailed that a Great Power could no longer tolerate the attitude of the Serbian Government. Moreover, twice already a portion of the army had been assembled on the Serbian frontier and had been sent home after standing under arms for several months in the face of the threatening neighbor. Now the military authorities declared that the troops could not be called again to arms without being sure that the differences with Serbia would be settled, if necessary, by the sword. Furthermore, have not nations their sense of honor the same as individuals? Is it therefore so very strange that the Austro-Hungarian statesmen should have thought it impossible to bear any longer the insolence of the Serbs? In this feeling they were actuated by the same sentiments which Lloyd George expressed in the year 1911 in saying that if peace could only be maintained by the dishonor of the British nation, he would not hesitate a moment to take up arms. ‘Better a fearful end than endless fears,’ was the *mot* of a leading Austrian statesman.”⁸⁰

Austro-Hungarian View. The following are extracts from a letter sent to Mr. Roosevelt by Count Albert Apponyi, a Magyar statesman:

“The direct cause of the outbreak is Serbia’s insane ambition to extend her dominion over those southern parts of Austria-Hungary: Bosnia, and Herzegovina, to begin with, Croatia and the Slovene countries to follow, where South Slavs live in great numbers. Never could a small country like Serbia nourish such designs against a great power, unless it felt sure of being supported by some other great power. Recent developments have shown that Serbia had good reasons to expect such support. On behalf of the mad ambitions, not warranted even by the claims of racial kinship (since the Roman Catholic Croatians generally abhor Serbia), a constant agitation was organized in the aforementioned parts of Austria-Hungary. The origin of this agitation can be traced as far

⁷⁹ III, p. 491.

⁸⁰ *Austrian Foreign Policy, 1908-18*, pp. 62-3.

back as the accession of the Karageorgevitch dynasty to the Servian throne."

Referring to the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, the Count said:

"From the standpoint of international law, the annexation was certainly not unexceptionable. Turkey, whose nominal rights were set aside, had a right to protest, and so had the signatory Powers of the Berlin treaty; but Serbia had absolutely no voice in the matter. No right of hers was invaded, no legitimate interest of hers damaged; only mad pretensions were thwarted, and unfair opportunities lessened; still it was Serbia whose outcries, echoed by Russia, endangered the peace of Europe."

Referring to the more recent period, the Count said:

"What nation, big or small, can tolerate the setting up in her neighborhood of a whole machinery of treason and destruction, the organization of a permanent conspiracy against her moral cohesion, with murder lurking at every street corner, threatening the individual safety of her most valued citizens? Austria-Hungary has tolerated it long enough to feel her strength shaken, to see her power disbelieved, her destruction discounted, and her future ruler murdered. . . . The case was not arbitrable, nor fit to be submitted to an international inquiry. . . . What could have been the result of international proceedings against Serbia. A verdict establishing her malpractices and bidding her to desist from them. Serbia of course would have professed to submit, just as she professed to be a good neighbor after the crisis of 1908. In fact, she would have persisted in her dark work, somewhat cautiously perhaps at the beginning, more daringly afterward. And in a couple of years, maybe after another series of attempted and successful assassinations, matters would again have ripened to a crisis. Should we then, again, have begun that parody of an international procedure, which settles nothing, because the adverse party hypocritically accepts, and barefacedly evades, every decision running against it? Should we have gone on rotting all the while and hastening toward dissolution? Really, we could not do that; international institutions must not be converted into traps where honesty is caught and dishonesty enjoys good fun; they are meant to insure justice, not to further the designs of cheats. In the face of God and man do I proclaim: If ever there was a case of lawful self-defense here you have it."⁸¹

RUSSIA'S ENCOURAGEMENT OF SERBIA

Passing from the testimony of these authorities, we may now observe that the attitude attributed by them to Serbia is precisely in line with

⁸¹ *The Continental Times*, 9 October 1914.

the counsels and encouragements which, at various times, she had received from Russia.

1908-9. We have seen ⁸² that in 1908-9, when, at the time of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia presented truculent front to the Dual Monarchy, Russia advised patience for the moment and preparation for a better opportunity in the future:

"Our line of conduct should be: — an understanding with Turkey, a calm attitude, military preparation, and watchful waiting."⁸³

1912-13. It was under the ægis of Russia that the Balkan League of 1912 was formed, and Russia's counsel to Serbia, during the negotiations in the course of the ensuing wars, was identical with that of 1908-9, namely, patient preparation for a better opportunity. On 26 November 1912, the Serbian Minister at Bucarest (Roumania) informed his Foreign Office that the Ministers of Russia and France had advised Serbian moderation with regard to assertion of claims to territory on the Adriatic. They had said that:

"we should not 'go the limit' as regards the question of an outlet on the Adriatic, for if a European complication should arise out of it, we should be hazarding all the extraordinary achievements we have hitherto made. They are of the opinion that we should declare ourselves satisfied with a guaranty of an unconditional free use of an Adriatic port, and the time will come when we shall be able to retain some such port as our own. It would be better that Serbia, which would be at least twice as large as formerly, should strengthen herself and gather herself together, in order to await with as great a degree of preparedness as possible the important events which must make their appearance among the Great Powers. Otherwise, if a European war is started, Europe will make Serbia answerable for the catastrophe. It seems to the Russian Minister that Italy is opposing our demand more than Austria, for she calculates that at the favorable moment she will be able to tear possessions away from Austria more easily than from us."⁸⁴

Shortly afterwards, and while an international conference at London was seeking a settlement of the war, the Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg reported a conversation with the Assistant of the Russian Foreign Minister (27 December 1912) as follows:

"I told him, as I had yesterday told the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that any further yielding might be fatal in view of the bad effect on the sentiment of Army and people. The Minister of Foreign Affairs had replied that in view of our great successes he had confidence in our strength, and believed that we would be able to deliver a shock to Austria. For that reason we should feel satisfied with what we were to receive

⁸² Cap. XXIII, pp. 935-9.

⁸³ *Ante*, p. 938.

⁸⁴ Bogitshevich, *op. cit.*, p. 98; *Remarques*, etc., p. 60; *Is Germany Guilty?*, II, 48. Cf. Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 394.

and consider it merely as a temporary halting place on the road to further gains, for the future belonged to us. The main thing was to come to an agreement with Montenegro. Bulgaria, meanwhile, would bring her ethnic mission to a close.”⁸⁵

Afterwards, on 9 April (1913), the Serbian Minister at Paris reported that he had been confidentially informed⁸⁶

“that in the middle of the foregoing week, we had stood face to face with the danger of a general European war, and that the reason why this war, at a cost of certain moral sacrifices, was now averted, rests upon the fact, among others, that it is desired to assure the Balkan allies an opportunity for recuperation, concentration, and preparation for eventualities which may emerge in the not too distant future.”⁸⁷

Afterwards (23 April 1913), Sazonoff instructed the Russian representative at Belgrade to urge moderation in Serbian demands. Serbia, he said:

“on the other hand, has reached only the first stage of her historic development and to attain her end, she must again sustain a frightful struggle, in the course of which her entire existence may be placed in jeopardy. The Promised Land of Serbia is situated upon territory now Austrian, and not in the direction in which she is extending and where the Bulgarians cross her path. Under these conditions, it is a vital interest for Serbia to maintain, on the one hand, alliance with Bulgaria, and, on the other hand, to prepare herself, by determined and patient work, in adequate measure, in view of the inevitable conflict in the future. Time works for Serbia and for the ruin of her enemies, who already show evident signs of disintegration. Declare all that to the Serbians. Everyone tells me that if there is a voice which can make itself heard at Belgrade, it is yours. Say to them on this occasion that we do not lose sight of their interests, and that we will support them energetically in Bulgaria. A rupture between Bulgaria and Serbia would be a triumph for Austria. Her agony would be thereby postponed for many years.”⁸⁸

On 29 April, the Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg reported that Sazonoff had told him:

“that we must work for the future because we would acquire a great deal of territory from Austria. I replied that we would gladly give Bulgaria Monastir (Bitolia) if we could acquire Bosnia and other territory of Austria.”⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Bogitshevich, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

⁸⁶ By “a competent person.”

⁸⁷ Bogitshevich, *op. cit.*, p. 125; *Remarques* etc., p. 63; *Is Germany Guilty?*, II, 51.

⁸⁸ *Remarques* etc., pp. 40-1; *Is Germany Guilty?*, II, pp. 23-4.

⁸⁹ Bogitshevich, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-100; *Remarques* etc., p. 61; *Is Germany Guilty?*, II, 50.

Afterwards (23 June 1913), the Serbian Minister at Bucarest reported that the Russian Ambassador had said to him that we ought to make concessions to Bulgaria:

“up to a certain point, bearing in mind that it would be only temporary, for some years, up to the moment when, in default of any other question, the question of Albania at least will be (again) raised.”⁹⁰

Afterwards (2 August 1913), the Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg reported that the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs advised that care should be taken to retain the friendship of Roumania:

“the assistance of Roumania will be necessary for us in the future because of our aspirations in Austria-Hungary.”⁹¹

As summary of the situation, Bogitshevich (a Serbian diplomat) wrote: “that Russia was continuously insisting to Serbia (in order to induce Serbia to make greater concessions to Bulgaria) that the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Serbia was only a question of a very short time”; and “that Serbia and Russia, from their point of view, did not regard the two Balkan wars as a final determination of the development of things in the Balkans (although Bulgaria, Greece and probably Roumania did so regard it), but that they regarded these two wars as only the first step toward a war with Austria — in other words, a general European war.”⁹²

Bogitshevich has supplemented the documents by quoting:

“a highly characteristic utterance of the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paschitsch, which he made to me personally, at Marienbad, immediately after the Serbo-Bulgar war, and which I regarded at that time as an expression of insane megalomania. His words were as follows: ‘For the sake of acquiring Bosnia and Herzegovina likewise, I might have caused a general European war to break loose already at the time of the first Balkan war; but as I learned that in that case we should find ourselves compelled to make greater concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia, I desired above all to secure possession of Macedonia for Serbia in order that when that was secure we might then move forward to the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’”⁹³

1914. If any further evidence along the same line be needed, it is amply supplied by the language of a report by Paschitsch himself (at the moment Serbian Minister-President) of a conversation with the Czar on 2 February 1914. In the course of a lengthy recital, Paschitsch said:

“Thereupon I set forth the policy of Serbia, which amounts to this, that it desires the maintenance of peace in the Balkans, and that new complications be avoided, for Serbia needs peace in order to recuperate,

⁹⁰ *Remarques* etc., p. 63; *Is Germany Guilty?*, II, 52.

⁹¹ *Remarques* etc., p. 62; *Is Germany Guilty?*, II, 51.

⁹² *Op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

and in order that she may arm herself afresh for the defense of Serbian national interests. I also set forth the difficulties which Serbia will have to meet in the pursuit of her peaceful policy. Bulgaria, Turkey and Austria are dissatisfied. Turkey, because she had lost the war with the Balkan States; Bulgaria because it could not retain or acquire all that she wished; and Austria because she had lost the prospect of an advance to Saloniki."

Paschitsch further said to the Czar that Serbia "ought not to be sulky" towards Bulgaria:

"but take thought of the fact that a state of harmony between Bulgaria and Serbia might be useful to both, and that perhaps the time would come when we might even be willing to make some concessions to Bulgaria in case she was willing to be of assistance in the solution of the Serbo-Kroatian question."⁹⁴ Thereupon the Tsar inquired how many Serbo-Kroatsians lived in Austria-Hungary, and what they were now believing and desiring. I replied about six millions and told him where they lived. I also told him of the Slovenes, that they, too, were gravitating to the Serbo-Kroatsians and that they would adopt the Serbo-Kroatian language, owing to the fact that their dialect is bad, and that they have long lost their national independence. . . . I then told the Tsar how great a reverse in sentiment had taken place among the Slavs of Austria-Hungary, how many Starcevic followers there were who formerly expected salvation from Austria, but now comprehended that this salvation could come to them only from Russia or Serbia, and that they could scarcely await the opportunity to see their desires fulfilled; and then I told him that for every rifle we received, we would have a soldier from these countries to carry it."

The Czar said:

"If Austria does not cease her anti-Slavic policy, nothing good will ever come of it for her. Then he asked how many soldiers Serbia could now put into the field. Serbia, said the Tsar, had astonished the world when she marched out 400,000 men. I replied: We believe that we can put a half million well clothed and armed soldiers into the field. 'That is sufficient, it is no trifle, one can go a great ways with that.'"

During the interview, policy with reference to Greece, Albania, and Roumania was discussed, and Paschitsch finished with the suggestion of a marriage between the son of the Serbian King and "one of the Grand Duchesses" of Russia. After gracious reply, the Czar added:

"For Serbia we shall do everything, greet the King for me and tell him (in Russian) 'For Serbia we shall do all.'"⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Meaning an incorporation with Serbia of the Serbs and Croats of Austria-Hungary.

⁹⁵ Bogitschewich, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-34; *Remarques* etc., p. 64 (and see also *Annexe* on same page); *Is Germany Guilty?*, II, 52-9.

SUMMARY

The foregoing quotations leave little room for doubt of the truth of the following statements:

1. Prior to the annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908):

“there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in these two provinces.”

2. That feeling was at first “particularist and provincial,” but, with the change of dynasty in Serbia (1903):

“a new theory began to crop up, that of a union independent of the Hapsburgs, which should include not only all the Slavs under their rule, but also the independent Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula.”

It was at this period that:

“the existing particularist discontents within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy became linked up with the idea of the creation of a South Slav kingdom or federation, which should include Serbia. . . But within a few years the Jugo-Slav ideal made great headway, and, as was natural, it roused intense sympathy in Serbia.”

“Further the return of the Karageorgevitch dynasty restored Russian influence, and the question of Southern Slav union became once more an important factor of Balkan politics.”

3. “The start of a new movement, which looked to something more than local autonomy under the Hapsburg rule, and took into consideration union with the independent Serbian state beyond the Save, may be traced to that year” (1905).

4. Organization, in co-operation with Serbians, commenced with a meeting at Fiume (1905):

“From that time dates the Serbo-Croat or Pan-Serb propaganda which continued steadily to increase in strength.”

5. The annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908) caused “the most acute discontent and friction.”

“So bitter was the discontent . . . that it seemed for a moment as if Serbia would make armed protest against it, and risk everything by setting on foot insurrectionary movements against the Hapsburg rule, both in Bosnia itself and in the Austrian provinces beyond.”

6. But Russia, being temporarily incapacitated, refused to help Serbia.

“The South Slavs were obliged to swallow their wrath and submit; the only result of the business was to exacerbate the already existing quarrel.”

“Yet the Serbs emerged from out of the struggle stronger and prouder, and thoroughly aroused to the life-struggle which it was now obvious lay before them.”

7. Serbia promised (1909):

“to change the direction of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter in friendly and neighborly relations.”

8. The “acute discontent and friction” in Bosnia and Herzegovina resulted:

“in the outbreak of political crimes of violence against the local Austrian and Hungarian officials, of which the most notable were an attempt at Serajevo, in 1910, to assassinate General Varesanin, Governor of Bosnia; a second at Agram, in 1912, directed against Baron Cuvaj, Royal Commissary for Croatia; and a third and fourth, in the same place, against his successor in office, Baron Skerlec.”

“On the opening day of the Diet [of Bosnia-Herzegovina] a student fired at the Governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this shot inaugurated a series of violent outrages which culminated in the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand on June 28th 1914.”

9. “The Austrian Government maintained that the central nucleus of political crime was a Belgrade patriotic association called the *Narodna Odbrana* (‘National Defence’), which had been established in Serbia at the time of the Bosnian annexation, when open war with Austria had seemed probable. The society was not governmental or official, but many prominent Serbian soldiers and functionaries were members of it.”

10. “It would appear to be rather the fact that while the association as a body, and its responsible chiefs, confined themselves to their avowed programme, there were certain members, both native Serbs and Austrian subjects, who were cognizant of the various deeds of violence which took place in Croatia and Bosnia.”

11. “The imminent danger having passed, the society was radically reorganised. Its military programme was replaced by a different, peaceful activity, which entered into the national life. Its chief task now consisted in organising popular lectures, or, at most, rifle clubs in the villages, and in promoting the patriotic education of the people. All existing societies derived moral and material support from it.”

12. “Discontented Croats or Bosnians always betook themselves to Belgrade, and were regarded there as martyrs. Dismissed Jugo-Slav officers and cadets sometimes got commissions in the Serbian army. Exiled teachers joined the Serbian education department; students, ‘sent down’ for disloyalty, took degrees at Belgrade, and so forth.”

13. The “irritation and anger” of Austria-Hungary may be easily realized.

“It might be possible to imagine some parallel for ourselves [British] if Galway had happened to be only fifty miles from New York, and if, in the time of some Irish crisis, the Hibernian associations of the United States passed their usual resolutions from across a river instead of across an ocean.”

14. Notwithstanding the 1909 promises of Serbia:

“Her nationalist aspirations still continued, however, and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13 — successes which were compromised by Austria’s opposition to her territorial expansion. As Serbia grew, Austrian suspicion of her designs deepened.”

15. “In the light of this history, the storm of anti-Servian feeling which swept Austria-Hungary after the Serajevo murders is easily understood. It is a feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its exaggerations, and sympathise with its motives.”

16. “With regard to the Serajevo crime, we must regard it as a normal and logical successor of the various attempts made against Bosnian and Croatian governors and commissaries between 1909 and 1913.”

17. “As the national unification [Greater Serbia] could not be accomplished by Austria, it would perforce have to be effected outside the borders and in opposition to her. It was thus that the rôle of a Yugoslav Piedmont devolved upon Serbia. From thenceforth there were two centres of action tending towards Yugoslav Union: one among the Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavs, the other in Serbia.”

18. For Austria-Hungary, Serbia:
“owing to her increasing prestige, was a dangerous centre of attraction for the Yugoslavs.”

19. Serbia disliked her exclusion from the sea.
“To reach any seaport, it was necessary to transport her merchandise either through Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey — a fact which entailed a certain dependence upon them — and this knowledge gave birth to a desire to ameliorate the situation of the Kingdom. There accordingly sprang up that agitation in favor of an outlet to the Adriatic which was one of the principal reasons of Serbia’s participation in the first Balkan war.”

20. Some among the Serbians:
“more strongly imbued with the national idea, were undoubtedly carried beyond the extremes of international courtesy. To this extent, Austria-Hungary had a legitimate grievance.”

21. “The dream of Serbia and of all the Southern Slavs is the formation of a democratic kingdom, with Serbia at its head, which shall unite the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into one homogeneous nation.”

22. With reference to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand:
“It is no doubt true that this plot and many others were hatched in Servia, where the kindred peoples are also threatened by Austrian ambition. It is not regarded there as a crime, but as an heroic act of patriotism. Where we hold meetings in protest, they use bombs. To us it remains a crime.”

23. M. Bogitshevich has written:
“As regards the contents and the question of blame, however, I consider it my duty (however hard I find it, and however much I regret that matters turned out as they did) to state in the interests of historical

truth that the accusations of the Austro-Hungarian Note, with few slight exceptions, were just and correct."

24. Russian counsel in 1908-9 and in 1912-14 was an encouragement to Serbian aspirations. Serbia was advised to adopt:

"an understanding with Turkey, a calm attitude, military preparation, and watchful waiting."

All the above quotations are taken from authorities who may well be regarded as anti-Austrian. In their light, it is difficult to deny the accuracy of that part of the note delivered by Austria-Hungary to Serbia on 23 July 1914 which has been quoted on a previous page:⁹⁶

"The history of the last years, and especially the painful events of June 28th, have demonstrated the existence of a subversive movement in Servia whose aim is to separate certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This movement, which developed under the eyes of the Servian Government, has found expression subsequently beyond the territory of the kingdom, in acts of terrorism, a series of assassinations and murders. Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in the declaration of March 31st, 1909, the Servian Government has done nothing to suppress this movement."

Nor can it be denied that the Serbian agitation was a serious menace to the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.

COMPLAINTS, REPLIES, AND COMMENTS

Bearing in mind the situation as above described, and noting that the Austro-Hungarian government did not allege that the Serbian government, as such, had been a party to the assassination, nor that, by direct evidence, the official complicity of the *Narodna Odbrana*, as a society, could be established, let us look at the Austro-Hungarian complaints (23 July), the Serbian replies (25 July), and the Austro-Hungarian comments (28 July).⁹⁷ The first part of the indictment was as set out in the note of 23 July (above quoted), and to this, as a general reply, Serbia pleaded that, since her promises of 1909, Austria-Hungary had made no protest against the actions the existence of which she now asserted,

"excepting in the case of a textbook, in regard to which the I. and R. Government had received an entirely satisfactory explanation."

In the Austro-Hungarian comments, no reference is made to this statement, and the absence of previous complaint is well calculated to arouse suspicion of the existence of the alleged grievances. Probably some explanation may be found in the fact that, from the time of Serbia's promises (1909) down to her great accession of strength by the treaty of Bucarest (10 August 1913), her propaganda had not assumed suffi-

⁹⁶ Pp. 1001-2.

⁹⁷ These may be seen in Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 39; Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 34; Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 96; Coll. Dip. Docs., pp. 414-23, 507-14.

ciently menacing proportions.⁹⁸ Professor Pribram, after referring to the danger to Austria-Hungary from Pan-Serbian agitation, indicates that a division in Austro-Hungarian councils made action difficult:

“Most of the Hungarian statesmen advocated the use of force, while the Austrians preferred conciliation. . . . Time passed, and nothing was done. The South Slav sore, allowed to fester on the body of the Empire, spread over it until it brought about its death. The responsibility for this fact, so fateful for the Empire, and for the dynasty, rests largely with Francis Joseph, who in the last years of his reign continued to strive to preserve peace for his realm, but avoided decisive measures.”⁹⁹ In her Red Book of 1914,¹⁰⁰ Austria-Hungary complained that her “unparalleled patience had been interpreted as weakness by Servia.”

As a further general reply, Serbia argued that:

“The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for expressions of a private character, as for instance newspaper articles and the peaceable work of societies, expressions which are of very common appearance in other countries, and which ordinarily are not under the control of the state.”

Commenting upon this argument, Austria-Hungary declared that subjection of:

“the press and the societies to a certain control of the state . . . is also provided for by the Servian institutions”

— a statement that was supported, as far as related to societies, by Serbia’s undertaking to dissolve the *Narodna Odbrana*:

“. . . the Royal Government will accept the demand of the I. and R. Government and dissolve the society *Narodna Odbrana*, as well as every society which should act against Austria-Hungary.”

Austria-Hungary might well have added that any deficiency in Serbia’s laws was not a sufficient excuse for failure to fulfil her promises. Paschitsch, the Serbian Premier, pleaded that:

“the liberal democratic constitution of the country, notably with reference to associations and the press, gave to the government hardly any authority, and every attempt to increase the powers of the government and to permit it to take energetic action had always been foiled by the resistance of the *Skoupchtina*.”¹⁰¹

But the sufficient answer is that by failure to supply methods of implementing the national promise, the *Skoupchtina* assumed responsibility for its breach.

Proceeding to a specification of demands, the Austro-Hungarian note continued as follows:

“In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the Royal

⁹⁸ See Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 26.

⁹⁹ *Austrian Foreign Policy, 1908-18*, pp. 18-9.

¹⁰⁰ In the Introduction.

¹⁰¹ *Kautsky Docs.*, No. 32. Cf. No. 86.

Servian Government will publish on the first page of its official organ of July 26th, 1914, the following declaration:

"The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, *i.e.*, the entirety of those machinations whose aim it is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences of these criminal actions.

"The Royal Servian Government regrets that Servian officers and officials have participated in the propaganda, cited above, and have thus threatened the friendly and neighborly relations which the Royal Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its declaration of March 31st, 1900.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and rejects every thought or every attempt at influencing the destinations of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to call most emphatically to the attention of its officers and officials, and of the entire population of the Kingdom, that it will henceforth proceed with the utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar actions, to prevent and suppress which it will make every effort.

"This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the cognisance of the Royal Army through an order of H. M. the King, and it is to be published in the official organ of the Army."

With the demand for publication Serbia expressed her willingness to comply, with the following exceptions:

(1) Instead of agreeing to condemn "the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary," Serbia offered to condemn "every propaganda which should be directed against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian comment was (in part):

"The alteration in the declaration as demanded by us, which has been made by the Royal Servian Government, is meant to imply that a propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist, and that it is not aware of such."

(2) Instead of regretting "that Servian officers and officials have participated in the propaganda," Serbia offered to regret "that, according to a communication of the I. and R. Government, certain Servian officers," &c., thus avoiding acknowledgment of the acts charged.

Austria-Hungary's other demands, Serbia's replies, and Austria-Hungary's comments were as follows:

1st Demand: "to suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and whose general tendency is directed against the latter's territorial integrity."

In answer Serbia offered, by amendment of her press laws, to place her government in position to punish persons publishing documents

"whose general tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary,"

and to confiscate the publications — an amendment that ought to have been made in 1909. Austria-Hungary's comment was that the mere enactment of legislation:

“is of no use to us. For we want the obligation of the Government to enforce it, and that has not been promised us.”

2d Demand: “To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society *Narodna Odbrana*; to confiscate their entire means of propaganda; and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and associations in Servia which occupy themselves with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the necessary measures, so that the dissolved societies may not continue their activities under another name or in another form.”

The Serbian reply was as follows:

“The Government possesses no proofs, and the note of the I. and R. Government does not submit them, that the society *Narodna Odbrana* and other similar societies have committed, up to the present, any criminal actions of this manner through any of their members. Notwithstanding this, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the I. and R. Government and dissolve the society *Narodna Odbrana*, as well as every society which should act against Austria-Hungary.”

In her comment, Austria-Hungary very truly said:

“The propaganda of the *Narodna Odbrana* and affiliated societies hostile to the monarchy fills the entire public life of Servia: it is therefore an entirely unacceptable reserve if the Servian Government asserts that it knows nothing about it.”

Austria-Hungary also noted that Serbia did not agree to:

“take the necessary measures, so that the dissolved societies may not continue their activities under another name, or in another form.”

3d Demand: “without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Servia, so far as the corps of instructors as well as the means of instruction are concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary.”

The Serbian reply was as follows:

“The Royal Serbian Government binds itself without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Servia anything which might further the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, provided the I. and R. Government furnishes actual proofs.”

The Austro-Hungarian comment was as follows:

“Also in this case the Servian Government first demands proofs for a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy in the public instruction of Servia, while it must know that the textbooks introduced in the Servian schools contain objectionable matter in this direction, and that a large portion of the teachers are in the camp of *Narodna Odbrana* and affiliated societies.

“Furthermore the Servian Government has not fulfilled a part of our demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its text the addition

desired by us: 'as far as the body of instructors is concerned, as well as the means of instruction' — a sentence which shows clearly where the propaganda hostile to the Monarchy is to be found in the Servian schools."

4th Demand: "to remove from military service and the administration in general, all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of the material which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to the Royal Government."

The Serbian reply was as follows:

"The Royal Government is also ready to dismiss those officers and officials from the military and civil services in regard to whom it has been proved by judicial investigation that they have been guilty of actions against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy; and it expects that the I. and R. Government communicate to it for the purpose of starting the investigation the names of these officers and officials, and the facts with which they have been charged."

The Austro-Hungarian comment was as follows:

"By promising the dismissal from the military and civil services of those officers and officials who are found guilty by judicial procedure, the Servian Government limits its assent to those cases in which these persons have been charged with a crime according to the statutory code. As, however, we demand the removal of such officers and officials as indulge in a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy, which is generally not punishable in Servia, our demands have not been fulfilled on this point." This demand was one of the three to which Sazonoff made special objection. A telegram from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin (30 July) indicates that Serbia, for some reason, eventually withdrew opposition.¹⁰² Of that, however, there is no other evidence.

5th Demand: The second of the demands to which Sazonoff made special objection was that Serbia should:

"consent that, in Servia, officials of the Imperial and Royal Government co-operate in the suppression of a movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy."

The Serbian reply was as follows:

"The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear about the sense and the scope of that demand of the I. and R. Government which concerns the obligation on the part of the Royal Servian Government to permit the co-operation of officials of the I. and R. Government on Servian territory, but it declares that it is willing to accept every co-operation which does not run counter to international law and criminal law, as well as to the friendly and neighborly relations."

¹⁰² Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 30. The two "last points" referred to in the telegram were Nos. 5 and 6. Cf. Kautsky Docs., No. 357.

The Austro-Hungarian comment was as follows:

“The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The reserved attitude of Serbia is therefore incomprehensible, and, on account of its vague general form, it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties.”

Three days prior to issuing his comments, Berchtold had (25 July) instructed his Ambassador at St. Petersburg to explain to Sazonoff:

“that in putting forth this demand, we had only practical aims in view, and certainly did not mean in any way to offend Serbia’s sovereignty. In writing, point 5, ‘collaboration’ we were thinking of establishing in Belgrade a secret ‘*bureau de sureté*,’ similar to the Russian establishments in Paris and Berlin which would co-operate with the Servian police and administrative authority.”¹⁰³

The demand having in this way been rendered unobjectionable, Serbia indicated (29 July) her willingness to comply with it.¹⁰⁴

6th Demand: The third of the demands to which Sazonoff made special objection required Serbia:

“to commence a judicial investigation against the participants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who are on Servian territory. Officials delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government will participate in the examinations.”

The Serbian reply was as follows:

“The Royal Government considers it its duty as a matter of course to begin an investigation against all those persons who have participated in the outrage of June 28th and who are in its territory. As far as the co-operation in this investigation of specially delegated officials of the I. and R. Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as this is a violation of the constitution and of criminal procedure. Yet in some cases the result of the investigation might be communicated to the Austro-Hungarian officials.”

The Austro-Hungarian comment was as follows:

“The Austro-Hungarian demand was clear and unmistakable:

“1. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants in the outrage.

“2. Participation by I. and R. Government officials in the examinations (*Recherche*’ in contrast with *enquête judiciaire*’).

“3. It did not occur to us to let I. and R. Government officials participate in the Servian court procedure; they were to co-operate only in the police researches which had to furnish, and fix, the material for the investigation.

¹⁰³ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 38; Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 27. It will be observed that the word “collaboration” appears here instead of “co-operation” as in the original demand. The difference is a matter of translation.

¹⁰⁴ Kautsky Docs., No. 357; Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 30.

"If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between '*enquête judiciaire*' and simple police researches. As it desired to escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the co-operation of our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in great numbers), it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our demands as impossible."

Prior to this comment, Serbia had understood that Austria-Hungary demanded a right to take part in the proceedings "at the trial."¹⁰⁵ After hostilities had been prematurely commenced Serbia (30 July) intimated her willingness to comply with the demand.¹⁰⁶

7th Demand: "to proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Servian State Officials, who had been compromised through the result of the investigation." The Serbian reply was as follows:

"The Royal Government has ordered on the evening of the day on which the note was received the arrest of Major Voislav Tankosic. However, as far as Milan Ciganowic is concerned, who is a citizen of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and who has been employed till June 28th with the Railroad Department, it has as yet been impossible to locate him, wherefor a warrant has been issued against him.

"The I. and R. Government is asked to make known, as soon as possible, for the purpose of conducting the investigation, the existing grounds for suspicion, and the proofs of guilt obtained in the investigation at Serajevo."

The Austro-Hungarian comment was as follows:

"The reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation, Ciganowic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three days after the outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that Ciganowic had participated in the outrage. In the first place, it is therefore incorrect that Ciganowic left the Servian service on June 28th. In the second place, we add that the prefect of police in Belgrade, who had himself caused the departure of this Ciganowic and who knew his whereabouts, declared in an interview that a man by the name of Milan Ciganowic did not exist in Belgrade."

8th Demand: "to prevent, through effective measures, the participation of the Servian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the frontier and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz and Loznica who assisted the originators of the crime of Serajevo in crossing the frontier."

The Serbian reply was as follows:

"The Servian Government will amplify and render more severe the

¹⁰⁵ Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 6.

¹⁰⁶ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 30. Cf. Kautsky Docs., No. 357.

existing measures against the suppression of smuggling of arms and explosives.

"It is a matter of course that it will proceed at once against, and punish severely, those officials of the frontier service on the line Shabatz-Loznica who violated their duty and who have permitted the perpetrators of the crime to cross the frontier."

Upon this reply Austria-Hungary offered no comment.

9th Demand: "to give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in regard to the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries in Servia and abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their official position, to express themselves in interviews in a hostile manner against Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June 28th."

The Serbian reply was as follows:

"The Royal Government is ready to give explanations about the expressions which its officials in Servia and abroad have made in interviews after the outrage, and which, according to the assertion of the I. and R. Government, were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon as the I. and R. Government points out in detail where those expressions were made and succeeds in proving that those expressions have actually been made by the functionaries concerned, the Royal Government itself will take care that the necessary evidences and proofs are collected therefor."

The Austro-Hungarian comment was as follows:

"The Royal Servian Government must be aware of the interviews in question. If it demands of the I. and R. Government that it should furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews, and if it reserves for itself the right of a formal investigation, it shows that it is not its intention seriously to fulfil the demand."

10th Demand: "The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the Royal Government at the latest until Saturday, 25th inst., at 6 P.M. A memoir concerning the results of the investigation at Serajevo, so far as they concern points 7 and 8, is enclosed with this note."

The Serbian reply was as follows:

"The Royal Government will notify the I. and R. Government, so far as this has not been already done by the present note, of the execution of the measures in question as soon as one of those measures has been ordered and put into execution."

To her replies, Serbia added the following:

"The Royal Servian Government believes it to be the common interest not to rush the solution of this affair, and it is, therefore, in case the I. and R. Government should not consider itself satisfied with this answer, ready, as ever, to accept a peaceable solution, be it by referring the decision of this question to the International Court at the Hague, or by leaving it to the decision of the Great Powers who have participated in the working out of the declaration given by the Servian Government on March 31st, 1909."

Upon Serbia's whole document, Austria-Hungary commented:

"The Servian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time."¹⁰⁷

Russia's Attitude. It is now important to ascertain more particularly the Russian view of the demands. On 24 July, in a conversation with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador (as he reported), Sazonoff denounced them; "protested vigorously against the dissolution of the Society 'Narodna Odbrana'"; and objected specifically to the fifth demand — **Austro-Hungarian**

"functionaries taking an active part in the suppression of the subversive movement."¹⁰⁸

In reply to the Ambassador's report, Berchtold telegraphed to him (25th) the satisfactory explanation of point 5 above quoted. And Serbia, in her note to Austria-Hungary, having undertaken to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana, that objection, too, was eliminated. In reporting a more important conversation of the 26th¹⁰⁹ with Sazonoff, the Ambassador said that Sazonoff had declared:

"that of the ten points, seven were acceptable without great difficulties, but that the two points referring to collaboration of Imp. and Roy. functionaries in Servia" (the 5th and 6th points), "and the point in which we demand *ad libitum* the dismissal of officers and officials, which we name" (the 4th point), "are in their present form altogether unacceptable. With regard to the 5th point I was able to give a full interpretation, having been instructed by your Excellency's telegram No. 172 of the 25th July."¹¹⁰ With regard to the other two points, I said I did not know how my government interpreted them, but that both were absolutely necessary."¹¹¹

According to Sazonoff's account of the same conversation, he drew the attention of the Ambassador:

"to the fact that, quite apart from the clumsy form in which they were presented, some of them were quite impracticable, even if the Servian Government agreed to accept them. Thus, for example, points 1 and 2 could not be carried out without recasting the Servian press-law and associations-law, and to that it might be difficult to obtain the consent of the Skupchtina. As for enforcing points 4 and 5, this might lead to most dangerous consequences, and even to the risk of acts of terrorism

¹⁰⁷ The foregoing quotations are from *The Original Telegrams and Notes* as they appear in the German White Bk., 1914: Coll. Dip. Docs., pp. 414-23.

¹⁰⁸ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, Nos. 16-18. Cf. Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 14.

¹⁰⁹ Szápáry telegraphed under date of the 27th, but Sazonoff's account of the same interview (Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 25) is dated the 26th, and the German Ambassador telegraphed to Berlin an account of it on the 26th. (Kautsky Docs., No. 238.) Moreover, Szápáry's account itself contains, at two places, evidences of having been written on the 26th.

¹¹⁰ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 38; Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 27.

¹¹¹ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 73. The telegram appears in different form in Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 31. Cf. Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, Nos. 25, 31; Kautsky Docs., No. 238.

directed against the Royal Family, and against Pashitch, which clearly could not be the intention of Austria. With regard to the other points it seemed to me that, with certain changes of detail, it would not be difficult to find a basis of mutual agreement, if the accusations contained in them were confirmed by sufficient proof."

Sazonoff added that it was:

"most desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador should be authorized to enter into a private exchange of views in order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of the 10th (23rd) July in consultation with me."¹¹²

The seven points which, according to the Ambassador, "were acceptable without much difficulty" were those above numbered 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10. Of the remaining three, it is clear (as already noted¹¹³) that objection to points 5 and 6 was removed by Austro-Hungarian explanations, and it may be that objection to point 4 was withdrawn. If we accept Sazonoff's account of the conversation, it will be observed that his only comment with reference to points 1 and 2 was not that they were unreasonable, but that the Serbian parliament might not agree to them; that he made no specific objection to point 6 (as the Ambassador had understood); and that his criticism of points 4 and 5 was that compliance with them "might lead to most dangerous consequences" in Serbia. Evidently, in Sazonoff's opinion, Austria-Hungary had good reason for complaint against Serbia, but had not framed her demands properly. He offered to help in the redrafting of the document.

Comment. Upon the whole, if it be admitted (as seems to be necessary) that Austria-Hungary had solid ground for complaint in respect of the matters referred to in her note, perhaps the worst that can be said of her demands is that they were clumsily framed; that her time-limit was unreasonable; and that she did not desire compliance. She wanted war. On the other hand, while some of Serbia's replies merited the Austro-Hungarian comments, they certainly supplied basis for discussion; and the Kaiser's impression (written immediately after perusal of them) will probably be the verdict of history:

"After reading the Serbian reply, which I received this morning, I am convinced that the desires of the Dual Monarchy are substantially fulfilled. The few reservations which Serbia has made on particular points can, in my judgment, be cleared up by negotiation. But her capitulation (one of the most submissive kind) is here proclaimed to all the world, and with it every reason for war falls to the ground."¹¹⁴

All these facts must be borne in mind when reading, in the next succeeding chapter, the diplomatic interchanges with reference to conversations between Austria-Hungary and Russia.

¹¹² Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 25. See *ante*, pp. 1020-22.

¹¹³ *Ante*, pp. 1038-40.

¹¹⁴ Kautsky Docs., No. 293; Kautsky: *The Guilt &c.*, p. 136.

RESPONSIBILITY OF SERBIA

There still remains the question whether Serbia ought to have been held to be accountable for the aspirations of her people, and for what some of them did with a view to the realization of those aspirations. In a despatch of 21 July 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg related a conversation which he had had that day with M. Poincaré, the President of the French Republic:

“Monsieur Poincaré then delivered a kind of lecture, using all his oratorical powers, and explained that to make a government responsible for anything was only admissible when there were concrete proofs against it, otherwise a *démarche* of this kind would be a mere pretext, and this he could not suppose Austria-Hungary to be guilty of, in the case of such a small country. At any rate one must not forget that Serbia has friends, and that a situation might be created, which might become dangerous to peace. I confined myself to a quiet and precise answer, remarking that up to a certain degree every government is responsible for everything that happens on its territory. The president sought to refute this thesis, by constituting analogous cases between other states, so that I could not but say that all depended upon circumstances and that analogies and generalisations did not serve.”¹¹⁵

On 20 July, the German Ambassador at Rome reported that the Italian Foreign Minister had expressed the same opinion. He said: “that San Giuliano had consulted Fusinato on the subject, who had declared that a foreign state could only be made responsible for common crimes and certainly not for political propaganda. The murder of the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary was not committed by Servian subjects, and could not therefore be the ground of reclamations.”¹¹⁶ Distinction must be made between complicity of the government in the murder, and responsibility for the years of propaganda with the murder as the not unnatural climax. It was of the latter of these that Austria-Hungary complained. In his circular despatch of 23 July 1914, Berchtold said:

“The iniquitous deed of Serajevo, which has caused horror and indignation all the world over, must be regarded as a direct consequence of the agitation spread abroad from Belgrade. The inquiry, which has been initiated, has shown that the crime is not the deed of a single insane individual, but the work of a complicated plot and conspiracy, the origin of which reaches across the frontier to the neighboring kingdom.”¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., I, No. 45. Cf. Kautsky Docs., No. 134.

¹¹⁶ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., I, No. 35. Cf. Kautsky Docs., No. 42. Sazonoff expressed the same opinion (Kautsky Docs., No. 204), as also did Paschitsch, the Serbian Prime Minister (*ibid.*, No. 32).

¹¹⁷ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., I, No. 73.

If Poincaré meant that one country has no right to complain of what takes place in a neighbouring country, unless it can, by "concrete proofs," trace the authorship directly to its neighbour's government, he was announcing an international principle that has never been acknowledged. Rather is it true that to a certain degree every government is responsible for everything that happens on its territory. That must be so. A nation can protect itself against machinations within its own boundaries. But it can take no proceedings against persons in a neighbouring territory who may be plotting there. For remedy of grievance in that regard, it must look to the government of the territory in which the acts complained of take place.

The United States. The principle is well recognized. For example, when Irish citizens of the United States were gathering on the northern border with the intention of attempting to overthrow the Canadian government, the American administration felt that its duty demanded prohibitory action. On various occasions, too, although the federal government of the United States has declared that it is not responsible for the actions of individual states, it has been obliged to acknowledge that, as foreign governments have no relations with these states, complaint must be made at Washington, and satisfaction demanded there.

Irish Propaganda in the United States. Replying, in the House of Commons on 7 December 1920, to a question as to whether: "the time has not arrived when Great Britain should make serious representations to the United States Government that any further toleration of de Valera and the conferring on him of municipal honors was an unfriendly act,"

Mr. Bonar Law said:

"I think there is no doubt that we would, from the diplomatic point of view, have the right to take the course suggested. But it is not a question of a right, but of what is expedient."

Responding to another query, Mr. Bonar Law said:

"Undoubtedly a very severe campaign is being conducted in America against this country, but so far we have found the Americans can be trusted to look at the matter from a reasonable point of view."

The Orsini Case. On 14 January 1858, Orsini (an Italian refugee) and his accomplices attempted the life of Napoleon III by throwing a bomb under his carriage.¹¹⁸ The plot having been arranged in England, the bombs having been made in Birmingham, and Orsini having travelled to France under the protection of an English passport, the French Foreign Minister complained of the laxity of the English laws in that respect:

"Ought the English legislation to contribute to their designs and continue to shelter persons who place themselves beyond the pale of common right and under the ban of humanity? Her Britannic Majesty's

¹¹⁸ The Emperor was little hurt, but some twenty other persons were killed.

Government can assist us in averting a repetition of such guilty enterprises by affording us a guarantee of security which no state can refuse to a neighboring state, and which we are authorized to expect from an ally.¹¹⁹

Quite recognizing the justice of the complaint, the British government (under Lord Palmerston) introduced a bill amending the law; but although he carried his motion for introduction by a vote of 299 to 99, the bill, in its second reading, was defeated by 234 to 215. The change in the vote was due, not in any way to a disposition to deny the existence of obligation to suppress conspiracies aimed at friendly Powers, but to the feeling that what might be done voluntarily ought not to be conceded to foreign demand.¹²⁰

Serbia's Duty. Any one who would attempt to lay down precise rules of conduct as between states would meet with difficulty. Probably, as in the conduct of internal government, each case ought to be dealt with according to its own circumstances. England rather prides herself upon the fact that refugees not only find asylum upon her shores, but may carry on their propaganda from there. She tolerates them as she does all sorts of propagators of sedition aimed at her own government. But as these last must not exceed certain limits, so does she recognize that her territory must not be a base of operations dangerous to the integrity of other states.

Very special duty in this regard rested upon Serbia. For, in addition to any obligation customarily recognized, she had, only five years previously, given written pledge:

"to change the direction of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter in friendly and neighbourly relations."¹²¹

Perhaps we may take Sir Edward Grey as decisive authority upon the point. In his opinion, as we have already seen,¹²² "There must, of course, be some humiliation of Servia." Even if mediation were undertaken by the Great Powers:

"the Serbs would, in any case," he said, "be chastised, and, with Russia's approval, forced to subordinate themselves to Austria's wishes. Austria could thus obtain guarantees for the future without a war which would put the peace of Europe in danger."¹²³

¹¹⁹ Ashley: *Life of Lord Palmerston*, II, p. 353.

¹²⁰ See *ibid.*, pp. 333-7; *Ann. Reg.*, 1858, pp. [32-50; J. A. R. Marriott, *England Since Waterloo*, pp. 298-300; *The Camb. Mod. Hist.*, XI, pp. 327-8. As these pages are passing through the press, propaganda in England by Russian internationalists (the Zinovieff letter) is being charged to the account of the Russian Government, and for the assassination of Sir Lee Stach, the British Government is holding the Egyptian responsible.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 1061.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 1018.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

Method of Redress. The foregoing citations make sufficiently certain that Austria-Hungary had a right to complain of the propaganda aimed at her disruption. Whether she was justified in proceeding in the peremptory manner which she adopted, is open to dispute. Two considerations may be suggested: First, on three separate occasions — 1881, 1889, and 1909 — Serbia had made promise of correct conduct; undoubtedly the promise had been broken; was there any reason for believing that a further promise would be fulfilled? Indeed, the circumstances were such as made it impossible of fulfillment. The “legitimate aspirations” of a virile people cannot be extinguished by forcing their government to promise abandonment. Protection can be obtained only by reduction in the military strength of the menacing nation. Second, Austria-Hungary had much better ground for declaring war upon Serbia than had the United States for war against Spain in 1898, or the United Kingdom against the Transvaal in 1899.¹²⁴ To the contention that, in the Balkan case, Austria-Hungary’s action meant war not merely against Serbia but a European war, the reply is that, for the expansion, Austria-Hungary was not responsible. Neither the United Kingdom nor the United States would listen to proposals for arbitration with their proposed victims. And, unless actuated by fear, neither of them would have stayed her hand because of possible intervention.

CONCLUSIONS

From what has been said, the following conclusions may safely be drawn:

1. Under the circumstances, the demands made by Austria-Hungary (as afterwards explained) were not, with the exception of the forty-eight-hour limit for reply, unreasonable. They were clumsily framed. And they were designed with a view to non-acceptance and war.

2. While the reply was conciliatory, it is not true, as frequently asserted, that Serbia acceded to all the demands, except two, and these she offered to submit to arbitration.

3. But the reply was such as removed “every reason for war.” It might well have formed a basis for negotiation and mediation. Responsibility for failure of solution in that way is the subject of the next succeeding chapter.

4. Serbia, as a matter of international usage, and because of her treaty-promise, was answerable for propaganda, carried on within her limits, dangerous to the integrity of Austria-Hungary.

5. Whether for failure in this respect Austria-Hungary was justified in forcing punitive war upon Serbia, may be debatable. In considering that subject, note must be taken of what is now to follow.

¹²⁴ That it was the Transvaal, and not the United Kingdom, which declared war, is, of course, immaterial. It was the United Kingdom, and not Germany, which declared war in 1914.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN, RUSSIAN, AND GERMAN ATTITUDES —
JUNE AND JULY 1914

Austro-Hungarian Attitude. In considering the action of Austria-Hungary in July 1914, we must endeavor to ascertain her point of view; and, fortunately, for that purpose we have ample documents of unimpeachable authenticity, namely, the three volumes entitled *Austrian Red Book: Official Files pertaining to Pre-War History*. Preliminarily, we may remember that the result of the two Balkan wars of 1912-13 had seriously prejudiced the position of Austria-Hungary, (1) by closing her route to Salonica and Constantinople, and (2) by enhancing the size and strength, and whetting the ambitions of Serbia. Austria-Hungary had wished to intervene when, at Bucarest (1913), the territory taken from Turkey was partitioned among the Balkan states, but had met with refusal of assistance from one of her allies — Italy, and with counsel of delay from the other — Germany.

The Memoir. Whether, between that time and June of 1914, the subject was again discussed between Austria-Hungary and Germany, and whether, during the visit of the Kaiser to Franz Ferdinand at Konopischt (12 June 1914), any resolution was arrived at, are matters for surmise.¹²⁵ Certainty commences with the preparation (very shortly after the Konopischt meeting, and prior to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand) by Austria-Hungary of a "Memoir" for presentation to Germany¹²⁶ in which the necessity for some kind of activity was argued at considerable length. In transcribing from the document the following extracts, paragraph headings have been added:

RECENT CHANGES INJURIOUS. "If we compare the present situation [that is, after the treaty of Bucarest] impartially with the situation before the crisis, we must admit that the total result cannot be judged favorably either from the point of view of Austria-Hungary or of that of the Triple Alliance. . . . Turkey, whose interests tallied with those of the Triple Alliance, and which weighed heavily in the balance against Russia and the Balkan countries, has been almost entirely driven out of Europe, and has suffered considerably in its *prestige* as a Great Power. Serbia, whose policy has for many years been hostile towards Austria-Hungary, and stands entirely under Russian influence, has gained both in population and in territory, much more than it ever expected. Its territorial neighbourhood to Montenegro, and the visible growth of the idea of a Greater Serbia, makes an aggrandisement achieved by a union with Montenegro a not unlikely event. And last, not least, the relations of Roumania with the Triple Alliance have undergone a considerable change in the course of the crisis."

¹²⁵ Kautsky, *The Guilt* &c., p. 54.

¹²⁶ *Aus. Red Bk., O. F., I*, pp. 3-13.

BALKAN LEAGUES. After reference to the advantage of the recent "creation of an independent Albanian state," and to the supposedly independent attitudes of Greece and Bulgaria, the Memoir declared that:

"Russian and French diplomacy has launched upon a course, which aims at improving the advantages obtained and modifying the results of what is to their disadvantage."

Russia, seconded by France, had wished to form the first Balkan League — Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro — in 1912, as offset against "the military superiority of the Triple Alliance":

"The first condition for the realisation of this plan was to exclude Turkey from the territory inhabited by the Christian Balkan peoples, so as to increase the latter's importance and give them full freedom towards the west. The last war has in a general way realised this condition. But on the other hand the war caused a division of the Balkan states, which now stand against each other in two equally strong opposing groups, Turkey and Bulgaria on one side, the two Servian states, Greece and Roumania, on the other.

"The next task which Russia wished to accomplish with the aid of France, was to annul this division, or at least to change its proportions, so as to obtain the greater number of Balkan states when the European forces are measured against each other."

"There can be no doubt as to the basis upon which Russian and French diplomacy intends bringing about the adjustment of all this opposition and rivalry and forming a new Balkan league. A league of the Balkan states, now that Turkey is no longer in question, must be founded on a programme directed against Austria-Hungary, at the expense of whose territorial integrity the members of the league might be promised an advance of their frontiers toward the west. It is scarcely possible to imagine any other basis for a Balkan league; the basis as above mentioned, is by no means out of question and even on the way to become a fact."

This new Balkan League was to include all the states, except Bulgaria, and as to it, Russia and France were:

"hard at work to bring about the complete isolation of Bulgaria with a view to making it more pliable to the wishes of Russia. . . . Up to the present the policy of isolating Bulgaria has not borne visible fruits, perhaps because there has, as yet, been no reason why Sofia should distrust the intentions of Turkey. Still Russia is justified in expecting that the complete isolation of Bulgaria in the Balkans and in Europe would make it necessary for Bulgaria to give up its present course of politics and to accept the conditions which Russia would enforce, before it granted Bulgaria its protection and patronage."

ROUMANIA. "Roumania, like Serbia, had designs upon Austro-Hungarian territory, that is upon Transylvania and Bukowina. Roumania

had, indeed, been in war-alliance with the Central Powers since 1883, but *entente* diplomacy had made the promised co-operation uncertain of fulfillment:

"As to Roumania, the action of Russia and France became intense before the crisis in the Balkans, and with the help of extraordinary distortions and by cleverly encouraging the old idea of a Greater Roumania, which in this country always smoulders under the fire, had inspired public opinion with hostile feelings against the monarchy and had persuaded Roumania to a military co-operation with Servia, which was scarcely fair, when its duties as an ally of Austria-Hungary are taken into consideration.

"This action has not in any way been interrupted; on the contrary, it was continued most emphatically with impressive and demonstrative means, such as the Czar's visit to the court of Roumania.

"At the same time a complete change took place in Roumanian public opinion, and there can be no doubt, by this time, that wide circles in the army, among the intelligent classes, and among the people are in favor of a new course, and in favor of approaching Russia, of a policy which would have the aim of liberating 'our brothers on the other side of the Carpathians.' There can be no doubt that the ground has been well prepared for the eventuality of Roumania joining a Balkan league, if it were founded."

"Under these circumstances, it is practically impossible that the alliance [the Austro-Hungarian alliance] with Roumania should ever again become so reliable and so trustworthy that it might be regarded as the pivot for Austria-Hungary's Balkan politics.

"The political and military importance of Roumania make it imperative for Austria-Hungary not to continue remaining passive and possibly imperil its own defences, but to commence military preparations and political actions that will dispel or at least attenuate the effects of Roumania's neutrality and eventual hostility."

"All Austria-Hungary's past military preparations for the eventuality of a conflict with Russia were based upon the supposition of Roumania's co-operation. If this supposition proves fictitious, if there is not even the certainty that Roumania will not become aggressive, the monarchy must change its dispositions for the eventuality of a war, and must take into consideration that fortifications against Roumania will become necessary."

BULGARIA AND TURKEY. "From a political point of view, Roumania must be shown that we are fully able to choose a different point of support for our Balkan policy. While this is being achieved, the necessity arises to take effective measures for paralyzing the efforts made by the Entente Powers for the establishment of a new Balkan League. Both actions cannot be otherwise realised than by accepting the offer of Bulgaria, made a year ago and repeated several times since, the offer of

concluding a definite treaty with that state. At the same time the monarchy must direct its policy towards bringing about an alliance between Turkey and Bulgaria, in favor of which both states are so well disposed that a short time ago a draught for such a treaty has been worked out, though it has not been signed. . . . Roumania's attitude literally propels Austria-Hungary in the direction of granting Bulgaria what it has long asked for, and what will frustrate Russia's policy of isolating Bulgaria. But these things must be done while the roads to Sofia and Constantinople are still open."

GERMANY. "Before Austria-Hungary undertakes the action in question, it is most anxious to establish a full understanding with the German Empire, not only in consideration of old traditions, or of what is due to a close ally, but more especially because vital interests of the Triple Alliance and of Germany are at stake, and the safety of common interests can only be ensured if the joint action of Russia and France is opposed by a joint action of the Triple Alliance, especially of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

"It must be considered that if Russia, sustained by France, tries to unite the Balkan states against Austria-Hungary, if it undermines the relations with Roumania, which are already not the best, these hostile actions are not directed against Austria-Hungary alone, but quite as much against the German Empire, whose geographical situation and internal structure make it the more exposed and accessible part of the Central-European bloc, which stands in the way of the realisation of Russia's world-politic plans."

RUSSIA. "It is the aim of the two allied Powers to check the superiority of the two Empires by making sure of helpful troops on the Balkan, but this is by no means the ultimate aim of Russia. While France hopes to weaken the monarchy, because this would promote the aspirations of *revanche*, the intentions of Russia are much more comprehensive.

"If we analyse the development of Russia during the two last centuries, the extension of its territory, the growth of its number of inhabitants, so much more rapid than that of all other Great Powers in Europe, the progress of its economical resources and of its military command of power, and if we consider that this enormous Empire is still as good as debarred of the sea, partly by its situation and partly by treaties, it is not difficult to understand why Russia's policy has at all times borne an immanently aggressive character.

"It is not in reason to assume that Russia harbors territorial plans of conquest at the expense of Germany, still the extraordinary armaments and the extensive preparations of war, the building of strategical railways towards the west certainly point more to Germany than to Austria-Hungary.

"Russia has found out that the realisation of its plans in Europe and

Asia, arising from internal necessities, would violate Germany's vital interests and would perforce meet resistance.

"The policy of Russia is determined by unchangeable circumstances and is therefore constant and far-seeing.

"The manifest tendencies of Russia to isolate and detach Austria-Hungary, which is not following a course of world-policy, have the ultimate aim of making it impossible for the German Empire to continue its resistance against final success and against its political and economical supremacy."

It will be observed that this Memoir was not prepared with a view to the commencement of immediate war with Serbia. On the contrary, its purpose was to point out to Germany the dangers of the situation, and to recommend the inauguration of a certain line of diplomatic policy, namely, counteraction of Russian and French designs by the formation of a Balkan League under the auspices of Austria-Hungary. After the completion of the Memoir, Franz Ferdinand was assassinated, and the draftsman of the document added the following:

"Austria-Hungary has shown good-will and friendliness to bring about tolerable relations with Serbia. We have a fresh opportunity of judging that all these efforts were in vain and that the monarchy must in future look to the tenacious, irreconcilable and aggressive enmity of Serbia. It is all the more necessary for the monarchy to seize the threads which its enemies are weaving into a net over its head with a strong hand and tear them once for all."

Russian Attitude. Contrast between Austrian pessimism, as revealed in the Memoir, and Russia's satisfaction with the situation may be seen in the report of the Russian Ambassador at Vienna (3 April 1914):

"However deplorable the second Balkan war has been from the point of view of the Slavs, one cannot deny that the result of this war, so far as it is a question of special Russian interest, has been advantageous to us. Indeed what would have happened if wisdom had prevailed at Sofia at the conclusion of the armistice with Turkey, and if the Bulgarian Government had been willing to accept the justifiable demands of Serbia as to the alteration of the agreement existing between them and the entirely unjustifiable, but relatively modest, demands of Roumania? So far as the expansion of her territory and strength of her population are concerned, Bulgaria would have become the greatest of the Balkan States; Roumania would have hastened to approach her, probably Turkey too, and if finally even a rapprochement with Austria had been brought about — which I have always thought possible even before the war with Serbia — a block hostile to us would have been formed in the Balkans, consisting of Austria, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Turkey. Now, however, under existing political conditions, Austria is entirely isolated in the Balkans, and every attempt on her part to alter the *status quo*

would meet with decided resistance on the part of the League — Roumania, Serbia, and Greece. For this reason, everything must be avoided that could set Roumania at variance with Serbia and Greece, an end which Austrian diplomacy will probably try to attain. In this respect, Austria possesses an efficacious means in Albania. It must be understood at Belgrade and Athens that every imprudence on their part can only be of service to Austria, as it would evoke Roumania's dissatisfaction, whilst Austria and Italy, left to themselves in Albania, would ultimately quarrel. This situation, and the knowledge that the Vienna Cabinet has committed an error in supporting Bulgaria during the last crisis, are calling forth in Austria and Hungary that vague general apprehension which has become apparent of late.

“ In conclusion, I should like to express my regret that our newspapers, and especially the French ones, are so noisily expressing their satisfaction as to the new course of Roumanian policy. To do this is quite futile, because the only significant fact for us is that we have disengaged Roumania from the coalition opposed to us, and not the diplomatic success obtained. This noise, however, excites our enemies and induces them to do their utmost to retrieve what they have lost. In Roumania, this circumstance will be used by the elements hostile to us, so as to represent matters as if the Entente Powers wished to compromise Roumania and cut off her retreat.¹²⁷

Emperor-King to Kaiser. On the 2d July, the Emperor-King sent the Memoir to the Kaiser with a letter in which he said:

“ The crime committed against my nephew is the direct consequence of the agitation carried on by Russian and Servian Panславists, whose sole aim is to weaken the Triple Alliance and shatter my Empire. The researches made up to the present have shown that the bloody deed of Serajevo is not the work of a single individual but the result of a well-organised plot, the threads of which reach to Belgrade, and though it may be impossible to prove the complicity of the Servian government, there can be no doubt whatever that this government's policy, intent as it is to unite all South-Slavs under the Servian flag, must encourage such crimes, and that if it is not stopped, it will prove a lasting danger to my house and to my countries.

“ This danger is increased by the fact that Roumania, though it is allied to us, entertains intimate bonds of friendship with Servia and tolerates the same hateful agitation within its realm as Servia does. I find it difficult to doubt the good faith of such an old friend as King Charles of Roumania; but he has within the last two months twice declared to my minister in Bucarest that in view of the excited and hostile sentiments of his people he would, if serious events arose, find it impossible to do his duty as an ally.

¹²⁷ Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 442-4.

“At the same time the present Roumanian government is openly encouraging the aims of the league of culture; it favors the approachment of Servia and is trying to found a new Balkan league, which cannot but be directed against my Empire.”

“I fear that merely giving good advice will be of no avail and that Roumania can only be rescued for the Triple Alliance if we make it impossible for a Balkan league to be founded under the patronage of Russia, by gaining Bulgaria for the Triple Alliance and making Bucarest understand clearly that the friends of Servia cannot be our friends, and that Roumania must not look to us as allies, if it does not break with Servia and does not at the same time stop the agitation directed against my Empire in Roumania.

“My government’s efforts must in future be directed to isolating Servia and reducing its size. The first step on the road would be the strengthening of the present Bulgarian government, so that Bulgaria, whose real interests tally with ours, would not be tempted to turn to its old love for Russia. If Bucarest finds out that the Triple Alliance is resolved not to renounce friendship with Bulgaria, but is prepared to cause Bulgaria to make friends with Roumania and guarantee its integrity, it is possible that Roumania will abandon the dangerous road into which the friendship with Servia has led it, and the approaching of Russia has tempted it. If we succeed in this, we might make the attempt to reconcile Greece with Bulgaria and Turkey. A new Balkan league could then be formed under the patronage of the Triple Alliance, whose aim would be to stop the progress of the panslavist flood and ensure lasting peace for our countries. This will not be otherwise possible but by pushing aside Servia and preventing it from becoming a factor of power in the Balkans, as it is at present the cornerstone of panslavist politics.

“After the recent terrible events in Bosnia, I am certain that you are also convinced that a conciliation between Servia and us is out of the question and that the peace-loving policy of all European monarchs is threatened, while this centre of criminal agitation continues unpunished in Belgrade.”¹²⁸

The apprehensions expressed in the Memoir and letter were well founded. Servia desired expansion at the expense of Austria-Hungary. Russia, as we know from other sources, was busily engaged in forming a second Balkan League. Turkey, still regarded by Germany as an ally, had been enfeebled. And Roumania, upon whose co-operation Austro-Hungarian military policy in the past had been based, could no longer be regarded “as the pivot of Austria-Hungary’s Balkan policies.” Indeed, she too, for Greater-Roumanian purposes, “tolerates the same hateful agitation within its realm as Servia does.” And the remedy is to be found in

“pushing aside Servia and preventing it from becoming a factor of

¹²⁸ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., I, pp. 1, 2, 3.

power in the Balkans, as it is at present the cornerstone of panslavist politics."

Reply of the Kaiser. On 5 July, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin presented the letter and Memoir to the Kaiser, and thereafter reported as follows:

"The first thing he assured me was that he had expected some serious step on our part towards Serbia, but that at the same time he must confess that the detailed statement of His Majesty made him regard a serious European complication possible, and that he could give no definite answer before having taken counsel with the Imperial Chancellor.

"After lunch, when I again called attention to the seriousness of the situation, the Emperor authorised me to inform our gracious Majesty that we might in this case, as in all others, rely upon Germany's full support. He must, as he said before, first hear what the Imperial Chancellor has to say, but he did not doubt in the least that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg would agree with him, especially as far as our action against Serbia was concerned. But it was his (Emperor William's) opinion that this action must not be delayed. Russia's attitude will no doubt be hostile, but to this he has been for years prepared, and should a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia be unavoidable, we might be convinced that Germany, our old faithful ally, would stand at our side. Russia at the present time was in no way prepared for war, and would think twice before it appealed to arms. But it will certainly set other Powers on to the Triple Alliance, and add fuel to the fire in the Balkans.

"He understands perfectly well that His Apostolic Majesty, in his well-known love of peace, would be reluctant to march into Serbia; but if we had really recognised the necessity of warlike action against Serbia, he (Emperor William) would regret if we did not make use of the present moment, which is all in our favor."¹²⁹

The next morning, the Kaiser left for a trip in the Baltic. From Bornholm, he wrote to the Emperor-King (14 July) a letter in which he said:

"Your deserving Ambassador, whom I esteem highly, must have given you my assurance that in the hour of serious danger you will find me and my Empire, in full harmony with our old tried friendship and with our duties as faithful allies, at your side. It is a pleasant duty to repeat this assurance in this place.

"The horrible crime of Serajevo has thrown a gruesome light upon the pernicious doings of insane fanatics and panslavist agitation threatening the structure of our Empires. I must renounce expressing an opinion on the question which at this moment remains undecided between your government and Serbia. Still I consider it a moral duty for all cultured States, and a duty towards their own preservation, to oppose this prac-

¹²⁹ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., I, No. 6.

tical propaganda which attacks the sound foundation of all monarchies, to the utmost of their power. I do not close my eyes to the grave danger which threatens our countries, and at the same time the Triple Alliance, from this Russian and panslavist agitation. I perfectly see the necessity of relieving your southern frontier from the heavy burden which oppresses it. I am therefore willing to support the efforts of your government for preventing the establishment of a new Balkan league under the patronage of Russia, hostile to Austria-Hungary, and overmore to bring about the accession of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance."¹³⁰

Austro-Hungarian Council — 7 July. Well assured of Germany's support, the Austro-Hungarian Council of Ministers for Common Concerns met on 7 July, with the result, as summed in the official state report, as follows:

"1. That all present wish for a speedy decision of the controversy with Servia, whether it be decided in a warlike or a peaceful manner.

"2. That the Council of Ministers is prepared to adopt the view of the Royal Hungarian Premier (Tisza), according to which the mobilization is not to take place until after concrete demands have been addressed to Servia and, after being refused, an ultimatum has been sent.

"All present, except the Royal Hungarian Premier, hold the belief that a purely diplomatic success, even if it ended with a glaring humiliation of Servia, would be worthless, and that therefore such stringent demands must be addressed to Servia that will make a refusal almost certain, so that the road to a radical solution by means of a military action should be opened."¹³¹

The report¹³² contains notes of the observations of each of the speakers, and from these we learn that the reasons adduced for the adoption of "a radical solution" were as follows: Russia's efforts to form:

"a league of the Balkan states, including Roumania, which it would at a suitable moment play out against our Monarchy . . . in the face of this policy our situation must become more precarious as time goes on, all the more because if we do not act, our own South-slavs and Roumanians will interpret our attitude as weakness, and would be all the more disposed to lend a willing ear to the persuasions of our neighbours across the frontier."

Answering the view of the Hungarian Premier (Tisza) that:

"a marked diplomatic success, which would cause a deep humiliation of Servia, would decidedly improve our situation and give us a chance of initiating an advantageous policy in the Balkans,"

the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Berchtold) contended that:

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 18.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, No. 8.

¹³² *Ibid.*, No. 8, pp. 21-33.

“diplomatic successes against Serbia had increased the Monarchy’s *prestige* for the time being, but had in the end also increased the tension in the relations with Serbia. Neither our success in the crisis of the annexation, nor that of creating the Albanian state, nor yet Serbia having had to give way after the ultimatum of the autumn of last year,¹³³ changed any of our circumstances. A radical solution of the question raised by the propaganda for a Greater Serbia, which is systematically set to work in Belgrade and whose corrupting effects we feel from Agram to Zara, can only be brought about by the exertion of main force.”

“It is his belief that Roumania cannot be won back as long as Serbian agitation continues, because agitation for Greater Roumania follows the Serbian and will not meet with opposition until Roumania feels isolated by the annihilation of Serbia and sees that its only chance of being supported is to join the Triple Alliance.”

The President of the Council (Stürgkh) said:

“Two reasons make this question very pressing just now; in the first place the chief commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina declares that it is his belief that no successful measures could be applied in the interior of these provinces unless we deal Serbia a forcible stroke first. His opinion is founded on his own perceptions and on his thorough knowledge of the country. These perceptions on General Potiorek’s part make it imperative to ask whether we are at all able to stop the decomposing activity which originates in Serbia, and whether we are able to keep the two provinces in question if we do not promptly deal a blow to Serbia.”

The Common Finance Minister (Bilinski) said:

“It is two years since General Potiorek holds the belief that we must measure our forces with those of Serbia if we wish to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina. . . . The recent events in Bosnia had produced a very dangerous state of feeling in Serbia. Especially the Serbian pogrom in Serajevo excited and embittered all Servians to such a degree that it is impossible to decide who among our Servians is still loyal and who is for Greater Serbia. It will be impossible ever to change this situation by measures taken within our frontiers; the only means will be to bring about an ultimate decision, whether the idea of Greater Serbia may be successful in the future or not. . . . The ultimatum which we sent Serbia last autumn made matters worse in Bosnia, and inflamed the hatred against us. The people of Bosnia tell each other everywhere that King Peter is coming to liberate the country. Servians are not amenable to anything but force, and a diplomatic success would have no effect whatever in Bosnia, but it might most likely do harm.”

¹³³ The reference is to the demand by Austria-Hungary for the withdrawal of Serbian troops in Albania. The subject is referred to in cap. XXIV, p. 980.

Dealing with the question as to what should be done with Serbia when conquered, Tisza declared that he could:

“never consent to the Monarchy’s annexing any part of Servia.”

The Magyars did not desire that the difficulties arising from their already numerical inferiority to the Slav population should be increased. Solution of the question was, for the moment, found in the formula:

“that Servia might be reduced as to size but not annihilated, out of consideration for Russia.”

Referring to the nature of the demands to be addressed to Servia, Tisza said:

“It is absolutely necessary that we address demands to Servia, and if these are rejected we must make out an ultimatum. Our exactions may be hard, but not such that they cannot be complied with.”

The President of the Council was indifferent to questions of detail:

“We should therefore decide in principle to-day that action must and shall follow.” He was “by no means convinced that an expedition to Servia must necessarily involve us in a war with Russia.”

Reporting to the Emperor-King (7 July), Berchtold said that, with the exception of Tisza:

“All the other members of the conference shared the view I hold, that the present opportunity for a warlike action against Servia should be made use of, because by delay our situation would suffer, and because the Bulgarian arrangement, towards which nothing has as yet been done, even if it fully succeeds, will not entirely compensate the certain deterioration of our relations with Servia and Roumania and the political conditions in our own country connected with it.”¹³⁴

Tisza’s report to the Emperor-King (8 July) contained the following:

“The gratifying news from Berlin, combined with the indignation felt over the events in Servia, in yesterday’s conference of ministers, matured the intention of bringing about a war with Servia and to settle accounts with the arch-enemy of the monarchy, with all the members of the conference except myself.”¹³⁵

Proceeding to give reasons for his dissent, Tisza said that:

“Public opinion in Roumania would passionately cry out for war with us, and the present government would not be able to resist — King Carol very little. In this war we should therefore have to expect to see the Russian and the Roumanian armies among our foes, and this would make our chances of war very unfavorable.”

Advances, he urged, ought to be made to Bulgaria, Greece, and Roumania. Financial and other economic interests would suffer through war.

“I am far from advising an inactive or unenergetic policy towards Servia. We cannot remain indolent spectators of the intrigues spun

¹³⁴ *Aus. Red Bk., O. F., I, No. 9.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid., No. 12.*

against us, we cannot see our own subjects encouraged in high treason, or assassinations plotted. The explanations published by the Servian (even the semi-official) press not only, but by the representatives of Serbia in foreign countries, betray so much hatred and such total want of international decency, that out of consideration for our *prestige* and our safety, we must act in an energetic way against Serbia, if we are not indifferent to what foreign countries and our own think of us.

“I am not pleading that we should pocket these provocations, and am prepared to take the responsibility for all the consequences which a rejection of our just demands would entail. But according to my belief Serbia must be given the possibility to avoid a war by suffering a heavy diplomatic defeat. If a war is unavoidable, all the world must see that we are acting in defence, not defiance.

“A strictly measured, but not a threatening note should, therefore, be addressed to Serbia, in which all our concrete complaints are enumerated and precise demands are formulated. . . . If Serbia gives an unsatisfactory answer or seems disposed to delay giving an answer, an ultimatum should be sent and when the allowed time is over, hostilities might begin. In this case the war would have been forced upon us — no country that wishes to continue existing as a State can refuse to fight out such a war; and besides we should have put the blame on Serbia, which courted the danger of war by refusing to comply with the duties of a decent neighbour, after such an event as the abomination of Serajevo.”

“It is my belief that after a successful war it would be best to reduce the size of Serbia by returning its newly acquired territory to Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania, and to ask only certain important strategic corrections of the frontier lines.”

Germany Urges Action. On 12 July, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin sent to Vienna the following interesting report:

“I never for a moment doubted that Emperor William and all the German Empire would loyally fulfil the duties of an ally, and I have been faithful to this conviction during the whole period of my ambassadorship in Berlin. I was not in the least surprised when, in the present moment, Germany assured us of its perfect loyalty and assistance.

“Still I think that the fact that His Majesty Emperor William, and with him all persons in authority, urge us to undertake an action against Serbia, which may eventually end in war, needs some explanation.

“It is clear that after the late deplorable events, the monarchy must use all energy in its dealing with Serbia, but the fact that the German government from its own point of view considers the present moment for politically opportune [*sic*], must be set in the right light.

“According to the German way of thinking, entirely shared by myself, general political considerations, and special ones, inspired by the murder of Serajevo, form the conclusive argument.

“Germany has recently found its conviction confirmed that Russia is preparing for a war with its western neighbours, and does not regard war as a possibility for the future, but positively includes it in the political calculations of the future. This is important: it intends waging war, it is preparing for it with all its might, but does not propose it for the present, or we should rather say, is not prepared for it at the present time.

“It is therefore anything but certain that if Serbia is embarked in a war with us, Russia would lend an armed hand; and should the Czar’s Empire resolve for war, it would not be ready from a military point of view, and not by any means so strong as it will be a few years hence.

“Overmore, the German government believes that it has proofs that England would not take part in a war caused by disturbances in the Balkans, even if Russia and France were involved in it. Not only have the relations between England and Germany improved so far that Germany need no longer fear direct hostilities on England’s part, but England just now desires anything rather than a war, and would certainly not expose itself to danger for Serbia’s or even Russia’s sake.

“When all is said, it must be admitted that the constellation is at present as favorable as it can be.

“In the past, a large part of our population refused to believe in the separatist tendencies of our Servians, hostile to the monarchy, and expressed doubts that Servian’s intrigues reached across the frontier; all are now convinced, and there is a general outcry for an energetic treatment of Serbia, which will finally suppress all agitation for a Greater Serbia.

“In a similar manner the eyes of the whole world have been opened, and there is no nation that does not condemn the bloody deed of Serajevo, and all admit that we must make Serbia responsible for it. If Serbia’s foreign friends for political reasons do not openly blame Serbia, still we cannot believe that they will stand up for it at the present moment, at least not with armed forces.

“These I believe to be the political reasons why the German Empire, with a clear perception of the opportunity offered, unreservedly encourages us to make clear our relations toward Serbia, which Germany also feels to be untenable, in such a manner as to stop panslavist agitation for all time.

“In Emperor William’s case these political grounds are, as I learn from a quarter very much in His Majesty’s confidence, enhanced by a purely personal circumstance, the infinite enthusiasm for our gracious Majesty, who, as his letter to Emperor William proves, is prepared to act with admirable energy where the vital interests and the *prestige* of the countries entrusted to his care are at stake.”¹³⁶

¹³⁶ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., I, No. 15.

Report on Enquiry into the Assassination. Reporting to Vienna (13 July) on the judicial enquiry at Serajevo as to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the special commissioner, Councillor von Wiesner, said:

“There is nothing to prove or even to suppose that the Servian government is accessory to the inducement for the crime, its preparation, or the furnishing of weapons. On the contrary, there are reasons to believe that this is altogether out of the question.

“From evidence of accused persons, ascertained almost indubitably that the crime was resolved upon in Belgrade and that preparations were made with the coercion (*sic*) of Servian state-officials Ciganovic and Major Tankosic, who jointly provided bombs, Brownings, ammunition, and prussic acid. Guilt of Pribicevic not ascertained; reports about him based on regrettable misunderstandings on part of examining police organs.

“There can be no doubt that bombs came from army stores at Kragujevac, but there is no proof that they were obtained for the crime, as they might have been in the hands of the Komitadschis since the war.

“Evidence of accused persons leaves scarcely a doubt that Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez, with bombs and weapons upon them, were secretly smuggled across the frontier to Bosnia by Servian organs, under the direction of Ciganovic. These organised transports were directed by the frontier-captains Schabatz and Loznica, and were contrived by frontier guards. Though it is not ascertained that they knew the purpose of the journey, still they must have accepted secrecy of mission.

“Other information gives insight into organisation of propaganda carried on by ‘Narodna odbrana.’ This is valuable material, which will be useful, but has not yet been sifted; will be delivered without loss of time.”¹³⁷

Austro-Hungarian Council — 14 July. Reporting (14 July) to the Emperor-King on the proceedings of another Ministerial Council, Berchtold said:

“Count Tisza has given up his objections to an ultimatum with so short a term, because I showed him the military difficulties which would arise from delayed action. I also argued that, even after the mobilisation, a peaceful arrangement might be possible if Serbia gives way in good time.¹³⁸ . . . Count Tisza most decidedly declared that he would give his consent to the intended action if, before the ultimatum is sent, a council of the ministers of Austria and Hungary votes the resolution that the monarchy is not striving to acquire territory by the war, except what might accrue from small regulations of the frontier lines.

“The text of the note to be sent to Belgrade, as it was settled today, is such that we must reckon with the probability of war. Should Serbia decide for conceding our demands, this incident might signify a

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 17.

¹³⁸ And see Aus. Red Bk., O. F., I, No. 23.

downright humiliation for the kingdom, not only, but *pari passu* a blow to Russian *prestige* on the Balkan, and it would no doubt procure for us certain guarantees that Servian intrigue and underground work on our territory will be restrained.”¹³⁹

Austro-Hungarian Council — 19 July. At the Council meeting of 19 July, the text of the note to be presented to Serbia was definitely settled, but the disposition to be made of Serbia, in the event of a successful termination of the war, was once more left undetermined. Tisza demanded that the Council:

“must express, unanimously, that the action against Serbia was not in any way connected with plans of aggrandisement on the part of the monarchy, and that not any portion of Serbia should be annexed, except slight frontier regulations imposed by military considerations. He must absolutely insist that such a resolution be voted unanimously by the council.”¹⁴⁰

Berchtold disagreed, saying that:

“The situation in the Balkans might change; it is not impossible that Russia should succeed in overthrowing the present cabinet in Sofia and appointing a government hostile towards us; Albania is no reliable factor as yet; he must, as manager of the foreign affairs of Austria-Hungary, reckon with the possibility that after the war there might be circumstances which would make it impossible for us to renounce all annexation, if we are to improve our frontiers.”

Thereupon Tisza craftily proposed that they should:

“declare to the Powers as early as possible that we have no intention of annexing any territory whatever.”

Berchtold having welcomed that method of dissimulation:

“The Common Council of Ministers, at the proposition of the Royal Hungarian Premier (Tisza), votes that as soon as the war begins, the monarchy declares to the foreign Powers that no war for conquest is intended, nor is the annexation of the kingdom contemplated” — a declaration that was quite consistent with a war for security and annexation of portions of the kingdom. To this was added — but not, of course, for communication to the other Powers:

“Of course, the strategically necessary corrections of the frontier-lines, or the reduction of Serbia’s territory to the advantage of other states, or the unavoidable temporary occupation of Servian territory, is not precluded by this resolution.”

As we have already seen, the dissimulation deceived nobody.

Unconditional Acceptance of Demands. When sending the memorandum of demands for presentation to Serbia, Berchtold said (20 July):

“We cannot enter into negotiations with Serbia with regard to our

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 19.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 26.

demands, and cannot be satisfied with anything less than their unconditional acceptance within the stated term; otherwise we should be obliged to draw further consequences."

"I must beg your Excellency to avoid discussing the contents of the note and the interpretation of the single points, and should Herr Pasic insist, you will declare that you have no authority to discuss the subject further, but must demand the acceptance *pur et simple* of the conditions."¹⁴¹

To the demands, Berchtold added the following supplement:

"The inquiry set on foot by the court of justice in Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and accomplices, guilty of, and accessory to, the murder committed on the 28th June, has up to the present time led to the following conclusions:

"1. The plan of murdering Archduke Francis Ferdinand during his stay in Serajevo was devised in Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Gabrinovic, a certain Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez with the assistance of Major Volja Tankosic.

"2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols with their ammunition, which were the tools used by the murderers, were procured in Belgrade by a certain Milan Ciganovic, and by Major Volja Tankosic, and there handed to Princip, Gabrinovic, and Grabez.

"3. The bombs are hand-grenades, which come from the arms-depôt of the Servian army in Kragujevac.

"4. To make sure that the plot would succeed, Ciganovic taught Princip, Gabrinovic, and Grabez the use of the grenades, and, in a wood near the rifle grounds of Topschider, he taught Princip and Grabez the use of the Browning pistols.

"5. To make it easy for Princip, Gabrinovic, and Grabez to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to get their weapons through, Ciganovic organised a system of transports.

"The frontier-captains of Schabatz (Rade Popovic) and of Loznica, the customs officer Radivoj Grbic of Loznica, and several other persons were all implicated in the transport of the criminals and their weapons to Bosnia and Herzegovina."¹⁴²

In a circular despatch of 20 July to London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburg, and Constantinople, Berchtold stated shortly, the reasons for the demands upon Serbia.¹⁴³ This he followed (23 July) by another in which he said:

"We cannot allow the demands which we have addressed to Servia and which contain nothing that would not be considered natural between

¹⁴¹ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., I, No. 28.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, No. 27.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, No. 29. In a circular despatch (23 July) to the other Powers, Berchtold stated the reasons in differing phraseology: *Ibid.*, No. 73.

two neighbours, living in peace and harmony, to be made the subject of negotiations and compromises.”¹⁴⁴

Conclusion. These records make clear the reasons which, in the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian statesmen, justified war upon Serbia. Rightly or wrongly, they believed that the reduction of Serbia's strength was necessary to the maintenance of the territorial integrity of their country. A mere diplomatic success would in their opinion have availed nothing.

The change in the situation effected by the Serbian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands will be dealt with in the next chapter.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 61.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE INTERRUPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

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Preliminary. Although the quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia (brought to climax by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and his wife) was the true precipitating cause of the wars of 1914-18, the interruption of the negotiations for a peaceful settlement may, in a not inappropriate sense, be regarded as a subsidiary cause — it was that which, negatively, prevented the possibility of avoiding precipitation. Indeed, it is to the circumstances attending the diplomatic rupture that public attention has been predominantly directed. It is in them that the public has been taught to see the accomplishment of Germany's "forty years' determination" to launch, on "some carefully selected day," a war for "the domination of the world."¹ Note the character of the war-literature in the English language. Hardly anything — nothing at all adequate — upon the most important of the subjects, the roots of the wars; nothing upon the merits of the quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; no investigation of Austria-Hungary's asserted justification for proceeding to military execution against Serbia; and yet a flood of books and pamphlets to prove that Germany was to blame for the interruption of the negotiations. Few of these publications are of any value. Absence of necessary analysis characterizes almost all those which have come to the notice of the present writer — due, sometimes, to the lack of records subsequently made available. It is with the hope of supplying prevailing deficiency in this respect that the present chapter is submitted.

Observe, first, that for the purpose in hand, we must leave on one side the very debatable question as to the right of Russia to intervene in the quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia — we must assume (although it is subject to serious challenge) that Russia was justified in asserting a right to protect Serbian independent sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Observe, secondly, the difference between failure on the part of the diplomats to arrive at agreement, and interruption of their work by the emergence of war. What might have happened had the negotiations been prolonged, we cannot tell. That there was some prospect of success is certain. It is the narrow question of responsibility for the interruption that we are to investigate. For that purpose some exposition of the negotiations themselves will be necessary.

The Argument. For appreciation of what is to follow, a *précis* of the argument may be useful.

1. Believing (as indicated in the next preceding chapter) that the

¹ See cap. XV.

integrity of the Dual Monarchy could be maintained only as the result of a successful war against Serbia, Austria-Hungary determined (1) to present to Serbia a series of demands of such a nature and in such a manner that compliance with them would be refused; (2) to decline all discussion with Serbia or any other Power as to the propriety of the demands; (3) to refuse satisfaction with any reply from Serbia other than complete submission; (4) to press proceedings hurriedly to a finish, with a view to "localizing" the war—that is, to making less probable the intervention of Russia and the other Powers. Germany was a party to this programme.

2. On 27–28 July, the attitude of Germany changed. Berlin regarded the reply of Serbia to the Austro-Hungarian demands as substantially satisfactory. "Every reason for war falls to the ground," was the opinion of the Kaiser.

3. It is not true, as frequently alleged, that, either before or after the 27th–28th, Germany rejected every proposed method of accommodation.

4. On and after the 27th–28th, Berlin strongly urged Austria-Hungary to adopt conciliatory measures.

5. Austria-Hungary temporized, delayed, and finally acceded; but not until after mobilization against both Austria-Hungary and Germany had been ordered by Russia.

6. In the opinion of the diplomats who were in the best position to form judgment, a peaceful solution might have been arranged but for the interruption of the negotiations by military action.

7. Military operations opened as follows:

Austria-Hungary commenced mobilization against Serbia either before, or on, the day upon which she made her demands	23 July.
Russia determined, in principle, to mobilize against Austria-Hungary, and initiated military proceedings	25 July.
Serbia commenced mobilization	25 July.
Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia	28 July.
Russia announced mobilization for "tomorrow" against Austria-Hungary	28 July.
Austria-Hungary commenced the bombardment of Belgrade	29 July.
Russia mobilized secretly against Germany	29 July.
The Czar sanctioned mobilization against Germany	30 July.
Russia announced mobilization against Germany	31 July.
Austria-Hungary mobilized against Russia	31 July.
Germany demanded cessation by Russia, and declared "the threatening state of war"	31 July.
Sir Edward Grey appealed to Russia, suggesting cessation of mobilization	1 August.
King George V appealed to the Czar "to remove the misapprehension"	1 August.

Russia refused to cease preparations, and Germany declared
war 1 August.

8. Russia was aware that mobilization against Germany meant war.

9. Responsibility for interruption of the work of the diplomats must be shared by Austria-Hungary and Russia as hereinafter mentioned.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN PROGRAMME — GERMAN CONCURRENCE

Unacceptable Demands. That Austria-Hungary endeavored to frame demands which Serbia would reject, is clear. To the evidence afforded by the minutes of the meetings of the Austro-Hungarian Council (referred to in the next preceding chapter) the following may be added: On 10 July 1914, Tscherschky (German Ambassador at Vienna) reported that Berchtold (Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister) had said to him that:

"Should the Serbians accept all the stipulated demands, this would be a solution which would be 'very disagreeable' to him, and he is still considering what demands could be put which would make an acceptance absolutely impossible for Serbia."²

Upon this telegram the Kaiser penned the following comment:

"Evacuate the Sandschack! That will bring quarrel at once. Austria-Hungary ought immediately to retake it in order to prevent the union of Serbia and Montenegro, and cut off Serbian access to the sea." He meant that Austria-Hungary should demand the evacuation by Serbia of the Sanjak of Novibazar — territory which Serbia had acquired from Turkey by the treaty of Bucarest (1913), and which Austria-Hungary needed as a railway route to Salonica and Constantinople. Demand of that sort would certainly have been refused, but presentation of it would have secured for Serbia universal sympathy. Recklessly and stupidly, the Kaiser adhered to his idea. On 24 July, Tscherschky reported that Berchtold, in an interview with the Russian Ambassador, had offered the following assurance:

"Austria will not demand any Serbian territory. Similarly, every humiliation of Serbia has been carefully avoided in the note addressed to Serbia. Austria firmly insists that the step is solely a defensive measure against Serbian intrigues, but she must necessarily demand guarantees for friendly relations of Serbia towards the Monarchy."³

Upon this the Kaiser's comment was:

² Kautsky Docs., No. 29. And see Nos. 65, 87, 301.

³ The Kaiser was accustomed to scribble on state documents the comments and exclamation with which he accompanied their perusal. Many of these were childishly petulant, but all are now valuable, not only as revelations of the Kaiser's temperament, but as trustworthy indications of his attitude toward the subjects dealt with.

⁴ Kautsky Docs., No. 155.

“Jackass! The Sandschack she must take, otherwise the Serbs will get to the Adriatic.”

Lichnowsky (German Ambassador at London), in a previous despatch, having referred to Serbia as “a state,” the Kaiser noted:

“Serbia is a band of brigands who must be laid hold of for their crimes.”⁵

On a telegram from Belgrade of the same day, announcing that:

“The energetic tone and the precise demands of the Austrian Note have taken the Serbian Government completely by surprise,” the Kaiser noted:

“Bravo! We had not thought the Viennese were still capable of that.”

At the end of the telegram, he wrote:

“All the Slavic states show the same hollowness as the so-called Servian world-power. Don’t mind stepping hard on the feet of that rabble.”⁶

That attitude was maintained by the Kaiser until, on the 28th July, he read the Serbian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands.⁷

Rigorous Insistence. The second and third items in the Austro-Hungarian programme — to decline all discussion as to the propriety of the demands either with Serbia or with any other Power, and to refuse to be satisfied with any reply other than complete submission — are sufficiently evidenced by the available documents. Presentation of the demands (23 July) was accompanied by the statement:

“We cannot enter into negotiations with Servia with regard to our demands, and cannot be satisfied with anything less than their unconditional acceptance within the stated term; otherwise we should be obliged to draw further consequences.”⁸

At the same time, Austria-Hungary notified the Powers:

“We cannot allow the demands which we have addressed to Servia, and which contain nothing that would not be considered natural between two neighbors, living in peace and harmony, to be made the subject of negotiations and compromises.”⁹

And when Serbia had delivered her reply to the demands, and consideration of their sufficiency was proposed by Russia, Berchtold telegraphed to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg (28 July) that he “could not accede to such a proposal.”¹⁰

⁵ Kautsky Docs., No. 121. Cf. Kautsky, *The Guilt &c.*, p. 164.

⁶ Kautsky Docs., No. 159. Cf. Kautsky, *The Guilt &c.*, pp. 124-5.

⁷ Von Bethmann-Hollweg tells us that von Jagow complained to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador that the note was “too severe,” and that he himself (Bethmann) deplored its severity: *Reflections &c.*, pp. 122-3.

⁸ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., I, No. 28.

⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 61. Cf. Serb. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 52.

¹⁰ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 95. A longer quotation from this telegram appears on p. 1093.

Rapidity of Action. When first appealed to by the Austro-Hungarian Monarch, the Kaiser not only promised assistance but urged that "action must not be delayed,"¹¹ and von Jagow was:

"most decidedly of opinion that the action proposed against Servia should be taken in hand without delay."¹²

On 16 July, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin telegraphed:

"State Secretary understands perfectly that the intended energetic step in Belgrade cannot be undertaken before the President of the French Republic has left Petersburg, but regrets this delay extremely. Herr von Jagow fears that the sympathetic approval for this step and the interest in it will be debilitated by this delay, not only in the Monarchy but in Germany as well."¹³

On 18 July, von Jagow, when taking counsel with Lichnowsky, wrote:

"We have endeavored to localize the conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. Shall we succeed? That depends, first of all, upon Russia and, in the second place, upon the moderating influences of the Entente Allies. The more Austria displays energy, the more energetically we support her, the more chance there is that Russia will remain tranquil. Evidently there will be some commotion at St. Petersburg. Fundamentally, Russia is not at present ready to undertake war. France and England do not desire war at the present time."¹⁴

On the same day, the Bavarian Chargé at Berlin reported as follows:

"Here it is readily agreed that Austria should take advantage of the favorable hour, even at the risk of future complications. Whether Vienna will really rise to the occasion, seems still doubtful to both von Jagow and Mr. Zimmermann. The Under Secretary of State was of the opinion that Austria-Hungary, owing to lack of decision and unsteadiness, had now really become the sick man of Europe, just as formerly Turkey, when Russians, Italians, Roumanians, Serbians, and Montenegrins were waiting for it to be divided up. . . . For this reason, it would have suited us better if there had not been such a long delay in the action against Serbia, and if no time had been given to the Serbian Government to offer satisfaction spontaneously under Russo-French pressure."¹⁵

On the 25th July, the day upon which expired the time fixed by Austria-Hungary for Serbia's reply, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin telegraphed:

"Here every delay in the beginning of war operations is regarded as signifying the danger that foreign Powers might interfere. We are urgently advised to proceed without delay and to place the world before a *fait accompli*."¹⁶

¹¹ *Ibid.*, I, No. 6.

¹² *Ibid.*, Nos. 13, 15.

¹³ *Ibid.*, No. 23.

¹⁴ Kautsky Docs., No. 72.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, p. 139. And see p. 145.

¹⁶ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 32.

German assurances of war-support are further dealt with in the preceding chapter.¹⁷

Localizing the Quarrel — Non-Intervention. It is perfectly clear that, so far from wishing to precipitate a world — or even a European — war, Germany's principal anxiety was that the quarrel which she wished to localize (the fourth item in the Austro-Hungarian programme) might take on larger proportions. Rapidity of action had for its purpose the localization of the war. On very many pages of the diplomatic documents may evidence of this fact be found.¹⁸ In 1908-9, Austria-Hungary had carried through the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with no opposition more serious than threats. Before the Kaiser's display of "shining armor," Russia had declined to support by war the Serbian protests. That might happen again.¹⁹ At all events, a local, and not a world war, was what Germany and Austria-Hungary desired. Indeed, in the Kaiser's view, the quarrel was of such an essentially local character that no Power, not (as he at first thought) even Germany, had a right to interfere.²⁰ The following excerpts make clear his attitude in this respect. Two days after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, he annotated a despatch from Tschirschky, the German Ambassador at Vienna (30 June) as follows (Annotations in capitals and within brackets):

"Count Berchtold told me to-day that, according to all appearances, the threads of the conspiracy to which the Archduke fell a victim, could be traced to Belgrade. The affair was so well thought out that, intentionally, only young people were charged with the execution of the deed, because their punishment would be milder. [LET US HOPE NOT! — W.] The Minister spoke very bitterly about the incitements proceeding from Serbia. Here, even serious people are saying that accounts with Serbia must be settled at once. [NOW OR NEVER. — W.] A series of demands must be presented to Serbia, and in case she does not accept them, energetic steps must be taken. I use every occasion of this kind to warn our friends quietly, but very emphatically and seriously, against taking any over-hasty steps. [WHO GAVE HIM ANY AUTHORITY TO DO THAT? THAT IS VERY STUPID! NO AFFAIR OF HIS, SINCE IT IS PURELY AUSTRIA'S AFFAIR WHAT SHE THINKS FIT TO DO IN THIS MATTER. AFTERWARDS THEY WILL SAY, IF THINGS GO WRONG, 'GERMANY WOULD NOT LET US.'

¹⁷ Cap. XXVI.

¹⁸ Reference may be made to Kautsky Docs., Nos. 67, 72, 84, 100, 107, 125, 126, 142, 157, 192, 199, 204, 214, 237, 245, 248, 292, 322, 367, 368, 371, 400; German White Bk., 1914, Ex. 13; Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, Nos. 29, 30. Cf. Oman: *The Outbreak of the War of 1914-18*, pp. 34-6.

¹⁹ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 42.

²⁰ A contention similar to that of the United Kingdom in her quarrel with the Transvaal, and of the United States in hers with Spain.

TSCHIRSCHKY MUST KINDLY AVOID THIS NONSENSE. SERBIA MUST BE SETTLED WITH, AND THAT SOON. — W.] ²¹

Upon a report (23 July) from Prince Lichnowsky (German Ambassador at London) indicating that Sir Edward Grey had said that he expected:

“that our” (Germany’s) “influence in Vienna has succeeded in suppressing demands which cannot be fulfilled,”

the Kaiser noted:

“How would that come within my province? It does not concern me at all! What is the meaning of ‘cannot be fulfilled?’ The scoundrels have carried on their agitation with murder, and must be humbled! This is a monstrous piece of British impudence. It is not my duty to prescribe, à la Grey, to His Majesty, the Emperor, regarding the preservation of his honor.” ²²

Von Jagow (German Foreign Minister) having referred to the Lichnowsky report as something relating to:

“Austria-Hungary’s internal affairs, regarding which it would not be proper for us to intervene,”

the Kaiser noted:

“Right! This ought, however, to be told very seriously and clearly to Grey so that he may see that I stand no trifling. Grey is making the mistake of placing Serbia on the same level as Austria and other great Powers. This is unheard of! Serbia is a band of brigands, who must be laid hold of for their crimes. I shall intervene in nothing which the Emperor alone is entitled to decide.” ²³

A few days afterwards, the Kaiser acted upon the contrary view.

Probabilities of Localization. In the first days of speculation as to the probability of the conflict being localized, the belief that Russia would not fight was somewhat general. Some of the documents which so indicate are referred to in the subjoined note. ²⁴ On the other hand, as early as the 26th July, the German Ambassador at London reported:

“I doubt whether Sir Edward Grey will be able to approach Russia in the sense indicated, for, after the appearance of the Austro-Hungarian conditions, no one here believes in the possibility of localizing the conflict. No one here questions that such an action on the part of Austria must produce a world war.” ²⁵

The Ambassador on the following day telegraphed:

²¹ Kautsky, *The Guilt &c.*, pp. 63-4.

²² Kautsky Docs., No. 121; Kautsky, *The Guilt &c.*, p. 162.

²³ Kautsky Docs., No. 121; Kautsky, *The Guilt &c.*, p. 163.

²⁴ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., I, Nos. 6, 15; II, No. 41; Bethmann-Hollweg, *Reflections &c.*, pp. 126, 160; Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 71; Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 96; Kautsky Docs., Nos. 72, 222, 249; Kautsky, *The Guilt &c.*, pp. 96-8, 159, 165; Beyens, *L'Allemagne avant la Guerre*, p. 281; Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

²⁵ Kautsky Docs., No. 218. See also No. 236.

“How can I argue in favor of localization of the conflict when, here, nobody doubts that the intervention of Austria affects the vital interests of Russia, and that Russia, in the event of our not exercising pressure upon Austria, will see herself forced to intervene, even contrary to her wish? Maintaining such a thesis, I would only provoke ironical shrugging of the shoulders.”²⁶

By the 28th–29th, Russian intervention, carrying with it French and probably British co-operation, seemed to be assured.”²⁷

PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT

We are now to examine the negotiations with reference to the various proposed methods for arriving at a peaceful solution of the quarrel, keeping in view the frequently repeated statement that Germany declined every proposal for accommodation. Four methods were proposed:

1. A Conference at London of the Ambassadors of France, Italy, and Germany with Sir Edward Grey.
2. Mediation between Austria-Hungary and Russia.
3. Direct conversations between Austria-Hungary and Russia.
4. Mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

Of these, Germany and Russia declined the first with Sir Edward Grey's approval. Germany concurred in the second, and actively assisted in it; and eventually proposed the third. The fourth was not suggested until the 27th, and Germany, immediately and persistently, pressed acceptance of it upon Austria-Hungary. To these statements must be added, however, that prior to the 27th, when the German Chancellor first received the Serbian note and became impressed with its submissive character, he had in mind the acceleration of the war-measures (by which he hoped to forestall and prevent intervention) rather than the furtherance of negotiations which (as he afterwards said) he treated with a certain “reserve.” On and after that date, he insistently urged Austria-Hungary to agree to terms of settlement.

1. A Conference of Ambassadors. On 26 July (1914) Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Berlin, Paris, and Rome, asking:

“Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications?”²⁸

To this, the British Ambassador at Berlin replied (27 July):

²⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 266.

²⁷ Russian mobilization was ordered on the 29th. No one doubted that France would support Russia, and the intention of Sir Edward Grey to support France became reasonably clear on the same day: Kautsky Docs., Nos. 357, 368, 456; Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 89. Italy's attitude appears in Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, Nos. 51, 86, 87; III, Nos. 7, 10; Kautsky, *The Guilt &c.*, pp. 153–6.

²⁸ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 36. Cf. Kautsky Docs., No. 304.

“Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to cooperate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M. Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.”²⁹

Giving his own reasons for declining the proposed conference, the German Chancellor said (27 July):

“We could not participate in such a Conference, for we could not drag Austria before a European tribunal in order to settle her difference with Serbia. As your Excellency has expressly informed me, Sir Edward Grey distinguishes clearly between an Austro-Serbian conflict and an Austro-Russian conflict, and takes as little interest in the first as do we. Our mediation ought to limit itself to an eventual Austro-Russian conflict. In the Austro-Serbian dispute, the method indicated in telegram No. 163 from St. Petersburg, consisting of a direct understanding between St. Petersburg and Vienna, seems to me practicable.”³⁰

Sazonoff was of the same opinion. Of an interview which he had with the British Ambassador, the latter has related as follows:

“On the following day — July 26 — he informed me that he had, in conversation with the Austrian Ambassador, suggested a direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg for the purpose of finding a formula that, while giving satisfaction to Austria as regarded her principal demands, might prove more acceptable to Serbia. He had, he said, told Count Szapary that he quite understood the motives which had

²⁹ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 43. And see Nos. 60, 71; German White Bk., 1914, Ex. 12; and Kautsky Docs., Nos. 236, 248, 249. At Paris the suggestion of a conference was associated with the idea of mediation. In Nos. 32, 34, 36, 50, 56, 69 of the Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, the word *mediation* is used. Nos. 61, 70 indicate, but do not mention, a *conference*. In Nos. 68, 71, 73, 74, 80, 81, the word *conference* is used. In Nos. 78, 79, 80, distinction is made between the two methods. While still at sea in the Baltic, the Kaiser, in one of his annotations on the despatches, wrote with reference to the proposed mediation: “It is useless! For Austria has already explained her intentions to Russia, and Grey cannot propose anything else. I’ll join in only if Austria expressly requests me, which is little likely. In questions of honor and vital interests, one does not consult others.” Kautsky Docs., No. 157; Kautsky: *The Guilt &c.*, pp. 165-6.

³⁰ Kautsky Docs., No. 248. See also No. 204.

prompted Austria to present her ultimatum, and that if only she would consent to revise certain of its articles it would not be difficult to arrive at a satisfactory settlement.”³¹

The British Ambassador thereupon (before the arrival of Sir Edward Grey's telegram), telegraphed to London (27 July) as follows:

“I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.”³²

After the arrival of Sir Edward's telegram, the British Ambassador reported an interview with Sazonoff as follows:

“I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially of your instructions to me, and enquired whether instead of such a conference, he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed. The German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary. His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.”³³

In his own account of this interview (27 July), Sazonoff said that he replied to the British suggestion of a conference by intimating:

“that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hope, may be favorable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two cabinets. If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favorable solution of the conflict. I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which might arise from the answer given by the French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador, regarding counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial Cabinet.”³⁴

On the same day, a similar telegram was sent by Sazonoff to the Russian Ambassador at Paris, to which, however, the following clause was added:

“If there is a question of exercising a moderating influence in Petersburg, we reject it in advance, as we have adopted a standpoint from the outset which we can in no way alter, as we have already shown ourselves favorable to all of Austria's acceptable demands.”³⁵

³¹ Buchanan, *op. cit.*, I, p 196.

³² Br. Blue Bk., No. 45. See Sazonoff's telegram of 26 July: Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 25.

³³ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 55.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 53.

³⁵ Baron G. von Romberg: *The Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*, p. 28.

For obvious reasons, this telegram was omitted from the Russian Orange Book, 1914. France forthwith protested that she had no idea of influencing St. Petersburg. On the 28th, Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed that:

“the acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs did not for a moment admit the possibility of exercising a moderating influence in Petersburg, but only retorted to the German Ambassador that it was not Russia, but Austria, who threatened peace, and that in any case if it was a question of exerting a moderating influence, this must be done not only in Petersburg, but before all in Vienna.”³⁶

These documents would seem to indicate that Sir Edward Grey made his proposal for a conference without enquiring how it would be regarded by Russia. That would have been improbable, and it was not the fact. A telegram of the Russian Ambassador at London to Sazonoff (27th) has the following:

“Having heard from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that you would be prepared to accept such a combination, Grey decided to turn it into an official proposal, which he communicated yesterday to Berlin, Paris, and Rome.”³⁷

The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg had made a mistake. Russia did not want a conference. When, afterwards, the Ambassador approached Sazonoff officially, he was made aware of that fact, and reported as above quoted. The documents make certain that St. Petersburg and Berlin agreed that “direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet” were the preferable method of procedure, and that Sir Edward Grey had been misled into proposing a conference. The suggestion was, accordingly, dropped, Sir Edward readily admitting, as we shall see, that direct conversations were “the most preferable method of all.”

Austria-Hungary's disapproval of a conference was based not merely upon objection to foreign intervention in her quarrel with Serbia, but upon her belief that, in the conference, Germany would be opposed not only by the United Kingdom and France, but by Italy also, for, although nominally a member of the Triple Alliance, her known sympathies were with the Entente.³⁸ Not unreasonably, too, Berchtold objected to the proposal upon the ground stated by him in the Austro-Hungarian Council of 31 July:

“As is known from experience, the Powers in such cases always try to make reductions when passing on the demands made by one Power, and it is very probable that this would now also be tried, as the present

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

³⁷ Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 31. The British Ambassador's telegram is not in the Br. Blue Bk.

³⁸ In 1902, Italy had entered into war-alliance with France, and had subsequently, in various ways, made clear her friendship with the Entente Powers. See cap. VII.

constellation would make France, England, and also Italy take Russia's part, and we had a very doubtful support in the German representative in London. Anything might sooner be expected from Prince Lichnowsky than that he would warmly represent our interests."³⁹

Berchtold had some reason for distrusting Lichnowsky."⁴⁰

2. **Mediation between Austria-Hungary and Russia.** While refusing to agree to intervention between Austria-Hungary and Serbia by means of a conference, Germany not only was quite willing to co-operate in an effort to bring Austria-Hungary and Russia to agreement upon the important question as to the effect upon Serbia of an Austro-Hungarian military success, but persistently urged Austria-Hungary to make specific definition of her purposes in that regard. For Italy's satisfaction⁴¹ as well as Russia's, clear declaration was pressingly necessary. Berchtold, nevertheless, evaded categorical statement. Indeed, because of disagreement with Tisza (Hungarian Prime Minister), definition was impossible, and, for that reason, the German Chancellor himself could not be informed. Berlin recognized the unreasonableness of the situation and endeavored to persuade Austria-Hungary to give Russia the proper and requisite assurance. The facts in this respect appear upon subsequent pages.⁴²

Mediation between Austria-Hungary and Russia (as distinguished from Austro-Hungarian explanation and assurances to Russia) was first

³⁹ Aus. Red Bk., III, No. 79. Cf. *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 288.

⁴⁰ As indicated by Mr. Wilfred Scawen Blunt: "Prince Lichnowsky, a Polish gentleman of ancient family, though in the German diplomatic service, was no German either by birth or sentiment, and his friendly feeling for England was that common to all the Polish aristocracy, and it was for that reason, as also to conciliate his fellow Poles, that the Kaiser Wilhelm sent him to London on a friendly mission which he undertook *con amore*" (*My Diaries*, II, p. 433.) Not German in sentiment, he was strongly anti-Austro-Hungarian. He himself tells us (*My Mission to London*, p. 6) that when, in 1913, he urged that Germany should leave Austria-Hungary without support in her dispute with Russia with reference to Albania, "I received agitated reproaches from the Chancellor; he said that I had the reputation of being 'an opponent of Austria,' and I was to abstain from such interference and direct correspondence." Lichnowsky was at that time the German Ambassador at London. Were he to be taken seriously, we should have to say that a proposed treaty between the United Kingdom and Germany (1914) for the settlement of various difficulties — a treaty "which offered us extraordinary advantages, the result of more than a year's work, was thus dropped because it would have been a public success for me" (*Ibid.*, p. 18). We should have to believe also that the negotiations immediately preceding the recent war failed because "the more I pressed, the less were they inclined to come round, were it only that I might not have the success of averting war in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey" (*Ibid.*, p. 35). Attacking the attitude toward him of the German Foreign Office, Lichnowsky says: "Nothing can describe the rage of certain gentlemen at my London successes, and the position which I had managed to make for myself in a short time. They devised vexatious instructions to render my office more difficult" (*Ibid.*, pp. 29-30). Other examples of the egotism of the Ambassador may be seen on pp. 23, 31 of his pamphlet.

⁴¹ Cf. *ante*, cap. VII, pp. 247-9. ⁴² Pp. 1094-7, 1100-2, 1106, 1107.

suggested by Sir Edward Grey to the German Ambassador (24 July) as a method which might be adopted "in case of dangerous tensions" between those Powers.⁴³ The next day, in a further conversation, Sir Edward indicated, as the Ambassador reported, that:

"in his opinion, the moment has arrived to attempt, in accord with us [Germany], France, and Italy, mediation between Austria and Russia."⁴⁴

In his own telegram of the same day to the British representative at Berlin, Sir Edward intimated that he had said to the German Ambassador that:

"Apparently, we should soon be face to face with the mobilization of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, and Russia, and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had time to try and arrange matters between them."

The Ambassador replied that Austria, "having launched that note," could not "draw back," adding, however, that if what was contemplated was:

"mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it. He expressed himself as personally favorable to this suggestion."⁴⁵

The German Chancellor concurred. In a telegram of the same day to the Ambassador at London, he said:

"We are prepared, in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the other Powers."⁴⁶

Observe that Sir Edward Grey thought that "the moment has arrived" for mediation, whereas in the view of the German Chancellor it had not — there was as yet no Austro-Russian controversy.⁴⁷ That was strictly correct, but probably an item in the German policy of "reserve." At the moment, the trouble was that, while Austria-Hungary was offering certain rather vague assurances as to her purposes with reference to the future of Serbia, Russia, not unnaturally, declined to accept them as altogether trustworthy. Further negotiations with reference to mediation between Austria-Hungary and Russia were superseded by the direct conversations (approved by Sir Edward Grey) between the same Powers.

3. Direct Conversations. It will be advisable to defer opening the subject of direct conversations between Austria-Hungary and Russia until

⁴³ Kautsky Docs., No. 157. And see No. 179. ⁴⁴ Kautsky Docs., No. 180.

⁴⁵ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 25. Cf. Kautsky Docs., No. 180. The word "Russia" where it first occurs in the above telegram should be *Italy*.

⁴⁶ German White Bk., 1914, Ex. 13. Cf. Kautsky Docs., No. 248; and Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 46.

⁴⁷ Three days afterwards (28th), Vienna declared that mediation between the two countries "is unsuitable inasmuch as it alleges a dispute between these two Empires which does not exist up to the present" (Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 83).

the effect of the Serbian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands has been dealt with.

4. Mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. In the course of the conversation between Sir Edward Grey and the German Ambassador last above referred to (25th), Sir Edward, alluding to the distinction between an Austro-Russian and an Austro-Serbian quarrel, said:

“I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand.”⁴⁸

To this the Chancellor assented. In his telegram of the 25th to Lichnowsky, he said:

“The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro-Serbian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do not wish to interpose in the former any more than England, and, as heretofore, we take the position that this question must be localized by virtue of all Powers refraining from intervention.”⁴⁹

The delivery of the Serbian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands led to a proposal for negotiation upon its basis; and this was followed by a suggestion of mediation as between the two countries. We shall come to these — after dealing with the effect of the Serbian reply.

Summary. The foregoing quotations make clear (1) that Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a conference was offered under mistaken apprehension as to the wish of Russia; (2) that Germany and Russia pointed out that the direct conversations which were then proceeding between St. Petersburg and Vienna formed a preferable method of procedure; (3) that Sir Edward Grey at once concurred and dropped his proposal; (4) that Germany was (at that period) unwilling to exercise moderating influence upon Vienna; (5) that France was similarly unwilling to put pressure upon Russia; (6) that Russia rejected “in advance” any attempt to induce her to change her attitude; (7) that London and Berlin agreed in the advisability of mediation as between Russia and Austria-Hungary; and (8) that development of the scheme was superseded by the direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg. We have still to deal with these conversations, and with the proposals for mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia which followed delivery of the Serbian reply to Austria-Hungary.

⁴⁸ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 25; Kautsky Docs., No. 180, and see Nos. 157, 204, 248, 266.

⁴⁹ German White Bk., 1914, Ex. 13. And see Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 46.

THE SERBIAN REPLY AND THE KAISER

With the exception of Austria-Hungary, all the Powers agreed that the submissive character of the Serbian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands very sensibly modified the situation. Sazonoff proposed (26th) that it:

"might well be used as a basis on which one might come to an understanding."⁵⁰

Sir Edward Grey was of the same opinion.⁵¹ And Germany, as we shall see, urged upon Vienna acceptance of the proposal. Meanwhile, it is important to note the effect of the Serbian note upon the Kaiser himself. He read it on the morning of the 28th⁵² — the morning after return from his cruise in the Baltic, and upon it he wrote the following comment:

"A brilliant achievement for a time-limit of only forty-eight hours! That is more than one could have expected. A great moral success for Vienna, but it removes every ground for war, and Giesl⁵³ should have remained quietly in Belgrade. After that I should never have advised mobilization."⁵⁴

Quite in accord with the Kaiser's view of the note, the Chancellor, at a meeting of the Prussian State Council on 30 July, said:

"Account must always be taken of this, that the Serbian reply, save in some points of detail, gave full satisfaction to the Austro-Hungarian requirements."⁵⁵

The Kaiser's Pledge Plan. Translating his view into action, the Kaiser immediately (28th, 10 A.M.) wrote to the Chancellor as follows:

"After reading the Serbian reply, which I received this morning, I am convinced that the desires of the Danube Monarchy are substantially fulfilled. The few reservations which Serbia has made on particular points can, in my judgment, be cleared up by negotiation. But her capitulation (one of the most submissive kind) is here proclaimed to all the world, and with it every reason for war falls to the ground.

"All the same, we can only attach a limited value to this scrap of paper and its contents so long as it is not translated into action. The Serbs are Orientals, and therefore sly, false, and masters of evasion. In order that these fine undertakings may be realized in truth and fact, it will be necessary to exercise a *douce violence*. This could be managed by Austria taking a pledge (Belgrade) for the compulsion and

⁵⁰ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 95. Cf., particularly as to dates, Kautsky Docs., No. 238.

⁵¹ Kautsky Docs., No. 258. Cf. Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 68.

⁵² Sent to him by von Jagow the previous evening: Kautsky Docs., No. 270.

⁵³ The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Belgrade.

⁵⁴ Kautsky Docs., No. 271; Kautsky, *The Guilt &c.*, p. 135.

⁵⁵ Kautsky Docs., No. 456.

execution of the undertakings, and retaining it until the demands are actually fulfilled. This is also necessary in order to afford to the army, which would be a third time mobilized for nothing, an external *satisfaction d'honneur*, a show of success in the eyes of foreign countries and the consciousness of having at least stood on foreign territory. Apart from this, if there is no campaign it will give rise to a very bad feeling towards the dynasty, and this would be an extremely serious matter. In case Your Excellency shares these views, I propose that we address Austria to the following effect: The withdrawal of Serbia (in a very submissive form) has been compelled, and we offer our congratulations. In consequence of this, there is naturally no longer any reason for war. A guarantee is, however, very necessary in order that the undertakings shall be executed. This could be obtained by the military occupation of a part of Serbia. Just as in 1871 we kept our troops in France until the milliards had been paid. On this basis I am ready to mediate for peace in Austria. Should there be any contrary proposals or protests on the part of other States, I would uncompromisingly reject them, all the more since all of them are more or less openly appealing to me to help preserve peace. I shall do this, but in my own fashion, and shall be as considerate as possible of Austria's national sentiment and the military honor of her army. The latter has been appealed to by its highest War Lord, and stands ready to obey the summons. Therefore it must absolutely have a visible *satisfaction d'honneur*, and this is a preliminary condition of my mediation. Will Your Excellency, therefore, prepare a proposal in the sense outlined above for communication to Vienna? I have written in the same sense, through Plessen, to the Chief of the General Staff,⁵⁶ who entirely shares my opinion."⁵⁷

The Kaiser's suggestion of Austro-Hungarian occupation of Belgrade, as security for performance by Serbia of her promises, may well be referred to (adopting Mr. S. B. Fay's suggestion) as "the pledge plan." Sir Edward Grey afterwards (the 29th) made a similar proposal,⁵⁸ and King George telegraphed the same suggestion to Prince Henry of Prussia on the 30th.⁵⁹

The Kaiser's Apprehension. The Kaiser saw very clearly that the submissive character of the Serbian note had completely changed the situation. Upon a memorandum by the German Military Attaché at St. Petersburg, referring to Serbia's good-will as evinced by her note, and adding:

"This is a thoroughly loyal position, and Austria would take on herself a heavy responsibility should she bring about a European war by not recognizing the attitude of Serbia,"

⁵⁶ General von Moltke.

⁵⁷ Kautsky, *The Guilt &c.*, pp. 136-8; Kautsky Docs., No. 293.

⁵⁸ Kautsky Docs., No. 368; Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 88.

⁵⁹ Kautsky Docs., No. 452.

The Kaiser noted (29 July):

"This is what makes me anxious after reading the Serbian reply."⁶⁰

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin noted the change, and reported as follows (30 July):

"Whilst hitherto I had been able to observe the greatest calm, in all influential circles, concerning the eventuality of a European conflict, I must own that I now have the feeling that, in the last few days, a state of nervousness has seized them which is not wholly due to the greater imminence of the question of Peace or War."⁶¹

The Kaiser's nervousness rose to apprehension and timidity as he read on the 30th a telegram from his Ambassador at St. Petersburg announcing that, in reply to a German warning that Russian mobilization (commenced on the previous day) meant danger to peace:

"Sasonow declared that the cancelling of the order for mobilization was no longer possible, and that the Austrian mobilization was to blame for this."⁶²

To this telegram, the Kaiser appended the following:

"If the mobilization can no longer be cancelled — which is not true — why, then, did the Tsar appeal for my intervention three days later, without mentioning the issue of the order for mobilization? Surely this shows clearly that even to him the mobilization appeared premature, and he afterwards took this step toward us *pro forma* to calm his awakened conscience, although he knew that it was no longer of any avail, as he did not feel himself strong enough to stop the mobilization. For this leaves me without the slightest doubt any longer: England, Russia, and France have agreed — taking as a basis our *casus fœderis* with Austria — using the Austro-Serbian conflict as a pretext, to wage a war of destruction against us. Hence Grey's cynical observations to Lichnowsky: that so long as the war remained confined to Austria and Russia, England would stand aside, but only if we and France became involved he would be forced to become active against us, *i.e.*, either we are basely to betray our Ally and abandon her to Russia — and thus break up the Triple Alliance, or, remaining faithful to our Ally, are to be set upon by the Triple Entente together and chastised, by which their envy will finally have the satisfaction of completely ruining all of us. This, in a nutshell, is the true, naked situation, which, slowly and surely set in motion and continued by Edward VII, has been systematically developed by disclaimed conversations of England with Paris

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 337; Kautsky, *The Guilt Sec.*, p. 139.

⁶¹ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 32. The Ambassador thought that the change was due to "the fear . . . that Italy, in case of a general conflict, would not fulfill its duty as an ally of the Triple Alliance, but rather, that its general attitude toward us might become downright doubtful." It was to this factor in the situation that the attention of the Ambassador would naturally have been directed, for it was through him that Austria-Hungary was being pressed in Italy.

⁶² Kautsky Docs., No. 401.

and St. Petersburg, and finally brought to its culmination and set in motion by George V. At the same time, the stupidity and clumsiness of our Ally is made a trap for us. The celebrated 'encircling' of Germany thus finally became an accomplished fact, in spite of all the endeavors of our politicians and diplomats to prevent it. The net is suddenly drawn over our heads, and, with a mocking laugh, England reaps the most brilliant success of her assiduously conducted, purely anti-German world policy. Against this we have proved powerless, while, as a result of our fidelity to our Ally, Austria, she has us isolated, wriggling in the net, and draws the noose for our political and economic destruction. A splendid achievement, which compels admiration even from one who is ruined by it! Edward VII after his death is stronger than I who am alive! And there were people who thought we could win over or satisfy England by this or that trifling measure!!! She unceasingly and relentlessly pursued her aim with notes, holiday proposals, scares, Haldane, etc., until she had reached it. And we ran into the noose, and even introduced the ship for ship ratio in naval building in the touching hope that this would pacify England!!! All warnings, all requests on my part were without avail. Now we get what the English call thanks for it. From the dilemma of fidelity to our alliance with the venerable old Emperor is created the situation which gives England the desired pretext to destroy us, with the hypocritical semblance of right, namely, of helping France to maintain the notorious balance of power, that is to say, the playing of all European states in England's favor against us! Now the whole scheme must be ruthlessly exposed, the mask of Christian readiness for peace which England has shown to the world must be rudely torn off, and her Pharisaic protestations of peace pilloried! And our Consuls in Turkey and India, our agents, etc., must rouse the whole Mohammedan world to a wild rebellion against this hated, deceitful, unscrupulous, nation of shop-keepers, for if we are to bleed to death, England shall at least lose India."⁶³

On another document, the Kaiser appended the following:

"The whole war is plainly arranged between England, France, and Russia for the annihilation of Germany, lastly through the conversations with Poincaré in Paris and Petersburg, and the Austro-Servian strife is only an excuse to fall upon us! God help us in this fight for our existence, brought about by falseness, lies, and poisonous envy."⁶⁴

The attitude here revealed is not that of a man who finds himself, at his own selected moment, in the situation for which he has secretly prepared for forty years.

Bavarian View. Bavaria being, next to Prussia, the most important of the German states, it is material to observe that her Minister at Berlin

⁶³ Kautsky, *The Guilt &c.*, pp. 176-8; Kautsky Docs., No. 401.

⁶⁴ Kautsky Docs., No. 402.

took the same view as the Kaiser of the sufficiency of the Serbian note. Reporting on the 29th, he said:

"After that, it would be difficult to deny that Serbia has shown herself disposed to give satisfaction on almost all the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian demands. Austria-Hungary may have doubts as to the execution by Serbia of her proffered promises, and these doubts are assuredly justified, but, on the other hand, the strikingly conciliatory attitude of Serbia will make it very difficult for Russia to abandon her Slav brother."⁶⁵

CONVERSATIONS — AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND RUSSIA

British, German, and Russian Approval of Conversations. We may now take up the subject of direct conversations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. When declining to agree to Sir Edward Grey's proposed conference of Ambassadors, the German Chancellor proposed (as we have seen⁶⁶) "a direct understanding between St. Petersburg and Vienna." To the British Ambassador at Berlin, the German Foreign Secretary made the same suggestion (27 July). He said:

"that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M. Sazonoff to exchange views with Count Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments."⁶⁷

On the same day, Russia made the same sort of suggestion to Berlin, and von Jagow replied (as the Russian Chargé reported):

"that he was aware of this proposal, and that he agreed with Pourtalès that as Szápáry had begun this conversation, he might as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German Ambassador at Vienna."⁶⁸

Sir Edward Grey thoroughly approved of this method of procedure. He said (28 July):

"But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that this is the most preferable method of all."⁶⁹

"It is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram of the 27th July."⁷⁰

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 157-8.

⁶⁶ *Ante*, p. 1075.

⁶⁷ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 43. A conversation between Sazonoff and the German Ambassador of 25 July is summarized in Kautsky Docs., No. 204.

⁶⁸ Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 38. Cf. German White Bk., 1914, Ex. 5.

⁶⁹ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 67.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 69. Cf. Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 80.

Subjects for Conversation. There were two subjects for conversation between Austria-Hungary and Russia: (1) the fate of Serbia, in the event of her defeat by Austria-Hungary, and (2) consideration of the Austro-Hungarian demands upon Serbia and the adjustment of differences. Investigation of responsibility for the final interruption of the negotiations involves inquiry as to the attitudes assumed by Austria-Hungary in her diplomatic exchanges with the other Powers with reference to these two subjects. We shall deal with them in turn.

CONVERSATIONS — THE FATE OF SERBIA

Quotations, in the next preceding chapter,⁷¹ from the minutes of the meetings of the Austro-Hungarian Council for Common Concerns have made clear that Berchtold had in view the annexation of some part of Serbian territory; that Tisza insisted that:

“action against Serbia was not in any way connected with plans of aggrandisement”;

and that, as compromise, the Council agreed to the ambiguous formula: “that as soon as the war begins, the Monarchy declares to the foreign Powers that no war for conquest is intended, nor is the annexation of the kingdom contemplated.”

No “war for conquest,” only a “war for security.” No “annexation of the kingdom,” only a portion of it. And intentions might alter, for, as Berchtold said at the Council:

“The situation in the Balkans might change . . . he must as manager of the foreign affairs of Austria-Hungary reckon with the possibility that after the war there might be circumstances which would make it impossible for us to renounce all annexation if we are to improve our frontiers.”

No present intention, but, as the Englishman said of his war-motive: “it will be blooming hard luck if we don’t get something out of it.”

With nothing better than his foolish formula (Tisza would permit nothing better), Berchtold had to make replies to foreign enquiries.

Irritation at Rome, Paris, and London. In a previous chapter we saw that Berchtold irritated Italy by declining to give assurance as to what would be Austria-Hungary’s treatment of Serbia when conquered.⁷² He would say that “we have no *intention* of annexing any territory whatever,” but he not only avoided making engagement to that effect, but was silent as to what he did intend.

At Paris, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, to whom the concocted formula was communicated, was at first misled by it. He was soon put right. Having reported (26 July) that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had announced:

⁷¹ Pp. 1056-9.

⁷² Cap. VII, pp. 247-9.

“that we are resolved not to touch the territorial integrity of Servia,”⁷³

Berchtold replied (27 July) that the statement:

“must be founded upon a mistake, which I do not think opportune to correct just now.”⁷⁴

Berchtold's trickery was of poor quality, and Paris remained restless and apprehensive. As late as the 30th July, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador there telegraphed to Vienna:

“I am being worried by Government circles and other politicians to make some sort of reassuring declaration, concerning our intentions, which might be made use of to effect (*sic*) the Russian alarm news.”⁷⁵

Another telegram from the Ambassador of the same day summarised the complaint of the French Prime Minister, and the reply of the Ambassador, as follows:

“His principal thesis was, that it was not known, now, what we wanted, and that thus the way was blocked for every mediation. I replied that we had very clearly formulated our demands to Servia; as they had not been accepted, the state of war (‘Kriegszustand’) had begun.”⁷⁶

London was treated in similar fashion. On 28 July, the German Ambassador reported that the members of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy, including Mensdorff the Ambassador, had intimated that:

“it was intended to cede portions of Servian territory to Bulgaria, and probably also to Albania.”⁷⁷

But Mensdorff made no further explanation. The next day (29th), the German Ambassador sought to satisfy Sir Edward Grey by asserting that Austria-Hungary did not intend to annex Servia, but the obvious reply was that:

“without annexation, there was a method by which Servia could be converted into an Austrian vassal.”⁷⁸

The next day (30th), Mensdorff telegraphed to Vienna that probably the time for giving assurances had passed.

“My impression,” he said, “is that there is a desire here to maintain peace and to give greatest support to any effort tending toward that end; also to give us far-reaching satisfaction and guarantees for the future against Servia, if — a matter perhaps too late to undertake now — we made some sort of declaration regarding future existence of Servia as an independent state [which] would be acceptable to Russia.”⁷⁹ Neither Rome, Paris, nor London ever received satisfactory assurance as to the fate of Servia in the event of her defeat.

⁷³ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 55.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 75.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Part III, No. 41. And see No. 62.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 62.

⁷⁷ Kautsky Docs., No. 301.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 357.

⁷⁹ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 42.

Trickery at St. Petersburg. In his daily report to the Emperor of the 24th, Berchtold related a conversation with the Russian Ambassador in which (as he said) he assured him:

“that we had no intention of increasing the size of our territory, but wished to maintain it intact, a point of view which Russia must applaud, as much as we think it natural that Russia would never tolerate an attack upon its own integrity.”⁸⁰

Sazonoff was not satisfied with such assurances. On the same day, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported a conversation with him with reference to the proposed fate of Serbia, and added:

“Whether I am to make use of the argument of our territorial *désintéressement*, and when, is for your Excellency to say.”⁸¹

Berchtold's reply (25th) was:

“I beg your Excellency for the present not to mention the question of our territorial *désintéressement* either to Herr Sazonow, or to your Italian colleague.”⁸²

The limit of the language that the Ambassador was to employ, Berchtold indicated in a simultaneous message as follows:

“But there is one argument which cannot fail to impress the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and that is the fact that Austria-Hungary, firmly adhering to the principles upheld for many years, has no egotistical motive in this crisis or in the armed controversy with Servia that may follow. Territorially the monarchy is saturated, and does not wish to possess itself of any portion of Servia. If we are forced to go to war with Servia, it will not be a war for territorial gain, but a means of self-defense and self-preservation. . . . When your Excellency in conversation with Herr Sazonow will have reached this point,⁸³ the time will have come for adding, to the explanations of our reasons and our intentions, the fact that though we certainly do not wish for territorial gain and will not in any way touch the sovereignty of the Kingdom, still to enforce our demands, we would not shrink from taking extreme measures, even if European complications should arise from our attitude.”⁸⁴

With carefully studied ambiguity, Sazonoff was not satisfied. But he could get nothing better from Berchtold, whose chicanery was clearly manifest in his telegram of the 27th authorizing his Ambassador at St. Petersburg:

“to tell Herr Sazonow and your Italian colleagues, though not in a binding form, that as long as the war between Austria-Hungary and

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, II, No. 23. Cf. Kautsky Docs., No. 155.

⁸¹ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 19.

⁸² *Ibid.*, No. 40.

⁸³ The agitation for Greater Serbia.

⁸⁴ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 42; Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 26.

Servia remains localized, the Monarchy will refrain from all territorial acquisitions." ⁸⁵

German Dissatisfaction and Pressure. When Count Hoyos carried to Berlin the personal appeal of the Austro-Hungarian Sovereign to the Kaiser of 2 July 1914, he (Hoyos) stated to Zimmermann, the German Under Secretary of State, that the intention of Austria-Hungary was "completely to dismember Serbia." ⁸⁶ Upon his return to Vienna, both Berchtold and Tisza declared that the statement must be regarded "as the expression of his personal opinion." ⁸⁷ Wanting something explicit, Jagow telegraphed to the German Ambassador at Vienna (17 July):

"In my view, it is important for the conduct of diplomatic negotiations relative to the dispute with Servia to know immediately what are the ideas of the Austrian Statesmen on the future configuration of Servia, for this question may exercise a great influence on the attitude of Italy, and on both the public opinion and attitude of England. . . . I pray your Excellency to endeavor in a conversation with Count Berchtold to obtain explanations on this subject." ⁸⁸

The "ideas of the Austrian Statesmen" being irreconcilable, no clear "explanations" could be obtained, and although the German Chancellor pointed St. Petersburg, Paris, and London to Berchtold's declaration of intentions, ⁸⁹ he himself was by no means satisfied with it. After various efforts to evoke clear statement, the Chancellor on the 28th (10.15 P.M.) telegraphed ⁹⁰ to the German Ambassador at Vienna as follows (Note the four points of assurance which the Chancellor urged should be given to St. Petersburg. Numbers are, for convenience, now inserted):

"The Austrian Government has clearly declared to Russia that it does not contemplate territorial annexations in Servia. That agrees absolutely with the information received from your Excellency, according to which neither Austrian nor Hungarian statesmen consider the addition to the Monarchy of Slav elements as desirable. Beyond that, the Austro-Hungarian Government, notwithstanding repeated questions, has left us in uncertainty as to its intentions.

"The Serbian Government's reply to the Austrian Ultimatum, now to hand, shows that Servia is willing to meet the Austrian demands to such a comprehensive extent that, in the case of a completely intransigent attitude on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government, a

⁸⁵ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 75. See III, No. 29; and Kautsky Docs., No. 433.

⁸⁶ Kautsky Docs., Nos. 18, 61. Cf. No. 326.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, Nos. 18, 61.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 61. Cf. Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 94.

⁸⁹ Kautsky Docs., Nos. 198-200, 300.

⁹⁰ The Chancellor had probably been waiting for reply to his telegram of the previous evening, 11.50 P.M. (post, p. 1095). It arrived at 7.25 P.M.: Kautsky Docs., No. 313, note.

gradual estrangement from her of public opinion throughout Europe must be reckoned with.

“ According to the statements of the Austrian General Staff, an active military advance against Serbia will not be possible until August 12th. The Imperial [German] Government is therefore placed in the extraordinarily difficult position of being exposed, in the meantime, to the mediation and conference proposals of the other Cabinets, and, if she adheres to her present attitude of reserve in respect of such proposals, of being covered before the world, and ultimately also in the eyes of the German people, with the odium of having caused a world-war. Now on such a basis we cannot launch a successful war on three fronts. It is imperative that the responsibility for any extension of the conflict to those not directly concerned should, in all circumstances, devolve upon Russia.

“ In the last conversation of Sazonow with Count Pourtalès, the Minister admitted that Serbia ought to receive a well-merited lesson. The Minister was no longer, as formerly, absolutely opposed to the Austrian point of view. One might draw from this the conclusion that the Russian Government would be led to acknowledge that after mobilisation of the Austro-Hungarian army has commenced, the honor of arms requires an entrance into Serbia. But this idea might be much more easily accepted if the Vienna Cabinet would repeat in St. Petersburg (1) the formal declaration that she has not any intention of making territorial annexations in Serbia. (2) That the military measures have for their object only the temporary occupation of Belgrade and other definite points of Serbian territory in order to compel the Serbian Government to the complete fulfillment of her demands, and to serve as guarantees for future good behavior, to which Austria-Hungary incontestably is entitled after the experiences she has had with Serbia. (3) The occupation would have the same character as the German occupation in France after the peace of Frankfort, to assure the payment of the war indemnities. (4) As soon as the Austrian demands were fulfilled, evacuation would follow.

“ Should the Russian Government not recognize the justice of this standpoint, it would have against it the public opinion of all Europe, which is turning against Austria. As a further consequence, the general diplomatic and, probably, also the military situation would shift very materially in Austria-Hungary's favor.

“ Your Excellency will, by return, make an explicit statement to this effect to Count Berchtold, and suggest a corresponding *démarche* in St. Petersburg. In doing so, you must carefully avoid arousing the impression that we wished to hold Austria back. It is solely a question of finding a *modus operandi* that will facilitate the realization of Austria-Hungary's aim to undermine the foundation of the Great-Serbian propaganda, without at the same time letting loose a world-war; and, if it

cannot be finally averted, to improve for us, as far as feasible, the conditions under which it is to be waged. Please reply by telegraph." ⁹¹

On the same day (28th), the German Ambassador at London reported to Berlin that:

"The members of the Austrian Embassy here, including Count Mensdorff, have, in the course of their conversations with the members of my Embassy and with me, never made the least concealment that Austria's determination was to crush Serbia, and that the note had been framed in such a way as to secure its rejection. . . . Moreover, Count Mensdorff said to me yesterday, confidentially, that Vienna was absolutely determined upon war, seeing that Serbia ought to be crushed. These gentlemen have also declared to me that there was the intention to cede portions of Serbian territory to Bulgaria, and probably also to Albania." ⁹²

The Chancellor now quite out of humour with Berchtold's divagations — with his reticences as well as with the inconsistent attitudes assumed at St. Petersburg, Rome, and London — sent to von Jagow (the German Foreign Minister) the following minute (29th):

"Would not it be necessary to send Vienna another telegram, in which we should declare frankly that we consider as absolutely insufficient the manner in which Vienna discusses with Rome the question of compensations, and we shall throw back upon Vienna responsibility for the attitude which Italy may assume in an eventual war? If, on the verge of a possible European conflagration, Vienna threatens in this way to break up the Triple Alliance, the whole alliance will be shaken. The declaration of Vienna that in case of a lasting occupation of districts of Serbian territory, they would come to an understanding with Italy, is in contradiction of the assurances that she has given to Petersburg as to what concerns her territorial disinterestedness. The declarations made to Rome are certainly known at St. Petersburg. We are unable, as allies, to support a policy of duplicity.

"I consider this as necessary. Otherwise, we cannot continue to serve as mediators at St. Petersburg, and we place ourselves completely under the influence of Vienna. I do not wish that, even at the risk of being taxed with weakness.

"In case you do not see any objections to this, I beg you to submit to me as soon as possible a telegram to this effect." ⁹³

⁹¹ Kautsky Docs., No. 323. See also Nos. 308, 456. At the same time (28th., 9 P.M.), the Chancellor advised St. Petersburg that he was continuing to urge Vienna "to explain herself frankly to St. Petersburg, and to disclose there the aim and extent of the Austrian intervention in Serbia in a manner incontestable, and, we hope, satisfactory to Russia. The declaration of war which has supervened changed nothing in the situation" (*Ibid.*, No. 315). The above translation of the Chancellor's telegram is taken from Kautsky: *The Guilt &c.*, pp. 141-2.

⁹² Kautsky Docs., No. 301.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, No. 340.

In the evening of the same day (8 P.M.), an expostulatory telegram — prepared by Bergen, and modified by Stumm, Jagow, and, finally by the Chancellor — was despatched. It was as follows:

“These Austrian diplomatic declarations disclose some new desires and new aspirations. I regard the attitude of the Government of Vienna, and the difference in the character of the representations to the various Governments with increasing distrust. At Petersburg, it makes a declaration of territorial disinterestedness, but it leaves us absolutely in the dark as to its program; it feeds Rome with insignificant proposals relative to the question of compensations; at London, Count Mensdorff assigns portions of Servian territory to Bulgaria and to Albania, and places himself in formal contradiction with the solemn declarations of Vienna at Petersburg. From these contentions, I am led to conclude that the disavowal of Count Hoyos, which was communicated to me by telegram 83⁹⁴ was intended for the gallery, and that the Government of Vienna has some plans which it considers desirable to keep hidden from us, for the purpose of assuring to itself in any event the support of Germany, and of not exposing itself to an eventual refusal by making open disclosures. The preceding remarks are intended principally for the personal direction of your Excellency. I pray you only to draw the attention of Count Berchtold to the fact that it would be well to dissipate the distrust which his declarations to the Powers touching the integrity of Servia inspires. I ask you to point out to him also that the instructions sent to Baron de Mérey can hardly be considered satisfactory by Italy.”⁹⁵

Berchtold's Obstinacy. After waiting twenty-four hours for a reply to his telegram to the German Ambassador at Vienna of the 28th with its “four points,”⁹⁶ the Chancellor telegraphed (29th, 10.18 P.M.) asking whether it had arrived,⁹⁷ and followed this by another (10.30 P.M.) saying that he was awaiting “immediate execution of his instructions.”⁹⁸ Shortly afterwards (11.50 P.M.), the Ambassador replied that Berchtold was:

“ready to renew his declaration of territorial disinterestedness that he has already made at St. Petersburg, and through the Russian representative here. As to that which concerns the declaration relative to military measures, Count Berchtold declared that he was not prepared to give me an immediate reply. Although I insisted upon the urgent character of the question up to this evening,⁹⁹ I have not received any new communication.”¹⁰⁰

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 18.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 361.

⁹⁶ *Ante*, pp. 1088-9.

⁹⁷ Kautsky Docs., No. 377, note (3).

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 377.

⁹⁹ Evening of the 29th.

¹⁰⁰ Kautsky Docs., No. 388.

Only one of the "four points" was agreed to. Thirteen hours afterwards (30th, 2.30 P.M.), the German Ambassador at Vienna telegraphed that Berchtold was about to make representations in accordance with the Chancellor's suggestion — that Berchtold would send for the Russian Ambassador and would say to him:

"that the Monarchy had not any intention of making territorial annexations in Serbia, and that after the conclusion of peace, she proposes exclusively a temporary occupation of Serbian territory in order to force the Serbian government to comply fully with her demands, and to compel her to procure for her guarantees of a proper attitude in future. The evacuation of Serbian territory by the Monarchy will keep pace with Serbian fulfillment of the conditions of peace."¹⁰¹

But Berchtold did not keep his word. He sent, indeed, for the Russian Ambassador, but merely for the purpose of making explanations about the interruption in the conversations; and when met with complaint of reticence as to his intentions with regard to Serbia, confined his reply to the old formula. Telegraphing the conversation to St. Petersburg, Berchtold said:

"M. Schébéko then went on to say why St. Petersburg viewed our attitude toward Serbia with much anxiety. We were a Great Power attacking the small Servian state without St. Petersburg knowing what our intentions were, whether we deprive it of its sovereignty, overthrow, or even crush it altogether."

Deliberately refraining from complying with the German request, and merely repeating his previous unsatisfactory language, Berchtold replied: "that we had repeatedly laid stress on the fact that we did not desire to pursue a policy of conquest in Servia, nor attack its sovereignty, but merely to establish a state of things which would give us guarantees against the Servian agitations."¹⁰²

That was all — not a word as to temporary occupation and eventual evacuation. In his other telegrams to St. Petersburg of the same day and the next, there is no reference to the subject.¹⁰³ Nor is there in the minutes of the meeting of the Council of State on the 31st.¹⁰⁴ On that day, Berchtold assumed to answer foreign enquiries in a circular telegram to Berlin, London, St. Petersburg, Paris, and Rome, in which, making slight advance upon his formula, he said that Austria-Hungary was:

"not entertaining any idea of territorial aggrandisement, and would in no way question the sovereignty of the kingdom. I, at the same time, authorize your Excellency energetically to deny the view taken, that

¹⁰¹ Kautsky Docs., No. 433.

¹⁰² Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 45; Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 50.

¹⁰³ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, Nos. 44, 62.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 79.

we are supposed to intend re-occupying the Sanjak, and beg of you to impart this officially to the French statesmen.”¹⁰⁵

Precisely what was to be the fate of Serbia, Berchtold would not say. The “four points” of assurance dictated by Germany, and necessary for Russia’s satisfaction, he would not enunciate. They were inconsistent with his personal purpose. Russia had good reason for complaint.

CONVERSATIONS — DEMANDS AND ADJUSTMENTS

Turning to the subject of conversations between Russia and Austria-Hungary with reference to the Austro-Hungarian demands, we note first that the delivery of the note to Serbia was immediately followed by intimation to the Powers that:

“We cannot allow the demands which we have addressed to Servia, and which contain nothing that would not be considered natural between two neighbors, living in peace and harmony, to be made the subject of negotiations and compromises.”¹⁰⁶

Serbia’s Note as Basis for Negotiation. On the 26th July, in a very important interview with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Sazonoff stated with marked moderation his views with reference to the Austro-Hungarian demands, and suggested two things:

(1) “a private exchange of views in order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of the 10th (23d) July in consultation with me”; and (2) that the Serbian note might be taken as a basis of negotiations.¹⁰⁷ Schébéko (Russian Ambassador at Vienna) reported the conversation to Berchtold,¹⁰⁸ who, thereupon, in a telegram to his Ambassador at St. Petersburg (28 July), restated Sazonoff’s proposal as follows:

“All circumstances considered, he [Sazonoff] thought that the Servian answer might well be used as a basis on which one might come to an understanding, the Russian government offering to act as mediator. Herr Sazonow therefore proposed that the exchange of ideas and opinions so happily begun¹⁰⁹ might be continued through your Excellency, and that instructions should be forthwith sent to your Excellency.”

Berchtold added that he had explained to Schébéko:

“that I could not accede to such a proposal. There could be no negotiations on the text of an answer which we had found unacceptable. No one in our country would understand or approve. There can be no question of negotiations when, as the Ambassador must be aware, public opinion was already a prey to terrible excitement in Hungary as well as in Austria — and besides we had to-day declared war on Servia. . . .

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 62. See also No. 66.

¹⁰⁶ *Ante*, p. 1069.

¹⁰⁷ The conversation is more fully referred to in chap. XXVI, pp. 1042-3.

¹⁰⁸ Schébéko had just returned from St. Petersburg.

¹⁰⁹ The allusion is to the conversations of the 24th and 26th referred to, *ante*, pp. 1042-3.

It is impossible from this moment to bring about a lasting peaceful arrangement, and we are forced to meet Servian provocations in the only form which, under these circumstances, is respondent to the dignity of the Monarchy."¹¹⁰

Readers will remember that Russian objections to the Austro-Hungarian demands became reduced (by Austro-Hungarian explanations and Serbian submissions) to little more than assertion of drafting clumsiness which Sazonoff would have helped to remove.¹¹¹ After having rejected Serbia's reply, Austria-Hungary could hardly have been expected to redraft her demand; but that the Serbian reply might be taken as a basis for negotiation was a reasonable suggestion — one approved by both the United Kingdom and Germany. In the later exchanges, the two methods of arriving at adjustment are confused. By both Russia and Austria-Hungary was meant the Austro-Hungarian-Serbian dispute. And it was that which Berchtold, until the 31st, declined to discuss.

The Lichnowsky First Telegram — Serbia's Note as Basis. On the 27th, Sir Edward Grey made a proposal similar to that of Sazonoff. In conversation with Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, he said (as the Ambassador telegraphed to Berlin) that Serbia had:

"given satisfaction to the Austrian demands in a measure which would never have been thought possible; except upon one point — the participation of Austrian officers in the judicial inquiry — Serbia has, in fact, consented to all that was required of her";

and he asked:

"us to exercise our influence at Vienna in order that the Serbian reply might be considered either as satisfactory or as a basis for negotiations."¹¹²

The suggestion being one for solution by negotiation, Sir Edward Grey's proposal for mediation between Austria-Hungary and Russia referred to on a previous page¹¹³ dropped, Sir Edward saying (28 July):

"I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress."¹¹⁴

From this time until the outbreak of the war, the diplomatic interchanges relate principally to two of the four above-mentioned proposals, namely, (1) negotiation or mediation as between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, upon the basis of the Serbian note; and (2) direct conversations between Austria-Hungary and Russia.

German Pressure. Taking the same view as Sir Edward Grey of the Serbian note,¹¹⁵ the German Chancellor, before receiving the Lich-

¹¹⁰ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 95. And see III, Nos. 23, 44, 45; Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 50.

¹¹¹ *Ante*, pp. 1020-22, 1042-3.

¹¹² Kautsky Docs., No. 258. The same conversation is referred to in Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 46.

¹¹³ Pp. 1077-8.

¹¹⁴ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 68.

¹¹⁵ Although the note was delivered on the 25th, and was asked for by Berlin

nowsky telegram above referred to, telegraphed to the Kaiser (27th, 11.20 A.M.), who at the moment was *en route* from the Baltic to Berlin, as follows:

“Serbia in her reply to the ultimatum, a reply of which we have not yet obtained the text, seems to have accepted almost all the points, even punishment of the officers, outside of the military command; the collaboration only under certain reserves.”¹¹⁶

After receiving the Lichnowsky telegram (27th, at 4.37 P.M.¹¹⁷), the Chancellor communicated with the Kaiser (who that evening¹¹⁸ arrived at Berlin), and, in consequence, on the same day at 11.50 P.M., telegraphed to the German Ambassador at Vienna the whole of the Lichnowsky despatch containing Sir Edward Grey’s suggestion, and added:

“After having declined the English proposal for a Conference, it is impossible for us to reject also *a limine*¹¹⁹ this English suggestion. In refusing all mediating action, we should be held by the world wholly responsible for the conflagration and represented as the real instigators of the war. That places us in an impossible situation in our own country, where we must be regarded as constrained to war. Our situation is all the more difficult that Serbia has apparently made great concessions. We cannot, therefore, refuse the rôle of mediators, and we must submit the English proposal to the examination of the Cabinet of Vienna at the same time that London and Paris will continue to act at St. Petersburg. I desire to know the views of Count Berchtold upon the English suggestion, as well as the desire of M. Sazonoff as to negotiating directly with Vienna.”¹²⁰

on the 27th (Kautsky Docs., Nos. 246, 280. Cf. Aus Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 66), it was not received there until the 29th (Kautsky Docs., No. 347). Meanwhile (the 27th), the Serbian representative supplied a copy (Kautsky Docs., Nos. 270, 271). The U. K. received a copy in the same way, and on the same day: Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 39.

¹¹⁶ Kautsky Docs., No. 245.

¹¹⁷ Kautsky Docs., No. 258, note (2).

¹¹⁸ Kautsky, in *The Guilt of William Hohenzollern*, fixes the date as in the text (p. 102). Beyens, in *L’Allemagne avant la Guerre*, alleges the 26th (p. 289), and Sir Charles Oman quotes to the same effect a telegram from the British Consul at Berlin (*The Outbreak of the War*, p. 60). The Kautsky Docs. (Nos. 231, 245), and von Bethmann-Hollweg’s book, *Reflections on the World War* (p. 129), make quite clear that the 27th is the correct date: See the article by S. B. Fay in *The American Historical Review*, XXVI, p. 38, note.

¹¹⁹ On the threshold.

¹²⁰ Kautsky Docs., No. 277; Kautsky, *The Guilt &c.*, p. 133; Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 25, note. In the Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 68, appears a telegram from Count Szögyény, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin, to Berchtold, which is utterly irreconcilable with the message above quoted. It bears the same date, and is, in part: “State-secretary, in strictest privacy, informed me that very shortly eventual English propositions of mediation would be communicated to your Excellency through the German government. The German government assures me in the most decided way that it does not identify itself with these propositions; that, on the contrary, it advises to disregard them, but that it must

Employment of the words "mediating action" and "mediators" must not be permitted to obscure the fact that the full extent of Sir Edward Grey's request to Germany was (as above noted):

"to exercise our influence at Vienna in order that the Serbian reply might be considered either as satisfactory, or as a basis for negotiations."¹²¹

Negotiation, and not mediation in the stricter sense, was, at this moment, Sir Edward Grey's proposal. On the same day, the German Chancellor telegraphed to London (11.50 P.M.) as follows:

"We have at once commenced mediating action at Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward Grey. Besides the furtherance given to this English suggestion, we have submitted to Count Berchtold the desire of Sazonoff to come to an understanding directly with Vienna."¹²²

A few hours afterwards,¹²³ the Chancellor followed this telegram by a longer one to London in which he said that he could not counsel Austria-Hungary to consider the Serbian reply as satisfactory, for that would be:

"to counsel Vienna to sanction *a posteriori* the Serbian reply, which she had immediately, and without having it brought to our attention, rejected as insufficient."

With regard to accepting the note as a basis for negotiation, however, the Chancellor said:

"We have gone very far in the way of conciliation in regard to England, when, concerning the second demand, we have undertaken mediating action."¹²⁴

These telegrams despatched, the Chancellor sent the following by hand to the Kaiser:

"I submit respectfully to Your Majesty a telegram from Prince Lichnowsky which has just reached me. In accordance with Your Majesty's orders, I have submitted the suggestions of Sir Edward Grey to

pass them on, to satisfy the English government. . . . The German government will, whenever England has such a request to make, declare with decision that it cannot support such proposals of intervention and only passes them on to please England." The German delegation at the Peace Conference denied the truth of this statement. That no such declaration was made to England is evidenced by the fact that there is no appearance of it in any of the English documents, and that it is irreconcilable with the telegrams which immediately afterwards passed from Berlin to London. Kautsky's comments on the Szögény telegram may be seen in *The Guilt &c.*, pp. 129 ff. Notwithstanding these facts, Mr. Asquith quotes the document as authentic and veracious: *The Genesis of the War*, cap. XXIV.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1094.

¹²² Kautsky Docs., No. 278.

¹²³ 28th, 2 A.M.

¹²⁴ Kautsky Docs., No. 279. See also No. 314. On the 29th, Jagow, when speaking to the French Ambassador at Berlin with reference to the Serbian reply, said "that he saw in it a basis for possible negotiation": Cambon to Paris: Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 92.

Count Berchtold. It is for Austria to frame a policy on that subject. If we reject *a limine* the rôle of mediator, while London and Paris are constantly using their influence at St. Petersburg, we will be considered by England and by the whole world as responsible for the conflagration, and as the real instigators of the war. On the one hand, we would make it impossible to maintain in our own country the present sanguine character of public opinion, and, on the other hand, it will drive England from her neutrality.”¹²⁵

The reply to the Chancellor's telegram to Vienna submitting “the English proposal” was a curt refusal. On the 28th (4.55 P.M.), the German Ambassador there telegraphed as follows:

“Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his thanks for the communication of the English mediation proposal. He states, however, that, after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequent declaration of war, the step appears belated.”¹²⁶

Berchtold quickened. The effect of the Chancellor's telegram of the 27th saying “we cannot therefore refuse the rôle of mediators,”¹²⁷ and of another from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin saying that:

“very shortly eventual English propositions of mediation would be communicated to your Excellency,”¹²⁸

was to stimulate Berchtold into an activity that he had not desired. Telegraphing, earlier in the day (27th), to his Ambassador at Berlin, he had said:

“Declaration of war within a few days. Beginning of war operations must, however, be delayed until marching up of troops has been completed, so that decisive blows can be dealt with full force. A certain time will be necessary for this, because experience has taught us not to hurry on military measures on a large scale before we are certain that there will really be war.”¹²⁹

And the German Ambassador at Vienna had been informed (27th) that “mobilization cannot be accomplished before the 12th August.”¹³⁰ But it now appearing that postponement of a declaration of war until ready for it would produce not only unpleasant international embarrassment, but possibly a change in the German attitude, Berchtold decided upon immediate action. In a report to his sovereign of the same day, he asked that he might be authorized to publish a declaration of war “to-morrow,” saying that it did not:

¹²⁵ Kautsky Docs., No. 283.

¹²⁶ German White Bk., 1914, Ex. 16. Cf. Kautsky Docs., No. 313; Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 81.

¹²⁷ *Ante*, p. 1095.

¹²⁸ *Ante*, pp. 1095-6, note 120.

¹²⁹ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 69.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 67. See Kautsky Docs., Nos. 245, 323; IV, pp. 152, 155.

"seem improbable that the Powers of the Triple Entente will make one more effort to bring about a peaceful solution of the conflict, unless by an early declaration of war we make the situation clear. . . . I take the liberty to mention that His Imp. & Roy. Highness Chief Commander of the Balkan forces, Archduke Friedrich, and also the Chief of the General Staff make no objection to the declaration of war being sent off to-morrow morning."¹³¹

On the same day (27th), the German Ambassador at Vienna telegraphed:

"It has been decided to make to-morrow, or the day after to-morrow at the latest, an official declaration of war, principally to prevent any attempt at intervention."¹³²

It was issued on the 28th.¹³³ In this way, Berchtold arranged that to any proposal for mediation he could reply "belated."¹³⁴ With the sole view, moreover, of supporting this plea, bombardment (from across the river) of Belgrade, an unfortified city, was uselessly commenced on the next day (29th), and thereupon, Berchtold hypocritically sent a circular despatch to the Powers¹³⁵ in which, after asserting the insufficiency of the Serbian reply, he said:

"Moreover the Imperial and Royal Government must point out that, to its greatest regret, it is no longer in a position to consider the Servian reply in the sense proposed by England, as, at the moment the German step was taken here, the state of war between the Monarchy and Servia had already begun and the Servian reply has therefore been forestalled by events. . . . If, however, the English cabinet is ready to use its influence with the Russian Government with a view to the preservation of peace between the Great Powers and the localizing of the war which has been forced upon us by the Servian agitation and intrigues of many years' standing, the Imperial and Royal Government will be only too pleased."¹³⁶

That the existence of "the state of war" was merely a contrived excuse is evidenced by the fact that a similar refusal was given to the British Ambassador *prior* to the declaration of war. On the 28th, that Ambassador reported a conversation with Berchtold as follows:

"I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted

¹³¹ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 78.

¹³² Kautsky Docs., No. 257.

¹³³ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 97. The declaration was despatched from Vienna to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at 1.20 P.M., and delivered to the Serbian Minister at 6.30 P.M. An open telegram, direct from the Austro-Hungarian to the Serbian government, declaring war, arrived at Nish (the temporary capital of Serbia) at noon of the same day: Serb. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 46; Kautsky Docs., No. 311.

¹³⁴ *Ante*, p. 1097.

¹³⁵ St. Petersburg, Paris, London, and Rome.

¹³⁶ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 25. Cf. Kautsky Bks., No. 400.

a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador at Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.”¹³⁷

On the 30th, the British Ambassador at Berlin reported to London as follows:

“I found the Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a *fait accompli*. This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Servia’s reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war.”¹³⁸

Serbia’s boundary was not crossed until 13 August, and that, as the Austro-Hungarian Generals soon ascertained, was prior to proper preparation.

Irreconcilable Purposes. Berchtold’s telegram to his Ambassador at St. Petersburg of the 28th (above noted), declining all negotiation with reference to the Serbian note, was intended to be merely for the information of the Ambassador. It contained no instructions. Without them,¹³⁹ Szápáry had an interview with Sazonoff and reported it (29th) to Vienna as follows:

“As I have learned from the German Ambassador that M. Sazonof is showing himself greatly excited over your Excellency’s alleged disin-

¹³⁷ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 62. On the 27th, Sazonoff had asked the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg whether Austria-Hungary would accept the mediation of the King of Italy or the King of England (Aus. Red Bk., O. F., II, No. 73). Two days afterwards, Sazonoff expressed disappointment at having received no reply (*ibid.*, III, No. 16). Thereupon the Ambassador telegraphed Vienna: “In order to avoid any *froissement* of Sazonoff, who expects some sort of reply to his proposal of mediation, and in order that it should not look as if declaration of war was so to say the reply to his proposal, I would beg to inquire whether I might tell the Russian Minister that the declaration of war had already been decided upon when my telegram arrived and when Mr. Schébéko made similar proposals” (*ibid.*, No. 17). Berchtold replied on the same day (29th): “Your Excellency can, in any case, truthfully point out to Mr. Sazonow that when your report concerning his proposal of mediation arrived here, the declaration of war had already been finally decided upon” (*ibid.*, No. 20).

¹³⁸ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 76. Cf. Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, Nos. 31, 33.

¹³⁹ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 74.

clination to continue the exchange of ideas with Russia, and over the mobilisation of Austria-Hungary, which is supposed to be much more extensive than is necessary, and, therefore, directed against Russia, I visited the Minister in order to remove certain misunderstandings which seemed to me to exist. The Minister began by making the point that Austria-Hungary categorically refused to continue an exchange of ideas. I agreed in view of your Excellency's telegram of the 28th July that your Excellency had indeed declined, after all that had occurred, to discuss the wording of the note, and in general the Austro-Hungarian-Servian conflict, but said that I must make it clear that I was in a position to suggest a much broader basis of discussion in declaring that we had no desire to injure any Russian interest, that we had no intention, naturally on the assumption that the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia remained localised, of annexing Servian territory, and that also we had no idea of touching the sovereignty of Servia. I was convinced that your Excellency would always be ready to keep in touch with St. Petersburg with regard to Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.

"M. Sazonof gave me to understand that he had been convinced of this so far as territory was concerned, but so far as the sovereignty of the country was in question he must continue to hold the opinion that to force on Servia our conditions would result in Servia becoming a vassal State. This, however, would upset the equilibrium in the Balkans, and this was how Russian interests became involved. He returned to the question of a discussion of the note, the action of Sir E. Grey, &c., and he desired again to point out to me that Russia recognised our legitimate interest, and desired to give it full satisfaction, but that this should be clothed in a form which would be acceptable to Servia.' I expressed the view that this was not a Russian but a Servian interest, whereupon M. Sazonof claimed that Russian interests were in this case Servian interests, so that I was obliged to make an end of the vicious circle by going on to a new topic."¹⁴⁰

There lay the difficulty. Russia wished to converse upon a subject which Austria-Hungary refused to talk about. The Ambassador's report of the conversation terminated by saying that, during it, news of the bombardment of Belgrade arrived. Sazonoff:

"appeared as if transformed, and said: 'You are only wanting to gain time by negotiations and are meanwhile advancing and bombarding an unprotected city. . . . What is the good of our continuing our conversation if you act in this manner?' . . . I left him in a state of great agitation; and also my German colleague, who renewed his call, had — at least for to-day — to renounce all hope of a calm interview."¹⁴¹

Interruption of Conversations — German Insistence. Although the

¹⁴⁰ Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 47.

¹⁴¹ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 19.

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had in this way made his position reasonably clear — he would discuss one subject, but not the other — word went to London¹⁴² and Berlin that Austria-Hungary had declined conversation upon any subject.¹⁴³ Sir Edward Grey made complaint to the German Ambassador, who reported accordingly to Berlin.¹⁴⁴ Thereupon the Chancellor telegraphed to Vienna (30th, 12.30 A.M.):

“Russia complains that the conversations have not been continued either through the agency of M. Schébéko or through that of M. Szápáry. We therefore request insistently, in order to stop a general catastrophe, or, in any case, to put Russia in the wrong, that conversations with Vienna commence and continue conformably with telegram 174.”¹⁴⁵

Two and a half hours afterwards (3.00 A.M.), the Chancellor followed his telegram with another in which, after asking for explanation of the fact that Sazonoff had complained of Vienna’s silence, whereas the Ambassador had reported a recent conversation between Berchtold and the Russian Ambassador at Vienna,¹⁴⁶ he said:

“We cannot demand that Austria should negotiate with Serbia, with whom she is in a state of war. But the refusal of any interchange of opinion with St. Petersburg would be a grave error, as it would simply provoke the military intervention of foreign countries, to avoid which is Austria’s first interest. We are, it is true, ready to fulfil the obligations of our alliance, but we must decline to allow Vienna to drag us wantonly, and in disregard of our counsels, into a world-conflagration. In the Italian question, also, Vienna seems to pay no attention to our advice. Please speak plainly to Count Berchtold at once with all emphasis and great seriousness.”¹⁴⁷

At 3.05 A.M., the Chancellor telegraphed to St. Petersburg:

“The refusal of Vienna to carry on conversations must have occurred before our last representation at Vienna, of the result of which we have not as yet been informed.”¹⁴⁸

Berchtold maintained that, in fact, there had been no refusal to continue the conversations; that he had been misunderstood; that he had said to the Russian Ambassador that although the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been told that:

“he was absolutely to refuse to discuss the various points of the note to Serbia, their justification etc.,”¹⁴⁹

¹⁴² Kautsky Docs., No. 357; Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 62.

¹⁴³ Kautsky Docs., No. 343.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 357.

¹⁴⁵ Kautsky Docs., No. 385. The telegram referred to is *ibid.*, No. 323.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 356.

¹⁴⁷ Kautsky, *The Guilt &c.*, pp. 184-5; Kautsky Docs., No. 396; *Remarques &c.*, p. 4; Loreburn, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-9.

¹⁴⁸ Kautsky Docs., No. 397. *Cf.* No. 357.

¹⁴⁹ German Ambassador at Vienna to Berlin, 30th, 8.50 P.M.: *ibid.*, No. 448. See also Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, Nos. 25, 44, 45.

he, nevertheless, had been authorized to give explanation as to the meaning of the note; and that the Russian Ambassador had improperly inferred that the conversations were to cease. Sazonoff appears to have been under the impression, too, that the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia necessarily put an end to the conversations.¹⁵⁰

Further Conversations — Hampering Limitations. Whatever the fact, Berchtold determined to present an appearance of conciliatory disposition. The report of 30 July of the French Ambassador at Vienna supplies the following:

“ In spite of the communication made yesterday by the Russian Ambassador to several of his colleagues, among them the German Ambassador, with reference to the partial mobilisation in his country, the Vienna press refrained from publishing the news. The enforced silence has just been explained at an interview of great importance between M. Schébéko¹⁵¹ and Count Berchtold, who examined at length the present formidable difficulties with equal readiness to apply to them mutually acceptable solutions.

“ M. Schébéko explained that the only object of the military preparations on the Russian side was to reply to those made by Austria, and to indicate the intention and the right of the Tsar to formulate his views on the settlement of the Servian question. The steps towards mobilization taken in Galicia, answered Count Berchtold, have no aggressive intention and are only directed towards maintaining the situation as it stands. On both sides endeavors will be made to prevent these measures from being interpreted as signs of hostility.

“ With a view to settling the Austro-Servian dispute it was agreed that *pourparlers* should be resumed at St. Petersburg between M. Sazonof and Count Szápáry; they had only been interrupted owing to a misunderstanding, as Count Berchtold thought that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed that the Austrian representative should be given powers which would allow him to modify the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Count Szápáry will only be authorized to discuss what settlement would be compatible with the dignity and prestige for which both Empires had equal concern.

“ It would therefore for the moment be in this direct form, and only between the two most interested Powers, that the discussion which Sir Edward Grey proposed to entrust to the four Powers not directly interested would take place.

“ Sir M. de Bunsen¹⁵² who was with me, at once declared to M. Schébéko that the Foreign Office would entirely approve of this new

¹⁵⁰ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, Nos. 70, 88; Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, Nos. 81-83; Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 50; Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, Nos. 45, 65, 79; Kautsky Does., No. 368.

¹⁵¹ Russian Ambassador at Vienna.

¹⁵² British Ambassador at Vienna.

procedure. Repeating the statement he made at the Ballplatz, the Russian Ambassador stated that his Government would take a much broader view than was generally supposed of the demands of the Monarchy; M. Schébéko did everything to convince Count Berchtold of the sincerity of Russia's desire to arrive at an agreement which would be acceptable to the two Empires."¹⁵³

That appeared, once more, to open happy prospect, but Berchtold had not the slightest intention of departing from the position already assumed. On the same day (30th), he sent two telegrams to his Ambassador at St. Petersburg. In the first, after referring to the misunderstanding as to the continuation of the conversations, he said:

"I am of course, as always, ready to explain to Mr. Sazonow the different points of our Note to Servia, which, however, have since been forestalled by events. At the same time I should also very much like to talk over, amicably and confidentially, questions directly concerning our relations with Russia, according to the suggestion of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which Mr. Schébéko interpreted to me, and which might clear up many matters which, I regret to say, are not quite clear, and which might assure the so much desired peaceful development of neighborly relations. Will your Excellency please ask Mr. Sazonow, as though the question came from you, what subjects the Minister would like this conversation to embrace; eventually do you also, in a non-compromising manner, proceed to enter upon a discussion of matters in general, eliminating, of course, from the outset everything counter to Russian interests, and express your readiness to report to me on the subject."¹⁵⁴

Note the usual reservation — discussion must be limited to Austro-Russian relations. In his second telegram of that day, Berchtold said that he had made similar representation to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, and begged him so to report to St. Petersburg.¹⁵⁵

Sir Edward Grey. It is somewhat surprising to find that Sir Edward Grey did not regard as unreasonable the limitations imposed by Berchtold. In his telegram to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg (31st), he said:

"I learn from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also

¹⁵³ Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 104. M. Dumaine added that "The interview was carried on in a friendly tone and gave reason for thinking that all chances of localizing the dispute were not lost, when the news of the German mobilization arrived at Vienna." The reference is to a false report of German mobilization which appeared in the *Lokalanzeiger* of Berlin, and which was immediately and officially contradicted. It had no effect upon the negotiations. See *post*, pp. 1143-6.

¹⁵⁴ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 44.

¹⁵⁵ Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 50; Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 45.

been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. . . . It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them."¹⁵⁶

Further Conversations. But the conversations, as one might assume, made little progress. In his report of the 31st,¹⁵⁷ the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, after acknowledging the receipt of Berchtold's first telegram,¹⁵⁸ and after mentioning that the interview of the 29th had been abruptly broken off by Sazonoff, added:

"In view of the fact that it had meanwhile become clear from the conversation between the German Ambassador and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia would not be satisfied even with a formal declaration that Austria-Hungary would neither attempt to reduce the size of Serbia (!) nor touch its sovereignty, nor yet injure Russian interests in the Balkans or elsewhere, and with regard to the fact that the Russian mobilization has since been ordered, I believe it best, without further special instructions from your Excellency to abstain from the requested *démarche*."¹⁵⁹

After receiving Berchtold's second telegram, the Ambassador changed his mind. In his report of the 31st (continued on the next day), he said that he had:

"decided without regard to the orders for general mobilization since issued in Russia and the breaking-off of our exchange of views, which on the part of Russia was effected in an unfriendly manner, nevertheless to act according to these telegrams, because on the one hand I did not want to disavow the assertion of Emperor William that we were willing to continue the conversation, and on the other hand it seemed opportune to me, for the establishment of our tactical situation, to appear as the ones attacked and yet to have given an ultimate proof of good will and thus to put Russia in the wrong as much as possible."¹⁶⁰

The Ambassador added that he had explained to Sazonoff that Vienna was:

"especially inclined to discuss the text of our Note as far as its interpretation was concerned. I knew, of course, that the Russian point of view was that the form of the Note should be modified, whilst your

¹⁵⁶ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 110.

¹⁵⁷ In the report there is reference to a conversation on the 30th with "purely negative result" (Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 71). Probably the conversation of the 29th was meant.

¹⁵⁸ *Ante*, p. 1094.

¹⁵⁹ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 74. The exclamation mark after the word Servia is in the official publication. *Cf.* Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 55.

¹⁶⁰ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 75; Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 55.

Excellency were (*sic*) of opinion that its meaning could be explained.”¹⁶¹ The two points of view had not materially approximated. The Ambassador added further remarks which cannot be understood without observing that he was reporting not only (as he said) a conversation held after the receipt of Berchtold's two telegrams above referred to, but also a later conversation engaged in after the receipt of two further telegrams. One of these — very important — will be referred to on a subsequent page.¹⁶²

MEDIATION BETWEEN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SERBIA

The Lichnowsky Second Telegram — Mediation. Concurrently with these conversations (between Vienna and St. Petersburg), London and Berlin endeavored to arrange for “intervention of the Great Powers by means of counsels to Serbia.” On the 30th, Sir Edward Grey said to Lichnowsky (the German Ambassador) that direct conversations between Austria-Hungary and Russia having ceased, he wished Germany to propose some method of mediation. To a remark of the Ambassador (as he telegraphed, 2.08 P.M.), Sir Edward replied:

“that he understood perfectly that Austria ought not to be humiliated, that of that there could be no doubt. He hoped that an expedient could be found making possible for Austria to obtain entire satisfaction, without however imposing upon Russia an attitude of passivity until Austria had arrived at the ultimate object of her warlike enterprise. That would mean a humiliation for Russia which she could not accept.

“I replied that Serbian affairs did not directly concern Russia, and that Russia had all the less reason for intervening in this quarrel between neighbors that Austria had no intention of annexing Serbia.

“He replied that, even without annexation, there was a method which would convert Serbia into a vassal state of Austria. That, Russia could not, and never would permit. The situation of Russia in relation to her orthodox Christianity was involved. He expressed the idea that it might perhaps be possible to arrive at agreement on the subject of the extent of the military operations of Austria and the demands of the Monarchy. . . . In closing, the Minister informed me that the Serbian Chargé d’Affaires at Rome had declared to the Marquis San Giuliano that, under reserve of certain explanations touching the nature of the participation by Austrian agents, Serbia would be disposed to accept articles 5 and 6 of the Austrian note and therefore to comply with all her demands.¹⁶³ As it could not be supposed that Austria would lend herself to direct negotiations with Serbia, the affair could be regulated

¹⁶¹ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 97. The reproduction of this telegram in Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 56 is imperfect.

¹⁶² P. IIII.

¹⁶³ Cf. Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 64.

by the intervention of the great Powers by means of counsels to Serbia. The Marquis San Giuliano thinks that on this basis a settlement might be arrived at. But the Minister desires above all that discussions be commenced immediately.”¹⁶⁴

German Pressure. This telegram, holding out the prospect of “entire satisfaction” for Austria-Hungary and indicating further submission by Serbia, the Chancellor immediately (30th, 12.30 A.M.) forwarded to Vienna with the following instructions:

“I request that you communicate immediately that which precedes to Count Berchtold, and add that we consider the fact that Serbia has submitted, as a proper basis for negotiations, with a provision for an occupation of part of the Serbian territory as guarantee.”¹⁶⁵

To this Berchtold made short reply — as reported by the German Ambassador (30 July, 3.20 P.M.):

“It is a mistake to consider that the acceptance of articles 5 and 6 of the Austrian note would be equivalent to its acceptance in entirety, for Serbia has made reserves upon various other points. Unqualified acceptance of the demands of the note was considered sufficient as long as a pacific solution of the conflict between Serbia and the Monarchy was in prospect. Now, since a state of war has supervened, Austrian conditions ought naturally to be different.”¹⁶⁶

Than such a reply nothing could be more self-condemnatory. War had been declared and hostilities commenced before completion of military preparation, merely for the purpose of framing an excuse for declining proposals for peaceful settlement of the quarrel, and now the pendency of war (halting for lack of preparation) is advanced as a reason for adding to the conditions upon which submission would be accepted.

The Lichnowsky Third Telegram — Grey’s “Pledge Plan.” Later in the same day as the above-recited conversation in London (20th), Sir Edward Grey spoke still more seriously to Lichnowsky. According to the Ambassador’s report (telegraphed at 6.39 P.M.), Sir Edward said:

“Sazonow had declared that after the declaration of war¹⁶⁷ he was not in a position to negotiate directly with Austria, and he had requested London to take up again the question of mediation. The Russian Government considers that the condition precedent to this mediation would be provisional cessation of hostilities.”

Sir Edward thought that:

“a good basis for mediation would be that Austria, after occupying Belgrade or other towns, would disclose her intentions. . . . But the

¹⁶⁴ Kautsky Docs., No. 357. Sir Edward Grey’s account of the conversation is in Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 90.

¹⁶⁵ Kautsky Docs., No. 384.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 432.

¹⁶⁷ By Austria-Hungary against Serbia.

necessity for mediation appeared to him to be urgent if one did not wish to precipitate a European catastrophe.”

This was substantially the “pledge plan” suggested by the Kaiser on the previous day — the 28th. In the same telegram, Lichnowsky reported that Sir Edward had said to the Italian Ambassador that:

“in case mediation was accepted, he would be able to procure for Austria all possible satisfaction. There could not be any question of a humiliating withdrawal by Austria, seeing that the Serbians ought in any case to be chastised, and that they would be obliged, with the assent of Russia, to submit themselves to Austrian desires. Austria therefore, without a war which would put European peace in question, could obtain guarantees for the future.”¹⁶⁸

German Pressure. This telegram, providing for “all possible satisfaction” for Austria-Hungary and a pledge that it would be secured, the Chancellor, during the ensuing night (30th, 2.55 A.M.), forwarded to Vienna (his previous telegram had preceded this by nearly two and a half hours), and added:

“If Austria refuses any intervention, we are thus faced with a conflagration, in which England would go against us, and, according to all indications, Italy and Roumania not with us, and we two would have to face four Great Powers. The heavy end of the fighting would, through England’s hostility, fall to Germany. Austria’s political prestige, the honor of her arms as well as her legitimate demands on Serbia, could be amply preserved by the occupation of Belgrade or other places. By the humiliation of Serbia, she would, as against Russia, strengthen her position in the Balkans. Under these circumstances we must urgently and earnestly submit to the considerations of the Vienna Cabinet that it should accept mediation under the honorable terms specified. The responsibility for the consequences which will otherwise result would be uncommonly serious for Austria and for ourselves.”¹⁶⁹

(Read with this telegram another sent five minutes afterwards, quoted on a previous page, in which the Chancellor declined to be drawn wantonly “into a world-conflagration.”) On the same day (30th, 7.15 P.M.), the Kaiser made the following personal appeal to the Austro-Hungarian sovereign:

“I have not felt myself able to decline the personal request of the Czar to make an attempt at mediation in order to prevent a general conflagration and to maintain the peace of the world, and yesterday and to-day I have caused propositions to be submitted to your Government by my Ambassador. They provide, among other things, that Austria, after occupation of Belgrade or other localities, disclose her conditions.

¹⁶⁸ Kautsky Docs., No. 368. See Br. Blue Bk., 1914, Nos. 88-90; Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 79, p. 70.

¹⁶⁹ Kautsky, *The Guilt &c.*, pp. 183-4; Kautsky Docs., No. 395. Cf. Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, Nos. 31, 33, 65, 79.

I should be sincerely obliged if you would communicate your decision as early as possible." ¹⁷⁰

The Chancellor's second telegram reached Tschirschky (German Ambassador at Vienna) while he was at lunch with Berchtold (30th), who, as the Ambassador telegraphed (31st, 1.35 A.M.), declared that he would immediately report the matter to the Emperor. The Ambassador added:

"I again called the special attention of the Minister to the fact that the justified claims of Austria appear to have received full satisfaction, thanks to the acceptance of the proposal of mediation, including the chastisement of Serbia with guarantees for her future good behavior, and that in this way the declared object of all action of the Monarchy against Serbia may be obtained by the Monarchy without unchaining a world war. Under these conditions, the total rejection of mediation would appear to me to be impossible. The honor of arms would be sufficiently satisfied by the occupation of Serbian territory by Austro-Hungarian troops. Military occupation of Serbia, with the express assent of Russia, signifies incontestably a valuable reinforcement of Austrian influence with regard to Russia and in the Balkans. I begged these two gentlemen ¹⁷¹ not to lose sight of the incalculable consequences of rejection of the mediation." ¹⁷²

In the afternoon of the same day, the Ambassador renewed his appeal — this time to Counts Forgach and Hoyos. ¹⁷³ As he reported:

"They both assured me that because of opinion in the army and among the people, the limitation of the military operations would, in their view, be impossible. To-morrow morning Count Tisza will arrive in Vienna, and his opinion upon this question of great importance will be taken." ¹⁷⁴

Having been made aware, by telephone, of Berchtold's procrastinating reply to Tschirschky, ¹⁷⁵ the Chancellor, on the same day (30th, 9 P.M.), sent to him (Tschirschky) the following:

"If Vienna, as is to be assumed from the telephone conversation of your Excellency with Herr von Stumm, refuses any intervention, in particular Grey's proposals, it is hardly possible any longer to shift the guilt of the European conflagration, which is breaking out, on to Russia. His Majesty has, at the Tsar's request, undertaken intervention in Vienna, because he could not refuse to do so without arousing the irrefutable suspicion that we want the war. The success of this intervention is, however, rendered difficult by the fact that Russia has mobilized against Austria. We have mentioned this to-day to England, adding that we have already raised in a friendly way in St. Petersburg and Paris the

¹⁷⁰ Kautsky Docs., No. 437; Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 49A.

¹⁷¹ Count Forgach was present.

¹⁷² Kautsky Docs., No. 465.

¹⁷³ Of the Foreign Office.

¹⁷⁴ Kautsky Docs., No. 465. And see No. 468.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

question of stopping Russian and French military measures, and could only take a new step in this direction through an ultimatum, which would mean war. We have, therefore, suggested to Sir Edward Grey that he should, for his part, work earnestly in Paris and St. Petersburg in this sense, and have just received his assurance to that effect through Lichnowsky. If England's efforts succeed while Vienna refuses everything, Vienna will show that she wants a war at all costs, in which we will be involved, while Russia remains free from blame. The result is a quite untenable situation for us as regards our own nation. We can therefore only urgently recommend Austria to accept Grey's proposal, which guarantees her position in every respect. Your Excellency will at once communicate most emphatically with Count Berchtold in this sense, and, if possible, also with Count Tisza."¹⁷⁶

Later in the evening (11.20), the Chancellor followed this telegram with another:

"Please do not carry out for the present instructions No. 200."¹⁷⁷

The reason for this direction was the arrival at Berlin of a telegram from the British King to Prince Henry (received 30th, 11.08 P.M.), in part as follows:

"My Government is doing the utmost possible in order to induce Russia and France to postpone further military preparations, provided that Austria declares herself satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighboring Servian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands, while at the same time the other countries suspend their preparations for war. I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe."¹⁷⁸

Finding in this message a method of influencing Vienna better than his already despatched telegram, the Chancellor, a few hours after its receipt (31st, 2.45 A.M.), repeated it to Vienna; said that, because of it, he had cancelled his previous instructions; required that a copy of it should be immediately sent to Berchtold; and added:

"We urgently request a definitive decision from Vienna during the day."¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Kautsky, *The Guilt &c.*, pp. 185-6; Kautsky Docs., No. 441. This is the telegram with reference to which Kautsky said: "Even with this telegram it is possible to be in doubt whether Bethmann-Hollweg was more concerned with maintaining peace or shifting the responsibility for the war on to Russia. But the pressure on Vienna was there, and it ought in the end to have worked for peace" (*The Guilt &c.*, p. 450).

¹⁷⁷ Kautsky, *op. cit.*, p. 188; Kautsky Docs., No. 450.

¹⁷⁸ Coll. Dip. Docs., pp. 538-9; Kautsky Docs., No. 452. When perusing this message, the Kaiser wrote in the margin, opposite the words "accept this proposal," "Austria has this evening made the same proposal." That is a striking example of the Kaiser's impetuous inaccuracy. ¹⁷⁹ Kautsky Docs., No. 464.

Berlin had now done what it could to persuade Vienna to moderate its attitude. Meanwhile the Czar had been induced — on the morning of the 30th — to confirm (if he had not already ordered) the mobilization against Germany which on the previous day had been commenced by his Minister for War.

Austro-Hungarian Council Meeting on 31st. At the Austro-Hungarian Council meeting during the morning of the 31st, Berchtold said that, after receipt of Sir Edward Grey's proposal for mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, he had:

“ reported to His I. and R. Majesty on the contents of the *démarche* of the German Ambassador. His Majesty had instantly declared that the cessation of hostilities against Serbia was impossible, and had approved of the proposal to carefully avoid accepting the English offer on its merits, but agreed that we should in the form of our reply, show that we desired to meet England's wishes and thus also meet the wishes of the German State Chancellor by not offending the Government. The reply to the German Government had not yet been elaborated, but he could already say now, that three fundamental principles had been observed in its wording, viz.:

“ 1. The warlike operations against Serbia must continue.

“ 2. We cannot negotiate concerning the English offer as long as the Russian mobilization has not been stopped.

“ 3. Our demands must be accepted integrally, and we cannot negotiate about them in any way.

“ As is known from experience, the Powers in such cases always try to make reductions when passing on the demands made by one Power, and it is very probable that this would now also be tried, as the present constellation would make France, England, and also Italy take Russia's part, and we had very doubtful support in the German representative in London. Anything might sooner be expected from Prince Lichnowsky than that he would warmly represent our interests. If this whole action ended in nothing else than a gain of prestige, it would, according to his [Berchtold's] opinion, have been undertaken altogether in vain. A mere occupation of Belgrade would be of no good to us; even if Russia would allow it. All this was moonshine. Russia would pose as the Saviour of Serbia and especially of the Servian army; the latter would remain intact, and in two or three years we could expect a renewed attack of Serbia under far more unfavorable conditions. He therefore had the intention of replying most courteously to the English offer, making at the same time the aforementioned conditions and avoiding to discuss facts.”

More diplomatic, Count Tisza proposed:

“ to reply to the English suggestion by stating that we were ready to approach it in principle, but only on the condition that our operations in Serbia be continued, and the Russian mobilization stopped.”

Berchtold agreed. In the official report, we read that he:

“explains that the idea of a conference is so odious to him that he would not even like to appear to accept it. He therefore finds Count Tisza’s proposal the best. We must continue the war with Servia and declare ourselves ready to continue negotiating with the Powers as soon as Russia stops its mobilization. . . . After Baron Burian had also expressed agreement, the proposal of Count Tisza was unanimously accepted and the fact established that the inclination was to accept the English proposal on the conditions formulated by Count Tisza.”¹⁸⁰

That stipulation of these conditions was intended to be equivalent to repudiation of the mediation proposals, is apparent from the form of the reply of the Austro-Hungarian monarch to the Kaiser (31st, 1.06 P.M.):

“The action of my army now in progress against Servia cannot be interrupted by the threatening and provoking attitude of Russia. A new rescue of Servia by Russian intervention would entail for my States the most serious consequences, and it is therefore impossible for me to permit such an intervention. I am aware of the implication of my decisions, and have made them with entire confidence in the justice of God and with the certainty that your armed forces will range themselves with unalterable fidelity in favor of my Empire and the Triple Alliance.”¹⁸¹

In accordance with the decision of the Council, Berchtold, early the next morning (3.45), advised London and St. Petersburg that he was telegraphing to Berlin as follows:

“I ask your Excellency to convey our warm thanks to the Secretary of State for the communication made to us through Herr von Tschirschky, and to declare to him that in spite of the change in the situation which has arisen through the mobilization of Russia, we are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir Edward Grey to negotiate between us and Servia. The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our military action against Servia should continue to take its course, and that the British Cabinet should move the Russian Government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilization which is directed against us, in which case, of course, we will also at once cancel the defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which are occasioned by the Russian attitude.”¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 79. Berchtold’s report to the Emperor is in *ibid.*, No. 80.

¹⁸¹ Kautsky Docs., No. 482; Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 49B.

¹⁸² Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 51, and see No. 56; Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 65. In another circular telegram of the same date, Berchtold authorized his Ambassador to declare that “we were not entertaining any idea of territorial aggrandizement and would in no way question the sovereignty of the kingdom. I at the same time authorize Your Excellency energetically to deny the view taken that we were supposed to intend reoccupying the Sanjak, and beg of you to impart this officially to the French statesmen”: Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 62.

Sazonoff and Szápáry. Reporting a conversation with Sazonoff in pursuance of this telegram, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador said (1 August):

"Mr. Sazonow replied that he took note with satisfaction of this proof of good will; also that he would like to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations in St. Petersburg would seem, for reasons easily understood, to promise less hope of success than those on the neutral ground of London. I answered that Your Excellency, as I had already explained, started from the point of view of direct contact with St. Petersburg, so that I was not in a position to give any opinion concerning his suggestion about London, but that I would report to Your Excellency on the subject. Mr. Sazonow seemed greatly relieved by my information and to consider them of exaggerated importance, so that I always again had to point out the modified situation, the discrepancy of our initial views, and so forth. Moreover, during the conversation two principal points were completely avoided: on my part the purely retrospective and theoretical character of a conversation — about the text of the Note as I gathered it from Your Excellency's telegram; on his part, the question what would become of the military operations during the eventual negotiations."¹⁸³

Austria-Hungary's Concession (?) — Sazonoff's Circular. From the Ambassador's point of view, the conversation appears to have been unsatisfactory, and certainly the most difficult subject — cessation of the military operations — had not been touched; but Sazonoff appears to have understood that the Ambassador had at least agreed that the points of difference between Austria-Hungary and Serbia should be discussed. In a circular despatch to London, Berlin, Paris, and Rome (31st) he said:

"The Austrian Ambassador visited me and informed me that his Government is prepared to enter into an exchange of views regarding the contents of the ultimatum handed to Serbia. I expressed my satisfaction, and remarked to the Ambassador that it would be preferable to conduct the negotiations in London, all the Great Powers participating. We hope that the English Government will take over the direction of these discussions, whereby it will earn the thanks of Europe. In order that these negotiations shall proceed favorably, it is very important that Austria should suspend her military operations on Serbian territory."¹⁸⁴ A telegram of the same date from the Russian Ambassador at Paris to St. Petersburg was as follows:

¹⁸³ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 97; Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 56. The above is the latter part of a telegram quoted *ante*, pp. 1104-5, with which it should be read.

¹⁸⁴ *The Fabrications of the Russian Orange Book*, p. 51. The despatch was omitted from Russ. Orange Bk., 1914. Cf. with it Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 121, and see No. 125. On the same day, the Belgian Minister at Berlin telegraphed to Brussels to the same effect: Belg. Grey Bk., 1915, No. 20.

“The Austrian Ambassador yesterday visited Viviani and declared to him that Austria, far from harboring any designs against the integrity of Servia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Servia with the other Powers.”¹⁸⁵

The foregoing documents make clear that on the 31st July, London, St. Petersburg, and Paris understood that Austria-Hungary had agreed to discuss “the grounds of her grievances” in the presence of representatives of other Powers, but that the question of cessation, meanwhile, of military operations and preparations remained unsettled. We shall return to the subject.¹⁸⁶

Early in the morning of the same day (31st) as that upon which Sazonoff framed his circular despatch above quoted — thanking the United Kingdom, in advance, for its peace efforts¹⁸⁷ — Russia announced her mobilization against Germany, and so ended negotiations and precipitated war.

CONVERSATIONS — GERMANY AND RUSSIA

Leaving, for later treatment, detail of the conversations at St. Petersburg between Sazonoff and Pourtalès (the German Ambassador) with reference to mobilization, it will be convenient to note at this place those relating to proposals for settlement. It will be remembered that on the 28th July the Kaiser had formulated his “pledge plan,”¹⁸⁸ and that, quite independently, Sir Edward Grey had (29th) hit upon the same idea.¹⁸⁹ On the 29th, the Czar ordered mobilization against Austria-Hungary, and the Minister for War, with the knowledge of Sazonoff, extended the order to mobilization against Germany also. Afterwards (midnight of the 29th–30th), Sazonoff had an interview with Pourtalès, who (30th, 4.30 A.M.) telegraphed to Berlin as follows:

“I have just had a conversation of an hour and a half with Sazonoff, who summoned me at midnight. The object of the Minister was to persuade me to advise my Government to participate in a conversation *à quatre* in order to find the means, by way of friendly representation, to lead Austria to renounce her demands prejudicial to the sovereignty of Serbia. I consented only to report our conversation, and I took the ground that all exchange of views appeared to be very difficult, if not impossible, since Russia had decided upon mobilization.”¹⁹⁰

Sazonoff's Formula. Before receiving this message, the German Chancellor, on the evening of the 29th, at 11.05, had instructed Pourtalès to say to Sazonoff that if Vienna declared again, in the most

¹⁸⁵ Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 73.

¹⁸⁶ *Post*, pp. 1117–23.

¹⁸⁷ Sazonoff personally expressed to the British Ambassador “his deep gratitude”: Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 120.

¹⁸⁸ *Ante*, pp. 1080–1.

¹⁸⁹ *Ante*, pp. 1106–7.

¹⁹⁰ Kautsky Docs., No. 401. See also No. 412.

formal manner, that she had no intention of annexing Serbian territory, and that the military measures were being undertaken merely with a view to temporary occupation in order to force Serbia to give guarantee for future good conduct,¹⁹¹ Russia ought to be content, for Sazonoff had himself conceded that Serbia ought to receive a well-merited lesson.¹⁹² Acting upon this instruction, Pourtalès had an interview with Sazonoff, and reported it (30th, 1.01 P.M.) as follows:

"The Minister renewed to me his declaration of this evening, according to which the assurance by Austria-Hungary of territorial disinterestedness would not satisfy Russia. He could not maintain any other policy without putting the life of the Czar in danger. While warning Sazonow that to my mind there was no chance that his wishes would be agreed to by Austria, I begged him once again to formulate them for me in writing, without losing sight of the fact that if there still remained any prospect of a solution, he would be obliged necessarily to accept some compromise. The Minister wrote as follows:

"If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations."¹⁹³

Sir Edward Grey evidently thought that Russia was asking too much,¹⁹⁴ and suggested that:

"if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade . . . Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Servia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence."¹⁹⁵

Sazonoff thereupon recast his formula (31 July) as follows:

"If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory; and if, recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the

¹⁹¹ The Chancellor had urged Vienna to make such a declaration: *Ibid.*, No. 323. See *ante*, pp. 1088-90.

¹⁹² Kautsky Docs., No. 380.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, No. 421. Sazonoff's account of the interview, as published in the Russian Orange Book, No. 60, is as follows: "The German Ambassador, who has just left me, has asked whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might give — that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia — and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate action. . . ." That was a garbled version. In the original, after the word "Servia," there followed the words, "I replied that this declaration was not sufficient": *Un Livre Noir*, II, pp. 291-2; *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*, p. 46. In connection with Pourtalès' report, reference may be made to Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 97; Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 103; Oman, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-2.

¹⁹⁴ Germany was of the same opinion: Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, p. 107.

¹⁹⁵ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 103. Cf. Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 112.

Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude."¹⁹⁶

The incident is important as indicating (1) that, in the opinion of both Sir Edward Grey and Sazonoff, the Kaiser's "pledge plan" might have proved the way to peace had Russia refrained from mobilization against Germany; (2) therefore, that Sazonoff's reason for mobilization against Germany — that war was inevitable — was not well-founded; and (3) that, on the contrary, Sazonoff was himself making approach toward adjustment.¹⁹⁷

The French Ambassador, in reporting the interview between Sazonoff and Pourtalès (as given to him by Sazonoff), indicated that Sazonoff had said that:

"the Emperor Nicholas is so anxious to prevent war that I am going to make a new proposal to you in his name."¹⁹⁸

If we are to assume that the proposal was made in good faith, we must, at the same time, remember that mobilization against Germany had been "going on splendidly," but perhaps unauthorizedly (as we shall see), since the afternoon of the 29th; that Sazonoff had just returned from a successful effort to induce the Czar to sanction that mobilization (if, indeed, he was not already a party to it); that at his (Sazonoff's) instance, a council of ministers was about to give it the necessary endorsement; and that mobilization against Germany meant war. It is but fair to add that the over-mastering anxieties and apprehensions of the moment may well have appeared to urge simultaneous action in these contrary courses.

SUMMARY OF THE PRESSURE-TELEGRAMS

For appreciation of the full weight of Berlin pressure upon Vienna, a short summary of the telegrams is necessary.

1. On the 27th, at 11.50 P.M., the Chancellor telegraphed to Vienna the first of the Lichnowsky telegrams, and declared that "we cannot refuse the rôle of mediators," and asked for the view of Berchtold. The reply (received 28th, 7.25 P.M.) was that "the step appears belated."
2. On the 28th (10.15 P.M.), the Chancellor telegraphed the Kaiser's "pledge plan"; deprecated "a completely intransigent attitude on the part of Austria-Hungary"; and declared that adherence to a policy of reserve with reference to the proposals of the other cabinets would result in Germany being:

¹⁹⁶ Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 67. Cf. Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 113; Br. Blue Bk. 1914, No. 120.

¹⁹⁷ Sir Charles Oman has said (*The Outbreak of the War*, pp. 86-7): "that there was no insuperable divergence between this offer" (that of Berchtold of 31 July) "and M. Sazonoff's final revision of his formula."

¹⁹⁸ Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 103.

“covered before the world, and ultimately also in the eyes of the German people, with the odium of having caused a world war.”

The Chancellor mentioned “four points” in respect of which assurances ought to be given to Russia. And he complained that although the Austro-Hungarian government had declared that:

“the Austro-Hungarian Government, notwithstanding repeated questions, has left us in uncertainty as to its intentions.”

3. On the 29th (8 P.M.), the Chancellor repeated to Vienna the complaint which he had received from London on the same subject, and added:

“I was led to conclude . . . that the Government of Vienna has some plans which it considers desirable to keep hidden from us, for the purpose of assuring to itself in any event the support of Germany, and of not exposing itself to an eventual refusal by making open disclosure.”

4. The same evening (10.30), not having received a reply to his message with the Kaiser’s “pledge plan,” the Chancellor telegraphed asking whether it had arrived, and followed that immediately (10.30 P.M.) with:

“I await immediate execution of the instructions of the despatch No. 174.”

The reply (during the night of the 29th–30th July) was that the proposal had been “forestalled by events.”

5. On the 30th (12.30 A.M.), the Chancellor forwarded the second of the Lichnowsky telegrams, adding:

“I request that you communicate immediately that which precedes to Count Berchtold, and add that we consider the fact that Serbia has submitted as a proper basis for negotiations, with a provision for an occupation of part of the Serbian territory as guarantee.”

6. During the same night and at the same hour, the Chancellor telegraphed:

“We therefore request insistently . . . that conversations with Vienna commence and continue conformably with telegram 174.”

7. During the same night (30th, 2.55 A.M.), the Chancellor forwarded the third of the Lichnowsky telegrams, adding:

“Under these circumstances we must urgently and earnestly submit to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet that it should accept mediation under the honorable terms specified. The responsibility for the consequences which will otherwise result would be uncommonly serious for Austria and for ourselves.”

8. Five minutes afterwards (30th, 3.00 A.M.), the Chancellor telegraphed:

“We are . . . ready to fulfil the obligations of our alliance, but we must decline to allow Vienna to drag us wantonly, and in disregard of our counsels, into a world-conflagration. In the Italian question, also, Vienna seems to pay no attention to our advice. Please speak plainly to Count Berchtold at once with all emphasis and great seriousness.”

9. On the same day (7.15 P.M.), the Kaiser made a personal appeal to the Austro-Hungarian sovereign. The reply was a refusal to interrupt the action of his army.

10. During the same day (9 P.M.), the Chancellor pressingly urged acceptance of mediation.

11. A few hours afterwards (31st, 2.45 A.M.), the Chancellor cancelled the telegram last mentioned; transmitted a telegram, received from King George, urging acceptance of the "pledge plan"; and added:

"We urgently request a definitive decision from Vienna during this day."

The reply was a diplomatically evasive acceptance of mediation. Notwithstanding all these facts, Mr. Asquith quotes from Kautsky, a long-time opponent of the Kaiser, as follows:

"Austria rejected all mediation proposals that were made, none of which emanated from Germany. The latter was satisfied with simply transmitting the proposals of others, or else refusing them at the very outset as incompatible with Austria's independence."¹⁹⁹

Mr. Asquith also quotes from Lichnowsky as follows:

"It had, of course, needed but a hint from Berlin to induce Count Berchtold to be satisfied with a diplomatic success. But this hint was not given. On the contrary, the war was hurried on."

And to this Mr. Asquith adds:

"It was urged on by the advice of the Kaiser and the Chancellor with regard to the necessity of guarantees."²⁰⁰

The documents contain no word of support for these assertions. Much more honestly, Mr. Winston Churchill, in his recent book, has said:

"They" (the German Government) "had before their eyes the deliberate British announcement that the Fleet was being held together. That at least was a serious if silent warning. Under its impression, the German Emperor, as soon as he returned to Berlin, made, on this same Monday and succeeding days, strong efforts to bring Austria to reason and to prevent war. But he could never overtake events or withstand the contagion of ideas."²⁰¹

Mr. Churchill may not have been aware that the submissive character of the Serbian note was that which principally actuated the Kaiser.

BRITISH, FRENCH AND RUSSIAN ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION

Attitudes of Austria-Hungary and Russia. As already noted, while London, St. Petersburg, and Paris, on 31 July, understood that Austria-Hungary had agreed to discuss "the grounds of her grievances," the question of the cessation of military operations and preparations remained

¹⁹⁹ *The Genesis of the War*, cap. XXIV.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, cap. XXV.

²⁰¹ *The World Crisis*, I, p. 216.

unsettled. Upon that subject, Austria-Hungary and Russia appear (by the documents above quoted) to have been in sharp disagreement. It will be remembered that when telegraphing to London, St. Petersburg, and Berlin (1 August, 3.45 A.M.) the decision of the Austro-Hungarian Council (held on 31 July), Berchtold said:

“The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our military action against Servia should continue to take its course, and that the British Cabinet should move the Russian Government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilization which is directed against us.”²⁰²

There is no direct evidence of modification of these conditions. Russia, on the other hand (assuming her determination to fight), could not have been expected to negotiate upon that basis. Sazonoff had informed Sir Edward Grey that he considered:

“that the condition precedent to this mediation would be provisional cessation of hostilities.”²⁰³

And in the formula which he handed to the German Ambassador on the 31st, and in his ensuing circular telegram to the Powers, he repeated that stipulation. Sir Edward Grey agreed with Sazonoff: Austria-Hungary, he said:

“after occupying Belgrade or other towns, would disclose her intentions”;²⁰⁴

and, on the 31st, he said to the German Ambassador:

“that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia.”²⁰⁵

Bearing these facts in mind, let us look at the opinions of the diplomats who were most closely associated with the events, as to the chances of a peaceful solution of the quarrel. They had information other than as disclosed by the bare documents, and they could gauge the elements in the situation more correctly than can mere sifters of evidence. They may be regarded as expert witnesses. Telephonic communications, moreover, of which we have no record, were passing between Berlin and Vienna, and of these the German Secretary of State said to the British Ambassador (31 July) that they were “of a promising nature.”²⁰⁶

British Opinion. In the final report of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna (1 September 1914), was the following:

“The tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M.

²⁰² *Ante*, p. 1111.

²⁰³ *Ante*, p. 1106. And see p. 1112.

²⁰⁴ *Ante*, p. 1106.

²⁰⁵ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 110. And see Nos. 103, 111.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 121.

Schébéko²⁰⁷ that Count Szápáry²⁰⁸ had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof, M. Schébéko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff,²⁰⁹ to the effect that Austria had neither 'banged the door' on compromise nor cut off the conversations. M. Schébéko to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach,²¹⁰ had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiations, and M. Schébéko repeatedly told me that he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.

"Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history."²¹¹

The last paragraph of the report is misleading. The conversations "were cut short" not by Germany's intervention, but by Russian mobilization against Germany, "to which only one answer was possible."

In his book *My Mission to Russia*, Sir George Buchanan (British Ambassador at St. Petersburg), referring to the 31st July at 11 P.M., said:

"There were at that moment signs of a relaxation of the tension between Vienna and St. Peterburg; there had been friendly conversations between their respective Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors, and the Austrian Government seemed even disposed to admit a discussion on the interpretation to be placed on the text of their note to the Serbian Government."²¹²

Sir Edward Grey's view was expressed in a telegram to Berlin of 1 August:

²⁰⁷ Russian Ambassador at Vienna.

²⁰⁸ Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

²⁰⁹ Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London.

²¹⁰ Austro-Hungarian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

²¹¹ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 161.

²¹² I, pp. 203-4.

"I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war. The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia, and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objection raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested."²¹³

On the same day, Sir Edward telegraphed to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg:

"You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace."²¹⁴

That was distinct and strong support of the German demand of a few hours before.

In the "*Introductory Narrative of Events*," published by the British Government in 1914, is the following:

"Meanwhile on the 30th and 31st, negotiations continued between Russia and Austria. On the 29th, Germany had suggested to Austria that she should stop as soon as the troops had occupied Belgrade. Late on the same night, Russia offered to stop all military preparations²¹⁵ if Austria would recognize that the conflict with Serbia had become a question of general European interest, and would eliminate from her ultimatum the points which involved a violation of the sovereignty of Serbia. As the result of this offer, Russia was able to inform His Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria had at last agreed to do the very thing she had refused to do in the first days of the crisis, namely, to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Serbia. Russia asked the British Government to assume the direction of these discussions. For a few hours there seemed to be a hope of peace. At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched an ultimatum to Russia,²¹⁶ demanding that she should countermand her mobilization within twelve hours."²¹⁷

Although this statement is inaccurate in the respects referred to in the foot-notes, it is important as an indication that in the opinion of the British government there was hope that the negotiations might have resulted in a peaceful solution had they not been interrupted.

French Opinion. France held the same view. M. Viviani (French

²¹³ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 131. And see Kautsky Docs., No. 595.

²¹⁴ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 135.

²¹⁵ That is not quite correct. Russia had agreed merely to "maintain her waiting attitude," that is, not to attack. See *ante*, p. 1115.

²¹⁶ Germany's sudden despatch was the only possible reply to the Russian announcement of mobilization against her.

²¹⁷ Price: *The Diplomatic History of the War: "Great Britain and the European Crisis,"* p. viii.

Foreign Minister), in a telegram to the French Ambassador at London of 1 August, said:

“In accordance with the wish expressed to him by Sir George Buchanan, M. Sazonof consented to modify the first formula which he put forward, and he has drawn up a second which is shown not to differ materially from the declaration which Count Scézszen made yesterday to M. de Margerie. Count Scézszen affirms that Austria had no intention of seeking territorial aggrandisement and does not wish to touch the sovereignty of Servia. He expressly adds that Austria had no designs on the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar. It would seem that an agreement between Sir Edward Grey’s suggestion, M. Sazonof’s formula, and the Austrian declarations could easily be reconciled.”²¹⁸

The French Ambassador at Berlin telegraphed to Paris on 1 August as follows:

“The German ultimatum, coming at the precise moment when an agreement appeared to have been almost established between St. Petersburg and Vienna, is significant of her bellicose policy. The conflict exists, in fact, only between Russia and Austria, Germany having intervened only as Austria’s ally. In these conditions, the two Powers principally interested being disposed to negotiate, it is incomprehensible, unless Germany is anxious for war on her own account, that she should have sent Russia an ultimatum, instead of continuing to work, like all the other Powers, for a peaceful solution.”²¹⁹

The comment of M. Poincaré, the President of the French Republic, is as follows:

“Matters thus appeared to be on the way to an arrangement, and possibly they would have been arranged but for the ultimatum addressed to Russia by Germany in which she demanded total demobilization.”²²⁰

A circular despatch from the French Foreign Minister (1 August) contained the following:

“Two *démarches* were made yesterday evening by the Austrian Ambassadors — the one at Paris, which was rather vague, the other at St. Petersburg, precise and conciliatory. . . . At St. Petersburg the Austrian Ambassador called on M. Sazonof and explained to him that his Government was willing to begin a discussion as to the basis of the ultimatum addressed to Servia. The Russian Minister declared himself satisfied with this declaration, and proposed that the *pourparlers* should take place in London with the participation of the Powers.²²¹ Sazonof will have requested the British Government to take the lead in the discussion; he pointed out that it would be very important that Austria

²¹⁸ Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 127. And see Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 134.

²¹⁹ Poincaré: *The Origins of the War*, p. 244.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ The report of the conversation by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador (Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 97) does not entirely accord with this last statement.

should stop her operations in Servia. The deduction from these facts is that Austria would at last show herself ready to come to an agreement, just as the Russian Government is ready to enter into negotiations on the basis of the British proposal.

"Unfortunately these arrangements which allowed one to hope for a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been rendered useless by the attitude of Germany. This Power has in fact presented an ultimatum giving the Russian Government twelve hours in which to agree to the demobilisation of their forces not only as against Germany, but also as against Austria; this time-limit expires at noon. The ultimatum is not justified, for Russia has accepted the British proposal which implies a cessation of military preparation by all the Powers."²²²

A second French circular despatch of the same date contained the following:

"The German Ambassador came to see me again at 11 o'clock this morning. After having called to his memory all the efforts made by France towards an honorable settlement of the Austro-Servian conflict and the difficulty between Austria and Russia which has resulted from it, I put him in possession of the facts as to the *pourparlers* which have been carried on since yesterday:

"(1) A British compromise, proposing, besides other suggestions, suspension of military preparations on the part of Russia, on condition that the other Powers should act in the same way; adherence of Russia to this proposal.

"(2) Communications from the Austrian Government declaring that they did not desire any aggrandisement in Servia, nor even to advance into the Sandjak, and stating that they were ready to discuss even the basis of the Austro-Servian question at London with the other Powers.

"I drew attention to the attitude of Germany who, abandoning all *pourparlers*, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very moment when this Power had just accepted the British formula (which implies the cessation of military preparations by all the countries which have mobilized) and regarded as imminent a diplomatic rupture with France."²²³

Russian Opinion. Sazonoff was of the same opinion as the others. As already noted,²²⁴ he was carrying on negotiations for a settlement

²²² Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 120. See also Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 73; and *ante*, pp. 1115, 1120.

²²³ Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 125. Viviani's information as to the Austro-Hungarian attitude was probably based upon a telegram from the French Ambassador at Berlin (1 Aug.) as follows: "My Russian colleague received yesterday evening two telegrams from M. Sazonof advising him that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had explained that his Government was ready to discuss the note to Servia with the Russian Government even as to its basis. M. Sazonof answered that in his opinion these conversations should take place in London" (*ibid.*, No. 121). For the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador's view as to the effect of his conversation with Sazonoff, see *ante*, p. 1112. ²²⁴ *Ante*, pp. 1097-9.

concurrently with the institution of mobilization against Germany. Even on the 31st—during the early hours of which mobilization was proclaimed—he had hope of a peaceful solution. Telegraphing on that day to London, he said:

“I have requested the British Ambassador to express to Grey my deep gratitude for the firm and friendly tone which he has adopted in the friendly discussions with Germany and Austria, thanks to which the hope of finding a peaceful issue to the present difficulties need not yet be abandoned. I also requested him to inform the British Minister that in my opinion it was only in London that the discussions might still have some faint chance of success and of rendering the necessary compromise easier for Austria.”²²⁵

M. Schébéko, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had the same idea. When taking leave of Berchtold (1 August), he said that between the two countries “there was really only a great misunderstanding.”²²⁶ Finally, Sir Charles Oman, the British semi-official expositor, has said: “But it will be noted that there was no insuperable divergence between this offer and M. Sazonoff’s final revision of his ‘formula,’ which he was showing to the British and French Ambassadors apparently at much the same moment that Count Berchtold was sending his telegram to Berlin. For the Russian Minister had, in the last resort, consented to contemplate negotiations while Austrian troops were on Serbian soil²²⁷—as great a concession on his part as Count Berchtold’s contemporaneous decision to allow of interference between Austria and Serbia by the four Powers—a thing which Vienna had till now refused to contemplate. It appears conceivable that an agreement might have been arrived at, if other disturbing forces had not intervened; this agreement would have been decidedly to the detriment of Russian prestige, since the Czar would have condoned the Austrian invasion of Servia, in spite of his previous declaration that he would protect the little Slav state against her enemy.”²²⁸

These opinions must be taken as demonstrating conclusively that there existed some well-founded hope of a peaceful solution of the quarrel, and consequently that heavy responsibility rests upon the Power which caused the interruption of the negotiations. If while Sazonoff believed that peace might be maintained (of which, in view of his own actions and language, there can be no doubt) he precipitated mobilization against Germany (which will be made equally clear), the placing of the responsibility will not be difficult.

²²⁵ Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 69.

²²⁶ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 99.

²²⁷ Sir Charles had access to unpublished documents in the British Foreign Office, and may have found there justification for this statement.

²²⁸ *The Outbreak of the War*, pp. 86-7.

THE MOBILIZATIONS

Précis of the Facts. We are now at the crux of the question. According to some of the documents last above quoted, it was the German ultimatum which "cut short" the conversations. There is in them, however, not a word of reference to the Russian mobilization which made inevitable the German demand for cessation of preparation. On the contrary, they appear to imply that German action was a purely wanton, wicked, unprovoked announcement of determination to wage war. Succeeding pages will make certain that while the Kaiser, at the instance of the Czar, was strongly pressing Austria-Hungary to adopt conciliatory methods, Russia ordered mobilization against Germany — secretly on the 29th July, and, openly, early on the 31st; that not until after that time did Germany proclaim *Kriegszustand* (danger of war); that she did not order mobilization until the 1st August; that at various times, both before and after the 29th, Russia was warned that mobilization by her against Germany meant war; and that that was also the understanding between Russia and France.

For mobilization and concentration of her troops, Russia, because of her area and her deficient transportation facilities, needed time. Germany's chances of success in war depended upon rapidity of action. Russia had the men, and Germany had the speed, von Jagow said:²²⁹ and as Russian mobilization during protracted negotiations would have been fatal to Germany, the Kaiser sent his demand that Russia: "stop every measure of war against us and against Austria-Hungary within twelve hours."

Russia would not stop. If the French Foreign Minister was right in saying (as already quoted) that:

"Russia has accepted the British proposal which implies a cessation of military preparation by all the Powers,"

Russia would certainly have said that that was her view. On the contrary, she repeatedly declared that cessation of her mobilization proceedings was "technically impossible."

If these are the facts, interruption of the negotiations was due (1) to the Russian secret mobilization against Germany on the 29th; (2) to the public announcement of that mobilization on the 31st; and (3) to Russia's failure to make favorable reply to the German demand that she should "stop every measure of war." It was purely because of that failure that Germany declared war.²³⁰ The subject may best be dealt with under the headings: (1) Reciprocal mobilization of Austria-Hungary and Serbia; (2) Reciprocal mobilization of Russia and Austria-Hungary; and (3) Reciprocal mobilization of Russia and Germany.

²²⁹ *Post*, p. 1150.

²³⁰ The declaration may be seen in *Russ. Orange Bk.*, 1914, p. 76.

Let us note, as we proceed, the many warnings given to Russia on the effect of mobilization by her.

Reciprocal Mobilizations — Austria-Hungary and Serbia. It may be assumed that Austro-Hungarian mobilization commenced immediately after, if not before, the rupture of diplomatic relations with Serbia on 25 July,²³¹ but it was against Serbia only.

“The three Galician corps (I, X, XI, Cracow, Przemysl, and Lemberg) were not moved — obviously because that would have been an open threat to Russia, whom the Austrian Government still hoped to keep out of the struggle — wrongly opining that M. Sazonoff would at the last moment shrink from taking up the challenge.”²³²

Serbian mobilization was decreed on the same day, shortly before the answer to the Austro-Hungarian demands was delivered.²³³

Reciprocal Mobilizations — Russia and Austria-Hungary. A few hours prior to the rupture of relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the Czar ordered, “in principle,” mobilization in the southern districts, namely, those fronting Austria-Hungary. That fact is attested in two ways: (1) by a telegram from the Czar to the Kaiser of 30 July,²³⁴ and (2) by the testimony of Maurice Paléologue, who was, at the time, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Paléologue recounts that, on the 25th July, he and Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador, had an interview with Sazonoff, when:

“He told us that an extraordinary council had been held this morning at Krasnoïé-Sélo, under the Presidency of the Emperor, and that his Majesty has decided, in principle, to mobilize the thirteen army corps which are intended eventually to operate against Austria-Hungary.”²³⁵ The same day, reporting the same conversation, the British Ambassador said:

“On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favor of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and that she would take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria’s action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed

²³¹ Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 24. And see *ante*, p. 1067. At the meeting of the Austro-Hungarian Council of State on 7 July 1914, it was resolved that “mobilization is not to take place until after concrete demands have been addressed to Serbia and, after being refused, an ultimatum has been sent” (Aus. Red Bk., O. F., I, No. 8). Poincaré says that Austro-Hungarian mobilization commenced on the 25th: *The Origins of the War*, p. 215. See also Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

²³² Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

²³³ Belg. Grey Bk., 1914, No. 5.

²³⁴ German White Bk., 1914. Ex. 23a.

²³⁵ *La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre*, p. 26. Action was to be deferred until military proceedings had been initiated by Austria-Hungary, and until sanctioned by Sazonoff: Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 50; von Bethmann-Hollweg: *Reflections on the World War*, p. 133.

at overthrowing the present *status quo* in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. . . . I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once." ²³⁶

(Warning number one.) Later in the day (after 7 P.M.), Paléologue learned (as he related):

"that the Emperor had just ordered the preliminary measures for mobilization in the military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Kazan, and Moscow. Further, the towns and governments of St. Petersburg and Moscow are declared in a state of siege. Finally, the camps at Krasnoïé-Sélo had been broken up and the troops have returned, this evening, to their normal garrisons." ²³⁷

On 27 July, General Sukhomlinoff (Russian Minister for War) said to the German Military Attaché (so the latter reported) that:

"If Austria crossed the Servian frontier, such military districts as are directed toward Austria, viz., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilised. Under no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilni, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry into the object of mobilisation against Austria, he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that we appreciated the kindly attentions, but considered mobilisation even against Austria as very menacing." ²³⁸

(Warning number two.) On 28 July, Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia; and Russia, giving that action as a reason, and not waiting for Austro-Hungarian commencement of hostilities, announced mobilization against Austria for "to-morrow." ²³⁹ On 28 July, Austria-Hungary uselessly commenced bombardment of Belgrade. Not being ready for war, she did not cross the Serbian frontier until 13 August. On the 31st July, the French Ambassador at Vienna telegraphed that Austro-Hungarian mobilization against Russia had been declared "*à la première heure*." In the French Yellow Book, 1914 (No. 115), these words are translated "this morning at 1 o'clock." That is a mistake. Poincaré properly substitutes "early this morning." ²⁴⁰ The fact, therefore, is that Russian mobilization against Austria-Hungary preceded Austro-Hungarian mobilization against Russia by nearly two days.

Reciprocal Mobilizations — Russia and Germany — German Action.

²³⁶ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 17. Cf. Buchanan, *op. cit.*, I, p. 195.

²³⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

²³⁸ German White Bk., 1914, Ex. 11; Kautsky Docs., No. 242; Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

²³⁹ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 70; *Un Livre Noir*, II, No. 283.

²⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 236. Cf. Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 86; Aus. Red Bk. (First), Nos.

Although Russia announced on the 28th that mobilization against Austria-Hungary would be proclaimed the next day,²⁴¹ Germany did nothing by way of military reply. Had she wanted war, that was her opportunity. She might have said that Russia well knew that Germany was under obligation to support Austria-Hungary, and that mobilization against a German ally necessitated mobilization by Germany. Not until two days after Russia had openly announced mobilization against Austria-Hungary did Germany (31 July) make the preliminary declaration of "danger of war"; and she did not order mobilization until Russia had declined (1 August) to cease preparations. That restraint was in pursuance of a policy adopted as early as the 26th with the hope of preventing general war. At 1 P. M. of that day, the Chancellor advised the Kaiser as follows:

"Should Russia prepare for conflict with Austria, England means to attempt mediation, and hopes to do so with French support. So long as Russia attempts no hostile act, I believe that we must keep quiet and aim at localization of the conflict. General von Moltke returned from Carlsbad to-day, and shares this view."²⁴²

Half an hour afterwards (1.35), the Chancellor telegraphed to the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg:

"We trust in Russian love of peace and our good and tried relations; we hope that she will not undertake any action which could seriously compromise European peace."²⁴³

In the evening (7.15), the Chancellor sent another telegram to the Ambassador:

"As already indicated in telegram No. 126,²⁴⁴ Russian military preparations directed against us would have compelled us to counter-measures consisting in the mobilization of the army. But mobilization means war, which, owing to French obligations to Russia, well known to us, would necessarily be directed against Russia and France at the same time."²⁴⁵

On the same day, the German Ambassador sought an interview with Sazonoff, and:

"called his attention to the great danger of such a measure, which might easily provoke counter-measures."²⁴⁶

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, in reporting on that day to Berchtold, said:

"As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilization of Russian troops, Count Pourtalès has called the Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner to the fact that nowadays measures of

²⁴¹ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 70.

²⁴² Kautsky: *The Guilt &c.*, p. 127; Kautsky Docs., No. 197.

²⁴³ Kautsky Docs., No. 198.

²⁴⁴ This document is No. 198 of the Kautsky Docs. ²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 219.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 230. Cf. Pourtalès' Diary in *ibid.*, IV, p. 182.

mobilization would be a highly dangerous form of diplomatic pressure. For, in that event, the purely military consideration of the questions by the general staffs would find expression, and if that button were once touched in Germany, the situation would get out of control."²⁴⁷

(Warning number three.) In other words, Germany was to remain quiescent unless (1) Russia actually attacked Austria-Hungary, or (2) commenced war-preparations against Germany herself. Adoption of this policy was frankly communicated to the British Ambassador at Berlin, who, reporting (27 July) a conversation with the German Foreign Secretary, said as follows:

"In the course of a short conversation, Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Germany, latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by 'mobilising against Germany.' He said that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too."²⁴⁸

Prior to Russian mobilization against Austria-Hungary, Germany endeavored to prevent that action by pointing to its natural effect. On 28 July, when reporting a conversation with Sazonoff, the German Ambassador said:

"I then pointed out to the Minister that, according to reliable information which had come to us, there was not any doubt that military preparations which surpassed those about which the Minister for War had spoken to our Military Attaché were in progress. I could not explain that by the fact that the chiefs of the military districts had perhaps, in the measures which they had taken, exceeded the intentions of the Government. In any case, I was obliged to point out with the greatest energy the danger which, at the present critical moment, might result from important military preparations. At my request, my English and Italian colleagues declared themselves ready to make equally clear to Sazonoff the danger."²⁴⁹

(Warning number four — a triple fourth.) Without departing from his policy of restraint, the Chancellor now determined to add to the weight of the warnings by intimation of possible counter-measures. Telegraphing to the Ambassador on the 29th, he said:

"I beg you to draw the attention of M. Sazonoff very seriously to the fact that continuation of measures of Russian mobilization would force us to mobilization, and that under such conditions it would be almost impossible to avert European war."²⁵⁰

²⁴⁷ Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 28. Cf. Oman, *op. cit.*, pp. 64, 76.

²⁴⁸ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 43. Jagow made similar statement to the French Ambassador: Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 67.

²⁴⁹ Kautsky Docs., No. 338. Cf. Pourtales' Diary in *ibid.*, IV, No. 183. The British representative gave warning on three separate occasions — the 25th, 26th, and 28th: Buchanan, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 195, 196, 197. ²⁵⁰ Kautsky Docs., No. 342.

Before the arrival of this message, Sazonoff, in an interview with the Ambassador (the same day between 1 and 2 P.M.) said (as the Ambassador reported 1.58 P.M.):

“ Besides, Austria had mobilized eight army corps, and that measure ought to be considered as directed in part against Russia. In consequence, Russia believed herself to be equally obliged to mobilize the military districts on the Austrian frontier. The order to this effect would be given to-day. As I raised most serious objections against these measures, the Minister sought to convince me that mobilization in Russia did not signify war as in the western States of Europe, that the Russian army could eventually rest entire weeks completely armed without crossing the frontier. Russia wished, as much as possible, to avoid war. I replied that these declarations could not reassure me. The danger of every military measure consisted in the counter-measures taken by the other party. One could not help thinking that the General Staffs of the eventual enemies of Russia would not wish to give up the trump card of their substantial advantage over Russia in the matter of mobilization, and would urge counter-measures. I pressed him strongly to think of this danger. M. Sazonoff again solemnly protested that nothing would be done against us. I replied to him, at the same time making clear that I had no intention of offering a menace, that our obligations of alliance with Russia were well known to him.”²⁵¹

(Warning number five.) After arrival of the Chancellor's telegram, in another interview (7 P.M.), the Ambassador informed Sazonoff of its contents and reported as follows:

“ I have just communicated to M. Sazonoff the message which you sent to me, and I have insisted upon the fact that not a menace, but only an amicable declaration was intended. The Minister, who received this communication with much emotion, replied that he would report the matter to His Majesty the Emperor Nicolas.”²⁵²

(Warning number six.) At midnight Sazonoff sent for the Ambassador in order to urge submission of the difficulty to a conference of four. In making his report (sent 30th, 4.30 A.M.), the Ambassador said:

“ I could merely promise to report the conversation and took the

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, No. 343. On 20 Sept. 1917, there appeared in a Swiss newspaper, *Basler Nachrichten*, a statement by the Ambassador of the above conversation. In it, the last sentence of the above telegram is somewhat hardened: “ I was forced to remind him of our treaty of alliance with Austria, which would cause German mobilization automatically ”: Oman, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-4.

²⁵² Kautsky Docs., No. 378. In his statement in the *Basler Nachrichten*, the Ambassador, referring to the interview, said: “ About 7, in another interview with Sazonoff, I brought to his knowledge a telegram of our Chancellor, in which it was stated that any further development of Russian military preparations would compel us to take counter-measures, and that meant war ”: Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 64. See p. 63. The Ambassador's recollection of the contents of the telegram was not very accurate.

position that, after Russia had decided upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. . . . I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger."²⁵³

(Warning number seven.) Failure to stop Russian mobilization did not change the German policy above referred to. Telegraphing on the evening of the 29th (at 11.05 P.M.) to the Ambassador, the Chancellor made clear (1) that he adhered to his policy, and (2) that the administration of an ultimatum to Sazonoff (as suggested by Sir Charles Oman²⁵⁴) had not been in his (the Chancellor's) thought:

"Russian mobilization on the Austrian frontier will, I presume, have for consequence Austrian counter-measures. Up to what time can the movement be delayed. That is difficult to say, and I fear that the pacific intentions of M. Sazonoff cannot further be realized."

After referring to the German pressure that was being applied to Austria-Hungary, the Chancellor proceeded:

"We consequently assume that in the event of our representations at Vienna being crowned with success, Russia will not undertake any war-like action against Austria. I beg Your Excellency to be good enough to make a communication in this sense to M. Sazonoff. Reply by telegraph."²⁵⁵

This telegram despatched, the Chancellor reported to the Kaiser, saying:

"I immediately instructed by telegraph Your Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg to point out to the Russian Minister the probable consequences of this mobilization against Austria-Hungary, and to pray him to avoid all armed conflict with Austria as long as the negotiations with Vienna, in which we are mediators, are being continued."²⁵⁶

The Ambassador communicated to Sazonoff the contents of the Chancellor's telegram the next mid-day.²⁵⁷

(Warning number eight.) The form of the Kaiser's personal telegram to the Czar of the 29th (6.30 P.M.) is quite in accordance with the telegram of the Chancellor of the same evening:

"Naturally, military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid, and would undermine my position as mediator, which — upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid — I willingly accepted."²⁵⁸

²⁵³ German White Bk., in Coll. Dip. Docs., pp. 409-10; Kautsky Docs., No. 401.

²⁵⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 64.

²⁵⁵ Kautsky Docs., No. 380.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 399.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 421.

²⁵⁸ German White Bk., in Coll. Dip. Docs., p. 432.

(Warning number nine.) Germany, in her exchanges with the United Kingdom, continued to indicate her adherence to the policy above referred to. In a telegram to Sir Edward Grey, the British Ambassador at Berlin, after reference to the Kaiser's "pledge plan," said (30th — the day after Russian mobilization against Austria-Hungary):

"Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement, and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria, he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved."²⁵⁹

Reciprocal Mobilizations — Russia and Germany — Russian Action.

On the 29th July (according to a statement made three years afterwards by Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador before the war, at St. Petersburg), Russian

"orders for partial mobilisation were signed, to be directed solely against Austria, as the Emperor had refused to yield to strong pressure brought to bear upon him by his military advisers who, on technical grounds, and in view of secret preparations made by Germany, had insisted on its being made a general one. The military authorities, however, without his Majesty's knowledge, did make secret preparations for a general mobilisation, though on being questioned by the Emperor on the subject General Sukhomlinoff denied it."²⁶⁰

Other documents make clear that the Czar did on the 29th sign and hand to Januskevitch (Russian Chief of Staff) a mobilization ukase, but whether it ordered merely partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary or general mobilization against both Germany and Austria-Hungary, is uncertain — as we shall see. During the trial (September 1917) of General Sukhomlinoff (Russian Minister for War), following the March revolution in Russia,²⁶¹ General Januskevitch testified as follows:

"When it became clear that war was inevitable, he" (meaning himself) "insisted before the Emperor on the need of proclaiming a general mobilisation . . . because it was clear that Germany stood at the back of Austria and that war with Germany was inevitable. The Emperor maintained that general mobilisation would threaten war not only against Austria, but against Germany. But considering this war unavoidable, I insisted on the proclamation of general mobilisation, and

²⁵⁹ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 98.

²⁶⁰ Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

²⁶¹ The General was charged with conspiring to assist the enemy, and with acts of corruption. He was acquitted of the first charge, but on the second, was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Cf. *Ann. Reg.*, 1917, pp. [255-6. No official report of the evidence given at the trial is available. In a series of articles in *The Westminster Gazette* (2, 3, 5 Oct. 1917), Mr. J. W. Headlam supplied extracts from various newspaper reports. Responsibility for some of the inconsistencies may probably be chargeable to the reporters. The present writer has availed himself of Mr. Headlam's work.

on July 29th I drove to the Council of Ministers, where it was signed by the three Ministers whose signatures were by our laws necessary for a declaration of mobilisation.”²⁶²

This statement gives the impression of the existence of a ukase for general mobilization — an impression not consistent with other parts of Januskevitch’s evidence.

On the 29th (3 P.M.), the German Military Attaché — Major von Eggeling — telegraphed Berlin as follows (in part):

“The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, and has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate once more that everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days ago.”²⁶³

Referring to this interview, Januskevitch, in his evidence, said:

“I pointed out that Russia was not following any aggressive aims towards Germany. The Major answered that unfortunately mobilization in Russia had already begun. I gave him the assurance that it had not yet begun. On that, the military attaché declared with extraordinary decision that on this matter he had better information. I gave him the word of honor of the Chief of the General Staff that at that moment, precisely at 3 o’clock on the 29th July, mobilization had not yet been proclaimed. I remember this important moment in all its details. The Major did not believe it. I offered to give it to him in writing because, as a matter of fact, mobilization had at this moment not been proclaimed. I still had in my pocket the ukase about mobilization.”²⁶⁴

At this point, the reader should recall the two interviews of the same day (29th) between Sazonoff and Pourtalès, the German Ambassador — the one between 1 and 2 P.M., and the other at 7 P.M. Following the story (as adopted by Sir Charles Oman in his semi-official narrative) Sazonoff, after the later of the two interviews:

“had come to the conclusion that, since the ukase for mobilisation against Austria had already been issued, war was probably inevitable. . . . He consulted the Minister for War [Sukhomlinoff] and the Chief of the Staff [Januskevitch] and found that they had already not only come to the same conclusion, but acted on it. They had, though defeated at the ministerial council that had met a few hours before, drawn up a proclamation for general mobilisation signed by three Ministers [no doubt Sukhomlinoff and two others]. But such a document was of no value without the Czar’s signature, which had been withheld. Nevertheless

²⁶² *The Cambridge Magazine* (6 Oct. 1917), quoting from the Petrograd newspaper the *Rech* (26 Aug., O. S., 1917). Cf. *The Westminster Gazette*, 2 Oct. 1917.

²⁶³ German White Bk., in Coll. Dip. Docs., p. 410.

²⁶⁴ Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 67. Why Januskevitch should have concealed a ukase for partial mobilization, is not clear. Sazonoff, an hour or two before, had admitted its existence to the German Ambassador: *ibid.*, pp. 63, 68.

they had begun to despatch secret orders for general mobilisation to the higher military authorities. . . . Application was made to the Czar, who approved the alternative [general mobilization] — unwelcome as it was to him.”²⁶⁵

It will be observed that, according to Januskevitch, the Czar signed the ukase prior to the signature of the ministers being obtained. That would be the natural order. About the same time, Sazonoff sent the following telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Paris:

“The German Ambassador to-day informed me of the decision of his Government to mobilize if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Now, in point of fact, we only began these preparations in consequence of the mobilization of *8 corps* already undertaken by Austria, and owing to her evident unwillingness to accept any means of arriving at a peaceful settlement of her dispute with Servia. As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten on our military preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the French Government of this, and add that we are sincerely grateful to them for the declaration which the French Ambassador made to me on their behalf, to the effect that we could count fully upon the assistance of our ally, France.”²⁶⁶ In the existing circumstances, that declaration is especially valuable to us.”²⁶⁷

The words “of 8 corps” (now italicized) are omitted from the telegram as it appears in the Russian Orange Book. Their restoration²⁶⁸ makes clear that on the 29th there was no complaint of Austro-Hungarian mobilization against Russia. For the eight army corps were to operate against Serbia.²⁶⁹

After the Czar had given his assent to general mobilization — whether originally in the morning (as Januskevitch indicates), or afterwards upon Sazonoff’s application in the evening (as Oman holds) — he (the Czar) received the following telegram (already partly quoted) from the Kaiser (despatched 29th, 6.30 P.M.):

“I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the conservation of peace. However: I cannot — as I told You in my first telegram — consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an ‘ignominious war.’ Austria-Hungary knows from experiences that the promises of Servia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable. According to my opinion, the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Servia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 68. Cf. Buchanan, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 199–200.

²⁶⁶ Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 55.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 58.

²⁶⁸ *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 289; *Remarques* etc., p. 112; telg. of M. Viviani of 30 July, Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 101.

²⁶⁹ Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 20.

the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your Government and Vienna, an understanding which — as I have already telegraphed You — my Government endeavors to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which — upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid — I willingly accepted.”²⁷⁰

The Czar now repented his assent to mobilization against Germany.²⁷¹ At the trial above referred to, Sukhomlinoff testified as follows:

“In the night before the 30th July, the ex-Czar called me upon the telephone, and told me that it was necessary to break off the mobilization in the three military districts,²⁷² but mobilization was then already going on splendidly, and the order to break it off was identical with the complete cancellation of mobilization, as, on account of technical impossibilities, it could not be broken off, but only completely cancelled, as so much time is taken up with the preliminary preparation and despatch of the new maps, &c.”²⁷³

Sukhomlinoff remonstrated with the Czar:

“The Czar, however, maintained his opinion, and I made the following proposal to him: ‘If your Majesty does not believe that it is technically impossible to interrupt the mobilisation, will your Majesty apply to the Chief of the General Staff?’ ”²⁷⁴

Adopting that suggestion, the Czar telephoned Januskevitch, and, after some conversation, directed him to cease mobilization against Germany. At the trial, Januskevitch testified:

“I then implored the Monarch not to cancel the order for a general mobilisation. I pointed out to him that such a cancellation would spoil the mobilisation plan, and would render a new rapid mobilisation impossible. But Wilhelm’s word of honor gained the upper hand, and I was ordered to proclaim a partial mobilisation. I immediately reported this to Sazonoff, Minister for Foreign Affairs.”²⁷⁵

Thereupon the two generals held a conversation over the telephone. Sukhomlinoff, in his evidence, told its purport:

²⁷⁰ German White Bk., 1914, Ex. 22; Kautsky Docs., No. 359; Oman, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-9.

²⁷¹ Cf. Kautsky Docs., No. 445. It adds to the uncertainty.

²⁷² Meaning those fronting Germany.

²⁷³ Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

“Half an hour later General Januschkevitch rang me up. He told me that the Czar had ordered him to stop the mobilisation. ‘What did you reply?’ I asked. ‘I replied,’ said he, ‘that it was technically impossible, but he nevertheless ordered me to stop. What shall I do?’ ‘Do nothing,’ said I. Thus it was I who ordered that the mobilisation should continue in spite of the Czar’s will, and General Januschkevitch endlessly thanked me for it.”²⁷⁶

Commenting upon this, Sir Charles Oman says:

“Thus Sukhomlinoff made himself a party to a second act of disobedience. The first had been the previous issuing of an order for general instead of partial mobilisation, the second was the ignoring of the Czar’s clear command to suspend the general mobilisation at midnight . . . the two Generals allowed their military preparations to proceed, and their master had no knowledge of them.”²⁷⁷

But Sazonoff had. Summarizing a portion of Januskevitch’s testimony, Sir Charles Oman says that:

“after having had his telephone conversation with the Czar about demobilisation, and his subsequent wire talk with Sukhomlinoff, he [Januschkevitch] ordered his carriage, drove to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and made a clean breast to Sazonoff of what he had done, arguing that the countermanding of general mobilisation was now technically impossible — whatever the Czar might wish. He says that he found Sazonoff was quite of the same opinion, and easily consented to overruling the Imperial will. He said that he would draw up a new report, and present it to the Monarch in the morning, approving general mobilisation.”²⁷⁸

The next day, 30th, Sazonoff and Sukhomlinoff waited upon the Czar. Sukhomlinoff, in his evidence, said:

“Next morning I lied to the Czar, and explained to him that mobilization was only taking place in the districts in the south-west.”²⁷⁹

And Sazonoff (as Sir Charles Oman says):

“set himself to the task of demonstrating” that general mobilization was necessary. “At any rate, it is clear that Nicholas II was talked out of his resolution to cancel general mobilization, and persuaded to refer the question of general or partial mobilization back to the Council of Ministers.”²⁸⁰

Referring to the interview, Paléologue tells us that Sazonoff found the Czar:

“very badly affected by a telegram²⁸¹ which Emperor William had

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 76. Cf. Sazonoff’s account of the interview: *ante*, pp. 1132-3.

²⁷⁹ Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 78. The British Ambassador fixes the time at “early in the afternoon”: Buchanan, *op. cit.*, I, p. 201.

²⁸⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 78.

²⁸¹ The telegram is Kautsky Docs., No. 420.

sent him during the night, and the tone of which is almost menacing." ²⁸² Sazonoff urged (Paléologue says) that:

"We shall no longer escape war! . . . Germany, obviously, has ceased the mediating action that we asked of her, and she seeks only to gain time to complete in secret her offensive preparations. Under these circumstances, I do not believe that Your Majesty can longer delay ordering general mobilization."

The Czar had done everything possible for peace, Sazonoff said:

"But to-day I have the conviction that diplomacy has finished its work. It is necessary henceforth to think of the security of the Empire. If Your Majesty stops our mobilization preliminaries, He will have succeeded only in dislocating our military organization and in disconcerting our allies. War will none the less break out at the hour wished by Germany, and will surprise us in complete disarray. After a moment of reflection, the Emperor said in a firm tone: Serge-Dimitriewitch, go telephone to the Chief of the General Staff that I order general mobilization. Sazonoff descended to the vestibule of the palace, where was the telephone cabinet, and transmitted to General Yannouchkewitch the imperial order. The clock indicated exactly four o'clock." ²⁸³

Paléologue's dramatic touches are probably inaccurate. It is more in accordance with the version of the story which we have been following that (as Sir Charles Oman says):

"At 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 30th, the Russian Ministers met, ²⁸⁴ as had been settled in the morning, and, after only ten minutes of discussion, re-issued the formal order for general mobilization. The Czar signed the Ukase, and orders were given for its promulgation during the night." ²⁸⁵

On the same day (30th), M. Viviani (French Foreign Minister) telegraphed to the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg instructions to suggest to Sazonoff as follows:

"The conversations which have taken place between the less directly interested Powers enable us still to hope that peace may be preserved. I suggest, therefore, that in connection with the precautionary and defensive measures which Russia believes it to be her duty to carry out, she will take no immediate steps that may give Germany any pretext for the total or partial mobilization of her forces." ²⁸⁶

The Ambassador carried out his instructions. ²⁸⁷

²⁸² *La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre*, p. 38. Cf. Buchanan, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 201-2.

²⁸³ *Paléologue, op. cit.*, pp. 38-9.

²⁸⁴ According to Januskevitch's evidence, there were but four ministers present: War, Marine, National Affairs, and Sazonoff. Januskevitch was there.

²⁸⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 79. Cf. Buchanan, *op. cit.*, I, p. 202.

²⁸⁶ *Fr. Yell. Bk.*, 1914, No. 101; Poincaré, *op. cit.*, p. 229. On the same day, Isvolsky sent a similar warning from Paris: *Un Lièvre Noir*, II, p. 290.

²⁸⁷ *Fr. Yell. Bk.*, 1914, No. 102; Poincaré, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

(Warning number ten.) Early in the next morning (31st), Russia announced her mobilization against Germany. At 2 P.M., the Kaiser (not yet aware of that action) telegraphed to the Czar as follows:

“Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for aid, I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilized against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully for Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary.”²⁸⁸

(Warning number eleven.) This telegram crossed one from the Czar as follows:

“I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which were made necessary by the Austrian mobilisation. It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.”²⁸⁹

After receiving news of Russian mobilization, Germany (31st) proclaimed *Kriegszustand*—danger of war. When advising the Austro-Hungarian sovereign of this action, the Kaiser said:

“The preparations for the mobilization of my whole army and fleet ordered by me to-day will within the shortest time be followed by a definite mobilization. I am counting upon the 2nd of August being the first day of mobilization.”²⁹⁰

On the same day, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported to the Kaiser an audience with the Czar with reference to the Russian mobilization against Germany as follows (in part):

²⁸⁸ German White Bk., 1914, in Coll. Dip. Docs., pp. 411-12.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 411. ²⁹⁰ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 81.

"I expressed the fear that this measure might already have entailed irreparable consequences. But above all, I expressed anxiety that the mobilization against Germany, pending mediatory action directed by Your Majesty which has not yet definitely failed, was considered by Your Majesty an affront and by the German people as a provocation. I prayed him to stop, if possible, that measure, or to revoke it. His Majesty replied that, for technical reasons, that was no longer possible."²⁹¹ (Warning number twelve.) On the same day, the German Chancellor instructed the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg as follows:

"In spite of negotiations still pending, and although we have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy, hence also against us. On account of these Russian measures, we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim the threatening state of war, which does not yet imply mobilization. Mobilization, however, is bound to follow if Russia does not stop every measure of war against us and against Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, and notifies us definitely to this effect. Please communicate this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of communication."²⁹² The demand was made at midnight. The report of the Ambassador was as follows:

"I have at midnight just executed my instructions. M. Sazonow invoked once more the technical impossibility of stopping the war measures, and endeavored again to persuade me that we exaggerated the importance of Russian mobilization, which could not be compared to ours. He has again insistently begged me to point out to Your Excellency that the engagement taken by the Czar on his word of honor in His Majesty Emperor Nicolas' despatch of yesterday to his Majesty the Emperor and King ought to tranquillize us as to the intentions of Russia. I replied that the Czar by no means engaged to abstain under all circumstances from military action, but only as long as there were prospects of resolving the Austro-Russian difference with reference to Serbia. I put directly to the Minister the question whether he could guarantee me that Russia, even in case she did not arrive at an understanding with

²⁹¹ Kautsky Docs., No. 535.

²⁹² German White Bk., 1914, Ex. 24. Cf. Ex. 25; Kautsky Docs., No. 490; Kautsky, *The Guilt*, etc., p. 205. The demand to "stop every measure of war" became transmuted into a demand to "demobilize." The French Minister for Foreign Affairs so understood from the German Ambassador (Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 117). And the French Ambassador at Berlin obtained the same idea from von Jagow himself (*ibid.*, No. 116). On the other hand, the German declaration of war was based upon the refusal of Russia to comply with the demand for a "cessation of the aforesaid military acts" (Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 76). And Sazonoff telegraphed to Russian representatives that if within 12 hours "we had not yet begun to demobilize," Germany would mobilize also (*ibid.*, No. 70). Probably, to a military man, to cease preparations would be equivalent to demobilization.

Austria, had resolved to maintain peace. The Minister was not able to make affirmative reply to this question. In that case, I replied, no one can reproach us for not being disposed to allow Russia to take a still greater advantage in mobilization.”²⁹³

That was the thirteenth and final warning given to Russia as to the effect of mobilization. The next day (1 August) at 5 P.M., Germany ordered mobilization.²⁹⁴ So far from complaining of this action, the Czar acknowledged that the Kaiser had been “forced to mobilize.” In a telegram to him at 2 P.M., the Czar said:

“I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the same guarantee which I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts.”²⁹⁵

Russia was willing that both countries should proceed with mobilization during negotiations. For reasons well understood (referred to on a subsequent page). Germany could not agree to that — could not give time for accumulation on her frontiers of Russia’s overwhelming numbers. Russia’s mobilization and refusal to stop preparations meant war.

The Czar and Secrecy. The foregoing narrative, in so far as it relates to the orders of the Czar and the actions of the Generals, represents one view that may well be taken of the events. It is the view adopted by Sir Charles Oman, and deducible from the relation of Sir George Buchanan (*My Mission to Russia*). But Paléologue’s story is not consistent with it. In his book, *La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre*, he has revealed the following:

“At eleven o’clock in the evening [the 29th] Nicolas-Alexandrowitch Basily, vice-director of the Chancellory of the Department of Foreign Affairs, presented himself at my embassy; he came to tell me that the imperative tone in which the German Ambassador had expressed himself this afternoon had determined the Russian Government: (1) to order, this very night, the mobilization of the thirteen corps destined to operate against Austria-Hungary; and (2) to commence secretly the general mobilization.”²⁹⁶

According to Paléologue, “the Russian Government” — that is the Czar — had determined “to commence secretly the general mobilization.” Paléologue, however, did not like that situation. Perceiving the inadvisability, from a political and international point of view, of “the Russian Government” mobilizing against Germany even “secretly,” he urged, “provisionally,” mobilization against Austria-Hungary only. But Basily replied that:

²⁹³ Kautsky Docs., No. 536.

²⁹⁴ German White Bk., 1914, in Coll. Dip. Docs., p. 413.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, Kautsky Docs., No. 546.

²⁹⁶ P. 35. Cf. Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 76, note.

“a council of our highest military chiefs . . . had determined that, under present circumstances, the Russian government had no choice between partial and general mobilization; for partial mobilization would be technically practicable only if conditioned on disarranging all the mechanism of the general mobilization. If, then, we limit to-day our mobilization to the thirteen corps destined to operate against Austria, and to-morrow Germany resolves to give our ally military support, we should be powerless to defend ourselves on the Polish and East Prussian frontier. Is not France interested as much as we are that we may be able to intervene promptly against Germany? ”

(Not a word about insubordinate Generals.) To this, Paléologue made noncommittal but skillfully suggestive reply: why not *General Staff* instead of “Russian Government”? :

“You raise some important considerations. I judge nevertheless that your General Staff ought not to take any step before conferring with the French General Staff. Will you be good enough to say to M. Sazonoff that I call his most serious attention to this point, and that I desire to receive his reply in the course of the night? ”

Sazonoff saw the point, and acted promptly. Paléologue continues:

“Hardly had Basily returned to the Foreign Office, before Sazonoff asked me, by telephone, to send my chief secretary, Chambrun, to him ‘for a very urgent communication.’ ”

The Secretary was told by Sazonoff that the Czar had ordered cessation of the mobilization against Germany. That was what Paléologue expected; and, in this way, the official side of the affair was made correct. Paléologue is to know nothing about secret mobilization. Nevertheless, it is to proceed. For, as he tells us, “at the same time ” that Chambrun was summoned to hear that the Czar had forbidden mobilization against Germany:

“My Military Attaché, General de Laguiche, is called to the General Staff. It is then three quarters past midnight.”

Paléologue does not tell us what took place at this meeting. It is not necessary. Laguiche met Januskevitch, and was told that, instead of “the Russian Government ” secretly ordering mobilization against Germany, the Russian Generals were themselves to take action. The French Ambassador was assured that mobilization against Germany was not proceeding. The Military Attaché was told that it was.

It is well worthy of note that when Paléologue first published his work, namely, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, he italicized, as of special importance, the word *secrètement* in the last phrase of the above quotation — “to commence *secretly* the general mobilization ”;²⁹⁷ while in his book he dropped the italics as being (probably) much too suggestive. He left, however, the words with which, in the *Revue*, he followed the phrase, namely, “*Ces derniers mots me font sursauter*” (Those last

²⁹⁷ *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Jan.-Feb. 1921, p. 257.

words made me jump). He jumped skillfully enough, but could not resist taking credit for it. Hence the revelation.

It is also well worthy of note that, in an unpublished report of 15 September 1917 (from which Sir Charles Oman was privileged to quote), Sir George Buchanan said:

“that at 11 o'clock at night on the 29th the French Ambassador was told by an official that secret preparations were on foot for general mobilization: half an hour later the Czar countermanded everything.”²⁹⁸

This makes clear that the “secret preparations” had been ordered by the Czar, and that it was these preparations which “half an hour later the Czar countermanded” — at Paléologue's suggestion, as above indicated.

A further noteworthy fact is that, although Sir George's unpublished report contains the paragraph just quoted, and although he had read Paléologue's account of the incident, he (Sir George), in his book *My Mission to Russia*, makes no reference whatever to the Czar's connection with the secrecy of the preparation-proceedings; he omits the statement contained in his report; and he makes no attempt to conciliate it with the narrative as presented in his book.

Finally, attention ought to be directed to the terms of the manifesto issued by the Czar to his people on 3 August. Referring to the Austro-Hungarian bombardment of Belgrade on 28th July, the Czar said:

“Forced by the situation thus created to take necessary measures of precaution, we ordered the army and the navy put on a war footing, at the same time using every endeavor to obtain a peaceful solution. Pourparlers were begun amid friendly relations with Germany and her ally, Austria, for the blood and the property of our subjects were dear to us. Contrary to our hopes in our good neighborly relations of long date, and disregarding our assurances that the mobilization measures taken were in pursuance of no object hostile to her, Germany demanded their immediate cessation. Being rebuffed in this demand, Germany suddenly declared war on Russia.”²⁹⁹

It will be observed (1) that there is in this document no suggestion of the ordering of a partial mobilization; (2) that the order that was issued because of the bombardment (that is, on the 29th) was to put “the army and the navy on a war footing” — a general mobilization of both services; (3) that the order was concurrent with the beginning of “pourparlers” with Germany and Austria, and was the only mobilization order; (4) that assurances were given to Germany that “the mobilization measures taken were in pursuance of no object hostile to her”; (5) that these assurances were contained in the Czar's telegrams to the Kaiser of the 31st (pp. 1137, 1160); (6) that the assurances related to Russia's general mobilization; and (7) that the only mobilization to which

²⁹⁸ Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 76, note.

²⁹⁹ *Current History*, I, p. 358.

the Czar referred was that which he ordered on the 29th and that which Germany required should be discontinued — namely, a general mobilization. The manifesto appears to make foolish the story that it was the Generals who ordered general mobilization — practically declared war on Germany — in contemptuous violation of the categorical orders of the Czar.

Discrepancy in the Narratives. The narratives do not harmonize. According to the view of Sir Charles Oman (writing prior to the publication of Paléologue's book), the sequence of events was as follows: The Czar, on the 29th, ordered mobilization against Austria-Hungary, and refused to agree to mobilization against Germany; the Generals, nevertheless, proceeded secretly with general mobilization — that is proceeded to make war with Germany certain; Sazonoff, in the evening, obtained (Sir Charles does not say how) the assent of the Czar to general mobilization; the Czar, because of a telegram from the Kaiser, reverted (the same evening) to his refusal; the Generals, nevertheless, persisted with general mobilization. The next day the sanction of the Czar was secured. The story is improbable.³⁰⁰ In derogation of it, Paléologue asserts that he was officially informed on the 29th, about 11 P.M., that "the Russian Government" (the Czar) had determined: "(1) to order, this very night, the mobilization . . . against Austria-Hungary; and (2) to commence secretly the general mobilization." It was not the Generals, but the Czar himself, who introduced the element of secrecy. Almost immediately after receiving this information, Paléologue was told that the Czar had cancelled the mobilization against

³⁰⁰ Improbable for several reasons: (1) Sir Charles does not suggest how Sazonoff obtained the Czar's assent in the evening. All he says is: "But their" (the Generals') "action was now approved by the Foreign Minister, — who came to tell them that after his interview at 7 P.M. with Count Pourtalès he thought war inevitable and general mobilization necessary. Application was made to the Czar, who, approved the alternative — unwelcome as it was to him" (*op. cit.*, p. 68). Were the application and approval by telephone merely? That is unlikely, but, on the other hand, there is no room for suggestion that after 7 P.M. Sazonoff travelled to Tsarskoie-Selo (15 miles away) where the Czar was. (2) If the Czar gave his approval, the Generals thereby escaped discovery of their insubordination. For, in that case, the Generals had for some hours the Czar's authorization for their action, and the Czar need not have been told that commencement of the action had preceded its sanction. (3) There would have been no occasion for the imagined "agony of mind" of Sukhomlinoff because "he was about to be detected in his abuse of his authority" (*ibid.*, p. 70). And (finally) when, next day, Sazonoff and Sukhomlinoff, in an interview with the Czar, persuaded him to agree to mobilization against Germany (if that is the fact), there was no need for Sukhomlinoff lying to the Czar by telling him that partial mobilization only was proceeding. Sazonoff would have reminded the Czar of his permission, which had lasted until 11 P.M. of the previous day. In the evidence given at the Sukhomlinoff trial, there is no suggestion (as far as we know) that the Czar was told that general mobilization had had his sanction, and that the ensuing embarrassments were chargeable to himself.

Germany. But had he? Or was not that action simulated in pursuance of Paléologue's suggestion; and did not the Generals patriotically endeavor to conform their evidence at the Sukhomlinoff trial to the story agreed upon?

Support for this suggestion is to be found in the fact that the reason offered by Paléologue for the Czar's alleged cancellation of his assent to the general mobilization is the receipt of a telegram from the Kaiser.³⁰¹ That is unsatisfactory. The telegram referred to Russian mobilization against Austria-Hungary only, and warned the Czar that such mobilization "might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary." It had no relation to mobilization against Germany. It might possibly have induced cancellation of the proclaimed partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary. But it could not have had any effect upon the "secret" mobilization which had been commenced against Germany. Observe, too, that Januskevitch declared that, as against his pleading of the impracticability of partial mobilization, "Wilhelm's word of honor" "gained the upper hand."³⁰² But the telegram contained no promise or assurance of any kind.

Both stories present difficulties which cannot be confidently solved upon the material available. But of the all-important fact, that mobilization against Germany commenced on the 29th although not avowed until the morning of the 31st, there is no room for doubt.

Alleged Reasons for Russian Mobilization — The Lokal Anzeiger. General Sukhomlinoff stated at his trial that the assent of the Czar to mobilization against Germany was motived by the receipt of a telegram from Berlin to the effect that mobilization there had been proclaimed. That is not the fact. A Berlin newspaper, the *Lokal Anzeiger*, had indeed assumed to announce mobilization (shortly after noon on the 30th), and the Russian Ambassador had telegraphed the statement to St. Petersburg.³⁰³ But within an hour of the appearance of the newspaper, the Ambassador had been advised that the statement was false, and he so notified his government.³⁰⁴ Nowhere, except in the statement of Sukhomlinoff, can there be found any support for the pretence that Russian mobilization was motived by German. For even if it be the fact that the Czar was not a party to the "secret" mobilization, his assent was secured by Sazonoff and Sukhomlinoff during the morning (as Sukhomlinoff testified), or at "four o'clock" (as Paléologue declared), of the 30th. These two men (according to one story) had gone to Tsarskoie-Selo (15 miles away) during the morning of the 30th,

³⁰¹ *Ante*, pp. 1135-6.

³⁰² *Ante*, p. 1134.

³⁰³ Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 61.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 62. The two telegrams of the Ambassador reached St. Petersburg at almost the same time: Speech, von Bethmann-Hollweg in Reichstag, 9 Nov. 1916. See *Ann. Reg.*, 1916, p. [242.

for that purpose, having agreed the night before that that was what they would do. And the *Lokal Anzeiger* did not issue until after noon of the same day. It is to be noted, too, that, according to Sir Charles Oman, it was at four o'clock that the Council of Ministers met and acted ³⁰⁵ after the return of Sazonoff and Sukhomlinoff from their visit to the Czar.

Although the facts were well known to him, Sir Edward Grey, in his speech to the Foreign Press Association on 23 October 1916, permitted himself to offer justification for the Russian mobilization by saying:

"It is said that Russia was the first to mobilise. That, I understand, is what is represented in Germany as justification for the statement that the war was not an aggressive war on Germany's part, but was forced upon her. Russia never made the mobilisation of which Germany complained, until after Germany had refused the conference, and she never made it until after a report appeared in Germany that Germany had ordered mobilization, and that report had been telegraphed to Petrograd." ³⁰⁶

Sir Edward meant people to believe that the Russian mobilization was ordered not merely "after" but *because* of the two specified circumstances. That was not true. The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg had given to Sir Edward (as we shall see) the reasons assigned for Russian mobilization, and had thought so little of the newspaper publication that he had made no reference to it. Germany's alleged refusal of a conference has already been dealt with. ³⁰⁷

In the reason officially given (2 August) by the Russian government for general mobilization, there is no reference to prior German mobilization. The announcement was as follows:

"The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the scope of our precautionary military measures. The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that Russia was compelled to begin preparations so as to be ready for every emergency." ³⁰⁸

Nor is there any reference to the Berlin newspaper in the explanation given by the Czar in his telegram of 1 August to King George V:

"I was eventually compelled to take this course in consequence of complete Austrian mobilization, of the bombardment of Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian troops in Galicia, and of secret military preparations being made in Germany." ³⁰⁹

As stated by the German Chancellor in the Reichstag, 7 November 1916, the Russian government itself:

³⁰⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 79.

³⁰⁶ *The Times* (London), 24 Oct. 1916. Writing after the war, Sir Charles Oman can offer less excuse for an assertion similar to that of Sir Edward Grey: *op. cit.*, p. 78.

³⁰⁷ *Ante*, pp. 1073-7.

³⁰⁸ Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 77. And see No. 58.

³⁰⁹ Coll. Dip. Docs., p. 537.

“had never had the thought of invoking the special edition of the *Lokal Anzeiger* in order to justify the fatal step.”³¹⁰

The Czar, as we have just seen, acknowledged that Germany had been “forced to mobilize” — forced by Russia’s mobilization.

The report of the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg (31 July) contains no reference to the Berlin newspaper.

“It has been decided,” the Ambassador said, “to issue orders for general mobilization. This decision was taken in consequence of reports received from Austrian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Russia is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as Servia. Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.”³¹¹

Comparison of this report with a sentence from the Ambassador’s book makes clear the difficulty in forming a satisfactory reason for Russian mobilization:

“Russia, it is true, mobilized, but not until mobilization had been forced upon her by the discovery of Germany’s secret military preparations as well as by Austria-Hungary’s threatening attitude.”³¹²

Not a word about Austria’s being “determined not to yield.” Not a word about Austria “moving troops against Russia.” And the “reason to believe” in Germany’s making “active military preparations” is developed into “the discovery of Germany’s secret military preparations.” Sir George makes no reference to the Russian secret preparations which had been “going on splendidly” since the 29th.

The French Ambassador at Berlin was informed of the mistake made by the *Lokal Anzeiger* before he had time to telegraph the fact of the publication. The first reference to it, in his despatches, was (30th) as follows:

“Herr von Jagow telephoned me at 2 o’clock that the news of the German mobilization which had spread an hour before was false, and asked me to inform you of this urgently; the Imperial Government is confiscating the extra edition of the papers which announced it.”³¹³

In a telegram of the following day (31st), the Ambassador assigned the reasons for Russian mobilization, as follows:

“As a result of the general mobilization of Austria, and of the measures for mobilization taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days, the order for the general mobilization of the

³¹⁰ Quoted in *Le Mensonge du 3 Août* (published by Payot & Cie, Paris, 1917), pp. 65-6. Cf. *Ann. Reg.*, 1916, pp. [242-3.

³¹¹ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 113.

³¹² Buchanan, *op. cit.*, I, p. 208.

³¹³ Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 105. Poincaré (*op. cit.*, p. 236), quotes a telegram which does not appear in the Fr. Yell. Bk., and omits the one above quoted, which does.

Russian army has been given, Russia not being able without most serious danger, to allow herself to be further out-distanced; really she is only taking military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. For imperative reasons of strategy the Russian Government, knowing that Germany was arming, could no longer delay the conversion of her partial mobilization into a general mobilization.”³¹⁴

The statement as to Austrian previous general mobilization is inaccurate. It was not proclaimed until early on the 31st³¹⁵ — simultaneously with the Russian announcement of mobilization against Germany. It will be observed that the Ambassador makes no reference to the mistaken announcement of the *Lokal Anzeiger*.

German Mobilization. With reference to the only act alleged as against Germany as a reason for a public declaration of mobilization against her, namely, “secret military preparations,” every one of the future belligerents had, undoubtedly, commenced measures preliminary to mobilization. Poincaré, for example, tells of what was done in France while he was yet on his way from St. Petersburg — that is, prior to the 29th:

“soldiers on leave had been recalled, the men in the training camps had been sent to rejoin their garrisons; the administrative officials had all received instructions to remain at their posts; supplies had been purchased for Paris — in a word, all the necessary steps had been taken in case mobilization should become necessary, but nothing had been done that would resemble an act of mobilization.”³¹⁶

The next day (30th), less circumspectly, the Russian Ambassador at Paris telegraphed that the French Minister for War had said:

“we are able to declare that in the higher interests of peace we are ready to slacken for the instant the mobilization measures, which would not hinder us from pursuing our military preparations, and even of intensifying it through abstaining as much as possible from transporting our troops in masses.”³¹⁷

The United Kingdom, besides keeping her navy undistributed after manoeuvres, made certain military preparations, Sir Edward Grey saying (30th) that they:

“were not of an offensive character, but that in the present state of affairs on the continent it was natural to take some precautions.”³¹⁸

The machines were getting into motion. Soon their momentum would be uncontrollable.

Real Reason for Russian Mobilization. Pretence of justification for

³¹⁴ Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 118.

³¹⁵ *Ante*, p. 1126.

³¹⁶ *The Origins of the War*, p. 207.

³¹⁷ *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 290. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 288, 293, 295. As offset to this, see Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 105.

³¹⁸ Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 108.

Russian general mobilization as a response to German mobilization is made foolish by the telegram which Sazonoff sent to the Russian representatives abroad on 2 August (*Italics now added*):

“It is quite evident that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist upon us the responsibility for the rupture. We were forced *to mobilize* by the immense responsibility which would have fallen on our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade *and was undertaking general mobilization*. The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that he would take no aggressive action as long as the discussions with Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many proofs of Russia’s desire for peace, Germany neither could, nor had the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and independence of Servia. Any other solution, besides being entirely incompatible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset the European balance of power by securing the hegemony of Germany. The European — nay, the world-wide — character of this dispute is infinitely more important than the pretext from which it springs. By her decision to declare war upon us, at a moment when negotiations were in progress between the Powers, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility.”³¹⁹

The words italicized are fraudulent alterations of the telegram. Instead of “to mobilize” should be read “to general mobilization.” The words “and was undertaking general mobilization,” and the whole of the last sentence should be erased.³²⁰ Russia ordered mobilization against Austria-Hungary nearly two days before the latter replied.³²¹ Passing these points let it be noted that two days after Russian mobilization against Germany had commenced, Sazonoff said (31st):

“the hope of finding a peaceful issue to the present difficulties need not yet be abandoned”;³²²

and that, therefore, in avoiding the “immense responsibility” to which he refers, Sazonoff was assuming the far greater responsibility of putting an end to the negotiations for settlement which were regarded by the diplomats as not unlikely to produce a peaceful solution.³²³ Germany could not have been expected to permit mobilization to proceed while Russia limited herself to negotiations which, she stipulated, must have for their object a solution (in Sazonoff’s phrase) “compatible with the dignity and independence of Servia.”³²⁴ It was Sir Edward Grey who said, “There must, of course, be some humiliation for Serbia.”³²⁵ Von Bethmann-Hollweg’s indictment of Russian action is as follows:

³¹⁹ Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 78.

³²⁰ *The Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*, pp. 61-2.

³²¹ *Ante*, pp. 1125-6.

³²² *Ante*, 1123.

³²³ *Ante*, pp. 1117-23.

³²⁴ Above.

³²⁵ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 90.

“The Russian mobilization was ordered in spite of the fact that Vienna was ready to enter into direct conversations with St. Petersburg on the Serbian issue, in spite of the fact that Vienna had accepted the Grey mediation, in spite of the fact that Vienna had given assurances as to the integrity of Serbia, in spite of the fact that Vienna was prepared not to go beyond such a temporary occupation of a part of Serbian territory as England itself had considered acceptable, finally, in spite of the fact that Austria had only mobilized against Serbia, and that Germany had not yet mobilized at all.”³²⁶

If that be somewhat strained, readers who have perused the preceding pages will readily accept the verdict of *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*:

“The World-war was, nevertheless, precipitated by the action of Russia, at a moment when conversations between Vienna and Petrograd were being resumed, when the Chancellor was at length endeavoring to restrain his ally, and when the Tsar and the Kaiser were in telegraphic communication.”³²⁷

German Situation. That, under all these circumstances, Germany peremptorily demanded cessation of Russian preparations is not surprising. Although unaware, at the moment, that mobilization against her had been ordered by the Russian Generals on the 29th July, the fact (as one of them said) that it was “going on splendidly”³²⁸ could not be concealed. Prior to the official announcement by Russia, on the 29th, of the mobilization against Austria-Hungary, many reports of mobilization against Germany had reached Berlin. Count Montgelas (one of the persons engaged, after the flight of the Kaiser, in publishing the Kautsky documents³²⁹) has said that:

“As early as July 25 Russia had decided to mobilize 13 Army corps in case of an armed Austrian intervention in Serbia. From this day onward news kept pouring in from all sides reporting military preparations in different parts of the vast Empire, not only on the Austrian, but also on the German front, particularly in the Vilna and Warsaw districts. No less than twenty important reports on military measures in Russia reached the Berlin Foreign Office from July 26 to 29, and, it may be added, that some more reports of minor importance have not been published.”³³⁰

According to Sir Charles Oman:

“clearly mobilisation on the South-Western frontier was by this time” (27th) “‘in the air.’ The British Consul at Odessa telegraphed on the

³²⁶ *Reflections on the World War*, pp. 136-7.

³²⁷ III, p. 499.

³²⁸ *Ante*, p. 1134.

³²⁹ Kautsky: *The Guilt &c.*, pp. 10-11.

³³⁰ *Foreign Affairs*, Feb. 1920, p. 14. Cf. German White Bk., 1914, in Coll. Dip. Docs., p. 408; Kautsky Docs., No. 372.

morning of the 27th that he had heard that the railways had been taken under military control at midnight, and that regiments which had been out in summer camps had been warned to move back to their headquarters.”³³¹

After the official announcement on the 29th of partial (changed to general) mobilization, reports of Russian preparations against Germany became more impressive:

“During the interval from July 29th to July 31st there appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilisation. Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier, and the declaration of the state of war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilisation was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were denied to our representative at St. Petersburg on word of honor.”³³²

During the morning of the 30th (9.10 A.M.), the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg telegraphed that:

“Up to the present, all the news arriving with reference to the movement of non-mobilized troops toward the frontier creates the impression that there have been ordered, prematurely and nervously, measures for the protection of the frontier which may exercise an influence on the course of mobilization. . . . The fleet is supposed to remain until the 29th at Sweaborg, and to have received the mobilization order on the 30th at 2 A.M. The fleet at Reval and Cronstadt is evidently prepared for war.”³³³

On the 31st, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin reported as follows:

“The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just told me that our discussions, which were already difficult, on account of the mobilization against Austria, were becoming more so in view of the serious military measures that we were taking against Germany. He said that information on this subject was reaching Berlin from all sides, and this must inevitably provoke similar measures on the part of Germany. To this I replied that, according to sure information in my possession, which was confirmed by all our compatriots arriving from Berlin, Germany also was very actively engaged in taking military measures against Russia. In spite of this, the Minister for Foreign Affairs asserts that the only step taken in Germany has been the recall of officers from leave and of the troops from manœuvres.”³³⁴

German Speed and Russian Numbers. It must not be forgotten that

³³¹ *The Outbreak of the War*, p. 60. And see Aus. Red Bk. (First), No. 42.

³³² German White Bk., 1914, in Coll. Dip. Docs., p. 411. Upon the subject of Russian preparedness, see Kautsky Docs., Nos. 230, 274, 275, 281, 294-296, 327, 330, 331, 333, 335, 338, 365a, 369, 376a, 404, 410, 422, 473.

³³³ Kautsky Docs., No. 478.

³³⁴ Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 68.

if Germany permitted mobilization to proceed pending negotiations, she would, if the negotiations failed (as may well have been thought quite probable), be supplying Russia with a very important military advantage.³³⁵ For her soldiery being dispersed over wide areas meagrely provided with railways, and her supplies having to come from long distances, a grant of time for concentration on the frontier would be to court disaster. Reporting a conversation with von Jagow on 1 August, the British Ambassador at Berlin said:

"Your telegram of to-day. I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilization, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to an answer as creating a state of war."³³⁶

Russia was well aware of the value of German speed. But it was not "the safety of the German Empire" that interested her. Von Jagow may, perhaps, be pardoned for having thought of it. Later (4 August), he said to the Ambassador that:

"Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops."³³⁷

That was not only the view of the Czar also, but his excuse for precipitate action. In his telegram to the British King of 1 August, he said that his:

"military advisers strongly advised a general mobilization owing to

³³⁵ Cf. Kautsky Docs., No. 536: quoted *ante*, pp. 1138-9.

³³⁶ Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 138.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 160.

quickness with which Germany can mobilize in comparison with Russia." ³³⁸

M. Poincaré was of the same opinion, and offered as a reason for the excitement in St. Petersburg that:

"The immensity of the Russian Empire and the insufficiency of her means of communication rendered Russian mobilization much slower than that of the other European nations." ³³⁹

Finally, Viscount (formerly Sir Edward) Grey, in a speech at Edinburgh on 27 January 1922, upheld the German view. He said:

"I think Germany was perfectly entitled to say she could not accept a conference unconditionally. I do not think she was entitled to turn it down unconditionally, as she did, ³⁴⁰ but I think she was perfectly entitled to say that she was more ready for war than France and Russia and that she could not agree to a conference unless there were guarantees that there would not be mobilization or preparations of that kind for war during the conference. And there would not have been the Russian mobilization of which the Germans afterwards complained. But observe, that if you had the situation over again, that is very likely what would happen. The nation most ready for war would say: 'I cannot have a conference without guarantees that while the conference is taking place there are no military preparations which are to my disadvantage,' and it might not always be easy to find those guarantees." ³⁴¹

Recital of views upon this point may be fittingly closed by the following from Sir Charles Oman's semi-official argument, *The Outbreak of the War of 1914-18*:

"Germany had, no doubt, valid reasons for mobilizing when Russia had done so. But for making mobilization tantamount to war there was no excuse, except the military one that Germany had a valuable asset in her power of quick concentration, which would only be available if she broke off all negotiations at the same moment at which she assembled her army. This subordination of all other political ends to the desire to utilize a strategic advantage is the true mark of a 'militaristic' State." ³⁴²

In other words, Germany ought to have surrendered her "valuable asset" — her only chance of success in case of war — and placed herself unreservedly in the power of her potential enemies. It is only a "militaristic" state, Sir Charles imagines, that during hazardous days would insist upon the maintenance of any "strategic advantage" which it might possess. For the purpose of improving her strategic position — for the purpose of reducing that of Germany — Russia

³³⁸ Coll. Dip. Docs., p. 537; Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

³³⁹ *Origins of the War*, p. 236.

³⁴⁰ As already noted, that statement is inaccurate: *ante*, pp. 1073-7.

³⁴¹ *The Times* (London), 28 Jan. 1922.

³⁴² P. 96.

ordered mobilization. By refusing to assent to that alteration in the situation, Germany wrote herself down "militaristic"!³⁴³ If Germany had "valid reasons for mobilizing when Russia had done so," and if, as Sir Charles said on another page,³⁴⁴ German "mobilization means war," then, clearly enough, it was Russia's mobilization which produced war. Perhaps the best way to get rid of the fact and the effect of Russian mobilization is, quite unwarrantably, to assert with Sir Charles that: "if the latter" (the Russian mobilization) "had never been made, Germany would still have acted as she did, but would have had to produce a different excuse."³⁴⁵

Mr. Asquith. To the points of unfairness in Mr. Asquith's book, *The Genesis of the War*, which have already been noted, must now be added one which gives an unmistakable character of unreliability to his whole narrative. For it consists in the omission of the slightest reference to the most important of the facts which immediately preceded and, indeed, caused the outbreak of the war, namely, the Russian mobilization against Germany. After indicating (as the fact was) that the negotiations had taken a more hopeful turn, and quoting that Sir Edward Grey believed:

"that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war,"

Mr. Asquith adds:

"It was remarkable that just when Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have presented this ultimatum."³⁴⁶

Mr. Asquith allows no hint of the reason for that ultimatum to escape him. He creates the impression that it was motived merely by apprehension that Russia and Austria-Hungary might come to agreement unless the negotiations were interrupted by war.³⁴⁷

³⁴³ Sir Charles did not overlook the importance to Germany of rapidity of action. On the contrary, he said: "The German mobilization scheme had, since its last revision, always contemplated action against France and Russia at the same moment — with the theory that the main force must be thrown to the west, against the enemy who could mass and strike in a comparatively small number of days, and then, after France should be disposed of, be turned against the much more slowly-moving enemy on the east" (*ibid.*, p. 93). To avoid being classed as militaristic, Germany should have accepted revision of her strategy at the hands of Russia.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.* Sir Charles Oman wrote prior to the publication of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian documents. He may therefore be forgiven for various errors, but not for scoffs framed in the absence of the facts, such, for example, as appear upon pages 36, 39, 55, 81-2, 84, and 144.

³⁴⁶ *The Genesis of the War*, cap. XXVI.

³⁴⁷ Subsidiarily to the above misrepresentation, it may be added that Mr. Asquith alleges that "on July 31st Russia and Austria mobilized against each other," whereas it is not disputable that Russia mobilized openly against Austria-Hungary on the 29th, and secretly against Germany on the same day.

EFFECT OF MOBILIZATION

Sir Charles Oman has sought to attenuate the effect of the Russian, and even of the German, mobilization by insisting that:

“A dozen cases in modern history show that mobilization does not necessarily mean war, unless the mobilizer is determined on a rupture.”³⁴⁸

But to that there are several answers: (1) One nation may warn another that mobilization *will* mean war, and, as has already been made clear, Germany repeatedly gave the warning.³⁴⁹ (2) That Sazonoff thoroughly understood what the effect of proceeding with preparations would be is shown by his telegram to Paris (already quoted) of the 29th:

“The German Ambassador to-day informed me of the decision of his Government to mobilize, if Russia did not stop her military preparations. . . . As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten our own military preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable.”³⁵⁰

And (3) without warning of any kind, Sazonoff could have entertained no doubt that mobilization of such huge armies as those of Russia and Germany meant war. Indeed, the Czar had so arranged in 1892 with France. The French General de Boisdeffre, when settling the form of a military convention with Russia, had an interview with the Czar (18 August), part of which he (de Boisdeffre) reported to Paris as follows:

“The Emperor then spoke to me about mobilization — the subject of Article 2. I remarked to him that mobilization was a declaration of war; that to mobilize was to oblige his neighbor to do the same thing; that mobilization necessitated arrangements for strategic transportation and concentration. Without that, to allow a million men to mobilize upon his frontier, without simultaneously doing likewise, would be to deprive himself of all possibility of moving afterwards, and to place himself in the situation of an individual who, having a pistol in his pocket, would allow his neighbor to put a weapon into his face without drawing his own. ‘That is exactly as I understand it,’ the Emperor replied to me.”³⁵¹

The Article referred to was as follows:

“In the event that the forces of the Triple Alliance, or one of the Powers which compose it, should proceed to mobilize, France and Russia, at the first announcement of the event, and without the necessity for preliminary arrangements, will immediately and simultaneously mobilize all their forces, and will transport them to the nearest possible of their frontiers.”³⁵²

³⁴⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 80.

³⁴⁹ *Ante*, pp. 1126-39.

³⁵⁰ Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 58.

³⁵¹ Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Franco-Russian Alliance*, pp. 95-6.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 92.

Unless the Czar imagined that after his mobilization Germany would remain unmobilized, he knew that his action was, by the very terms of his agreement with France, immediately to be followed by a rush of allied troops to both of the German frontiers. He knew that that inevitably meant war. Moreover, on the day of Russian mobilization (open as against Austria-Hungary, and secret as against Germany), the Czar said in a telegram to the Kaiser:

"I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me, and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war."³⁵³

By "measures," the Czar certainly meant mobilization.

Although Sir Charles Oman asserts (as above) that "mobilization does not necessarily mean war," yet when desirous of making a point against Germany — when gibbeting her for the demand "to demobilize" within twelve hours, and the declaration that default would be followed by German mobilization, he adds:

"and (as we have quoted before from German official sources) 'mobilization means war.'³⁵⁴

Sir Charles overlooked the fact that the Czar, so far from finding fault with Germany for mobilization, said in one of his telegrams to the Kaiser. "I comprehend that you are forced to mobilize";³⁵⁵ and that he himself (Sir Charles) had said that:

"Germany had no doubt valid reasons for mobilizing when Russia had done so."³⁵⁶

According to the Czar and Sir Charles, Germany was "forced" to mobilize, or, at all events, was justified in mobilizing; and, according to Sir Charles, German mobilization meant war.

TELEGRAMS OF THE SOVEREIGNS

King George and the Czar. The impression derived from perusal of the documents already quoted is in perfect harmony with the import of the telegrams which passed between King George and the Czar; King George and the Kaiser and Prince Henry; and the Kaiser and the Czar. On the same day (1 August) that Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that if:

"Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace,"³⁵⁷

King George sent to the Czar "a personal message" in which, after referring to the German announcement that, in consequence of Russian mobilization, an ultimatum had been sent to St. Petersburg, he said:

³⁵³ *Post*, p. 1158.

³⁵⁴ Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

³⁵⁵ *Ante*, pp. 1160-1.

³⁵⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 96.

³⁵⁷ *Ante*, p. 1120.

“ I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has produced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility of avoiding the dreadful calamity which at present threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal appeal to you to remove the misapprehension which I feel must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace. If you think I can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do everything in my power to assist in reopening the interrupted conversations between the Powers concerned. I feel confident that you are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be done to secure the peace of the world.”³⁵⁸

To King George, the existence of “ some misunderstanding,” as he politely phrased it, was very evident. He was aware of the Russian mobilization against Austria-Hungary. There appeared to be no reason, pending negotiations, for extending it to Germany. There must be “ some misunderstanding.” Very evidently, too, the King believed that it was the Czar who could “ remove the misapprehension,” — really, cancel his mobilization — and thus “ leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace.” The reply of the Czar (1 August) is notable:

“ I would gladly have accepted your proposals had not German Ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my Government declaring war.”

After referring to the Austro-Hungarian design “ to crush Serbia,” and blaming Germany and Austria-Hungary for misconduct in the negotiations, the Czar continued:

“ Austria’s declaration of war on Serbia forced me to order a partial mobilization, though, in view of threatening situation, my military advisers strongly advised a general mobilization owing to quickness with which Germany can mobilize in comparison with Russia. I was eventually compelled to take this course in consequence of complete Austrian mobilization, of the bombardment of Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian troops in Galicia, and of secret military preparations being made in Germany. That I was justified in doing so is proved by Germany’s sudden declaration of war, which was quite unexpected by me, as I have given most categorical assurances to the Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued. In this solemn hour, I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and Russia. God bless and protect you.”³⁵⁹

The “ complete Austrian mobilization ” did not take place until the 31st, the day — if not two days — after the Czar had signed the ukase for

³⁵⁸ Coll. Dip. Docs., p. 537.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

mobilization against Germany.³⁶⁰ And the Czar had not given assurances "that my troops would not move," &c. What he had said was "my troops will undertake no provocative action." (Telegram Czar to Kaiser, 31 July: German White Book, Coll. Dip. Docs., p. 411, *post* p. 1160.) In the circular telegram of 2 Aug. (*ante* p. 1147), Sazonoff said that "the Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that he would take no aggressive action," &c. The difference to Germany between a Russian promise not to move troops to the frontier and a promise that they would not cross it is obvious. The former, if implemented, would be of some value. The latter would not.

King George and the Kaiser. Contrast these telegrams between London and St. Petersburg with those which passed between London and Berlin. On 31 July, King George (probably not having yet heard of Russian secret mobilization against Germany) telegraphed to Prince Henry of Prussia (the Kaiser's brother) respecting the "pledge plan" already formulated by the Kaiser and Sir Edward Grey:

"Thanks for your telegram. I am very glad to hear of William's efforts to act with Nicholas for the maintenance of peace. I earnestly desire that such a misfortune as a European war — the evil of which could not be remedied — may be prevented. My government is doing the utmost possible in order to induce Russia and France to postpone further military preparations, provided that Austria declares herself satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighboring Servian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands, while at the same time the other countries suspend their preparations for war. I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Please assure William that I am doing all that I can, and will continue to do all that lies in my power, to maintain the peace of Europe."³⁶¹

It will be remembered that "William" was applying and continued to apply, very effectively, "his great influence" in the way suggested³⁶² — indeed, that the "pledge plan" was originally his own. In answer to King George, the Kaiser telegraphed the next day (31 July):

"Many thanks for your friendly communication. Your proposals coincide with my ideas and with the communication which I have this evening received from Vienna, and which I have passed on to London. I have just heard from the Chancellor that intelligence has just reached him that Nicholas this evening has ordered the mobilization of his entire army and fleet. He has not even awaited the result of the mediation in which I am engaged, and he has left me completely without information.

³⁶⁰ *Ante*, pp. 1125-6.

³⁶¹ Coll. Dip. Docs., pp. 538-9; Kautsky Docs., No. 452.

³⁶² *Ante*, pp. 1115-7.

I am travelling to Berlin to assure the safety of my eastern frontier, where strong Russian forces have already taken up their position.”³⁶³

In reply, King George telegraphed (1 August):

“Many thanks for your telegram of last night. I have sent an urgent telegram to Nicholas in which I have assured him of my readiness to do everything in my power to further the resumption of negotiations between the powers concerned.”³⁶⁴

The “urgent telegram” was the one above quoted. And thus we see that “Germany and England are working together to prevent” war; that King George sent an “urgent” telegram to the Czar “to remove the misapprehension,” and thus “leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace”; that the Czar replied that he could not comply with the King’s request because Germany had declared war; that the German declaration of war was the inevitable response to Russian mobilization; and that Russia declined to cease preparations even though Sir Edward Grey (as already quoted — p. 1120) said that if:

“Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace.”

The Czar and the Kaiser. Before perusing the telegrams between the Czar and the Kaiser, it is necessary to remember that Russian mobilization against Austria-Hungary was decided upon (in principle) on 25 July; that news of Russian military preparations reached Berlin on 26 July;³⁶⁵ and that, on the same day, the German Ambassador was instructed to declare to Russia that:

“Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army. But mobilisation means war. As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France.”³⁶⁶

On the 29th, at 1.45 A.M., the Kaiser telegraphed to the Czar as follows:

“I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in Servia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment. On the other hand, I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of

³⁶³ Coll. Dip. Docs., p. 539; Kautsky Docs., No. 477.

³⁶⁴ Coll. Dip. Docs., p. 539; Kautsky Docs., No. 574.

³⁶⁵ German White Bk., 1914, Exs. 6-8. Cf. Coll. Dip. Docs., p. 408.

³⁶⁶ German White Bk., 1914, in Coll. Dip. Docs., p. 408.

the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise."³⁶⁷

This telegram crossed one from the Czar to the Kaiser (29th, 1 A.M.), asking for intervention, as follows:

"I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country, and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a European war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from going too far."³⁶⁸

The "measures" to which the Czar referred as to those which, in his opinion, "will lead to war" were primarily, of course, those of mobilization. The Kaiser's reply (29th, 6.30 P.M.) has already been quoted. The last sentence was as follows:

"Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which — upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid — I willingly accepted."

What stopped Tatischtschew? Passing two telegrams — one from the Czar asking, and one from the Kaiser giving, explanation³⁶⁹ — we note the Czar's message of the 30th, at 1.20 P.M.:

"Thank you heartily for your quick answer," (the telegram last referred to). "Am sending Tatischtschew this evening with instructions. The military measures which have now come into force were decided five days ago for reasons of defence on account of Austria's preparations. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not in any way interfere with your part as mediator which I greatly value. We need your strong pressure on Austria to come to an understanding with us."³⁷⁰

Tatischtschew was to start for Berlin on the evening of the 30th. Why

³⁶⁷ German White Bk., 1914, Ex. 20. In the German White Bk., the hour of departure is given as "July 28th, 10.45 P.M." The true time was three hours later: See Kautsky Docs., No. 335.

³⁶⁸ German White Bk., 1914, Ex. 21. The date of the telegram is given as "July 29th, 1 P.M." That is a mistake (See Kautsky Docs., No. 332). Cf. Kautsky, *The Guilt &c.*, p. 144, note.

³⁶⁹ Kautsky Docs., Nos. 366 and 420.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 390; German White Bk., 1914, Ex. 23a. The hour of the despatch given in the German White Bk. is 1.20 P.M. It is 1.20 A.M. in the Kautsky Docs. The former appears to be correct.

did he not go? Why was that form of negotiation interrupted? Possibly (following Oman and Buchanan), when the Czar sent his telegram he was not aware that mobilization against Germany was "going on splendidly." During the afternoon, his assent to that action was obtained.³⁷¹ He knew that mobilization was to be proclaimed the next morning. He knew that that meant war. He knew that he had terminated negotiations for a peaceful solution. He knew that the telegraph would outstrip Tatischtschew. So Tatischtschew remained at home. Sir Charles Oman argues that "German action . . . made his departure from Petrograd useless."³⁷² But that cannot be correct. The "action" to which Sir Charles refers is "Count Pourtalès' threat about 'automatic mobilization' by Germany," but that occurred before, and not after, the Czar sent his telegram. Sir Charles dates "the threat" as of the preceding day (29th), at seven o'clock in the evening.³⁷³

On the 31st (2.04 P.M.), the Kaiser sent to the Czar the following (already partly quoted):

"Upon your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid, I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilized against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost illusory.³⁷⁴ In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue these military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary."³⁷⁵ That telegram crossed one from the Czar (despatched 2.55 P.M.) as follows:

³⁷¹ *Ante*, p. 1136. The British Ambassador notes that the Czar's telegram was sent "earlier in the afternoon" of the day upon which Sazonoff persuaded him to sanction general mobilization: Buchanan, *op. cit.*, I, p. 202.

³⁷² *Op. cit.*, p. 87. And see p. 79.

³⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 63-4.

³⁷⁴ It was a complaint of M. Viviani that interruption of the negotiations took place while Russia was making concession: Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 125.

³⁷⁵ German White Bk., 1914, in Coll. Dip. Docs., pp. 411-12; Kautsky Docs., No. 480.

"I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia³⁷⁶ continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe."³⁷⁷

Four points for comment on these two last telegrams are as follows:

(1) The final sentence of the Kaiser's telegram is almost identical with the words in Sir Edward Grey's telegram of the next day: that if "Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it still appears to be possible to preserve peace."³⁷⁸

(2) No reference is made in the Czar's telegram to his change of purpose with regard to Tatischtschew, who, by this time, ought to have been well on his way to Berlin.

(3) The fact of mobilization against Germany having been ordered (on the previous day) is concealed by the Czar; for the words "our military preparations" refer to "defence on account of Austria's preparations" spoken of in the Czar's previous telegram.³⁷⁹

(4) The Czar's assertion, that "it is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations,"³⁸⁰ is in sharp contrast with Sazonoff's offer of the previous day — under certain conditions, "to stop her [Russia's] military preparations."³⁸¹

Sir Charles Oman makes a futile attempt to explain the Czar's telegram by saying that it was:

"evidently intended to prepare the Kaiser for the news of the Russian general mobilization, and to urge that it had no provocative meaning, but was a logical consequence of the Austrian mobilization."³⁸²

In other words, the way to assure the Kaiser that Russian general mobilization "had no provocative meaning" was to conceal its existence; to deny, inferentially, that it was proceeding; and to allege that, when discovered, it ought to be attributed to a false cause. An alternative inference is that the Czar desired, by tranquillizing the Kaiser, to gain a little more time for his Generals.

To the Kaiser's appeal — "to discontinue these military preparations" — the Czar replied (1 August 2.06 P.M. — already quoted) as follows:

"I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced

³⁷⁶ In Kautsky Docs. the language is "negotiations with Austria on Serbia's account."

³⁷⁷ Coll. Dip. Docs., p. 411; Kautsky Docs., No. 487.

³⁷⁸ *Ante*, p. 1120.

³⁷⁹ *Ante*, p. 1158.

³⁸⁰ Above.

³⁸¹ *Ante*, p. 1114.

³⁸² *Op. cit.*, p. 88.

to mobilize, but I should like to have from You the same guarantee which I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible in our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your urgent reply.”³⁸³

To this, the Kaiser replied (1 August, 10.30 P.M.):

“I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear, and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply, I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers.”³⁸⁴

This final appeal was as ineffectual as the others. The Czar insisted upon proceeding with war-preparations during negotiations, while the Kaiser insisted upon cessation of them. War-preparations meant war.

German Ultimatum. If the form of the Czar’s telegram of the 31st is to be accounted for by the belief (as Sir Charles Oman appears to think) that concealment of the fact of the general mobilization, and inferential denial of its existence, was the best way:

“to prepare the Kaiser for the news of the Russian mobilization, and to urge that it had no provocative meaning,” &c., the Czar very seriously miscalculated Germany’s and, probably, everybody’s mental methods. For the inevitable effect of the subsequent arrival in Berlin of “the news of the Russian general mobilization” — of discovery of the dupery — was to move the Chancellor to instruct the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg (31st, 3.30 P.M.) to declare that failure on the part of Russia to “stop every measure of war within 12 hours” would cause mobilization by Germany.³⁸⁵ The Ambassador executed his instructions at midnight of the same day, and received the answer already quoted — a refusal.³⁸⁶ The declaration of war, handed to Sazonoff the next day (1 August) at 7.10 P.M., was as follows:

“The Imperial German Government have used every effort since the beginning of the crisis to bring about a peaceful settlement. In compliance with a wish expressed by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg;

³⁸³ German White Bk., 1914, in Coll. Dip. Docs., p. 413.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁵ The text of the telegram appears *ante*, p. 1138.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

but Russia, without waiting for any result, proceeded to a general mobilization of her forces both on land and sea. In consequence of this threatening step, which was not justified by any military proceedings on the part of Germany, the German Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The German Government were, therefore, obliged to make representations to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and to insist upon a cessation of the aforesaid military acts. Russia having refused to comply with (not having considered it necessary to answer) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this attitude) that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honor on the instructions of my Government, to inform Your Excellency as follows:

“His Majesty, the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at war with Russia.”³⁸⁷

Austria-Hungary did not declare war on Russia until 6 August.³⁸⁸ Although Belgrade was bombarded on 29 July, Austro-Hungarian troops did not cross the boundary until 13 August.

CONTENTION OF THE ALLIES AT PARIS

The Report of the Commission appointed by the Allies at the Paris Peace Conference for consideration of the responsibility of the authors of the war dealt at some length with German mobilization. In answer, the German Delegation, besides stating the facts relative to Russian mobilization, disputed the accuracy of some of the allegations of the report, and added:

“While the German mobilization is thus incorrectly represented, and measures the most anodyne are given a menacing character, the Commission passes completely in silence the Russian mobilization.”³⁸⁹

To this, the only reply of the Allies was as follows:

“The German Government would now throw the blame for the failure of the attempts to procure peace on the mobilization of the Russian army. They ignore that this was the immediate and necessary consequence of the mobilization of the Austrian army and the declaration of war on Serbia — both authorized by Germany. These were the fatal acts by which the decision was taken out of the hands of statesmen, and control transferred to the military.”³⁹⁰

³⁸⁷ Russ. Orange Bk., 1914, No. 76. “The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both inserted in the note”: *ibid.*, note.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 79.

³⁸⁹ *Remarques &c.*, p. 17.

³⁹⁰ Br. White Paper, Misc. No. 4 (1919), Cmd. 258, p. 27.

As we now know, that statement is not true. The sequences are inverted. Mobilization of the Russian army against Austria-Hungary was determined upon "in principle," and the preliminaries of it commenced three days before the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia, and six days before Austria-Hungary mobilized against Russia. Mobilization of the Russian army against Austria-Hungary was publicly proclaimed, and secret mobilization against Germany was commenced, on the 29th — two days before Austria-Hungary mobilized against Russia. The "fatal acts" were the Russian secret mobilization against Germany on the 29th; the open announcement of it on the 31st; and the refusal to cease preparations, as demanded by Germany and counselled by the United Kingdom.³⁹¹ Russian mobilization against Germany was ordered while the Kaiser, at the Czar's request, was acting as mediator at Vienna, and for that mobilization the only excuse is that given by Sazonoff, namely:

"the immense responsibility which would have fallen on our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade."³⁹²

Political and military considerations came into conflict, and the military prevailed.³⁹³

CONCLUSIONS

The documents referred to in the foregoing pages warrant the following conclusions.

1. Austria-Hungary believed that maintenance of her territorial integrity necessitated the reduction of Serbia's military power, and determined to accomplish her purpose by resort to military force; to press her action with energy and rapidity; and to decline all intervention. Germany promised support and, as she herself afterwards asserted:

"permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia."³⁹⁴

Both Powers believed that an uncompromising attitude would enable them to confine the hostilities to a duel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Neither desired European war.

2. Whether Austria-Hungary was justified in adopting this course, depends upon an estimate of the grievances alleged by her against Serbia, and upon the probability of success in the removal of these grievances by any method other than war. Of this, readers must judge for themselves."³⁹⁵

³⁹¹ *Ante*, pp. 1120, 1125-6.

³⁹² *Ante*, p. 1147.

³⁹³ *Ante*, pp. 1131-6, 77.

³⁹⁴ *Ante*, p. 79.

³⁹⁵ The subject is treated in cap. XXVI.

3. Whether Russia was justified in intervening in the quarrel depends upon the view which may be taken of the right of one country to intervene between disputants in cases of the class in question. In support of her attitude, Russia could cite plenty of precedents. She made no suggestion of Serbia's innocence. Her plea was that Serbia was an essential factor in Russia's Balkan policies.

4. On 26 July, Sir Edward Grey proposed a conference of Ambassadors at London. In so doing, he believed that the proposal would be agreeable to Russia. He was mistaken. Russia and Germany preferred direct negotiations between Russia and Austria-Hungary, and in that method of procedure Sir Edward Grey concurred, declaring that it was "the most preferable of all."

5. Prior to 27 July, Germany treated suggestions for a peaceful solution with a certain amount of "reserve," her policy being as above mentioned. In maintaining that attitude, Germany and Austria-Hungary were not blameworthy if Austria-Hungary's case against Serbia justified war. They were under no obligation to acknowledge a right of intervention on the part of Russia, based upon interests which conflicted with their own.

6. When, on the 27th-28th, Germany became aware of the character of the Serbian reply to the Austro-Hungarian note, her attitude changed, and from that time she persistently urged, even to the extent of threat of non-support, conciliatory methods on her ally.³⁰⁶ Recognition of the probability that a local war would immediately become one of European dimensions probably deepened Germany's desire for conciliation.

7. The Kaiser, and afterwards Sir Edward Grey, and, still later, King George V, proposed the "pledge plan" — Austria-Hungary to stay military operations after limited occupation of Serbian territory, and submit to mediation, by the Powers, between her and Serbia.

8. Although Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom desired that Austria-Hungary should carry on friendly conversations with Russia with a view to adjustment of the quarrels, Austria-Hungary, for a time, declined to do more than explain her demands. She refused to discuss their modification.

9. The United Kingdom and Russia desired, and Germany urged, that Austria-Hungary should negotiate directly with Russia on the basis of the Serbian note.

10. Austria-Hungary at first declared that:
"there could be no negotiations on the text of an answer which we had found unacceptable."³⁰⁷

11. Austria-Hungary was willing to discuss with Russia questions in

³⁰⁶ *Ante*, pp. 1080-1, 1088-91, 1094-7, 1106, 1115-7.

³⁰⁷ *Ante*, p. 1093.

which (in Berchtold's view) Russia was interested. But when Sazonoff asserted that adjustment must be upon lines acceptable to Serbia, Szápáry (the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador) replied (as he reported 29 July): "that this was not a Russian, but a Servian question, whereupon Sazonow claimed that in this case Russian interests were identical with the Servian, so that I put an end to this futile discussion by changing the subject."³⁹⁸ The parties could not agree upon the subjects for discussion.

12. The United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, and Italy were anxious to be informed as to the intentions of Austria-Hungary with reference to Serbia in the event of successful war. Germany strongly pressed Austria-Hungary to give proper assurances, specifying "four points." Austria-Hungary had no fixed policy. Berchtold and Tisza having been unable to come to agreement, a negative formula, for service in answer to inquiries, had been concocted: "Austria-Hungary has no intentions"; "Austria-Hungary does not contemplate," &c. Berchtold refused to adopt the formula pressed upon him by Germany, or, to give satisfaction in any other form.

13. Austria-Hungary hastened her declaration of war against Serbia, and precipitated the bombardment of Belgrade, for the purpose, merely, of furnishing an excuse for declining any proposal for mediation.

14. After her declaration of war, with the same object in view, Austria-Hungary declared that even complete submission would not satisfy her. Until the last moment, she dallied and prevaricated.

15. When finally Austria-Hungary grudgingly acceded to the proposal for mediation upon the basis of the Serbian note, she stipulated two conditions: (1) her own military operations in Serbia should proceed, and (2) Russian mobilization should cease. Russia, on the other hand, required cessation of Austro-Hungarian operations.

16. If it be granted that Russia had a right to intervene, she had good reason to be dissatisfied with her treatment by Austria-Hungary.

17. On 31 July, in the opinion of the diplomats there was hope of successful termination of the negotiations for a peaceful solution. In the opinion of the British Ambassador at Vienna and others:

"A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the gravest calamities in history."

18. The cause of the interruption of the negotiations was Russia's secret mobilization by the Russian Generals (or the Czar) against Germany on the 29th July; the Czar's sanction of it (if he had not previously ordered it) on the 30th; and the proclamation of it on the 31st. That mobilization commenced while the Kaiser, at the request of the Czar, was putting heavy pressure upon Austria-Hungary.

19. During the few days prior to the mobilization, Russia had frequently been warned that mobilization against Germany meant war.

³⁹⁸ Aus. Red Bk., O. F., III, No. 19.

Apart from all warnings, she was well aware of the fact. Indeed, it was an item in the arrangements between Russia and France.

20. Although Russian mobilization against Austria-Hungary was announced on the 28th and proclaimed on the 29th, it did not evoke similar action against Russia by Germany. Her order of "Kriegszustand" (threatening state of war) was not issued until the 31st.

21. Germany urged cessation of preparations against Austria-Hungary. The Kaiser's "pledge plan" — proposed also by Sir Edward Grey and King George — contemplated cessation of Austro-Hungarian operations after occupation of a limited portion of Serbian territory.

22. On the 31st, Germany formally demanded cessation of preparations against both Germany and Austria-Hungary.

23. On 1 August, Sir Edward Grey urged cessation of preparations by Russia, and King George made a personal appeal to the Czar to "remove the misapprehension."

24. Russia refused compliance with all requests.

25. Germany was justified in refusing to Russia the great advantage of indefinite time, during negotiation, for mobilization. The Czar admitted that Germany was "forced to mobilize." Sir Charles Oman agreed that Germany was justified in mobilizing; and he asserted that mobilization by Germany meant war.

26. Under these circumstances, responsibility for the transfer of action from the diplomats to the soldiers can easily be placed:

(1) By bringing Europe to the verge of war, Austria-Hungary made possible, indeed probable, the action of the Russian Generals, Sazonoff, and the Czar.

(2) Responsibility for Russian mobilization against Germany rests, principally, upon the Russian Generals. They may have precipitated it in defiance of the direct command of the Czar. In any case, at one stage or another, it was their urgings which induced the Czar to give his assent.

(3) Sazonoff must share responsibility with the Generals, for he approved their action and devoted himself to procuring the sanction of the Czar. Afterwards he declined to cease preparations for war, and by the refusal, precipitated it.

(4) Officially, the blame must be attributed to the unfortunate Czar. There can be little doubt that he desired peace. Temperamentally he would be opposed to its breach. But he was a weak puppet in the hands of those around him. To them he surrendered the duty of his high office. They disobeyed him. They lied to him. They shoved him into a war which cost him and his family first their dynasty, and shortly afterwards their lives.

27. For Berchtold this much may be said: Serbia had not kept her promises of 1881, 1889, and 1909, namely, to:

"change the direction of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary,

and in future to live with the latter in friendly and neighborly relations." ³⁹⁹

On the contrary, the Greater-Serbia propaganda had become still more menacing, and recent accretions of power had made Serbia still more formidable. There was no hope that an enforced renewal of promises would in any way modify what Serbians declared were their "legitimate aspirations" for union with their fellow-Slavs of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, &c., with frontage on the Adriatic. Nothing short of reduction of her war-ability could remove the danger to Austria-Hungary's territorial integrity. There was truth in what Berchtold said in the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet Council for Mutual Affairs on 31 July 1914:

"If this whole action ended in nothing else than a gain of prestige, it would, according to his opinion, have been undertaken altogether in vain. A mere occupation of Belgrade would be of no good to us, even if Russia would allow it. All this was moonshine. Russia would pose as the saviour of Servia and especially of the Servian army; the latter would remain intact and in two or three years we could expect a renewed attack of Servia under far more favorable conditions." ⁴⁰⁰

28. But for Sazonoff's admission that as late as the 31st July: "the hope of finding a peaceful issue to the present situation need not yet be abandoned," ⁴⁰¹

Russian apologists for mobilization against Germany might plead that he was well aware that Germany could mobilize much more rapidly than could Russia; that his concurrence in the secret mobilization against Germany and its sequel was not motivated by a desire to interrupt the negotiations, but by conviction that further negotiations would be futile, and that for success in the unavoidable war, instant action was pressing necessary. His own apology was that, under the circumstances, he could not assume responsibility for delay. ⁴⁰² But his action meant assumption of responsibility for precipitating a war which, according to his own admission, might have been avoided. He was in a perplexingly difficult position. He rightly distrusted Austria-Hungary. Belgrade was being bombarded. He was sceptical as to the asserted attitude of Germany. He was not aware of the weight of the peace-pressure which was passing from Berlin to Vienna. He may have believed that Germany was in reality sympathizing with Austria-Hungary, and urging her on, while, at the same time, sending soldiers to the Russian frontier. He did not know that Serbia, for the moment, was in no great danger — that Austria-Hungary was not in a position to attempt invasion for a further thirteen days. Probably he believed (he might well have believed), as

³⁹⁹ *Ante*, pp. 920-1, 921-2, 1001, 1003-4.

⁴⁰⁰ *Aus. Red Bk.*, O. F., Part III, p. 72.

⁴⁰¹ *Ante*, p. 1123.

⁴⁰² *Ante*, p. 1147.

he said to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, that Austria-Hungary was "only wanting to gain time by negotiations."⁴⁰³ Had he known what we know now — especially the attitude of Germany — he might have held his hand. But, placed as he was — What, reader, would you have done? Would you have assumed the responsibility of inactivity?

29. For the Kaiser and his Chancellor, this may be said:

(1) They believed (as stated in the German White Book, 1914) that:

"If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian panslavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count, and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbors."⁴⁰⁴

(2) They were of opinion that only by war could Austria-Hungary be made safe against the Serbian menace, and, with a view to frustrating Russian intervention, they urged rapidity of action.

(3) Perusal of the Serbian note reversed their policy. In their view, "every reason for war falls to the ground," and they persistently urged Austria-Hungary to drop her "intransigent attitude" and come to agreement.

⁴⁰³ *Ante*, p. 1100.

⁴⁰⁴ Coll. Dip. Docs., p. 406.

CHAPTER XXVIII

SUMMARY

EXPOSITION of the subject in hand having covered so many pages, a short summary of the argument will be advisable.

1. The popularly termed "cause of the war" must be divided into (1) predisposing causes — preferably roots; and (2) precipitating causes.

2. There were two main roots of the war, one in Alsace-Lorraine and the other in the Balkans.

3. The Alsace-Lorraine annexation by Prussia, in 1871, was the principal factor in the counter-alliances, ententes, and antagonisms which perturbed continental Europe for forty-three years. It was the chief cause of the establishment of two huge military combinations, and of the formation (apart from the defections of Italy and Roumania) of the war-alignment of the Great Powers in 1914.

4. France was responsible for the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1. Bismarck had regarded it as lying in "the logic of history"; had prepared for it; and welcomed it.

5. A contributing factor in the creation of the Dual Entente (France and Russia) in 1891-4, was the association of the United Kingdom with the Central Powers. Until a still later date, France and Russia continued to be the objects of British apprehension.

6. Negotiations for alliance between the United Kingdom and Germany were prosecuted between the years 1875 and 1880, and in 1895, 1898, 1899, and 1901. Failure of the last of these inclined the United Kingdom toward *entente* relations with France.

7. As Germany waxed strong in manufactures, in trade, in shipping, in military and naval equipment; as Germany, rather than France, became the menace to British interests in western Europe; and Germany, rather than Russia, came to be feared in the East, British traditional antagonism to France and Russia changed into dislike, fear, hatred of Germany. The United Kingdom became openly an associate, and secretly a virtual war-ally of France and Russia.

8. During the sixteen years which preceded the outbreak of the war of 1914-18, Europe was, on several occasions, at war-crisis. Hostilities might well have commenced in 1898 in connection with the Fashoda incident. Or in 1899-1902 in connection with the Anglo-Boer war. Or in 1904 in connection with the attack of the Russian fleet upon British fishermen at Dogger Bank. Or in 1904-5 in connection with the Russo-Japanese war. Or in 1905-6 in connection with the first of

the Morocco incidents. Or in 1908 in connection with the Casablanca incident. Or in 1908-9 in connection with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. Or in 1911 in connection with the second of the Morocco incidents. Or in 1911-12 in connection with the Italo-Turkish war. Or at several junctures in 1912-13 in connection with the Balkan wars. Each of these occasions made the imminence of the peril more real, more unmistakably vivid — made the accumulation of explosive material vaster and more dangerous.

9. Under such circumstances, the diplomats became increasingly anxious and active; and the military men prosecuted more diligently their preparations for the anticipated war.

10. Meanwhile, there was developing, in the Balkans, the political and economic situation out of which the precipitating causes of the war arose.

11. The Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina — although by hard fighting they had gained their deliverance from Turkish control — were in 1878 placed by the Great Powers under the domination of Austria-Hungary.

12. The Provinces, during the ensuing thirty years, became, from a political point of view, Austro-Hungarian in every respect save the persistence of nominal Turkish sovereignty. Austria-Hungary in 1908 assumed to annex them.

13. Serbia, seeing in that action the creation of an obstacle to her "legitimate aspirations" (the political union of all the southern Slav states), vigorously protested, and appealed to Russia for assistance. Partly because the Russian Foreign Minister, Isvolsky, had given tentative assent to the annexation, but chiefly because of Russian war-debility (due to the Japanese war), Serbia was advised to acquiesce and to make preparations for a future occasion.

14. Serbia accordingly promised:

"to cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she binds herself to change the direction of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter in friendly and neighborly relations."

15. Serbia did not keep these promises. But her aspirations were natural, and, in a virile race, irrepensible. Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, was justified in insisting upon compliance with the promises.

16. The treaty of Bucarest (10 August 1913, at the end of the Balkan wars) added extensively to the area and population of Serbia. It materially enhanced her self-confidence. It strongly stimulated her desire for speedy realization of her "Greater Serbia" ambitions, by subtraction from Austria-Hungary and addition to herself of Bosnia and Herzegovina. To Austria-Hungary she became an ever-increasing menace.

17. The treaty of Bucarest vested in Serbia and Greece territory (theretofore Turkish) through which Austria-Hungary had purposed to secure railway connection with the Ægean. It also placed in more powerful hands her existing railway route to Constantinople and Salonica. It interposed obstruction to realization, under German influence, of the proposed Berlin-to-Bagdad railway.

18. While the treaty of Bucarest was being arranged, Austria-Hungary, seeing that she was to be prejudiced, made appeal to her allies, Italy and Germany, to join her in the interposition of objection by force. Failing to get support, she too fell back to make preparation for a future occasion.

19. To frustrate attack upon the Bucarest treaty, Russia endeavored to form, and to some extent succeeded in forming, a second Balkan League, composed of Serbia, Greece, Roumania and Montenegro — a league at once anti-Bulgarian and anti-Austro-Hungarian.

20. Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, proposed, but did little beyond proposing, the formation of a league composed of Bulgaria, Greece, and Roumania — anti-Serbian as well as anti-Russian.

21. Before either of these schemes could reach fruition, Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife were assassinated at Serajevo, in Bosnia (23 June 1914), by Slavs who, although Austro-Hungarian subjects, had received their equipment and their inspiration in Belgrade, the capital of Serbia.

22. Declaring that the Serbian promises of 1909 had been disregarded, and believing that her territorial integrity depended upon the humiliation of Serbia and the reduction of her strength, Austria-Hungary resolved upon war. On 23 July, she presented to Serbia a series of demands of such a character as would almost certainly insure non-compliance, and required submission within forty-eight hours. She purposed "a local war" — one between herself and Serbia. She was aware that some of the other Powers might intervene; but she hoped that, by pressing her purpose to rapid accomplishment, she might escape interference.

23. Germany shared with Austria-Hungary the belief that the safety of the Dual Monarchy depended upon action against Serbia, and was deeply interested in the maintenance of her ally in undiminished strength. She too desired that the war should be "local," and she urged rapidity of action for the purpose of forestalling intervention.

24. It is ground common to the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and Germany, that Austria-Hungary had substantial reason for complaint against Serbia. But while Sir Edward Grey held that "there must of course be some humiliation of Serbia," Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, declared that he would agree to a settlement "only so far as it involved no humiliation of Serbia as an independent state."

25. Perusal, on the 27th-28th July, of the Serbian reply to the

Austro-Hungarian demands completely changed the direction of German action. The Kaiser declared that "every reason for war falls to the ground," and the German Chancellor thereafter persistently and urgently pressed Austria-Hungary to adopt conciliatory methods.

26. Austria-Hungary ought to have accepted the Serbian reply as a basis for negotiation, and ought to have acceded readily to German insistence in that regard. On the contrary, Berchtold dallied and procrastinated; and, for the express purpose of evading proposals for mediation, he persuaded his sovereign to declare war against Serbia on the 28th July and to commence the bombardment of Belgrade on the next day. By so doing, Austria-Hungary furnished reason for apprehension in Russia as to the inevitableness of European war, and supplied opportunity for the exercise by military officers of pressure for war-preparation.

27. Notwithstanding the commencement of hostilities, Germany continued to insist at Vienna upon a change of attitude, with the result that on 31st July the prospects of a peaceful solution were thought to be good.

28. Meanwhile, the military men had been making their preparations: Austria-Hungary commenced mobilization against Serbia

on, or earlier than	23 July.
Russia determined, "in principle," to mobilize against Austria-Hungary, and commenced preparatory action	25 July.
Serbia commenced mobilization	25 July.
Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia	28 July.
Russia announced mobilization for "to-morrow" against Austria-Hungary on the 28th, and openly declared it on	29 July.
Austria-Hungary commenced bombardment of Belgrade	29 July.
Russian Generals, with the approbation of the Russian Foreign Minister (perhaps in disregard of the Czar's orders), commenced secret mobilization against Germany	29 July.
Russia was well aware that mobilization against Germany meant war.	
The Czar sanctioned — if he had not already ordered — mobilization against Germany	30 July.
Austria-Hungary proclaimed mobilization against Russia	31 July.
Russia proclaimed mobilization against Germany	31 July.
Germany demanded a cessation, within twenty-four hours, of all Russian mobilization, and declared "danger of war"	31 July.
Sir Edward Grey appealed to Russia, suggesting cessation of mobilization	1 August.

King George V appealed to the Czar to "remove the mis- apprehension"	1 August.
Russia refused to stop, alleging impracticability	1 August.
Germany declared war	1 August.

29. The negotiations for a peaceful solution were interrupted by Russian mobilization against Germany.

30. Whether Russia had a right to intervene between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, is not discussed in this work.⁴⁰⁵ Her reason for her action was self-interest.

31. The reason for participation in the war of all the Accessory Powers and four of the Associates — Japan, Italy, Bulgaria, and Roumania — was self-interest. Belgium fought because her territory was invaded. The United States was forced into the war by persistent attacks upon her citizens and shipping. Greece was forced into it by the military and naval power of the United Kingdom and France. Turkey was tricked or kicked into it by Germany.

Shortly stating the larger and more salient points:

1. France was responsible for the western root of the war — Alsace-Lorraine.

2. Responsibility for the eastern root — the Balkan situation — must be shared, in chief measure by the Great Powers (1878); secondarily, by Austria-Hungary (1908); and thirdly, by the parties to the treaty of Bucarest (1913). To the effect of the actions in these respects must be added: (1) national Jugo-Slavian ambition and propaganda; (2) national Austro-Hungarian reaction; (3) German interest in the preservation of Austro-Hungarian integrity; (4) Russia's pursuit of her "historic mission."

3. Responsibility for precipitation of hostilities must be attributed (1) to Serbia, because of her unneighborly conduct; (2) to Austria-Hungary, because of continuation of her truculent attitude after receiving Serbia's reply; and (3) and chiefly — conclusively — to Russia, because of interruption of negotiations for a peaceful settlement.

Upon all this, the following comments may well be pondered:

1. Sazonoff's plea for mobilization against Germany was that he believed that war was inevitable. His action, he said, was forced: "by the immense responsibility which would have fallen on our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade."⁴⁰⁶

2. Von Bethmann-Hollweg, speaking in the Prussian Council on 30 July 1914 (the day before the German ultimatum) said: "that all the Governments, including Russia, and the great majority of

⁴⁰⁵ Intervention was quite in accordance with precedent.

⁴⁰⁶ Ante, p. 1066.

the peoples, were in themselves pacific, but the control was lost and the machine was set in motion."⁴⁰⁷

When making report to his government of this speech, the Bavarian Minister at Berlin said:

"The Chancellor of the Empire finished by saying: 'He was sorry to have to say that blind forces and hostile excitations between the Cabinets would perhaps unchain a war which no State desired.'"⁴⁰⁸

3. Mr. Elihu Root has said:

"Law cannot control national policy, and it is through the working of long-continued and persistent national policies that the present war has come. Against such policies, all attempts at conciliation and good understanding and good-will among the nations of Europe, have been powerless."⁴⁰⁹

4. Mr. Lloyd George has said:

"The more one reads memoirs and books written in the various countries of what happened before the first of August 1914, the more one realizes that no one at the head of affairs quite meant war at that stage. It was something into which they glided, or rather staggered and stumbled, perhaps through folly, and a discussion, I have no doubt, would have averted it."⁴¹⁰

5. In the *Round Table* was the following:

"Thus it was, as was pointed out in this review in 1915, that the terrible time-table of the European General Staffs had far more to do with the actual outbreak of the world war than the deliberate decision of any man or Government. . . . But it is almost certain that no one, politician or general, deliberately decided to start the world war. It was the military time-table itself which swept them, like everybody else, headlong into the struggle once the first button had been pressed."⁴¹¹

6. Imperialisms, based upon antagonistic interests; mutual timidities; military preparation for defence of interest, and for support of "historic missions," of "legitimate aspirations," of "redemptions of territories"; narrowness of diplomatic aims; ineffectiveness in methods during tranquil periods, and bargaining delays and insincerities during crises; urgent necessity for a few hours' advantage in military mobilizations; rapidly tightening tensities as war-clouds darken; dissipation of nerve-control under strain of anxious days and sleepless nights; war-machinery gathering momentum; war-officers ever more pressingly insistent; war a relief from years of closely recurring perils and final weeks of restless solicitude.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ante*, cap. II, p. 77. The Chancellor subsequently changed his view: See his *Reflections on the World War*, pp. 106, 130-7.

⁴⁰⁸ Kautsky Docs., Vol. IV, p. 161.

⁴⁰⁹ *Ante*, cap. I, pp. 16-17.

⁴¹⁰ *Ante*, cap. I, p. 18.

⁴¹¹ March 1922, pp. 236-7.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Aus.	= <i>Austria-Hungary or Austro-Hungarian.</i>
Belg.	= <i>Belgium or Belgian.</i>
Bos. & H.	= <i>Bosnia & Herzegovina.</i>
Br.	= <i>British.</i>
Bulg.	= <i>Bulgaria or Bulgarian.</i>
Fr.	= <i>France or French.</i>
Ger.	= <i>Germany or German.</i>
Ital.	= <i>Italy or Italian.</i>
Jap.	= <i>Japan or Japanese.</i>
Roum.	= <i>Roumania or Roumanian.</i>
Russ.	= <i>Russia or Russian.</i>
St. P.	= <i>St. Petersburg.</i>
Serb.	= <i>Serbia or Serbian.</i>
Tksh.	= <i>Turkish.</i>
Tky.	= <i>Turkey.</i>
U.K.	= <i>United Kingdom.</i>
U.S.	= <i>United States of America.</i>

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